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Moment Russian military transport plane breaks apart in midair before plummeting to the ground
MS Daily brief-15 DECEMBER 2025
Contents
News from Ukraine | New evidence of total disaster for Russians in Ukraine. 1
Mass shooting on Bondi Beach: what we know so far about the terrorist attack. 6
Ukraine is willing to give up its ambitions to join NATO, says Zelenskyy. 11
Pilot narrowly avoids “mid-air collision” with US Air Force plane near Venezuela. 14
“The front line is everywhere”: new MI6 chief warns of growing threat from Russia. 22
Russia attacks a ship owned by the United Arab Emirates in the Black Sea with a drone. 26
Ascalon’s unusual Atlantic route raises questions about a possible return of the Syrian Express 28
The US Navy Poseidon conducted an ISR mission over the Black Sea. 31
Trump approved Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s “ghost fleet”. 33
Ukraine strikes Russian oil infrastructure in the Caspian Sea for the second time. 33
North Korean leader Kim greets troops returning from mission in Russia, state media says 35
Philippines says fishermen injured, boats damaged by China in South China Sea. 36
Taurus Neo and the future of the European missile industrial base. 37
Russia strikes Odessa and Chornomorsk ports: Three Turkish ships damaged in attack. 39
Turkish-owned RoPax in flames after Russian attack on Odessa region. 40
Where has this round of peace talks left us?. 41
What does Trump’s 28-point plan say about territorial control?. 42
Are Russia and Ukraine willing to compromise on territory?. 42
Why is a small piece of Donbas such a major point of contention?. 43
How could the two sides reach a peace agreement?. 45
Attacks on oil tankers in the Black Sea endanger civilian sailors, warns ITF. 51
“We are Russia’s next target,” warns NATO chief, stressing that “the time for action is now” 52
US Navy activates second squadron of MQ-4C Triton drones to enhance high-altitude surveillance 52
US Navy views Coast Guard patrol ship as new class of frigates after Constellation cancellation 54
US Special Forces seize Chinese cargo linked to Iranian missile program.. 59
BREAKING NEWS: ISRAEL ATTACKS HAMAS’ “NUMBER 2” — HEZBOLLAH WARRIOR, US ADVANCES PLAN FOR GAZA | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine | New evidence of total disaster for Russians in Ukraine
Terrorist attack on Bondi Beach: father and son suspected of being behind the shootings, using licensed firearms
Naveed Akram was known to security agencies, the prime minister said. His father, Sajid, who owned the gun, was shot dead by police at the scene
- Follow the latest live news on the shooting on Bondi Beach
- Victims identified so far
- What we know so far about the terrorist attack in Bondi
Monday, December 15, 2025, 06:36 CET
According to police, the alleged perpetrators of the Bondi Beach attack are a father and son suspected of using legally obtained firearms to carry out the massacre.
Naveed Akram, 24, was arrested at the scene and taken to a Sydney hospital with serious injuries. His father, 50, whom the Sydney Morning Herald initially reported as Sajid Akram, was shot dead by police. Police have not confirmed their names.
The two allegedly killed 15 people and wounded dozens more during the shooting on Sunday, during a gathering to celebrate the first night of Hanukkah.
The son was known to police and security agencies in New South Wales, while his father had a gun license and six firearms registered in his name. All six firearms have been recovered, police said.
Four of these weapons, long guns believed to include a rifle and a carbine, were seized at the scene in Bondi, and other weapons were found during a police raid on a house in Campsie, in southwestern Sydney.
Naveed Akram, who worked as a bricklayer, came to the attention of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in October 2019, according to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. He was investigated for six months because of his alleged links to other people, with ABC reporting that the counter-terrorism investigation involved an Islamic State cell.
“[Naveed Akram] was investigated based on his association with other individuals, and it was concluded that there was no evidence of an ongoing threat or threat of his involvement in violent acts,” Albanese said.
NSW Police Commissioner Mal Lanyon said the two men were living in another house in Bonnyrigg, in the west of the city, which was also searched on Sunday evening.
Lanyon said there was nothing “to suggest that any of the men involved in yesterday’s attack were planning the attack” and confirmed that the older man had held a gun license for ten years.
NSW Premier Chris Minns said there would “almost certainly” be changes to firearms laws, and police are investigating whether there was a failure in their systems in relation to how licensed firearms could have been used in a terrorist attack.
Although police did not confirm the names of the two men to Guardian Australia, they did release details about their ages, the suburb where they lived, and information about the older man’s gun license.
Sajid held an AB category gun license, police said. This is a license that requires the person to demonstrate to the police that they have a “special need” for certain weapons, which may include muzzle-loading firearms (other than pistols); centerfire rifles (other than self-loading); and rifle/shotgun combinations.
Interior Minister Tony Burke said Naveed is an Australian citizen. His father arrived in Australia on a student visa in 1998, switched to a partner visa in 2001, and has since had return visas for residents.
The boss remembers a hard-working guy who loved boxing.
Until recently, Naveed Akram worked as a bricklayer.
The man who employed him said he took him on as an apprentice six years ago, describing him as a hard worker who never took time off.
But a few months ago, he said Naveed reported that he had broken his wrist while boxing and would not be able to work until 2026.
“He asked to be paid all his entitlements, annual leave and everything else, but many do that at the end of the year,” said the employer, who did not want to reveal his name.
“Now you can’t help but wonder what he’s going to spend all the money he received on.”
He did not know Naveed well, saying he had hired dozens of people at the same time, but he was considered a quiet person.
“In the masonry trade, you work closely as a team on the construction site, but he doesn’t associate with anyone outside of work… he had lunch alone, not with anyone else,” he said.
He said he knew Naveed came from “a Muslim background,” but Naveed didn’t talk much about religion at work.
He said some employees told him that Naveed’s parents were separated and that he was closer to his father.
He also disputed claims that Naveed had lost his job, saying he wanted him to return to work despite his wrist injury.
“He boxes outside of work… he said his doctor recommended he take a few months off,” the employer said.
“I asked him if he could come back earlier… being a good employee and all, I thought, hell, I don’t want to lose this guy.
“As a bricklayer, I couldn’t fault him; he worked well. He was a good employee in that regard.”
Another bricklayer described Naveed as a strange colleague, but a hard worker who was passionate about hunting.
“No one was close to him,” said the former colleague, who did not want to reveal his name.
“You spend a lot of time together, obviously working as bricklayers — [which is] a pretty boring job, so you talk a lot, but he was just a weird guy.
Although authorities have not confirmed that the son had a gun license, his colleague said he hunted regularly and talked about hunting rabbits and other wildlife in the Crookwell area in the state’s southern highlands.
They worked in Sydney, and the last time he saw Naveed was at a construction site in Penrith.
There were also unconfirmed claims that Naveed was a member of a hunting club after images emerged of what appeared to be a membership card said to have been found in his wallet.
It has not yet been confirmed whether he was a member of the club.
Shortly after the attack, an old photo of Naveed, originally posted by Sheikh Adam Ismail, head of the Al-Murad Institute, went viral. Ismail distanced himself from the man, telling Guardian Australia that he had not seen him since 2022.
“As I have done with thousands of students over the years, I taught him Quran recitation and Arabic for a total of only one year,” he said.
Ismail said he was deeply saddened by what had happened and offered his condolences to the victims and the Jewish community.
“The Quran … clearly states that taking an innocent life is like killing all of humanity. This makes it clear that what happened yesterday in Bondi is completely forbidden in Islam.”
In Bonnyrigg, reporters and police gathered outside the house, which remained cordoned off with blue tape on Monday morning. Two police cars were parked outside the house.
