

## Cupons

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### Azov-Black Sea maritime operational area

Russian Black Sea Fleet forces continue to project force onto the coastal and mainland part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and maintain control over captured territory. Due to stormy conditions, the number of the Russian naval group at sea has been reduced to 6 ships and boats which are located along the south-west coast of Crimea. The number of ships with Kalibr missiles is constantly changing, but at least 16 Kalibr missiles are always ready for launch. In the waters of the Sea of Azov, enemy ships and patrol boats approach Mariupol and Berdiansk to block the Azov coast.

Enemy aircraft continue to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwest Black Sea. In the last day, 10 enemy aircraft from Belbek and Saki were deployed to these airfields. The enemy continues to bomb Ukraine and its coastal areas.

On the morning of 23 October, the enemy used kamikaze drones en masse. 14 "Shahed-136" kamikaze drones were shot down over Mykolaiv.

"Grain Initiative".

On 23 October, the bulk carrier PANGEO, the sixth ship chartered by the UN (World Food Program (WFP), left the port of Chornomorsk. It has 40,000 tonnes of wheat for Yemen on board. Also, in the framework of the implementation of the "Grain Initiative", 6 ships with 124.3 thousand tons of agricultural products left the ports of Odessa, Chornomorsk and "Pivdenny" for countries in Asia and Europe. As previously reported, Russia is deliberately delaying full implementation of the Grain Initiative. Because of this, ports have been operating at only 25-30% capacity in recent days. Overall, since 1 August, 380 ships have exported 8.5 million tonnes of agricultural products to African, Asian and European countries from the ports of Greater Odessa.

Around 50,000 dolphins have died in the Black Sea because of the war. According to Ivan Rusev, a doctor of biological sciences, many warships are manoeuvring in the southwestern part of the Black Sea, including submarines, which sometimes approach the coastline. It is because of the use of sonars by ships that dolphins die. Off the coasts of

Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania, 2,500 carcasses of these mammals have been found, but according to international studies, only 5% of dead dolphins are brought ashore.

Source: CDS Daily Brief

### Sixth ferry started operating in Kerch

On the night of 23 October, the sixth ferry, the Conro Trader, began operations to Kerch, Russia's Transport Ministry reports on its Telegram channel. It says that on its first transit it carried 32 wagons from the terminal of the port of Rybny (Kerch) to the port of Kavkaz.

Between 9 and 23 October, 18,340 passengers were transported across the strait in both directions and 8,284 vehicles, mainly heavy and medium trucks, as well as a batch of wagons. The six ferries operating on the line carried a total of 230 trips. Now the weather in the straits is starting to worsen, but so far it remains in the range of indicators that it does not interfere with navigation. According to the automatic weather station at Cape Zmeiny (Kerch), at 10:00 on 23 October, the average wind speed from the south was 10.4 m/s, with gusts up to 12.6 m/s. Recall that on the morning of October 8, 2022, the Crimean bridge partially collapsed on the motor route, and fuel tanks caught fire on the railway line. Road and rail traffic on the bridge was temporarily halted, in connection with which, on the night of 9 October, the Kerch ferry crossing was launched. Four ferries operate at the crossing: the ferry Kerch-2 carries medium-sized trucks weighing up to 3.5 tons; the ferry "Lavrentiy" - heavy trucks and passenger buses; the ferry "Yeisk" - light vehicles; the ferry "Maria" - large vehicles, as well as a Ro-Ro cargo and Ro-Ro equipment ship of the "Elza Ibragimova Composer" class.

Source: <https://www.blackseanews.net/read/195893>

### Sources of concern

After last month's sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, concerns are growing over Russia's covert actions. Recently, police in Norway arrested several Russians, equipped with drones and video cameras, who were showing an unusual interest in the country's oil and gas facilities, according to The Guardian.

Norway has become Europe's largest gas supplier after Russian gas stopped flowing through Nord Stream. And while the Oslo government does not directly accuse Moscow, it knows that Russia makes it a prime target for covert hybrid warfare operations.

Of particular concern is the Baltic Pipe, a gas pipeline linking Norway to Poland and other EU countries, which opened last month. The obvious concern is that it could have the explosive fate of Nord Stream.

Theoretically vulnerable, in this new era of hostility between Russia and Europe, are the vital pipelines that supply Britain.

"We are seeing the consequences of the new security situation in Norway," warned justice minister Emilie Enger Mehl after the Russian arrests. "We cannot exclude other cases."

