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### [Russia removes 2 radar decoys protecting the Kerch bridge](#)

The Kerch Bridge, built by Russia since it annexed Crimea, is of strategic importance. Additional measures were taken in June to protect it from Ukrainian attacks, including two target barges with radar reflectors. These have now been removed. They were present in Sentinel 2 satellite imagery on 5 September, but not on 10 September. The barges have been an enigma for analysts because it is not clear what they are supposed to accomplish. Similar barges have since been used to protect bridges in Herson. But HIMARS and other Ukrainian systems don't use radar seekers, so it was in vain. It could be a case of convenience and image ("cope-barges"). In any case, the Kerchites are not currently there.

Source: <http://www.hisutton.com/Russia-Kerch-Bridge-Decoys-Gone.html>

### [Chinese naval development: yet another massive dry dock takes shape](#)

The rate of Chinese warship production is impressive by any standards. A new update of Google Earth satellite imagery of Shanghai's shipyards highlights this. But while many eyes are on the new Type-003 Fujian Class aircraft carrier and destroyer/cruiser, there's more on the horizon. The latest image shows solid progress on a massive dry dock. The dock, part of the Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard, is extremely large. More than big enough for an aircraft carrier. Provisional estimates, based on visible supporting edges, show a construction of about 90 metres in diameter and over 400 metres long. This is larger than another extremely large dock built for aircraft carriers. The bulkhead is laid and the walls begin to take shape. Especially the end wall, which allows us to estimate the final dimensions. The new yard will also have a large basin for fitting out ships. The construction halls, which are also taking shape, fit to scale with the dry dock. The yard is massive and is expected to be used for

building warships. Large amphibious warships are the safest bet at present, based on Hudong-Zhonghua's current activities.

Source: <http://www.hisutton.com/China-Dry-Dock-Shanghai.html>

### [Navy 2032 - Unified naval strike power.](#)

The Finnish Navy has a good readiness and capability to perform its tasks against any threats that might arise under normal or emergency conditions. Our operating environment is changing and evolving, our operating procedures and the equipment and systems we use continue to develop, so change is necessary and safe. In 2032, the Navy will be a uniform, generally approved and operational naval organization. It will perform any emerging tasks and respond to the operating environment below and above the sea surface, in the airspace and in the cyber and information dimension with its military capabilities. The Navy's ability to accomplish its tasks is based on high readiness of capable troops with high firepower and combat resilient systems, Army and Air Force and partner support, and flexible and coordinated execution of tasks across all states. readiness and size.

How does the Navy work?

Under normal conditions, Navy activities and forces are tasked with overseeing and safeguarding territorial integrity, maintaining a necessary level of readiness against military threats, building and providing the necessary capabilities for emergencies, and performing other military national defence tasks. Under emergency conditions, the Navy controls its battlespace using its information supremacy, presence and capabilities to deny the adversary freedom to operate. To control its battlespace, the Navy monitors its area of operations, denies the adversary freedom to operate, protects its own operations and strikes adversary targets at the right time, and attrite, repel and defeat firepower. The Navy's capability is based on the coordinated use of many different weapon systems. Operational troops are used in the area of operations, according to the threat, to wear down the adversary, repel naval attacks and defeat the adversary's combat power. Local troops supplement the situation picture and targeting capability in the area of focus. They protect assets, operations and supported troops in the area and use the adversary's power. Naval defence tasks are executed through naval operations. The emphasis is on mobility, speed, flexibility, dispersed use of troops, joint situational awareness and centralised, extensive and precise weapon effect. Naval operations are executed with the support of the joint capabilities of Defence Forces, Army and Air Force and cooperation partners. The Navy's command cycle is maintained faster than the adversary's using information supremacy, mission tactics, automation, networked systems and standardised, repeatable operating procedures. The Navy uses its own and other Services' weapons and target acquisition systems to enable extended strike power designed to take the enemy by surprise. Navy troops use the circumstances in their area of operations to their advantage by altering terrain characteristics and protect friendly troop operations and maintain their capability. Marine troops also perform their duties autonomously if command communications break down. Monitoring international cooperation contributes to Finland's national capabilities and serves to complete the picture.

