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US vs. Iran: The Retaliation Plan Nobody Talks About
MS Daily brief- 21 November 2026
Published from Monday to Saturday 09.00(GMT+2)
- MS Daily Brief-en
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- New version FSM Maritime Atlas v40.53 – Maritime simulations that are even closer to reality!
- The trilateral negotiations between the United States, the Russian Federation and Ukraine
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- FSM Maritime Atlas — Simulation, decision-making and analysis of maritime situations
- INTEGRATED MARITIME STRATEGIC ANALYSIS – From concepts to methodology andapplications in maritime security
- INTEGRATED MARITIME STRATEGIC ANALYSIS – From concepts to methodology and applications in maritime security
- Romania’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Neptun Deep: a strategic pillar to be protected within the Black Sea Strategic Maritime Ecosystem
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- THE MARITIME STRATEGIC ECOSYSTEM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
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- SUMMARY OF THE STUDY-Beyond the dispute Ukraine v. Russian Federation
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- The 2026 US-Iran war through the lens Zbigniew Brzezinski’s strategic thinking
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- The decline of Iran’s naval power in the current conflict. The destruction of major platforms and the survival of asymmetric capabilities
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- Deficiencies in Romania’s military procurement system
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- COMBATING NAVAL DRONES
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- STRATEGIC CHANGES IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE MARITIME DOMAIN
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- Maritime Critical Infrastructure
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- The Regulatory borders of the Black Sea through the Cartography of European Union Law and International Law
- Event
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- The role of the maritime and inland waterway sector in Romania’s economy
- CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO MARITIME SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES, CONCLUSIONS FOR THE SITUATION OF ROMANIA
- THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY STUDIES AS A NEW FIELD OF GEOPOLITICAL REFLECTION AND RESEARCH
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- EVENTS
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- STATE IMMUNITY, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE
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- After a year of war, possible scenarios
- “SEA BLINDNESS”
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- Do we need military science?
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- Maritime Romania
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- Fighters and actors in winter fatigue
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- Newsletter 18 August 2022
- Newsletter 18 july 2022
- Geostrategic and geopolitical maritime scenarios in the Middle East and North Africa
- Geopolitics
- Geopolitica
- Webinar
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- Newsletter 06 july 2022
- Newsletter
- THE NAVIGATION REGIME ON THE DANUBE AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR ROMANIA
- Buletin informativ- iulie 2022
- CONFERENCE “THE DYNAMCS AND COMPLEXITY OF ROMANIA’S MARITIME SECURITY” 29-30 september 2022
- Libertatea de navigație pentru porturile Ucrainei de la Marea Neagră
- Freedom of navigation for Ukraine's Black Sea ports
- Buletin informativ iunie 2022
- Buletin informativ mai 2022
- Buletin informativ aprilie 2022
- Buletin informativ martie 2022
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Contents
EXCLUSIVE: The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have uncovered a cache of explosive drones; Hezbollah is forcing evacuations in Israel | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine | Impressive! Large-scale attacks deep into Russian territory | Crimea BLOCKED | Putin has played all his cards
DAILY STRATEGIC BRIEFING – Ukraine – Black Sea – Middle East – MARITIME SECURITY FORUM (MSF) 21 November 2026
I. SUMMARY
The developments of strategic relevance identified for the period under review point to the persistence of three interdependent processes: the reconfiguration of negotiations on Ukraine, the increased maritime exposure of NATO’s eastern flank, and the continuation of military and energy risks in the Middle East.
1. Negotiations on Ukraine are entering a sensitive phase for the European security architecture.
On 20 November, US President Donald Trump described his discussions with Vladimir Putin in positive terms, whilst the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine remained unresolved. On the same day, Russia rejected the proposal for US guarantees comparable to those offered by NATO.
ASSESSMENT: The main strategic issue concerns not only the conditions for a cessation of hostilities, but also the possibility that the negotiations might affect NATO’s military posture, the freedom of action of Eastern European states and future deterrence mechanisms.
2. Romania faces security risks that go beyond the geographical proximity of the war.
Documented maritime incidents near the Danube Delta, the Romanian coastline and the Bulgarian coast demonstrate the vulnerability of commercial shipping and the need for integrated aerial, naval and underwater surveillance. A Reuters report dated 17 November documents multiple attacks on commercial vessels in the region. These relate to events prior to the monitoring period, not new incidents from the last 24 hours.
3. The Middle East remains a major source of risk to international energy and maritime security.
Reports from 20 November indicate Houthi threats to Saudi infrastructure and ports, attacks by the Saudi-led coalition on the port of Hodeidah, and continuing incidents affecting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
4. Energy markets show a divergence between geopolitical risk and price trends.
At the close of trading on 20 November, Brent crude was quoted at US$92.57 per barrel and WTI at US$83.98 per barrel. Although prices rose during Friday’s session, both benchmarks remained under pressure from expectations of a supply surplus.
5. Key implication for the FSM.
Romania’s maritime security must be assessed by correlating incidents in the Black Sea with developments in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. In both areas, unmanned systems, mines, attacks on commercial vessels and disruption to infrastructure can have disproportionate economic and strategic effects.
This correlation is an ASSESSMENT, not a finding regarding the existence of operational coordination between the theatres of conflict.
II. UKRAINE
1. Military operations and attacks
CONFIRMED – general situation: The Russian-Ukrainian conflict continues in parallel with US diplomatic initiatives. For the closely monitored period, insufficient independent data has been identified to provide a comprehensive overview of attacks, casualties, changes to the front line and equipment losses.
Previous operational context: On 20 November, Reuters reported on the effects of Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries, indicating an estimated 45 per cent reduction in crude oil processing volumes compared with the end of October. This figure should be treated as reported information, not as an independently confirmed assessment for 20 November.
reuters.com
ASSESSMENT: Attacks on refining capacity may be aimed at depleting Russia’s logistical and economic resources. The military impact, however, depends on reserves, repair capacity and the ability to redeploy production.
2. Russia–Ukraine–US negotiations and Europe’s involvement
This represents the main political and strategic development of the period.
CONFIRMED – official statements reported:
On 20 November, Donald Trump presented his discussions with Vladimir Putin in a favourable light, although the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine remained unresolved.
Also on 20 November, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov contested the prospect of US guarantees for Ukraine similar to those within the NATO framework.
The Associated Press reported the resurgence of Russian demands regarding the European security architecture: limiting NATO’s expansion, restrictions on Western military deployments, and a review of certain post-Cold War security arrangements.
CLAIM – political positions: Moscow presents its own demands as necessary conditions for its security, whilst Ukraine insists on guarantees against further aggression. These positions are incompatible on several key points.
ASSESSMENT: Three distinct levels of negotiation are emerging:
- The cessation of hostilities and possible monitoring mechanisms.
- International guarantees granted to Ukraine following the end of the conflict.
- The future configuration of European security, including the allied military presence on the eastern flank.
For Romania, the third level is of direct strategic importance. Any arrangement that would limit NATO’s ability to deploy its forces in member states could affect deterrence and defence in the Black Sea region.
There is no confirmation in the sources consulted of a final agreement or of NATO’s acceptance of such restrictions.
3. Energy and critical infrastructure
CONFIRMED – context: The vulnerability of energy infrastructure remains a key aspect of the conflict. The data on the reduction in oil processing in Russia, mentioned earlier, indicates the need to monitor the cumulative effects of attacks on refineries.
UNCONFIRMED for the period: It has not been possible to establish a verified inventory of Ukrainian energy facilities struck between 06:00 on 20 November and 06:00 on 21 November.
4. Technological developments and unmanned systems
The use of unmanned aerial and naval systems continues to alter the operational risk profile in the Black Sea.
ASSESSMENT: Three trends are relevant: the extension of operational range, the integration of reconnaissance and strike systems, and the difficulty of rapidly attributing incidents occurring in the vicinity of merchant vessels.
For the period analysed, no new, independently verified demonstration of an autonomous naval capability was identified that would justify its presentation as confirmed technological progress.
5. Strategic and humanitarian consequences
The negotiations do not eliminate the need to monitor the humanitarian consequences of the conflict.
ASSESSMENT: Any ceasefire agreement would require verifiable mechanisms regarding the protection of the population, civilian infrastructure, humanitarian access and compliance with obligations under international humanitarian law.
No new casualty figures are presented for the monitored period, as sufficient independent confirmation has not been obtained.
III. ROMANIA – NATO AND THE EASTERN FLANK
1. Updates from the Ministry of National Defence
CONFIRMED – 20 November 2026: The Ministry of National Defence (MApN) has published three relevant statements:
- The meeting between the Minister of National Defence, Ștefan-Radu Oprea, and Gunther Krichbaum, State Minister for Europe at the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Presentation of the international doctrinal conference ‘Romanian Military Thought’, held on 18–19 November, focusing on defence strategies, technologies and decisions up to 2045.
- Announcement of an event to showcase the Spanish ‘Paznic’ detachment, involved in NATO’s enhanced air policing missions, at Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, on 24 November.
