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Revealed: Ukraine’s covert teams CRIPPLING Putin’s Infrastructure
MS Daily brief-05 DECEMBER 2025
Contents
BREAKING NEWS: Hamas AMBUSH injures IDF troops; US deploys ATTACK DRONE squadron | TBN Israel 1
UK and Norway to operate joint fleet of frigates to hunt Russian submarines in North Atlantic 1
Four countries to boycott Eurovision 2026 after Israel gets green light to participate. 2
Macron reportedly warned Zelenskyy that the US could “betray Ukraine on the issue of territory” 4
Russia blocks Snapchat and restricts Apple’s FaceTime, state officials say. 8
Pentagon announces it killed four men in another attack on a boat in the Pacific. 10
Yasser Abu Shabab, leader of Israeli-backed militia, killed in Gaza. 16
Putin and Modi to meet during difficult political times for Russia and India. 18
Trump news in brief: US Supreme Court rules in favor of Texas in battle over redistricting 25
Police say they have recovered the Fabergé pendant from the man accused of swallowing it 28
Son of Earth and Sky – source RUSSIA.. 29
The fate of the Burevestnik – Flight of Chernobyl – source RUSSIA.. 35
Pirates attack LPG tanker and kidnap crew off West Africa. 41
Russia and Myanmar conclude annual joint naval exercise. 42
Gambia joins Comoros and others in crackdown on flying the flag. 43
Gambia seeks to reassert control over its flag. 44
Romania secures Hisar-class corvette from Turkey to bolster NATO’s Black Sea Shield. 50
ULAQ’s 15 MPV drone marks a new step in Turkey’s autonomous naval warfare. 54
Egypt presents the USV-AIO-001 unmanned vessel with Eagle-2 weapon station at EDEX 2025. 57
Port investment planning for a changing maritime landscape. 64
Flooded with defense money, Poland rolls out the red carpet for American tech companies 67
BREAKING NEWS: Hamas AMBUSH injures IDF troops; US deploys ATTACK DRONE squadron | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine | Ukraine attacks Russian base in Crimea | Pokrovsk is in critical condition | Putin in India
Britain and Norway to operate joint fleet of frigates to hunt Russian submarines in North Atlantic
HMS Cardiff, the second British Type 26 frigate in a long series. Photo: Profimdia
The United Kingdom and Norway will sign a new defense cooperation agreement today, which provides for the joint operation of a fleet of frigates to “hunt Russian submarines” in the North Atlantic, according to the British Ministry of Defense, AFP notes.
This agreement comes a few months after Norway announced the purchase of at least five Type 26 frigates from the British group BAE Systems for £10 billion (€11.5 billion), the ministry’s statement recalls, writes Agerpres. Under the new agreement, which is to be confirmed during a visit on Thursday by Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store and Defense Minister Tore Sandvik, the two countries will operate an “interchangeable” fleet of at least 13 frigates, eight British and those ordered by Oslo.
This fleet, capable of “rapid deployment wherever needed,” will have the primary mission of “hunting Russian submarines and protecting critical British infrastructure,” the statement said, without specifying when it will become operational.
According to London, Russian submarine activity in British territorial waters has increased by 30% in the last two years, as tensions with Moscow have escalated due to the war in Ukraine.
“In this period of profound global instability, with an increasing number of Russian vessels detected in our waters, we must work with international partners to protect our national security,” British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said.
“This historic agreement with Norway strengthens our ability to protect our borders and the critical infrastructure on which our nation depends,” he added.
On November 10, British Defense Minister John Healey warned Russia after the Russian warship Yantar was detected in British waters for the second time this year. He accused Russia of, for the first time, directing its lasers at Royal Air Force pilots monitoring its activities.
Norway announced in August that it had accepted the offer for frigates from the British group BAE Systems, over the French Naval Group. These are scheduled for delivery to the Norwegian Navy starting in 2030. Germany and the United States also bid for this contract.
Source: here
Four countries will boycott Eurovision 2026 after Israel was given the green light to participate
Ireland, Spain, Slovenia, and the Netherlands are withdrawing after the decision not to hold a vote on Israel’s participation
Philip Oltermann and Lisa O’Carroll
Friday, December 5, 2025, 12:20 a.m. CET
Ireland, Spain, Slovenia, and the Netherlands will boycott next year’s Eurovision after Israel was given the green light to compete in the 2026 music contest, despite calls from several participating television stations to exclude it because of the war in Gaza.
On Thursday, at the general assembly of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), the body that organizes the contest, no vote was taken on Israel’s participation.
Instead, participating television stations voted only on the introduction of new rules designed to prevent governments and third parties from disproportionately promoting songs to influence voters.
“A large majority of members agreed that no further vote on participation was necessary and that the Eurovision Song Contest 2026 should go ahead as planned, with additional safeguards,” the EBU said in a statement.
In response, Irish broadcaster RTÉ said it would not participate in the 2026 contest and would not broadcast the competition. “RTÉ believes that Ireland’s participation remains unacceptable given the appalling loss of life in Gaza and the humanitarian crisis there, which continues to endanger the lives of so many civilians,” the broadcaster said in a statement.
Spain’s RTVE also said it would not broadcast next year’s contest or semi-finals in Vienna, describing the decision-making process as “insufficient” and generating “mistrust.”
The BBC indicated that it would broadcast next year’s contest, stating: “We support the collective decision taken by EBU members. It is about applying EBU rules and being inclusive,” the broadcaster said. German broadcaster SWR confirmed that it would participate.
The Spanish national broadcaster, along with seven other countries, formally requested a secret ballot at Thursday’s summit of broadcasters in Geneva.
“The EBU presidency rejected RTVE’s request to hold a specific vote on Israel’s participation. This decision increases RTVE’s distrust of the festival’s organization and confirms the political pressure surrounding it,” a statement said.
Spain’s culture minister, Ernest Urtasun, supported the boycott. He said: “You cannot cover up the genocide in Gaza with Israel. Culture should be on the side of peace and justice. I am proud of RTVE, which puts human rights before any economic interest.”
In a statement released Thursday afternoon, Dutch broadcaster Avrotros announced that it would also withdraw from next year’s contest. “After weighing all perspectives, Avrotros has concluded that, under the current circumstances, participation cannot be reconciled with the fundamental public values of our organization.”
Slovenian national broadcaster RTVSLO — the first to threaten a boycott this summer — said participation “would conflict with its values of peace, equality, and respect.”
At Thursday’s meeting, EBU members discussed new rules designed to prevent governments and third parties from promoting songs to influence voters.
Some countries expressed concern about inappropriate promotion methods after Israel took first place in the public vote in May’s contest, finishing second overall after jury votes were taken into account.
The proposed rule changes were seen as an olive branch to television stations critical of Israel, but appear to have been deemed insufficient by most nations that had signaled their intention to boycott the event.
Sixty-five percent of delegates voted in favor of the changes to the music contest and did not discuss Israel’s participation further, while 23% voted against and 10% abstained.
Among those who supported the changes were television stations in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland, which said they would continue to support the music contest.
In a joint statement, they said they “support” the EBU’s decision to “address critical shortcomings” in the voting system, but believe it is “important to maintain an ongoing dialogue on how we can protect the credibility of the EBU and the Eurovision Song Contest in the future.”
Iceland’s RÚV, which threatened a boycott earlier this year, said it would review its position at a board meeting next Wednesday.
Israeli President Isaac Herzog welcomed the decision on his country’s participation, saying that Israel “deserves to be represented on all stages of the world.”
“I am delighted that Israel will once again participate in the Eurovision Song Contest and hope that the competition will remain one that promotes culture, music, friendship between nations, and cross-border cultural understanding,” he wrote on X.
The 2026 edition of the world’s largest live music event, the 70th in its history, will take place in Vienna, following this year’s victory by Austrian singer JJ.
In Germany, leading politicians proposed that SWR withdraw in solidarity if Israel were excluded. ORF, the Austrian host broadcaster, also said it wanted Israel to participate in the contest.
SWR said before the meeting that Israel has the right to participate in the contest. It said that for decades, the contest has been “a competition organized by EBU broadcasters, not governments” and that “Israeli broadcaster Kan meets all the requirements for participation” for 2026.
Russia was excluded from Eurovision after its large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Israel, which has won the contest four times since its debut in 1973, has participated for the past two years despite disputes over its participation.
Macron reportedly warned Zelenskyy that the US could “betray Ukraine on territory”
Der Spiegel cites a leaked phone call in which European leaders express doubts about Washington’s approach to peace negotiations
Deborah Cole in Berlin
Thursday, December 4, 2025, 5:35 p.m. CET
Emmanuel Macron reportedly warned Volodymyr Zelenskyy that “there is a possibility that the US will betray Ukraine on the issue of territory, without clarity on security guarantees,” German magazine Der Spiegel reported, citing a leaked memo from a recent conversation with several European leaders.
Der Spiegel said it obtained an English summary of Monday’s conversation, which it said contained direct quotes from European heads of government expressing fundamental doubts about Washington’s approach to the negotiations.
The French president described the current tense phase of negotiations as “a great danger” for the Ukrainian president, who is in a difficult position, according to the summary. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz reportedly added that the Ukrainian leader must be “very cautious.”
“They are playing with you as well as with us,” Merz reportedly told him, according to the magazine, which concluded that this remark referred to this week’s diplomatic mission to Moscow by President Donald Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
The magazine said other leaders have also shared their worries, like Alexander Stubb from Finland, who became friends with Trump while playing golf, warning that “we shouldn’t leave Ukraine and Volodymyr alone with these people.”
Even NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte—who publicly praises Trump highly—reportedly agreed with Stubb “that we must protect Volodymyr.”
Der Spiegel said it spoke to “several” participants in the conversation who confirmed it took place, with two of them saying the remark was “accurately reproduced.”
A spokesperson for Zelenskyy declined to comment, as did Merz’s office, while the Élysée Palace disputed the quotes attributed to Macron. Der Spiegel said Rutte’s office declined to comment.
The magazine published a report in German and separately published an English version, stating that it contained original quotes from the briefing note.
Last month, Washington presented a 28-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine, drafted without the input of Ukraine’s European allies and criticized as being too close to Moscow’s maximalist demands.
A series of diplomatic efforts followed, with American and Ukrainian negotiators holding talks in Geneva and Florida before Witkoff and Kushner headed to Moscow on Tuesday.
The two spent five hours in talks with Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin, and Witkoff is scheduled to meet with the head of Ukraine’s National Security Council, Rustem Umerov, in Miami on Thursday.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius told parliament on Thursday that an imposed peace would be “disastrous” not only for Kyiv but also for Europe’s security.
He called on European nations not to weaken their support for Ukraine.
“An imposed peace would be disastrous for Europe… because a Ukraine that is militarily defeated or potentially even defeated at the negotiating table (or) destabilized internally by Russian influence would jeopardize Europe’s security,” Pistorius said.
In a column for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper, Merz argued for using frozen Russian state assets to support Ukraine and said that Europe seems to be largely on its own in protecting its interests.
“The question of European independence is being decided today, when our security interests are under threat. And it will be decided by how we respond to this challenge,” he said.
“We are sending a signal of European independence, a signal that we Europeans decide and shape what happens on our continent.”
Merz stressed that “we cannot let other, non-European countries decide what happens to the financial resources of an aggressor that have been legally frozen in the jurisdiction of our constitutional state and in our own currency.
“What we decide now will determine the future of Europe.”
Ukraine war update: drones spotted near Zelenskyy’s flight path during his trip to Dublin
An Irish navy ship spotted suspicious drones near Zelenskyy’s flight path as he landed in Ireland on Monday, local media reported. What we know on day 1,381
Guardian staff and agents
Friday, December 5, 2025, 03:38 CET
- An Irish navy vessel spotted up to five drones operating near the flight path of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s plane as he arrived in Ireland on Monday for a state visit, Irish and Ukrainian media reported. The sighting triggered a major security alert due to concerns that it was an attempt to interfere with the flight path, the Irish Times reported. Anonymous sources quoted by the publication said the plane, which arrived a little earlier, was not in danger. The Journal’s website reported that the drones arrived at the location where Zelenskyy’s plane was expected to be just as it was due to pass. It said investigations were underway to determine whether the drones took off from land or from an undetected ship. They were first spotted northeast of Dublin, about 20 km (12 miles) from the airport, both news agencies reported. Ukrainian media quoted Dmytro Lytvyn, an adviser to Zelenskyy, as saying that Ukrainian officials had been informed about the drones but no action was deemed necessary. “According to their data, there were indeed such drones, but this did not affect the visit and there was no need to impose any changes to it.” Ireland’s defense forces said they had no comment on the details of the alleged incidents for security reasons. “However, the Defense Forces’ support for the security operation, led by An Garda Siochana [the police], was successfully carried out through multiple means, ultimately resulting in a safe and successful visit,” a spokesperson said in a statement.
- Vladimir Putin has again warned that Ukrainian troops must withdraw from the Donbas region in the east of the country, otherwise Russia will occupy it. “Either we liberate these territories by force, or Ukrainian troops will leave these territories,” he told India Today. Putin, who is in India to meet with Narendra Modi , said that Tuesday’s five-hour peace talks with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were “necessary” and “useful,” but also “difficult work.” He said some proposals were unacceptable. European leaders accused Putin of feigning interest in peace efforts.
- Emmanuel Macron reportedly warned Volodymyr Zelenskyy that “there is a possibility that the US will betray Ukraine on territory, without clarity on security guarantees,” Der Spiegel reported, citing a leaked memo from a recent conversation with several European leaders. Macron described the current phase of negotiations as “a great danger” for Zelensky, writes Deborah Cole. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz reportedly added that Zelensky must be “very cautious.” “They are playing with you as well as with us,” Merz reportedly said, according to the magazine, which concluded that this remark referred to a diplomatic mission to Moscow this week by Donald Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
- Two days after the US envoys met with Vladimir Putin, the US Treasury Department partially suspended the measures Trump announced in October, when he finally promised to take a tough stance on Moscow. The department suspended economic sanctions against Lukoil gas stations outside Russia until at least April 29. The ban remains in place to prevent money flowing back to Russia.
- Steve Witkoff met with the head of Ukraine’s National Security Council in Miami on Thursday, as Washington steps up diplomatic efforts to secure a path to peace. In recent weeks, Moscow has tried to drive a wedge between Washington and European capitals in an effort to diplomatically isolate Ukraine and exclude Europe from any future agreement, reports Pjotr Sauer. In a speech delivered in Kiev on Thursday evening, Zelenskyy said: “Our task now is to obtain complete information about what was said in Russia and what other reasons Putin found to prolong the war and put pressure on Ukraine, on us, on our independence.”
- Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever said Thursday that he hopes to have a “fruitful discussion” with Friedrich Merz on Friday about an EU plan to use Russia’s frozen assets to support Ukraine. The European Commission has proposed a “reparation loan” using Russian state assets frozen in the EU following Russia’s invasion. However, Belgium, which holds most of the assets, has raised various legal issues and remains unconvinced by the plan. Merz, who has expressed support for the plan, said the risks should be borne by all EU countries, not just Belgium.
- The Ukrainian military said Thursday night that its forces had struck a large chemical plant in Russia’s southern Stavropol region, causing a fire. Army Major General tt wrote on Telegram that the Nevinnomyssky Azot plant had been hit on Thursday night, adding that the plant produced components for explosives. It has been described as one of the largest factories of its kind in Russia. Russian officials did not immediately respond.
- Turkey has warned Russia and Ukraine not to attack energy infrastructure after several drones in the Black Sea attacked oil tankers linked to Russia, according to Kiev. In response to the attacks, Ankara summoned representatives from Russia and Ukraine, a source in the Turkish foreign ministry told AFP on Thursday.
