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MS Daily brief-10 April 2026

- Liminal Maritime Aggression in the Black Sea: Romania at a Crossroads of Energy Security
- MS Daily Brief-en
- IRANIAN ATTACKS IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ: BETWEEN THE USE OF FORCE, ARMED ATTACK AND GREY ZONE OPERATIONS AS A FORM OF ZAHHAKIAN LIMINAL MARITIME AGGRESSION
- Romania: Between a Theoretical Threat and a Layered Defence
- The decline of Iran’s naval power in the current conflict. The destruction of major platforms and the survival of asymmetric capabilities
- Iran’s Islands and the Strategic Architecture of the Strait of Hormuz
- The possibility of establishing a special regime for the Strait of Hormuz: legal, maritime and geopolitical arguments
- The French nuclear deterrence initiative and European security: legal and strategic implications of a debate on Romania
- “The Stratified Conflict: Multidomain Warfare and Iran’s Strategic Dynamics in the Middle East”
- PHASES OF THE ATTACK ON IRAN AND MULTIDOMAIN WARFARE
- FOUR YEARS OF WAR IN UKRAINE
- Iran’s air defence system
- The need to reevaluate maritime doctrine following the introduction of maritime drones into the Romanian Navy
- Artificial Intelligence in Defense: Between Technological Enthusiasm and Operational Reality
- 2026 – Will the Munich Security Conference be without expectations?
- The implementation of naval drones in the Romanian Naval Forces – a necessity
- The multi-domain deadlock in the context of Romania and the Black Sea
- Integrated military cooperation for the protection of offshore energy platforms in the Black Sea
- NAVY ARSENAL – Explanatory Memorandum
- The Phantom Fleet and maritime security challenges
- China’s military leadership faces a serious problem
- The possibility of Romania initiating a project similar to Nordic-Baltic Eight
- From Davos to the White House: Donald Trump’s Peace Council and Romania’s dilemma
- THE US, CHINA, AND TUCIDIDES’ TRAP
- ATTACK ON OFFSHORE TARGETS IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE
- Operationalization of the European Maritime Security Hub in the Black Sea
- The European Maritime Security Hub in the Black Sea. A major challenge for Romania.
- “Resetting military strategy: multi-domain operations and the emergence of artificial intelligence S8NTH Strategic Engine as a decision-making accelerator”
- Securitate maritima – tancuri petroliere si industria de petrol si gaze
- Legal aspects of unmanned maritime systems
- Sub-conventional conflicts in the maritime domain in the Black Sea
- Network-centric warfare and its implications for the maritime domain
- Russian authorities temporarily suspend operations at the CPC terminal in the Black Sea. Possible implications for Romania?
- Deficiencies in Romania’s military procurement system
- THE IMPLICATIONS OF CYBER ACTIONS ON MARITIME SECURITY
- Combat Management System versus Command and Control (C2)
- IS ROMANIA PREPARED TO PROTECT ITS CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE?
- COMBATING NAVAL DRONES
- Podcasts
- Naval helicopters and their role in combating surface vessels
- The global influence of the Vatican and its role in world geopolitic-PDF
- The global influence of the Vatican and its role in world geopolitics
- The light corvette, an immediate solution to regional challenges
- Lessons learned applicable to the Romanian Naval Forces: strategic perspectives and needs for modernisation and equipment
- Russia’s strategic naval collapse (2022-2025) in the context of the war in Ukraine
- Russia’s strategic naval collapse (2022-2025) in the context of the war in Ukraine
- Can the empires of the world be “resurrected?
- The Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline A subject of negotiations?
- “The US Air Bases in Romania: Strategic Pawns in NATO’s Security Architecture and Global Geopolitics”
- Arctic Region – Melting Ice, Rising Tensions
- The Lepanto trap – what remains after the first naval battle?
- UK NATO and the Royal Navy A Defense Without America
- IS ROMANIA PREPARED FOR THE PROTECTION OF ITS OWN CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE?
- STRATEGIC CHANGES IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE MARITIME DOMAIN
- Romania, possible increase in security responsibilities
- How much does it cost? “War and Peace”
- Romania and Yalta 2.0- Dual Strategies and Reconfigurations of Influence
- WILL CHINA BE THE WORLD’S FIRST WORLD POWER IN THE NEXT DECADE?
- After three years of war, Russia is still an energy superpower?
- Maritime Critical Infrastructure
- Modernization of the Romanian Naval Forces: A Problem?
- Analysis of the Motivations of the Algerian Navy’s Choice of the Type 056 Corvettes from China
- Point Defense Missile Systems
- The Panama Canal: A Strategic Piece in the US Geopolitical Game
- Shipyards, an essential element of Romania’s maritime power
- Romania and Davos 2025
- THE RACE FOR ARCTIC RICHES
- Donald Trump’s geopolitical vision
- Greenland – a current and prospective geostrategic issue
- Strategic directions of Romania’s national defense in 2025
- The Regulatory borders of the Black Sea through the Cartography of European Union Law and International Law
- Event
- BLACK SEA CHRONICLES
- BLACK SEA CHRONICLES
- Misterul ambarcațiunii identificate la Tuzla
- BLACK SEA CHRONICLES
- A TRINKET DEDICATED TO THE ROMANIAN FLEET – 1913
- MS Daily Brief-Fr
- A POSSIBLE VISION: REBUILDING MARITIME ROMANIA
- The Imperative of a Maritime Security Policy and Strategy for Romania
- MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
- Importance of National Security Policy and Strategy
- TOWARDS ENSURING MARITIME SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION
- ROMANIA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE BLACK SEA, THE DANUBE AND THE PLANETARY OCEAN
- The role of the maritime and inland waterway sector in Romania’s economy
- CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO MARITIME SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES, CONCLUSIONS FOR THE SITUATION OF ROMANIA
- THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY STUDIES AS A NEW FIELD OF GEOPOLITICAL REFLECTION AND RESEARCH
- Romania’s maritime resilience in the age of hybrid threats and the importance of a Maritime Security Strategy
- Romania: A centerpiece in the revitalization of the Silk Road for the 21st century
- CHINA OPTION
- 1st Black Sea Security Conference
- Regional Detension in the Middle East and North Africa
- POLAND-A possible way to follow
- The influence of Russia and the Ukrainian War in the Asia-Pacific area
- EVENTS
- Polemic at the mouth of the Danube
- To ensure security in the Black Sea region
- Geopolitical and Geostrategic Provocations in the Black Sea Region
- A NEW NATO STRATEGIC POINT IN THE BALKAN AND BLACK SEA AREA
- PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES – A POSSIBLE PLAYER IN THE WAR AT SEA?
- The war in Ukraine – reflections
- A new Black Sea strategy for a new Black Sea reality
- STATE IMMUNITY, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE
- Maritime security and the law of the sea
- Resilience and importance of the maritime sector in the Romanian economy
- Montreux Convention – a factor of stability or a catalyst for insecurity in the Black Sea Region
- The Black Sea in the Geopolitical equation
- Implications of war on the marine environment
- After a year of war, possible scenarios
- “SEA BLINDNESS”
- Does Romania need a Maritime Policy and a Maritime Strategy?
- Are missile ships still relevant in modern warfare?
- Do we need military science?
- War in Ukraine, how the nature of power is changing
- Maritime Romania
- The problem of Arabat and Genichesk
- Energy, freedom of navigation and the China-Russia relationship
- Winter militarization: Can Ukraine prevent Russia from regrouping as temperatures drop?
- THE INFLUENCE OF BLACK SEA CHARACTERISTICS ON THE ASSEMBLED OPERATIONS
- Fighters and actors in winter fatigue
- THE RELATIVE DOMINANCE OF RUSSIAN NAVAL POWER IN THE BLACK SEA
- HAS RUSSIA STARTED TO WAKE UP TO REALITY?
- The New European navigation channels – editorial
- Newsletter 18 August 2022
- Newsletter 18 july 2022
- Geostrategic and geopolitical maritime scenarios in the Middle East and North Africa
- Geopolitics
- Geopolitica
- Webinar
- Buletin informativ
- Newsletter 18 july 2022
- Transforming the North-South ITC into a major transport corridor
- Newsletter 06 july 2022
- Newsletter
- THE NAVIGATION REGIME ON THE DANUBE AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR ROMANIA
- Buletin informativ- iulie 2022
- CONFERENCE “THE DYNAMCS AND COMPLEXITY OF ROMANIA’S MARITIME SECURITY” 29-30 september 2022
- Libertatea de navigație pentru porturile Ucrainei de la Marea Neagră
- Freedom of navigation for Ukraine's Black Sea ports
- Buletin informativ iunie 2022
- Buletin informativ mai 2022
- Buletin informativ aprilie 2022
- Buletin informativ martie 2022
THE MARITIME SECURITY FORUM WISHES YOU A HAPPY EASTER!
We’ll be back with news starting April 14
READ ALSO THE ARTICLES FROM THE MARITIME SECURITY FORUM
Liminal Maritime Aggression in the Black Sea: Romania at a Crossroads of Energy Security
Contents
News from Ukraine | Heavy blows! Crimea’s supply chain collapses. 1
Developments over the last 24 hours in the Middle East – Maritime Security Forum.. 1
Netanyahu says there is no ceasefire in Lebanon, as Israel launches new attacks. 2
Who can claim victory if the ceasefire in Iran holds? An early winner is China. 5
Islamabad prepares to host historic talks between Iran and the US. 8
Trump news in brief: Melania Trump’s strange distancing from Epstein gets even stranger 12
Developments in the war in Ukraine over the last 24 hours – Maritime Security Forum.. 14
Vladimir Putin announces an Orthodox Easter truce with Ukraine. 15
UK exposes covert Russian submarine operation in and around UK waters. 22
France to double penalties for ‘shadow fleet’ vessels – Maritime Security Forum.. 34
Portugal’s new multi-purpose vessel was launched in Romania. 36
The French Navy further expands its CAMCOPTER® S-100 fleet 37
BREAKING: IDF launches lightning strike on Hezbollah; US warns NATO; Iran tests the ceasefire | TBN Israel
https://youtu.be/4Vpq9k3YnYM?t=1
News from Ukraine | Heavy blows! Crimea’s supply chain collapses
https://youtu.be/k_2I74PVkb4?t=1
Developments over the last 24 hours in the Middle East – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 24 hours, developments in the Middle East have confirmed the deepening of a state of acute systemic instability, in which the maritime, military and diplomatic dimensions are interdependent, and any attempt at de-escalation is undermined by the dynamics on the ground. The central element of this development remains the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran continues to exercise strict operational control over maritime traffic, rendering the formal ceasefire a framework with no real effect on freedom of navigation. Despite the existence of the agreement, transit through the strait remains severely restricted, with approximately seven ships reported to have managed to pass through in the last 24 hours, compared to a normal volume of over a hundred ships daily. This drastic reduction confirms the continuation of a de facto maritime blockade, in which operational risk, Iranian control and legal-military uncertainty are deterring trade flows, particularly in the energy sector.
This situation has direct implications for global markets, where energy price volatility reflects the perception of a persistent risk on one of the world’s most important maritime routes. From a strategic perspective, Iran is utilising this choke point to maximum effect, demonstrating that a total blockade is not necessary to produce global effects, but merely the maintenance of a sufficient level of risk to inhibit traffic and shift the pressure onto economies dependent on these flows.
At the same time, the military dimension of the conflict has continued to intensify, particularly on the Lebanese front. Israel has carried out new air strikes on infrastructure and positions associated with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and in peri-urban areas, targeting both tactical objectives and high-value operational targets. These attacks included strikes on logistics centres and members of the organisation’s leadership, confirming a strategy of systematically degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities. In response, Hezbollah resumed rocket fire on northern Israel, maintaining a dynamic of mutual escalation that currently precludes a rapid stabilisation of the front.
Outside Lebanon, indirect hostile activities have continued to be reported across the wider region, including pressure on maritime routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, linked to Iranian-backed proxy actors. These actions have not necessarily reached the scale of major strikes in the last 24 hours, but they maintain a climate of insecurity that complements the pressure exerted in the Persian Gulf and contributes to the fragmentation of the regional security landscape.
On the diplomatic front, the situation remains characterised by ambiguity and contradictions. The truce between the United States and Iran is clearly fragile, and recent statements by Iranian leaders indicate that the Israeli strikes in Lebanon are perceived as undermining the negotiations. At the same time, Israel has signalled a willingness to engage in indirect or direct talks with Lebanon, under pressure from the United States, but these initiatives coexist with the continuation of military operations, which undermines the credibility of any prospect of a ceasefire in the short term.