Source: <https://merivoimat.fi/en/web/merivoimat/navy-2032-unified-naval-striking-power>

### [Russians evade ban on entering EU ports](#)

Russia is circumventing a ban on entering EU ports by transshipping oil from its oil tankers onto EU-flagged ships, which then quietly sail to European ports. The operations take place at sea, right off the coast of Constantinople.

An investigation by Radio Svoboda (the Ukrainian branch of Radio Free Europe) reveals the very simple way in which the Russians are violating the ban on entering EU ports, which they received following the war in Ukraine.

But Russian tankers continue to deliver oil products, transshipping them off the coast of Constanta onto ships flying the flags of EU countries, which then enter European ports without any problems, Profit reports.

The situation can be tracked on the Marine Traffic and Equasis vessel monitoring systems, which show that Russian tanker operations are taking place in the Black Sea off Constanta.

A first method of violating the ban usually involves oil tankers leaving Russian ports full of cargo and then stopping in the Black Sea near Romania, where the cargo is transhipped to vessels flying the flags of EU countries, which transport it to ports in other countries, including EU countries.

The tanker New Legend has been sitting off the port of Constanta for five months

The second method involves the Liberian-flagged New Legend large storage tanker. According to data analysed by Radio Svoboda, this is the fifth month it has been stationed, in violation, near the Port of Constanta. Russian tanks have been coming and filling it regularly since June.

And the New Legend, in turn, transfers the oil products to other ships, which then either go directly to European ports and unload, or hand over the baton and tranship the cargo to other ships, so that Russian oil can pass through as many as four different ships before reaching an EU port.

Journalists say the Russian tankers involved in the scheme belong to Volga Shipping, owned by Russian billionaire Vladimir Lisin.

Source: <https://www.repliconline.ro/rusii-fenteaza-interdictia-de-a-intra-in-porturile-ue-531885/>

#### [Naval situation - Sevastopol](#)

3 ships carrying Kalibr missiles (3x (!!!) pr.21631) were reported at the exit of Sevastopol port, direction N. 1x Kilo SSK observed the same area Pr.22160 Vasiliy Bykov reported patrol units at the entrance at 0700 UTC

Sursa: [https://twitter.com/Cyx\\_5/status/1568869956774948871](https://twitter.com/Cyx_5/status/1568869956774948871)

#### [New details of Japan's upcoming BMD ships revealed](#)

Here are the latest details about Aegis-equipped ships (ASEV), Japan's upcoming ballistic missile defense (BMD) ships.

On 31 August 2022, Japan's Ministry of Defence (MOD) released its budget request for the 2023 financial year, which included an element for Aegis-equipped ships (ASEV). However, no specific budget amount has been given for this, as its details have not yet been finalised. The Japanese government intends to review its national security-related policies, including the National Security Strategy, by the end of this year, which is why budget amounts for many items were not indicated until the end of August. As Naval News previously reported, ASEV is a ship that was decided to be built as an asset to defend Japan from the threat of ballistic missile attacks, mainly from North Korea, as an alternative to Aegis Ashore, which was cancelled in 2020. In Japan, especially since 2016, the ballistic missile threat from North Korea has been widely recognized and since then, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Aegis destroyers have been deployed in the Sea of Japan at all times to be on alert for ballistic missile launches by North Korea. However, this has been a heavy burden on the JMSDF's Aegis destroyers, which have also had to deal with increased

Chinese naval activities in the East China Sea. Therefore, the deployment of Aegis Ashore was planned to take the place of this role. However, as the Aegis Ashore deployment was forced to be cancelled due to MOD mismanagement and opposition from local residents, the decision was taken to build an ASEV with Aegis Ashore components to take its place. According to local newspapers, initial details of the ASEV indicate a massive vessel: 210 metres long and 40 metres wide, with a standard displacement of 20,000 tonnes and a crew of about 110. Crew comfort on board will be a priority, as all crew members will have private cabins. In terms of length and displacement, it is equivalent to the Izumo DDH class (248 meters long, standard displacement 19,500 tons), the largest ship in the JMSDF, but it resembles more a civilian ship than a warship in that all crew members are given private cabins and the crew complement is quite small for a ship of this size.