Following reports of drones flying around North Sea platforms, Norway and Denmark - plus NATO membership applicants Finland and Sweden - are all increasing their maritime and security patrols.

Putin's hybrid war, a danger to France and Britain

Russia's non-military hybrid warfare takes many forms, all with the same goal: executing "active measures" to harm, frighten, weaken and divide target states while maintaining plausible deniability.

Thus, the EU and US strongly suspect that Putin ordered the sabotage of Nord Stream as part of his undeclared energy war on Europe. But he denies it, and they have provided no evidence.

As they realise that Russia's president will stop at nothing, EU leaders wonder what he can do next to undermine support for Ukraine and weaken their governments.

Thinking ahead, it is logical - and prudent - to assume that Putin, desperate and reckless, will increasingly turn to hybrid attacks in Europe. France worries that transatlantic internet cables, essential to Western security and communications, are in the Kremlin leader's sights.

Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the head of the UK's defence establishment, has warned that disruption of communications cables will be seen as a serious matter and an act of war.

Russia's hybrid options extend to covert use of special forces and proxy fighters, such as the "little green men" deployed in Crimea in 2014. NATO has said that "hybrid actions" against one or more allies would be seen as an attack on all under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Division, disruption, destabilisation: these are the fruits of Putin's covert hybrid war. He is losing ground on the battlefield in Ukraine, but can he win the battle with a covert hybrid war to destabilise the will of Europe?

Source: <https://ziare.com/putin-razboi/razboiul-nevazut-al-lui-putin-incearca-sa-loveasca-inima-europei-pe-ascuns-in-secret-razboi-hibrid-1768021>

### [EU warns Germany over Chinese port acquisition](#)

The European Commission warned the German government last spring not to approve an investment by Chinese company Cosco in the port of Hamburg, the German daily Handelsblatt reported on Friday, citing sources. Shipping giant Cosco last year made a bid to take a 35% stake in one of three terminals at Germany's largest port in the northern city of Hamburg. Germany's ruling coalition is split on whether to approve the investment, government sources say, although Beijing is urging Berlin not to politicise the bid and the port authority warns that doing so could hurt the economy. According to Handelsblatt, the EU has warned that sensitive information about the deal could end up in Chinese hands if Germany allows the investment. The German government, which is still considering whether to approve the deal, declined to comment on the report. A spokesman for Olaf Scholz said the German chancellor had not yet agreed with the relevant ministers how to proceed. The commission said it was commenting on individual cases. European Union leaders are due to discuss reducing their economic dependence on China on Friday, among other topics, when they meet for a second day of talks in Brussels.

Source: <https://gcaptain.com/eu-warns-germany-against-china-port-buy/>

### [Report on large unmanned surface vehicles and naval submarines](#)

From the report

The Navy wants to develop and procure three types of large unmanned vehicles (UVs) called large surface unmanned vehicles (LUSVs), medium surface unmanned vehicles (MUSVs) and extra-large unmanned submarine vehicles (XLUUVs). The Navy's proposed FY2023 budget calls for \$549.3 million in R&D funding for these large UVs and LUSV/MUSV-enabling technologies and \$60.7 million in supplemental funding for baseline technologies for XLUUVs and other Navy UUVs. The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to move the Navy toward a more distributed fleet architecture, i.e., a mix of ships that spreads the Navy's capabilities across an increased number of platforms and

avoids concentrating a large portion of the total fleet. capability in a relatively small number of high-value ships (i.e., a mix of ships that avoids "putting too many eggs in one basket"). The Navy and Department of Defense (DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a new Navy force-level goal that reflects this new fleet mix. The Navy's FY2023 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan (FY2023-FY2052), released April 20, 2022, includes a table summarizing the results of studies that have been conducted on the new force-level goal. These studies outline potential future fleets of 27 to 153 large USVs and 18 to 51 large UUVs. The Navy predicts that LUSVs are 200 feet to 300 feet long and have full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons, which would make them the size of a corvette (i.e., a ship larger than a patrol vessel and smaller than a frigate). The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships with a large capacity to carry various modular payloads - mainly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, i.e. mainly anti-ship and land attack missiles. Each LUSV could be equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) with 16 to 32 missile launch tubes. Although referred to as UVs, LUSVs could more accurately be described as optional or lightly crewed vessels, as they could sometimes have several crew members on board, especially in the near term as the Navy develops technologies and operational concepts that enable LUSVs. Under the Navy's FY2023 five-year plan (FY2023-FY2027), procurement of LUSVs through the Navy's shipbuilding account is scheduled to begin in FY2025. The Navy defines LUSVs as 45 to 190 feet in length with displacements of about 500 tons, which would make them the size of a patrol ship. The Navy wants MUSVs, like LUSVs, to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships that can accommodate a variety of payloads. The initial payloads for MUSVs should be intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Navy's five-year shipbuilding plan for FY2023 (FY2023-FY2027) does not include the procurement of any MUSVs in FY2023-FY2027. XLUUVs are roughly the size of a subway car. The first five XLUUVs were funded in FY2019 and are built by Boeing. The Navy wants to use the XLUUVs, among other things, to secretly deploy the Hammerhead mine, a planned mine that would be tethered to the seafloor and armed with an anti-submarine torpedo, largely similar to the Navy's Cold War-era CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) mine.