From an integrated strategic perspective, developments over the last 24 hours highlight three main directions. The first is the consolidation of the use of maritime space as an instrument of global coercion, through the maintenance of a selective blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. The second is the intensification of the conflict on the Israeli-Lebanese front, where air strikes and missile responses are creating a spiral of escalation that is difficult to control. The third is the persistence of a structural diplomatic deadlock, in which differences of interpretation and divergent interests are preventing any real progress.
Maritime Security Forum
Netanyahu says there is no ceasefire in Lebanon, as Israel launches new attacks
The Israeli Prime Minister declares he will continue to attack Hezbollah “with full force” following the attacks that have killed over 300 people
Julian Borger Senior International Correspondent
Friday, 10 April 2026, 04:28 CEST

Benjamin Netanyahu has said that “there is no ceasefire in Lebanon” and that Israel will continue “to strike Hezbollah with full force”, as the country’s military launched new attacks.
The Israeli prime minister’s remarks and the latest strikes on what the IDF called “Hezbollah launch sites” came shortly after Donald Trump said he had asked Netanyahu to be more “discreet” in Lebanon.
Later on Friday, a US State Department official said that Israel and Lebanon would hold talks in Washington next week. The announcement came as Netanyahu ordered his ministers to seek direct talks with Lebanon, focused on the disarmament of the Iran-backed Hezbollah.
Neither Israel nor Lebanon has publicly confirmed the talks with the US for next week.
Previously, the Lebanese government had stated that a ceasefire must be agreed before any talks could begin.
In a written message, Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, stated that the Islamic Republic does not want war with the US and Israel, but will defend its rights as a nation, state television reported on Thursday.
“We did not seek war and we do not want it,” he said. “But we will not relinquish our legitimate rights under any circumstances and, in this regard, we regard the entire resistance front as a unified whole,” he added, in an apparent reference to Lebanon.
More than 300 people were killed by Israeli air strikes in the 24 hours following the announcement of a ceasefire in the war with Iran on Tuesday evening. The bombing, which apparently targeted Hezbollah sites, included heavy strikes on densely populated areas, sparking outrage from the International Committee of the Red Cross and other international humanitarian organisations.
The fierce attack on Lebanon threatened to derail hopes of a negotiated end to the war in Iran, which began with a US-Israeli strike on 28 February. Despite claims by US President Donald Trump that the ceasefire brokered by Pakistan marked significant progress towards establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East, the truce appeared in danger of collapsing from the very first day.
Iran warned that, in response to Israeli attacks following the ceasefire, it would once again close the Strait of Hormuz, the economically vital waterway that it had agreed to keep open for the two-week duration of the ceasefire. The country’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, stated that negotiations were “meaningless” as long as Israel continued to bomb Lebanon, casting doubt on the talks between the US and Iran in Pakistan scheduled for Saturday. Pezeshkian promised that Iran would not abandon the Lebanese people.
According to Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Saeed Khatibzadeh, Iran was prevented from responding forcefully to Israel’s escalation of the conflict in Lebanon by Pakistan’s intervention, which urged restraint in the interests of a broader peace agreement. Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, condemned “Israel’s continued aggression against Lebanon”.
Netanyahu insisted that Lebanon was not included in the ceasefire agreement brokered by Donald Trump on Tuesday evening and promised that the Israeli military would continue to strike Hezbollah targets “wherever necessary”. The Israeli Prime Minister stated that his forces had killed the secretary to Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem.
Trump himself backed Netanyahu’s account, telling the public broadcaster PBS that Lebanon “was not included in the agreement” because of Hezbollah’s role. He referred to the conflict in Lebanon as a “separate clash” from the war with Iran and added: “And that’s what he’ll deal with. It’s fine.”
CNN reported that Netanyahu’s announcement regarding peace negotiations with Lebanon came at the insistence of the US president, who wishes to withdraw the US from a war he was persuaded to join by Netanyahu, according to several accounts of the run-up to the conflict.
US Vice-President JD Vance, appointed to lead the American delegation at the peace talks in Pakistan, suggested that there had been a “legitimate misunderstanding” regarding the geographical scope of the ceasefire agreement.
Pakistan, which stepped up its mediation efforts after Trump threatened an attack that would have led to the end of civilisation, stated that Lebanon was part of the agreement.
Robert Malley, a former US envoy who led previous negotiations between the US and Iran, said: “I would trust the Pakistani mediator that Lebanon was included. They issued a statement saying it was included, and I didn’t hear any American correct the Pakistani version for many hours.”
“It appears to be a case where the US changed its mind and gave the Israeli Prime Minister [permission] to continue [the bombings] for a further 24 hours before they were ‘held back’.”
Malley said that the best-case scenario for the peace talks in Pakistan was for the region to return to the status quo prior to the start of the US-Israeli attacks on 28 February, with the Strait of Hormuz open, and with options for limiting Iran’s nuclear programme on the table, alongside some form of financial compensation for Tehran.
The authorities in Islamabad have begun implementing strict security measures in anticipation of the arrival of delegations for the talks, which are due to begin on Saturday.
As the future of the ceasefire appeared to be in jeopardy, Trump issued his latest ultimatum on social media, promising a resumption of US attacks (as he put it, “Shootin’ Starts”) if Iran did not comply with the “real deal”. He made it clear that Tehran must fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping and that it should not possess “nuclear weapons”. He made no mention of Lebanon.
US allies insisted that the ceasefire must be comprehensive. A joint statement by the UK, EU countries, Canada and Japan called on “all parties to implement the ceasefire, including in Lebanon”, where Israel is seeking to destroy the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement.
Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, said on Thursday: “Hezbollah has dragged Lebanon into war, but Israel’s right to defend itself does not justify causing such massive destruction. Israeli attacks killed hundreds of people last night, making it difficult to argue that such brutal actions fall within the scope of self-defence.”
The French Foreign Minister, Jean-Noël Barrot, condemned the Israeli attacks as “unacceptable”, whilst his British counterpart, Yvette Cooper, described them as “extremely damaging”, adding that the exclusion of Lebanon from the ceasefire agreement would “destabilise the entire region”.
A Downing Street spokesperson said that Keir Starmer had spoken to Trump on Thursday about “the next step in finding a solution” to reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
“The Prime Minister outlined the discussions he had held with Gulf leaders and military planners in the region regarding the need to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as the UK’s efforts to bring partners together to agree on a viable plan.
“They agreed that, now that a ceasefire is in place and an agreement has been reached on opening the Strait, we are in the next stage of finding a solution.”
Global diplomatic efforts have focused on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, the gateway to a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas supply. Only 11 ships – four Iranian, four Greek, one Chinese, one Omani and one unidentified – were allowed to pass through the strait in the 24 hours following the ceasefire, less than a tenth of the pre-war flow.
Around 1,400 ships remain anchored in the Gulf, stranded first by the war, then by the uncertainty surrounding the vague and fragile ceasefire. After an initial drop in the global price of oil following the announcement of the ceasefire, it began to rise again on Thursday, heading towards $100 a barrel.
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/09/israel-bombing-lebanon-us-iran-ceasefire-condemnation
Who can claim victory if the ceasefire in Iran holds? An early winner is China
Amy Hawkins in Beijing
It is believed that influential figures in Beijing have managed to persuade Iran, although one analyst claims they “pushed an open door”
Thursday 9 April 2026, 11:22 CEST

Whilst the world struggles to understand what, if anything, has been achieved by the ceasefire agreement announced on Tuesday by the US and Iran, one major power set to benefit regardless of the outcome is China.
The powers that be in Beijing are credited with having pushed Iran to accept the ceasefire, thereby consolidating their status as a regional mediator. In China’s domestic media, subject to strict censorship, articles were allowed to circulate that basked in the glory of China being the ‘adult in the room’ at a time of international crisis.
Guancha, a nationalist website, published a report on Wednesday discussing articles in the New York Times and the Associated Press that attributed a key role to China in the ceasefire agreement between Iran and the US. The Guancha article stated: “This ceasefire could not have been achieved without the active mediation of China, Pakistan and other countries.”
US President Donald Trump told the Agence France-Presse news agency that he believed China had persuaded Iran to accept a ceasefire. This confirmed reports from Iranian and Pakistani officials that Beijing had played a crucial role in the last-minute negotiations in Islamabad.
However, some analysts are sceptical about how influential China may actually have been in the overnight talks.
The agreement, as initially announced by Tehran, is so advantageous to Iran that encouraging the regime to accept it would have been like “pushing an open door”, according to one analyst.
Nicholas Lyall, a senior researcher at Trends, a research and consultancy firm in Abu Dhabi, said: “As regards the question of whether China had to exert significant pressure on Iran for it to accept the temporary ceasefire, and whether Iran was influenced by this Chinese effort, it is important to clarify what Iran actually agreed to.”
The 10 points of Iran’s ceasefire plan, which were initially promoted by Trump as a “viable” basis for negotiations, were “maximalist and represent all the demands previously expressed by Iran in the preceding weeks”, said Lyall. “All of this means that Iran has made no real concessions by agreeing to start talks and can, quite legitimately, present this as a genuine political victory to any audience.
“It is therefore highly likely that any involvement by China in the process by which Iran agreed to the negotiations was not as influential as some might assume, as it largely pushed an open door, given the apparent US acceptance of those Iranian demands.”
Officially, China has neither confirmed nor denied reports that it played an active role in the Islamabad negotiations. At a press conference on Wednesday, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning merely stated that China “has been actively working to promote de-escalation and the cessation of all hostilities”.
Nevertheless, Beijing will be happy to be credited with brokering a fragile peace deal that appears to have pulled the conflict in Iran back from the brink of a major escalation.
Before Trump’s second term in the White House upended global stability and fractured regional alliances, China was building a reputation as a mediator in the Middle East, particularly through brokering the surprise rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.
In 2024, leaders of rival Palestinian factions signed a ‘Beijing Declaration’ following talks in China, in which they agreed to form a government of national unity for Palestine at an unspecified point in the future.
More recently, officials from China and Pakistan – the country that has become the most important mediator in this conflict – published a five-point plan aimed at bringing about a ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
“All these plans are designed to project a global image of China’s responsibility and restraint, rather than to actually resolve the conflicts they address,” said Lyall.
William Yang, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said: “There have been previous attempts where China has claimed victory in some very straightforward cases. This time, it is quite different, as I believe China feels that continued disruption will have a more direct impact on its core interests.”
He added: “Ultimately, if China is able to ensure that it uses its influence and leverage over Iran to genuinely help facilitate any form of ceasefire, it would consider it in its interest to do so,” but said that Beijing would be “cautious” about making public what kind of pressure, if any, had been exerted.
China’s actual diplomatic influence in the region is limited, though it is growing. As the largest buyer of Iranian oil, China is economically important to Tehran. But the two countries do not have a particularly deep diplomatic relationship.
Song Bo, a researcher at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy, stated that Iran is “outside the top 10” of countries important to Beijing.
Analysts are even more sceptical about the idea that China could act as a guarantor of a potential ceasefire agreement in the Middle East.
On Wednesday, Iranian envoy Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli said in Beijing that he hoped “major countries such as China and Russia” would work together to help secure peace in the region. China and Russia supported Tehran by vetoing a UN Security Council resolution, proposed prior to the ceasefire, which aimed to force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. However, the actual commitment of resources to the conflict is a far greater requirement.
Song stated: “China has no direct interest in any of the parties in the Middle East. Acting as a guarantor of a ceasefire would be an extremely costly diplomatic initiative, and I do not believe China would readily commit to such a move.
“It is simply not realistic. Even if China were to act as a guarantor, it lacks the diplomatic or military leverage necessary to effectively influence or control the parties involved in the conflict.”
Lyall stated that China lacks the capacity to verify whether the terms of the ceasefire are being upheld and that it is unlikely to be able to impose any significant sanctions on a party that breaches these terms.
The ceasefire agreement is not merely a PR victory for China. Although the country possesses large oil reserves, the risk of a global recession and the skyrocketing prices of fossil fuels nevertheless pose a threat to the Chinese economy, which is heavily dependent on exports.
“If it is possible to manage this conflict and, by managing the conflict, bring down oil prices, then this is certainly very important for China,” said Song.
Additional reporting by Lillian Yang and Yu-chen Li
,,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/09/who-can-claim-victory-iran-ceasefire-china
Islamabad prepares to host historic talks between Iran and the US
In Pakistan’s capital, the army has been mobilised, a public holiday has been declared, and the streets are strangely empty
Hannah Ellis-Petersen in Delhi and Shah Meer Baloch in Islamabad
Friday, 10 April 2026, 05:00 CEST

The streets of Islamabad were subject to strict restrictions as Pakistan’s capital prepared to host the historic negotiations between Iran and the US, which held the promise of an end to a war that has devastated the Middle East.