Defence Minister Yasukazu Hamada explained the reasons for such a large ship and the rationale behind the high standards of crew comfort at a press conference on 2 September: "The reason is to ensure seaworthiness, to be able to operate in bad weather, to improve the crew's living environment for long-term offshore missions and to be expanded to cope with hypersonic gliding vehicles (HGVs) in the future." However, in addition to the reasons cited by the defence minister, some believe the hull has been enlarged to address the size and weight of the SPY-7, a Lockheed Martin-made radar that will be installed on the ASEV. The Defence Minister also commented that the ASEVs are expected to be commissioned around March 2028 for the first ship and March 2029 for the second ship. The primary role assigned to the ASEV is to relieve the JMSDF's Aegis destroyers of their surveillance duties in North Korea and enable them to respond to China's maritime expansion. ASEV therefore does not inherently require air defence or anti-submarine warfare capabilities, its only primary objective being BMD. This is because North Korea does not currently possess such weapons to attack the ASEV. However, according to press reports, the ASEV will be equipped with SM-6 missiles to deal with cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles, as well as an upgraded version of the Type 12 ship-to-ship missile that can attack surface targets as well as naval vessels and has a range of about 1,000 km. The ASEV could therefore become an asset that could respond not only to North Korean ballistic missiles, but also to attacks by Chinese ballistic missiles, HGVs and cruise missiles. The question then would be how ASEV would respond to the threat of Chinese submarines and anti-ship missiles. Above all, in this case, ASEVs would probably have to be planned as a completely new type of warship, as it cannot be positioned as a mere alternative to Aegis Ashore.

Source: <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/09/new-details-on-japans-future-bmd-vessels-revealed/>

### India's MDL launches fifth P17A Nilgiri-class frigate

Indian shipbuilder Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) today launched the fifth Nilgiri-class frigate (Project 17A) for the Indian Navy at its Mumbai shipyard. The upcoming INS "Taragiri" is the fifth of seven P17A frigates currently under construction for the Indian Navy. Following the Government of India's declaration of state mourning on 11 September 2022 (in connection with the passing away of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II), the event was limited to a technical launch (the launch of the ships at the MDL shipyard depends on the tides, any change in the schedule was not possible). Seven P17A frigates are in various stages of construction at MDL and Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE). The Taragiri that was launched today is the 5th frigate built by GRSE. It is named after the mountain range in the state of Uttarakhand. The fourth ship in the class was launched by Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited (GRSE) in Kolkata in July this year. Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd (MDL) has laid the keel of the 7th and final ship at the end of June 2022.

This vessel was built using the integrated construction methodology involving construction of hull blocks in different geographical locations and integration/assembly on Slipway at MDL. The Taragiri keel was laid on September 10, 2020 and the vessel is expected to be delivered by August 2025. "The indigenously designed 'Taragiri' will have state-of-the-art weapons, sensors, advanced action information system, integrated platform management system, world-class modular living spaces, sophisticated power distribution system and a host of other advanced features. It will be equipped with a supersonic surface-to-surface missile system.

