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Oil hedging plans will open a new front in the Russia-West conflict

The oil and shipping market will almost certainly end up in turmoil, and Russia will need its own dedicated fleet of tanks.

After months of talks, the EU unveiled its plans for a price cap on Russian oil exports in response to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine. US treasury secretary Janet Yellen subsequently set the potential price cap at \$60 a barrel.

Having already closed its ports to Russian ships, the EU outlined in detail how it intends to enforce the price cap in its eighth sanctions package, published on 6 October. Any ship carrying Russian crude and, in three months, Russian oil. products - sold above the price cap would be banned from obtaining any shipping industry services from European suppliers, such as insurance, financing, servicing and bunkering.

The design was likely influenced by the "180-day rule" introduced by the United States in 1992, which banned ships carrying oil to Cuba from entering US ports for six months. This approach led to the creation of a separate tanker fleet serving Cuba.

The EU approach goes even further. There would be no time limit on the ship's excommunication period, and neither a change of flag nor a change of ownership would end its pariah status. In the long run, this could create a major headache for service providers, who would be obliged to check a ship's history since the introduction of sanctions. And as the history of Cuban sanctions - first introduced in the early 1960s - shows, that period can last for decades.

EU sanctions authors hope that shipowners who have made a tempting offer to ship Russian cargo to Asia in defiance of sanctions will consider the risks too great and simply stay away from Russian crude. Then Russia, faced with a shortage of shipping and therefore the need to cut production and lose revenue, will succumb to the inevitable and start selling oil at the capped price.

The price quoted by the US Treasury of \$60 per barrel is 20 percent lower than Russian crude has brought recently, but closer to the upper end of the price range in recent years. The inflation adjustment brings the value lower in real terms, but it's still a relatively generous offer: at least for now. Ironically, if the global economy goes into recession, which is very likely, market prices could move closer to this benchmark or even fall below it. For

Russia, however, the stakes are higher than simply keeping cash flow at current levels: it is more important to retain full control over its own oil exports.

Russia is far from the only country alarmed by the prospect of a price cap, even if for now it would only apply to Russian oil. At a summit in Vienna on 5 October, OPEC+ countries agreed to cut their production quotas by 2 million barrels a day: a significant departure from previous changes, which have usually been capped at 500,000 barrels.

In fact, only Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait will have to make modest cuts, as most OPEC+ countries are already producing substantially less than their quotas and even below the newly set targets, despite operating at full capacity. It seems likely, therefore, that OPEC+ is announcing the step only to signal that after 5 December, when the first wave of Russian oil sanctions comes into force, the other OPEC+ members will not step in and fill the gap, but will allow prices to rise and the world to feel the consequences.

This is an unusual move for OPEC+, which is positioning itself as a stabilising force in the global oil market. Oil-exporting countries loathe price increases almost as much as price lows, because increases lead to economic slowdowns and a drop in demand, followed by over-investment and further price declines.

There are two reasons why OPEC+ would not attempt to stabilise the market on this occasion. First, its ability to do so is quite limited due to global underinvestment in the oil industry since the 2014 price drop, particularly during the pandemic when fewer new wells were drilled. As global demand has returned to pre-COVID levels, OPEC+ countries have been met with an ageing and less productive well stock.

Second, there is a fear within OPEC+ that, if successful, the sanctions mechanism could subsequently be applied to other causes, both political and cartel-busting, and that OPEC countries could become the next target. They would therefore prefer to see the mechanism fail.

Russia itself has made it clear that it has no intention of submitting to the price cap. At Russia's annual Energy Week on 12-13 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Deputy Prime Minister (and former Energy Minister) Alexander Novak, Energy Minister Nikolai Shulginov and captains of the Russian energy industry insisted that Russia would not sell its oil at below-market prices, in principle.

Source:

https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88211?utm_source=rssemail&utm_medium=email&mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGHIEGKXd5mbiW1RsJf9yih_CdrvFmnp0otgiKNWp_0Vwp_PU4FggZNec67yR02yKBe9x-TgWtg6ZtOdPOw5cG29QiIP9Ru9OpFU0IRZA

Strategic delay: what's Russia's game with nuclear signaling?

Putin said the Kremlin hopes to end the "special military operation" as soon as possible. If Zelensky does not want to stop his counteroffensive and resume talks, then the Kremlin believes it must convince its Western partners to force him. Moscow desperately needs to stop Ukraine's counter-offensive. Russian troops are losing combat effectiveness, barely staying on territory they control and increasingly forced to "withdraw to more advantageous positions". It is essential for the Kremlin to avoid obvious military losses: another major setback could lead to widespread destabilisation. The only solution is to halt or suspend hostilities on all fronts. Russia has no reserves or resources to change the situation on the battlefield: partial mobilisation is not enough to withstand the Ukrainian counter-offensive, and major losses could tear the Russian armed forces apart. The key point of Russian President Vladimir Putin's 30 September speech was therefore his call on Kiev to cease all hostilities immediately and return to the negotiating table, but taking into account "new territorial realities". The warning that Moscow is ready "to defend Russian soil by all

available means", the massive bombing of Ukrainian cities and the allusion to the use of nuclear weapons are meant to motivate Kiev and, in Putin's words, "its real masters in the West". " to cease fire and resume negotiations on Russia's terms. Moscow wants to return to negotiations as they were before they broke down in mid-April. On 29 March in Istanbul, Russia and Ukraine coordinated key parameters for a peace deal. These included a neutral, non-nuclear status for Ukraine (this has technically been the case since 1994) in return for security guarantees from "a group of leading powers", including Russia - and possibly even Belarus. The security guarantees did not extend to Crimea or the self-proclaimed Donbas republics, whose final status was to be decided at some future point. In other words, Kiev agreed to de facto new borders for Ukraine. The parameters also had military components: a ban on foreign military bases in Ukraine, Russia's right to veto military exercises with third countries on Ukrainian territory, and restrictions on the size of Ukrainian armed forces and the types of weapons used (including a ban on long-range ballistic and cruise missiles). However advantageous the Istanbul formula was to Russia, it would have required Russian troops to withdraw to the positions they occupied on 23 February. This was not acceptable to Putin, whose goals were more ambitious than preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. Moscow therefore asked Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenski to accept the new "territorial realities" and rejected demands that Russia withdraw its troops. The "new realities" were apparently included in the Russian draft agreement submitted to Kiev in mid-April. Meanwhile, Ukraine has also strengthened its position, presumably following consultations with its Western partners, which may have made it clear to Zelensky that Russia's role as one of the security guarantors has given Moscow new opportunities to curtail Ukraine's sovereignty, turning it into "mandate territory". of the guarantor states. Kiev rejected Russia and Belarus as Ukrainian security guarantors and opposed Moscow's right to veto military exercises involving third parties in Ukraine.