Even as the ceasefire between the US and Iran appeared increasingly precarious, against the backdrop of Israel’s ongoing bombardment of Lebanon and disputes over the terms of the talks, Pakistani officials insisted that the decisive peace negotiations would take place over the weekend, as planned.
The conflict, which began when Israel and the US attacked Iran in late February, has left thousands dead and caused global economic devastation. Iran’s retaliatory blockade of the critical shipping route, the Strait of Hormuz, led to a global oil and gas shortage and triggered the worst energy crisis in history.
Pakistan’s mediation efforts on Tuesday night were what ultimately persuaded the two warring nations to agree to a two-week ceasefire, after US President Donald Trump had threatened that “an entire civilisation would perish” if Iran did not meet his demands.
As part of the ceasefire agreement, the two sides agreed to meet in Islamabad for talks aimed at negotiating a lasting peace, which was seen as a resounding diplomatic victory for Pakistan.
However, critical questions remain regarding the ceasefire and the basis for the talks. Whilst Iran and Pakistan have stated that the ceasefire also includes Lebanon, the US and Israel have since insisted that this is a separate matter. Iran’s President, Masoud Pezeshkian, stated that any peace negotiations would be “meaningless” if they took place whilst bombs continued to fall on Lebanon.
According to Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Saeed Khatibzadeh, Pakistan’s efforts to maintain peace and protect the fragile ceasefire have continued behind the scenes. Khatibzadeh claimed that Pakistan had intervened to prevent Iran from retaliating against the attacks on Lebanon.
Ahead of the first round of talks in Islamabad, due to take place on Saturday, soldiers and paramilitary rangers were mobilised, and security was tightened across the capital. Thursday and Friday were declared public holidays, and the streets were strangely empty.
Pakistani officials have remained tight-lipped about the arrangements for the talks, citing security and diplomatic reasons, but have stated that preparations are in full swing.
“Our priority is for the talks to proceed smoothly,” said an official involved in the arrangements. “We do not want to be seen as disruptors. Our role is that of facilitator and mediator. We will leave it to both sides, Iran and the US, to communicate any developments to the media, if they so wish.”
The official confirmed that the main delegations were due to arrive on Thursday evening and Friday morning. On the US side, the White House confirmed that the negotiating team would be led by Vice-President JD Vance, and that special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner would also travel to Islamabad.
Iranian officials stated that their delegation would include Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who both participated in the ceasefire negotiations. High-ranking figures from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are also expected to attend the meeting.
Officials said that delegations from Gulf countries, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which have faced intense bombardment from Iran since the start of the war, will also travel to Islamabad and may take part in parallel talks.
Due to the high security risks involved, Pakistani officials have confirmed that there are three or four possible venues prepared for the crucial meeting between Iran and the US.
The most senior participants are expected to stay at the exclusive five-star Serena Hotel in Islamabad, which could also host the talks. The hotel has been cleared of guests, and the surrounding roads within a 3-kilometre radius have been closed to traffic and placed under military control. Other possible venues mentioned by officials include the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, the Islamabad Convention Centre or a secure military facility.
Officials stated that there is no set timetable for the duration of the talks. However, guests who were evacuated from the Serena Hotel on Wednesday were informed that the hotel would be occupied until Sunday evening.
In a meeting on Thursday between Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and the head of the Pakistani army, Asim Munir, who has been credited with helping to negotiate the ceasefire, the two “expressed their satisfaction with the de-escalation of the situation achieved so far”.
,,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/10/islamabad-pakistan-negotiations-iran-us
“Nervous breakdown”: sailors on oil tankers stranded in the Persian Gulf for six weeks are reaching their breaking point
A sailor describes an “impossible” situation, with the strait still so unsafe that the crew would not cross it even if ordered to sail
Jillian Ambrose and Joanna Partridge
Thursday, 9 April 2026, 19:16 CEST

“You can try to minimise the impact this situation has on your mental health, but it becomes impossible.” After six weeks stranded in the Persian Gulf, one of the 20,000 seafarers caught in Iran’s stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz is reaching his limit.
However, against the backdrop of the fragile Middle East truce that is already unravelling, the oil tanker worker – who first spoke to The Guardian a month ago – said that any hope they might be released soon has already evaporated, if it ever truly existed.
“We are anchored, alongside dozens of loaded tankers. No one has moved an inch,” said the crew member, one of hundreds of sailors anchored off the coast of the United Arab Emirates, with a clear view of the loaded Kuwaiti tanker set ablaze by an Iranian missile less than two weeks ago.
A few hours after the ceasefire took effect, the characteristic plumes of smoke from intercepted missiles streaked across the sky above their ships. After a month and a half of drone attacks and reports of underwater mines, many sailors feel reluctant and unable to cross the strait – even if the ceasefire were to allow them to do so.
“I handed in my notice exactly a month ago,” said the sailor. “I informed the captain that I am not willing to sail through the strait. It’s about safety; it’s all about safety.”
On board the same tanker, most of the crew feel the same way, they added, saying that around 90 per cent of those on board wish to exercise their right to refuse to sail. One crew member has suffered a ‘nervous breakdown’ and is being checked on regularly by colleagues.
“I have no doubt that this specific problem, this nervous breakdown, is happening [on tankers] all around us because of the stress of this situation. The helplines for seafarers are trying to help, but from the start we all knew it wouldn’t be enough,” said the seafarer.
Since the start of the conflict, the union, the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), has received around 1,000 requests from seafarers on 300 different ships. Around 20 per cent of these were from those seeking repatriation. Other concerns related to wages or access to essential supplies, such as fuel, food and water.
Following the recent attack on the Kuwaiti oil tanker Al-Salmi, just a few miles away, the seafarer called a helpline for the first time. “I was a bit overwhelmed and wasn’t sure if I could cope with the feelings I was having. It’s important to me that others don’t see me crying. It helped to get all my feelings off my chest to a stranger.”
However, the advice and reassurance offered remotely have limited effectiveness, according to David Appleton, a senior leader at Nautilus, the organisation representing seafarers. “Everyone is doing their best to help, but what you really want is to get people out of that situation,” he said.
“As well as the psychological impact that the threat of violence has on people – the fact that you’re sitting there almost as an easy target – there’s also the uncertainty, and the fact that you don’t know how long it will last,” added Appleton.
The deterioration in the mental health of those aboard the stranded tankers has reignited calls for shipowners to replace their crews with seafarers willing to step in. Under maritime regulations, shipping companies cannot force seafarers to work in dangerous areas, but there will still be those desperate enough to accept the work.
“Most of our potential replacements are Ukrainian seafarers; those who are far from home, spending money in foreign European countries because they cannot return home,” said the seafarer.
Shipping companies are obliged to offer double pay to crews working in dangerous areas. They are expected to find people interested in promotion and offer them a higher rank to entice them to sign on. They will also seek out those who have been ashore the longest and are in need of work.
The sailor said: “The only difference between them and us is choice. At least they will be making the choice to come here, whatever their reason for doing so.”
They hope that in the coming weeks their tanker will be taken to anchorage to allow the new crew to take the place of those who do not wish to or cannot continue.
“The captain had an informal conversation with our crew manager, who was trying to persuade the crew to stay on board until we reach the unloading port, but he immediately rejected the idea,” they said.
“I’m not in the right frame of mind to carry out any demanding tasks after all this. It’s the hardest situation I’ve ever been in,” said the seafarer. There is no guarantee they will ever return to sea.
“I’ve worked on oil tankers all my life. Leaving means giving up everything I’ve achieved. But staying in this job means there’s a chance I might have to come back here eventually. I’ll only be able to make that decision a few months after I’m no longer on this tanker. At home,” they said.
Trump news in brief: Melania Trump’s strange distancing from Epstein gets even stranger
It is unclear what specific allegations prompted the First Lady to react publicly – the top US political stories from Thursday 9 April, in brief
The Guardian team
Friday 10 April 2026, 02:53 CEST
Melania Trump stood at a podium in the same room where Donald Trump addressed the nation last week regarding the war in Iran to make an announcement: she “never had a relationship” with the late sex offender Jeffrey Epstein and his accomplice Ghislaine Maxwell.
It was unclear what specific allegations had prompted Melania Trump to respond publicly. The First Lady went on to say that she and the President were invited “from time to time” to the same parties as Epstein, as “overlapping social circles are common in New York City and Palm Beach”.
This claim is contradicted by the fact that the most well-known photographs of the two couples together were taken at Trump’s own club, Mar-a-Lago, on 12 February 2000.
Adding to the confusion surrounding the motives behind the First Lady’s statement are reports that the President told reporters he had no idea his wife was going to make this statement. A spokesperson for the First Lady initially told for the New York Times that the President knew his wife intended to make a statement. That report was later updated to state that the spokesperson “later said it was unclear whether Mr Trump was aware of the subject of her remarks”.
Melania Trump says she did not have a relationship with Jeffrey Epstein
US congressional leaders have seized on the First Lady’s call for Congress to take sworn testimony from Epstein’s victims at a public hearing.
“We agree with First Lady Melania Trump’s call for a public hearing with Jeffrey Epstein’s survivors,” said Robert Garcia of California, a senior member of the House Oversight Committee. “We encourage Chairman Comer to respond to the First Lady’s request and schedule a public hearing immediately.”
US judge rules Pentagon defied his order on press access
A federal judge ruled on Thursday that the Pentagon had failed to comply with a March order that struck down much of a new restrictive press accreditation policy implemented by the Department of Defence and ordered the return of press credentials to seven New York Times reporters.
Exclusive: US defence official overseeing AI made millions from selling xAI shares after the Pentagon struck a deal with the company
A senior US Department of Defence official, who oversees the agency’s efforts in the field of artificial intelligence, made a profit of up to $24 million from the sale of a private investment he held in Elon Musk’s AI company earlier this year, according to government ethics records published this month. The value of his stake stood at a maximum of $1 million when he joined the department.
George Clooney describes Donald Trump’s threat to Iran – “an entire civilisation will die tonight” – as a war crime
The long-running war of words between George Clooney and the White House has flared up again after the Oscar-winning actor criticised Trump’s threat against Iran that “an entire civilisation will die tonight”.
On Wednesday, in a speech to an audience of 3,000 high school students in Cuneo, Italy, Clooney claimed that the US president had committed a war crime with his threat.
Republicans block Democrats’ efforts to limit Trump’s war powers over Iran
An attempt by Democrats in the House of Representatives on Thursday to pass a resolution with little chance of success to limit Trump’s war powers over Iran failed after the pro forma Republican Speaker, Chris Smith, failed to recognise the presence in the chamber of MPs from the opposing party.
What else happened today:
- A man in California who was shot by US immigration agents has claimed that officials wrongly accused him of being a gang member and that officers fired at him without justification during a roadside stop.
California authorities have filed criminal charges against 21 people, whom they say orchestrated a palliative care fraud scheme that cost the state $267 million, State Attorney General Rob Bonta announced on Thursday.The Democratic National Committee’s Resolutions Committee voted on Thursday to reject a measure targeting the pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC and deferred two other resolutions on Middle East policy to a working group that critics say exists primarily to avoid difficult decisions.Cuba’s foreign minister accused the United States of “blackmailing” Latin American countries by pressuring them to cancel decades-old agreements with Havana on the provision of doctors.
- The US Environmental Protection Agency proposed on Thursday a relaxation of rules on the safe disposal of ash from coal combustion. These regulations were tightened under the Biden administration as part of a wider campaign to tackle pollution from coal-fired power stations.
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/09/trump-news-at-a-glance-latest-updates-today
Developments in the war in Ukraine over the last 24 hours – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 24 hours, available data indicates a series of air strikes and concrete military actions carried out by Russia and Ukraine, with no major territorial changes but with an impact on infrastructure and civilian areas.
Russia has launched a new wave of drone attacks on Ukrainian territory, particularly in the south and east. In the Odessa region, drones struck an electrical substation, causing significant damage and power cuts in several towns. Meanwhile, attacks were also reported in the regions of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia, where energy infrastructure and industrial areas were targeted. In Sloviansk, strikes on urban areas were recorded, and in Kherson, drone attacks on local infrastructure and residential areas continued. In Sumy, the authorities reported new explosions following air strikes.
During this period, Russia also attacked Ukrainian port infrastructure on the Danube. In the port of Izmail, one of Ukraine’s main logistics hubs, drones damaged port facilities and a civilian vessel moored at the quay. This type of attack directly affects Ukrainian trade flows and exports.