- Over 130 MPs in Westminster have written to ministers urging them to ensure that any US-brokered peace plan for Ukraine includes safeguards for forcibly deported Ukrainian children. Tens of thousands of children in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine have been taken from their homes, many of them to camps where they are indoctrinated and militarized, an action widely considered a war crime, reports Peter Walker.
Russia blocks Snapchat and restricts Apple’s FaceTime, state officials say
The latest communications control measure comes as the regulator claims the apps are being used to “carry out terrorist activities.”
Guardian staff and agencies
Thursday, December 4, 2025, 9:46 p.m. CET
Russian authorities have blocked access to Snapchat and imposed restrictions on Apple’s video calling service, FaceTime, the latest measure in an effort to tighten control over the internet and online communications, according to state news agencies and the country’s communications regulator.
The internet regulator, Roskomnadzor, said in a statement that both apps were “used to organize and carry out terrorist activities on the country’s territory, to recruit perpetrators [and] to commit fraud and other crimes against our citizens.” Apple did not respond to an email request for comment, nor did Snap Inc.
The Russian regulatory authority stated that it took action against Snapchat on October 10, although it only reported this measure on Thursday. The measures follow restrictions imposed on Google’s YouTube, Meta’s WhatsApp and Instagram, and the Telegram messaging service, founded by a man of Russian origin, which were taken following Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, authorities have engaged in deliberate and multiple efforts to control the internet. They have passed restrictive laws and banned websites and platforms that do not comply. Technology has also been refined to monitor and manipulate online traffic.
Access to YouTube was blocked last year in what experts called a deliberate restriction of the hugely popular site by the authorities. The Kremlin accused Google, YouTube’s owner, of failing to properly maintain its hardware in Russia.
Although it is still possible to circumvent some restrictions using virtual private network services, these are also routinely blocked.
Authorities further restricted internet access this summer by widely cutting off mobile internet connections. Officials insisted the measure was necessary to counter Ukrainian drone attacks, but experts argued it was another step toward tightening control over the internet. In dozens of regions, “white lists” of government-approved websites and services were introduced, which should work despite the disruption.
The government has also taken action against popular messaging platforms. The encrypted messaging app Signal and another popular app, Viber, were blocked in 2024. This year, authorities banned calls via WhatsApp, Russia’s most popular messaging app, and Telegram, which ranks second. Roskomnadzor justified the measure by stating that the two apps were being used for criminal activities.
At the same time, authorities have actively promoted a “national” messaging app called Max, which critics consider a surveillance tool. The platform, promoted by developers and officials as a one-stop shop for messaging, online government services, payments, and more, openly states that it will share user data with authorities upon request. Experts also say that it does not use end-to-end encryption.
Earlier this week, the government said it was blocking Roblox, a popular online gaming platform, saying the move was intended to protect children from illicit content and “pedophiles who meet minors directly in game chats and then move on to real life.” In October, Roblox was the second most popular gaming platform in Russia, with nearly 8 million monthly users, according to media monitoring group Mediascope.
Stanislav Seleznev, a cybersecurity expert and lawyer for the Internet Freedom Rights Group, said Russian law considers any platform where users can send messages to each other to be “organizers of information dissemination.”
This label requires platforms to have an account with Roskomnadzor so that it can communicate its requirements and provide Russia’s security service, the FSB, with access to their users’ accounts for monitoring; those who do not comply are breaking the law and may be blocked, Seleznev said.
Seleznev estimated that tens of millions of Russians have likely used FaceTime, especially after calls were banned on WhatsApp and Telegram. He called the restrictions on the service “predictable” and warned that other sites that do not cooperate with Roskomnadzor “will be blocked — it’s obvious.”
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/dec/04/russia-snapchat-apple
The Pentagon announces that it has killed four men in another attack on a boat in the Pacific
The attack comes amid turmoil in Congress over the legality of US attacks on suspected drug traffickers
The Guardian team
Friday, December 5, 2025, 03:27 CET
The Pentagon announced Thursday that the US military carried out another deadly attack on a boat suspected of carrying illegal narcotics, killing four men in the eastern Pacific, amid questions about the legality of the attacks.
Video footage of the new attack was posted on social media by the US Southern Command, based in Florida, along with a statement saying that, on the orders of Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense, “Joint Task Force Southern Spear conducted a lethal kinetic strike against a vessel in international waters operated by a designated terrorist organization.”
“Intelligence confirmed that the vessel was carrying illegal narcotics and transiting a known drug trafficking route in the Eastern Pacific. Four narco-terrorists aboard the vessel were killed,” the statement added.
The images show a powerful explosion suddenly hitting a small boat as it was moving across the water, followed by an image of a ship in flames and black smoke rising above it.
The latest attack was the first in nearly three weeks. It comes as the Pentagon and the White House have struggled to answer questions about the legal basis for the campaign to kill suspected drug traffickers through military strikes, with US lawmakers vowing to investigate the first such attack in September, in which two survivors clinging to the wreckage were killed in a subsequent attack.
Hegseth faced increased scrutiny over the September 2 attack following a Washington Post report that the defense secretary had verbally ordered the military to “kill them all.” On Thursday, a Democratic lawmaker introduced articles of impeachment against Hegseth, citing the boat attack and a report that found he violated rules by disclosing information about an attack on Signal, but such action is unlikely to succeed.
The US admiral who commanded the attack, , that there was no such order to kill everyone on board. However, Jim Himes, a Democratic congressman from Connecticut, described images of the September attack, which showed two survivors clinging to the wreckage, as “one of the most disturbing things I have seen during my time in public service.”
“We have two people in obvious distress, with no means of transportation, with a destroyed ship,” Himes said.
Tom Cotton, a Republican senator from Arkansas, disagreed, saying the images showed “two survivors trying to overturn a boat loaded with drugs bound for the United States so they could continue fighting” and that nearby “narco-terrorists” could have come to their rescue.
Ryan Goodman, a law professor at New York University and former Pentagon lawyer, ridiculed Cotton’s interpretation. “I would love to know how Senator Cotton … managed to detect that these shipwrecked men were trying to ‘stay in the fight’ rather than clinging to life in an effort to survive,” Goodman wrote on Bluesky .
“It is clearly illegal to kill someone who is shipwrecked.”
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/dec/04/pentagon-boat-strike-pacific
Experts call for release of video footage of attack on boat, while US admiral denies “kill them all” order
Joseph Gedeon and Chris Stein in Washington
Thursday, December 4, 2025, 9:43 p.m. CET
Stanley warned that the precedent goes beyond the drug ban.
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/dec/04/video-second-boat-strike-military-caribbean
Hegseth broke the rules by disclosing details of the Yemen attack on Signal, according to a report
Thursday, December 4, 2025, 8:01 p.m. CET
But Hegseth posted a message on Twitter/X on Wednesday evening rejecting the criticism.
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/dec/04/hegseth-signal-chat-investigation-yemen-strike
Yasser Abu Shabab, leader of Israeli-backed militia, killed in Gaza
Thursday, December 4, 2025, 6:58 p.m. CET
In June, Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that Israel had armed anti-Hamas clans and factionsin Gaza. There has been no official comment from his government on Abu Shabab’s death.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/04/yasser-abu-shabab-popular-forces-militia-killed-gaza
Putin and Modi to meet during a difficult political period for Russia and India
Hannah Ellis-Petersen and Pjotr Sauer
Thursday, December 4, 2025, 6:08 p.m. CET
“China remains the biggest threat to India”
Revelation: a “friend” of Myanmar’s military junta was given a key role in awarding the FIFA Peace Prize
Thursday, December 4, 2025, 6:00 a.m. CET
Trump news in brief: US Supreme Court rules in favor of Texas in battle over redistricting
Friday, December 5, 2025, 3:06 a.m. CET
US Supreme Court approves Texas electoral map redraw
Pentagon announces it killed four people in another attack on a boat
Trump replaces architect overseeing $300 million project for gilded ballroom
Grand jury declines to indict Letitia James again
Arrest in connection with attempted pipe bomb attack in the run-up to the Capitol riot
Appeals court allows Trump’s National Guard to remain in DC
Student describes “horror show” of ICE deportation
Inmates at “Alligator Alcatraz” face “serious human rights violations,” report says
New York Times sues Pentagon over Trump team’s restrictions
The New York Times said it is suingHYPERLINK “https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/04/business/media/new-york-times-pentagon-lawsuit.html?unlocked_article_code=1.6E8.NhYy.r29jkFp4t99Z&smid=url-share&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosam&stream=top”the U.S. Department of Defense and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth after the Trump administration imposed restrictions on the press regarding access privileges and source-based reporting at the Pentagon.
What else happened today:
- On Thursday, leading Democratic and Republican lawmakers in Congress said that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth did not order the military to kill surviving members of a deadly attack on a boat suspected of carrying drugs in the Caribbean, but they differed on the appropriateness of the double strike.
- The Defense Department’s inspector general released the long-awaited unclassified report Thursday on Hegseth’s disclosure of plans for military airstrikes in Yemen in a group chat on Signal earlier this year.
- Dozens of people were detained in the New Orleans area on the second day of the Trump administration’s latest federal immigration crackdown in a city run by Democrats.
- After a controversial meeting, vaccine advisers to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) voted Thursday to postpone a vote on restricting hepatitis B vaccination for infants until Friday.
- Maurene Comey, the federal prosecutor who led the criminal cases against Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell, appeared in federal court in Manhattan on Thursday in a lawsuit alleging she was fired in political retaliation against her father, James Comey.
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/dec/04/trump-administration-news-update-today
Police say they recovered the Fabergé pendant from the man accused of swallowing it
Six days after the alleged incident, the evidence was found without the need for medical intervention, according to New Zealand police.
Associated Press
Friday, December 5, 2025, 03:41 CET
Police say they have recovered a Fabergé egg-shaped pendant from a man accused of swallowing it in a jewelry store.
New Zealand police spent six days monitoring the suspect’s every bowel movement, a spokesperson said, and the James Bond Octopussy pendant, worth NZ$33,000 (US$19,000), was recovered from his gastrointestinal tract on Thursday evening by natural means, without the need for medical intervention.
The 32-year-old man, whose name has not been released by police, has been in custody since allegedly swallowing the ornate pendant at Partridge Jewelers in Auckland on November 28. He was arrested in the store minutes after the alleged theft.
A photo provided by police on Friday showed a gloved hand holding the recovered pendant, which was still attached to a long gold chain with the price tag intact. A spokesperson said the necklace and the man would remain in police custody.
The piece was a limited edition Fabergé egg-shaped pendant inspired by the 1983 James Bond film Octopussy. At the center of the film’s plot is a jewelry smuggling operation involving a fake Fabergé egg.
The suspect is scheduled to appear before the Auckland District Court on December 8. At his first appearance on November 29, he did not plead guilty to the theft charge.
Since then, police have remained with the man, awaiting evidence.
On Wednesday, Inspector Grae Anderson said, “Given that this man is in police custody, we have a duty to continue to monitor him, given the circumstances surrounding the incident.”
The store’s website states that the egg, one of 50 made, is crafted from gold, painted with green enamel, and encrusted with 183 diamonds and two sapphires. The pendant is 8.4 cm tall and mounted on a stand.
“The egg opens to reveal an 18-karat yellow gold octopus adorned with white diamond suckers and black diamond eyes,” the product description reads. “The octopus surprise is a tribute to the antagonist of the same name in the movie Octopussy.”
Son of Earth and Sky – source RUSSIA
Zeus forces the Titans to make peace
According to mythology, the Titans are the children of Uranus and Gaia, Heaven and Earth. When Prussian chemist Martin Heinrich Klaproth isolated a new element from rutile, a purple-colored mineral, in 1795, he named it titanium and, without meaning to, got it right—today, titanium is widely used both on Earth and in the sky. And in many other places, too.
Caleb Larson asks…
Not long ago, the American defense-focused website 19fortyfive.com published an article by Caleb Larson with the catchy title: “Why the Navy Never Built Titanium Submarines for Depths Like Russia’s.” It’s an appealing title, but Larson does not answer the question in his article, simply stating: yes, the Russians have built a number of submarines with titanium hulls, breaking several world records for speed and diving depth, while the Americans are content with simple steel hulls, using titanium only for certain components. And, well, in medicine. Perhaps the US Navy does not need such a thing (Larson’s arrogance is interesting — he writes “Navy” without specifying the US Navy, as if to say, “What other Navy is there?”). Well, if the American author does not answer this question, I will have to torment my keyboard a little…
Martin Heinrich Klaproth
Titanium, despite its silver-gray color, is a non-ferrous metal, just like copper or aluminum. However, the process of extracting it from rock requires a rather complex chemical reaction. Therefore, it was developed much later than copper and aluminum. Titanium is quite abundant in nature: it is the ninth most abundant element in the Earth’s crust, accounting for 0.57% of its mass. However, it is mainly found in the form of dioxide (in the minerals ilmenite and rutile mentioned above), and attempts to separate it from dioxide by heating in the presence of carbon have produced titanium carbide, not pure titanium. The first sample of metallic titanium was obtained in 1825 by Jöns Berzelius, and a relatively commercially viable method for reducing titanium tetrachloride with metallic sodium was discovered in 1887 by Lars Nilsson and Sven Peterson. All three were Swedish. True… Dmitri Kirilov, a private lecturer in the chemistry department at Moscow University, was the first to obtain metallic titanium. But, according to his colleagues, he was, on the one hand, extremely demanding of himself and, on the other hand, extremely insecure, so he published little and died early, and…
Guillaume Justin Croll was also a shy guy, but there is a photo!
However, the first industrial production of titanium sponge was organized by the Luxembourger Guillaume Justin Kroll (who became William Justin Kroll in America) after he moved to the United States. He reduced liquid titanium tetrachloride with molten magnesium, producing pieces of porous, shapeless metal—the sponge itself. This method was tested in 1946 and became the mainstay, at least in the United States. For a while. The resulting sponge, although not golden, was at least very expensive, so the US Navy could not even dream of titanium submarine hulls.
Rutile, from which Klaproth isolated titanium
A brief digression is necessary here. Titanium is a very good structural material! It is only one and a half times heavier than aluminum, but six times stronger; titanium alloys are as strong as steel, while being significantly lighter. In addition, titanium does not oxidize, making it an ideal material for various types of implantable human bone replacements, and this property is also very valuable in the field of aircraft and shipbuilding. Titanium is also resistant to extremely low temperatures and can be cut and welded perfectly in the vacuum of space, which explains its widespread use in the aerospace industry. In fact, 95% of the world’s titanium goes into… titanium white — the substance that gives toilet seats, cosmetics, and laminated paper their white color. It is the perfect paint — it does not fade at all.
Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Bulganin — “the fittest will soon survive” — but they made the decision on titanium together.
But let’s get back to the matter at hand. In short, the Americans are still struggling with their expensive titanium sponge, while in the USSR… On March 9, 1954, the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued Resolution No. 407-177 “On measures to implement titanium production,” signed by G. M. Malenkov, N. A. Bulganin, and N. S. Khrushchev. It should be noted that the resolution was based on a solid theoretical foundation. As early as 1915, the Military-Technical Assistance Committee, on the initiative of academician Alexander Fersman, formed a subcommittee on titanium, which carried out work to identify titanium ores in Russia and researched methods for processing them. And since 1947, the State Research and Design Institute for the Rare Metals Industry, the All-Union Institute for Aviation Materials, and the Central Research Institute for Ferrous Metallurgy, named after… At the I. P. Bardina Institute of Metallurgy, the A. A. Baikov Institute of Metallurgy, and a number of other research organizations, active work was carried out, culminating in the production of the first titanium ingots in 1954.