The package of recommendations on security guarantees for Ukraine published by the working group led by Andriy Yermak and Anders Fogh Rasmussen in September no longer included such excesses. Russia was not included among the guarantor states, and the section on limiting Ukraine's military potential was replaced by a plan for large-scale expansion. The biggest challenge for today's resumption of negotiations is the territorial issue, which could take decades to resolve. Keeping the newly annexed territories part of Russia is now almost the only way to demonstrate that "all the objectives of the special military operation have been achieved", making negotiations unfeasible for Russia. But further military action that could lead to the loss of acquired territory is also impossible. If Zelensky does not want to stop his counteroffensive and resume talks, then the Kremlin believes it must convince its Western partners to force him. The Kremlin needs to convince US President Joe Biden's administration of the threat of a nuclear conflict between Russia and the United States that will affect the continental United States, not just Europe or Ukraine. The Kremlin hopes the nuclear threat will force Washington to intervene and "freeze" the conflict with Russia's current territorial gains, although there does not seem to be unanimity among the Russian leadership on whether the conflict should be temporarily frozen until Russia can recover. its power, or forever. Moscow has also changed its rhetoric on US military assistance to Ukraine. This is now referred to as "direct participation in hostilities", and the Kremlin warns that it could lead to an inevitable military conflict between the US and Russia - even though all of the Biden administration's actions have been aimed at avoiding such a conflict. conflict, and providing weapons and intelligence was common practice even during the Cold War. The Kremlin is also sending Washington other signals that it is serious. In particular, the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy held a conference to mark the 60th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis, focusing on lessons learned from the crisis, such as "respecting other countries' red lines" and resolving conflicts through secret channels. At the same time, Moscow is taking

actions that could be interpreted by the United States as increasing the readiness of its nuclear forces: broadcasting images of a train carrying equipment to a Defense Ministry directorate in charge of Russia's nuclear arsenal; announcing military exercises using Iskander missile systems in Kaliningrad; preparing to test a Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile in Novaya Zemlya; closing the airspace for the test launch of a Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile from Plesetsk to Kamchatka; and surfacing the Belgorod nuclear submarine, carrying Poseidon nuclear torpedoes, in neutral waters, where it is sure to be seen. All of the above are routine exercises, albeit more tightly grouped. Even if the Defense Department starts carrying trains of nuclear warheads back and forth, this is common practice for both Russia and the United States and could raise the nuclear threat level, but it won't bother Biden. Moscow could take a page out of the Cuban missile crisis playbook and continue to escalate Strategic Nuclear Forces combat readiness to maximum, with bombers armed with nuclear cruise missiles on full alert or even in the air and submarines deployed in patrol areas. However, it would be easy to get carried away and make a fatal mistake. For now, Moscow isn't taking any extraordinary steps, and the Pentagon isn't taking the bait. This means Washington is not motivated to rush in and stop Kiev on the battlefield. Despite the frenzied TV coverage, Moscow is unlikely to take the use of nuclear weapons seriously. A showcase detonation of a nuclear warhead over Novaya Zemlia, the Black Sea or the Chernobyl exclusion zone will not scare Kiev. What it will do is destroy any remnants of Russia's reputation as a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and deprive Moscow of the amicable neutrality of Turkey, India and China. Unlike the Cuban missile crisis, Moscow and Washington are not currently in a direct nuclear standoff. Artificially creating such a standoff would be a difficult and dubious undertaking, because for now the United States is fully capable of ignoring Russian signals and avoiding nuclear conflict. Ukraine is not Cuba. However, Russia must take some action, because strategic delay is becoming increasingly costly. Of the lessons learned from the Cuban missile crisis, the most obvious is the need to create and maintain secondary channels for dialogue.

Biden's national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said recently that the US administration has communicated to the Kremlin "directly, privately and at very high levels its concerns and warnings about any use of nuclear weapons". He may have been referring to his telephone conversations with Putin's foreign policy adviser, Yuri Ushakov. However, even this kind of communication is not enough. Moscow and Washington need a permanent channel for secret diplomacy to discuss the indisputable. In May 2022, the Biden administration informed the Kremlin through an intermediary that it was prepared to create such a back channel. CIA Director William Burns was expected to oversee these communications on the US side. At the time, however, Moscow was not interested. A key aspect of the Cuban missile crisis was that Moscow and Washington initially created a back channel on intelligence lines. Robert Kennedy (then Attorney General and younger brother of President John F. Kennedy) first communicated with Alexander Feklisov, head of the KGB station in Washington. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin joined the dialogue only after the KGB confirmed that Robert Kennedy's information was correct and that he was speaking on behalf of the US President. Repeating this back-channel diplomatic operation would be constructive, but after all the diplomatic dismissals, there are no good candidates for it in Moscow and Washington.

Source: <https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88130>

Officer shortage in the world's merchant shipping fleet has risen to 20,000

Shipping is responsible for 90% of the world's trade, on which the development of national economies and global prosperity depend. According to a report by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), in 2021, the world's fleet comprised 74,000 ships, on which 1.89 million seafarers were working, of which 47% were officers and 53% non-shift.

China, the Philippines, Indonesia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine are the largest suppliers of crew. While the Philippines provides the largest number of non-sailors, China provides the largest number of officers.

Romania is among the major European suppliers of well-trained seafaring manpower. As of 22 November 2021, there were 39,536 seafarers certified for the maritime sector in the records of the Romanian Naval Authority. The global shipping market is facing a shortage of around 20,000 officers, with the increase in the number of ships leading to an increase in demand.

Changes in the world's fleets

A United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report shows that the world's merchant shipping fleet has seen an increase in shipping capacity of 63 million tdw from January 2020 to January 2021, reaching 2.135 billion tdw.