Under the Navy's five-year plan for FY2023 (FY2023-FY2027), procurement of additional XLUUVs through the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) account is scheduled to begin in FY2024. In marking up the Navy's proposed budgets for FY2020-FY2022, congressional defense committees expressed concern about whether the Navy's acquisition strategies provided sufficient time to adequately develop key concepts of operations and technologies for these large UVUs, particularly LUSVs, and included legislative provisions designed to address these concerns. In response to these increases, the Navy has restructured its acquisition strategy for the LUSV program to conform to these legislative provisions and provide more time for development of key operational concepts and technologies before entering mass production of deployable units.

Source: <https://news.usni.org/2022/10/21/report-on-navy-large-unmanned-surface-and-undersea-vehicles-11#more-98324>

## [NATO boosts maritime infrastructure protection in the North Sea after Nord Stream explosions](#)

NATO member states are increasing their naval presence near energy infrastructure. The protection of energy infrastructure comes in the wake of the Nord Stream pipeline damage, according to Defence24. As a result, the Norwegian Navy has announced that NATO countries have increased surveillance of offshore platforms operating in the North Sea.

The Norwegian Ministry of Defence tweeted a photo taken through the periscope of a Norwegian submarine. The image shows the Norwegian Barentshav-class patrol vessel KV Sortland, which is used by the Norwegian Coast Guard.

In the North Sea, the Norwegian Naval Forces sail alongside other NATO ships to secure Norwegian oil and gas installations.



The photo is taken through the periscope of a Norwegian submarine, showing the KV Sortland on patrol near Norwegian oil and gas platforms in the North Sea.

Subsequently, the German Navy published a photo of the F123 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern sailing in the North Sea.

"We have increased our presence in Norwegian waters and are sailing together with our allies to ensure the protection of Norwegian oil and gas platforms," the German Navy said.

Such statements and actions are a signal to the Russian Federation of NATO's readiness to counter possible "accidents" like the Nord Stream pipeline.



German investigators have found that a series of explosions on the Baltic seabed along the Nord Stream and Nord Stream-2 submarine gas pipelines were the result of sabotage.

In addition, France, Germany and the UK will help other NATO member states to protect their critical energy infrastructure in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea after the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines.

Source: [https://www.defenseromania.ro/nato-sporeste-protectia-infrastructurii-maritime-dupa-exploziile-de-la-nord-stream\\_618993.html](https://www.defenseromania.ro/nato-sporeste-protectia-infrastructurii-maritime-dupa-exploziile-de-la-nord-stream_618993.html)

Playing Solitaire with gas - we change Ukraine to Turkey and Nord Streams to the Turkish version (!Source: RUSSIA!)

The invitation to the Turkish hub for Russian gas going to Europe is designed to not only and not so much replace supply via Nord Stream. An alternative is also needed for the route through Belarus ("Yamal-Europe") and even more so through Ukraine.

Already in the near future.




While the transit of gas through Ukraine continues, which surprises no one - war is war, and gas is on schedule. The option with a Turkish hub is provocative in one sense - it aims at the economic separation of one of the alliance members from NATO. But at the same time, the firefighter also has problems - Russia is doing badly with gas transportation routes, most of which we simply cannot afford to route for liquefaction.