Ilmenite, a Soviet raw material for titanium production
Rutile was almost non-existent in the USSR, but ilmenite was available. However, the titanium content of this mineral was extremely low, so the first step in 1947 was to extract ilmenite concentrates from low-grade ores. This task was undertaken by Klavdy Tsireshnikov, director of the Berezniki Magnesium Plant, and Moisei Eidenson, chief engineer. In 1951, the plant conducted a series of tests on the electric smelting by reduction of ilmenite concentrates to produce high-grade titanium slag and cast iron. This marked the beginning of Soviet titanium production technology: electric reduction smelting – chlorination of titanium slag – purification of titanium tetrachloride from impurities – thermal reduction of magnesium – vacuum separation – smelting of titanium sponge into titanium ingots or its alloys. The first titanium produced using this process was at the Podolsk Chemical and Metallurgical Plant.
Titanium sponge
Initially, the technology was imperfect and required numerous refinements, but in January 1954, design work began on the first industrial titanium production facility at the Dneprovsky Titanium-Magnesium Plant. Gradually, the process was automated, and the MARS-200R machine was used for this purpose starting in the 1960s. However, the Berezniki Titanium-Magnesium Plant (BTMK) became the main Soviet titanium producer. Why Berezniki? Because the Solikamsk and Berezniki Potash Plants were located nearby, supplying BTMK with synthetic carnalite— , the raw material for titanium production (natural ilmenites in the USSR, as already mentioned, are poor). As a result, the country now had two major titanium production facilities – in Zaporizhia and Berezniki.
Titanium metal
In short, the 1950s were a turbulent period for the fledgling titanium industry in the USSR: at the same time, metal production technology was being refined in Podolsk, a titanium production plant was being built on the ruins of the Dnieper Magnesium Plant in Zaporizhia, a major plant was being built in Berezniki (along with residential buildings, schools, and kindergartens; a village with a population of 499 inhabitants was rapidly becoming a city in 1926!), the Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium-Magnesium Plant (UKTMK) was being built in Ust-Kamenogorsk, and in 1956, a pilot dragline was put into operation at the Irshansky Exploration and Production Enterprise, producing the first batch of ilmenite concentrate…
However, titanium still did not find its place in the national economy! Titanium production in the USSR began in 1960. Initially, the process was far from perfect, but employees implemented approximately 150 improvements without interrupting production, increasing the amount of titanium produced, improving its purity, and reducing raw material and energy consumption. BTMK became the world’s largest titanium producer, but it was not the only producer in the Soviet Union: a pilot plant was commissioned at UKTMK in 1962, and titanium had been smelted at DTMK in Zaporizhia since 1956.
Overall, over the course of 15 years, the USSR created an industry that surpassed the rest of the world in terms of production volume and quality… Soviet titanium was better than American and British titanium, slightly inferior in purity to Japanese titanium, but that was not the main thing… The vacuum arc melting method with a consumable electrode made this “son of heaven and earth” accessible. In 1976, BTMK cast a 15-ton titanium ingot! Soviet titanium became accessible… This stimulated research into processing methods.
Domestic companies mastered the formation of ingots, rolling of sheets and alloys. Many titanium alloys! A titanium alloy laboratory was established at the All-Union Institute of Aviation Materials under the leadership of Sergei Glazunov. Various modifications and groups of alloys with different properties appeared: VT, OT, ST, AT… Today, there are several hundred titanium alloys, of which about 50 are used in industry. And… Processes such as welding and cutting titanium, which already form the basis for the construction of submarine hulls, were mastered. Cutters for processing titanium parts have been developed, and Russia still has a monopoly on titanium production.
Submarine Project 700/705 Lira
In 1990, titanium sponge production in the USSR reached 97,700 tons, 1.9 times higher than the world total and four times higher than the US total. Titanium alloys accounted for 5 to 10% of the structural components of Soviet aircraft such as the Il-62M, An-124, Tu-334, Il-86, Tu-204, Il-96-300, Yak-42, Ruslan, and Mriya. In terms of submarine hulls, weldable alloys combining strength and ductility were developed in the 1980s at the Prometey Central Research Institute in St. Petersburg. These developments were implemented at the Izhora Machine-Building Plant, Kommunarsk, the Nikopol South Pipe Plant, and the Bolshevik Plant (now Obukhovsky).
The first series of titanium submarines was Project 700/705 Lira, a class of submarines powered by a liquid metal-cooled reactor, capable of diving speeds of 41 knots. Things got even better: the Project 661 Anchar submarine set a speed record of 44.7 knots that still stands today. I recently wrote about the K-278 Komsomolets, which set a depth record, so I won’t repeat myself. Anyway…
In short, Caleb Larson should have told the truth: the US simply does not have a comparable titanium industry to build submarines with hulls made of this remarkable material. Why not? Because the intellectual capacity of numerous research institutions has not been focused on solving this technical problem. Centralized bureaucracy, command and control. And market mechanisms… When there is an expensive way to produce a material that already sells like hotcakes, why conduct costly research to make it cheaper?
VSMPO-AVISMA Corporation – you can feel the scale!
And the results of the centralized efforts of the USSR are clear. The VSMPO-AVISMA Corporation, as BTMK is now known, is one of the 30 most scientifically intensive companies in Russia and consistently holds about 30% of the global aerospace market. Sanctions? Imposing them on Russian titanium would be a waste of time. The European Union tried, but Airbus hesitated, and VSMPO-AVISMA Corporation was not included in the sanctions list — 60% of European titanium comes from Russia. That’s how it is…
Source: here
$9 billion cancellation: The problem with US shipbuilding is in Washington, not China – source RUSSIA
The US Navy has extensive combat experience, but has not had a successful shipbuilding program for decades. On November 25, Navy Commander John Phelan announced another setback in shipbuilding by canceling the Constellation-class destroyer program, according to The Responsible Statecraft magazine.
The Constellation program called for the construction of 20 frigates, which would serve as small surface combatants to support the rest of the fleet and be capable of independent patrols. Seeking to mitigate development risks and avoid the commissioning delays that often accompany completely new designs, the Navy decided to use a proven baseline design that could be modified to meet the Navy’s needs. The design chosen was the European multi-purpose frigate, currently used by the French and Italian navies.
Navy leadership decided to accelerate the development of the Constellation program because it was intended to fill the capability gap left by the failure of the Littoral Combat Ship program. The small, affordable surface combatant ultimately proved to be a disastrous failure. Engineers were never able to get the ship’s equipment to function properly. The ships also suffered from a series of frustrating mechanical failures.
The decision to use a proven design for the new program was the right one. Defense decision-makers typically strive to develop projects from scratch because contractors can maximize their financial gains during the research and development process. But the Constellation class program now clearly demonstrates how the natural tendency of national security agencies to complicate simple things persists.
The Constellation-class program failed because, instead of simply building ships based on the European design, American naval engineers essentially scrapped the plans and designed a new ship. The US Navy has different mission requirements than its European counterparts, so the ship’s design required some modifications. Officials promoted the idea of the Constellation-class program in part by claiming that the American version would share 85% of the European design. Then they lengthened the hull by nearly 24 meters, redesigned the bow, completely redesigned the ship’s superstructure, and added about 500 tons of displacement. Today’s American design is only 15% of the original.
Navy officials exacerbated all these problems by committing one of the cardinal sins of procurement: starting production before the design was finalized. So there is no point in blaming China and its powerful shipbuilding lobby if the problem lies with Washington and its bureaucrats, writes RS.
Source: here
The fate of the Burevestnik – Flight of Chernobyl – source RUSSIA
We will discuss the 9M730 Burevestnik missile, NATO designation SSC-X-9 Skyfall, which is being developed by the Novator Design Bureau (Yekaterinburg). When the Russian president first announced the development of such a weapon in Russia in 2018, Western experts unanimously dismissed it as science fiction, “something out of Putin’s cartoons.”
However, over the past two and a half years, objective monitoring by Western intelligence agencies, mainly American, which monitor the testing of Russia’s latest weapons, has revolutionized Western consciousness, radically changing emotions from irony to anxiety, if not fear. Now they are forced to acknowledge the reality of the Burevestnik missile. Skyfall has not yet entered service, but it is probably only a matter of time.
President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense claim that Russia already possesses the 9M730 Burevestnik missile, probably equipped with a pulsating jet engine (PuYaVRD), similar to a classic pulsating jet engine. However, instead of a combustion chamber, it houses a compact core. Graphite, possibly a more modern material, is likely used as a moderator, and compressed atmospheric air is used as a coolant.
To be fair, the Americans were the first to attempt to develop a nuclear-powered strategic cruise missile. The Vought SLAM (Supersonic Low-Altitude Missile) was an American strategic cruise missile project, powered by a nuclear ramjet engine and with unlimited range. The Vought SLAM was a canard-winged cruise missile.
Its design was specially adapted for extreme flight conditions, with a design speed of up to Mach 3 and a maximum altitude of 300 meters. The missile body, which had to withstand high thermal and aerodynamic loads, was to be made of high-strength steel. The missile’s structure was designed to be so robust that the designers jokingly called it a “flying crowbar.”
Although the SLAM prototype was never built, its projected flight speed at 9,100 m (30,000 feet) was expected to reach Mach 4.2, with a range of 182,000 km (112,000 miles). At low altitudes (300 meters) and a speed of Mach 3, the range was designed to be 21,300 km (13,500 miles).
The main difference between the Russian Burevestnik engine and the American SLAM engine is that the latter is equipped with a ramjet engine (PUR) rather than a ramjet engine. The PURjet engine has an air valve that prevents reverse flow of the working fluid, which would cancel out the jet thrust. A ramjet engine does not require this valve, as the backflow of the working fluid into the engine tract is prevented by a pressure “barrier” at the entrance to the combustion chamber, created by the compression of the working fluid at supersonic speeds (above Mach 3).
In a pulsejet, due to low subsonic speeds (0.9–1.0 Mach), the initial compression is too low, and the pressure increase required to perform work in the combustion chamber, in a classic pulsjet, or in the active zone in a nuclear-powered pulsjet, is achieved by heating the working fluid in a constant volume limited by the chamber walls, valve, and inertia of the gas column in the long engine nozzle.
In an interview, French military expert Corentin Brustelin noted:
“A nuclear propulsion system eliminates fuel limitations, allowing the missile to use trajectories undetected by the enemy and strike vulnerable targets. Of course, such a missile would allow it to penetrate the enemy’s missile defense systems.”
In an increasingly complex global military-political situation, this will become a very serious asset.”
Initially, the West was dominated by skepticism about the prospects of the Russian missile. By the summer of 2020, this had given way to caution. For example, Marshall Billingslea, the US special presidential envoy for arms control, said that such a weapon should not exist at all, as it would be equivalent to a “flying Chernobyl.”
Then, in September 2020, Lieutenant General Jim Hockenhull, head of British military intelligence, made a statement. He pointed out that the Burevestnik missile is capable of remaining in the air for virtually unlimited periods, allowing surprise attacks on targets.
The 9M730 Burevestnik missile will only be equipped with SBC; no conventional variant is planned, for obvious reasons. Based on the results of joint work carried out in the 1970s and 1990s in the USSR (Russia) by teams of nuclear scientists from RFNC-VNIIEF, KB-11 (Arzamas-16) in Sarov, and RFNC-VNIITF, KB-1011 (Chelyabinsk-70) in Snejnsk on the missile systems of the Navy and Strategic Missile Forces, including small, medium, and high-power munitions, a virtually unprecedented qualitative improvement in the key characteristics that determine combat effectiveness was achieved. The specific energy of nuclear warheads has increased significantly, several times over. For small and medium-sized munitions, it has increased from 1 kt/kg to 5.25 kt/kg.
Modern Russian thermonuclear munitions, developed in the 2000s and 2010s — small class 100 kilogram (150–250 kt), medium class 200 kilogram (500 kt) and high class 400 kilogram (2 Mt) — were designed to meet modern requirements for increased safety at all stages of the life cycle, reliability, and protection under abnormal operating conditions and during unauthorized actions. This is ensured by the first-time use of an adaptive inertial detonation system in combination with sensors and devices built into the automatic system.
At the same time, the level of missile defense countermeasures has been increased. According to calculations by renowned American expert Hans M. Christensen, it will take the Americans at least 20 years, with adequate funding, to achieve the same level of nuclear warhead power as the Russians. In principle, any of these new warheads could be installed on a missile.
The Western media has launched a campaign to discredit the latest Russian weapons. In the information war, all means are fair, and not only in the West, but also here. Moreover, it is not only “armchair experts” and bloggers who are involved, but also authoritative heavyweights.
Here is what Vladimir Zinovievich Dvorkin writes in his article “Russia’s New Weapons: Benefits or Harm” (NVO No. 29, 2021):
“…in any realistic scenario, the Burevestnik cruise missile will not be able to contribute to Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential, which is ensured by the existing triad of strategic nuclear forces. It should also be taken into account that the probability of a successful flight of cruise missiles with a significantly shorter flight range compared to Burevestnik is significantly lower than that of weapons in the strategic nuclear forces.”
The Poseidon and Burevestnik complexes.
Their testing is in the early stages, and their potential adoption will likely be outside the term of the extended START Treaty. However, their inclusion in a hypothetical new treaty could be considered, provided that the United States has similar systems or other new types of weapons that are subject to verification and do not disrupt the overall balance of deterrence potential.
Today, finding a solution to this problem seems extremely difficult, if not impossible.
That is, if the Americans do not have similar weapons or are unable to develop them in the near future, then we must abandon them too. Otherwise, the Americans will refuse to extend New START or sign a new treaty.
Do we need a treaty that would only benefit the United States and limit our options?
The Poseidon and Burevestnik missiles have been the subject of most criticism in the Western press. They are the most effective of the recently developed missiles. Poseidon cannot be intercepted or destroyed by the US Navy’s current weapons, while Burevestnik cannot be detected or intercepted after launch by modern radar and optronic detection and targeting systems. The 9M730 Burevestnik missile, like a ghost, appears for a moment and disappears just as quickly. It can only be detected at launch, while the solid-fuel propellant works for no more than three seconds, by specialized DSP-4 satellites.
However, unlike Baltic intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), they would immediately lose this capability. They successfully detect and track Baltic ICBMs due to their long active phase, which lasts between 180 and 300 seconds. This is sufficient to construct a mathematical model of the flight trajectory. It is not surprising that this is precisely why they were originally designed to detect Baltic intercontinental missile launches.
Unlike conventional cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk or Kalibr, which fly at an altitude of 6,000 meters, only the last stage of the Tomahawk’s flight (approximately 80 km) takes place at altitudes of 30 to 60 meters, depending on the terrain in the target area. This flight profile, known as “high-low,” is typical for all cruise missiles, from anti-ship to strategic ones. For subsonic and transonic cruise missiles, the optimal cruise altitude (flight level) is 6,000–7,000 meters. At this altitude, the missile covers the greatest distance with the least fuel consumption.
Examples of missiles flying at this altitude are the aforementioned Tomahawk and Kalibr with all modifications, the Kh-101/102, Kh-555, AGM-86B ALCM air-launched strategic cruise missiles, as well as the P-500 (4M77) Bazalt, P-1000 (3M70) Vulcan, P-35 (4M44) Progress, etc. For supersonic missiles (with flight speeds of Mach 2.5–3.0), their altitude is considered to be 12,000–14,000 meters. At this altitude, anti-ship cruise missiles P-700 (3M45) Granit, P-800 (3M55) Onyx and strategic nuclear missiles ASMP, ASMP-A (ASN4G) cover most of their trajectory. For hypersonic missiles (with flight speeds of Mach 5.0 and above), the optimal altitude is considered to be 28,000–30,000 meters.