On the ground, clashes continued in eastern Ukraine. In the Pokrovsk area, intense fighting was reported, with repeated Russian attacks on Ukrainian positions. In the direction of Hulyaipole, clashes took place between units of both sides, with no significant changes to the front line. Overall, over 100 armed clashes have been reported along the contact line in the last 24 hours.
As for Ukraine’s actions, it has continued deep strikes against Russian infrastructure. Energy and logistics facilities, including refineries and oil terminals, have been targeted. Among the targets affected in recent days and relevant to this period are the NORSI refinery, terminals in Ust-Luga and infrastructure in the Novorossiysk port area. These attacks have led to the temporary shutdown or reduced activity of certain facilities.
Regarding the use of drones, Ukraine has reported the destruction of a large number of Russian drones, including massive interceptions overnight. At the same time, Ukraine continues to use drones for attacks on Russian infrastructure deep within its territory.
In terms of officially reported losses, Ukraine has indicated that over the last day approximately 1,040 Russian troops were killed, as well as the destruction of dozens of artillery systems and over 2,000 tactical and operational drones. These figures come from official Ukrainian sources and cannot be independently verified in real time.
No major territorial advances have been reported in the last 24 hours by either Russia or Ukraine. The front line has remained generally stable, with fighting concentrated in the east and south-east.
In summary, the last 24 hours have included:
– Russian drone attacks on energy and urban infrastructure in Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Sloviansk, Kherson and Sumy
– strikes on the port of Izmail and Danube infrastructure
– over 100 clashes along the front line, particularly in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole areas
– Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure (NORSI, Ust-Luga, Novorossiysk)
– intensive use of drones by both sides
Maritime Security Forum
Vladimir Putin announces an Orthodox Easter ceasefire with Ukraine
The Kremlin proposes a 32-hour ceasefire starting on Saturday afternoon – Ukraine is expected to accept the plan
Reuters
Thursday, 9 April 2026, 22:23 CEST
Vladimir Putin has declared a 32-hour ceasefire in Ukraine over the Orthodox Easter weekend, following an earlier call by Volodymyr Zelenskyy for a pause.
The presidential decree, published by the Kremlin on Thursday, orders Russian forces to observe a ceasefire from 4 pm on Saturday until the end of Sunday.
Zelenskyy proposed earlier this week that each side cease attacks on the other’s energy infrastructure during the holiday, stating that he had made this offer via the US, which has been mediating talks between delegations from Moscow and Kyiv as Russia’s invasion enters its fifth year.
There was no immediate reaction from Kyiv to Putin’s announcement.
Previous attempts to secure a ceasefire have had little or no impact. Putin unilaterally declared a 30-hour ceasefire last Easter, but each side accused the other of violating it.
The Kremlin’s statement announcing the ceasefire reads: “Orders have been issued for this period to cease hostilities in all directions”, adding: “Troops must be prepared to counter any possible provocations by the enemy, as well as any aggressive actions.”
“We assume that the Ukrainian side will follow the Russian Federation’s example,” the statement notes.
Russia effectively rejected the 30-day unconditional ceasefire proposed last year by the US and Ukraine as a step towards peace, insisting instead on a comprehensive settlement, but Moscow has announced several short-lived and unilateral ceasefires.
US-led talks have made no progress on key issues, and Washington’s attention has shifted to the conflict in the Middle East, whilst Russian and Ukrainian forces remain locked in combat along a front line of approximately 800 miles (1,250 km).
Overview of the war in Ukraine: First official ceasefire agreed after Zelenskyy’s initiative succeeded
Vladimir Putin presents the Easter truce as Russia’s idea, but the Ukrainian president has made repeated offers. What we know on day 1,507
Warren Murray with Guardian editors and news agencies
Friday 10 April 2026, 02:32 CEST
- Ukraine and Russia appeared to be on the brink of what could be their first official theatre-level ceasefire since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, after Vladimir Putin accepted Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s concerted offers for a pause in hostilities to mark Orthodox Easter, which is celebrated this weekend. The 32-hour ceasefire was due to begin on Saturday afternoon.
- Zelenskyy responded on Friday morning: “Ukraine has repeatedly stated that we are ready for reciprocal measures. We have proposed a ceasefire during this year’s Easter celebrations and will act accordingly… People need an Easter free from threats and a real step towards peace, and Russia has the chance not to resume attacks even after Easter.”
- The Kremlin has attempted to present the initiative as its own: “We assume that the Ukrainian side will follow the Russian Federation’s example,” a statement said. “Orders have been issued for this period of cessation of hostilities in all directions.” Russia has, however, left itself a loophole for continuing military action: “Troops must be prepared to counter any possible provocations by the enemy, as well as any aggressive actions,” the Kremlin statement said.
- Previously, during the full-scale war, there had been only unofficial, vaguely defined and sporadically observed ceasefires; or localised ceasefires to allow for surrenders, prisoner exchanges, the handover of bodies or the evacuation of civilians from the front line. In March 2025, a limited ‘energy ceasefire’ was declared, intended to halt attacks on oil, gas and electricity facilities, as well as maritime targets. Moscow – although it had rejected numerous previous ceasefire initiatives accepted by Ukraine – also attempted to declare a unilateral ceasefire, for example to allow Russia to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Second World War.
Given the Trump administration’s repeated and prolonged courtship of Putin, which has yielded no results over the past year, the Easter truce appears to have taken place with minimal US involvement, as the US president and his officials remained preoccupied with the war with Iran and their own fragile truce. Zelenskyy has stated in recent days that he has conveyed his ceasefire offers to Russia via the US. Reuters reported that, according to its sources, Putin’s special envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, was in the US on Thursday. Putin may be seeking a respite, as successful Ukrainian attacks have dealt a heavy blow to Russia’s oil export industry, which generates revenue for the war; whilst Ukraine itself is grappling with the impact of Russian attacks on its civilian energy grid.
Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) said on Thursday that a former freelance contributor to Radio Free Europe had been detained in the city of Chita on charges of treason, the Russian news agency Tass reported. The FSB said the man, whose name was not disclosed, had been charged with treason for cooperating with Ukraine. In Moscow, the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta said that masked security service agents raided its offices on Thursday and barred lawyers from entering. The state news agency RIA quoted law enforcement officials as saying the raid was linked to an investigation into the illegal use of personal data.The UK and its allies, including Norway, have deployed warships to prevent any attacks on undersea cables and pipelines, as Russian submarines surrounded them earlier this year, according to the UK’s Defence Minister, John Healey. The UK has accused Russia of conducting a covert operation in the Far North maritime region, which is home to key shipping routes and critical infrastructure, such as undersea cables. “To President Putin I say: we are watching you. We can see your activity on our cables and pipelines, and you must know that any attempt to damage them will not be tolerated and will have serious consequences,” said Healey. The Russian Embassy in London stated that Healey’s claim was “impossible to believe or verify… Russia does not threaten the undersea infrastructure, which is of critical importance to the UK. Nor do we use aggressive rhetoric in this regard.”
A poll shows that most Hungarians want better relations with the EU, after years of criticism of Brussels by Orbán
Exclusive: A poll published a few days before the elections in which the anti-EU prime minister risks being ousted from power after 16 years
Jon Henley, Europe correspondent
Thursday, 9 April 2026, 14:03 CEST

After years of relentless attacks on the EU by their nationalist and illiberal prime minister, an overwhelming majority of Hungarian voters support the country’s membership of the bloc, and most – including many of Viktor Orbán’s own supporters – now want a new approach to Brussels.
A few days before the elections in which Orbán, who has consistently described the EU as an enemy of the Hungarian people, risks being ousted after 16 years in power, a poll has revealed a strong desire to recalibrate the country’s relations with the bloc.
The poll, conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) think tank, found that 77% of voters support EU membership; three-quarters of respondents “trust” the bloc; and 68% want at least some degree of change in Hungary’s commitment to the EU.
Orbán has clashed with Brussels – which has suspended billions of euros in funding – over a wide range of policies, including justice, migration, LGBTQ+ rights and aid for Ukraine, which, alongside sanctions against Russia, he has consistently blocked.
EU leaders have largely refrained from commenting on Sunday’s vote to avoid accusations that they were trying to influence it, but Orbán’s status as an icon of the far right in Europe and beyond makes the election the most important for the bloc this year.
Whilst the desire for change was strongest (91%) among supporters of Péter Magyar, the centre-right candidate whose Tisza party leads Orbán’s Fidesz by a double-digit margin in recent polls, nearly half (45%) of Fidesz voters also wanted a reset.
A majority of Fidesz voters also stated that they support Hungary remaining in the EU (65%) and that they ‘trust’ the bloc (64%), whilst a significant minority (43%, compared to 66% of the total population) even supported Hungary joining the eurozone.
Is this the end of Viktor Orbán in Hungary?
The poll revealed “a Hungary different from the one Orbán presents to Europe and his friends around the world”, suggesting that the next government would have a mandate to adopt a “very different approach” to relations with the EU, the authors said.
“The poll shows that the majority of Hungarians do not share their prime minister’s view of the EU as an enemy, nor do they consistently align with his other preferences and grievances,” said ECFR researchers Piotr Buras and Pawel Zerka.
However, the survey suggested that domestic issues, rather than the EU, were the key factor for many voters. When asked to indicate the main reason for their choice, 40% of voters in Tisza replied “the desire for change”; 27% of Fidesz voters replied “peace and security”.
When asked to choose from a list of the most important issues they believed Hungary was facing, the majority of voters in Tisza opted for corruption and governance (31%), public services (18%) and the cost of living and inflation (17%). Fidesz voters chose energy security (22%) and the cost of living and inflation (20%).
The poll, conducted between 26 March and 1 April, also showed that whilst Orbán’s combative and disruptive approach to relations with the EU failed to mobilise his voters, his anti-Ukraine rhetoric appears to have had a stronger impact.
The poll revealed that Tisza voters clearly differed from Fidesz supporters in viewing Ukraine primarily as a ‘partner’ of Hungary rather than an ‘adversary’, but they shared the latter’s scepticism regarding future financial aid for Kyiv and Ukraine’s bid to join the EU.
Although a majority (57%) of voters in Tisza say they would like a “very different approach” to the war in Ukraine from that of the current government, the poll showed that this does not mean their views on specific policies differ radically from those of Fidesz voters.
Fidesz voters, for example, overwhelmingly reject (85%) providing additional financial support to Kyiv, but voters in Tisza were divided (48% in favour; 45% against). Similarly, 83% of Fidesz supporters oppose Ukraine’s accession to the EU, but voters in Tisza were split 50% to 40%.
Regarding perceptions of Russia, voters from the two camps held radically different views, with only 6% of Fidesz voters perceiving Moscow as an adversary, compared to 40% of Tisza voters. Similar deep divisions were evident on other foreign policy issues.
Overall, the authors stated, although one might expect Budapest – should Tisza emerge victorious – to be more cooperative towards Brussels, there are limits to how constructive Hungary could become as a foreign policy partner, particularly regarding Ukraine.
“Hungary’s EU partners would be wise not to expect a radical change in foreign policy. Old habits may be hard to break [regarding Ukraine], given the potential for division among Tisza voters and generally negative views among Hungarians,” they stated.
The authors also warned that a change of government would first require “putting Hungary’s own house in order”, so European leaders should “work with the new government to establish what the new normal should mean”.
Tensions within NATO and the Conflict with Iran: Perspectives, Conclusions and Implications for Romania – Maritime Security Forum
General context and the positions of NATO and US leaders
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has publicly acknowledged US President Donald Trump’s disappointment with the reaction of NATO allies in the context of the conflict between the US, Israel and Iran. (This disappointment was also highlighted in repeated statements, reflecting the growing tensions between Washington and European capitals, which have called into question the alliance’s traditional solidarity.) In an interview with CNN following his meeting with Trump at the White House, Rutte emphasised that, although some NATO member states had failed to meet their commitments, the majority had contributed as promised, providing logistical support, access to bases, overflights and other forms of assistance. (These contributions, whilst significant for security operations, were not deemed sufficient by the US administration, which called for a higher level of direct military involvement in the Strait of Hormuz region and on NATO’s southern flank.) Nevertheless, Trump expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack of involvement from European allies, reiterating on Truth Social that NATO had not been present when the US needed it. (This public criticism amplified transatlantic anxieties and fuelled discussions about the future of the alliance, with repercussions for NATO’s cohesion and ability to respond to challenges in the Middle East and other sensitive areas.)