ASSESSMENT: Allied presence and bilateral cooperation are components of deterrence. However, the announcement of a public event does not, in itself, constitute an enhancement of military capabilities.
2. Air, naval and cross-border incidents
The Ministry of National Defence portal presents the following aggregated data for the year 2026, at the time of consultation:
118
Attacks near the border
96
Combat aircraft sorties
39
Unauthorised incursions
44
Drones or fragments identified
Cumulative figures for 2026; not events occurring in the last 24 hours. Categories may overlap and should not be added together. Source: Ministry of National Defence.
The same portal indicates six drones shot down and two sea mines neutralised in 2026. The data are cumulative and may be updated at a later date.
Limitation: No Ministry of National Defence press release has been identified confirming a new aerial or naval incident occurring strictly within the timeframe of this report.
3. NATO and EU decisions
CONFIRMED – diplomatic context: The debate regarding guarantees for Ukraine and Russian demands concerning the European security architecture has direct implications for NATO.
No new formal decision by the North Atlantic Council or EU institutions has been identified for the period analysed that would alter the Alliance’s military posture in Romania.
4. Military cooperation and deterrence
Official context, 16 November: The Ministry of National Defence announced the participation of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey in the activities of the Black Sea Naval Mine Countermeasures Group, including through the Romanian vessel ‘Căpitan Constantin Dumitrescu’. This deployment took place between 6 and 18 November.
ASSESSMENT: Cooperation between the three NATO member states bordering the Black Sea represents an important regional capability for ensuring safe navigation and neutralising explosive hazards.
5. Direct implications for Romania’s security
The operational priorities arising from the developments analysed are:
- Early detection and classification of unmanned aerial and naval objects.
- Protection of maritime access to Constanța and Sulina.
- Surveillance of maritime energy infrastructure.
- Coordination between the Navy, the Air Force, the Coastguard and allied organisations.
- Maintaining the capacity to respond to incidents affecting commercial vessels.
ASSESSMENT: The main risk lies in the accumulation of individual incidents which, whilst not constituting a direct military attack against Romania, may affect economic security and freedom of navigation.
IV. THE BLACK SEA, THE DANUBE AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
1. Commercial shipping security
CONFIRMED – context from 13–17 November: Reuters has documented a series of maritime incidents off the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts, including attacks on commercial vessels and the sinking of ships.
Of these, the following are particularly relevant to the risk analysis for Romania:
| Date of incident | Vessel | Relevance |
| 13 November | Larissa 1 | Struck whilst en route to the Sulina Canal |
| 14 November | Evia Petrol V | Oil tanker struck in Romanian territorial waters |
| 14 November | Marsol | Incident near the entrance to Sulina |
| 14 November | Ali Najafov | Oil tanker struck in the Sulina area |
| 16 November | Betul8 | Ship sunk in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone |
| 17 November | Gas Husky | Liquefied petroleum gas carrier sunk off the coast of Bulgaria |
Events prior to the monitored period, presented solely as a basis for assessing the current risk. Source: Reuters summary of 17 November.
ASSESSMENT: The concentration of incidents in the vicinity of trade routes necessitates treating the safety of navigation as a regional issue, not solely as a matter concerning shipments to Ukrainian ports.
2. The ports of Constanța, Sulina, Reni and Ismail
Constanța: The main vulnerabilities to monitor are vessel access, the security of oil terminals and the capacity to respond in the event of explosive devices or unmanned systems.
Sulina: The incidents documented between 13 and 14 November warrant increased operational attention to access to the Danube.
Reni and Ismail: The location of these Ukrainian ports in close proximity to Romania necessitates monitoring of attacks, river traffic and any potential cross-border effects.
UNCONFIRMED: Insufficient new data has been obtained regarding the closure, reopening or restriction of traffic at these four ports during the closely monitored period.
3. Sea mines, drones and naval incidents
CONFIRMED – context from 15–16 November: A French ATLANTIQUE 2 aircraft reported unmanned aerial objects adrift in the Black Sea. The Ministry of National Defence (MApN) announced that specialist teams had been deployed to assess and manage them.
This situation highlights the need for an operational distinction: an aircraft that has crashed into the water does not automatically become a naval drone. Its classification depends on its construction and function.
4. Port, energy and subsea infrastructure
Context: Reuters has previously documented incidents in the vicinity of the Neptun Deep project and Romanian maritime terminals. These are not presented as new events.
ASSESSMENT: The protection of maritime energy infrastructure requires a multi-layered approach: aerial, surface and underwater surveillance, the verification of suspicious objects, and operational continuity mechanisms.
No new confirmed attack on Neptun Deep was identified during the period analysed.
5. Freedom of navigation and regional risks
From the perspective of international law of the sea, maritime incidents raise issues concerning the security of commercial transport, duties of care, the protection of civilian vessels and liability for the use of weapons.
ASSESSMENT: Monitoring must distinguish between accidental hazards caused by drifting objects, a deliberate attack on a commercial vessel, and an incident caused by electronic interference or the loss of control over an unmanned system.
This distinction is essential for attributing responsibility and determining proportionate response measures.
V. USV–USV CONFRONTATIONS
1. Documented direct confrontations
UNCONFIRMED – latest developments: No independently documented incident demonstrating a direct confrontation between two unmanned surface vessels (USV–USV) was identified during the period 20–21 November 2026.
Consequently, no new confrontation of this type is reported.
2. The evolution of autonomous naval capabilities
ASSESSMENT: From an operational development perspective, four levels must be distinguished:
- Platforms remotely controlled by an operator.
- Platforms with automated navigation.
- Platforms capable of adapting their route to environmental conditions.
- Platforms with autonomous target identification or engagement capabilities.
Navigational autonomy does not automatically imply autonomy in the use of force.
3. The distinction between unmanned systems
| Category | Operating environment | Main characteristic |
| UAV | Aerial | Reconnaissance, attack or surveillance |
| USV | Water surface | Unmanned navigation and naval operations |
| UUV | Underwater | Reconnaissance, inspection or other underwater operations |
Operational conclusion: Incidents caused by adrift aerial drones do not constitute USV–USV engagements. Similarly, an attack on a manned vessel carried out by a USV does not constitute an engagement between two USVs.
VI. THE MIDDLE EAST
1. US–Iran: relations and negotiations
CONFIRMED – statement of 20 November: According to the Associated Press, President Donald Trump stated that Iran wants an agreement, but that the proposals put forward so far do not meet Washington’s conditions. The statement does not confirm the existence of an imminent agreement.
Diplomatic context as at 17 November: Reuters reported on diplomatic contacts between Iran, Oman and Qatar, aimed at reducing tensions and safeguarding maritime corridors. These efforts took place alongside military exchanges between the US and Iran.
ASSESSMENT: Negotiations are taking place against a backdrop of mutual military pressure. The issue of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is both a matter of international security and a bargaining chip.
For European states, any potential agreement should also be assessed in terms of its ability to restore predictability to energy transport.
2. US military strikes and Iranian retaliation
CONFIRMED – background: On 17 November, Reuters reported on a US attack on a missile launch site on the Iranian island of Qeshm, following an attack claimed by Iran against a US military facility in Bahrain. The Bahraini authorities reported that the attack had been intercepted without any casualties or damage.
CLAIMED: The Iranian Revolutionary Guard presented its attacks as a response to US military actions. These justifications represent the Iranian side’s position, not an independent legal finding.
Regarding 20 November: An explosion reported on Qeshm Island was subsequently attributed by the Iranian news agency Tasnim to the destruction of unexploded ordnance, following initial reports of a possible missile strike.
UNCONFIRMED: There is insufficient independent confirmation in the sources consulted that the explosion on 20 November constituted a new US military attack.
ASSESSMENT: This example demonstrates the importance of cross-checking information, as initial reports of explosions do not always establish the cause or perpetrator of the incident.
3. The Strait of Hormuz
CONFIRMED – 20 November incident: The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that an oil tanker caught fire following an impact from an unidentified projectile, approximately eight nautical miles north of Khasab, Oman. No casualties or environmental impact were reported.
CLAIMED – Iranian version: The Iranian Revolutionary Guard claimed that the oil tanker had struck a naval mine. The two accounts do not allow for an independent determination of the exact mechanism of the incident.
ASSESSMENT: The incident is significant as it highlights the combined risk posed by projectiles, mines and information uncertainty. For commercial operators, the inability to rapidly identify the threat may drive up insurance costs and security measures.
Reuters has reported that oil flows through the straits have returned to near pre-war levels, despite persistent incidents. This does not equate to the full restoration of navigational security.
4. Gaza
CONFIRMED – 20 November report: The Associated Press reported that Israeli strikes in the centre of the Gaza Strip had killed six people, according to local medical authorities. Israel stated that the operations targeted militants.
CLAIM: The characterisation of those targeted as militants reflects the position of the Israeli authorities; the status of each victim has not been independently verified by available sources.