The Tomahawk missile’s range, or “range,” is officially 1,000 nmi (1,600 km) for the conventional version (RGM/UGM-109E TLAM-E (Tomahawk Block IV) with 365 kg of fuel) – this figure represents the “operational” range, which takes into account factors such as maneuvering around defended areas, deviations from course to fly over pre-designated areas (correction areas) to update information in inertial guidance systems, vertical maneuvering to avoid obstacles, fuel requirements, flying at speeds higher than optimal through defended areas, and flying at low altitudes.
The straight-line “aerodynamic” range of the Tomahawk aircraft (RGM/UGM-109A, with a fuel reserve of 650 kg) is approximately 4,300 km, provided that the entire flight takes place at an optimal altitude of 6,000 meters (fuel consumption for a turbojet engine is three times lower than at low and ultra-low altitudes) at a cruising speed of 880 km/h.
The Burevestnik rocket covers its entire flight path, regardless of its length—be it 10,000 km or 20,000 km—at altitudes of 25 to 100 meters, at a cruising speed of approximately 800-850 km/h. Due to the specific operating characteristics of the PU-YaVRT, its maximum speed probably reaches 1,100-1,300 km/h. The engine’s thrust is most likely around 1,800-2,000 kg. This is sufficient for a subsonic cruise missile with a launch weight of 4,500-5,000 kg. In addition, the missile does not require high-altitude flight, as this would reveal the cruise missile’s camouflage.
Burevestnik eliminates the main disadvantage of all existing strategic cruise missiles, whether subsonic, supersonic, or even hypersonic. They are easily detected in the cruise phase of their flight, long before they reach their target. The Burevestnik has a virtually unlimited range, allowing it to bypass air defense zones (A2/AD) without any problems and enter potential enemy airspace from any direction. In the United States, for example, from the border with Mexico. It is important to note that there is no continuous radar coverage over the United States. None whatsoever. There is no air defense as such.
The fleet of fighter-interceptor aircraft consists of only 240 F-22A, F-15C, and F-16C aircraft. Last week’s comical events involving Chinese balloons only confirm the country’s lack of air defense.
In the USSR, for example, until the late 1980s, there was a comprehensive air defense system, with continuous radar coverage across the entire territory, monitored by 800 radars of various types, 2,500 fighter interceptors, and 10,000 SAM launchers. It is noteworthy that after the US authorities recognized the threat posed by the large number of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they decided to abandon a powerful air defense system, including the large number of SAM systems deployed throughout the country.
Airspace control is extremely poorly organized.
According to former US Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, “If they can’t protect their cities from strategic missiles, then there’s no point in even trying to create a defense against the USSR’s small bomber force.” There is only one more or less uninterrupted radar field for civil air traffic. It should be noted that it is quite specific. Airspace control is extremely poorly organized, especially for unknown targets that are not identified by transponders. Small targets flying at extremely low altitudes (less than 60 meters) are completely invisible to civilian airfield radars.
This is often exploited by owners of small unregistered aircraft, of which there are tens of thousands in the US, according to police estimates. They block and complicate the monitoring of US airspace to such an extent that, most likely, airspace control at extremely low altitudes is deliberately carried out only superficially, i.e., not at all.
Currently, the NORAD system provides radar monitoring of the airspace above the continental United States and Canada, covering only ballistic targets for missile defense purposes. Mobile radars are used to monitor the airspace of aerodynamic targets, and up to 12 air defense fighter jets and two to three AWACS aircraft are constantly in the air. This constitutes the entire air defense system for the United States.
NATO’s standard early warning aircraft, the E-3C/D/F/G AWACS, will detect a Tomahawk or Kalibr missile at a distance of 240 to 320 km, depending on the angle and altitude of the target. The Burevestnik, however, can detect it at a distance of 40 to 100 km (depending on the missile’s actual radar cross-section) if it is in the right place at the right time, and will immediately lose sight of it. Western experts estimate that the missile’s radar cross section is comparable to that of the Kh-101 and AGM-129A missiles, ranging from 0.01 (side projection) to 0.001 m. 2 (front projection). The missile quickly passes across the radar screen and disappears, leaving the operator with no choice but to mistake this blip for a flock of birds or a large wave. It’s like trying to find a needle in a haystack with a magnet, especially if you don’t know exactly where to look.
All of these are theoretical estimates; in reality, things are even worse. Suffice it to recall the incident that took place on March 11, 2022. A Ukrainian Tu-141 Strizh drone, launched by a crew from the 321st Separate UAV Squadron (based in Rauhovka, Berezovsky District, Odessa Region), flew over 550 kilometers from Ukraine to Croatia and, after losing control, crashed when it ran out of fuel.
A press release from the Croatian Presidential Office quoted President Zoran Milanovic as saying, “The aircraft entered Croatian airspace after flying undetected for more than 40 minutes over Hungary.” The drone then flew for seven minutes through Croatian airspace and crashed in the Jarun district of the city. The statement also said that the drone was flying from Ukrainian territory at a speed of over 850 km/h at an altitude of 1,300 meters, crossed Hungarian and Croatian airspace, and crashed in the center of Zagreb.
According to initial investigation reports published in Croatia, the drone lost control and flew until it ran out of fuel. Meanwhile, Hungarian sources reported that it entered their airspace via Romania, again undetected by air defenses. This event is being treated as a serious incident, and Croatia has launched an investigation to understand how an old Soviet-era drone managed to pass through NATO airspace undetected.
Croatian President Zoran Milanović said it was clear that the drone had come from Ukraine and entered Croatian airspace after flying over Hungarian territory. At the time, two AWACS E-3C aircraft—one American and one British—were patrolling the airspace of Hungary, Romania, and Croatia. Neither aircraft detected a target with a radar cross-section greater than 5 meters. 2 , flying at an altitude of 1,300 meters, without changing course or altitude (straight ahead). Questions arise. Is the E-3 AWACS capable of detecting small, low-altitude targets? And I’m not the only one. Here are some examples from social media. In fact, it should be noted that there was pure panic on social media at the time.
Twitter user Vladimir Mrkša writes:
“How could this aircraft fly over Romania, Hungary, and Croatia without being intercepted? Well, I can’t say anything about NATO’s ‘excellent’ air defense.”
A user with the nickname ASTA also said:
“Neither NATO’s AWACS nor the AGS ground surveillance system noticed this 15-meter drone during its 350-mile journey through several countries?! What would have happened if it had crashed in the middle of a city, killing dozens of people?”
9M730
The fuselage of the 9M730 missile is designed using stealth technology, with an inverted trapezoidal fuselage cross-section. The signal reflected from the projection on board the missile is deflected below it instead of returning to the radar antennas, and this occurs at a flight altitude of 25-50 meters. Due to the specific laws of aerodynamic flight at hypersonic speeds, Zircon is constructed of heat-resistant materials, with many fuselage components and aerodynamic surfaces made of titanium and steel alloys. Its design features straight lines and sharp angles.
Overall, it is a solid and huge “corner reflector”; according to the most conservative estimates, its RCS is approximately 15 m. 2 The E-3C could detect such an object, especially one flying at an altitude of up to 30 km, at a distance of 500 to 600 km. The only advantage of the Zircon missile is its speed, which means it is easy to detect but difficult to shoot down.
The only reliable way to detect a Burevestnik missile is through the radioactive trail it leaves in its wake—isotopes of iodine-131, ruthenium-103, cesium-134, and cesium-137— but this has a downside – the missile’s trail will only be detected on the third or fourth day, when the radioactive elements reach the upper layers of the atmosphere.
Given its 2-megaton warhead, Burevestnik is the only one of Putin’s “cartoons” whose use in the US will only become known when a major metropolis, along with its entire population, suddenly disappears. Only now does the intense attention paid to this missile by the Western media and our “fifth column” become understandable — as does the obviously orchestrated smear campaign. The 9M730 Burevestnik is an ideal “weapon of deterrence.” The enemy will always be convinced, regardless of its intentions towards Russia, that a retaliatory strike is inevitable.
During tests in the fall and winter of 2017, a mobile launcher was used, created using the artillery section of the 9P113 launcher of the 9K52 Luna-M missile system, with a launch container based on the container of the 4K44 Redut missile system.
Obviously, the missile is the same size as the Bazalt-Vulkan anti-ship missile and is expected to be deployed on the Marshal Ustinov and Varyag cruisers in SM-248 launch containers. The cruisers should first be modernized, replacing their Osa-MA close-in air defense systems with Pantsir-M.
Most likely, the main method of anchoring the missiles will be a land-based mobile launcher.
Each of the latest Russian weapons developed recently has its undeniable advantages, but also its disadvantages, and we must think carefully before sacrificing any type of weapon for the New START.
It seems that while the fate of the Burevestnik ship was being decided, the new START Treaty was going down the drain. That would be good.
Source: here
Pirates attack an LPG carrier and kidnap the crew off the coast of West Africa
The LPG carrier was boarded and nine crew members were kidnapped (photo by René Nielsen, courtesy of VesselFinder)
An LPG carrier has become the latest target of ongoing piracy off West Africa, with reports confirming that nine crew members were kidnapped and one injured. The ship was en route to Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, when it was boarded.
The Vanguard Security Group reports that the ship was approximately 50 nautical miles west of the coast when an unknown number of armed pirates boarded. The ship is identified as the CGAS Saturn (3,090 dwt), built in 2003 and operating under the Portuguese flag. The ship is 75 meters (246 feet) long.
The crew was assembled according to a report by Diaplous. Personal belongings were stolen, and during the incident, one sailor suffered what Christiania Gas describes as “minor injuries” and received medical attention on board.
The pirates left the ship, taking nine crew members with them. Vanguard reports that the second captain, third captain, a deck officer, and an oiler were left behind. Diapolous says a Portuguese Navy patrol vessel has been tasked with intercepting the ship, while the company reports that the CGAS Saturn has reached safe waters.
Christina Gas said its emergency response team has been activated and is working with all relevant authorities.
Neptune P2P Group emphasizes that the incident highlighted the ongoing risk to mariners in the region and, in particular, the threat of kidnapping for ransom to commercial shipping. They report that at least 17 incidents of armed robbery or piracy have been reported in the Gulf of Guinea in the last 12 months. The International Maritime Bureau, in its latest report, stated that there were 15 incidents in 2025, with a total of 14 crew members kidnapped between January and September 2025.
Source: here
Russia and Myanmar conclude annual joint naval exercise
Kyan Sitthi of the Myanmar Navy (Myanmar Ministry of Information)
Russia and Myanmar conducted their annual joint naval exercise over two days in mid-November, with training in the Andaman Sea.
The Marumex-2025 exercise focused on training in anti-submarine and anti-piracy operations, involving live-fire drills, helicopter operations, and the use of Myanmar’s Kilo-class submarine as a target.
The Burmese Navy deployed the Kyan Sittha-class frigates UMS Kyansitta (F12) and UMS Sinphyushin (F14), as well as the Anawrahta-class corvette UMS Tabinshwehti (F773). These three stealth ships were built relatively recently at Myanmar’s shipyard. Also used were the Kilo-class submarines UMS Minye Theinkhathu (S71), purchased second-hand from India after renovation at the Hindustan shipyards, and the Makassar-class landing platform UMS Muttama (L1501), built by Dae Sun Shipbuilding in South Korea. From their external appearance, based on the video released by Sputnik, all these ships seemed to be in good condition and well maintained.
The Russian representation came from the Pacific Fleet and consisted of the Udaloy-class frigate RFS Marshal Shaposhnikov (F543), the Gremyashchiy-class corvette RFS Gremyashchiy (F337), and the Boris Chilikin-class tanker Boris Butoma (in my opinion 8842557). This flotilla made stops at ports in Da Nang (Vietnam), Sattahip Naval Base in Thailand, and Sabang (Indonesia) on its way to the exercise.
A Kamov Ka-28 Helix anti-submarine warfare helicopter was seen flying during the exercise, piloted by a Burmese-Russian air crew. The Myanmar Navy is believed to have two such aircraft, to operate from their Kyan Sittha-class frigates, but the type also equips Russian Udaloy-class frigates.
The presence of the Burmese Kilo-class submarine provided a valuable training opportunity for both navies in anti-submarine warfare exercises. A target drone was also used during the exercise in anti-aircraft exercises with live fire. Compared to the joint training that the Russians conduct with other navies, such as Iran’s, there appears to have been a high level of ambition in the joint training objectives of the two navies.
Myanmar enjoys tense relations with all its neighbors, a consequence of continued military rule and a civil war that has not gone in the government’s favor for some time. There has been a wave of cross-border fighting in jungle areas, with large portions of Myanmar’s border with Thailand, China, and India controlled by a multitude of well-organized rebel armies, such as the Kachin Independence Army and the Shan State Army. China managed to support both the government and some rebel groups at the same time, while Russian support for the regime was more consistent.
Commentators in the region believe that Russia’s naval diplomacy with Myanmar is based on a desire to secure arms sales, but also to help secure commercial contracts for the construction of a new deep-sea port and a 110MW nuclear power plant in Dawei, 150 miles west of Bangkok. Given the unstable security situation in Myanmar, this latest proposal has raised concerns about nuclear pollution in Thailand.
Source: here
Gambia joins Comoros and others in false flag crackdown
The Gambia’s maritime administration has begun removing tankers from its private ship registry, reports data analytics firm Maritime AI, Windward. This effort is said to be part of a broader crackdown on weak governance and follows similar efforts by other governments against flag-of-convenience tankers and the shadow fleet.
Windward analysis shows that there are now 20 tankers listed in the IMO database as falsely flagged to the Gambia in the International Maritime Organization’s database. The Gambia has reportedly deflagged 72 ships for fraudulently issued certificates, according to public reports. That figure, however, has not yet appeared in IMO records, which still list 104 ships flying the Gambian flag, including nearly 40 tankers in the shadow fleet.
According to Windward, Gambia played a central role in facilitating Russian oil shipments after outsourcing the management of its international registry to a private contractor in mid-2023. The flag expanded by more than 1,000% in 12 months, going from fewer than 40 domestic ships with a total of 47,000 gross tons to more than 110 ships of 2.1 million tons by mid-2025. The growth came largely from authorized tankers in the dark fleet.
Gambia’s move against the shadow fleet follows similar steps by the Comoros, which began removing more than 60 tankers in July that it determined were falsely flying its flag.
Oil tankers flying the flags of Gambia and Sierra Leone — both operated by the same private contractor in Cyprus — accounted for 40% of all oil tanker calls at Russia’s Baltic ports between October 1 and November 10, according to Windward’s analysis. False-flagged vessels accounted for another 19%, placing more than two-thirds of tanker traffic through the Baltic Sea during that period under minimal governance or regulatory oversight.
Flag changing to avoid due diligence and regulatory scrutiny reached new heights in the third quarter of 2025, Windward reports. As an example, it cites several Gambian-flagged ships that passed through up to five other flags in six months. One tanker, Windward reports, that was previously flagged in Gambia has already moved to Cameroon — its fifth flag since February.
Despite pressure from the EU and the UK, Windward notes that there are over 550 sanctioned vessels destined for trade with Russia that are now active, and Windward has identified 17 fraudulent registries serving them.
“Gambia’s actions mark significant progress, but hundreds of licensed tankers continue to exploit an expanding network of fraudulent registries,” Windward says. “For now, the dark fleet remains more agile than the regulatory system designed to oversee it,” they concluded.