In recent years, its tonnage has increased considerably in all segments except general cargo. The bulk-carrier fleet has grown particularly rapidly. Between 2011 and 2021, their share of total transport capacity has risen from 39% to 43%. On the other hand, the share of oil tankers has decreased from 31% to 29% and that of cargo ships from 6% to 4%.

"World shipping 'kings"

On 1 January 2021, the world fleet had 53,973 ships in service. Most - 7,318 ships - belong to Chinese shipowners. In the next places are owners from: Greece - 4,705 ships; Japan - 4,029 ships; Singapore - 2,843 ships; Germany - 2,395 ships; Indonesia - 2,325 ships; Norway - 2,042 ships; USA - 1,813 ships; Russia - 1,786 ships and China, Hong Kong - 1,764 ships. A further 22,957 ships belong to shipowners from many other countries.

In January 2021, the top five largest commercial ship owners accounted for 52% of the world fleet tonnage. In first place is Greece, with a market share of 18%. It was followed by China (12%), Japan (11%), Singapore (7%) and Hong Kong SAR (5%). Half of the world's tonnage was owned by Asian companies, with owners in Europe accounting for 40% and those in North America for 6%. Companies in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean had a share of just over 1% and those in Oceania less than one percent.

Shipping tax havens

In order to cope with tough competition in the international market and maximise their profits, many shipowners prefer to register their ships under more tax-efficient or permissive flags in terms of compliance with international technical standards for safe navigation, so-called flags of convenience. This is why a large number of ships in the international merchant shipping fleet are registered under a flag that does not correspond to the nationality of the ship owner. For example, at the beginning of 2021, more than half of the fleet owned by Japanese shipowners was registered under the Panama flag. Of the vessels owned by Greek shipowners, 25% were registered under the Liberian flag and another 22% under the Marshall Islands flag.

On 1 January 2021, of the total capacity of 2,116.401 million tdw of the world merchant shipping fleet, the following tonnages were registered under the main flags:

- Panama - 343.601 million tdw;
- Liberia - 300.076 million tdw;
- Marshall Islands - 274.016 million tdw;
- Hong Kong (China) - 205.011 million tdw;
- Singapore - 136,164 million tdw;
- Malta - 116.373 million tdw;
- China - 106.879 million tdw.

Of these pavilions, the Marshall Islands has seen the strongest growth in registrations over the last decade.

Who's calling the shots in shipbuilding?

The world shipbuilding market is dominated by China, South Korea and Japan. In 2020, shipyards in these countries delivered 94% of the world's new ship tonnage.

South Korea's shipbuilding industry had an order book of 688 ships in the last six years. Orders accumulated in the first four months of 2022 amounted to 5.81 million gross registered tonnes, surpassing China, which has accumulated orders of 5.80 million gross registered tonnes. South Korea's market share during this period increased to 45.9%.

In ship recycling, Bangladesh and India together have a 71% share of the market, with Pakistan in third place with 17%.

Source: https://cugetliber.ro/stiri-economie-deficitul-de-ofiteri-din-flota-maritima-comerciala-a-lumii-a-crescut-la-20-000-467664?utm_source=cugetliber&utm_medium=site&utm_content=slider-item&utm_campaign=Slider%20-%20poza%20mica

Azov-Black Sea maritime operational area

Russian Black Sea Fleet forces continue to project force on the coastal and mainland part of Ukraine and control the north-western part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and maintain control over captured territory. Offshore, the Russian naval group consists of 9 ships and boats located along the southwest coast of Crimea. These include 2 cruise missile carriers (a Project 21631 corvette and a 636.3 submarine) carrying a total of 12 "Kalibr" missiles. Russian aircraft continue to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Hvardiyske over the north-west Black Sea. In the last day, 14 Su-27, Su-30 and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved. The Russian military continues to target Ukrainian ports and coastal areas with missiles and drones. Ukrainian defenders shot down 14 Iranian Shahed-136 kamikaze drones in two hours on the night of 20 October over the Mykolaiv region. According to the Air Force Command, nine drones were shot down by the forces and air defense assets of Air Command "South". The Navy and National Guard soldiers destroyed two drones each and another one was destroyed by National Police lawmen. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 63% of cruise missiles are shot down by Ukrainian air defenses. Since 10 October, the Russian military has fired 154 missiles over Ukraine, which is an almost 7-fold increase compared to the first ten days of the month (there were 21 missiles). Oleksandr Sukhanov, deputy head of the Russian transport ministry, is to resign over the explosion at the Kerch Strait Bridge. Oleksandr Sukhanov has primarily taken care of security issues in the transport industry and supervised the operations of the Government Security Department (UVO) of the Ministry of Transport, including the security of the Kerch Strait Bridge. "Grain initiative": 8 million tons of Ukrainian agricultural products have already been shipped. Today, 20 October, within the framework of the "Grain Initiative", 2 ships with 82 thousand tons of agricultural products left the port of Pivdenyi. In particular, the tanker ATLANTIS ALMERIA and the bulker ARIS T left the port. The food is heading to countries in Asia and Europe. Since the departure of the former, 8 million tonnes of agricultural products have already been exported, along with Ukrainian grain. A total of 362 food ships have left Ukrainian ports for countries in Asia, Europe and Africa. Russia threatens to "reconsider cooperation" with the UN Secretary General if the UN sends experts to verify the provenance of drones used by the Russian military to damage Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and strike cities. Such statements were made after a closed session of the UN Security Council, convened at the initiative of the US, France and Britain. Experts assume the statement referred to the so-called "grain

initiative", launched following personal efforts and agreements with the Kremlin reached by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres.

Source: CDS Daily Brief 20.10.2022.pdf

The Kerch bridge, the old ferry and the Azov alternative



Do not redirect - redirect

The Kerch ferry crossing, in an unregulated market, almost instantly fell victim to the great Crimean bridge, for some reason called the Kerch Bridge. And the sacrifice, as it turned out after the bridge sabotage, was also futile and in vain. Moreover, both economically and, most importantly, strategically. Work on the ferry that has not yet been fully wound up across the Kerch Strait had to be urgently resumed because of an explosion on the bridge. Remember that for almost seven decades - from September 1954 to September 2020, ferries worked at least 10 months a year. Ferry work was stopped in favor of the Crimean Bridge, but even then many considered this business decision a strategic mistake. Especially given the exacerbation of Russian-Ukrainian relations that has grown year by year since Crimea's reunification with Russia. The vulnerability of the bridge has increased all the more in relation to the Russian NWO in Ukraine. Work on the old crossing most likely needed to be resumed and adjusted immediately, but again, it is only resuming now, when a break may soon be needed due to storms and necessary preventive maintenance.