ASSESSMENT: The continuation of military strikes is hindering the stabilisation of the humanitarian situation and continues to pose challenges for the protection of the civilian population.
From a legal perspective, the assessment of each attack requires an examination of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack, in accordance with international humanitarian law. A mere tally of casualties is not sufficient to determine the legality of an operation.
5. The West Bank
UNCONFIRMED – new developments: No sufficiently well-documented information has been identified to report a new major incident in the West Bank during the period under review.
ASSESSMENT: Monitoring must continue regarding security operations, violence against civilians, the expansion of settlements and administrative measures with implications for the status of the territory.
From the perspective of international law, developments in the West Bank must be analysed separately from military operations in Gaza, even though both form part of the same regional crisis.
6. Israel–Hezbollah and Lebanon
CONFIRMED – report from 20 November: The Associated Press reported that Israel had announced strikes on access routes to a site in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, which the Israeli military claims was being used by Hezbollah to rebuild its weapons production and storage capabilities. No casualties were reported in the report consulted.
CLAIMED: The exact military purpose of the facilities is an assertion by the Israeli authorities and requires independent verification.
CONFIRMED – institutional development: The UN Security Council has reaffirmed its support for UNIFIL, as the date set for the end of the mission’s mandate, 31 December 2026, approaches.
ASSESSMENT: A reduction or withdrawal of UNIFIL’s presence, without a sufficient alternative mechanism, could exacerbate the difficulties in monitoring the cessation of hostilities in southern Lebanon.
7. Syria
UNCONFIRMED – new developments: The checks carried out did not reveal any new, sufficiently documented military or political incident occurring in Syria during the monitoring period.
ASSESSMENT: Syria remains relevant to the regional analysis due to the interplay between border security, the presence of external military actors, the activities of armed groups, and the risks of conflict spillover from neighbouring states.
No unconfirmed attacks, troop movements or territorial changes are attributed to this period.
8. Yemen and the Houthis
CONFIRMED – 20 November: The Saudi-led coalition announced strikes on the port of Hodeidah in Yemen, stating that it had targeted infrastructure used for the transport of weapons and missiles. Yemen’s Minister of Information stated that the port remained operational.
CLAIMED – Houthis: Military spokesman Yahya Saree warned shipping companies to withdraw their vessels from Saudi ports on the Red Sea and threatened further attacks on Saudi infrastructure and airspace.
reuters.com
CONFIRMED – coalition statement: The coalition reported that two ballistic missiles heading towards the province of Jazan had been intercepted. The Houthis claimed responsibility for attacks on a power station in Shuqaiq and a port in Jazan. The exact impact of these attacks has not been independently confirmed.
ASSESSMENT: The escalation of the conflict poses simultaneous risks to commercial ports, energy infrastructure and the supply of essential goods to the Yemeni population.
Hodeidah is of major humanitarian importance. Disruption to its operations could affect the flow of food and other essential goods into northern Yemen.
9. Gulf States
Saudi Arabia: Houthi threats to ports and energy infrastructure constitute the main new development affecting the security of the Gulf States.
Oman: The incident involving the oil tanker near Khasab confirms the vulnerability of commercial shipping in the vicinity of Omani territory.
Qatar and Oman – diplomatic context: Both states have been involved in mediation talks with Iran in recent days.
Bahrain – military context: The attack claimed by Iran on a US facility in Bahrain, reported on 17 November, highlights the risk faced by states hosting US military infrastructure.
ASSESSMENT: The Gulf states face a double constraint: maintaining security cooperation with the US whilst protecting their economic infrastructure against regional escalation.
10. Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea
CONFIRMED – 20 November: Houthi threats against Saudi ports on the Red Sea, combined with the attack on the port of Hodeidah, indicate a further intensification of the conflict in the vicinity of regional trade routes.
UNCONFIRMED: No new attack on a merchant vessel in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, occurring strictly within the period analysed, has been identified that can be presented as confirmed.
ASSESSMENT: The strategic risk stems from the possibility of attacks spreading from port infrastructure to vessels in transit.
A major disruption to traffic through Bab el-Mandeb could affect access to the Suez Canal, transit times between Asia and Europe, and the logistical costs borne by European importers.
VII. ENERGY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY
1. Brent and WTI crude oil
Closing prices – 20 November 2026
Brent
92.57 USD
+0.64%
WTI
US$83.98
+0.93%
Prices per barrel at the close of trading on Friday. Source: Reuters, 20 November 2026.
CONFIRMED: Both benchmarks rose during Friday’s session, but remained on track for a third consecutive week of decline.
ANALYSIS: The trend reflects two competing factors: military risks to oil shipments and expectations regarding global supply availability.
2. Energy shipments and maritime routes
In the Strait of Hormuz, oil transport flows have returned to near pre-war levels, according to Reuters, but incidents targeting oil tankers continue.
ASSESSMENT: The recovery in transport volumes should not be confused with a proportional reduction in risk. Even a limited number of incidents can influence insurance premiums, route selection and vessel availability.
3. Oil and gas infrastructure
CONFIRMED – relevant developments: Houthi threats against the Shuqaiq power station and Saudi port infrastructure highlight the vulnerability of energy facilities in the region.
ASSESSMENT: Energy infrastructure must be analysed as an interdependent system, in which production, refining, storage, transport and export can be affected separately.
4. Impact on Europe and Romania
For Romania, the main channels through which risks are transmitted are international oil prices, maritime transport costs, commercial insurance and security of supply.
ASSESSMENT: Should incidents in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea escalate, pressure may arise on import costs and on shipments to European ports. The extent of the effects depends on the duration of the disruptions and the possibilities for rerouting flows.
There is insufficient data to quantify any new economic impact specific to Romania that has occurred in the last 24 hours.
VIII FINAL ASSESSMENT
1. The reconfiguration of European security
Diplomatic developments on 20 November indicate that negotiations on Ukraine must be interpreted beyond the immediate objective of a cessation of hostilities.
The reintroduction into the debate of certain Russian demands concerning NATO deployments and the European security architecture raises issues that directly concern the Alliance’s member states.
apnews.com
ASSESSMENT: For Romania, an agreement that would reduce NATO’s deterrence capability in the Black Sea region could create long-term vulnerabilities, even if it were to contribute to a temporary reduction in hostilities in Ukraine.
Consequently, any assessment of a diplomatic solution must take into account the implications for state sovereignty, allied obligations and the freedom to deploy defence forces.
2. The Black Sea: from military threat to systemic vulnerability
Incidents documented near Romania and Bulgaria demonstrate that the risks of war extend to commercial transport, access to the Danube and regional economic infrastructure.
investing.com
ASSESSMENT: Maritime security can no longer be assessed solely in terms of the conventional military capabilities of the littoral states.
An integrated analysis of commercial vessels, energy infrastructure, ports, supply routes, unmanned systems, explosive threats and institutional response mechanisms is now required.
This perspective is consistent with the Strategic Maritime Ecosystem approach, in which risks are assessed through the interdependencies between military, economic, technological, legal and environmental components.
3. The Middle East: the security of maritime corridors as a factor in international stability
The incidents in the Strait of Hormuz and the escalation of clashes in Yemen highlight the potential of regional conflicts to disrupt global energy transport and markets.
reuters.com+1
ASSESSMENT: The simultaneous presence of risks in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb may reduce the flexibility of maritime operators. A major disruption at either of these chokepoints could increase reliance on alternative routes that are already subject to additional costs.
For Europe, the implications are not limited to oil prices. The availability of transport capacity, the continuity of supply chains and economic security are also relevant.
4. Technology and the transformation of the operational environment
Unmanned systems alter the balance between the cost of the assets deployed and the potential impact on infrastructure or commercial vessels.
ASSESSMENT: The development of countermeasures must take into account the differences between aerial drones, surface naval systems and underwater systems.
For FSM research, this differentiation is essential both for classifying incidents and for developing simulation scenarios and resilience models.
FSM ASSESSMENT – 21 November 2026
The period under review confirms the persistence of an international environment characterised by the interdependence of security negotiations, military confrontations and the vulnerability of maritime infrastructure.
For Romania, the strategic priority stems from the overlap of three categories of risk: uncertainty regarding the future European security architecture, the exposure of transport and infrastructure in the Black Sea, and the economic spillover from conflicts in the Middle East.
The recommended course of action is to strengthen the capacity for anticipation, verification and integrated response by correlating military, maritime, economic and legal intelligence.
From the FSM’s perspective, maritime security must be approached as an essential component of national and regional strategic resilience, not merely as a sectoral issue of naval defence.
The Maritime Security Forum
The UK and Norway are funding two fast attack craft for Ukraine as part of a project worth over 100 million pounds – Maritime Security Forum
The UK and Norway will jointly invest over 100 million pounds (approximately 125–131 million dollars) in the construction of two modern high-speed attack craft for the Ukrainian Navy. The announcement was made on 19 November 2026 at the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Berlin, and aims to strengthen Ukraine’s defence in the Black Sea and increase pressure on Russia.