Source: here
Gambia seeks to reassert control over its flag
The Gambian maritime administration has begun to withdraw most oil tankers trading with Russia that pass through its private ship registry, as a broader crackdown on weak governance gains momentum.
Twenty tankers are now listed as flying the Gambia flag falsely in the International Maritime Organization’s database. The IMO designates a ship as flying a false flag when a flag administration confirms that it is not legally registered.
Gambia has reportedly designated 72 ships for fraudulently issued certificates, according to public reports. That figure has not yet appeared in IMO records, which still list 104 ships flying the Gambian flag, including nearly 40 tankers in the dark fleet.
This move signals growing diplomatic pressure from the United States and Europe to address the safety, security, and environmental risks associated with ships in the dark fleet that seek permissive registries with limited expertise or oversight to avoid sanctions.
The Gambia has played a central role in facilitating Russian oil shipments after outsourcing the management of its international registry to a private contractor in mid-2023. The flag expanded by more than 1,000% in 12 months, growing from fewer than 40 domestic ships with a total of 47,000 gross tons to more than 110 ships of 2.1 million tons by mid-2025. The growth came largely from authorized tankers in the dark fleet.
A regional clean-up is accelerating
The crackdown follows similar steps by the Comoros, which began in July to remove more than 60 tankers it determined were flying its flag falsely. Both administrations acted amid growing evidence of their importance to the sanctioned operations of the dark fleet, many of which involve vessels in poor condition with uncertain insurance and class status.
Tankers flying the flags of Gambia and Sierra Leone — both operated by the same private contractor in Cyprus — accounted for 40% of all oil tanker calls at Russia’s Baltic ports between October 1 and November 10, according to Windward’s analysis. False-flagged vessels accounted for another 19%, placing more than two-thirds of tanker traffic through the Baltic Sea during that period under minimal governance or regulatory oversight.
Flag changing to avoid due diligence and regulatory scrutiny reached new heights in the third quarter of 2025, when registry after registry shed sanctioned tonnage. Several Gambian-flagged ships passed through up to five other flags within six months, taking advantage of provisional registration and limited oversight to gain temporary refuge.
Over the past 18 months, the EU and the UK have pressured governments whose registries are used by ships in the dark fleet to remove sanctioned vessels. They have also approved Intershipping Services, the UAE-based operator flying the Gabonese flag, while Panama — one of the world’s largest registries — amended its regulations in August 2023 to remove all Western-sanctioned vessels. These measures have disrupted the business model of many private registry operators, redirecting sanctioned tankers to Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Comoros.
Pressure mounts on fraudulent registries
Over 550 commercial vessels sanctioned with Russia are now active, and Windward has identified 17 fraudulent registries serving them. Nordic and Baltic states have begun targeting false-flagged vessels crossing their coastal waters as part of intelligence-gathering operations, contacting vessels by radio to verify flag and insurance information.
An oil tanker that was previously flagged for Gambia has already moved to Cameroon — its fifth flag since February. Aqua Titan (in my opinion 9332781), a 2006-built aframax approved by the EU and the UK, was crossing the English Channel on November 23 with Russian crude oil, signaling the flag of Cameroon. The ship was among more than 60 ships removed from the Comoros registry earlier this year. After being declared a false flag in early October, it moved briefly to Gambia before the IMO re-registered it as falsely labeled. It began flying the Cameroon flag on November 3.
, sanctioned by the EU and the UK Aqua Titan , sails through the English Channel on November 23, after switching to the Cameroon flag, after the IMO declared it to be under false flag with Gambia.
Gambia’s actions mark significant progress, but hundreds of sanctioned tankers continue to exploit an expanding network of fraudulent registries. For now, the dark fleet remains more agile than the regulatory system designed to oversee it.
Source: here
Australia is testing the HIMARS rocket launcher on the amphibious assault ship HMAS Canberra and landing craft.
The Australian Defense Force has loaded an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, onto the amphibious assault ship HMAS Canberra and one of its landing craft in Sydney Harbor as part of a new series of sea trials. This move marks a practical step toward integrating long-range rocket artillery with Australia’s amphibious force, tightening the link between maritime maneuver and land attack options in the Indo-Pacific.
On December 2, 2025, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) quietly marked a turning point in its long-range firepower posture by embarking the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) aboard the amphibious assault ship HMAS Canberra and one of its landing craft in Sydney Harbor. Conducted as part of the system’s introduction into service, the activity went beyond a simple loading test and represented a key step in validating how rocket artillery can move alongside amphibious forces in contested coastal environments. In an Indo-Pacific context where dispersed fire and rapid maneuvers between sea and shore are increasingly central to deterrence, the ability to transport HIMARS by sea is strategically significant. The HIMARS at-sea tests, designed to confirm the platform’s transportability and supportability at sea, were conducted, according to the Australian Department of Defense report.
Beyond the technical success of loading and moving the launcher, the activity in Sydney Harbour signals that Australian HIMARS will not be limited to inland training areas or fixed garrisons (Image source: Australian Department of Defense)
HIMARS itself is now a central element of the Australian Army’s emerging long-range fire architecture. Mounted on a 6×6 wheeled chassis, the launcher can fire guided missiles tens of kilometers and, in the future, longer-range precision missiles, while remaining mobile enough to quickly reposition after firing. Australia has ordered 42 launchers as part of a foreign military sales deal with the United States, with the initial systems already delivered and operated by the newly re-established 54th Siege Battery of the 10th Brigade, the army’s long-range fire formation. The tests in Sydney Harbour therefore represent the next step in making this capability not only air deployable, which has already been tested, but also fully integrated with the ADF’s maritime component.
During the Sydney activity, a HIMARS launcher, along with its dedicated resupply vehicle and trailer, was loaded onto HMAS Canberra, the Royal Australian Navy’s flagship helicopter carrier, and then moved to one of the LHD landing craft for further testing. The focus was on verifying the practical aspects of maritime transportability: maneuvering the launcher inside the ship, securing it for sea conditions encountered in coastal operations, and demonstrating that resupply elements can be loaded and moved as a complete fire package over long distances. HMAS Canberra is designed to carry over a thousand soldiers and their vehicles and project them ashore using landing craft and helicopters, giving the ADF the means to position HIMARS batteries close to key maritime chokepoints, coastal approaches, and island targets.
From a geostrategic perspective, the process fits perfectly with Australia’s shift to a more littoral, archipelago-focused posture, as outlined in recent strategic reviews. The ability to transport HIMARS by Canberra-class ships, LHD landing craft, and, in the future, the Army’s new generation of landing craft under the LAND 8710 program allows for long-range fire dispersion in coastal regions and, potentially, on strategically located islands in the wider Indo-Pacific arc. Instead of being tied to fixed bases or major ports, the launchers can be embarked, moved at sea, unloaded on austere beaches, deployed on fire missions in support of joint forces, and then re-embarked or moved to another location. This complicates the adversary’s targeting calculations and underpins concepts such as expeditionary basing, sea denial along key sea lanes, and defense of Australia’s northern approaches ( ).
The tests highlight the trend toward a truly joint ADF, in which land-based fires are integrated with naval platforms to generate effects from and along the coastline. Major Ben Hutchinson, commander of 54th Siege Battery, emphasized the importance of rehearsing these movements in seemingly benign conditions at Fleet Base East so that they can be executed under operational pressure. For Army artillerymen, this means understanding how to operate in the confined spaces of a warship and its landing craft; for Navy crews, it means treating HIMARS and its support vehicles as a routine part of amphibious cargo. In future operations, this combination could enable the rapid deployment of rocket artillery to remote or underdeveloped islands where traditional port infrastructure is lacking but the need for credible long-range strike in support of allies and partners is acute.
Beyond the technical success of loading and moving the launcher, the activity in Sydney Harbour signals that Australian HIMARS will not be limited to inland training areas or fixed garrisons. By demonstrating that the system can be transported on Canberra-class ships alongside its support vehicles and operate as part of a larger amphibious task force, the ADF is laying the foundation for a flexible coastal strike capability tailored to the island geography of the Indo-Pacific. As the long-range fire brigade grows and new landing craft enter service, the ability to move HIMARS seamlessly between air, land, and sea will be central to Australia’s efforts to deter coercion, reassure regional partners, and respond rapidly to crises on strategic islands and coastal areas in the nearby region.
Source: here
China’s naval expansion and addition of 100 ships increase military pressure on Taiwan and allies in East Asia.
Reuters reports that China coordinated more than 100 naval and coast guard vessels in the East and South China Seas on December 4, 2025. Analysts say the scale and timing reflect China’s growing ability to conduct synchronized maritime operations, which limits the response time for nearby militaries.
China executed its largest maritime offensive in the East and South China Seas, according to a Reuters summary of intelligence reports published on December 4, 2025. Analysts said the operation involved more than 100 naval and coast guard vessels moving almost simultaneously in multiple sectors, a pattern that US officials have watched for signs of advanced fleet coordination. Although the intent was not specified, the activity was unusually coherent and significant for regional monitoring agencies .
China’s third aircraft carrier, Fujian (Hull 18), during its commissioning ceremony, marked a major step in the modernization of the PLAN’s carrier aviation. (Image source: Chinese Ministry of Defense)
China’s deployment of more than 100 naval and coast guard vessels in East Asia coincides with a rapidly expanding fleet capable of projecting power in multiple hot spots. The combination of massive maritime operations and major advances in aircraft carrier, amphibious, and submarine capabilities poses a growing strategic threat, particularly to Taiwan.
This growth is occurring as the PLAN (Chinese Navy) accelerates the development of its aircraft carrier fleet. In May 2024, the newest aircraft carrier, Fujian, began sea trials and continued extensive testing throughout 2024 and 2025. Its electromagnetic catapult and arresting gear system will enable China to launch heavier, longer-range aircraft, including next-generation fighter jets and electronic warfare platforms. Once operational, expected in late 2025 or 2026, Fujian will significantly expand the PLAN’s strike and surveillance area around Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the PLAN’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, completed a year-long overhaul in 2024, and the second aircraft carrier, Shandong, continued large-scale training cycles. Together, both aircraft carriers have conducted missions in the South China Sea, the Philippine Sea, and around Taiwan, demonstrating an increasingly sustained rate of sorties. Their flight operations near the island highlight China’s improving ability to conduct multi-day air operations that simulate blockades, encirclement exercises, or air denial scenarios.
A fourth, larger Chinese aircraft carrier is under construction, suggesting that the PLAN is seeking a multi-carrier force to maintain pressure on Taiwan from multiple maritime directions. Such a force is essential for any high-intensity contingency aimed at isolating or constraining the island.
China is expanding its amphibious assault capabilities faster than any regional rival. It has rapidly introduced several large Type-075 assault ships and is building the larger Type-076 class. Satellite imagery suggests that the Type 076 may exceed US LHDs in size and may have electromagnetic catapults for launching fixed-wing drones. If confirmed, the ship would be a hybrid amphibious-aviation platform, optimized for rapid island capture, surveillance swarms, and coastal defense suppression—capabilities directly relevant to Taiwan’s security.
The PLAN is strengthening its surface escort forces, with aircraft carrier groups increasingly protected by Type-055 cruisers — large warships equipped for air defense and command roles — and Type-052D destroyers, multifunctional ships focused on anti-air and anti-submarine warfare. These ships, which have advanced sensors and long-range missile systems, enhance China’s ability to enforce air and maritime exclusion zones around Taiwan or to defend amphibious assault and aircraft carrier groups during a regional crisis.
Submarine modernization complicates Taiwan’s defense planning. The anticipated arrival of Type-096 ballistic missiles and Type-095 attack submarines, along with new variants equipped with vertical launch systems, increases China’s ability to threaten Taiwanese ports, naval bases, and maritime lines of communication. Although reports of an unconfirmed submarine incident in Wuhan persist, ongoing construction signals China’s continued investment in its underwater fleet.
The threat to Taiwan becomes clear when combined with China’s recent deployment of 100 ships. Massed formations near the Taiwan Strait can simulate blockade patterns, saturate approaches, and strain Taiwan’s readiness cycles. Large coast guard groups provide China with gray-zone tools that force Taiwan to respond without clear thresholds for escalation, gradually normalizing a coercive presence and complicating support from the US and allies.
China’s expanded maritime power poses greater risks to the United States in key corridors necessary to support Taiwan in a crisis. Surveillance encounters, tracking Chinese vessels, and mass maritime saturation could delay early US presence in a conflict. Japan also faces greater difficulties in defending the Ryukyu Islands and vital air routes essential to bolstering Taiwan.
The Philippines is also under direct pressure, as Chinese formations operating in the Bashi Channel or the northern Luzon corridor could impede allied access routes to Taiwan while increasing tensions in the South China Sea. China’s 100-ship increase and rapid naval modernization mark a strategic shift: Beijing is moving beyond episodic force to a persistent, multi-theater maritime presence designed to pressure Taiwan, influence regional elections, and challenge US contingency planning in East Asian waters.
Source: here
Romania secures Hisar-class corvette from Turkey to bolster NATO’s Black Sea Shield.
Romania has signed a government-to-government agreement with Turkey for the Hisar Akhisar-class light corvette, a nearly new Turkish warship valued at €223 million. The acquisition aims to strengthen Romania’s naval capabilities in the Black Sea and enhance regional security cooperation.
On December 3, 2025, Romania officially signed an intergovernmental contract with Turkey for the purchase of the Hisar Akhisar class light corvette, in a transaction valued at €223 million excluding VAT. The contract, signed at the Ministry of National Defense in Bucharest between the General Directorate for Armament and ASFAT, marks the first export of a Turkish-built combat ship to a NATO and European Union member state and the first new surface combat ship to join the Romanian Navy in decades. Aimed at reducing a critical capacity deficit in the Black Sea, the corvette is expected to enhance maritime security, protect key offshore infrastructure, and improve Romania’s ability to operate alongside NATO partners in an increasingly contested regional environment.
Romania acquired the Hisar-class light corvette, built in Akhisar, Turkey, in a fast-tracked €223 million deal to modernize its aging Black Sea fleet and bolster NATO’s defense in the region (Image source: ASFAT)
During the ceremony, Minister Radu Miruță emphasized that the arrival of a new ship in service represents a “concrete step” that strengthens Romania’s defense posture in the Black Sea and directly affects the country’s security and the conditions in which Romanian sailors carry out their missions. The government-to-government agreement comes at the end of a decision-making process in which the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) approved, in March 2025, the multi-year program to equip the Romanian Naval Forces with a new Hisar-class light corvette, allowing the MoND to initiate the necessary procurement procedures. On September 8, the joint defense committees of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies unanimously issued a favorable opinion on the acquisition, paving the political way for the signing of the contract announced on December 3. The MoND specifies that the €223 million excluding VAT covers not only the ship itself, but also crew training and a logistics support package.
In service with Romania, the Akhisar light corvette will primarily feature a mix of Turkish and Western defense products integrated onto a compact multi-mission platform. The basic configuration of the Hisar class includes a 76 mm MKE naval gun derived from the OTO Melara 76/62, the Aselsan Gökdeniz 35 mm close-in weapon system using standard NATO 35×228 mm ammunition, as well as 12.7 mm remote-controlled weapon stations and additional machine guns for close-range defense and response to asymmetric threats. The ship’s combat system is centered on the Havelsan ADVENT CMS, connected to a modern set of sensors that combines a 3D surveillance radar, fire control radars, electro-optical directors, sonar, and electronic support measures. Romania may subsequently choose to integrate additional NATO-compliant systems or other Turkish-made systems onto this platform, but no detailed configuration has been officially disclosed.