The notorious turn to the East doesn't save either - not enough transit capacity there either, which threatens to shut down promising fields. However, from all points of view, one important factor cannot be ignored - in this case, Russian supplies become dependent (<https://topwar.ru/174219-russkij-transit-pod-tureckij-marsh.html>). It depends primarily on Turkey's policy towards Russia. Today, the long-awaited "no" seems to be told to Kiev about Bayraktars, but who knows what will happen tomorrow? Whether the European Union will agree to receive Russian gas only in transit through Turkey is another question, given the plans, which are already partly implemented, to reduce "Euro-dependence" on our gas. Baku is not sleeping, so is Sofia. At the same time, we should not forget that Turkey is the only transit country for Azerbaijani gas supplied to Europe. And for obvious political reasons, it is difficult to assume that Ankara's participation in Russian gas supplies will be a priority over its participation in Azerbaijani gas supplies. It is also important that the direction of the "trans-Turkish" route for the transit of Russian gas to its main consumers in the EU is primarily Central Europe. And at the same time, the Turkish pipeline is almost twice as long as the "trans-Ukrainian" route. It will also be almost two and a half times longer than the long Nord Stream. And about the same distance compared to the Yamal-Europe pipeline which is currently idle.

As if to spite the Russians, in the first ten days of this October, a 140 km gas pipeline from north-east Greece to Bulgaria was put into operation. Designed to supply three billion cubic metres of Azerbaijani gas, and from 2023-2024 - at least 5.5 billion cubic metres a year. This artery is scheduled to be expanded in 2023-2025, including branches in Northern Macedonia, Serbia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, Greece, according to Greek sources and the all-knowing Reuters, has reduced the volume of Russian gas imports by more than half in January-September 2022 compared to the same period in 2021. It is also characteristic that on the eve of the agreements between Moscow and Ankara on the gas node, Czech source Seznam zprávy reported on 5 October, referring to energy companies in the EU region, that Russian gas imports to the EU have decreased and do not exceed 10% of the total volume of gas imports. Europe is trying to compensate for this decline with LNG. At the end

of September, a drop of more than 50% in Russian gas deliveries compared to last year was noted. But supplies of LNG "have surged", received from Algeria, Egypt, Qatar, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago. Despite the fact that "its value significantly exceeds the previous year's values".


Why have they forgotten Yamal-Europe?



Given all these factors, it seems highly controversial to hastily abandon the use of the shortest and cheapest pipeline route to Europe - the Yamal-Europe pipeline. That is, the Yamal - Belarus - Poland - Germany route. To clarify: the sanctions imposed by Russia on 11 May this year against EuRoPol GAZ, the owner of the Polish Yamal-Europe section, "mean a ban on Gazprom using the capacity of this pipeline," confirmed Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov. Moreover, on 26 April 2022, Poland included Gazprom in the anti-Russian sanctions. But in the end, deliveries here came to an abrupt halt on 29 March. More: "Gazprom" did not book a pumping here in April this year from 89.1 million cubic meters. This decision was explained by "warming in Europe and increasing supplies of liquefied natural gas on the European market". In other words, the cessation of use of this pipeline took place just before the Polish sanctions... So it turns out that dependence on the Turkish gas hub is inevitable for Russia in the near future. Meanwhile, Russia's dependence on gas supplies through Ukraine remains, if not grows.

Someone is fighting, and someone is dictating

By the way, in the 1970s and 1980s, many Ukrainian émigré media noted that if the USSR collapsed, Ukraine would become the "owner" of Russia's main gas export arteries. And, they say, it would be able to dictate to Moscow and, at least to Eastern Europe, its own gas transit conditions... However, the gas hub in Turkey, according to Alexei Belogoriev, an energy expert at the Institute of Energy and Finance, guarantees little for the Russian Federation: "Unless there are radical changes in the international situation, the gas hub project in Turkey will, at best, face the fate of Nord Stream 2, the construction of which has cost tens of billions of dollars. But which was never put into operation."



Yes, a gas hub project for the Russian Federation is very attractive to Turkey, "but for such a construction there needs to be long-term demand guarantees and no one is going to offer them to Gazprom".

Already in 2025, according to the expert, "a significant increase in LNG supply from traditional suppliers is expected. This will radically improve the gas balance in Europe." The expert also points out that Germany, Austria and Italy "especially need" Russian gas in Europe. But "there are no direct gas flows from Turkey to these countries; there are many bottlenecks, including political bottlenecks, that do not allow you to build this infrastructure quickly." So increasing Russian gas deliveries across the Turkish-European border "will not radically improve anything".