Reactions and differences among allies
Despite the ‘frank and open’ discussions between Mark Rutte and Donald Trump, which took place at the White House and were widely reported in the international press, differences persist between the US and its European NATO partners, reflecting the deep-seated tensions affecting the alliance’s cohesion. Several NATO countries, notably Spain, have refused to support the US military campaign against Iran, restricting access for US military aircraft to their bases or refusing to send naval forces to the Strait of Hormuz. These decisions were motivated by a desire to avoid escalating the conflict and to maintain a diplomatic balance between the US, Iran and the other states involved. At the same time, European leaders welcomed the temporary ceasefire between the US and Iran, viewing it as an opportunity to revive regional dialogue, and expressed their intention to help ensure freedom of navigation in the area, but without becoming militarily involved whilst hostilities continue. This position was highlighted in official statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as in statements by the NATO Secretary General and European leaders, who emphasised the importance of a cautious approach and the strengthening of diplomatic cooperation mechanisms.
(Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CNN interviews with Mark Rutte, NATO press releases, international media, the Romanian Diplomatic Institute, the Romanian Academy 2026)
Tensions and threats to transatlantic cohesion
Donald Trump continued to criticise NATO, labelling the alliance a “paper tiger” and threatening to withdraw the United States, against the backdrop of the perception that European allies are not providing sufficient support for US-Israeli operations in Iran (as evidenced by his numerous public statements and posts on the Truth Social platform). This rhetoric has sparked waves of concern among member states, fuelling fears regarding the strength of the transatlantic commitment and the future of NATO, particularly as the US was calling for greater military involvement from its European partners, both in the Strait of Hormuz region and on the alliance’s southern flank.
(sources: NATO press releases, CNN interviews with Mark Rutte, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian Diplomatic Institute, the Romanian Academy 2026).
These tensions have amplified transatlantic anxieties, with effects also felt in debates on other sensitive issues such as the conflict in Ukraine, the dispute over Greenland, or differences regarding the military spending undertaken by each member state (sources: international press, official press releases). Despite assurances conveyed through diplomatic channels by various European and American leaders regarding the continuity of cooperation, uncertainty regarding the US commitment to NATO persists and remains a major issue on Europe’s security agenda.
(sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, Romanian Academy 2026).
Europe’s involvement and the evolution of transatlantic relations
Rutte, regarded as a trusted mediator between Europe and the US, has sought to maintain transatlantic dialogue and cooperation, repeatedly emphasising the importance of strengthening NATO unity and adopting a prudent diplomatic approach. He proposed intensifying cooperation both in the defence industry and on sensitive issues such as Iran and Ukraine, highlighting the need for a united front in the face of global challenges.
(Sources: CNN interviews with Mark Rutte, NATO press releases, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, Romanian Academy 2026)
On the other hand, Trump called on European states, particularly those dependent on oil from the Gulf region, to play an active role in unblocking the Strait of Hormuz, requesting direct military involvement to ensure freedom of navigation and support US-Israeli operations. Europe’s reaction, however, was reserved, with European leaders citing the risk of conflict escalation and the need to maintain a diplomatic balance between the US, Iran and the other states involved; thus, most preferred to offer logistical and diplomatic support, but did not engage in direct military operations.
(Sources: official NATO statements, CNN interviews with Mark Rutte, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian Diplomatic Institute, the Romanian Academy 2026, the international press)
Conclusions
- The conflict with Iran has highlighted the fragility of NATO’s cohesion and the differences in approach between the US and its European allies.
- NATO is facing one of its most difficult periods since its inception, being tested not only by the war in the Middle East, but also by the crisis in Ukraine and disputes over military spending.
- The bellicose rhetoric of American leaders and uncertainty regarding the future of the US commitment to NATO are fuelling transatlantic tensions and heightening the need for unity and dialogue within the alliance.
Implications for Romania
- As a NATO member, Romania must firmly reaffirm its commitment to the alliance’s values and objectives, particularly at a time marked by strategic uncertainty and potential geopolitical realignments. Strengthening cooperation with European and American partners is becoming essential not only for bolstering collective defence, but also for promoting regional stability and a united front against emerging threats. This entails active participation in NATO initiatives, constant dialogue with allies, and the adaptation of national strategies to new security challenges. (Sources: official NATO statements, CNN interviews with Mark Rutte, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, Romanian Academy 2026)
- Any reduction in US commitment to NATO could have direct and significant consequences for Romania’s security, both regionally – particularly in the Black Sea region and in the context of the conflict in Ukraine – and in terms of the country’s energy and economic stability. Romania should be prepared to address these potential vulnerabilities by strengthening its own defence capabilities, intensifying cooperation with other alliance members and developing additional strategic partnerships in the region. (Sources: official NATO statements, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romanian Diplomatic Institute, international press)
- Romania must diversify its energy sources and support European efforts to ensure freedom of navigation and the security of energy routes, including in sensitive regions such as the Strait of Hormuz. In this way, the country reduces its dependence on traditional sources and becomes more resilient in the face of potential energy crises or transport blockages, whilst also contributing to joint European efforts to guarantee energy security at a continental level. (Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NATO press releases, Romanian Academy 2026)
- Romanian diplomacy must play an active and visible role in maintaining NATO’s unity and relevance, promoting dialogue, cooperation and diplomatic solutions rather than military escalation. In the context of current tensions, a balanced diplomatic approach and support for mediation initiatives are essential to avoiding major conflicts and preserving the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance. (Sources: CNN statements with Mark Rutte, NATO press releases, the Romanian Diplomatic Institute, Romanian Academy 2026)
In conclusion, the current tensions within NATO, amplified by the conflict with Iran, represent a major test for transatlantic solidarity. Romania, like the other allies, must be prepared to respond to both security and diplomatic challenges in order to protect its interests and contribute to regional and global stability.
Maritime Security Forum
The UK exposes a covert Russian submarine operation in and around UK waters
The British military has exposed a covert Russian submarine operation in and around UK waters, forcing the vessels to retreat back to Russia.
- The UK exposes the Russian submarine operation in and around British waters.
- British personnel, ships and aircraft were deployed to send a message to President Putin and to keep Britain and our allies safe.
- The operation was part of a Russian bluff, whilst other specialised vessels carried out malicious activities near critical underwater infrastructure.
British aircraft and warships identified a Russian attack submarine entering international waters in the High North several weeks ago and tracked its movements around the clock.
Operational personnel quickly established that the submarine had been deployed as a diversion, and the UK has worked closely with allies – including Norway – to identify and monitor other Russian underwater naval units from the Main Directorate for Offshore Research (known as GUGI) carrying out malicious activities against critical underwater infrastructure elsewhere.
Please see below a declassified image of GIG surface and sub-surface vessels, based at Olenya Guba in Russia.

Declassified image of the Russian base at Olenya Guba.
The UK and its allies launched a campaign of overt actions to ensure that the Russian units knew they were being monitored and were no longer operating covertly as Putin had planned.
Both the GIG units and the Akula-class submarine subsequently withdrew home after failing to complete their operation in secret.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer said:
I am determined to protect the British people from paying the price for Putin’s aggression in their household bills.
That is why we will not shy away from taking action and exposing Russia’s destabilising activities as it seeks to test our resolve.
Our armed forces are among the best in the world, and the British public should have no doubt that this government will do whatever is necessary to defend our national and economic security, wherever in the world it is needed.
Defence Secretary John Healey said:
I wish to pay tribute to the personnel in the UK who have spent many days tracking these Russian submarines in extremely challenging and treacherous conditions. Whilst the eyes of many – understandably – were fixed on the Middle East, our British Armed Forces were simultaneously responding to growing Russian threats to the north of the UK.
Whilst we act to defend our interests and allies in the Middle East, we are addressing the growing threats to NATO in the High North, maintaining strong support for Ukraine and protecting our homeland in the UK.
To Putin, I say this: we see you, we see your activity over our undersea infrastructure. You must know that any attempt to damage it will not be tolerated and would have serious consequences.
Submarine fibre-optic cables are essential for all digital communications, with over 99% of international data traffic, including voice calls and internet data, travelling via submarine cables. This underpins global banking, trade and communications.
Under the cover of events in the Middle East, the Russian attack submarine and several vessels from the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (known as GUGI) entered international waters in the High North.
The Royal Navy deployed a helicopter from HMS St Albans, the RFA Tidespring and a Merlin to track the attack submarine whilst it operated near British territorial waters.
Working alongside RAF P8 aircraft, the submarine was tracked 24/7 in an operation conducted with allies.
As part of the operation, which saw British vessels covering thousands of kilometres, the RAF and the Navy deployed sonobuoys to track the Russian vessels.
Whilst the Russian attack submarine has now headed back towards Russia, the UK has kept both naval vessels and aircraft on standby to respond should the Russian vessels return.
GUGI is Russia’s long-term military programme to develop capabilities to be deployed from specialised surface vessels and submarines, which are intended to monitor underwater infrastructure in peacetime, but then to damage or destroy that infrastructure during a conflict.
The British defence was previously tested by GUGI when the Russian spy ship Yantar sailed near UK waters last year. The ship was tracked by a Royal Navy frigate and RAF aircraft, with lasers being directed at British pilots.
The Yantar is one of the best vessels Russia uses to threaten the UK and our allies. Over the past two years, the UK has seen a 30% increase in Russian vessels threatening UK waters.
This comes as the Royal Navy concludes ten days of intensive operations monitoring Russian warships and a submarine that entered UK waters in the English Channel and the North Sea. HMS Somerset and HMS Mersey, supported by the RFA Tideforce and Wildcat helicopters, tracked the movements of a Russian destroyer, frigate, landing ship and Kilo-class submarine. Royal Navy ships used their powerful range of radars and sensors to track the Russian vessels.
The UK is stepping up its commitment to protecting our critical underwater infrastructure. This includes an additional £100 million to support our vital P8 anti-submarine aircraft.
In line with the recommendations of the Strategic Defence Review, the Atlantic Bastion programme is transforming the Royal Navy’s anti-submarine capabilities – combining autonomous systems and advanced sensors with the Royal Navy’s fleet of warships. The project has already received millions in investment to develop and test innovative technology.
This comes as the government oversees the largest increase in defence spending since the Cold War, reaching 2.6% of GDP by 2027, and with £270 billion of investment in defence during this Parliament.
The UK continues to monitor the situation closely and is working closely with allies to track and deter any activity that threatens British interests
Source: here
Russia’s militarisation of maritime trade: Implications for NATO and the EU – Maritime Security Forum
Analysis of risks, conflict zones and European strategic responses
In recent months, Russia has stepped up its efforts to militarise maritime transport, using pretexts such as the risk of detentions and blockades to legitimise its naval presence, armed convoys and strict control over trade routes. This strategy manifests itself in the escorting of commercial vessels under the pretext of protection against external threats, which effectively shifts civilian shipping into the sphere of military control and transforms trade routes into potential theatres of confrontation. Furthermore, this approach allows Russia to create grey areas of legal ambiguity, complicating the application of international law and providing Moscow with pretexts to portray any inspection or control measure as hostile acts against ‘protected’ transport. Thus, the trend towards militarisation poses a direct challenge to both NATO and the European Union, calling into question the security of critical infrastructure, freedom of navigation in European waters and the stability of the region.
Against the backdrop of these developments, European states are compelled to rapidly adapt their strategic responses, step up monitoring and invest in surveillance and defence technologies, as any hesitation could give Russia the initiative in an increasingly tense maritime context.
Russia’s strategy: From pretext to militarisation
High-ranking Kremlin advisers, such as Nikolai Patrushev, have not only promoted the narrative that the Russian navy’s involvement in escorting commercial vessels is justified by the increased risks to which they are exposed, but have also amplified this rhetoric in public speeches, presenting it as an indispensable measure to protect Russia’s national interests. Strategically, this approach serves both to bolster Russia’s image as a protector of maritime transport and to legitimise the expansion of its military presence along international trade routes. In reality, this practice brings civilian shipping under military control, transforming trade routes into potential theatres of confrontation and escalation, where any incident can be exploited as a pretext for further intervention or for escalating the conflict. In this way, Russia succeeds in creating a climate of uncertainty and tension, in which every commercial vessel becomes a potential point of contention between states, and freedom of navigation is undermined by military logic and legal ambiguity.