The information was released by the British government in a press release, reported by Ukrinform and other publications. The Norwegian government confirmed the initiative in a separate statement, in which the value of the two vessels is estimated at over one billion Norwegian kroner.
“The UK and Norway are jointly funding the construction of two modern high-speed attack craft to help Ukraine strengthen its defence capabilities and increase pressure on Russia,” the British government’s statement reads.
The project was presented by British Prime Minister Andy Burnham and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, who joined allies at the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Berlin, dedicated to supporting Ukraine and its long-term security.
What the vessels will be capable of
The two vessels, built in the UK, are 30 metres long and are described by London as having capabilities comparable to those of a frigate, at a much lower cost. They will provide the Ukrainian Navy with manoeuvrable and powerful assets for offensive operations and air defence, being equipped with advanced air defence systems, missile armament and self-defence capabilities.
The equipment will be supplied by several European manufacturers, with the project bringing together defence technology and industrial expertise from across the continent. However, neither London nor Oslo has specified which shipyard will build the vessels, nor the delivery date.
Protecting the maritime grain corridor
The vessels will help to protect the Black Sea grain corridor, which is vital for Ukraine’s economy and for global food security. According to the Norwegian government, the Ukrainian maritime corridor was opened in September 2023, and since then 200 million tonnes of cargo have been transported through it, more than half of which was grain.
Prime Minister Burnham said: “Co-funded with Norway, built here in the UK, and providing Ukraine with a game-changing capability, this project not only strengthens defences in the Black Sea but also underpins Europe’s security. Stable and secure maritime routes are the lifelines of global trade, and Russia’s ongoing indiscriminate attacks in the Black Sea harm not only Ukraine and our European allies, but also the world’s most vulnerable populations. I am proud that these British ships, built with the support of the UK and Norway, will help deter aggression and provide Ukraine with the offensive and air defence capabilities it needs.”
Equal funding through the Maritime Capability Coalition
The programme will be funded equally by the two countries through the Maritime Capability Coalition, which they co-lead and which illustrates how states are translating their support for Ukraine into concrete military capabilities. Prime Minister Støre emphasised that the initiative “will strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, support the Ukrainian economy and protect vital exports”, whilst the Norwegian Minister of Defence, Tore O. Sandvik, welcomed the collaboration with London. Norway’s support is being provided through the Nansen Programme for Ukraine, and the government in Oslo has proposed allocating 85 billion kroner for military and civilian support in 2027.
British Defence Secretary Wes Streeting said: “Ukraine is the front line of freedom everywhere. The UK will stand with our Ukrainian friends for as long as it takes, whilst they bravely resist Putin’s illegal invasion.” He added that the vessels would be an integral part of maritime security and long-term deterrence in the Black Sea, beyond the current conflict.
Other support packages announced by London
At the same time, the UK has announced over 1,000 long-range attack drones as part of a £260 million package, of which over 80 per cent is set to be spent within the British defence industry. Some of the drones will have a range of over 1,000 km. London and Oslo have also agreed to deepen their cooperation in the field of defensive artificial intelligence for the battlefield.
The day before, the British Ministry of Defence had announced a package of approximately 240 million pounds (over $316 million) for Ukraine’s air defence during the winter, which includes over 1,000 short-range anti-aircraft missiles, launchers and over a dozen radars, with deliveries scheduled to begin in mid-December. Last week, London imposed sanctions on all ten major Russian oil producers, and in last month’s budget pledged over 10 billion pounds in additional financial support, on top of its commitment of 3 billion pounds a year in military assistance.
Maritime Security Forum
The Bulgarian Parliament calls for severe consequences for Russia following the attacks on ships in the Black Sea – Maritime Security Forum
Russia must face increased sanctions, and those responsible must be held to account for the attacks on civilian commercial vessels in the Black Sea. NATO and the European Union must coordinate their efforts to protect maritime transport, including through patrols, surveillance and early-warning systems. Military support for Ukraine should continue until Russian troops have completely withdrawn from its internationally recognised territory. These views were expressed in an interview with the Guildhall publication by Dimitar Naydenov, a member of the Bulgarian People’s Assembly.
Background: repeated attacks off the Bulgarian coast
The statements follow a series of drone attacks on commercial vessels in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone. On 6 October, a coordinated attack involving aerial and maritime drones targeted two cargo ships, one of which, the Alfa Watan, sank. On 13 October, two further vessels were struck approximately 20 miles off the coast. The HS Dignity sank, with 11 of its 16 crew members reported missing, whilst the 15 seafarers aboard the Chelsea-3, flying the Maltese flag, were rescued. The attacks took place outside Bulgarian territorial waters, so they do not automatically trigger Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.
Prime Minister Rumen Radev summoned the Russian ambassador, but said there was no clear evidence to accuse any particular party, although “logic suggests that the outcome favours the Russian Federation”. Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova described the attacks as “completely unacceptable” and a serious breach of international law, stating that the security of the Black Sea is an integral part of European security.
Question: How do you assess the attacks on civilian vessels, including those flying the flags of EU Member States, near the coasts of NATO countries?
Naydenov unequivocally condemns Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the attacks on civilian commercial vessels. In his view, Russia is the aggressor and bears responsibility for these attacks, which endanger civilian crews, threaten freedom of navigation and affect the security of Bulgaria, Romania and other Black Sea states. Each attack should be independently investigated, and those who gave the orders or deliberately carried out attacks on civilian vessels should be brought to justice.
Question: what punishment should Russia face to be forced to stop such actions?
The MEP’s response is that sanctions must be strengthened. The EU and its partners should restrict Russia’s access to the technologies and components used in the production of drones and missiles, and step up measures against the networks that help it circumvent sanctions.
Protection of maritime transport: the role of NATO and the EU
According to Naydenov, NATO should coordinate maritime patrols, surveillance and early warning in close cooperation with its Black Sea allies, whilst the EU should support these efforts by sharing information on the maritime situation and providing logistical assistance. Commercial shipping crews need a coordinated response system capable of protecting them directly at sea.
This call is part of a wider trend. On 22 October, the European Parliament adopted, by 432 votes in favour, 52 against and 88 abstentions, a resolution condemning Russia’s escalation in the Black Sea and calling on the EU to consider launching a naval operation in the region. MEPs also called on NATO to consider an initiative for the Black Sea, criticised Sofia’s diplomatic response as weak, and urged Bulgaria not to delay any further its participation in the NATO initiative against low-altitude drones.
Political reactions in Sofia
In the Bulgarian Parliament, the attacks have sparked a political row. The ruling Progressive Bulgaria group maintained that the country is complying with NATO procedures and that a coordinated European response is needed; the group’s leader, Petar Vitanov, said that Bulgarian institutions cannot resolve the issue on their own. GERB-UDF and Democratic Bulgaria called for an extraordinary session of Parliament, whilst Democratic Bulgaria proposed five measures, including urgent consultations within NATO and the deployment of the Alliance’s air defence systems along the Black Sea coast. DPS leader Delyan Peevski described the position of the Consultative Council for National Security as “toothless”. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov announced on 14 October that Sofia intends to join NATO’s anti-drone initiative by 30 October, with an annual contribution of 220,000 euros, and proposed the procurement of 20 anti-drone systems through the EU’s SAFE programme, worth 80 million euros.
Support for Ukraine until borders are restored
At the same time, says Naydenov, military assistance to Ukraine must be increased and maintained until Russian troops have been driven out of the entire Ukrainian territory, within its internationally recognised borders. Ukraine should have the necessary means to protect its population, its ports and its territorial integrity.
Maritime Security Forum
Moscow promises to restore parts of the Crimean bridge “in a month or two”, but experts are sceptical about such a short timeframe – Maritime Security Forum
The Russian government is considering several options for rebuilding the Crimean bridge following Ukrainian strikes that led to the collapse of a span and part of the road deck. Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin, who oversees the construction work, stated on 19 November, during Transport Week, according to TASS and the Moscow Times, that the authorities will assess the options depending on the method of reconstruction.
Statements by Russian officials
“We will now assess various options depending on how we are going to restore it. Individual sections may be ready in a month or two. As for the rest – we’ll have to see; it’s the stormy season at the moment,” said Khusnullin. He added that an accurate assessment would be possible within a week. As early as 16 November, the Deputy Prime Minister had stated that the restoration deadlines would be known shortly and that there was both the expertise and the resources for the work.
Transport Minister Dmitri Yadrov said the situation should be clarified by the afternoon of 19 November, as specialists inspect the bridge and determine the extent of the damage. “For us, the key factor now is passenger transport and the supply of goods,” he said. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated that the bridge would “undoubtedly” be rebuilt and would function better than before, and that a comprehensive technical plan was being drawn up following an emergency meeting of the government commission.