Around noon, three people returned to the house belonging to Naveed’s mother. A young man and two women, holding paper over their heads to protect themselves from the cameras, got out of the car and entered the house.
Glenn Nelson lives across the street. He has lived in the area for 37 years and describes it as a quiet neighborhood.
“My wife [calls it] ‘boring Bonnyrigg’,” he told Guardian Australia from outside his home.
He was watching the news about the attack shortly before noticing the commotion on the street on Sunday around 9:30 p.m.
“I went into the living room to look at something else and then I saw the traffic… and the flashing lights,” he said.
Another person who lives on the same street said she was at work when she got a call from her parents telling her something was happening on the street. She said she was shocked to learn it was the attack.
“We are very sad about what happened,” she said. “We left a very dangerous country to be safe here.”
Ariel Bogle contributed to this report.
Benjamin Netanyahu blames Anthony Albanese for Bondi Beach terror attack as world leaders express horror
The Israeli prime minister claims that the Australian government “has allowed the disease” of anti-Semitism to spread, “and the result is the horrific attack on Jews that we saw today.”
- Follow live updates
- Bondi Beach terror attack: full report
- What we know about the Bondi Beach attack
Guardian and Australian Associated Press staff
Sunday, December 14, 2025, 10:44 p.m. CET
Leaders around the world have expressed their horror at Sunday’s terrorist attack on Bondi Beach, in which at least 16 people died, in some cases mixed with harsh words for the Australian government for alleged failures to combat anti-Semitism over the past two years.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he wrote to his Australian counterpart, Anthony Albanese, in August, warning him that the government’s decision to recognize the Palestinian state “fuels the fire of anti-Semitism… encourages those who threaten Australian Jews and encourages the hatred against Jews that now haunts your streets.” He said Albanese “has replaced weakness with weakness and appeasement with more appeasement.”
“Your government has done nothing to stop the spread of anti-Semitism in Australia. You have done nothing to stop the cancerous cells growing in your country. You have taken no action. You have allowed the disease to spread, and the result is the horrific attacks on Jews that we have seen today.”
Albanese refused to respond directly when asked about Netanyahu’s comments at a press conference on Monday morning.
“This is a time for national unity,” Albanese replied. “This is a time for Australians to come together. That is exactly what we will do.”
Netanyahu praised the actions of a passerby who wrestled the weapon from one of the attackers, saying he saluted “a brave Muslim” who prevented the deaths of “innocent Jews” (the man’s religion had not been confirmed as of Monday morning).
“But at this moment, we are concerned for our people, for our safety, and we are not remaining silent,” Netanyahu said. “We are fighting against those who seek to annihilate us.”
Israeli President Isaac Herzog said in a video message posted online that “despicable terrorists deliberately targeted innocent Jewish families celebrating the first night of Hanukkah.”
“The people of Israel stand with you all in this very dark and difficult time… the Jewish people are strong, resilient, and united, and our message is clear: the Hanukkah lights must remain lit, and they will be lit around the world, especially on Bondi Beach in Sydney and throughout Australia.”
Surfcam in Australia shows tourists fleeing Bondi Beach during shooting – video
US President Donald Trump said it was “a terrible attack” and “an anti-Semitic attack, obviously.” He said he wanted to express his respect “to everyone.”
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the US strongly condemns the attack. “Anti-Semitism has no place in this world. Our prayers are with the victims of this horrific attack, the Jewish community, and the Australian people.”
Former US President Barack Obama said he and his wife, Michelle, were praying for the families mourning the victims of the attack. “To all those lighting a candle tonight, may the light of the menorah illuminate your darkest moments,” he wrote on X.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said the news was “deeply disturbing.” “The United Kingdom sends our thoughts and condolences to all those affected by the horrific attack on Bondi Beach.”
King Charles said he and Camilla were “appalled and saddened by this most appalling anti-Semitic terrorist attack.” “Our hearts go out to all those who have been so horribly affected, including the police officers who were injured while protecting members of their community… In times of suffering, Australians always come together in solidarity and determination. I know that the community spirit and love that shine so brightly in Australia — and the light at the heart of Hanukkah — will always triumph over the darkness of such evil.”
New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said he was shocked by the harrowing scenes at Bondi, “a place New Zealanders visit every day.”
“My thoughts and those of all New Zealanders are with those affected,” he said. “Australia and New Zealand are more than friends, we are family.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said: “Ukraine stands in solidarity with Australia in the face of the brutal terrorist attack … that targeted the Jewish community at the start of Hanukkah … Terrorism and hatred must never prevail — they must be defeated everywhere and always.”
United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres wrote on X: “I am appalled and condemn today’s heinous deadly attack on Jewish families gathered in Sydney to celebrate Hanukkah.
My heart goes out to the Jewish community around the world on this first day of Hanukkah, a holiday that celebrates the miracle of peace and light overcoming darkness.”
Mass shooting on Bondi Beach: what we know so far about the terrorist attack
Australia suffered one of the bloodiest massacres in its history on Sunday when two armed men opened fire on a Jewish celebration
Monday, December 15, 2025, 07:04 CET
Australia suffered one of the bloodiest armed attacks in its history on Sunday when two armed men opened fire on a Jewish celebration in Bondi, Sydney. At least 16 people died, including one of the alleged killers.
Here’s what we know so far:
- On Sunday at 6:47 p.m. local time, police and emergency services were called to Archer Park, near Bondi Beach in Sydney, after reports of gunshots.
- Images shared on social media show two armed men firing continuously at a large group of people who had gathered to celebrate Hanukkah, the Jewish holiday.
- At least 16 people died, including one of the alleged attackers. Among the victims were Holocaust survivor Alexander Kleytman, London-born Rabbi Eli Schlanger, French citizen Dan Elkayam, businessman Reuven Morrison, retired police officer Peter Meagher, and a 10-year-old girl. Police believe the oldest victim was 87 years old.
- Forty-two people were taken to hospital after the attack. As of 1 p.m. local time on Monday, 27 people remained in Sydney hospitals. Six were in critical condition, six were in critical but stable condition, and 15 were in stable condition.
- Two police officers were among the injured and were both in critical but stable condition.
- Police said they were treating the attack as an act of terrorism.
“The biggest gun I’ve ever seen”: Witnesses to Bondi Beach shooting share their experience – video
- The alleged attackers were a 50-year-old man, who was shot by police and died at the scene, and his 24-year-old son, who suffered serious injuries and was taken to hospital under police guard, where he remained on Monday.
- Police have not released the names of the alleged attackers, but media outlets have identified them as Naveed Akram and his father, Sajid Akram.
- Naveed Akram is an Australian citizen, Interior Minister Tony Burke said. His father arrived in 1998 on a student visa, switched to a partner visa in 2001, and after traveling abroad, was granted three return visas for residents.
- Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said the son first came to the attention of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in October 2019. He was investigated “on the basis of association with other individuals”.
- New South Wales Police and ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said one of the attackers was known to authorities, “but not as an immediate threat.”
- NSW Police Commissioner Mal Lanyon said the father was a licensed gun owner with six firearms.
- Bomb disposal experts removed two active improvised explosive devices from the scene. Police said Monday that a third improvised explosive device had been located in Bondi.
Rabbi calls man who fought alleged Bondi attacker a “hero” and welcomes him to synagogue – video
- On Monday, Albanese said the attack was “an act of pure evil.” “An act of terrorism, an act of anti-Semitism. An attack on the Jewish community on the first day of Hanukkah. A dark day in Australian history, on a day that should have been a bright one.”