Source: <https://topwar.ru/203650-gazovyj-pasjans-menjaem-ukrainu-na-turciju-a-severnnyj-potoki-na-tureckij-.html>

American scientists have discovered vulnerabilities in the Starlink satellite communications system that threaten its safe operation (!Source: RUSSIA!)

The Starlink satellite communications system, kindly offered for free use to Ukraine by SpaceX owner Elon Musk, is in fact the only communication channel for providing communications for Ukraine's Armed Forces both locally and over long distances. Musk recently announced that he was no longer prepared to fund the work on receiving and transmitting stations, let alone provide new ones, at his own expense, but quickly changed his mind under sincere pressure from US authorities. In total, about 20 thousand Starlink terminals have been transferred to Ukraine. Supply chain operations have cost SpaceX \$80 million so far. In Kiev, just in case, they made sure by trying to enter into direct negotiations with Musk and seemed to have found three sources of funding for the network, should the question of payment arise again. But it turns out that, in addition to Musk's unexpectedly eccentric statements, Starlink is not in the clear for other, purely technical reasons. The US journal MIT Technology Review, which writes about high-tech research and development, reported that scientists at the University of Texas have discovered a vulnerability in Starlink's security system. It turns out that the satellite system not only provides an internet connection, but can also function as a GPS navigation system. Like, well, so what? But the point is that this makes the timing sequence of the Starlink system unpredictable. Since the GPS system runs on unreliable open source channels, this makes it easy to spoof Starlink signals.

Ukraine and its Western allies are beginning to realize that they have little control over Starlink and know little about it - said Professor Todd Humphreys of the University of Texas.

In turn, the interference of signals from SpaceX satellites at Starlink ground stations with GPS signals can create problems in the proper functioning of the satellite navigation system.

Earlier, the Financial Times, citing Ukrainian officials, wrote about problems with the operation of Starlink terminals. For his part, Musk said that Russia is trying to "kill" the Starlink satellite internet system in Ukraine, it might not work, despite the resources invested in its protection. It is possible that our cyber experts, such as American scientists, have managed to detect vulnerabilities in the system and are trying to use them to deprive the Ukrainian military of its only stable communication channel. And if this happens, what will the Kiev authorities do, given that Ukraine's entire energy system is close to collapse?

Source: <https://topwar.ru/203833-amerikanskije-uchenye-nashli-ujazvimosti-v-sisteme-sputnikovoj-svjazi-starlink-ugrozhajuschie-ee-bezopasnoj-rabote.html>

### Battle for Herson (!Source: RUSSIA!)

For weeks now, every morning for me starts with the same kind of messages that "the situation on the N direction is alarming. Enemy forces up to... are preparing an attack on settlement A. But come midday and the mood improves. "Dill forces up to..., with support... have launched an attack on settlement A. Units... have successfully stopped the attacks". Well, in the evening, Lieutenant General Konashenkov's traditional speech that "in the direction... the enemy launched a desperate attack on our positions, but it was stopped and repulsed. At the same time, we lost... tanks and infantry fighting vehicles... armored vehicles and... personnel. True, the subject of evacuating civilians from Herson has recently been added. Here, thank goodness, there is almost no panic in our media and social networks. Everything is going according to plan. Civilians are temporarily going "on vacation" to reduce casualties during the ukrovoyak bombing in the city. But on the other hand, Ukrainians are dispersing this topic to the maximum: "Kherson is ours!" Looks like we're playing war. Not those who risk their lives every day and repel the desperate attacks of Ukrovoiskis, who perform a daily feat for us. We are the ones in the back. We need everything fast. Win fast with small forces. Disperse the real NATO army quickly. Quickly release, borrow and so on. There's a war on. What it's called is only important to politicians. To the soldiers and officers on the front lines, these nuances are not important. There is an enemy and it must be destroyed. All of it! The only important thing is how many forces this enemy has, how many equipment and weapons. It is important to carry out the task set by the commander. The enemy will advance In almost every article I write about the fact that October and the first half of November are the deadline for the Kiev regime when it is possible to somehow correct a rather precarious situation in the eyes of the owners. And the situation with the personnel of our armies is still dire. Superiority is on the side of Ukraine. But nevertheless, numerous operations by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to break through our defenses are failing. I'm not writing about the ones that have been, but the ones that are happening now. How many landings have been destroyed in various areas adjacent to the NPA. How many DRG, platoon, company and battalion battlegroups are either destroyed or repulsed. And notice, when correspondents communicate directly in the trenches with the fighters, there is absolutely no grim thought there. "Let them come up. They get punched in the face and crawl back..." The fighters wait for the offensive, but understand that here and now it is still impossible. Is it possible to break through the defenses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and then what? Who will break through? I am not at all surprised that we have learned to build a quality defense. Specifically, they learned to use the knowledge they got in the war. It is quite difficult to fight an enemy who has studied according to the same book and instructions as you. The thinking of commanders is similar. And they can predict the enemy's subsequent actions with a high