It is now unlikely that anyone can say with certainty how long it will be possible to restore the ferry's operation. After all that has happened, it is proving to be even more controversial and even the decision to completely transfer almost all freight and passenger traffic between Crimea and other regions of the Russian Federation onto a new bridge.

Weigh and share

This was not done immediately, in 2019-2022, and according to information available to the authors, some experts had previously proposed, for the interchangeability of transport modes here, to distribute passenger and cargo flows on this route between the ferry crossing and the bridge. They even agreed on proportions as a percentage of total transit volume. Ferry service was to account for 35 to 50% of passenger traffic and 55 to 65% of freight traffic. The bridge was to carry 50-65% of passenger traffic and 35-45% of freight traffic. Such a balanced approach appeared as early as the first half of the 1950s: according to the Institute


for Complex Transport Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR State Planning Committee (1955: the institute operated from 1955 to 1991), at the end of 1953, on the eve of the ferry crossing's entry into operation, its feasibility study noted that in the case of organising new transport options between Kerch and the Taman Peninsula, the ferry crossing should be maintained. This was foreseen in view of the possible congestion of these new options after a few years of operation. And, in general, it was planned to do everything for optimal distribution of transport between modes to ensure against dependence on a "monopoly" transport option. But these recommendations remain recommendations.

Cities and islands

However, on such a balanced basis, freight and passenger transport has been carried out for a long time: - between the US and Canada on the six Great Lakes (BCPs, bridges, water transport); - Singapore and Malaysia (bridge and BCP); - UK and France (Channel Tunnel and BCP); - Bahrain and Qatar (bridge and BCP); - Denmark and Sweden (bridge and BCP); - Argentina and Paraguay (bridge and BCP); - Lesotho and South Africa (bridge and BCP); - Tanzania and Zanzibar (delivery and BCP); - South Vietnamese region and approximately nearby. Phu Quoc (sea freight and BCP); - South China's Hainan Island and neighbouring Guangdong Province; - France's St. Pierre Island and the North Atlantic coast near Canada (bridge, BCP). And these are just a few examples of complementary transport schemes. By the way, in the PRC and the US, an adjacent version of operational insurance has been in place for a long time, i.e. a combination of maritime, river and mixed ("river-sea") transport along a given route. In the first case, this is the 1,800 km-long Grand Canal linking Beijing to the ports of Tianjin, Shanghai and Hangzhou. In the second, there is the 4850 km long Inland Coastal Canal, which operates along the Atlantic and Caribbean coasts of the United States.

Return to Crimea

As for the ferry service between Crimea and Russia, we note that the Ukrainian SSR authorities have "eschewed" Russian projects of the 1960s and early 1980s, which envisaged the creation of new ferry lines between the SFSR and post-Soviet Russia with Crimea. Such a process dragged on by inertia until Crimea had already come under Russian jurisdiction.



For example, in April 2015, the Crimean Ministry of Transport reported that the ports of Temryuk and Yeysk (Krasnodar Territory) would soon receive a ferry connection to Kerch (see diagram). That was implemented in 2016-2017, but this project was proposed by Russian experts... in the early to mid-1970s. In Kiev, they were able to "prove" to Moscow that this project was inadequate. In the RSFSR, in the same years and in the early 1980s, various

projects for trans-Azov ferry crossings to the Kerch Peninsula from Taganrog (Rostov region) and Primorsko-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar territory) were proposed. Including the creation of a new ferry port near Shchelkino - northwest of Kerch. But the Ukrainian authorities have also rejected these projects under various pretexts. As for the closure of the crossing over the Kerch Strait in September 2020, the verbatim information of 29 September from AnRussTrans, the operator of this crossing, is typical:

"There are no transport orders, as all passenger and cargo traffic has been redirected to the Crimean Bridge. There were three passenger ferries, two have already been sold, one is still for sale. It's the same with the trucks: some have been sold, some are still left."

However, former Crimean Transport Minister Anatoly Tsurkin is confident that

"It would be worth leaving the crossing at least as a spare 'fire engine'. Because even if there is a bridge, there should be a backup connection to Crimea. But keeping the ferry infrastructure in good condition is only possible at the expense of public funds."

It seems this recommendation is quite relevant today and for the foreseeable future. Especially given the well-known military-political situation near Crimea. And, consequently, sabotage on the Crimean bridge.

Source: <https://topwar.ru/203499-kerchenskij-most-staryj-parom-i-azovskaja-alternativa.html>

[Lessons from history that teach nothing: the Cuban missile crisis and its consequences \(Russia's Vision\)](#)

In October 1962, the most acute confrontation between the USSR and the USA in the entire history of US-USSR relations took place, which left the world on the brink of catastrophe - a nuclear war. Sixty years have passed since then, but the subject has still not lost its topicality, and in the present circumstances, when we are witnessing a new round of geopolitical confrontation between the United States and its allies and Russia, on the contrary, it has shone with new colours. Today, we increasingly hear the view that the world has returned to the period that has gone down in the history of international relations as the 'Cold War'. This view is justified - politicians make rash statements, in recent weeks we have heard again and again claims about the possible use of nuclear weapons. Much has been said and written about the Caribbean crisis, but the relevance of the main conclusions drawn from the analysis of this episode in history means that interest in these events is not waning. The historical context of the Cold War, the climax of which was the Caribbean crisis, in one way or another forces all those who refer to the events of the autumn of 1962 to consider it from the point of view of the confrontation between the two superpowers - the USSR and the USA. However, Cuba itself was also one of the participants in these events, it is no coincidence that in the United States the conflict in the autumn of 1962 is called the "Cuban missile crisis". In this material, we will try to answer the following questions - who was to blame for the outbreak of the crisis, did it have "winners" and "losers", was Cuba the subject or object of politics in the events of autumn 1962, and how much did it really influence the decisions received in Moscow. In addition, we will try to understand why historical lessons are often not learned by anyone, which is why historical events tend to repeat themselves, only in a slightly different form, in the form of similar but not identical plots.