Source: <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/09/indias-mdl-launches-5th-nilgiri-class-p17a-frigate/>

### U.S. places responsibility for Russian oil price cap on traders, not shipowners

Marine insurers, bankers and tanker owners may not be liable if their customers violate the new G7 price cap on Russian oil sales, according to the US Treasury - as long as they rely on their customers' word for compliance with the shipping price. The ruling addresses some of the shipping industry's main concerns about the potential effects of the ban. On 2 September, G7 finance ministers proposed "a comprehensive ban on services enabling the shipping of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products globally" - with the exception of oil purchased below a certain price. The idea is a form of "buyer's OPEC": unless oil is sold below an artificial price threshold, it cannot be secured or moved without risking sanctions. The Treasury guidance, issued on Friday, sets out three tiers of service providers for Russian oil shipping: refiners and oil brokers with direct access to price data (Tier I); bankers and ship owners with occasional access to price data (Tier II); and those who do not have access to price data in the normal course of business, such as insurers and P&I clubs (Tier III). All must keep compliance records and all are required to perform due diligence on their customers, but shipowners, bankers and insurers have an important exemption: they are allowed to rely on their customers for price data. If that data is fraudulent, they are not liable for inadvertently participating in a penalty violation. "This record-keeping and attestation process is designed to create a 'safe harbor' for service providers from liability for sanctions violations in cases where service providers inadvertently engage in the purchase of Russian offshore oil over the price cap due to falsified records," Treasury informed. Office of Foreign Assets Control. OFAC expects to see attempts to evade sanctions and has warned stakeholders to watch for signs of deceptive practices, such as manipulation of AIS or reluctance to provide price data. The bureau said it intends to harmonise its regulatory approach with other G7 members, indicating that the same guidance will be widely applied. The unprecedented decision to set a global price cap on Russian seaborne oil shipments is an attempt to restrict the amount of money flowing to Moscow without a total ban on crude. A complete ban would have a substantial impact on the rest of the global economy, and the price cap is designed as a compromise solution.

Source: <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/g7-puts-liability-for-russian-oil-price-cap-on-traders-not-shipowners>

### Turkey accuses Greek Coast Guard

On Saturday, Turkey's coast guard claimed that two Greek patrol boats fired shots in the Anatolian ro/ro off the coast of Bozcaada, Canakkale. Among the 18 ro/ro crew members, no casualties or injuries were reported and the Greek boats left upon the arrival of Turkish forces, the Turkish service claimed. The ship arrived safely in the Sea of Marmara and anchored near Istanbul. The Greek Coast Guard confirmed that its vessels had interacted with the ro/ro and that the ship's captain had refused to board for an inspection. The Greek

coastguard said the vessel was escorted back into Turkish waters and its crews fired "warning shots" to ensure compliance. According to Turkish media, diplomatic protests have been lodged with Greece demanding an explanation and investigation into the circumstances of the incident. Tensions between Greece and Turkey have risen higher than usual in recent weeks. Turkey has accused Greece of setting up military outposts on islands off Turkey's Aegean coast and using fire control radars to block Turkish planes during an ongoing NATO exercise (both nations are NATO members). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has warned Greece that it will pay a "heavy price" if it continues on its current path; Greece has responded that this form of rhetoric is "unacceptable" but is still open to talks. Anatolian (MMSI 20999016) was formerly known as Mavi Marmara. The Marmara gained international notoriety when Turkish activists tried to use it to pass through the Israeli naval cordon off Gaza in 2010. The Mavi Marmara was resold to a private company, and her latest available AIS data showed her off Mogadishu and headed for Alang; however, she later returned to the Aegean Sea, and her captain told local media that she had returned to Turkey for repairs.