degree of probability. So, what we have for today on the bottom line. In the north, the Armed Forces of Ukraine can no longer launch a serious offensive due to the lack of forces and assets that have been transferred to the central and southern directions. This means that positional battles will most likely be fought there with minimal movement of units. There may be some success by one side or the other in taking one or two points (today already conditional). In the center the situation is much the same. This is where the tactical sphere opens up for the Republican corps. The stability of the front helps reconnaissance work and, consequently, artillery. The only problem for the command here is the desire to attack, no matter what. The desire is precisely the fighters on the front line. There's a house here, I see it, but they won't let me take it... South stays. Herson and the Herson region. However, as was said at the very beginning of the Ukrainian offensive. Only in the event of the defeat of the Russian group in this area will it be possible to speak of a tactical victory of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the autumn campaign. The capture of Kherson may also play a huge psychological role. But...

No one will surrender more Russian cities



Today there is a lot of analytical material about how events will develop further. Lots of opinions and views. Quite a few controversial arguments. More to the point, on Kherson, everyone can find any opinion. From "we've already surrendered Kherson" to "hell no on Kostya-Odessa". And this is quite natural. The fact is that in recent weeks, and for the Armed Forces of Ukraine even earlier, both sides have seriously "shut up" about personnel and enlisted servicemen. If earlier, by opening an Internet channel, we could get information about any movement of units, about the build-up of forces in a particular sector, about the replenishment or supply of weapons, now most often this is information in the series of "it seems to me" or "I think ... And rightly so. It's not for nothing that I used the option at the beginning of the material to submit a summary of the Sovinformburo. I'm all for the truth, but so because of it, a mere front-line soldier doesn't pay with his own blood, even with his life. But back to the attack on Herson. To do so, you just have to "get higher". Simply move from the battlefield to headquarters and consider the task "on the map". If you listen carefully to General Surovikin's speech, and you should trust his opinion, Herson is the one who is preparing a powerful strike, similar to what we observed in the Kharkov region. I think Surovikin has already "greatly delighted" the Ukrainian staff officers with this statement. The military is simple. Don't talk. General Armageddon simply said that the losses of Ukraine's armed forces during an attack on the city would increase by several times compared to the

Kharkov operation. I know, I see, I'm preparing... There will be no sudden attack! I fully agree with the commander. The surprise factor is excluded. Intelligence works. We know where and with what weapons enemy troops are concentrated. Yes, and offensive plans are generally known. In such an environment, it's similar to begin the onset of death. But Kiev has no options. In the crosses are the coffins of soldiers and officers or the nearest cemetery. By the way, if you look carefully at what is happening now in Herson, it is not hard to see that the troops are not leaving there. The civilians are being removed, but the troops are staying put. So no one will leave in the future. I won't be giving away any military secrets if I write that the main problem in defending this city is its location on the right bank of the Dnieper. It is not for nothing that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been trying to demolish the Antonovsky Bridge for quite some time. This is the most important bridge for supplying the city, which is quite difficult to replace even with pontoon crossings. But in the absence of civilians, this is a completely doable task. Another thing is that at the moment we will not be able to provide the necessary number of staff. But this factor is also offset by artillery and UAV strikes. Unfortunately, videoconferencing cannot be used in sufficient volume. The airfields are too far away. Planes can't fly instantly out of Crimea. But there are helicopters. What's more, Russian airmen have already become adept at strikes against manpower and can independently take out entire units.

Yes, today Ukraine's armed forces far outnumber our army in this area. But the quality of personnel leaves something to be desired. Prepared drugs are now used in offensive operations. All these mini-offensives reduce the number of soldiers and officers trained and fired upon in combat. Today they are being diluted with mobilized with weekly training at the range. Overall, it is already clear that General Surovikin will not surrender Kherson. There will be a very serious and bloody battle. It is quite possible that the last battle, a kind of modern Kursk battle. After which the Armed Forces of Ukraine may lose their "Armored Armies" (Western support) and withdraw.