Causes of the Caribbean crisis

Talking about the causes of the Caribbean crisis, it is inevitable to raise the question of the culpability of the USSR and the USA in triggering this crisis. This question cannot be answered unequivocally; one can only argue about the degree of culpability of the parties in triggering the crisis. The official positions of the USSR and the USA, because of their bias, are not in a position to bring us any closer to an answer to this question. If, according to the

USSR, the deployment of missiles in Cuba in the autumn of 1962 was Moscow's reaction to the deployment of US missiles in Turkey a year earlier, which were capable of reaching the Soviet capital and therefore posed a direct threat to the Soviets. state, then Washington's official position, public opinion in America and many countries around the world defined US behaviour as a response to the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba capable of reaching Washington. If in the USSR they believed that the US was to blame for the crisis, then in the US, on the contrary, they claimed that the crisis was created by the USSR. This practice of mutual transfer of responsibility for the worsening international situation is also characteristic of the present. At the same time, neither in 1962 nor today does anyone deny or refute the fact that a year earlier American missiles had been deployed in the vicinity of the USSR, considering this a natural right of the world's greatest power. American politicians like to claim, when speaking of their country's foreign policy, that the use of force by the United States abroad is always explained by the fact that their force is virtuous, and their virtue has significant force, referring either to T. Roosevelt, who professed political realism, or to V. Wilson, who preached political idealism. An example of such a one-sided approach is the book 'The Edge: The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962' by the American scholar D. Detzer, published in New York in 1979, in which the USSR is called the sole culprit of the Caribbean crisis. Among his reasons, the author lists: first, the USSR's backwardness in the field of nuclear weapons and the Soviet leadership's desire to change the balance of power in a single action; second, the desire to thus solve the German problem and prevent an American attack on Cuba, which would be a major blow to the USSR's political prestige; third, the weakening of N. S. Khrushchev's position in the Political Bureau, the low effectiveness of Khrushchev's reforms, prompting him to look for something significant in foreign policy [1]. It is hard to ignore the fact that the Caribbean crisis was indeed preceded by a US attempt to shift the existing military-political balance of power in Europe in its favour. Let us recall the chronology of these events. So, as early as 1959, two squadrons of 15 missiles each, divided into five batteries, were deployed in northern Italy, and another 10 batteries were deployed in 1961. At the end of October 1959, the Turkish government agreed (on the same terms as Italy) to deploy a missile squadron (15 IRBMs) on their territory. In 1961, the United States began to deploy 15 medium-range PGM-19 Jupiter missiles with a range of 2400 km to Turkey, directly threatening the European part of the Soviet Union as far as Moscow. Should the Soviet leadership react (and couldn't they?) to such a change in the military-political situation? The head of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, publicly expressed his indignation at the deployment of missiles in Turkey and considered it a personal insult. After the deployment of US missiles in Turkey, the USSR leadership began investigating the possible reaction of the Cuban government to the deployment of Soviet troops and weapons in Cuba. For this reason, it is somewhat presumptuous to argue that it was the attempt by Cuban counter-revolutionaries, acting on instructions from Washington, to overthrow the Cuban government that became the main reason for the deployment of Soviet troops and missiles in Cuba. However, we discuss Cuba's role in the Caribbean crisis in more detail below. It should be noted that the interpretation of the events of the autumn of 1962 changed according to important changes in the international arena. During periods of "thaw" in relations between the two countries, the emphasis was on "wisdom and resilience", which enabled politicians and the military to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. However, a new "cooling" of relations between Russia and the United States also revives many Cold War stereotypes, especially accusations of the opposite side's aggression and recklessness.

The role of the Cuban government in the events of autumn 1962 The largest island in the Caribbean basin appeared on the agenda of relations between the two superpowers in the early 1950s and 1960s, after the victory in Cuba in January 1959 of the radical leftist rebel movement led by Fidel Castro. On 1 January 1959, young radical leftist reformers in Cuba

overthrew Batista's pro-American dictatorial regime. A sharp deterioration in US-Cuban relations followed. When on 10 January 1959, two days after the main column of the Rebel Army entered Havana, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR K. E. Voroshilov announced by telegram the Soviet Union's recognition of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Cuba, and no one in the USSR leadership had any idea of the forces controlling the new revolutionary regime. However, events developed rapidly. To everyone's surprise, a year and a half later, the pro-communist nature of the regime in Cuba became evident, and on April 16, 1961, Fidel Castro openly proclaimed the Cuban revolution as socialist [3]. In March 1960, US President D. Eisenhower signed a secret directive to create detachments of Cuban counter-revolutionary emigrants in the United States to land on the Island of Liberty. An air assault brigade was soon formed from them, which, in addition to terrorist actions and sabotage, began preparations for an armed invasion of the island in the autumn of 1960. In response to US assistance to the counter-revolutionaries, F. Castro began to seek support from the Soviet Union [4]. The new US President John F. Kennedy gave his consent to the anti-Cuban action prepared by the CIA under Eisenhower. On 17 April 1961, US planes cloaked themselves as the Cuban Air Force bombed Cuba, after which armed detachments of US-trained Cuban migrants landed on the island. With the support of the Cuban leadership by the absolute majority of the population, the mercenary brigade that landed on Playa Giron was quickly destroyed. This victory caused serious damage to the prestige of the American administration and brought enormous popularity to F. Castro's regime. The failure of the open intervention intensified the anti-Cuban activities of the United States, which considered Cuba a threat to the security of their country. In the early 1960s Cuba occupied a special place in Soviet foreign policy, which was based on the principles of class solidarity and proletarian internationalism. One of the main directions was the protection of Cuba's freedom and sovereignty. Soviet-Cuban military cooperation began at the end of 1960. Modern Soviet armoured, artillery and mortar weapons and some types of small arms began to be supplied to Cuba. Cuban historiography, expressing Havana's official position, assessing the actions of the US government in the period between the Playa Giron landing and the Caribbean crisis, characterized them as "a prelude to direct armed intervention in Cuba". The USSR leadership expressed concern about the security of socialist Cuba. It informed F. Castro that Soviet intelligence had managed to obtain absolutely reliable information on the American MongOOSE plan, which, along with acts of sabotage inside the country, envisaged a large-scale direct invasion by American armed forces. However, the decision to deploy missiles in Cuba was taken by N. Khrushchev after the US deployed missiles in Turkey. According to one version, N. S. Khrushchev learned about this during a visit to Bulgaria in May 1962. According to A. I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the idea of defending Cuba by deploying missiles with nuclear warheads was first expressed by N. S. Khrushchev after his return from Bulgaria on 20 May 1962. Moreover, the Soviet leadership immediately began to consider the possible reaction of the Cuban government to such a proposal. The delegation, led by the leader of Uzbekistan as a distraction, arrived in Havana late in the evening of 29 May 1962. On the morning of 30 May, the delegation held a conversation with Fidel and Raul Castro. Coordination of details with the Cuban side took place from 31 May to 9 June 1962. The final text of the Soviet-Cuban treaty, in particular, stated that the USSR would send its armed forces to Cuba in order to strengthen its defence capability against the danger of aggression from outside, thus contributing to the maintenance of peace throughout the world. The operation itself, codenamed "Anadyr", was being prepared under the guise of a strategic exercise with the movement of troops and military equipment at sea to different regions of the Soviet Union. The first ship arrived in Cuba on 26 July 1962, and then 42,000 people were smuggled onto the island within two months. personnel with weapons, equipment, ammunition, food and