Timeline of the attacks
The Ukrainian armed forces struck the bridge three times in the space of a week. On the night of 16 November, one of the approximately one hundred drones launched struck the 227-metre arch on the road section, bringing traffic to a standstill. On the night of 17 November, a further attack, involving Flamingo missiles and drones, caused the arch and a section of the road section to collapse into the water, the most severe damage since the start of the war. On 19 November, the Ukrainian General Staff announced that it had used Neptune missiles against the railway line, which again led to the suspension of traffic. Reports on rail services vary: the Kyiv Post states that services remain suspended, whilst EADaily, quoting the leader of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, reports that trains were due to resume services on the afternoon of 19 November.
The latest strike took place ahead of the meeting between Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen. From there, Putin said that the bridge was used exclusively for civilian purposes and that “there will be no agreements” following these attacks, abandoning the idea of a moratorium on strikes against the energy sector and maritime transport. “Our response will be far more painful than what the regime in Kyiv has done to the bridge,” he said.
Emergency measures to supply Crimea
The Russian-installed authorities in Crimea announced the launch of a ferry service to the mainland and claimed that supplies of food, medicines and fuel remain uninterrupted. On the Russian side of the strait, in the Temrik district, warming centres and canteens have been set up for stranded drivers. On 18 November, the VesselFinder service recorded the arrival near the affected area of six tugboats, a dredger and an oil spill response vessel, a sign that work has begun. Nearly 2.5 million people live on the peninsula.
How long will the reconstruction actually take?
Experts are sceptical about a short timeframe. Engineer Inger Kroon, from the Danish firm COWI, explained to Reuters that a new arch – a large steel structure – needs to be built, which cannot simply be a standard section, and the work could take more than a year; a temporary solution, with temporary piers, would make it difficult for ships to pass underneath. Professor Andreas Kappos, from Khalifa University, estimated, in an article quoted by the New York Times, that “approximately two years” is a reasonable timeframe for restoring road traffic, provided there are no further impacts and the supporting pillars are not seriously damaged.
In addition to the technical difficulties, there is also a security issue. Former Ukrainian MP Anton Gerashchenko stated that restoration is impossible, as it would require floating cranes, which the Ukrainian army would not allow to operate in the area. The Russian channel Rybar also admits that, unlike in 2022 and 2023, Ukraine now has the capability to strike the floating cranes and repair teams, and that installing even a ready-made arch under such conditions is “a task with an asterisk”. Analyst Emil Kastehelmi, from the Finnish OSINT group Black Bird, wrote that the road bridge will not be restored by the end of the war.
A symbol of the occupation
The 19-km bridge, inaugurated by Putin in 2018, is the longest structure of its kind in Europe, a vital supply route for Russian forces in Crimea and southern Ukraine, and a symbol of the peninsula’s annexation in 2014. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the attacks were a response to Russia’s strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, including bridges.
Maritime Security Forum
The Argentine Navy is interested in acquiring up to three FCX20 corvettes from Fincantieri, following a letter of intent signed in Rome – Maritime Security Forum
Rendering of the FCX20 corvette (image: Fincantieri)
The Argentine Navy has expressed an interest in acquiring up to three FCX20 corvettes, developed by the Italian group Fincantieri, in full combat configuration and together with an integrated logistics support (ILS) package. This interest was formalised on 18 November 2026 in Rome with the signing of a letter of intent (LoI) by the Defence Ministers of Italy and Argentina. Fincantieri made the announcement public on 19 November in a press release issued in Trieste.
What the agreement entails
At the signing, Fincantieri was represented by Pierroberto Folgiero, Managing Director and CEO, and by Eugenio Santagata, Managing Director of the Military Ships Division. The company states that it will be able to provide the Argentine Navy with its expertise in the design, construction and support of high-tech military vessels throughout the various phases of the programme.
The document is not limited to new vessels. It also provides for the possibility of exploring other opportunities for naval cooperation, including the acquisition of military vessels already in service. The sources consulted do not specify the value of the programme, the timetable or the final number of vessels, and the letter of intent expresses an interest, not a procurement contract.
Fincantieri’s position
Folgiero stated: “This agreement confirms the strategic value of Italian shipbuilding as a driving force for international cooperation and a key asset for the country’s industrial presence in global markets. Argentina’s interest in our platforms opens up a long-term prospect for cooperation, built on the ability to combine industrial excellence, innovation and cooperation between institutions, the Armed Forces and industry.” He added that, for Fincantieri, this is a new opportunity to transform this industrial heritage into strategic partnerships in international markets.
Why it matters for Argentina
The Times of Defence reports that a vessel of around 2,300 tonnes and 95 metres in length, derived from a tried-and-tested patrol platform, would enable Argentina to rebuild its offshore surface combat capability, whilst minimising development risks and life-cycle costs. The same article notes that a range of 3,500 nautical miles would be suitable for patrolling vast maritime areas and the exclusive economic zone. This is the publication’s assessment, not an official position. The ILS package would provide long-term maintenance and technical support for the fleet.
About the FCX20
Image: Fincantieri
The FCX20 is a modern corvette, equipped with state-of-the-art technological systems. The vessel has a powerful combat system and can operate in oceanic waters as part of a naval tactical group. In its full combat configuration, it can operate across all domains of warfare: anti-air, anti-ship and anti-submarine. The high degree of redundancy and high survivability standards, together with the ship’s long range and architectural flexibility, ensure mission readiness in all conditions. The platform is the same as that of the patrol version used by the Italian Navy, the Ugolino Vivaldi class.
Main characteristics
- Overall length: 95 m
- Maximum beam: 14.2 m
- Hull height: 8.4 m
- Displacement: approximately 2,300 t
- Maximum speed: 25 knots
- Range at 14 knots: 3,500 nautical miles
- Endurance: 20 days
- Crew: 93
Propulsion system
- CODLAD: 2 main diesel engines (PDE), 2 electric propulsion motors (EPM), 2 reduction gears (RG) and 2 fixed-pitch propellers (FCPP)
- 4 diesel generator sets (DGS)
Combat systems and sensors
- Kronos HP multifunctional radar
- IFF integrator and transponder (SIRM-C+)
- Electronic warfare and communications system (RESM/CESM)
- Infrared search and track (IRST) system
- Fire control systems: radar and electro-optical (FCS), electro-optical (EO-FCS)
- X- and S-band navigation radars, integrated navigation system (DGPS, depth sounder, speed log, weather sensors)
- Tactical data links 11, 16, JREAP and Y (Link 22 planned but not installed), dual-antenna SATCOM, integrated V/UHF and HF communications system, GMDSS A3
- Combat Management System (CMS) and integrated bridge system
Armament
- VL-MICA anti-aircraft missiles
- Exocet anti-ship missiles
- 76/40 mm main gun with multiple feed
- Two 30/25 mm secondary guns and one short-range anti-aircraft launcher / 30 mm
- Torpedo launch system (2 launchers)
- Mk1 anti-aircraft decoy launchers
- Two 12.7 mm machine guns (GFE)
Estimated price
Neither Fincantieri nor the Argentine authorities have published a price for the up to three FCX20 corvettes, and the letter of intent does not specify a figure. The figures below are therefore a rough estimate, based on the public contracts for the patrol version of the same platform, built for the Italian Navy (Ugolino Vivaldi class).
- In 2023, Orizzonte Sistemi Navali (a joint venture between Fincantieri and Leonardo) was awarded a contract worth 925 million euros (approximately 1.014 billion dollars) for three patrol vessels, with options for a further three and integrated logistical support. This works out at approximately 308 million euros per vessel.
- The Italian Navy’s current programme, comprising four vessels and logistical support, is valued at approximately €1.2 billion, or around €300 million per vessel. The first vessel is due to be delivered in 2027.
Applying these figures, three ships would cost, in the same patrol configuration, approximately 900–925 million euros, including logistical support. For Argentina, this estimate is likely a minimum figure: the FCX20 in full combat configuration, equipped with VL-MICA missiles, Exocet missiles, torpedoes and a complete combat system, is a more heavily armed version than the patrol variant, and the actual cost depends on the equipment selected, the ILS package and any adaptation requirements. For this reason, a realistic range would be between 300 and 400 million euros per ship, i.e. 0.9–1.2 billion euros for three vessels. The upper limit is my own assumption, not a figure published by any source.
Note: the values of the Italian contracts include logistical support and, in the case of the 2023 contract, options; the price of an export may differ significantly. The estimate should be treated as an order of magnitude, not as an official price.
Maritime Security Forum
Turkey has consolidated its position in NATO’s defence industry: exports worth over 10 billion dollars and a centralised industrial model – Maritime Security Forum
Long neglected by its NATO partners, the Turkish defence industry has earned a place among the major manufacturers, both within and outside the Alliance. This is the result of an ambitious policy, centralised at the highest level, reports AFP in an article carried by Agerpres. Official Turkish data confirms this trend: exports from the defence and aerospace sector reached approximately $10.1 billion in 2025, according to the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB), with 56 per cent of these going to NATO member states.