- Stories of heroism have emerged. A 43-year-old man, Ahmed al-Ahmed, was identified by Albanese as the man seen in footage fighting and disarming one of the attackers from behind, while gunshots rang out around him. Volunteer lifeguards rushed from a nearby club to help the victims.
- Messages of sympathy, shock, and condolences were sent by King Charles and many other world leaders, including US President Donald Trump, UN Secretary-General António Guterres, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and former US President Barack Obama.
- The massacre is Australia’s worstmassacre , Tasmania, when 35 people were killed — an attack that triggered sweeping gun control reforms.
Jimmy Lai: conviction of Hong Kong pro-democracy figure condemned as an attack on press freedom
Human rights groups reject the “false conviction” of the media mogul for national security crimes in the most watched court ruling in decades
Helen Davidson in Hong Kong
Monday, December 15, 2025, 07:18 CET
Jimmy Lai, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy media mogul, faces life in prison after being found guilty of national security and sedition offenses in one of the most closely watched court rulings since the city’s return to Chinese rule in 1997.
Immediately after the verdict was handed down, human rights groups and the press condemned the verdict as a “false conviction” and an attack on press freedom.
The 78-year-old man has been in prison since the end of 2020, being held in preventive detention and serving several sentences related to protests, totaling nearly 10 years. Monday’s conviction, in which judges called him the “mastermind” of conspiracies to destabilize the Chinese government, came after a controversial trial that lasted more than two years.
Lai appeared in West Kowloon District Court on Monday wearing a gray jacket, flanked by armed guards, while his family stood nearby. Crowds of supporters and onlookers, some of whom had queued overnight, filled the main courtroom and several adjacent rooms to hear the long-awaited but widely anticipated verdict.
Lai was charged with one count of conspiracy to publish seditious publications and two counts of conspiracy to collude with foreign forces under the city’s punitive National Security Law (NSL), introduced in 2020, and a sedition law from the British colonial era, which has been reused in recent years by the authorities.
Prosecutors accused Lai of using his media outlet, Apple Daily, and foreign political connections to pressure governments to impose sanctions and other punitive measures on Chinese and Hong Kong authorities.
He pleaded not guilty to all charges, but in their 855-page ruling, the judges, who are appointed by the government for national security cases, said the evidence was “clear.”
“We have no doubt that the first defendant never gave up his intention to destabilize the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] government and, despite the adoption of the national security law, was determined to continue, albeit in a less explicit manner,” Judge Esther Toh said on Monday, reading the written ruling in court.
The next court hearing is on January 12, and Lai has the option to appeal.
The ruling was welcomed by Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee and Security Police Chief Steve Li, who said the judges had shown “professionalism.”
Human rights groups were quick to condemn the verdict, with the Committee to Protect Journalists calling it a “bogus conviction” and a “shameful act of persecution.”
“The ruling underscores Hong Kong’s utter contempt for press freedom, which should be protected by the city’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law,” said the committee’s Asia-Pacific director, Beh Lih Yi.
“Jimmy Lai’s only crime is that he ran a newspaper and defended democracy. The risk of him dying from poor health in prison increases with each passing day — he must be reunited with his family immediately.”
‘s China director, Sarah Brooks, said the predictability of the verdict did not make it “any less appalling,” while Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch, called the sentence cruel and a travesty of justice.
“The Chinese government’s mistreatment of Jimmy Lai is intended to silence anyone who dares to criticize the Communist Party,” Pearson said.
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, the government department responsible for policy toward China, also called for Lai’s release. “This ruling serves as a statement to the world that Hong Kong’s freedoms, democracy, and judicial independence have been systematically eroded,” it said.
Three entities of Apple Daily — Apple Daily Limited, Apple Daily Printing Limited, and AD Internet Limited — which were co-defendants with Lai, were also found guilty on the two counts of collusion with foreign forces.
Lai pleaded not guilty to all charges, telling the court that he “hoped against hope” that US President Donald Trump would stop Beijing from imposing the national security law on the city, but that he never tried to influence foreign policy or ask foreign officials to take concrete action on Hong Kong.
A frequent criticism of the Hong Kong authorities’ national security prosecutions – including in Lai’s case – is that they sometimes appear to apply them retroactively, even though they should not be applied in this way. However, messages and meetings prior to the imposition of the law were an important part of the prosecution against Lai.
In its ruling, the court stated that it was “very clear” to it that Lai “had harbored hatred and resentment toward [the People’s Republic of China] for many years of his adult life” and that he had been thinking about how the US could exert pressure on China long before the national security law was introduced.
“The only reasonable conclusion we can draw from the preponderance of the evidence is that the first defendant’s intention—before or after the adoption of the national security law—was to bring about the downfall of the CCP, even if the ultimate price was the sacrifice of the people of the PRC [People’s Republic of China] and the SARHK [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region].”.
On Monday, there was a massive police presence—both uniformed and plainclothes—as well as a large crowd of journalists outside the West Kowloon District Court. The queue for the public seemed smaller than at previous key moments, such as the day Lai testified at th , and important days for other cases, such as that of Hong Kong 47, which attracted hundreds of people.
Two supporters in the queue held bright red apples to represent the Apple Daily newspaper, founded by Lai, which is now closed.
Lai’s national security trial has lasted more than two years. During that time, the Hong Kong government changed laws to limit bail rights and prevent foreign lawyers from defending Lai.
The closing arguments were presented in August.
Lai’s family has repeatedly expressed concern about his poor health, as he was being held in solitary confinement and subjected to “minor” efforts to demoralize him. Hong Kong authorities have repeatedly rejected these allegations.
Supporters and observers lined up outside the courthouse on Monday, with some arriving the night before to gain access to the courthouse complex. Passersby noted widespread accusations that some people were often paid by pro-Beijing groups to reserve seats that could otherwise have been occupied by international supporters and observers. But none of those waiting in line wanted to talk to the Guardian.
Simon, an elderly man from Hong Kong, said he wanted to support Lai and his wife, Teresa, by being there.
He and a friend held bright red apples in their hands to symbolize the now-closed Apple Daily newspaper, founded by Lai, who is a co-defendant in this trial.
Lai’s conviction comes just weeks before British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s planned visit to Beijing. Lai is a British citizen, and the British government has described his trial as politically motivated.
Ukraine is willing to give up its ambitions to join NATO, Zelenskyy says
This move marks a major shift for Ukraine, which has fought for NATO membership as a safeguard against Russian attacks.
Reuters
Sunday, December 14, 2025, 10:36 p.m. CET
Volodymyr Zelenskyy has offered to give up Ukraine’s aspirations to join the NATO military alliance, following five hours of talks in Berlin on Sunday with US representatives to end the war with Russia.
Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, said “much progress” had been made following the meeting he and the US president’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, had with Zelenskyy in the latest efforts to end Europe’s bloodiest conflict since World War II, although full details were not disclosed.
Dmytro Lytvyn, an adviser to the Ukrainian president, said Zelenskyy would make further comments at the conclusion of the talks on Monday. He added that officials were currently reviewing draft documents.
Prior to the talks, Zelenskyy offered to abandon Ukraine’s goal of joining NATO in exchange for security guarantees from the West.
This move marks a major shift for Ukraine, which has fought to join NATO as a safeguard against Russian attacks and has this aspiration included in its constitution. It also fulfills one of Russia’s war aims, although Kiev has so far remained firm against ceding territory to Moscow.
“The representatives held in-depth discussions on the 20-point peace plan, economic agendas, and much more. Significant progress has been made,” Witkoff wrote in a post on X.