From a financial and industrial standpoint, the contract is notable for both parties. Romania will pay €223 million, excluding VAT, for the platform itself, crew training, and a logistics support package, with the total cost of the program estimated at approximately €265 million once national integration work and additional systems are included. The ship is to be transferred directly from the Turkish Navy’s order of battle, allowing delivery to Constanța in approximately six months after signing, a much faster pace than Romania’s stalled domestic corvette program. This speed, however, comes at the price of limited work for Romanian shipyards, a sensitive issue in a country seeking to rebuild its shipbuilding industry. For Turkey, the transaction is a strategic export success: ASFAT ( ), the state-owned company that coordinates 27 military factories and 10 shipyards, secures the first sale of a Turkish-built warship to an EU and NATO navy, strengthening its position as a serious competitor in the European naval market.
The acquisition aligns with strategic objectives in response to the increasingly volatile security environment in the Black Sea, intensified by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Romania’s fleet includes several platforms dating from the late Cold War period, and major modernization efforts, such as new corvettes and frigate upgrades, have encountered substantial delays. By acquiring the Akhisar as a turnkey vessel under an intergovernmental agreement, Bucharest is ensuring a short-term improvement in maritime presence, escort and surveillance capabilities in support of NATO’s eastern flank, including the protection of offshore gas fields and vital maritime communication lines. The Hisar class design, optimized for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), patrol, anti-surface operations, and limited anti-air roles, represents a sustainable, high-availability asset capable of sustained operations in the northern and western Black Sea, providing early warning and enhancing allied maritime situational awareness.
The transaction has notable geopolitical resonance within NATO and the broader Euro-Atlantic industrial landscape. For Romania, the choice of a Turkish-built corvette reflects a pragmatic focus on rapid delivery of capabilities and interoperability, even if it means sourcing beyond traditional Western European shipyards. For Turkey, the export of the Akhisar to another NATO and EU member signals the maturity of its defense industry and its ability to deliver complex surface combatants that meet Alliance standards. The agreement expands the Bucharest-Ankara partnership, complements cooperation in the field of drones and land systems, and illustrates how defense industrial ties within NATO can evolve beyond traditional supplier-customer relationships to develop new regional security links in the Black Sea.
With the signing of the Akhisar contract, Romania is one step closer to implementing a coherent naval force structure that will ultimately include locally built patrol ships, corvettes from the European program, modernized frigates, submarines, and a growing family of unmanned systems. The rapid arrival of this Hisar-class corvette, acquired through a program officially approved by CSAT and Parliament in 2025, will be an early test of Bucharest’s ability to translate political decisions and parliamentary approvals into concrete maritime capabilities, while also providing Turkey with a high-visibility reference for future naval exports to allied nations. If deadlines are met and the integration of Romania-specific systems continues according to plan, Akhisar could soon become a symbol of both countries’ shared interest in a more robust and interconnected NATO posture in the Black Sea.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from top Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military weapons, and emerging defense technologies.
Source: here
The Royal Australian Navy completes the first tests of the Edge 130 tri-copter drone aboard a patrol boat.
On December 1, 2025, the Australian Department of Defense announced that the Royal Australian Navy had completed first-class tests of the Edge 130 tricopter drone aboard the HMAS Cape Pillar patrol boat. The results indicate a significant increase in coastal surveillance and small warship capabilities as unmanned systems gain wider acceptance.
The Australian Department of Defense confirmed on December 1, 2025, that the Royal Australian Navy had completed its first test campaign of the Edge 130 tricopter drone aboard the HMAS Cape Pillar patrol boat. Conducted in September over Darwin Harbor and nearby coastal waters, the flights were designed to validate safe deck operations and assess how a compact unmanned aircraft can extend the sensor range of minor warships. Defense officials noted that the platform demonstrated stable performance throughout its flight, giving crews a clearer understanding of how unmanned systems could be integrated into routine coastal patrols.
Royal Australian Navy sailors launch the Edge 130 tri-copter drone from the deck of HMAS Cape Pillar during operational trials in Darwin Harbor, demonstrating the integration of unmanned aerial systems into front-line patrol missions. (Image source: Australian Department of Defense)
Designed for easy modular deployment, the Edge 130 drone weighs only 1.2 kilograms but offers advanced aerial surveillance and tactical flexibility. With beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) capability, interchangeable lithium-ion batteries, and compatibility with a variety of sensors, the system is designed for high-tempo maritime operations. The drone’s compact design allows for rapid launch and recovery aboard small vessels, filling a critical information and reconnaissance gap that has traditionally been underserved by manned aviation assets in coastal patrols.
Tests aboard HMAS Cape Pillar began with technical integration and training for remote pilots, followed by operational development of onboard procedures and test flights alongside HMAS Coonawarra. Full operational assessment was conducted at sea under real-world conditions, simulating mission profiles over diverse coastal terrain, including mangroves, shallow inlets, and offshore surveillance areas. These are precisely the environments where unmanned systems offer a strategic advantage, reducing crew exposure and extending a ship’s situational awareness far beyond line of sight and radar.
For naval forces, the integration of compact aerial drones such as the Edge 130 represents a turning point in distributed maritime operations. On minor warships, such as Cape-class patrol boats, drones serve as force multipliers by extending the range of the ship’s sensors and improving maritime domain awareness without increasing crew workload or requiring air support from larger platforms. The ability to conduct persistent reconnaissance beyond the horizon allows commanders to detect, classify, and monitor contacts without diverting resources or exposing personnel.
The Edge 130’s operational flexibility supports multiple mission profiles. In law enforcement roles, the drones can patrol remote coastlines for illegal fishing, smuggling, or unauthorized maritime activities, providing real-time video and thermal imagery in hard-to-reach environments. In search and rescue missions, drones provide rapid deployment and surveillance, increasing the likelihood of detection in time-sensitive scenarios. In tactical operations, they provide critical surveillance support, early warning, and terrain mapping during interdiction efforts, particularly in shallow or confined waters unsuitable for larger platforms.
During testing, the Edge 130 demonstrated reliable stability in offshore flight, including successful missions in varied wind conditions and challenging coastal terrain. The final phase included a multi-ship coordination test near Charles Point, during which the drone captured high-resolution aerial imagery of a formation consisting of the ships HMA Cape Pillar, Albany, and Cape Woolamai. This highlighted not only the quality of the imagery, but also its ability to integrate into fleet-level operations as a flexible reconnaissance asset.
The success of Edge 130 aboard Cape Pillar is part of a broader trend toward expanding the use of unmanned systems within the Royal Australian Navy. With maritime challenges increasing in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in northern Australia, patrol vessels equipped with drones offer a cost-effective and scalable solution for surveilling vast maritime areas. The system has already been operationalized in support of Joint Task Force 639, with drones deployed to monitor dense mangrove areas for illegal fishing — an application that underscores the real-world value of these platforms for persistent maritime security enforcement.
As naval doctrine evolves to embrace distributed lethality and unmanned integration, platforms such as the Edge 130 offer a practical, operationally proven solution to extend surveillance range, reduce risk, and increase the effectiveness of even the smallest naval units. With this first operational milestone achieved, Edge 130 is positioned to play a critical role in shaping the future of maritime patrol operations for the Australian and allied navies facing similar coastal defense challenges.
Source: here
The ULAQ 15 MPV drone marks a new step in Turkey’s autonomous naval warfare.
At EDEX 2025, Turkish company ARES Shipyard presented the ULAQ 15 MPV unmanned surface vessel, following the restructuring of the program under ULAQ Global to coordinate production, integration, and export activities.
At EDEX 2025, the ULAQ 15 MPV was presented as one of the newest multifunctional variants of Turkey’s first unmanned armed surface vessel program, which now covers port security, intelligence and electronic warfare, mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare. This presentation also comes at a time when the ULAQ brand, originally created through collaboration between the ARES shipyard and Meteksan Defence, evolved into an independent company known as ULAQ Global in July 2025 to serve both domestic and international customers.
ULAQ vessels participated in the NATO Maritime Security Exercise in October 2023, where ULAQ ASuW and ULAQ PSV collaborated with a Turkish Navy Gabya-class frigate, Coast Guard interceptors, a Coast Guard RHIB, a Bayraktar TB2 UAV, and a special operations team. (Image source: Army Recognition)
At the heart of the ULAQ family is the ULAQ 15 for anti-surface warfare (ASuW), the newest member of a family that includes the ULAQ PSV for port security, the ULAQ ISR and EW for reconnaissance and electronic warfare, ULAQ 12 MCM for mine countermeasures, ULAQ ASW for anti-submarine warfare, and ULAQ 15 MPV as a multi-purpose vessel. The new ASuW version is based on a larger hull, designed to accommodate four Çakir cruise missiles, water jet propulsion, and a rear mission space for missiles, towed sonars, torpedoes, and unmanned underwater vehicles. This structure follows previous steps, in which the ULAQ was initially equipped with Cirit and L UMTAS guided munitions, later expanded to anti-submarine variants and kamikaze configurations such as the ULAQ KAMA. The EDEX 2025 exhibition also links these developments to the ongoing reorganization of the program under the new company ULAQ Global. This organization emerged from the partnership between ARES Shipyard and Meteksan Defense and aims to expand domestic and foreign deliveries, as well as manage the overall growth of the ULAQ program.
The integration of Çakir cruise missiles is the defining feature of the ULAQ 15 ASuW, moving the platform from the 8-kilometer range of UMTAS and Cirit missiles to an attack range of over 150 kilometers. The Çakir weighs up to 330 kg, has a diameter of up to 275 mm, and carries a 70 kg semi-armor-piercing explosive warhead or a thermobaric warhead. Its mid-course guidance uses inertial navigation, anti-jamming GNSS, radar and barometric altimeters, as well as terrain reference navigation, while terminal guidance uses infrared imaging, RF seeker or a hybrid IIR plus RF option. The missile can be launched from unmanned surface vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, including Akinci and Aksungur, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, ground vehicles, trucks, helicopters, and military ships. The missile can also be guided by another unit after launch, allowing for coordinated engagement between platforms. Çakir’s first known test firing took place from the Bayraktar Akinci UCAV and confirmed the missile’s multi-platform architecture.
The ULAQ program began in 2018 as a joint initiative between ARES Shipyard and Meteksan Defense to develop Turkey’s first unmanned armed surface vessel, with the first prototype unveiled in October 2020 and launched in early 2021. The initial ULAQ measures approximately 11 to 12 meters in length, carries up to 2,000 kg, and uses an advanced composite hull with the ability to operate in sea state 5 at speeds of up to 35 knots and a range of 400 kilometers. It uses encrypted communications, anti-jamming capabilities, day and night sensors, a gyrostabilizer, X-band navigation radar, EO and IR tracking systems, depth sounder, VHF radio, and onboard firefighting systems. The ship completed Cirit missile launch tests during the Denizkurdu exercise in May 2021 and subsequently passed acceptance tests for the ASuW version. Control is provided from mobile ground stations, command centers, or naval platforms. The platform is designed for reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, surface warfare, asymmetric missions, escort duties, and infrastructure security. Over time, it has expanded into ASW variants carrying light torpedoes and sonobuoys, mine countermeasure projects, firefighting versions, and humanitarian assistance modules.
Following the initial variant, the ARES shipyard completed production of Turkish Navy units under the ULAQ 12 ASuW and ULAQ 12 ASW programs, both based on a standard hull with different payloads. The ULAQ 12 ASuW uses Roketsan’s KMC modular launcher, combined with a 12.7 mm remote weapon station, and can fire UMTAS, L-UMTAS, Cirit, and L-UMTAS-GM guided munitions at ranges between 8 and 15 kilometers, depending on the type of missile. The ULAQ 12 ASW is equipped with sonar options and has materials for torpedoes and ASW missiles. The KMC and KMC-U launchers feature 360-degree stabilized turrets, autonomous laser marking, day and night operation, EO and IR sensors, STANAG 3733 compliance, MIL STD 1760 and MIL STD 810 compatibility, and spare ammunition storage. These launchers can also be integrated on other Turkish unmanned vessels, including MARLIN and SALVO. The ULAQ KAMA kamikaze boat was also introduced, with a payload of 200 kg, a speed of 20 knots, a range of 200 nautical miles, autonomous and semi-autonomous modes, and the ability to continue searching for targets if communication is interrupted.
ULAQ vessels participated in maritime exercises such as the NATO Maritime Security Exercise in October 2023, where ULAQ ASuW and ULAQ PSV collaborated with a Turkish Navy Gabya-class frigate, Coast Guard interceptors, a Coast Guard RHIB, a Bayraktar TB2 UAV, and a special operations team. They provided ISR, live video transmission, and interdiction support and demonstrated collaboration with unmanned crews in a mixed operational environment. The Center of Excellence for Maritime Security noted the operational completeness of the activities and the ability of manned and unmanned systems to operate without significant interference. Other national developments include Turkey’s order for ULAQ ASuW and ASW units in quantities described as in the tens, with unit prices characterized as in the millions of dollars, depending on configuration. The program’s goal includes localizing 90% of components such as propulsion, 12.7 mm remote weapon stations, torpedoes, L-UMTAS missiles, software, communications systems, sensors, and sonar. Statements indicate that the ships are now equipped with an internal propulsion system designed to improve cruiser performance.
Export activity has played a major role in shaping the ULAQ program, most notably with Qatar becoming the first international buyer through a QAR 21.3 million contract, approximately $5.85 million, for the ULAQ 11 PSV equipped with a 12.7 mm remote weapon station, radar, encrypted communications, and autonomous navigation software. The USV is intended for reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, and facility protection and is expected to be delivered after testing and possible modifications. The ULAQ PSV was also offered to Vietnam with the KMC-U launcher, and exports under consideration include one to five anti-surface warfare vessels, port security vessels, and sacrifice vessels for another foreign customer. The organizational restructuring of ULAQ into ULAQ Global, announced at IDEF 2025, formalizes its status as an independent company seeking international expansion, while remaining linked to its parent companies through financing and management. We can also mention that the broader landscape of Turkish unmanned surface vessels includes ULAQ from ARES and Meteksan, SALVO from Dearsan, Yonca Onuk and SANCAR from Havelsan, as well as ALBATROS and MIR from Aselsan and Sefine.
Source: here
Egypt presents the USV-AIO-001 unmanned vessel with Eagle-2 weapon station at EDEX 2025
Egypt presented the USV-AIO-001 with the Eagle 2 remote weapon station at EDEX 2025, marking a new step in unmanned naval development.
At EDEX 2025, Egypt’s Arab International Optronics (AIO) introduced the USV-AIO-001, an unmanned surface vessel equipped with the Eagle-2 remote weapon station, locally produced by Spanish company Escribano, highlighting a 70% local content level in the displayed configuration. The USV-AIO-001 was presented as a new Egyptian unmanned naval asset, combining an internally integrated hull with a stabilized combat system for coastal missions, capable of surveillance and force protection, with low crew exposure.
Based on Escribano’s Guardian, the Eagle-2 turret on the USV-AIO-001 is a lightweight, gyro-stabilized, two-axis weapon station designed for naval vessels and capable of operating in sea state 3 in all weather conditions. (Image source: Army Recognition)
The Eagle-2 turret on the USV-AIO-001 is a lightweight, gyro-stabilized, two-axis weapon station designed for naval vessels and capable of operating in sea state 3 in all weather conditions. It supports 5.56 mm, 7.62 mm, and 12.7 mm as standard naval calibers and 14.5 mm, allowing for different mission configurations depending on operational requirements. The system weighs 185 kg without weapons and ammunition, allowing for installation on small boats and unmanned vessels. Its electro-optical package includes an uncooled thermal camera with dual field of view and a day camera with 30x continuous optical zoom, supported by a Class I laser rangefinder, safe for the eyes, with a maximum range of 3.5 km. The software interface is described as fluid and easy to use for precise control, and a built-in simulator supports training without live firing. Eagle-2 is characterized as the naval version derived from the Eagle-1 turret.