From the perspective of NATO and the EU, this deliberate blurring of the line between civilian and military vessels not only complicates the application of international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but also undermines mechanisms for cooperation and risk management in the maritime domain. This creates fertile ground for provocations and divergent interpretations of international norms, allowing Moscow to respond to lawful inspections or control measures with accusations of aggression and to justify, in the eyes of domestic and international public opinion, new military actions or reprisals. In this context, any attempt to monitor or inspect ‘protected’ shipments can be portrayed as a hostile act, and European states find themselves compelled to rapidly adapt their strategic responses, strengthen cooperation and invest heavily in surveillance and defence technologies to prevent the escalation of incidents that would normally be managed through diplomatic or legal channels. This dynamic highlights the vulnerability of critical maritime infrastructure and calls into question the stability of the region, where every misstep can have major consequences for security and freedom of navigation in European waters.
European context: Inspections, sanctions and military responses
Against the backdrop of escalating maritime tensions, European states have implemented a series of rigorous measures to combat violations of the sanctions imposed on Russia. These measures include detailed inspections of vessels deemed suspicious, which not only aim to prevent the illegal transit of goods but also send a firm signal of resolve in the face of attempts to circumvent international norms. For example, the British authorities have detained several vessels in ports, demonstrating their ability to act swiftly and decisively when there are suspicions of non-compliance with sanctions. France’s action in seizing the oil tanker Deyna marked a turning point, highlighting European coordination and the willingness to intervene directly in cases of flagrant violations of the embargo. These interventions did not go unnoticed in Moscow: Russia perceived the inspections and detentions as deliberate provocations, interpreting them as an act of aggression against commercial shipping flying the Russian flag. In response, the Kremlin used these incidents as a pretext to intensify its military presence in sensitive areas around trade routes, whilst also promoting a model of armed escort for ships traversing European maritime spaces. This escalation of control measures and military reactions contributes to heightening a climate of uncertainty and tension, in which every inspection or seizure becomes a potential point of contention between states, amplifying the risk that maritime transport will be transformed into a theatre of strategic confrontation. In this context, the Romanian proverb “where there are many, strength grows” applies perfectly: European cooperation in the face of maritime challenges is essential for maintaining stability and freedom of navigation on the continent’s seas.
NATO, through the Royal Navy and French forces, has demonstrated the capability and readiness to respond swiftly to Russian threats, closely monitoring the movements of suspicious military and commercial vessels.
Key areas of potential conflict
- The Great Belt (Denmark) – a critical point for Baltic transit, with a high risk of blockades and confrontations.
- Øresund – a strait between two NATO states (Denmark/Sweden), exposed to Russian interference.
- Skagerrak and Kattegat – a dangerous area between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, traversed by hundreds of oil tankers annually.
- British waters in the English Channel and the Strait of Dover – a flashpoint following new authorisations for boarding and detention.
- The Western Mediterranean – the spread of the threat beyond the Baltic straits, confirmed by the capture of the Deyna.
Types of likely incidents
The confrontation between Russia and European states in the maritime domain will not resemble the classic naval battles of the past, but will be characterised by a series of unconventional, often ‘dirty’ incidents. These include the forced stopping or escorting of oil tankers, risky manoeuvres between military and commercial vessels, the use of electronic warfare to disrupt communications and navigation, warning shots intended to intimidate, as well as mutual accusations of ‘piracy’ and violations of international norms. Such actions are documented in the recent European context, where detailed inspections and the seizure of suspicious vessels have prompted firm reactions from Russia, which interprets these interventions as deliberate provocations and responds by stepping up its military presence and providing armed escorts for commercial vessels flying the Russian flag. Russia seeks to exploit every inspection or incident to turn the situation into a political and security crisis, amplifying tensions and forcing NATO and the EU to react swiftly and in a coordinated manner. This pattern of provocation is highlighted by cases such as the seizure of the oil tanker Deyna by the French authorities, which has become a benchmark for European coordination and direct intervention in cases of embargo violations. Consequently, Moscow uses these incidents to justify additional military measures in sensitive areas, turning maritime transport into a potential theatre of strategic confrontation. In this climate of uncertainty, NATO and the EU are obliged to respond promptly and in a coordinated manner to avoid escalation and to uphold the supremacy of international law on the continent’s seas. This strategy is reflected in the measures adopted by NATO, such as intensive monitoring of maritime routes and investment in autonomous technologies and advanced sensors for threat detection, as well as in the EU’s efforts to facilitate information sharing, coordinated inspections and the enforcement of sanctions. Consequently, it is not only direct military action but also hybrid warfare, involving elements of intimidation, electronic warfare and orchestrated security crises, that defines the new paradigm of maritime confrontation between Russia and the West. Only through vigilance, cooperation and firm responses can NATO and the EU counter Moscow’s strategy of pressure and intimidation at sea.
NATO and EU involvement: Countermeasures and strategies
From NATO’s perspective, ensuring freedom of navigation and protecting critical underwater infrastructure represent two fundamental pillars of European maritime security, as evidenced by the analysis of incidents in the Baltic Sea and the English Channel. The Strategic Defence Review and the Atlantic Bastion programme are concrete examples of initiatives involving massive investment in autonomous technologies, underwater drones and advanced sensors, designed to enhance detection efficiency and facilitate a rapid response to underwater threats and maritim . These measures are highlighted in the context of recent confrontations in key areas of potential conflict, where NATO has closely monitored maritime routes and intervened promptly in cases of suspected sabotage or breaches of embargoes.
The EU, through common regulations and operational cooperation, plays a vital role in facilitating information sharing, coordinated inspections and the enforcement of sanctions, which significantly limits the manoeuvring space for the Russian shadow fleet and vessels suspected of breaching embargoes. This model of collaboration is illustrated by cases such as the seizure of the oil tanker Deyna by the French authorities, which has become a benchmark for European intervention and rapid coordination in the face of Russian challenges. In this regard, the EU is helping to create a united front against the hybrid tactics employed by Moscow on the continent’s seas.
Additional British investment in P8 submarine hunter aircraft and the increase in the defence budget to 2.6% of GDP from 2027 are evidence of the long-term commitment of the UK and NATO to addressing Russian challenges in the maritime domain. These strategic decisions form part of the broader framework of measures adopted by NATO, which include intensive monitoring of maritime routes, the development of autonomous technologies and the strengthening of interoperability between allies. This creates the conditions for a rapid and coordinated response to unconventional incidents, such as the forced escorting of oil tankers or the use of electronic warfare.
Conclusions: European challenges, risks and responses
Russia’s militarisation of maritime transport poses a direct threat to European security and stability, as evidenced by the numerous recent incidents documented in the Baltic Sea, the English Channel and the Western Mediterranean, where the seizure and forced escort of oil tankers, as well as the use of electronic warfare, have prompted firm responses from NATO and the EU. Moscow’s actions are designed to exploit every inspection or incident to turn the situation into a political and security crisis, amplifying tensions and forcing Western alliances to react swiftly and in a coordinated manner. Consequently, NATO and the EU must respond firmly but in a coordinated manner to prevent escalation and to uphold the primacy of international law on the continent’s seas, as reflected in the measures adopted by NATO for the intensive monitoring of maritime routes and the EU’s investments in intelligence-sharing and coordinated inspections.
It is essential to strengthen interoperability between member states, develop monitoring and protection technologies such as underwater drones and advanced sensors, and maintain a balance between deterrence measures and avoiding unnecessary provocations. The example of the UK, which is investing further in P8 submarine hunter aircraft and increasing its defence budget to 2.6% of GDP from 2027, illustrates a long-term commitment to European maritime security and a response to Russian challenges. In this context, the old Romanian proverb ‘Better safe than sorry’ is more relevant than ever: only through vigilance, cooperation and firmness can NATO and the EU counter Moscow’s strategy of pressure and intimidation at sea, as demonstrated in cases such as the seizure of the oil tanker Deyna by the French authorities, which has become a benchmark for European coordination and direct intervention in cases of embargo violations.
Maritime Security Forum
Rules at Sea between International Law and Force: Current Dilemmas and Future Challenges Maritime Security Forum
A comparative analysis of compliance with UNCLOS by major powers and the implications for European maritime security
A return to the logic of force at sea
We are witnessing a profound and unprecedented reconfiguration of the international maritime space, in which the old rules enshrined in international law – once the fundamental pillar of order and stability on the oceans – are increasingly undermined by actions motivated by ambitions for power, geopolitical strategies and major economic interests. A turbulent era is taking shape, in which diplomatic dialogue and the application of legal norms are giving way to demonstrations of force, gunfire and hybrid tactics, transforming the sea from a space governed by rules into a battlefield for regional and global supremacy. This trend is evident in the recent European context, where unconventional incidents, electronic warfare and the forced escorting of oil tankers are no longer exceptions, but are becoming common tools of geopolitical pressure and destabilisation. Moscow, Beijing and Tehran, each with their own strategies, exploit every regulatory loophole and every ambiguity in treaties to generate crises and test the West’s reaction. Thus, the sea ceases to be a space governed by law, transforming into a theatre of strategic confrontation, where every incident can rapidly escalate into a regional or even global crisis. Against the backdrop of this development, the imperative for NATO and the EU to demonstrate vigilance, cooperation and firmness is growing. Only by strengthening interoperability, investing in advanced technologies – underwater drones, sensors, autonomous platforms – and rapidly coordinating responses to threats can Europe prevent its seas from becoming a permanent arena of uncertainty and conflict. In this new context, every incident, every attack on critical infrastructure or every seizure of a vessel becomes a direct challenge to the international order and a test of the solidarity and effectiveness of collective security mechanisms.

UNCLOS – A fundamental framework and its limitations
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remains the main pillar of the international maritime order, providing a clear and universal framework for the delimitation of state sovereignty, the management of marine resources and the settlement of maritime disputes. UNCLOS establishes the fundamental principle that the sea must be a space governed by legal rules and norms, not by the arbitrariness of force or unfounded historical claims. Thus, states’ rights over territorial waters, exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf are legally determined, and any conflict or dispute must be resolved through arbitration and diplomatic dialogue, not through demonstrations of force.
However, current realities show that this legal framework is increasingly vulnerable to the geopolitical ambitions and aggressive strategies of certain major powers. As reflected in recent European and global developments, states such as Russia, China and Iran are exploiting the ambiguities and limitations of UNCLOS to expand their influence and provoke security crises. Russia, for example, although a party to UNCLOS, has chosen to rewrite the maritime rules in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov by force, whilst China is ignoring international arbitration decisions in the South China Sea, consolidating de facto control through military infrastructure and pressure on its neighbours. Iran, which has not ratified UNCLOS, is turning the Strait of Hormuz into a tool for global pressure.
These developments underscore the fact that, although UNCLOS provides a fundamental framework, the rule of law at sea is being challenged by hybrid tactics, electronic warfare and the seizure of vessels, and every incident becomes a test of NATO and EU solidarity and effectiveness. In this context, the need for vigilance, cooperation and investment in advanced technologies for monitoring and protecting maritime routes is emphasised, as highlighted by the coordinated responses of NATO and the EU to recent challenges in the Baltic Sea, the English Channel and the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, UNCLOS is not merely a set of rules, but a barometer of the balance between law and force on the world’s seas. Current challenges demand not only compliance with the Convention, but also the adaptation of collective security instruments to defend the supremacy of international law against those seeking to turn the sea into a theatre of strategic confrontation.
China, Russia, Iran: Three models of challenging the maritime order
- China – although Beijing is a party to UNCLOS and formally recognises the international legal framework, the application of the rules depends strictly on their compatibility with its strategic interests. In the South China Sea, China has made extensive maritime claims, delineating the so-called ‘nine-dash line’, which contravenes the provisions of UNCLOS and has been explicitly rejected by international arbitration, as in the case of the Philippines v. China (2016). Nevertheless, China refuses to recognise the tribunal’s decision, continuing to consolidate its control over the disputed areas through massive construction of artificial islands, military infrastructure and aggressive naval patrols. In doing so, Beijing is undermining the fundamental principle of UNCLOS – the supremacy of law over historical claims and military pressure – and transforming the sea into a space for displays of force and hybrid tactics. Furthermore, China is using electronic warfare, blockades and intimidation against the fishing and commercial vessels of neighbouring states, constantly testing the reaction of the international community and collective security mechanisms such as NATO and the EU. This behaviour erodes the credibility of international legal norms and amplifies the risk of regional or global crisis, as highlighted by recent developments analysed in the European and global context.
- Russia – although a signatory to UNCLOS and formally recognising the international legal framework – is adopting an increasingly aggressive and overt approach to undermining maritime law, replacing the principles of law with the logic of brute force. A prime example is the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, followed by the unilateral rewriting of maritime rights in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, where Moscow imposes arbitrary navigation restrictions and carries out military actions designed to deter access by Western fleets and intimidate coastal states.