The talks were hosted by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz , who, according to one source, made a few brief remarks before leaving the two sides to negotiate. Other European leaders are expected in Germany on Monday for talks.
Steve Witkoff and Volodymyr Zelenskyy were hosted by Friedrich Merz (right) in Berlin. Photo: dts news agency Germany Handout Bundesregierung/Guido Bergmann/Shutterstock
Zelenskyy described the concession on NATO’s as a compromise.
“From the outset, Ukraine’s desire has been to join NATO: these are real security guarantees. Some partners in the US and Europe did not support this direction,” he said, adding that legally binding security guarantees from the US, Europe, and other countries, such as Canada and Japan, could “prevent another Russian invasion.”
Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demanded that Ukraine officially renounce its NATO ambitions and withdraw its troops from about 10% of Donbas, which is still under Kiev’s control. Moscow has also said that Ukraine must be a neutral country and that no NATO soldiers can be stationed there.
Russian sources said earlier this year that Putin wants a “written” commitment from the major Western powers not to expand the US-led NATO alliance eastward — which, in short, means officially excluding Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other former Soviet republics.
Zelenskyy has previously called for a “dignified” peace and guarantees that Russia will not attack Ukraine again.
Under pressure from Trump to sign a peace deal that initially supported Moscow’s demands, Zelenskyy accused Russia of prolonging the war through deadly bombings of cities, as well as Ukraine’s electricity and water networks.
Trump turns against Europe: will he withdraw support for Ukraine? | Latest news
The dispatch of Witkoff, who led negotiations with Ukraine and Russia on a US peace proposal, appears to be a signal that Washington sees a chance for progress nearly four years after Russia’s 2022 invasion.
Zelenskyy said Ukraine, Europe, and the US are considering a 20-point plan, at the end of which a ceasefire will be reached. He said Kiev has not held direct talks with Moscow.
A ceasefire along the current front lines would be a fair option, he added.
Britain, France, and Germany have been working to refine US proposals, which, in a draft revealed last month, called on Kyiv to cede more territory, give up its ambitions to join NATO, and accept limits on its armed forces.
European allies described this as a “critical” moment that could determine Ukraine’s future, and sought to bolster Kiev’s finances by using frozen assets of Russia’s central bank to fund Kiev’s military and civilian budgets.
Ukraine war update: British intelligence chief warns of Russia’s “expansionist threat” as Berlin talks enter second day
The head of MI6 will issue a statement on Monday warning that “chaos is a feature, not a flaw, of the Russian approach”; European leaders will join the second day of talks in Berlin. What we know on day 1,391
Guardian staff and agencies
Monday, December 15, 2025, 02:36 CET
The head of the British foreign intelligence service, known as MI6, will warn that Russia poses an “aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist” threat in her first speech since taking office. Blaise Metreweli replaced Richard Moore in October, becoming the first female head of MI6. “[Vladimir] Putin should be in no doubt that our support is enduring. The pressure we exert on behalf of Ukraine will be sustained,” Metreweli will say on Monday, according to excerpts from her speech. “Exporting chaos is a feature, not a bug, of the Russian approach to international engagement, and we should be prepared for this to continue until Putin is forced to change his calculations,” she said, according to the excerpt.
- Separately, Richard Knighton, the head of the British armed forces, will also call in a separate speech on Monday for a “whole of society” approach to defense in the context of uncertainty and growing threats, and will highlight the increased likelihood of Russia invading a NATO country.
- The Ukrainian leader called on Sunday for a “dignified” peace and guarantees that Russia would not attack Ukraine, while participating in talks with US officials in Berlin — the latest efforts to end the war with Russia. “Ukraine needs peace on dignified terms, and we are ready to work as constructively as possible. The coming days will be full of diplomacy. It is extremely important that they yield results,” Zelenskyy said on X. Later, ahead of a meeting with US officials, he added: “It is essential that all the measures we agree with our partners work in practice to ensure guaranteed security. Only reliable guarantees can ensure peace.” Zelenskyy is expected to comment on the talks after they conclude on Monday, when other European leaders are expected to join them.
- The Ukrainian leader said that a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia along the current front lines would be a fair option in any peace agreement. Russia has demanded that Kyiv withdraw its troops from parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the east of the country, which are still controlled by Ukraine. Responding to reporters’ questions in a WhatsApp chat, Zelenskyy reiterated that this option would be unfair, adding that the issue of territory remains unresolved and highly sensitive.
- US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff said that “much progress has been made” on the first day of negotiations. The meeting between the US and Ukrainian delegations was attended by Witkoff, President Zelenskyy, Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, and European officials. “The representatives held in-depth discussions… much progress has been made and they will meet again tomorrow morning,” Witkoff said in a post on X. The talks ended on Sunday after more than five hours.
- Ukraine’s offer to give up joining the NATO military alliance is unlikely to significantly change the course of peace negotiations, two security experts said on Sunday. “This doesn’t change the situation at all,” said Justin Logan, director of the Cato Institute’s defense and foreign policy studies department. “It’s an attempt to appear reasonable.” Ukraine’s accession to NATO has not been realistic for a long time, Logan and Andrew Michta, professor of strategic studies at the University of Florida, said. Michta described Ukraine’s accession to NATO as “a non-issue” at this point.
- The Kremlin said on Sunday that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s remark about preparing for war with Russia was irresponsible and showed that he did not truly understand the devastation caused by World War II. Rutte, in a speech in Berlin on Thursday, said NATO should be “prepared for a war on the scale of what our grandparents or great-grandparents endured” and claimed that “we are Russia’s next target.” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told state television reporter Pavel Zarubin: “They don’t understand anything, and unfortunately, Mr. Rutte, by making such irresponsible statements, simply doesn’t understand what he’s talking about.”
- Drone debris caused a fire near the Afipsky oil refinery in Russia’s Krasnodar region, without causing injuries or damage, an emergency center said on Sunday. “A gas pipeline caught fire outside the refinery, near one of the checkpoints. The fire covered an area of 100 square meters and was extinguished,” the center said on the Telegram messaging app. Ukraine previously said its military had struck the refinery and an oil depot in Russia’s Volgograd region.
- Russia’s Defense Ministry said on Sunday that its forces had captured the village of Varvarivka in the Zaporizhzhia region of eastern Ukraine. Reuters was unable to verify battlefield reports from both sides involved in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
Pilot narrowly avoids “mid-air collision” with US Air Force plane near Venezuela
The JetBlue pilot describes the incident as “outrageous” and says the US military tanker plane did not have its transponder turned on
Associated Press
Sunday, December 14, 2025, 9:28 p.m. CET
A JetBlue flight from the small Caribbean nation of Curaçao interrupted its climb to avoid a collision with a US Air Force tanker jet on Friday, and the pilot blamed the military aircraft for cutting across its path.
“We almost had a midair collision up here,” the JetBlue pilot said, according to a recording of his conversation with air traffic control. “They flew right across our flight path… They don’t have their transponders on, it’s outrageous.”
The incident involved JetBlue flight 1112 from Curaçao, which is off the coast of Venezuela, en route to JFK airport in New York. This comes as the US military has launched deadly airstrikes on alleged drug traffickers in the Caribbean and is also trying to ramp up pressure on the Venezuelan government.
“We just had traffic pass right in front of us, less than 5 miles away—maybe 2 or 3 miles—but it was a US Air Force refueling aircraft and it was at our altitude,” the pilot said. “We had to stop our climb.” The pilot said the US Air Force plane then headed toward Venezuelan airspace.