Arab International Optronics is a joint venture formed in 1982 between Thales, owning 49 percent, and Egypt’s National Service Products Organization, which has expanded from optronics to complete weapon stations. Previously, the company introduced the X29 RCWS for static defense roles, designed without stabilization and with an ammunition box on the left side, a centrally mounted machine gun, and an optronic package under the weapon. It supports 12.7×99 mm M2HB or KPVT 14.5×114 mm weapons and uses a 640×480 uncooled microbolometric thermal sensor, operating in the 8 to 12 micrometer band, with tank detection at 7.5 km and identification at 1.3 km. Its daytime camera uses a 1945×1225 CMOS detector with a 6 to 210 mm zoom lens, allowing tank detection up to 20 km in a narrow field and human recognition at 40 m. A 6 km laser rangefinder, automatic recording, video tracking , and a bullet counter are included, and the system weighs 160 kg without a weapon or ammunition. The Egyptian Ministry of Defense received a Zero batch in preparation for full production.
AIO also developed the Eagle-1 in collaboration with Escribano, based on the Guardian turret, forming the basis for the naval Eagle-2 featured on the USV-AIO-001. Eagle-1 can mount 12.7 mm or KPVT weapons and optionally MG4, MG3, or a 40 mm Mk19, with smoke launchers and STANAG Level 2 protection available. It features two-axis stabilization under 1 milliradian, with the ammunition box on the left and the sensor suite on the right, using thermal fields of view of 9.0 degrees by 6.75 degrees and 4 degrees by 3 degrees. Detection ranges include 6.9 km for vehicles and 4 km for people, with identification at 3.2 km and 1.4 km, respectively, and its day camera can detect vehicles up to 7.5 km away. A laser rangefinder reaches 20 km, and the artillery station uses a 12-inch screen with a built-in simulator. AIO produces about 30 percent of its value and targets 70 percent, with plans for 400 Eagle-1 units in two phases. Eagle-1 was seen on an Egyptian Sherpa, while Eagle-2 appeared on a mock boat.
The USV-AIO-001 appears in an expanding Egyptian unmanned surface ecosystem that includes projects by public and private entities. Private firm Amstone previously produced the B5 HYDRA with Leonardo and a Cypriot partner, a high-speed patrol USV with a payload of 600 kg, total weight of 1,500 kg, length of 2.1 m, and maximum speed of 85 knots. It can carry a 12.7 mm remote cannon, launch a small reconnaissance drone, and integrate Black Scorpion light torpedoes or serve as an explosive boat. The HORUS-USV survey vessel, a fiberglass catamaran measuring 1.4 m by 1.3 m, with a draft of 0.35 m and a payload of 150 kg, has also demonstrated hydrographic measurement capability with differential GNSS, a 50 to 200 kHz echo sounder, dual thrusters, microcontrollers, sensors, and modular instrumentation, complying with IHO S 44 standards with an uncertainty of ±0.15 m at a depth of 4.08 m.
Source: here
China is turning a civilian cargo ship into a maritime energy platform equipped with LY-1 laser weapons.
China has mounted and tested the LY-1 high-energy laser on a civilian ship, transforming an apparently commercial vessel into a potential anti-drone and close air defense platform. This experiment illustrates how Beijing is integrating directed energy weapons into its broader amphibious doctrine and blurring the line between civilian logistics assets and military combatants in any future regional crisis.
On November 30, 2025, images distributed on Chinese social media showed the LY-1 high-energy laser weapon system mounted on the open deck of a civilian roll-on/roll-off cargo ship conducting sea trials. The photos reveal a large, white Ro-Ro passenger and cargo ship with helicopter landing markings on the foredeck, on which a camouflage-painted carrier vehicle was positioned and secured with heavy chains. This system, previously associated with dedicated military platforms, is being tested on the same class of commercial Ro-Ro ships that China has been integrating for years into amphibious and landing exercises as auxiliary transport. The combination of a commercial hull and sophisticated directed-energy weaponry highlights how rapidly the boundary between civilian logistics and naval combat power is narrowing in the Western Pacific. Concerns about the vulnerability of slow, heavily laden transports to drones and munitions on the move point to a future in which every cargo ramp and vehicle deck could also function as a defensive node, signaling how China intends to strengthen the weakest links in any large-scale landing force.
China tested its LY-1 high-energy laser air defense system on the deck of a civilian Ro-Ro cargo ship, highlighting an increasingly deep fusion between the country’s commercial fleet and its amphibious combat capabilities (Image source: Chinese Social Media)
The LY-1 itself is a ship-based high-energy laser designed for close-range air and missile defense. First publicly revealed during the 2025 Victory Day parade in Beijing, the system was displayed on an 8×8 armored vehicle, with a prominent, large-aperture beam director surrounded by multiple electro-optical and infrared sensors for acquisition and tracking. Open-source information describes the LY-1 as a terminal layer of air defense intended to engage small, low-signature aerial threats (drones, standoff munitions, helicopters, and potentially low-flying cruise missiles) at the speed of light. Some open-source assessments place the system’s power at approximately 180–250 kW, with speculation that future variants could reach higher levels and suggest engagement ranges against small unmanned systems extending to several kilometers or more under favorable conditions. These figures remain unconfirmed by Chinese authorities, but are broadly consistent with the LY-1’s role as the innermost layer of a layered naval air defense network, alongside the HQ-10 and HQ-16 surface-to-air missiles. The weapon has already been spotted on Type 071 amphibious transport docks, such as Simingshan and Qilianshan, indicating that the People’s Liberation Army Navy is moving from technology demonstrations to serial integration into its landing fleet. In this role, the laser offers the ability to conduct repeated engagements at a much lower cost per fire than missile interceptors or gun ammunition, provided sufficient power and cooling are available on board the ship.
The latest image, spread on Weibo and other Chinese social platforms rather than through official channels, is striking not only because of the turret, but also because of the platform underneath and the way the system is installed. It shows the LY-1 mounted on a large camouflaged aircraft carrier vehicle, with the turret bearing the inscription “LY-1” and a visible blue primary aperture positioned toward the bow of the ship. The vehicle is parked on what appears to be a helicopter deck, identified by its circular landing markings, and is anchored to multiple deck tie-points using chains and turnbuckles, a standard maritime safety measure when heavy vehicles are transported on exposed decks. Several crew members, dressed in blue coveralls, are visible along the railings, providing scale and emphasizing that the test is being conducted under normal sea conditions, not in a controlled port or . There is no visible additional shielding, dedicated sponson, or structural reinforcement around the laser unit, suggesting that the system remains largely autonomous on its carrier vehicle and is being evaluated in a temporary but realistically operational configuration. This combination of an unchanged civilian superstructure, standard safety procedures, and an advanced weapon on deck illustrates how easily a commercial body can transition from commercial transport to a dual-use test bed, while exposing the laser to real-world factors such as vibration, ship motion, sea spray, and humidity that strongly influence directed energy performance.
The installation of the LY-1 on a roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ship highlights a practical approach that China could test to protect amphibious convoys against contemporary threats. In large landing operations, civilian Ro-Ro ships loaded with vehicles and personnel are particularly vulnerable to low-cost unmanned systems, from small quadcopters to one-way attack drones and loitering munitions, which seek out high-value hulls. A deck-mounted laser effectively turns each transport into a short-range counter-UAS and counter-munitions node, capable of engaging multiple threats without consuming limited missile inventory. Rather than relying solely on escort ships, this dispersion of defensive emitters throughout the convoy complicates enemy targeting and adds layers of protection for landing craft and landing craft that would otherwise be exposed. The concept aligns with preparations frequently discussed in analyses of possible operations across the Taiwan Strait, where civilian tonnage is expected to supplement amphibious lift and would therefore require organic defenses against the distributed drone and missile tactics seen in recent conflicts.
The test also fits squarely into a broader pattern of civil-military fusion at sea. For more than a decade, Chinese authorities have integrated commercial ferries and Ro-Ro ships into exercises involving beach landings, rapid loading and unloading of armored vehicles, and long-distance troop movements. Some of these ships have apparently undergone structural modifications to reinforce their decks and ramps for heavy military loads. The use of a civilian Ro-Ro as a platform for a high-energy laser is consistent with these previous activities, but takes the logic further: the ship ceases to be merely a logistical facilitator and becomes a potential combat platform, yet continues to sail under civilian guise in peacetime. This ambiguity raises questions about the laws of armed conflict, particularly the principle of distinction between civilian and military objects, and complicates decision-making for foreign commanders who must assess whether an apparently commercial ship approaching a contested area is in fact equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry. At the same time, from Beijing’s perspective, such dual-use configurations increase flexibility in crises, allow for rapid mobilization of the commercial fleet, and create additional options for signaling and pressure without resorting to open conflict.
Technologically and strategically, the LY-1 Ro-Ro tests highlight how directed energy systems are moving from experimental concepts to practical tools for maritime power projection. China is already deploying other laser systems for ground-based counter-drone missions, while several navies are evaluating high-energy lasers on destroyers and patrol ships to engage unmanned aerial vehicles and small boats. In this broader context, the LY-1 is seen by many analysts not only as an effort to keep pace with developments such as the US Navy’s HELIOS, but also to shape emerging naval laser concepts, advancing them from main battle ships to auxiliary platforms and, over time, potentially into broader segments of the commercial fleet. If these sea trials prove the system’s performance, regional navies may increasingly face the possibility that any Chinese Ro-Ro approaching a flashpoint could contribute to local air defense and sensor jamming, even in the absence of visible missile launchers on deck. Such a development narrows the traditional margin of safety for forces targeting logistics transports and complicates the planning of interdiction campaigns that rely on striking unprotected transports.
The appearance of the LY-1 on a civilian Ro-Ro is thus more than just a new test shot; it is an experiment in reconfiguring the architecture of amphibious power, integrating laser-based air defense directly into those transport platforms that are both indispensable and most exposed. By combining commercial hulls, directed-energy technology, and a ” ” doctrine built around mass landing operations, China is signaling that future maritime crises in the Western Pacific could involve not only missiles and aircraft, but also commercial ships capable of silently burning away threats from the sky. For regional defense planners, the presence of such a system on a civilian hull is not just a technological milestone, but a warning that convoy defense, civilian transport, and the dynamics of escalation in any future crisis are now more closely connected than ever.
Source: here
India will commission the INS Aridhaman as the third Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
India is preparing to commission the INS Aridhaman after the submarine entered the final phase of port and sea trials, Navy officials said during a briefing on December 2.
INS Aridhaman, India’s third domestically built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, is set to be commissioned shortly after entering the final phase of dock and sea trials, as stated by Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Dinesh K. Tripathi, during a press conference ahead of Navy Day on December 2, 2025. The submarine will join the existing INS Arihant and INS Arighaat, giving the Indian Navy three operational Arihant-class SSBNs at sea for the first time and expanding the submarine component of the nuclear triad.
With an enlarged hull compared to INS Arihant, INS Aridhaman will have a total length of approximately 130 meters, a width of 11 meters, and a draft of approximately 9.5 to 10 meters. (Image source: X/News IADN)
This announcement comes after the official establishment of INS Arighaat at the Strategic Forces Command in Visakhapatnam on August 29, 2024, following a lengthy period of construction and testing. Military assessments in early 2025 already indicated that INS Aridhaman, which had been undergoing testing for nearly three years, was scheduled to be commissioned within a year. Built as part of the Advanced Technology Vessel project at the Visakhapatnam Shipyard, INS Aridhaman, designated S4 or SSBN 82, is the third nuclear submarine manufactured in India and the second unit in the Arihant class. The submarine was built between 2017 and 2018, launched discreetly on November 21 or 23, 2021, and is undergoing port acceptance and sea trials in 2022, with final checks on the weapons and reactor to be completed by mid-2025.
The INS Aridhaman’s displacement is consistently estimated at approximately 6,000 tons on the surface and approximately 7,000 tons underwater, with a crew of approximately 95 to 100 members, including officers and sailors. The submarine is powered by an 83 MW compact pressurized light water reactor CLWR-B1, derived from the Kalpakkam naval reactor prototype, driving a single shaft with a seven-bladed propeller. Speed is stated as between 12 and 15 knots on the surface and approximately 24 knots when submerged, with range and endurance limited primarily by food stocks, crew rotation, and scheduled maintenance rather than fuel. The hull could be constructed using specialized low-carbon steel and, in some descriptions, anechoic plates for acoustic damping, and includes sonar mounts at the bow, flank, and tow. Once commissioned, INS Aridhaman is expected to be based at Rambilli, near Visakhapatnam, under the Eastern Naval Command, operating under the Strategic Forces Command within India’s nuclear command structure.
The INS Aridhaman’s missile and combat system reflects a larger payload than previous Arihant-class units, with eight tubes for the vertical launch system (VLS) in the raised section of the hull, compared to four on the INS Arihant and INS Arighaat. This configuration allows the submarine to carry up to 24 K-15 Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missiles with a range of approximately 750 kilometers. Alternatively, the submarine can carry up to eight K-4 SLBM missiles, with ranges of approximately 3,500 kilometers, and is widely expected to be compatible with the future K-5 missiles, which are described as having a range of between 5,000 and 6,000 kilometers. The K-15 can reach most targets in Pakistan from patrol areas close to the Indian coast, while the K-4 missiles provide coverage in the wider regional theater, and the K-5 is designed to provide a longer range in more distant strategic areas.
The INS Aridhaman also retains a set of six 533 mm torpedo tubes for launching heavy torpedoes, such as the Varunastra, as well as certain cruise missiles or mines for self-defense and limited conventional attack roles. Its sensor equipment includes the USHUS sonar, originally developed for Kilo-class submarines, and the Panchendriya unified sonar and tactical control system, which integrates passive, active, interception, distance, and underwater communications functions. These systems are complemented by submarine combat management systems designed to integrate navigation, fire control, and sonar information for underwater operations in the Indian Ocean region.
Under India’s nuclear doctrine, which is based on credible minimum deterrence and a stated policy of no first use, the Arihant class is a family of four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines developed under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) initiative, which has been estimated at approximately ₹900 billion for the nuclear submarine effort and approximately ₹40 billion or approximately $470 million per submarine in previous estimates. These submarines are described internally as strategic nuclear attack submarines, and with the commissioning of INS Arihant in 2016, India became the first state outside the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to build and deploy an SSBN. The conceptual basis for a sea-based deterrent emerged after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, when the US aircraft carrier group Task Force 74 entered the Bay of Bengal and was tracked by a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine, highlighting to Indian leaders the strategic value of submarines capable of carrying nuclear weapons. After the 1974 Smiling Buddha nuclear test, an internal feasibility study called Project 932 examined the potential of a domestic nuclear propulsion system, and the effort to design nuclear submarines subsequently crystallized in the 1990s under the name ATV.
Initially focused on nuclear-powered attack submarines, the project was reoriented toward ballistic missile submarines after India’s 1998 nuclear tests and the adoption of a no-first-use commitment, which emphasized a reliable second-strike capability. The prototype 83 MW light water reactor, designated S1, was installed at Kalpakkam, reached criticality in November 2003, and was declared operational in September 2006, providing the basis for the production reactors used in the Arihant-class boats and a training facility for naval nuclear personnel. Industrial participation in the program includes detailed engineering at the Larsen and Toubro submarine design center, control systems from Tata Power SED, and steam turbine packages from Walchandnagar Industries, with the Hindustan shipyard being transferred to the Ministry of Defense in 2009 to support construction work.