Repeated attacks on Ukrainian ports, the partial blockade of trade routes and direct threats to civilian shipping are turning the European maritime space into a zone of permanent risk, where rules become mere rhetorical tools in the face of a reality dictated by force. This behaviour is not isolated: recent incidents in the Baltic Sea, the English Channel and the Mediterranean demonstrate that Russia exploits every inspection, every ship seizure or act of sabotage to generate security crises, testing both the vigilance and the cohesion of NATO and EU response mechanisms.
By employing hybrid tactics – ranging from electronic warfare and intimidation to false-flag operations – Moscow is not only reshaping the European maritime space but also undermining the primacy of international law, seeking to impose a new normal in which force prevails over rules. Each maritime incident thus becomes a test of the solidarity and effectiveness of the European and Euro-Atlantic collective response, highlighting the vulnerability of the current maritime security system and the need to adapt to new geopolitical realities.
- Iran – has not ratified UNCLOS, which gives it considerable room for manoeuvre on the international maritime stage. This position allows it to exploit ambiguities and avoid the legal constraints governing the behaviour of signatory states. By turning the Strait of Hormuz into a tool for exerting pressure on global maritime traffic, Iran demonstrates how the absence of a formal commitment to international treaties can be used strategically to generate security crises and influence the global flow of energy. Blocking or seizing oil tankers, repeated threats to trade routes and the use of intimidation tactics contribute to the destabilisation of the maritime order, testing the vigilance and cohesion of NATO and the EU. In this way, Iran highlights the vulnerability of the current maritime legal system, where the lack of a common framework encourages the perpetuation of disputes and weakens conflict resolution mechanisms.
Iran’s behaviour, illustrated by repeated incidents in the Strait of Hormuz and international reactions to ship seizures and blockades, underscores the need to update the rules and strengthen international cooperation to protect vital maritime routes.
The role of non-signatory actors and the vulnerability of the system
States such as the United States and Turkey, although they have not ratified UNCLOS, largely adhere to the rules established by the Convention, which allows them to participate in the international dialogue on maritime security and to uphold the principles of freedom of navigation and the protection of trade routes. However, the absence of a formal commitment creates systemic vulnerabilities, particularly in disputed areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, where the lack of a common framework encourages the perpetuation of territorial disputes, the intensification of tensions and weakens conflict resolution mechanisms. This situation has been highlighted by repeated incidents between Turkey and Greece regarding the delimitation of exclusive economic zones and by the difficulty in coordinating the response to regional security challenges. This analysis is based on the context of recent maritime incidents and the measures adopted by NATO and the EU, as set out in the documentary sources of the Maritime Security Forum and in studies on the evolution of international law of the sea.

The evolution of maritime confrontation: technology, hybrid warfare and new threats
The current maritime confrontation diverges radically from the classic model based on massive fleets, evolving towards a paradigm in which technology and hybrid warfare play central roles. Today, strategic advantage is no longer determined solely by the tonnage of ships or the number of aircraft carriers, but by the integration of advanced technologies such as underwater and aerial drones, precision-guided missiles, autonomous platforms and surveillance systems with smart sensors. These tools enable extensive monitoring of maritime routes, rapid identification of threats and effective response to incidents, transforming the seas into a space for rapid manoeuvres and strikes against critical infrastructure. Maritime areas can be kept under constant pressure from cyberattacks, electronic jamming and hostile actions against ports or undersea pipelines, without the need for formal occupation of the territory. Russia, for example, has employed these tactics in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, imposing arbitrary navigation restrictions, sabotaging energy infrastructure and testing the cohesion of NATO and EU response mechanisms. China, for its part, has consolidated its control over disputed areas in the South China Sea through the construction of artificial islands, aggressive naval patrols and electronic warfare, undermining the supremacy of international law and turning the sea into a space for intimidation and demonstrations of force. This hybrid warfare, exemplified by the tactics of Russia and China, calls for an urgent adaptation of monitoring rules and tools. Recent measures adopted by NATO and the EU – such as investments in autonomous technologies, intensified maritime inspections and increased defence budgets – reflect the need to strengthen international cooperation and update the legal framework, so that the sea remains a space governed by rules, not by force. This analysis is based on the context of recent maritime incidents and the Maritime Security Forum’s documentary studies, highlighting the vulnerability of the current system and the urgent need for innovative solutions to protect critical infrastructure and vital trade routes.
Challenges for Europe: a coordinated response, advanced technologies and the rule of law
Faced with these complex challenges, NATO and the European Union have responded with a series of decisive measures designed to counter hybrid tactics and strengthen European maritime security. Substantial investment in autonomous technologies, such as underwater drones, unmanned aerial platforms and advanced sensors, enables real-time monitoring of maritime routes, rapid identification of threats and the protection of critical infrastructure, from ports to undersea pipelines. The example of the seizure of the oil tanker Deyna, alongside the intensification of maritime inspections and the significant increase in the British defence budget, highlights not only Europe’s commitment to upholding the supremacy of international law, but also its ability to adapt to new geopolitical realities. These actions are supported by studies and analyses from the Maritime Security Forum, which emphasise the importance of transatlantic cooperation and updating the legal framework to prevent the destabilisation of the maritime order. Thus, the NATO and EU strategy demonstrates that the sea can remain a space governed by rules, not by force, if vigilance, technology and European solidarity are constantly cultivated and adapted.
Conclusions: The need for a new maritime pact and the updating of rules
International maritime law is a living, ever-evolving body of law that adapts to geopolitical pressures, technological developments and the dynamics of regional conflicts. Recent events in the Strait of Hormuz, the Black Sea and the South China Sea have demonstrated that traditional rules can no longer effectively address current challenges, as they are often circumvented or reinterpreted by states that do not sign or comply with UNCLOS. Thus, the lack of a common framework encourages the perpetuation of disputes, the intensification of tensions and weakens conflict resolution mechanisms, as highlighted in the analyses of the Maritime Security Forum and in studies on the evolution of international law of the sea. To prevent chaos and the escalation of conflicts, it is imperative that the rules be updated and adapted to new realities, and that international cooperation be strengthened through dialogue and coordinated action. NATO and the European Union have responded by investing in autonomous technologies, stepping up maritime inspections and increasing defence budgets, demonstrating that the sea can remain a space governed by rules, not by force, only if vigilance, solidarity and a prompt response are constantly cultivated.
The fundamental principle of UNCLOS – the sea as a space governed by rules – must be firmly protected, and the old Romanian proverb “Better safe than sorry” proves more relevant than ever. It underscores the importance of constant vigilance, close cooperation and a firm response from the international community to counter the strategy of intimidation and pressure employed by major powers and to ensure the security of vital maritime routes.
This analysis is based on the context of recent maritime incidents and the measures adopted by NATO and the EU, as set out in the documentary sources of the Maritime Security Forum and in studies on the evolution of international law of the sea.
Maritime Security Forum
The Russians carried out 11 attacks on Ukraine’s port infrastructure in the first three months of 2026 – Maritime Security Forum
These attacks focused on strategic ports such as Odessa, Chornomorsk and Mykolaiv, where the bombardments targeted both grain loading terminals and fuel depots and logistics facilities. In particular, the port of Odessa was struck several times, leading to a temporary halt in exports and an increase in shipping costs. Furthermore, the attacks on port infrastructure also affected commercial vessels, some of which were forced to divert to alternative ports in Romania or Bulgaria to avoid the risks in the conflict zone.
In January–March alone, Russian troops attacked Ukrainian ports almost as much as they did throughout the whole of 2025. This escalation demonstrates the intensification of hybrid warfare, in which economic infrastructure becomes a direct target of military action. For example, in February 2026, a drone attack on the port of Chornomorsk caused massive fires and significant damage to grain silos, affecting Ukraine’s ability to supply agricultural products to international markets.
This was stated by the Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine, Volodymyr Lepushinsky, in an interview with Interfax-Ukraine, reports usm.media.
“The tactics of the bombardments have changed: from massive strikes on the energy sector, the enemy has moved on to more targeted strikes on logistics and port infrastructure. The number of such strikes has increased significantly: in the first three months of 2026, there were 11 attacks on port infrastructure – that is just two fewer strikes than in the whole of 2025 and seven fewer than in the whole of 2024,” said Lepushynsky.
A relevant example is the March 2026 attack on the port of Mykolaiv, where Russian missiles destroyed part of the iron ore loading facilities, causing major delays in exports and significant economic losses. Furthermore, the bombardments of ports coincided with attacks on railway infrastructure, creating a domino effect on national logistics.
The deputy head of the NBU also noted that Russia is targeting the railway network, with a peak recorded in March – 21 attacks on railway infrastructure, compared to 13 in January and 18 in February. These actions targeted transport hubs such as Zaporizhia and Dnipro, temporarily paralysing freight train traffic and disrupting the delivery of goods to ports. Thus, the Russian attacks form part of a strategy to disrupt the entire Ukrainian logistics chain, with a direct impact on export capacity and economic stability.
The bombings have affected exports from ports. According to Lepushinsky, the greatest negative impact was in the fourth quarter of 2025 – approximately $150 million in iron ore exports and $700 million in grain exports. These figures reflect not only direct losses but also the additional costs generated by rerouting transport, extra insurance and increased port tariffs in safe areas. Specific examples include cancelled or postponed export contracts, as well as difficulties in maintaining a steady flow of goods to European and Asian markets.
“In the first quarter of 2026, there were losses, but the scale is much smaller due to the relatively rapid restoration of logistics. We consider these losses to be temporary and expect exports to recover during 2026, provided that security risks do not lead to the critical destruction of maritime logistics facilities. “Despite the fact that the enemy is systematically attacking port infrastructure, attempting to destroy our export potential, the pace of recovery is rapid,” added Lepushinsky. This optimism is based on the rapid adaptation of port operators and the international support provided to Ukraine, including through the supply of modern surveillance equipment and emergency repairs to infrastructure.
Conclusions
The Russian attacks on Ukraine’s port and rail infrastructure in 2026 are a clear example of hybrid warfare, in which the economy and logistics become strategic targets for destabilising the Ukrainian state. Although the losses are significant, the capacity for rapid recovery and international cooperation enable Ukraine to maintain export flows and limit the long-term impact. It is essential that European states and NATO partners continue their support, and that the old Romanian proverb “Better safe than sorry” be applied through strengthened surveillance and coordinated response. For further details and sources, see the interview with the Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine in Interfax-Ukraine and the analyses by the Maritime Security Forum. usm.media.
Maritime Security Forum
UK deploying military forces to deter Russian submarines – Defence Minister – Maritime Security Forum
In recent months, the UK has significantly stepped up measures to protect its strategic underwater infrastructure in response to an alarming increase in Russian submarine activity in the vicinity of British territorial waters. The British armed forces have been mobilised to prevent potential attacks on telecommunications cables and energy pipelines, which are essential to the functioning of the economy and national security. For around a month, Russian submarines were under constant surveillance, and specialist Royal Navy units, alongside P8 patrol aircraft, were deployed to intercept and deter any hostile intentions.
This was stated by the country’s Defence Minister, John Gili, in an interview with Radio Liberty, emphasising the importance of vigilance and international cooperation in the context of increasingly complex hybrid threats. Radio
Minister Gili noted that, whilst public attention was focused on developments in the Middle East, the British military, alongside allies such as Norway, responded firmly to the intensification of Russian submarine activity. These operations were not only aimed at surveillance, but also at rapid intervention to prevent any potential sabotage of underwater infrastructure. A concrete example is the patrol missions carried out by P8 Poseidon aircraft, which detected and tracked the movements of ‘Shark’-class submarines and those of the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), known for their ability to operate at great depths and to interfere with submarine cables.
Gili emphasised that the Russian operation involved both attack submarines and vessels specialised in research and sabotage, indicating a sophisticated hybrid warfare strategy. These vessels are not only used for espionage but can also be deployed to damage underwater infrastructure, which could have devastating consequences for the communications and energy supply of the United Kingdom and Europe as a whole.
To counter these threats, not only naval forces but also modern surveillance and analysis systems, such as satellites and maritime drones, have been deployed, enabling continuous monitoring of vulnerable areas. The Minister highlighted that “any malicious activity” had been identified and neutralised in time, preventing potential incidents that would have seriously affected strategic infrastructure.
“I am making this statement to expose this Russian activity, and to President Putin I say: ‘We can see you. We can see your activities regarding our cables and our pipelines, and you should know that any attempt to damage them will not be tolerated and will have serious consequences,’ the British minister stated firmly, issuing a clear warning to Moscow.
Following these measures, the Russian submarines left British waters and headed north, and the authorities confirmed that no signs of damage to the underwater infrastructure had been recorded. This swift response demonstrates the effectiveness of defence mechanisms and the close cooperation between NATO allies in the face of hybrid threats.