Derek Dombrowski, a spokesman for JetBlue, said Sunday: “We have reported this incident to federal authorities and will participate in any investigation.” He added: “Our crew members are trained on the proper procedures for various flight situations, and we appreciate that our crew promptly reported this situation to our leadership team.”
The Pentagon referred the Associated Press to the Air Force for comment. The Air Force did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Last month, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a warning to US aircraft, urging them to “exercise caution” when flying in Venezuelan airspace “due to the deteriorating security situation and increased military activity in and around Venezuela.”
According to air traffic records, the controller replied to the pilot: “It was outrageous with the unidentified aircraft in our airspace.”
“The law is the only weapon I have”: a Ukrainian lawyer’s campaign to save children kidnapped by Russia
Although at one point she was so desperate that she considered giving up law in favor of art, Kateryna Rashevska continues to fight for the return of thousands of Ukrainian children kidnapped by the invaders.
Supported by
Mélissa Cornet
Monday, December 15, 2025, 6:00 a.m. CET
At just 28 years old, human rights lawyer Kateryna Rashevska has become the public face of Ukraine’s campaign to repatriate children forcibly deported to Russia. She knows that this means she is being watched.
Over the past two years, the Ukrainian has addressed the UN Security Council, the US Senate, and written memoranda to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which then issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin for the “illegal deportation” of Ukrainian children.
“I wouldn’t say that the Russians are afraid of me, but it’s clear that they monitor everything we do and publish. I am not naive about what would happen to me if they [the Russians] took control of Kyiv,” says Rashevska, who is responsible for international justice at the Regional Center for Human Rights (RCHR) in Ukraine.
If Russian forces were to advance further into the country, towards my home village, I would be the first to fail their “filtering” procedures.
“In a recent interview, Maria Lvova-Belova [the Russian children’s commissioner] referred point by point to the issues we raised, using the same language we used—almost as if she were responding directly to our work.”
Rashevska’s first thought when Russia invaded in 2022 was to leave Kyiv—where she was working on launching an investigation into the deportation of Ukrainian prisoners from occupied Crimea to Russia—and join her family in a village in the Poltava region of eastern Ukraine, about 15 km from the front line.
But she knew it would be impossible to live under Russian occupation. She had already deleted all the information and contacts she had collected in her work from her devices so as not to endanger the survivors of forced displacement and Russian deportation if Kyiv were to be occupied.
Kateryna Rashevska at a Senate hearing in Washington, D.C., earlier this month, holding a photo of what she said were Ukrainian children abducted by Russian forces. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty
“As a human rights defender documenting Russian crimes,” she says, “I understood very clearly that if Russian forces advanced further into the country, toward my home village, I would be the first to fail their ‘filtering’ procedures, in which they check documents and devices and subject people to interrogation. I understood that risk.”
So instead, Rashevska says she “tried to isolate herself from her family,” first taking an evacuation train to join colleagues from the RCHR on a mission to Vienna, then returning to Kyiv to work on the case of the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, as well as their .
The fight for these children, for their safe return, for the punishment of their aggressors, is something bigger than me.
An estimated 20,000 Ukrainian children have been deported and/or forcibly transferred from occupied territories to Russia. Some are believed to have been illegally adopted by Russian families, with their names—and in some cases even their places of birth—changed, making reunification even more difficult.
Diplomatic efforts to work directly with Moscow have yielded almost no results, with only 20 Ukrainian children repatriated, according to Russian authorities. The few children who were repatriated had been displaced to occupied Ukrainian territory, not Russia, Rashevska says, making international responsibility imperative.
“The fight for these children, for their safe return, for the punishment of those who abused them, is already something bigger than me,” she says. “I just feel like it’s the right thing to do.
“It’s not a profession, it’s not a job, it’s not a mission. It’s more of a calling from within me, which sometimes speaks through me, guides me, and helps me in moments of deep exhaustion.”
Kateryna Rashevska with a brochure designed to educate children about their rights, co-published by her human rights organization. Photo: Emile Ducke/The Guardian
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Rashevska says she was frustrated that the international community was not taking her evidence of forced displacement and deportation by the Russians seriously. She had become so disillusioned that she even sent her portfolio to apply to art school. As a painter, she felt she could be more effective in generating some of the discussions and changes she wanted to see in society.
The shift in international attitude and the recognition of crimes committed against Ukraine helped convince her to continue working in the legal field. “I knew I was needed here.”
The first arrest warrants issued by the ICC in 2023 were the moment when Ukrainians began to believe in international law again, says Rashevska. It is one of the achievements she is most proud of, but they did not end the violence and did not lead to any arrests.
When Putin subsequently traveled to Mongolia in 2024 and Tajikistan this year, both countries ignored their obligations to arrest him as members of the ICC. “Ukrainians believe that there is no international justice and that it is just another political tool,” she says.
Recently, she says, she worked on the case of a nine-year-old boy forced to watch Russian soldiers attempt to rape his mother. “All these cases, these atrocities, you think about them even at night.”
However, Rashevska remains optimistic and says she continues to draw inspiration from the children who have returned and begun to rebuild their lives. “I see children who a year ago were sad and lost, but now they are happy, they have found their community and have even started university,” she says.
Rashevska is also optimistic about her own future; the reality of her work has not changed her desire to become a mother one day, although, she jokes, “Putin will not be indicted before I have children.”
In her non-fiction work Looking at Women Looking at War, the late Ukrainian author Victoria Amelina, who was killed in a rocket attack in 2023, began to portray Rashevska. “For me, it is very symbolic that this chapter was not finished,” she says. “I can always do more.
“Even when the war ends, I will remain a lawyer. I believe my fight has meaning—and the only weapon I have is international law.”
The Assad family lives in luxury in Russia, while Bashar “perfects his knowledge of ophthalmology.”
Friends of the family, sources in Russia and Syria, and leaked data offer a rare glimpse into the dictator’s secluded life.
William Christou and Pjotr Sauer
Monday, December 15, 2025, 6:00 a.m. CET
In 2011, a group of teenagers spray-painted a warning on a wall in their schoolyard: “It’s your turn, doc.” The graffiti was a thinly veiled threat that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, an ophthalmologist trained in London, would be the next Arab dictator to be toppled by the Arab Spring that was raging at the time.
It lasted 14 years, during which time 620,000 people were killed and nearly 14 million were displaced, but eventually the doctor’s turn came and Assad was deposed, fleeing to Moscow in the middle of the night.
But after giving up his dictatorship for a golden exile in Moscow, Assad is said to have resumed his medical studies. The leader of the last Baathist regime in the Middle East now sits in the classroom, taking courses in ophthalmology, according to a well-informed source.
“He is learning Russian and refreshing his knowledge of ophthalmology,” said a friend of the Assad family who has kept in touch with them. “It’s a passion of his, obviously he doesn’t need the money. Even before the war in Syria began, he used to practice ophthalmology regularly in Damascus,” he continued, suggesting that Moscow’s wealthy elite could be his target clientele.
A year after his regime was overthrown in Syria, the Assad family leads an isolated, quiet, and luxurious life in Moscow and the United Arab Emirates. A friend of the family, sources in Russia and Syria, as well as disclosed data, have contributed to providing a rare insight into the life of the now-retired family that once ruled Syria with an iron fist.
The family likely lives in the prestigious Rublyovka, a gated community for Moscow’s elite, according to two sources familiar with the situation. There, they may rub shoulders with people such as former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who fled Kiev in 2014 and is believed to live in the area.
The Assad family is not short of money. After being cut off from much of the global financial system by Western sanctions in 2011 following Assad’s bloody crackdown on protesters, the family placed much of its wealth in Moscow, where Western regulators could not touch it.