Well, the technical part

Specifically, a brief analysis of the options for the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. I'm not going to suggest anything in particular. It's all like a boxing match. Swinging, left and right hand side attack and jab, straight jab and their combinations. The least likely punch is a swing from the right from the east. Quite a tricky maneuver that is fraught with huge losses and unpredictable results, judging by the landings in the ZNPP area. Crossing the Dnieper and accessing Herson from the east, practically from the rear. On the map it looks tempting, if not for General Surovikin's performance. Therefore, there is no particular interest in this shot, but it is to be feared. War, like boxing, is a "wonderful" thing. There are many such "miracles". Landing in the Stanislav area? Forcing the Dnieper estuary? Just read the Rules of Engagement and take the measures that are recommended there. You don't even have to make anything up. The second least likely option is the jab. The same direct jab from Nikolaev through Pravdino or, if possible, through Posad-Pokrovskoye. According to information from open sources, some of the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are really focusing on this direction. It is doubtful that this was the main direction of impact. Rather, it is "option B" or preparing a diversionary strike. Well, the most likely and most "chic" shot for APU is a left swing. The shot from the north, from Krivoy Rog. This direction has been pushed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces for a long time. Many Ukrainian Army units and divisions have already disappeared there. The village of Davydov Brod is probably known to almost all readers from the reports of the Ministry of Defense and reports of military correspondents. There is also option B. And also known to readers. This is the village of Dudchany, direction Nikopol. In addition, there is the possibility to "bite" the

Russian army in different directions using DRG and VTG. As it happened, for example, in the Snigirevka area.

The cornered cat

For I don't know how many times I write the same sentence about the activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in October and mid-November. Once it sounded like "in the next two or three months". Now "about a month". Now it is already possible to say openly that at that time, tentatively, even those units will come forward, which today actively "remember" what they were taught during active service. At that time, the monstrous superiority in personnel that exists today will be eliminated. I understand the objections that will follow. Today, offenses are more like reconnaissance in force than offenses. I respond immediately: a decisive offensive is being prepared. But no one has written off the possibility of sudden good fortune. The operation in Kharkov is a case in point. And the small groups used for the offensive are simply the result of a lack of resources. Thanks to our gunners, VKS and UAV operators. Thanks to them, the Armed Forces of Ukraine today are facing a shortage not only of equipment and weapons, but also of ammunition and fuel. I really liked the last big offensive of the Ukrainian army. "UAF forces up to two infantry battalions, supported by a tank battalion...". I think the strategists at Ukrainian and US headquarters chose this particular tactic for the reasons mentioned above. At the same time, I don't think the enemy has abandoned the "we'll throw our hats in the ring" option. The attack on Herson will, in my opinion, be just that. I repeat, the quality of personnel does not allow the command to plan an offensive in small groups. Bulk tactics will be used. Use of large units and formations simultaneously.

And the final conclusion for today

As you may have noticed, I have not addressed the issue of Kakhovka Dam. Meanwhile, judging by the condition of the dam itself and the number of craters from Ukrainian missiles and shells, the problem is serious. And if we add to this reports about the delivery of floating sea mines and plans to launch them along the Dnieper towards the dam, then the situation becomes generally disastrous. The dam is likely to explode eventually. What is the outcome? The military has long considered everything. After the explosion, water will come to Herson in 2 hours. The river will flow for five (more precise figure 4.8) kilometers. Settlements on the left and right banks will be flooded. UkroSMI has already begun actively zombifying its population in the now familiar "self-explode, self-dam, etc." style. The Kakhovskaya dam, in particular, we will blow up in the self-explode version. Numerous Ukrainian spies on the dam in the form of "unnamed sources" are already reporting "exploitation of the dam by Russia". There is another circumstance that is of paramount importance to Kiev. This is the ZNPP! Specifically, the Kakhovka reservoir is used at a nuclear power plant to take water for the cooling system. Putting the reservoir deep will create big problems. Here are all the landings in this area, here are the Energodar strikes... In the pile. I can't put together a puzzle in my mind about the statements of Ukrainian politicians, military and all sorts of experts. Try to combine at least some of the statements. "Russia, under the pretext of evacuation, takes patriotic Ukrainians to its territory". "The burning of the dam will lead to the simultaneous flooding of several settlements in the coastal area, which will automatically allow the forcible takeover of Ukrainians on Russian territory".