building materials. Nuclear munitions for R-12 strategic missiles with a capacity of 1 megaton, 6 aviation atomic bombs, as well as nuclear warheads for tactical firearms - Luna missiles:

"... many Cubans experienced indescribable bitterness and sadness when the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of the missiles. The eyes of thousands of people, Cuban and Soviet, who were ready to die with the highest dignity, wept when the news of the sudden, unexpected and almost unconditional decision to remove the weapons was made known."

The Caribbean crisis in the USSR and US media mirror

The USSR and the US used the media as one of the tools to influence audiences, both during the Caribbean crisis and earlier during the Cold War. A negative image of the USSR was formed in the US press, just as a negative image of America was formed in the Soviet press. If we are talking about the American media, then from 22 October, after US President John F. Kennedy's declaration that Soviet nuclear missiles had been deployed in Cuba, quite a lot of material aggressive towards the USSR was also placed there. In particular, the front page of The New York Times, October 23, 1962, appeared under the headline:

"U.S. Blocks Cuba Over Discovery of Missile Launchers; Kennedy Ready for Final Confrontation".

One of the articles anticipates J. Kennedy's published speech:

"President claims Russians lied and put Western Hemisphere in great danger".

This claim is presented as the only true one and requires no proof, which is total manipulation. In other publications, half the front page of the Dailynews, published on 23 October, was taken up by the headline 'We've Blocked Cuba's Military', followed by a noisy subhead 'Red Ships Will Be Found or Crashed'.

USSR openly called aggressor. The plan to counter the Soviet Union, announced on television by the US President, was supported by many congressmen and prominent political figures who were quoted in the media.

Republican Senator Ken Keating said:

"President Kennedy has already received strong political support across the country for imposing a quarantine against Cuba."

According to K. Keating,

"The armed forces of the Soviet Union, which have established themselves in Cuba, pose a threat to the security of the United States."

In his statement, he noted:

"The President's decision to introduce quarantine is what I have asked him to do before. I think the next major decision he will have to face is the need to invade Cuba, which I think is inevitable."

If we are talking about the Soviet press, then between September and October 1962, Pravda published 121 publications on Cuban events. Content analysis showed that 93.4% of the publications said that the United States had put the world on the brink of nuclear war. The lexemes "general world war", "thermonuclear war" were used for this. In absolutely all publications, the blame for the conflict was shifted completely onto the United States. This is proven by ideologies such as 'American imperialism', 'American aggressors', 'intervention', 'provocation', 'big club'.

In order to form a "correct" idea among the Soviet people about the participants in the Caribbean crisis and their role in the unfolding of the conflict, Pravda resorted to the silence of facts and their falsification. So, on 25 September, Fidel Castro announced that the USSR intended to establish a base in Cuba for its fishing fleet. This was covered up in passing by Pravda, because in reality this base was to become a cover for the Anadyr operation to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles on the Island of Liberty. The situation is similar to the "Imperialists don't give up" material, in which TASS accuses the US of having violated Cuban air borders

by a military aircraft, which was considered "a new provocation by US imperialists". However, this material did not say a word about the fact that an American intelligence officer discovered Soviet medium-range missiles during this flight. When covering the Caribbean crisis, Pravda fully supported the Soviet government's position, publishing not only statements, speeches, appeals by its representatives, but also reinforcing them with other material: statements by Soviet citizens in support of their chosen international tactics, quoting material from foreign periodicals echoing Soviet politicians. In general, as historian Vladimir Lota notes in his book *Armageddon is Cancelled. The Caribbean Crisis: people, events, documents*, Moscow journalists were writing at the time about American imperialism threatening peace-loving peoples, about the Soviet Union's solidarity with Cuba, and apparently did not imagine the scale of the catastrophe that could hurt Moscow. Residents of Soviet cities were ill-informed about the real developments.

The height of the crisis: on the brink of nuclear war



Map of Cuba, marked by US President John F. Kennedy. Soviet missile bases are marked with crosses

N. S. Khrushchev on 7 June 1962 at a meeting with the military leadership, noted: "We of the Central Committee have decided to throw a 'hedgehog' at America - to place our missiles in Cuba so that America cannot swallow the island of Liberty. There is the agreement of the Cuban side. The purpose of this operation is one - to help the Cuban revolution survive, to protect it from US aggression. The political and military leadership of our country, having thoroughly weighed up all the circumstances, sees no other way to prevent an attack from America, which, according to our information, is intensely prepared. Once the missiles are in place, America will feel that if it wants to deal with Cuba, it will have to deal with us."