Figures: from $800 million to over $10 billion
According to the specialist website TurDef, the turnover of Turkish arms manufacturers increased fifteen-fold between 2002 and 2023. Exports rose from around $800 million in 2010 to $7.1 billion in 2024 (AFP quotes the figure in euros, whilst SSB data gives it in dollars: $7.154 billion). In 2025, SSB estimates put the figure at around 10.1–10.5 billion dollars, an increase of almost 48 per cent compared with the previous year. In the first nine months of 2026, exports rose by 15.6 per cent to 6.92 billion dollars. In September alone, they reached 634 million, 10.7 per cent more than in the same month of 2025.
Domestic orders have also soared. The head of the SSB, Haluk Görgün, announced on 18 October that new defence contracts worth $15 billion had been signed in 2026, with a target of $20 billion by the end of the year. The main contractors, including Aselsan, Roketsan, Turkish Aerospace Industries, Havelsan and STM, have worked with over 16,000 domestic firms over the past three years and placed orders worth over $20 billion.
“Ten years ago, when people talked about the Turkish defence industry, they used to laugh. That no longer happens,” said Ozgur Eksi, founder of TurDef.
NATO Edge 26: Turkey hosts an Alliance technology event
In July, Ankara hosted the NATO summit. Between 17 and 19 November, Izmir (in the west) hosted NATO Edge 26, a major event dedicated to the Alliance’s critical technologies and digital weaponry, organised by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA). This is the first time the event has been held in Turkey. According to the Turkish Ministry of Defence, 284 companies from 25 countries are taking part, including 30 Turkish firms. The Anadolu Agency reports around 3,000 participants and 300 exhibiting companies, a discrepancy that is likely due to the method of counting. The gathering brings together senior military officials, government representatives and industry figures from member countries.
At the opening, Görgün described Turkey as a “strong ally” and said that the country contributes to the Alliance not only through a capable military, but also through an advanced defence industry. “This means we must move faster, expand our industrial ecosystem and produce more,” he said. According to him, the Turkish ecosystem comprises over 4,000 companies, 110 technology parks and 204 universities. Görgün recalled that, at the Ankara summit, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte had said that several allied nations were analysing the Turkish model, referring to a “revolution in the defence industry”. The contracts require prime contractors to subcontract part of the work to small and medium-sized enterprises, and 35 Turkish firms took part in the first call for proposals under the NATO Engine programme, which is dedicated to SMEs and start-ups.
A model shaped by the embargo and the war with the PKK
“Turkey designs, develops and manufactures a large proportion of its defence equipment. These efforts have ultimately borne fruit and are measured, in particular, by their export successes,” confirmed retired General Patrice Moyeuvre, director of defence and security at the Istanbul-based consultancy Advantis. A foreign businessman, speaking on condition of anonymity, refers to a “strategic positioning that regards defence as a priority, a lever for enhancing sovereignty and influence” and to a strategy of bringing the entire systems design chain in-house.
The tide turned in 1974 with the US arms embargo following Ankara’s military operation in Cyprus. Turkey then realised just how vulnerable it was in a tense region situated between the Caucasus, a declining Eastern bloc and the Middle East. In the years that followed, the giants Aselsan, Havelsan, Tusas and Roketsan emerged, and in 2004 the country abandoned the model of procuring weapons systems from abroad in favour of domestic production. The entire sector was placed under the SSB, an institution directly linked to the head of state.
“Given Turkey’s geostrategic position (…) the need for a coherent national strategy is clearly evident,” noted Ugur Tarcin, a professor at Marmara University in Istanbul. He added that, over the past decade, Ankara “has exported 230 types of defence products to 185 countries”, a portfolio that “reflects both the versatility and competitiveness” of its capabilities. Over the past three years, orders have soared, and Turkey has become the world’s eleventh-largest arms exporter, he said.
Drones and air defence: the spearheads
Drones from the Baykar (Bayraktar TB2, TB3) and Tusas (Anka, Aksungur) groups are now ubiquitous on modern battlefields. “We have made enormous progress with regard to domestically developed products,” said a Turkish industrialist. “We had to develop various systems during the war against the PKK, particularly in the area of surveillance. We could neither obtain foreign aid nor use fighter aircraft. Consequently, we developed drones.” On 8 November, a Bayraktar TB3 took part in the joint naval exercise “Sea of Friendship 2026”.
Tom Barton, an analyst at the British intelligence firm Jane’s, noted the investments in advanced systems, “particularly surface-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, drones and command networks”. He added that Turkey is now regarded as “a preferred supplier, competing with European companies and American ‘ ’, particularly in the Middle East and Asia”. Görgün also emphasised that Turkish low- and medium-altitude air defence systems offer cost-effective solutions, proven in operational use.
The Aselsan Group has just celebrated its 51st anniversary with a spectacular demonstration. The CEO, Ahmet Akyol, said that the Ejderha system, which uses high-power electromagnetic waves, “has become the first system in the world to successfully neutralise 51 drones at the touch of a button, without missiles or ammunition”. AFP notes that it is difficult to confirm such a world record, but the progress made is undeniable.
Targets for 2026
For 2026, Görgün listed, amongst other things, the signing of the contract for the mass production of the KAAN fighter aircraft, the delivery of the first Kizilelma unmanned aerial vehicles, the first deliveries of the Bayraktar TB3 to the Turkish Navy, the delivery of the frigate TCG İzmit (F-516) and the entry into service of the Koral 200 electronic warfare system.
Mistrust persists
Within NATO, Turkey continues to suffer from persistent mistrust on the part of certain partners, including France and Germany. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a polarising figure, notes AFP. He makes the country’s independence the cornerstone of his diplomacy and has held talks with everyone from Tehran to Washington and from Moscow to Kyiv. “You know the saying: ‘Keep your friends close and your enemies closer’,” summarised a Turkish military expert who wished to remain anonymous. “We must constantly remain in the grey area; we’re belly-dancing, but we have to dance for everyone,” he added. “Ankara must be pragmatic,” he concluded.
Maritime Security Forum
Baltic Workboats in the Baltic Sea have launched a modular EUROGUARD vessel in Estonia – Maritime Security Forum
Baltic Workboats, photo from the christening ceremony
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Estonia has christened and launched the 45-metre EUROGUARD prototype at Baltic Workboats, the largest warship ever built in the country and a testbed for autonomous naval technology.
On 19 November 2026, at the Baltic Workboats shipyard in Nasva, Saaremaa, the President of the Republic, Ülle Madise, christened the EUROGUARD, the largest experimental warship ever built in Estonia and a vessel that sets the course for the development of Europe’s future naval ships.
The 45-metre vessel is a joint project involving ten European countries and 27 industrial companies, led by Estonia.
“Ships have been built in Estonia and sold abroad for centuries. However, we have commissioned warships from abroad, relying instead on the expertise of our allies. EUROGUARD, a 45-metre modular ship prototype and the first of its kind in Europe, shows that we can now build warships ourselves. “What was launched today in Nasva is a vessel that points the way for future European naval developments. This project demonstrates that even smaller allies can make a truly decisive contribution to the development of the European community’s defence capability,” said Margus Vanaselja, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Baltic Boats. “This marks a new milestone in the history of Estonian shipbuilding and is something of which the whole of Estonia and the whole of Europe can be proud,” he added.
This is a significant step forward for the Estonian shipbuilding industry: no warship of this size has been built here since Estonia regained its independence. The EUROGUARD has been completed as a test and experimental vessel for a research and development project, but it is a fully-fledged, full-scale vessel built for military missions, enabling the solutions developed to be tested on board under real-world conditions at sea.
EUROGUARD is a research and development project involving 10 European countries and 27 industrial companies, the leadership of which the European Defence Fund entrusted to the Estonians in 2024. “This is a sign of great confidence in Estonian shipbuilders. We were the ones chosen to lead such a large-scale project, even though the consortium includes several of Europe’s leading defence companies. Today’s launch demonstrates that we have lived up to that trust,” said Ahto Pärl, director of the EUROGUARD Consortium.
The project aims to strengthen Europe’s maritime defence capabilities and promote cooperation and innovation within the European defence industry. It brings together companies and research institutions from ten European countries, including Thales, Leonardo, Naval Group, Naplantia, Kongsberg and Damen. Estonia is leading the cooperation at both government and industry level: the Estonian Defence Investment Centre coordinates cooperation between the participating countries, whilst Baltic Boats leads the consortium. This joint development work contributes to knowledge-sharing, improving the interoperability of solutions and building long-term partnerships within the European defence industry. The project has a budget of approximately 95 million euros, of which 65 million euros comes from the European Defence Fund.
The ship is the most visible part of this project, but just as valuable is GENSA, the common system architecture for European naval vessels that we have developed together. It provides a framework for integrating technologies from different manufacturers into complete solutions and for reusing development work in future ship projects. This means that future warships can be designed and built more quickly, more flexibly and more efficiently. The vessel launched today is where we can put these solutions to the test in real sea conditions for the first time,” said Jüri Saska, EUROGUARD project manager.