"The flooding of Herson and the forced removal of the people will deprive the patriots of the opportunity to launch a guerrilla war..." "Since the draining of the Kakhovka reservoir will cause problems in the atomic operation of the Zaporozhye power plant, Russia will shut down the station, which will make living conditions for Ukrainians in Herson and adjacent regions much worse." To a normal person who knows that Russian citizens now live in the Herson region, this seems savage. But to Ukrainians who are stubborn and lacking in the ability to get information from various sources, it will be fine. But it would be worth looking

at the history of the Great Patriotic War. Read what happened then, after the explosion of the Dnepro dam. Read about the vertical drop of almost 150 meters. And about the height of the 12-meter wave, too... The data is taken from the American statement of January 28 this year. By the way...

Source : <https://topwar.ru/203733-budet-li-sovremennaja-kurskaja-bitva-o-situacii-pod-hersonom.html>

### HAVELSAN continues to expand its portfolio of naval data distribution systems

HAVELSAN's 41st naval data distribution system has been accepted for use in 2 MİLGEM class corvettes of the Pakistan Navy. In the 14 years since the system was first delivered, the Submarine Data Distribution System (DBDS) for ten submarines and the Ship Data Distribution System (GVDS) for 31 surface ships have been successfully developed and implemented both at home and abroad. For domestic use, a total of 36 systems have been produced. Twenty-nine of these systems were GVDSs and were distributed as follows: 5 for MİLGEM, 16 for the new type patrol craft, 2 for LST, 1 for TCG Anadolu, DIMDEG, TVEG, Burak, Barbaros and Kılıç.



On the other hand, DBDSs were installed on seven submarines; 6 for Reis Class submarines and 1 for Preveze submarine. Ukraine names first Milgem corvette as "Hetman Ivan Mazepa" Ada class corvettes are equipped with GVDS (STM photo) A total of 5 systems have been developed, 2 GVDSs for Pakistan MİLGEM Corvette and 3 DBDSs for Pakistan AGOSTA submarines. GVDS and DBDS considered the heart of the platforms, have direct connections to many systems on the platform, and these systems get the data they need through GVDS and DBDS. The system has been designed and developed with such speed and performance that it prepares the data infrastructure needed for the ship to hit even rough seas in bad weather conditions. HAVELSAN, which provides the necessary infrastructure for tactical sensors such as radars and weapon systems such as guns to operate at the highest performance even in the worst conditions in the ship's environment, also supplies most of the electronic cards required for the GVDS/DBDS product family. and develops all its software and mechanical needs with its unique in-house engineering solutions. Despite the very large number of platforms these systems have run on to date, they continue to operate 24/7 with a very high success rate without experiencing any major failures. In addition, 41 systems have been delivered so far and 20 ships and submarines are in the delivery queue for awarded domestic and international projects.

The HAVELSAN GVDS/DBDS product family, which has reached around 75% national deployment exceeding even the quota in the contract signed with the Presidency of Defence Industries, allows the platform on which it is installed to operate at the highest performance even in difficult sea conditions.

HAVELSAN GVDS and Turkish HAVELSAN DBDS continue to expand the HAVELSAN DBDS naval data distribution systems portfolio

HAVELSAN Platform Data Distribution Systems (PDDS), is designed to operate with full performance in any surface platform environment condition. HAVELSAN GVDS, a redundant and reliable system, is developed for use on large, medium and small warships with its 24/7 combat availability and is a key system for ship systems integration. HAVELSAN GVDS, specially designed according to area allocation and operational needs on large, medium and small warships

MAXI CABINET: 28U device capacity

MIDI CABINET: 25U device capacity

MINI CABINET: 14U device capacity

MIKRO CABINET: 8U device capacity

The "heart" of ships, HAVELSAN's data distribution system platform, with its operational performance and reliable technology, is preferred by the Turkish naval forces and the naval forces of many other countries since 2009. DBDS Weapons, sensors and navigation systems in submarines, which have the most complex technology after space vehicles, must be able to operate fully, the data integration of these systems must be done correctly and only correct and valid data must be conveyed in the fastest way. throughout the combat system. The HAVELSAN Submarine Data Distribution System (DBDS), a member of the HAVELSAN Platform Data Distribution System (PDDS) family, is designed to operate seamlessly in any submarine environment condition. HAVELSAN DBDS, a redundant and reliable system, provides 24/7 war readiness and increases safety of navigation.

Source: <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/10/turkish-havelsan-keeps-enlarging-naval-data-distribution-sytems-portfolio/>