American intelligence, having ample capabilities and means, has never been able to reveal the composition of the Soviet troop group on Cuban soil. It only discovered the deployment of strategic missiles using aerial photographs on 14 October, when an American U-2 aircraft filmed the construction of launch sites for R-12 missiles. On 16 October, the results of the aerial photographs were reported to President John F. Kennedy. After that, the crisis situation began to get worse every day. Advisers to the US President proposed an immediate air strike on the missile positions or a direct invasion of Cuba. The US was put on

high alert. The same thing happened in the USSR armed forces. In addition, the combat readiness of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops was increased. Military-political and moral-psychological tension rose sharply. The activity of the US air force intensified, planes patrolled almost non-stop over Cuban territory. In Cuba, a general combat alert was announced, regular army troops advanced to combat positions and People's Defence formations were deployed. On 22 October, in a radio address, J. Kennedy announced the introduction of a quarantine and, in effect, a naval blockade of the young Cuban Republic. On the same day, F. Castro ordered the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic to announce a combat alert and to occupy units and sub-units of fighting positions and posts. All of Cuba was placed under martial law. By 23 October, some 180 US Navy ships had approached the Cuban coast carrying 95,000 sailors. The plan for a possible military operation against Cuba called for three massive strikes a day. On the first day of the operation, it was planned to carry out 1190 sorties by attack planes and bombers. The situation escalated further after 27 October 1962, when a Soviet anti-aircraft missile shot down a US U-2 Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft at high altitude over Cuban territory. The crisis threatened to become a global nuclear missile catastrophe. In this tense situation, the leaders of the USSR and the USA - N. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy - still had enough common sense and stamina. Intense negotiations began between them - by telephone and through intermediaries. As a result of the complex and tense negotiations between the heads of the two states, the US President gave a guarantee not to invade Cuba if the USSR removed its offensive weapons. The Soviet side, agreeing to this, also insisted on the liquidation of the US missile base in Turkey. On 28 October, the dismantling of missile launch sites and preparation of the missile division in full force for redeployment to the Soviet Union began. The Cuban missile crisis is in decline.

The "winners" and "losers" of the Cuban Missile Crisis

The assessment of the Caribbean crisis in Russia's public consciousness was changing. In the early 1960s - the second half of the 1980s, the outcome of the Caribbean crisis was seen in our country as a diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union, and the goal of deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba was seen as protecting the Cuban revolution from the United States [1]. The philosophical candidate V. T. Malakhov, in his scholarly article "The 1962 Caribbean Crisis: History and Modernity", which is often quoted in this material, for example, believes that the USSR won a military-strategic victory and demonstrated to the world that the USSR is a powerful power with weapons capable of dealing a crushing blow to America. At the same time, since the second half of the 1980s, estimates have begun to change. Not only Westerners but also many domestic scholars argue that the American side won, and that the Soviet leadership and Khrushchev personally bore the main responsibility for triggering this most dangerous crisis of the Cold War, which almost led to a nuclear catastrophe. Most contemporary publications state that Khrushchev eventually had to withdraw and remove not only Soviet missiles but also tactical nuclear weapons and Il-28 bombers from Cuba, and do so in front of the entire world under humiliating international control. Many Russian historians today argue that the negative consequences of the crisis were one of the reasons for N. Khrushchev's removal from power. A large number of those unhappy with J. Kennedy's position were also in the United States, especially among the military. Overall, in both superpowers, the results of the Caribbean crisis were indeed perceived as far from unambiguous. American hardliners were negative about the realistic tendencies of President Kennedy's policies. As for Khrushchev, he was criticised in Moscow both for going ahead to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba without considering the full consequences of this step and for agreeing to remove Soviet offensive weapons from the island under American pressure.

L.I. Brezhnev, who came to power in 1964, condemned Khrushchev's behaviour. He said he wanted to outmanoeuvre the Americans and hold them at gunpoint, but in the end he miscalculated and almost led the world to disaster. How hard the Soviet leadership had to

work later, Brezhnev said, to show the United States that we really wanted peace. Brezhnev's position can be explained largely by the specifics of leadership change under the Soviet regime: each new political leader tried to explain away the accumulated problems by the mistakes of his predecessor. Overall, it cannot be argued that either side emerged as a clear winner from the Caribbean crisis. Among the positive consequences of the crisis is a mutual awareness of the danger of nuclear confrontation and an unlimited arms race, especially in the absence of reliable communications and other crisis resolution mechanisms. However, this positive has, in fact, been ignored in recent years, when the confrontation between Russia and the United States has reached a new level.

Lessons from history not learned (conclusion)

The German philosopher G. Hegel in the early 19th century. noted:

"experience and history teach that peoples and governments have never learned anything from history and have not acted according to the lessons that might be drawn from it".

It is hard to disagree with this statement, because historical experience shows that states and peoples have often made the same mistakes as their ancestors. No wonder some philosophers and historiographers believe that history develops in a spiral with the repetition of similar, but not identical, stages of forward movement. The Caribbean crisis in the autumn of 1962 was the most dangerous in the history of the Cold War, when the two superpowers - the USSR and the USA - were very close to a full-scale war using nuclear weapons. After the end of the acute crisis phase in US-USSR relations, a "thaw" began, but the Cold War did not end there. It ended only after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The emotions that remained in American society after the Cuban missile crisis can be judged, for example, by the film *Blast from the Past*, released in 1998. According to the plot, an American family hid in a bomb shelter in 1962 and shut themselves in for 35 years. Then they learned to their surprise and delight that "there was no atomic blast", and that members of the 1991 CPSU Central Committee Political Bureau simply declared that they were "giving up". "The 'Cold War' is represented here by two main reasons: 'there was a mortal danger' and 'the United States emerged victorious'. In turn, the modern Russian interpretation of the Caribbean crisis is largely characterized by the 2009 history textbook (authors - O. V. Volobuev, S. V. Kuleshov). The Caribbean crisis is called there "the most serious foreign policy conflict since the Second World War". The textbook says that the USSR, by deploying missiles in Cuba, only wanted to mirror US aggression against the Cuban people, and that the crisis was resolved thanks to concessions from the USSR. After 60 years, Russia and the United States have become neither allies nor even full partners. In 2019, Washington formally withdrew from a Cold War-era treaty that restricted the deployment of medium- and shorter-range missiles. The lessons of the Caribbean crisis, unfortunately, have long been forgotten, and today we are again hearing statements about the possible use of nuclear weapons, threats from Washington to launch missile strikes against Russia. N.S. Khrushchev's son, historian Sergei Khrushchev, who lived in the United States and taught at Brown University, once spoke in an interview with *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* about the way the events of the Cuban missile crisis are presented in American academia. In the United States, in his opinion, the mythology of the crisis still exists: a "good power" must always emerge victorious. Exactly the same picture, he said ruefully, is seen in Russia.