Despite their comfortable home, the family is isolated from the Syrian and Russian elite circles they once enjoyed. Bashar’s last-minute escape from Syria left his friends feeling abandoned, and his Russian advisers prevent him from contacting senior regime officials.
“It’s a very quiet life,” said the family friend. “He has very little contact with the outside world, if any. He is only in contact with a few people who were in his palace, such as Mansour Azzam [former Syrian minister of presidential affairs] and Yassar Ibrahim [Assad’s most important economic friend].”
A source close to the Kremlin said Assad was also largely “irrelevant” to Putin and the Russian political elite. “Putin has little patience with leaders who are losing power, and Assad is no longer considered an influential figure or even an interesting guest to invite to dinner,” the source said.
Assad fled Damascus with his sons in the early hours of December 8, 2024, as Syrian rebels approached the capital from the north and south. They were met by a Russian military escort and taken to the Russian air base Khmeimim, from where they were flown out of the country.
Assad did not warn his extended family or close allies of the regime about the impending collapse, leaving them to fend for themselves instead.
A friend of Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother and a senior military official who knows many former members of the palace, said: “Maher called Bashar for days, but he didn’t answer. He stayed in the palace until the last second, with the rebels finding the charcoal in the hookah still warm. Maher, not Bashar, helped the others escape. Bashar only thought of himself.”
The lawyer representing Bashar’s uncle, Rifaat al-Assad, recalled how his clients called him in a panic, unsure of how to flee Syria after Bashar had fled. “When they arrived in Khmeimim, they told Russian soldiers that they were members of the Assad family, but they did not speak English or Arabic. So eight of them had to sleep in their cars in front of the base,” said Elie Hatem, Rifaat’s lawyer. It was only after the intervention of a senior Russian official that the family managed to flee to Oman.
In the first months after the Assad family fled, Bashar did not think about his regime’s former allies. The family gathered in Moscow to support Asma, the former first lady of Syria, who was born in the UK, had been suffering from leukemia for years, and whose condition had become critical. She had been treated in Moscow before the fall of the Assad regime.
According to a source familiar with the details of Asma’s health, the former first lady recovered after experimental therapy under the supervision of Russian security services.
With Asma’s health stabilizing, the former dictator is eager to tell his side of the story. He has scheduled interviews with RT and a popular right-wing American podcaster, but is awaiting approval from Russian authorities to appear in the media.
Russia appears to have prevented Assad from appearing in public. In a rare interview given in November to the Iraqi press about Assad’s life in Moscow, Russia’s ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev, confirmed that the ousted dictator had been banned from participating in any public activity.
“Assad can live here, but he cannot participate in political activities… He has no right to participate in any media or political activities. Have you heard anything from him? No, because he is not allowed to—but he is safe and alive,” Kutrashev said.
In contrast, the lives of Assad’s children seem to continue relatively undisturbed as they adapt to a new life as part of Moscow’s elite.
A family friend, who met with some of the children a few months ago, said: “They are a bit dazed. I think they are still a little shocked. They are just getting used to life without being the first family.”
The only time the Assad family—without Bashar—has been seen together in public since the end of their regime was at the graduation of his daughter Zein al-Assad on June 30, when she received a degree in international relations from MGIMO, the elite Moscow university attended by much of Russia’s ruling class.
A photo on MGIMO’s shows Zein, 22, alongside other graduates. In a separate, blurry video from the event, members of the Assad family, including Asma and her two sons, Hafez, 24, and Karim, 21, can be seen in public.
Two of Zein’s classmates who attended the ceremony confirmed that some members of the Assad family were present, but said they kept a low profile. “The family didn’t stay long and didn’t take pictures with Zein on stage like other families did,” said one of his former classmates, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Hafez, who was once groomed as Bashar’s potential successor, largely withdrew from public view after posting a video on Telegram in February in which he offered his own version of the family’s flight from Damascus, denying that they had abandoned their allies and claiming that Moscow had ordered them to leave Syria.
Syrians quickly located Hafez, who filmed the video while walking the streets of Moscow.
Hafez closed most of his social media accounts, registering instead under a pseudonym taken from an American children’s series about a young detective with dyslexia, according to the data disclosed. The children and their mother spend much of their time shopping, filling their new home in Russia with luxury goods, according to a source close to the family.
Zein al-Assad regularly buys luxury clothes, has registered at a luxury pedicure salon, and is a member of an elite gym in Moscow, according to leaked Russian data.
The Assad children also frequently visit the United Arab Emirates, with Asma joining them on at least one occasion. Leaked flight records seen by the Guardian from 2017-23 suggest that the UAE has long been a favorite destination for the Assad family, even when they were in power. Karim and Hafez made repeated trips between Abu Dhabi, Moscow, and Syria, including flights in November 2022 and September 2023.
Initially, the Assad family hoped to move from Moscow to the United Arab Emirates. The United Arab Emirates was a much more familiar location for them. They did not speak Russian and struggled to integrate into Russian social circles, according to a friend of the family. However, the family now realizes that a permanent move will not happen for a while, as even the United Arab Emirates, which hosts many of the world’s dubious elites, does not feel comfortable hosting Assad.
As rebels invaded Syria, they distributed photographs they found in Assad’s properties. Social media was flooded with images of a young Bashar in his underwear, Bashar swimming—a very different image from the autocratic self-portrait that stared back at Syrians from every corner.
It was the first crack in the steel image of a dictator whose rule, until a year ago, was considered unshakeable. However, Syrians still know little about the man who oversaw 14 years of killings that left hundreds of thousands of Syrians dead.
Kamal Alam, a former senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council who engaged in track two diplomacy during the Syrian civil war, said, “It took the fall of the regime for those photos to emerge. I would say that the family is very discreet and has never liked being exposed, nor will they want that in the future.”
- Shaun Walker contributed to this report.
“The front line is everywhere”: new MI6 chief warns of growing threat from Russia
Blaise Metreweli is expected to declare that Britain faces a new “era of uncertainty” in a speech identifying the Kremlin as a key threat
Dan Sabbagh Defense and security editor
Monday, December 15, 2025, 01:01 CET
Assassination plots, sabotage, cyberattacks, and information manipulation by Russia and other hostile states mean that “the front line is everywhere,” the new head of MI6 will warn on Monday.
Blaise Metreweli, in his first speech in office, is expected to declare that Britain faces a new “era of uncertainty” in which the rules of conflict are being rewritten, particularly in light of the Kremlin’s broader aggression following its invasion of Ukraine.
“Exporting chaos is a feature, not a bug, of the Russian approach to international engagement,” the agency’s first female chief will argue, and “until Putin is forced to change his calculations,” she expects this to continue.
Similar comments on the scale of the threat, particularly from Russia, are expected from Air Chief Marshal Richard Knighton, the chief of the defense staff, who is set to declare in a separate speech that “the situation is more dangerous than I have known in my career” and call on the entire country to “step up its efforts.”
Their pre-released statements come as Keir Starmer is set to fly to Berlin for an emergency summit with European leaders, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as well as Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, in an effort to persuade the US to accept an alternative European peace plan for Ukraine.
Russia is identified as an acute threat by Metreweli in his speech, which is to be published in full on Monday afternoon, with an “aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist” mindset that led Vladimir Putin to order the invasion of his neighbor and deploy aggressive support tactics across Europe.
“Putin should have no doubt: our support is enduring. The pressure we exert on behalf of Ukraine will be sustained,” the intelligence chief is expected to declare, although the diplomatic reality of the past month is that the US position is uncertain, with Trump and Witkoff previously favoring Russia’s demands.