Source: <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/turkey-accuses-greek-coast-guard-of-firing-shots-at-ro-ro>

### Indian Ocean high-risk designation to be withdrawn at the end of 2022

Reflecting further progress in reducing the piracy threat off the east coast of Africa and in the Indian Ocean, the shipping industry plans to formally end the designation as a "High Risk Area" from the first of the year. While it remains a risk level, they point out that there have been no boardings in nearly four years, with the last reports emerging in 2019 that pirates were scared off by EU forces after threatening a ship near the Horn of Africa. Formal notification of the plan to end the designation was sent to the International Maritime Organization on 22 August for review and approval at the next meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee, scheduled to begin on 31 October 2022. The decision to end the designation was made by the International Chamber of Shipping, BIMCO, the International Marine Contractors Association, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and the Oil Companies International Marine Forum. "This announcement is a testament to nearly 15 years of dedicated collaboration to reduce the threat of piracy in the Indian Ocean. Through a combination of military, political, civil society and shipping industry efforts over the years, operators and seafarers are now able to operate with increased confidence in these waters," the groups said in their joint statement to the IMO. The designation of the region as a high-risk area began in 2010 near the peak of attacks on ships near the Horn of Africa. Two years earlier, the Council of the European Union adopted an action plan based on UN resolutions to establish the EU's executive maritime military operation for Somalia. Known as Operation ATALANTA, the mission was to deter, prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. At the height of Somali piracy in January 2011, the EU Naval Force - Somalia reports that 736 hostages and 32 vessels were being held by pirates. The combined efforts contributed to a reduction in activity, so that two years later they could report no successful hijackings of a commercial vessel, and the last confirmed attack on a vessel occurred in 2018. EU NavFor reported chasing away a small craft in 2019, but Iran has continued to report that its navy has intervened in recent attacks. The EU mission was extended in 2020 to continue patrolling the waters and in particular to protect World Food Programme commercial vessels and others that may be vulnerable to attack. The EU NavFor mandate is currently scheduled to end on 31 December 2022. The removal of the HRA reflects a significant improvement in the piracy situation in the region, the organisations said. A year ago, they reduced the size of the designated region, but said today that the end of the designation would not come until the end of the year, allowing charterers, shipowners and

operators time to adjust to the changed piracy threat. The groups continue to warn, however, that threat and risk assessments should still be carried out and ships are still encouraged to report to the UKMTO and register with the Maritime Security Centre for the Horn of Africa in the voluntary reporting area administered by the UKMTO. At the end of 2021, the UN Security Council began efforts to curtail and end international programmes in the region. By March 2022, however, the EU has expressed concern about ending the programme while political unrest remains in Somalia.

Source: <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/indian-ocean-high-risk-designation-to-be-withdrawn-at-end-of-2022>

### [US Congress: Short-term funding decisions create long-term national and homeland security problems](#)

Year after year, U.S. shipyards that make up the defense industrial base raise their hopes that the federal government's annual funding process will produce stable and predictable budgets for U.S. Navy and Coast Guard acquisition programs. Each year, shipyards are disappointed as the U.S. government moves from spending crisis to spending crisis. At the same time, shipyards look favorably on shipbuilding plans that significantly increase our nation's fleet beyond today's 296 ships. However, to meet the increased demands these plans would require, U.S. shipyards would need to expand their workforces and improve their infrastructure - a requirement our nation's shipyards are eager to provide. But to build these ships in a timely and affordable manner, stable and robust funding is needed to sustain those industrial capabilities that support Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding. Absent that kind of certainty, shipyards like mine competing to build these national security assets are supported by commercial shipbuilding and repair so that we can remain viable when the time comes to build and repair national security fleets. While shipyards have been doing this work year after year, many shipyards are reaching a breaking point. Between supply chain, workforce, access to capital and inflation challenges, something has to give. Instead of another short-term solution or worse, our critical U.S. national security assets deserve a comprehensive long-term solution. Continuing on the same worn path now threatens our domestic and national security as our adversaries continue to advance. Look no further than the massive investment China has made in its navy and coast guard, which, by number of ships, is now the world's largest naval power with nearly 400 ships. China's naval prowess has been on full display in its latest war games and fire drills in the Taiwan Strait. And earlier this year, China participated in naval exercises alongside another rising naval power - Russia. While alarming, these developments should come as no surprise. Over the years, Washington has cast aside the traditional allocation process and become too dependent on continuing resolutions that are more closely aligned with election cycles than economic cycles or fiscal years. According to the US Navy, the use of short-term funding mechanisms unnecessarily forces the immediate prioritization of forward-deployed forces at the expense of essential long-term maintenance. For shipyards responsible for building critical programs, continuing resolutions introduce uncertainty into the future of previously authorized programs and put unnecessary pressure on our industrial base, which is already showing signs of strain. The U.S. Coast Guard, which has become integral to maintaining the United States' forward presence in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East, is similarly affected by continuing resolutions.