The crisis in the Caribbean did not end in nuclear war just because the parties showed common sense, the ability to compromise and negotiate among themselves. The question remains: will current politicians show common sense in a similar situation?

Source: <https://topwar.ru/203587-uroki-istorii-kotorye-nichemu-ne-uchat-karibskij-krizis-i-ego-posledstvija.html>

Euronaval 2022: BAE Systems launches XLAUV 'Herne' concept demonstrator




The Herne XLAUV concept is built around a broad set of capabilities that BAE Systems is developing and has already demonstrated in other products, Andrew Carr, the company's head of underwater engineering and technology, told Naval News in an interview with the show. "We looked at the underwater battlespace and the emerging opportunities and threats... and we've seen a gap around that size of platform, so this is a proof of concept to showcase the capabilities and innovation that BAE Systems has." Andrew Carr, Head of Underwater Engineering and Technology at BAE Systems Carr highlighted BAE Systems' work in autonomy, electric propulsion technologies, sensor matching and torpedo systems. "So it's a 'wrap' to build and integrate a design for what we believe will meet a global market." XLAUV's overall concept of operations includes global deployment, transportability, deployment aboard a "host" platform, long endurance and the ability to operate at depths down to the edge of the continental shelf, Carr explained. Primary operational tasks focus on surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking missions, particularly in circumstances where an unmanned vehicle may be preferred over a manned vessel. The XLAUV is designed "more around covert operations, being stealthy and being able to stay on station for a good period of time," Carr said. Here, he noted, the XLAUV could provide a smaller, more covert presence compared to a submarine, for example. Herne XLAUV Scale model Herne XLAUV on the BAE Systems stand at Euronaval 2022 Given that manned platforms might also be needed for other missions, "XLAUVs can be more dispersed, operating in a network, with multiple platforms in the water," Carr added. The XLAUV design concept and its payloads and mission capabilities have the flexibility to be tailored to meet customer requirements, Carr explained. "[Herne] is adaptable and adaptable to look at the types of missions and opportunities these customers might want to achieve," he said. "If a customer wants extra strength or a higher payload, we can adapt the design in a fairly straightforward way." "It's really about adaptability. It's not a fixed design. It's a capability we can offer customers, drawing on our experience to tailor it to their needs," Carr added. Payloads that the XLAUV can carry include a lightly towed sonar, masts and unmanned vehicles designed to carry out mine countermeasures tasks. XLAUV could also deploy and function as a way station for unmanned vehicles conducting seabed operations. BAE Systems sees XLAUV as a platform for the future. "We have a preliminary design. We understand all the key features. We understand how we would build it and take it on. We have a build strategy," Carr explained. "We have the design at a point where we would be able relatively quickly to build and integrate the product in a couple of years." For the next steps in XLAUV development, Carr said, "Right now, we're looking at activities in the critical path to make sure we understand the build in more detail and to make sure we continue to look at opportunities and customer

use. Cases to help us refine the concept." "We're focused on autonomy," he added. "The autonomous solution is key to this product."


Source : <https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/euronaval-2022/2022/10/euronaval-2022-bae-systems-launches-herne-xlauv-concept-demonstrator/>

Unprecedented accumulation of ships at anchorages in the Sea of Marmara or how Russian Federation representatives in the SCC in Istanbul are disrupting Ukrainian grain supplies

In the last 2-3 weeks, an unprecedented concentration of ships at anchorages has formed in the Sea of Marmara: this creates a danger for shipping and there has already been one case of collision of ships. Andriy Klymenko, head of the Monitoring Group of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies and editor-in-chief of the BlackSeaNews portal, reported this on his Facebook page: "This is a very important post: it is about how the Russian Federation's representatives in the Istanbul CSC are disrupting Ukrainian grain supplies. A detailed analysis will follow a little later. And now about the principle scheme. We have noticed that in the last 2-3 weeks in the Sea of Marmara an unprecedented accumulation of ships at anchorages has formed (by the way, this is a danger for shipping and we already have a case of ship collisions.). Three parking places are clearly distinguished.



The ships marked with a grey circle are, relatively speaking, the "grain fleet" for Ukrainian grain export. On map 2 - only ships of the "grain fleet".




District 1 and District 2 are the inspection holding areas of the Joint Coordination Centre (JCC), which includes representatives of the UN, Turkey, Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Area 3 is an area where vessels often wait for the opportunity to anchor in Areas 1

or 2 to take on board SCC inspectors on a "first come, first served" basis. Map 3 is a separate Region 1. Map 4 is Region 2. Vessels arriving from Ukrainian ports with grain on board are marked with a yellow marker.




District 1 - 37 vessels with Ukrainian grain are awaiting inspection by the SCC to obtain permission to continue their voyage to the various countries where this grain is expected. And another 5 vessels awaiting inspection to continue the voyage to Ukraine for grain.



District 2 -- 27 vessels with Ukrainian grain and 7 vessels going to Ukrainian ports.

District 3 -- 30 ships with Ukrainian grain, 3 ships to Ukrainian ports. And now ATTENTION (apologies for the capslock). How much longer are they waiting? -- 8, 10, 12, 15 -- NOT HOURS, BUT DAYS... Map 5 shows a typical route along the Sea of Marmara of one of the ships currently, at 23:53 local time on 20.20.2022, passing through the Bosphorus towards the southern port. The date of its arrival at the Sea of Marmara from the Canakkale

Strait is highlighted in yellow - 7 October 2022.



13 days waiting for SCC inspection." The Black Sea News and Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies monitoring group believes that the reason for the above is that the Russian Federation's representatives in the SCC in Istanbul are deliberately disrupting Ukrainian grain supplies. "I'll just say that the whole grain traffic depends on the mood of one of the inspector group members (from which country it's clear), how many ships he wants to inspect per day. And let's add that now daylight hours are getting shorter and shorter, and even in the calm Sea of Marmara there are storms and fog, when you can be capricious and refuse to go out to sea with a boat," writes Andriy Klymenko. For colleagues in the media. So far, the Black Sea News Monitoring Group and the Institute for Black Sea Strategic Studies have said it all, and unfortunately, it does not yet have the physical opportunity to add anything. There will be a detailed analysis in a day or two.

Source: <https://www.blackseanews.net/read/195795>