Threats to underwater infrastructure are not an isolated phenomenon. Last October, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, warned that Europe is the target of a hybrid war, explicitly mentioning the damage caused to submarine cables near certain European countries. These incidents highlight the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and the need for a coordinated defence at the continental level.
Relevant examples and regional context
The situation in the UK is part of a broader context in which hybrid attacks on infrastructure have become a recurring tactic. As the example of Ukraine, presented in the previous context, shows, port and rail infrastructure has been systematically targeted, causing major economic losses and logistical disruptions. In Ukraine, drone and missile attacks on ports such as Chornomorsk and Mykolaiv have affected grain and ore exports, whilst the bombing of railways has temporarily paralysed freight transport, disrupting deliveries to international markets.
Conclusions
The monitoring and deterrence operations carried out by the UK are an example of a prompt and effective response to Russian hybrid threats. International cooperation, advanced technology and the rapid adaptation of defence strategies are essential for protecting critical infrastructure, both at national and European level. It is vital that NATO and EU member states continue to invest in infrastructure security, strengthening surveillance and coordinated responses to any attempts at sabotage.
For further details and sources, see the interview with British Defence Minister John Gili on Radio Liberty, as well as the analyses by the Maritime Security Forum and the official statements from the European Commission. Radio
Maritime Security Forum
France to double penalties for ‘shadow fleet’ vessels – Maritime Security Forum
Against a backdrop of geopolitical tension, France intends to significantly tighten penalties for owners and operators of vessels flying false flags or ignoring orders from authorities to stop. This decision comes in response to the intensification of activities by the Russian “shadow fleet”, which is involved in illegal transport and evading international sanctions.
According to a report published by France24, cited by European Pravda, the draft amendment to the law on military planning provides for a doubling of existing penalties. The measure aims not only to deter ships engaging in these illegal practices, but also to strengthen maritime security at European level.
A source close to the legislative process stated that the increase in penalties is intended to strengthen the fight against Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, which uses ships flying false flags to circumvent restrictions imposed by the European Union and the United Kingdom.
Thus, under the new provisions, offenders could face up to two years’ imprisonment and fines of €300,000, double the current amount. The sanctions will apply to any person who has control over or exercises authority over the vessel’s operation, with the aim of holding decision-makers and operators directly accountable.
Furthermore, if the lives of those on board the vessel are endangered, penalties could reach seven years’ imprisonment and fines of €700,000, reflecting the seriousness of the risks posed by these illegal activities.
The French Parliament is set to vote on this bill by 14 July, a symbolic date for France marking National Day, which underscores the strategic importance of this decision for the security of the country and the continent.
The legislative discussions are taking place against a backdrop of increasing cases of vessels suspected of belonging to Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ being detained. Since September, France has already detained three such vessels, signalling an intensification of efforts to combat illegal trafficking at sea.
A recent example is the capture of the Russian oil tanker Boracay, whose Chinese captain was sentenced to one year in prison after the vessel was intercepted last year by the French fleet off the coast of Brittany.
On 22 January, with the support of the UK, France detained the oil tanker Grinch off the coast of Spain, after documents were checked confirming suspicions regarding the use of a false flag. This vessel is part of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ and is subject to sanctions imposed by the EU and the UK.
On 20 March, the French authorities, again with British support, detained the vessel Deyna in the Mediterranean Sea, which also belongs to Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tankers.
Conclusions
The tightening of sanctions proposed by France represents a decisive step in combating illegal shipping networks, particularly those associated with Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’. Strict measures, such as doubling prison sentences and fines, could deter ship operators from resorting to fraudulent practices and endangering the lives of crews or European security. At the same time, international cooperation, exemplified by the UK’s support, demonstrates that the problem transcends national borders, and the response must be firm and coordinated. Ultimately, the adoption of this legislation will send a clear message: ‘Where there is law, there is no room for negotiation’, and safety at sea remains a priority for Europe.
The main sources for this information include the France24 report and the European Pravda analysis, which detailed the legislative process and recent cases of the detention of vessels involved in illegal activities.
Maritime Security Forum
Ukrainian ports will be reorganised into companies, replacing the old model of state-owned enterprises – Maritime Security Forum
The process of reorganising Ukrainian ports marks a significant change in the management of the country’s maritime infrastructure. According to an order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, approved by the Ministry of Community and Territorial Development, several state-owned enterprises of strategic importance to the national economy and logistics will be transformed into companies, with the aim of streamlining management and increasing transparency.usm.media
Among the entities affected by this reorganisation are seven Ukrainian ports, which have played a crucial role in the country’s maritime trade and transport. The government’s decision reflects the need to adapt to the current economic context and the logistical challenges arising from the geopolitical situation.
This initiative is highlighted in specialist media outlets, such as usm.media, which has reported in detail on the reorganisation process, emphasising the authorities’ agreement on the transformation of these enterprises. usm.media
The reform aims to change the management structure of these companies so that key ports become limited liability companies, with the Ukrainian state as the sole shareholder. This approach allows for more flexible management, whilst the state retains full control over port assets and operations.
The key focus of the changes is the port industry, given that ports are strategic hubs for exports, imports and the movement of essential goods. The transformation of these ports into limited liability companies is intended to ensure better resource management and facilitate the attraction of investment, whilst maintaining state involvement and oversight. usm.media
The list of ports that will undergo this process includes: “Mykolaiv Commercial Seaport”, “Odessa Commercial Seaport”, “Valy Commercial Seaport”, “Mariupol Commercial Seaport”, “Reni Commercial Seaport”, “Izmail Commercial Seaport” and “Pivanny Commercial Seaport”. These ports are vital for the flow of goods and for Ukraine’s logistical stability. usm.media
In addition to the ports, the reorganisation process also covers the State Research Institute of Construction Structures, highlighting the focus on modernising and streamlining operations in transport and infrastructure-related sectors. usm.media
It is important to note that, throughout the reorganisation, the state will retain ownership and control of the assets, thereby ensuring the maintenance of security and the national interest. This is essential in an unstable geopolitical context, where port infrastructure may become the target of attacks or external pressure. usm.media
Conclusions
The reorganisation of Ukrainian ports and their transformation into limited liability companies represents a strategic move, aimed at increasing the transparency, efficiency and resilience of the maritime sector. By maintaining state control over assets, Ukraine ensures that critical infrastructure remains under the supervision of the authorities, protecting national interests and facilitating adaptation to regional and global challenges. Furthermore, this reform offers the opportunity to attract investors and stimulate economic development without compromising national security. The main sources detailing the legislative process and reorganisation include the usm.media report and information presented by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
Through this reorganisation, Ukraine is preparing its ports for better times and future challenges, strengthening its position on the international maritime transport scene.
Maritime Security Forum
Portugal’s new multi-purpose vessel launched in Romania
The Portuguese Navy’s Multifunctional Naval Platform João II (A5209) for unmanned platforms was launched at Damen’s Galati shipyard in Romania.
Dutch shipbuilder Damen has announced the launch of the João II multi-purpose vessel for the Portuguese Navy, which will carry various unmanned platforms, including UAVs, SUVs and UUVs.

The vessel was built at the Galati shipyard in Romania.
The D. João II, measuring 107 metres in length, features a flight deck to accommodate helicopters and VTOL/catapult-launched UAVs, as well as potentially smaller tactical UAVs.
The vessel is based on Damen’s Multipurpose Support Ship (MPSS) line, which ranges from 7,000 to 9,000 tonnes displacement. The MPSS is one of the concepts for a new type of vessel that has gained attention from various navies around the world as a ‘wild card’ for support and low-intensity missions.
The MPSS and similar concepts from other firms (Turkish STM, British Steller Systems, German NVL Group…) combine various capabilities to varying degrees with a fairly modular layout, thanks to a wide and tall beam in relation to the length. The large hangar volume allows for various internal configurations for patrol, anti-submarine warfare, and mine countermeasures missions; or non-combat duties, such as logistical support and medical support.
Source: here
The French Navy further expands its CAMCOPTER® S-100 fleet
Vienna, 9 April 2026: The French Navy, through the French Defence Procurement and Technology Agency (Direction Générale de l’Armement, DGA) and Naval Group, has ordered five additional CAMCOPTER® S-100 systems as part of the Navy’s unmanned aviation programme. Naval Group, as prime contractor and lead systems integrator, will deploy and integrate the systems on the European Multi-Mission Frigates (FREMM), including mission management via the Steeris® MS system.

Each system consists of two CAMCOPTER® S-100 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), bringing the French Navy’s total fleet to eight S-100 systems once deliveries are complete. The systems will be delivered progressively, starting in 2026.
The French Navy has operated and deployed the CAMCOPTER® S-100 globally at sea since 2012, when the system was first fully integrated on board the Gowind-class offshore patrol vessel L’Adroit. In 2019, it was integrated onto the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship Dixmude, marking the first operational integration of a rotary-wing Unmanned Aerial System (SUAS) into a European Naval Combat Management System (CMS). In 2020, the French Navy expanded its capabilities with the acquisition of two additional S-100 systems, deployed aboard the Mistral and Tonnerre.
The CAMCOPTER® S-100 provides maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and is operated from naval vessels without the need for launch or recovery equipment. Its compact footprint and proven performance allow for flexible deployment across a wide range of missions and different classes of ships.
The French Navy was among the first European navies to integrate the CAMCOPTER® S-100 operationally into its naval operations. “This follow-on order reflects the system’s capabilities, as well as the maturity and confidence placed in its performance at sea. We are proud to continue supporting the French Navy with a proven and operationally deployed VTOL UAS,” said Lubos Sramek, director of Schiebel Aéronaval SAS in Toulon.
Source: here
Alert over the Persian Gulf: US Navy MQ-4C Triton drone declares emergency and disappears from tracking sites
A US strategic maritime reconnaissance drone, en route to NAS Sigonella, experienced a severe anomaly during flight before disappearing from tracking screens.

In the last few hours, open-source intelligence (OSINT) flight tracking systems have recorded an abnormal and potentially critical event in the skies around the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The aircraft involved is a US Navy Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton (reg. 169804, c/s VVPE804).
The remotely piloted aircraft, a strategic asset valued at over $130 million, was operating in the Middle East theatre and was likely en route back to Naval Air Station (NAS) Sigonella in Sicily, the operational hub for Tritons deployed in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
Tracking analysis: Sequence of events
According to data extracted from major ADS-B tracking networks (such as Flightradar24), the sequence of events unfolded extremely rapidly:
- Course deviation (09:56z): The drone abruptly broke off its north-westerly route (heading towards Sigonella), executing a sharp right turn towards the inner Persian Gulf.
- Loss of altitude (09:58z): Just two minutes after the turn, the aircraft began a dramatic descent from its standard cruising altitude of 50,000 feet. The recorded rate of descent exceeded 10,000 feet per minute, a figure completely incompatible with the aircraft’s standard operating procedures.
- Emergency codes: During these phases, the drone’s transponder transmitted a squawk code of 7700 (General Emergency). According to unconfirmed sources, a transient squawk of 7400 (indicating Lost Communications with remote pilots) may also have been recorded in the early stages of the anomaly.
- Loss of signal (10:11z): The Triton managed to temporarily stabilise its attitude below 10,000 feet, levelling off at 9,500 feet, at which point civilian receivers lost the signal permanently.

Hypotheses: Between an accident and electronic interference
Looking at the altitude chart, the hypothesis of the aircraft going down at sea (or over hostile territory, given that the nose appeared to be heading towards the Iranian coast in the final stages) currently seems to be the most plausible, or at least points to a severe flight accident.
However, as is always the case with OSINT analysis in high-tension areas, caution is required. Several technical and environmental factors must be taken into account:
- Electronic warfare (EW): The Persian Gulf is an environment saturated with electronic warfare activity. GPS spoofing and jamming are systematic and frequently degrade ADS-B signals. Ground-based receivers may misinterpret these disturbances, translating them into sudden drops, false altitude readings or the complete disappearance of the aircraft from civilian radars, without the aircraft having actually crashed.
- Network coverage: At altitudes below 10,000 feet, ADS-B receiver coverage in the Gulf region may not be optimal, leading to a natural reduction in tracking capabilities.
Conclusions
Normally, the entire flight path of an MQ-4C is fully visible until landing. If the Triton does not reappear on radar near Sigonella or another allied base in the coming hours, and if the US Navy confirms the loss of communications, the accident hypothesis would, unfortunately, become a strong possibility.
We will continue to monitor the situation whilst awaiting any official statements from the US Central Command (CENTCOM) or the Pentagon.
Source: here