The long-term consequence of short-term thinking is a new depleted military and commercial fleet struggling to keep up with our strategic adversaries and competitors around the globe. This sentiment is clearly articulated in U.S. Senator John Kennedy's recent opinion piece discussing limiting China's ambitions in the Pacific. He says: "The U.S. cannot afford to ignore the economic investments and military overtures that China is making to our Pacific

neighbors." China, under the guise of its Belt and Road Initiative, has progressively built a commanding fleet presence, putting our allies and regional partnerships in the Oceania and Indo Pacific at risk. For example, just five years after an international court ruling that rejected 90% of Beijing's claims in the South China Sea, the presence of Chinese ships in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone is more frequent than ever. China has also continued to conduct dangerous military exercises in the Taiwan Strait that risk potential escalation and seriously jeopardise the nation's democratic independence. Beijing has spent billions to expand its network of ports to secure sea lanes and establish itself as a maritime superpower. Beijing's shipping lines carry more cargo and deliver more containers than those of any other nation. In total, the South China Sea carries about a third of the world's shipping, of which \$1.2 trillion comes from trade with the US. And as we've seen from the global supply chain and shipping crisis, China is taking full advantage to fuel its ambitions. at the expense of American businesses and consumers. Meanwhile, the entire U.S. fleet of ocean-going merchant ships numbers fewer than 200 out of a global total of 44,000. By allowing China to control the waters of the Indo-Pacific, America is ceding its leadership, seriously jeopardizing our critical supply chains and threatening our economic security and that of our allies. The United States must reassert its position as the world's unequivocal maritime superpower. The U.S. shipyard industry and industrial base are ready, supporting nearly 400,000 U.S. jobs annually, producing \$28.1 billion in direct labor income, and contributing \$42.4 billion in direct GDP to the national economy. As we face these significant challenges in the future, we must first start with stable and predictable government funding processes that are designed to build and maintain our national and homeland security assets and invest in our sailors and industrial base. Budgets must be designed for decades, not political cycles. Our domestic and national security depend on it.

Source: <https://www.marinelink.com/news/congress-shortterm-funding-decisions-499378>

### [Russian government to allocate RUB 15 billion under subsidised leasing programme for seagoing vessels](#)

More than 300 ships to be built by 2030 To increase economic resilience, the RF Government will allocate more than RUB 100 billion, including RUB 15 billion allocated under the subsidised leasing programme for maritime vessels. More than 300 ships of various destinations are to be built and delivered to shipping companies by 2030, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin said at the meeting with deputy prime ministers, according to the transcript available on the RF Government's official website. "External restrictions have worsened the situation with the supply of components and equipment to the shipbuilding industry and led to a considerable increase in expenses," Mikhail Mishustin explained the need for support. The Vyborg shipyard will receive a grant of RUB 3 billion. The shipyard is currently working on a new icebreaker for the North-West Basin. The Prime Minister also said that special assistance will be given to the Kaliningrad Region. "Due to the actions of unfriendly states, the region faces restrictions on the transit of goods from other Russian entities. To support investment projects and generate new jobs in the region, we will allocate RUB 5.5 billion," Mikhail Mishustin said. According to the statement, an additional RUB 2 billion is planned for the development of LNG production equipment. The industry development fund will be further capitalised with RUB 8 billion. In addition, RUB 4 billion will be allocated for small and medium tonnage chemical programmes.

Source: <https://en.portnews.ru/news/335382/>