Threats facing Britain include the attempt to kill Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 with a nerve agent, which led to the death of British citizen Dawn Sturgess. A public inquiry into the death of Sturgess, who accidentally picked up the bottle of poison, concluded this month that the Russian president was “morally responsible.“
These include Russia’s efforts to use artificial intelligence to create large-scale disinformation, to create online videos designed to undermine public support for Ukraine, or to spread false rumors about the health of the Princess of Wales, as highlighted in a recent speech by Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper.
Six Bulgarians living in the UK were jailed in May for their involvement in an espionage plot, which included hostile surveillance of an investigative journalist known for his revelations about the Kremlin across Europe and an attempt to retrieve the phone numbers of Ukrainian soldiers believed to be training in Germany.
However, in the excerpts published in advance, no explicit mention was made of China, except for a reference to sanctions imposed last week against two companies based in that country, accused of indiscriminate hacking against the UK and its allies.
Ministers are still wrestling with the decision to allow China to build a new super-embassy at Royal Mint Court in London, while the prime minister hopes to visit Beijing in January, before Trump travels there in April.
Knighton, the country’s top military officer since September, is also expected to highlight the threat from Russia to both Britain and the NATO military alliance in his first annual lecture at the Royal United Services Institute think tank.
“The war in Ukraine shows Putin’s willingness to target neighboring states, including their civilian populations,” he is expected to say, arguing that Moscow wants to “challenge, limit, divide, and ultimately destroy NATO.”
He will argue that the long-term success of the armed forces depends on reconnecting with society so that defense becomes “a more important national priority for all of us,” with the involvement of more British people.
Metreweli took over as head of MI6, or C, from Richard Moore in October. Previously, she was head of MI6’s technology and innovation department, or Q, and spent most of her career in the Middle East and Europe.
The new leader will also emphasize that the international spy agency must keep abreast of trends in information technology, a field traditionally belonging to its sister agency GCHQ, as well as maintain the effective use of human intelligence sources, its traditional activity.
“Mastery of technology must permeate everything we do. Not just in our laboratories, but also in the field, in our work, and, more importantly, in the mindset of every officer. We must be as comfortable with lines of code as we are with human sources, as fluent in Python as we are in multiple languages,” she is expected to say.
The excerpts published in advance highlighted more general references to the moral dimension of cutting-edge technological power, although allies said it was not a coded criticism of the Trump administration, but rather a call for a society-wide approach to technological development.
“The defining challenge of the 21st century is not simply who possesses the most powerful technologies, but who guides them with the greatest wisdom. Our security, prosperity, and humanity depend on it,” the new chief will say.
The head of the secret services is expected to declare that “we all have choices to make in the future” and that “rediscovering our common humanity, our ability to listen, and our courage will determine how our future unfolds.”
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/dec/15/new-mi6-head-blaise-metreweli-speech-russia-threat
Trump news in brief: President pays tribute to Brown University shooting victims amid calls for gun control
Donald Trump addressed the shooting, while politicians called for measures to improve gun control – Sunday’s important US political news in brief
The Guardian team
Monday, December 15, 2025, 01:44 CET
On Sunday, Donald Trump paid tribute to the two people killed and nine wounded in the Brown University shooting.
“Before we begin, I want to pay tribute to those who, sadly, are no longer with us, Brown University, nine wounded and two who are now watching us from heaven,” the president told guests at a holiday reception at the White House.
“Brown University,” Trump added, “an excellent school, truly one of the best schools in the world. Unforeseen things can happen.”
Saturday’s violence at Brown brought the number of mass shootings in the US this year to at least 389, according to the Gun Violence Archive. The attack has reignited the debate in the US over the need for the federal government to implement stricter gun control in response to the consistently high number of mass shootings reported in the country.
Senator Chris Murphy, a Democrat, drew a parallel with the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook in his home state of Connecticut, in which 26 people died.
“What I know is that a community never recovers from an incident like this,” he told CNN on Sunday.
Person of interest detained in Brown University shooting that left two dead
A person of interest in the shooting incident that killed two people and injured nine others at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island, on Saturday has been detained, police said.
Colonel Oscar Perez, Providence police chief, confirmed at a press conference on Sunday that the person of interest is in his 20s. Perez did not provide many other details about the person, including whether he had any connection to Brown University.
Experts urge caution as Trump’s bill encourages use of AI in healthcare
In order for states to receive certain funding under the Trump administration’s “big and beautiful” bill, they must meet three of 10 criteria — including integrating multiple artificial intelligence technologies ( AI ) into healthcare — which, according to experts, could have major benefits and responsibilities for under-resourced hospitals, depending on how they are implemented.
Manchin: Stop acting in “attack mode” in the context of political violence
Politicians should “calm down” and stop attacking each other in the context of the climate climate of political violence in the US, former US Senator Joe Manchin said on Sunday.
The West Virginia independent, who generally sides with Democrats in the Senate , echoed similar comments made Saturday at a public gathering by Erika Kirk, the widow of conservative political activist Charlie Kirk, who was fatally shot in September.
Trump says building the Washington DC triumphal arch is the “top priority” of the head of domestic policy
Amid concerns that he has failed to resolve the affordability crisis, with health insurance premiums set to rise dramatically for more than 20 million Americans, Donald Trump revealed on Sunday that the top priority of the head of domestic policy is to build a triumphal arch for Washington DC .
Immigration forces teenagers to take on the roles of detained parents
Vilma Cruz, a mother of two, had just arrived at her new rented home in Louisiana when federal agents surrounded her car in the driveway. She only had time to call her eldest son before they smashed the passenger window and detained her.
Cruz’s arrest forced her son, Jonathan Escalante, an 18-year-old American citizen who graduated from high school this year, to take care of his nine-year-old sister, who has a physical disability. Escalante is now trying to access his mother’s bank account, find his sister’s medical records and doctors, and figure out how to pay his mother’s bills.
What else happened today:
- The National Labor Relations Board, the federal agency that oversees workers’ rights, has become ineffective as employees struggle against corporations. Its five-member board requires at least three members to issue a ruling. But days after taking office, Trump fired senior official Gwynne Wilcox from the board, leaving it without that crucial quorum.
- Black journalists fired in the context of Donald Trump’s campaign against DEI initiatives have spoken openly about their dismissal from CBS, NBC, and Teen Vogue.
Russia attacks a ship owned by the United Arab Emirates in the Black Sea with a drone
Russian forces attacked VIVA, a ship owned by a company in the United Arab Emirates, with a drone in the Black Sea. The ship was sailing from Ukraine to Egypt, carrying a cargo of sunflower oil.
The Ukrainian Navy reported the attack.
“… On December 13, 2025, the aggressor state again carried out an attack on a civilian ship. The Russian Federation carried out a targeted UAV attack on the Turkish-operated ship VIVA, which was heading to Egypt with sunflower oil on board. The transit was through the grain corridor. There were 11 citizens of the Republic of Turkey on board,” the Navy reported.
The attack was reported to have taken place on the open sea, within Ukraine’s exclusive economic zone, beyond the range of Ukrainian air defense systems.
The Navy said it remains in contact with the ship’s captain, and maritime search and rescue services are on standby. No crew members were injured, the ship did not suffer significant damage and is continuing to its destination.
VIVA is a chemical tanker with a total length of 136 meters, a width of 23 meters, and a total weight capacity of 16,116 tons. The ship is operated by the Turkish company Chemtankers Shipping and owned by VEVA Shipping, based in the UAE.
Video footage suggests that the crew extinguished the fire on board independently. A crew member exposed the drone’s engine, which appeared largely intact. The engine closely resembles those used in the Shahed/Geran-2 drones deployed by Russia against Ukraine.