The vessel will be used to develop both autonomous navigation and remote control from shore. Its modular design allows the platform to be adapted for maritime surveillance, mine warfare, protection of the seabed and critical infrastructure, search and rescue, and the deployment and control of unmanned systems. Its design speed is at least 20 knots, its range at least 2,000 nautical miles, and it can remain at sea for ten days.
A semi-autonomous vessel: what this means in practice
EUROGUARD is being developed as a modular, medium-sized, semi-autonomous surface vessel (referred to in the project’s terminology as an M-SASV, or Medium Size Semi-Autonomous Surface Vehicle), equipped with a remote control system. The name derives from ‘EUROpean Goal-based mUltimission Autonomous naval Reference platform Development’. The project is funded by the European Defence Fund, and the European Commission’s official description refers to a platform capable of navigating autonomously, detecting obstacles and threats, avoiding collisions and carrying out mission-specific tasks. The term ‘semi-autonomous’ indicates that the vessel is not designed to be completely unmanned: it must be capable of operating with a reduced crew or, in certain situations, controlled from shore under human supervision.
Autonomy and safety capabilities
According to the manufacturer, Baltic Workboats, the prototype incorporates technologies for semi-autonomous and remotely controlled operations. The core capabilities are:
- autonomous navigation and route planning;
- obstacle and threat detection;
- collision avoidance systems;
- sensor data fusion and situational awareness;
- secure communications and remote control;
- system architecture protected against cyber-attacks;
- human–machine teaming functions.
The architecture is designed for reliability, data integrity and scalable software deployment, which are essential for operations involving unmanned or minimally crewed vessels. The prototype will also be used to develop capabilities for operations without personnel on board or with reduced crew numbers.
Reduced crew, not absent
According to data published by Naval News, the vessel can accommodate up to 20 people, with a standard crew of 10 and a reduced crew configuration of six. These figures show that, in its current form, the programme aims to reduce personnel, not eliminate them. The payload can reach 100 tonnes, which allows for the installation of interchangeable mission modules, including for the deployment and control of unmanned systems.
Sensors and communications
According to the same source, the sensor suite includes the Leonardo SSR X400/6 surveillance radar, the GEM Elettronica EOSS 450 electro-optical system, the Marduk Shark drone detection system, ELT Group electronic warfare equipment, the Leonardo TMMR 3D radar and hull-mounted sonar. Communications combine VHF, HF, UHF, satellite and 5G links, plus Kongsberg’s HiPAP 502 underwater communications system. The Polish part of the consortium is contributing the integrated communications and data transmission system: OBR Centrum Techniki Morskiej, part of Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa, is leading the ‘Secure Communications’ workstream. These configurations are those presented at the design stage and may be subject to change prior to the final version.
Stages and timetable
- 27 May 2025: the vessel was laid down at Nasva.
- 21 May 2026: Critical Design Review (CDR) and presentation of the hull, with a virtual demonstration of the system.
- 19 November 2026: christening and launch.
- Spring 2027: sea trials, according to Defence Industry Europe, in Estonian waters, in conjunction with the Estonian Navy.
- End of 2027: completion of the programme.
Commander Jüri Saska, then Commander of the Estonian Navy, said at the project’s launch that the combined use of manned and unmanned systems is the direction in which all armed forces are heading. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Kusti Salm, described the project as bringing about a ‘revolution in autonomy and modularity’ in the maritime domain.
Note: sources differ on some details. The shipbuilder refers to 28 organisations from ten countries, the launch press releases mention 27 companies, whilst at the outset, in 2024, the European Commission cited 23 firms. The speed is stated as a minimum of 20 knots in the official specifications and as a maximum of approximately 25 knots by Naval News. The timing of the trials – spring 2027 or late 2027 – depends on the stage in question, with the trials marking the start of testing and the end of the year signalling the conclusion of the programme.
EUROGUARD vessel specifications
| Parameter | Value |
| Type | Experimental prototype modular warship (test vessel for a research and development project) |
| Length | 45 m |
| Design speed | minimum 20 knots |
| Range | at least 2,000 nautical miles |
| Endurance | 10 days at sea |
| Builder | Baltic Workboats, Nasva, Saaremaa (Estonia) |
| Naming and launch | 19 November 2026 |
| Consortium | 10 European countries and 27 industrial companies, led by Estonia |
| Budget | approximately 95 million euros, of which 65 million euros from the European Defence Fund |
| Common architecture | GENSA, a common framework for integrating technologies from different manufacturers |
| Possible missions | maritime surveillance, mine warfare, protection of the seabed and critical infrastructure, search and rescue, deployment and control of unmanned systems |
| Tested functions | autonomous navigation and remote control from shore |
| Tests and demonstrations | scheduled for 2027 |
Cooperation with the consortium partners and the trust placed in them by the Estonian state have enabled the Baltic shipyards to further develop their knowledge, skills and shipbuilding capabilities. The experience gained through the project has strengthened the company’s readiness to design and build new warships for Estonia’s own needs, together with its partners, in the future.
The launch marks an important milestone in a development process spanning several years. The ceremony was attended by representatives of the European Commission, the Member States and the consortium. Following the launch, work will continue on fitting out the vessel, integrating its technological systems and conducting trials, during which the performance of the new solutions and their readiness for future maritime operations will be assessed. The vessel and the solutions developed on board are scheduled to be tested and demonstrated in 2027.
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Beyond the enthusiasm for drones: the Chief of the French Navy advocates a ‘reasonable’ hybrid fleet, with drones alongside large ships, not in their place Maritime Security Forum
Admiral Christophe Cluzel, Chief of the French Naval Staff
At Euronaval 2026, the Chief of the French Navy Staff, Admiral Christophe Cluzel, outlined to Naval News France’s ‘reasonable’ hybrid fleet doctrine, which combines large combat vessels with maritime drones. The interview was conducted by Xavier Vavasseur, editor-in-chief of the publication, at the Le Bourget exhibition (3–6 November 2026), a record-breaking edition with 705 exhibitors – 40 per cent more than the previous event.
Whilst several navies are rushing to adopt unmanned systems at the expense of large, manned warships, France is deliberately taking a measured approach. Cluzel, who took over as head of the French Navy in the summer of 2026, succeeding Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, advocates a doctrine of ‘reasoned hybridisation’ (in French, hybridation raisonnée): the integration of maritime drones must enhance, not replace, heavy front-line combatants. The Romanian publication Defence Romania summarises the doctrine as ‘moderate hybridisation’.
Countering the trend towards ever-smaller warships
On the exhibition floor, unmanned systems took centre stage, whilst some navies are rethinking the structure of their forces and reducing the size of their flagship surface vessels. The admiral warned against overestimating what hybridisation can achieve: preparing for a high-intensity clash of wills requires retaining the decisive instruments of naval power.
To maintain its strategic autonomy and freedom of action, France is retaining its power-projection and deterrence assets: the aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered attack submarines and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines from the SNLE 3G programme. According to Cluzel, large surface vessels remain indispensable for navigating rough seas and carrying sufficient weaponry. As the operation and maintenance of such complex systems cannot be automated in the near future, he does not expect these platforms to become unmanned within the next five decades.
Three areas where drones complement manned ships
As all components of the French fleet are being modernised, unmanned capabilities are being introduced to complement manned vessels in three areas:
- Tactical depth: extending the surveillance range for a quicker understanding of the situation, faster decision-making and an operational tempo imposed on the adversary.
- Self-defence: pushing back saturation thresholds, with drones intercepting other drones and short-range guided munitions designed to counter unmanned surface drones.
- Offensive lethality: strengthening the fleet’s strike capability to impose its will when necessary.
The SCX26 concept vessel, unveiled by Naval Group at Euronaval 2026, positions a heavy, manned surface combatant at the heart of a hybrid naval combat space. This architecture aligns closely with the French vision of a ‘resonant’ hybrid fleet. Photo: Naval News.
An economic argument in favour of the self-defence component comes from the Red Sea. According to Defence Romania, in December 2023 the French frigate Languedoc used Aster 15 missiles, costing over one million euros each, against Houthi Shahed-type drones, costing less than 40,000 euros, and frigates in the area had collectively fired 22 Aster 15/30 missiles by March 2024. Such an imbalance explains the interest in cheaper interceptors.
From doctrine to concrete programmes
Cluzel has made accelerating hybridisation one of the priorities for 2026–2027 and speaks of a ‘drone shock’. His predecessor, Vaujour, had a similar ambition: ‘to use drones wherever possible and retain manned operations where necessary’. In an interview with Marine & Océans magazine on 9 November, Cluzel said he wanted to “accelerate sensible hybridisation”, with more “consumable” and “decision-making” weapons and an open, resilient digital architecture.