The history of the Arihant class reflects a gradual expansion of India’s SSBN fleet, with submarines internally identified as S1 to S4*, followed by a planned S5 class. INS Arihant, designated S2 and SSBN 80, was laid down in 2004, launched on July 26, 2009, began sea trials and armament in December 2014, completed a series of missile launches, including a K-4 test in March 2016, and was commissioned in August 2016 before completing its first deterrence patrol on November 5, 2018. INS Arighaat, designated S3 and SSBN 81, was laid down in 2009, launched on November 19, 2017, began sea trials in January 2018, completed trials around March 2021, and was officially commissioned on August 29, 2024, after upgrades and testing. INS Aridhaman, or S4, launched in November 2021, began sea trials in 2022 and was evaluated for commissioning in late 2025, while a fourth unit, codenamed S4*, with approximately 75% indigenous content and armed only with K-4 missiles with a range of 3,500 kilometers, was launched on October 16, 2024.
Earlier in the program, internal discussions in 2007 led to a design change to extend the hull by approximately 10 meters to accommodate four additional missile tubes on the larger S4 and S4* variants, ensuring a larger missile payload without waiting for the subsequent S5 submarine. An additional S4* unit was approved in 2012 to avoid production gaps before the new class, while planning continued for three larger S5 SSBNs, with a capacity of approximately 13,500 tons, carrying longer-range missiles of over 5,000 kilometers. In parallel with the construction of the SSBNs, India arranged to lease a new Russian Akula-class nuclear attack submarine, often referred to as Chakra III, under a ten-year, $3 billion lease agreement signed in 2019 and scheduled for delivery around 2028, with a displacement of between 12,770 and 13,800 tons. Project 77, a separate plan for six indigenous 10,000-ton SSNs, designed by the Navy’s Warship Design Bureau and built at Visakhapatnam, received approval from the Cabinet Security Committee for two ships in October 2024, with design and construction timelines expected to take more than a decade.
In December 2024, the Indian Navy operated over 130 warships and 251 aircraft and helicopters, with targets to reach between 155 and 160 warships by 2030, between 175 and 200 by 2035, and up to 230 surface combatants and submarines by 2037. As of September 22, 2025, there were 54 ships in various stages of construction, from early manufacturing to sea trials, of which approximately 10 were to be commissioned in the same year, and contracts for these ships were valued at approximately ₹99,500 crore (approximately $11.1 billion). The Defense Acquisition Council has granted Acceptance of Necessity for 74 additional warships, worth approximately ₹2.35 lakh crore ($26 billion), while the Ministry of Defense continues to approve additional programs, including a first batch of four next-generation 10,000-ton destroyers and a future aircraft carrier. By October 31, 2025, the Navy had commissioned 10 warships and one submarine in that calendar year, with four more ships scheduled for delivery by December, corresponding to a recruitment rate of approximately one warship every 40 days.
In response to increased Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean region, including submarine and surface missions, India has invested in anti-submarine corvettes such as the Kamorta and Mahe classes, long-range P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, Saryu-class patrol vessels, and unmanned aerial vehicles such as the Heron-1. Plans also include strengthening island infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep chains to create a network of air bases and logistics nodes to support freedom of navigation and overflight over the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, while a Technology and Capabilities Roadmap published in September 2025 outlines an ambition for at least 10 nuclear-powered surface ships, including the proposed aircraft carrier INS Vishal.
Future plans for submarines under the “Future of the Indian Navy” include three more Kalvari-class or modified Type 214 submarines under consideration, six submarines equipped with Project 75I AIP, based on an extended Type 214 design, and twelve Project 76 submarines equipped with AIP and tube-launched land-attack cruise missiles, with feasibility studies beginning in July 2024 and design and construction planned for the next decade. Additional underwater plans include at least five 150-ton small submarines intended for MARCOS special operations as delivery vehicles for swimmers, a ₹2,500 crore (approximately $278 million) project for twelve additional large unmanned underwater vehicles, over 100 tons, with roles in ISR, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and mine warfare, as well as the Jalkapi XLUUV currently under construction in Halol, Gujarat, following a keel-laying ceremony on June 10, 2025.
Source: here
Planning Port Investments for a Changing Maritime Landscape
A summary of the new Port Investment Toolkit, designed to help port authorities strategically plan and finance infrastructure projects in the context of growing global trade and the urgent demand for maritime decarbonization.
Summary
Highlights the critical challenge of financing projects that deliver broad social benefits (the “value case,” such as clean energy infrastructure) but may not yield immediate commercial returns, forcing ports to secure public funding or innovative financing models. By analyzing different governance and business models worldwide, the toolkit provides a structured framework to align long-term investment decisions with national policies and economic objectives, ensuring that ports can make the efficient transition from traditional trade gateways to vital energy hubs for the future.
Responding to new demands on maritime infrastructure
As the global maritime sector faces increasing pressure to decarbonize, port authorities must consider not only how to support growing trade volumes, but also how to respond to increasingly complex energy and environmental requirements. A new report commissioned by Clear Seas and C40 Cities, Increasing Capital Investments in Ports: A Practical Toolkit, provides a blueprint for investing in the future of ports, both as traditional trade gateways and as vital energy hubs for the global energy transition.
The report addresses a common concern shared by many port authorities: how to structure, finance, and implement infrastructure projects that are essential for future resilience but may not yield immediate commercial returns. Drawing on a wide range of case studies, interviews, and international research, the toolkit provides a framework that helps port stakeholders make informed investment decisions, particularly in areas such as clean energy infrastructure and industrial development.
One of the report’s key findings is that while the need for port investment is growing, the path to securing that investment is not always straightforward. Some projects, such as terminal upgrades or land leases for new facilities, can generate predictable commercial returns and attract private financing. Others, such as renewable energy infrastructure or low-emission bunkering facilities, can bring broad social benefits but face difficulties in covering costs through direct user fees. These are often the projects that require public funding or innovative financing models to move forward.
Understanding the complexity of investments and governance models
According to the report, the total investment needed to support the maritime industry’s decarbonization goals could reach €2 trillion globally over the next decade, with ports accounting for a significant share. This includes not only infrastructure upgrades to support more efficient transport, but also investments in clean fuel production, electricity generation, carbon storage, and multimodal logistics connections.
To understand this challenge, the toolkit presents a typology of port governance and business models. Port management bodies range from state-owned corporations with financial autonomy to public authorities integrated into municipal governments. Their business models also differ; some operate on an owner model, leasing land and infrastructure to third parties, while others take a more active h e role in operations and investments. Understanding these structures is important because they shape who is responsible for what types of investments and what financing mechanisms are feasible.
The report highlights the need to distinguish between the “business case,” which considers commercial profitability, and the “value case,” which includes broader public, environmental, and social benefits. This distinction becomes particularly relevant when assessing whether public funding or policy support is needed. Some projects can recover their costs through user fees or lease agreements. Others, such as shore-side electricity (SSE) or port electrification, may require financing through grants, subsidies, or regulatory mandates to make financial sense.
Examples from Global Port Systems
To illustrate these concepts, the report highlights case studies from around the world. In the Netherlands, the implementation of OPS infrastructure was supported by EU regulations, national grants, and cooperation between port authorities and electricity providers. This combination of funding and political support has enabled ports to move forward with projects that have environmental benefits but limited commercial returns.
Map of global case studies
The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore has implemented a long-term strategy requiring port vessels to switch to electric or zero-emission fuels by 2030. This policy is supported by a national infrastructure plan, funding programs, and technical standards. In the UK, simplified authorization and development processes have allowed private port operators to expand with fewer regulatory barriers, helping to streamline investment in new terminals.
Oman offers another example, using its ports as platforms for foreign direct investment. Its large port-industrial complexes have attracted more than half of the country’s inward investment over the past decade, particularly in sectors such as manufacturing and energy production. These cases demonstrate how aligning infrastructure planning with national political and economic objectives can help attract capital and accelerate development.
Relevance to Canadian and Pacific ports
The toolkit also considers the Canadian context. Although Canada’s port authorities are financially self-sustaining and operate independently of government budgets, they often face constraints due to fixed borrowing limits and complex approval processes. These limitations can delay investments, particularly for projects related to energy transition, rail access, and climate adaptation. The report suggests that revising these regulatory frameworks could help Canadian ports invest more quickly and strategically.
Recent investments in Indigenous-led ports, such as the inland transport terminal developed by Millbrook First Nation and the Halifax Port Authority, the marine terminal expansion developed by Pabineau First Nation and the Port of Belledune, and the import logistics park developed by Metlakatla First Nation and Prince Rupert Port Authority, show how equity participation and new financing tools can help projects move forward more quickly, with community support and more flexible approvals. Similar projects supported by the Canada Infrastructure Bank and Indigenous Loan Guarantee Programs demonstrate how Indigenous partnerships are accelerating transportation and trade infrastructure nationwide.
For ports in the Pacific region, the insights in this report are timely. Many face climate-related risks, capacity constraints, and the need to modernize aging infrastructure. At the same time, they may be uniquely positioned to serve as hubs for regional logistics, green fuel production, and offshore energy development. The toolkit provides guidance that can support these goals, particularly when long-term investments require coordination among local stakeholders, government agencies, and private sector partners.
Building investment readiness through policy and operations
Beyond financing strategies, the report highlights internal operational practices that can strengthen a port’s ability to attract and manage capital. These include maintaining cost control, developing stable sources of revenue such as land lease agreements, and building internal capacity to manage complex infrastructure projects. Ports with steady leasing income, for example, may enjoy greater financial stability than those whose revenues depend on fluctuations in cargo volumes.
Phased development is another important strategy. By starting with smaller, more manageable phases, ports can adapt to market conditions, reduce risk, and create momentum for larger investments. The report also highlights the importance of aligning local, national, and international policies to create a more predictable environment for investment. Inconsistent regulations or financing rules can undermine otherwise sound projects, introducing uncertainty for investors and public authorities.
Effective coordination across multiple levels of government is often essential. Whether the project involves PPPs, hydrogen fueling, or intermodal rail improvements, ports often need to collaborate with utilities, transportation agencies, and funding bodies. The toolkit encourages governments to develop consistent regulatory frameworks and adopt transparent and competitive processes for allocating public funding.
A structured but adaptable framework
The Port Investment Toolkit does not prescribe a one-size-fits-all solution. Instead, it provides a structured and adaptable framework that helps port authorities and decision-makers assess trade-offs, identify opportunities, and navigate financing and governance challenges. It is intended as a practical reference not only for large national ports but also for smaller regional ports navigating similar issues on a different scale.
Designing a port investment framework
As ports adapt to changing global trade patterns, environmental regulations, and energy systems, long-term planning and investment readiness are becoming increasingly essential. This report provides tools and strategies that can help port authorities systematically address these challenges and align investment planning with broader policy objectives.
The complete set of port investment tools, including detailed case studies, risk assessments, and financing mechanisms, is available at https://clearseas.org/research/increasing-capital-investments-in-ports-a-practical-toolkit/.
It is intended as a resource for port authorities, government agencies, planners, and others involved in maritime infrastructure and policy development.
Source: here
Flooded with defense money, Poland rolls out the red carpet for American tech companies
An American soldier carries an Anduril Ghost-X helicopter surveillance drone during Combined Resolve 25-1 military exercises at the Hohenfels training area in Germany on February 3, 2025. (Sean Gallup/Getty Images)
WARSAW, Poland — Poland is working to expand its cooperation with American defense technology companies with roots in Silicon Valley, such as Palantir and Anduril, targeting new unmanned and artificial intelligence capabilities, as well as local production of cruise missiles.
This move comes on top of Warsaw strengthening ties with traditional American defense titans such as Lockheed, from which Poland buys fighter jets, tanks, helicopters, and missiles.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted the government to increase defense spending and accelerate the procurement of new weapons and equipment for the armed forces. With Poland’s military budget for 2025 expected to reach an unprecedented level in the nation’s history, at 4.7% of GDP, or PLN 186.6 billion ($51.1 billion), the two American technology companies join a growing list of defense groups supplying their products to Warsaw.
Poland is seeking additional funding for military purchases, with the European Union recently allocating approximately €43.7 billion ($50.7 billion) in low-cost loans for Poland’s defense purchases under the bloc’s Security Action For Europe (SAFE) scheme. In the coming years, unmanned technology will be one of the priorities of Poland’s Ministry of National Defense in the field of military procurement, according to senior government officials.
Speaking at a Nov. 20 session of the National Defense Committee of the Sejm, the lower house of parliament, Polish Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk said the ministry plans to spend at least PLN 15 billion (US$3.5 billion) on unmanned systems and anti-drone solutions over the next three years. At the same time, the ministry is stepping up its investments in AI with the launch this year of the AI Implementation Center for the Polish Army.
On October 27, the Polish ministry and Palantir signed a letter of intent to implement the company’s solutions in AI, information technology, and cybersecurity in Polish military units. On the same day, state-owned defense group PGZ signed an agreement with Anduril for cooperation in the field of autonomous and missile systems.
A spokesperson for the Polish ministry told Defense News that the letter of intent with Palantir is an extension of workshops and exercises that allowed defense officials to evaluate AI-based automation tools for the country’s military.
“The modern battlefield and the latest generation of combat equipment introduced into service, combined with sensors, generate enormous amounts of data,” the spokesperson said. “With such a rich data pool, human perception, without automation, cannot perform effective analysis.”
It is hoped that Palantir’s products will help commanders understand everything.
Polish military experts are set to implement Palantir’s tools in their activities, “ensuring full control over the security of the production environment and integrated information resources,” said the defense spokesman. No “external entities” would be needed to operate the systems, meaning Poland is expected to retain control over all processed data, they added.
During the official signing ceremony for the letter of intent, Palantir CEO and co-founder Alex Karp said his company is interested in investing in Poland, partly to develop dual-use technologies.
In a social media post, Palantir said the letter of intent paves the way for “the company’s AI-powered defense technology to begin rapidly supporting the country’s armed forces as they innovate at the forefront of an increasingly complex threat environment and strengthen Poland’s position as a sovereign leader in defense.”
In the United States, Palantir’s business with the Department of Defense has grown substantially since 2019. That year, Palantir won a fierce competition with Raytheon, now known as RTX, for a US Army contract to provide a new tactical version of its flagship intelligence analysis platform, Distributed Common Ground System-Army, or DCGS-A.
In addition to the defense ministry’s strengthened cooperation with Palantir, Poland is also positioning PGZ, which supplies most of its production to the Polish army, as a local partner for Anduril Industries.
PGZ’s October 2025 memorandum of understanding with Anduril follows a June visit to Warsaw by its CEO and co-founder, Brian Schimpf. At a June 9 press conference in the Polish capital, Schimpf said Anduril is interested in strengthening its presence in Poland through partnerships with local industry players.
Under the October agreement, PGZ and Anduril will jointly develop and produce a variant of the Barracuda-M medium-range turbojet cruise missile in Poland. This is intended to provide the country’s military with access to a new type of unmanned attack capability, but also to develop the strength of the Polish defense industry in AI, the state-owned group said in a statement.
Anduril says its Barracuda range comprises “air-breathing autonomous vehicles” that are “built specifically for mass production and mass deployment.”
“Collaborating with PGZ to localize Barracuda production demonstrates how allied industry and sovereign suppliers can deliver rapidly scalable and affordable capabilities to deter aggression,” Brian Moran, vice president of Anduril Europe, was quoted as saying in the statement.
Source: here