Aerial drones are already a reality, but naval drones – whether surface or submarine – do not yet possess the technical maturity and robustness required by the Navy. For this reason, on 9 October, the Agency for Defence Innovation (AID) selected three surface drones as part of the DANAE project (Autonomous Naval Surface Drone with an’Armement Embarqué), designed to protect naval bases and escort ships: the Flying USV, with hydrofoils, from the consortium led by SEAir; NEMEZIS, from SeaOwl, which can optionally carry a crew and be deployed ‘in a swarm’ by a single operator; and Seaquest S, from the SIREHNA–Couach–Naval Group consortium. The three will be evaluated by the end of 2027, after which the series production phase will follow. In January, seven manufacturers took part in tests at Saint-Mandrier, near Toulon, with the support of the Directorate-General for Armaments (DGA).
On 3 November, at Euronaval, the Minister for Defence, Catherine Vautrin, signed a pact with the naval industry organisation GICAN for the development of naval defence drones. Coordinated by the DGA, the initiative aims to align the Navy’s requirements with the industry’s capabilities. The first procurements, scheduled for 2027, will focus on long-endurance drones that can be deployed from ships and the industrialisation of SMOKERS remotely guided munitions; the DANAE system and dedicated command and control capabilities are set to follow in 2028. Zone Militaire also notes that the Norwegian firm Kongsberg is developing, based on a 56-metre trawler, a naval anti-submarine drone (Arctic Hunter). The use of inexpensive civilian vessels is one way in which costs can be shared with the private sector.
The reality of high-intensity naval warfare, from the Red Sea to Polaris
The balanced fleet architecture reflects the operational lessons learnt in 2022, when French sailors faced high-intensity threats in theatres such as the Red Sea. In an unpredictable maritime environment, where conflicts spill over into sea lanes and threaten European supply chains, warships face a spectrum of threats ranging from suicide drones to hypersonic missiles. As air and maritime superiority can be challenged anywhere outside territorial waters, the Navy has spent the last five years honing its capabilities through the Polaris exercises, which have boosted crew morale and training standards. Cluzel said that Euronaval remains essential for aligning operational needs with industrial innovation and for interoperability with international partners.
Interview: Xavier Vavasseur, Naval News, with Admiral Christophe Cluzel
Many navies, as we can see here at the exhibition, are moving towards the concept of a hybrid navy or ‘hybrid fleet’. Some place drone systems at the heart of the concept and tend to reduce the size of their flagship warships. What is the French concept of a hybrid fleet?
Admiral Christophe Cluzel: “I advocate ‘reasonable’ hybridisation. I call it that because I do not believe we should harbour illusions about the benefits of hybridisation. At a time when we are preparing for a clash of wills, our navies – and France – must retain their instruments of power. In the naval sphere, these are the aircraft carrier for superiority, ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). I am very pleased to have seen the launch of the SNLE 3G programme. This is the guarantee that France will retain its strategic autonomy and freedom of action.
There are also large platforms that we will need to retain in order to withstand the seas, weather storms and maintain a sufficient number of weapons in service. These platforms, which I had the opportunity to command a few years ago, are equipped with systems whose operation and maintenance are so complex that I cannot envisage them operating without a crew for the next five decades.
That is why I advocate, instead, for the current fleet – comprising all the components that are now being modernised – to be supplemented with drone capabilities. These will give us tactical depth in surveillance missions and enable us to understand the tactical situation more quickly, make decisions more swiftly and impose our own tempo on the adversary. In self-defence, they will enable us to push back the saturation thresholds: I am thinking of drones that intercept drones and short-range munitions capable of intercepting surface-based drones. And in the offensive domain, they will enhance our lethality, so that we can impose our will on the day we choose to do so.”
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Saab’s A26 submarine for Poland: from Sweden’s selection to the 47 billion krona contract – Maritime Security Forum
The Polish government selected Saab’s A26 submarine bid to replace its existing Kilo-class submarines, and in June 2026 Poland signed the contract for three vessels. Naval News visited the Saab Kockums shipyard in Karlskrona, where two A26 submarines are under construction for the Swedish Navy, to find out more. This report is part of a series of three videos produced following the visit. The text below retains the statements from the original article and supplements them with subsequent developments.
Statements from Saab Kockums
Maxwell Litton, head of sales and business development at Saab Kockums, said: “Sweden and Saab are proud. We are very, very pleased that Poland has decided to choose the Swedish bid, which included the A26 as the submarine for the Polish Navy. We understand this decision— —because we believe our submarine is uniquely suited to the needs of the Polish Navy, and we look forward to delivering our platforms now. Our expertise lies in the Baltic Sea […], so it should come as no surprise that the A26 is uniquely suited to this environment and, given the areas of interest in which Poland operates, I believe it is logical for it to select this platform. We will deliver to both our Swedish and Polish customers on time, as promised and as we have committed to.”
From selection to contract
Poland chose Sweden as its preferred partner for the Orka programme in November 2025. On 29 June 2026, the Polish Armaments Agency signed a contract with Saab in Gdynia for the production and delivery of three A26-class submarines, including weaponry packages, training and support. The order is worth approximately 47 billion Swedish kronor (around 4.8 billion dollars), and deliveries will continue until 2038. The contract was signed in the presence of Prime Ministers Ulf Kristersson and Donald Tusk.
Saab’s CEO, Micael Johansson, said that the three submarines “will play a vital role in strengthening security in the Baltic Sea region”, and the company has committed to establishing maintenance, repair and overhaul capabilities in Poland, in collaboration with Polish industry. Swedish Defence Minister Pål Jonson explained the choice by citing the submarine’s characteristics, noting that it had been “specially developed for the challenging conditions of the Baltic Sea”: shallow waters, complex seabed topography and limited operational space, which require stealth, manoeuvrability and autonomy.
The road to signing the contract was not without its hurdles. According to Defence Blog, negotiations were difficult in June, and Poland had demanded industrial offsets, including a joint project between PGZ and Saab for submarine maintenance and a technology transfer package. Competing bids came from Naval Group, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, Fincantieri, Hanwha Ocean and Navantia. However, Saab’s announcement does not specify the exact terms of the industrial cooperation.
The bridge submarine: HMS Södermanland and the Baltic Sea Pact
Under a separate agreement, Poland will lease the Swedish submarine HMS Södermanland until 2032, in order to rapidly bolster its submarine capability whilst awaiting the new vessels. Training for Polish crews began in August 2026, earlier than planned, as part of the most extensive submarine-related training and support initiative the Swedish Navy has ever undertaken. Sweden has also committed to supporting the NTS programme from approximately 2027 to 2038, with an option to extend, including through Poland’s participation in the testing activities of the submarines HMS Blekinge and HMS Skåne.
On the same day, the two countries launched the ‘Baltic Sea Pact’, a deepened bilateral cooperation in three areas: security and defence policy, military cooperation and defence industry cooperation. Kristersson stated that the partnership is based on “a shared view of the long-term threat posed by Russia and the importance of continued support for Ukraine”. The Grosswald publication also quotes a statement by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, according to which the submarines will be able to deploy “swarms of drones controlled from on board”.
Swedish submarines under construction
Currently, two Swedish A26 Blekinge-class submarines are under construction at Saab Kockums. In mid-October 2025, it was announced that Saab is due to deliver them in 2031 and 2033, following a renegotiation of the contract with the Swedish defence procurement agency FMV.
The Blekinge-class is a modern submarine measuring approximately 65 metres, with a surface displacement of around 2,000 tonnes, equipped with Stirling AIP propulsion, which allows it to remain submerged for over 18 days. The standard crew consists of 26 sailors, and the vessel can accommodate up to 35 people, including commandos and passengers. Defence Blog gives slightly different dimensions (approximately 62 metres and 1,800 tonnes), a discrepancy which we have noted in the table below.
Specifications of the A26 submarine
| Parameter | Value |
| Builder | Saab Kockums, Karlskrona (Sweden) |
| Class | A26 / Blekinge class (in the Polish Orka programme, also known as OPNT – Okręt Podwodny Nowego Typu) |
| Length | approximately 65 m (Naval News); approximately 62 m (Defence Blog) |
| Surface displacement | approximately 2,000 t (Naval News); approximately 1,800 t (Defence Blog) |
| Propulsion | air-independent Stirling (AIP) system, diesel-electric |
| Submerged endurance | over 18 days |
| Crew | 26 sailors, up to 35 including special forces and passengers |
| Capabilities | multi-mission hatch for the deployment of special forces and the launch/recovery of unmanned underwater vehicles; torpedoes; mine-laying capability |
| Weaponry options | vertical launch cells compatible with Tomahawk missiles (optional, according to Defence Blog) |
| Polish contract | 3 A26 submarines, plus armament packages, training and support; approximately 47 billion Swedish kronor (approximately 4.8 billion dollars) |
| Contract signing | 29 June 2026, Gdynia |
| Deliveries to Poland | ongoing, with the final delivery in 2038 |
| Deliveries to Sweden | HMS Blekinge and HMS Skåne: 2031 and 2033 (announced in October 2025) |
| Interim solution | leasing of the Swedish submarine HMS Södermanland until 2032 |
| Swedish support | for the NTS programme, approximately 2027–2038, with an option to extend |
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