Given that the ship was hit while sailing and the engine was recovered, the attack was likely carried out by a Shahed/Geran-2 drone equipped with a camera.
Comparison between the drone engine found on the attacked ship and at the site of the attack with the Shahed drone in Ukraine. Collage by Militarnyi
Although the exact range of this variant is unknown, Iranian presentations to the Russian military indicate that the Shahed-136, equipped with a video camera and supported by a drone, has a range of up to 220 kilometers.
This was the second attack on commercial ships carrying cargo to or from Ukrainian ports. On December 12, Russia attacked a Turkish container ship in the port of Odessa.
A circle with a radius of 220 kilometers centered on the western coast of Crimea. Google Maps
Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces recently struck four Russian ships: two tankers from the “shadow fleet” in the Black Sea (1, 2) and two ships carrying weapons from Iran in the Caspian Sea.
Russian channels also reported an alleged Ukrainian drone attack on a Russian tanker about 150 km from Yalta in Russian-occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry denied any involvement in that incident.
Source: here
Ascalon’s unusual Atlantic route raises questions about a possible return of the Syrian Express
In recent days, the Russian-flagged ro-ro cargo ship Ascalon has attracted attention not only for its unusual Atlantic route, but also for the broader context of Russian maritime logistics and pressure on sanctions. Tracking data shows that the Ascalon is moving south off the Bay of Biscay after spending extended periods in the English Channel and Atlantic approaches. This pattern is not typical for a purely commercial ro-ro carrier and raises questions about the ship’s mission and possible final destination.
The Ascalon left St. Petersburg at the end of November, crossing the North Sea and entering the English Channel, where it spent an extended period with no clear destination data. Such extended pauses often occur not in standard commercial voyages, but in cases where charterers delay orders or when sensitive missions are being negotiated. After remaining off the Bay of Biscay, the Ascalon resumed a more defined southward trajectory, now positioning itself off the west coast of Portugal, but without revealing a destination in the Automatic Identification System (AIS) data. This absence of a declared port of arrival is notable in itself, as ro-ro commercial traffic usually transmits an ETA and destination.
On paper, the Ascalon is a ro-ro cargo ship built in 1999, now flying the Russian flag, with a deadweight of approximately 7,100 tons. However, what sets this ship apart is its history of hard-to-find data on sanctions and logistics. The US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the owner of the Ascalon, the Russian company M Leasing LLC, in May 2022. Ascalon was listed as one of the ships involved in transporting weapons and military cargo for the Russian Federation and is believed to have participated in what analysts call the “Syrian Express,” the maritime supply chain between Russian Black Sea ports and Syria.
Being on the US sanctions list means that Ascalon is designated as a Specially Designated National (SDN) under Executive Order 14024, which covers sanctions related to Russia. It cannot legally conduct transactions with US persons or entities, and any secondary transactions involving US financial systems could trigger sanctions. This status limits the ship’s commercial flexibility and may make insurers and ports reluctant to provide services.
The broader context of the Ascalon’s ambiguous voyage is the ongoing difficulty faced by Russian supply routes through the Black Sea. Since the escalation of the war in Ukraine, Ukrainian forces have repeatedly used naval and aerial drones to strike Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” ships — a loose network of aging, often gray-listed vessels that operate under opaque flags or AIS behavior to help Russia export goods and support logistics under Western sanctions. In recent weeks, Ukrainian drones have struck and disabled several cargo tankers and oil tankers in the Black Sea, including sanctioned ships, which has increased war risk insurance costs and complicated any attempt to transport sensitive cargo directly through that region.
These strikes have made the classic route from Russian Black Sea ports through the Bosphorus and on to the eastern Mediterranean significantly riskier. Although this corridor has long been known as the “Syrian Express,” recent disruptions and increased threats have effectively forced Russian maritime logistics planners to consider alternative routes or operate with much greater secrecy. The route itself has changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Turkey’s stricter enforcement of the Montreux Convention, meaning fewer open military passages, but the transport of materials and supplies has continued in more clandestine forms.
Given the Ascalon’s sanctioned status, its documented involvement in military equipment transport in the past, and its current lack of a declared destination, speculation naturally turns to the possibility that it is repositioning itself for a new mission — possibly entering the Mediterranean Sea via Gibraltar, rather than the traditional Black Sea route. If so, this could align with Russia’s ongoing efforts to bypass riskier Black Sea crossings while supporting logistical needs in the Middle East.
At this point, there is no direct confirmation that the Ascalon is heading for Syria. Its current AIS track off Portugal simply does not yet show a clear plan to enter the Mediterranean. But in the context of strict sanctions enforcement, Ukrainian drone campaigns targeting Russian ships at sea, and the history of this ship and its owners, the Ascalon remains a vessel of interest — not just as a ro-ro cargo ship, but potentially as part of a broader and more opaque supply chain that is adapting to an ever-changing maritime strategic environment.
Source: here
US Navy Poseidon conducted an ISR mission over the Black Sea
A US Navy Boeing P-8A Poseidon conducted a mission over the Black Sea that appears to be a classic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operation.
The flight path shows extended time on station combined with repeated patterns over the track, a classic signature of ISR activity rather than simple transit or training flights. Such profiles are frequently associated with the collection of data related to maritime traffic, surface activity, and the broader operational environment.
Operating over international waters, the aircraft covered both the central and eastern sectors of the Black Sea, an area that remains under constant observation due to its strategic importance and the presence of multiple naval actors.
This mission once again highlights the role of the P-8A Poseidon as one of the primary ISR platforms used by the United States and NATO in the region, typically tasked with maintaining situational awareness in a highly sensitive and closely monitored theater.
Source: here
The tanker seized by the US off the coast of Venezuela is actually part of the ghost fleet of another American enemy
PHOTO: Twitter/Jason Brodsky
An oil tanker recently seized by US forces in the Caribbean has been under US Treasury sanctions since 2022, suspected of being part of a global fleet of ships involved in illegal Iranian oil smuggling.
The information, published by Radio Free Europe, also states that a US Treasury statement at the time claimed that the network was led by Viktor Artemov, a Ukrainian citizen with ties to Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF), according to his listing on the US sanctions list.
There is little publicly available information about Artemov. The US sanctions list states that he was born in 1975 in Donetsk and lists an address in Cologny, an elegant town on the shores of Lake Geneva in Switzerland, where, according to some reports, Russian oligarchs have purchased residences.
US President Donald Trump announced the seizure of the tanker during a press conference at the White House on December 10.
A video released by US Attorney General Pam Bondi showed helicopters landing on the ship and special forces taking control of it.
“For several years, the tanker has been sanctioned by the United States for its involvement in an illegal oil transportation network that supports foreign terrorist organizations,” she wrote on social media.
“Our investigation, conducted jointly with the Department of Homeland Security to prevent the transport of sanctioned oil, continues.”
Transportation of Venezuelan oil
Bondi said the ship was also used to transport sanctioned Venezuelan oil.
The seizure comes amid a major US naval buildup in the region and a controversial campaign of attacks on ships suspected of drug trafficking from Venezuela.
Venezuela condemned the seizure as an “act of piracy” and a “serious international crime.”
On the afternoon of December 11, the Kremlin issued a statement saying that Russian President Vladimir Putin had spoken with his Venezuelan counterpart, Nicolas Maduro.
“Putin expressed his solidarity with the Venezuelan people and reaffirmed his support for the policies of Nicolas Maduro’s government aimed at protecting national interests and sovereignty in the face of growing external pressure,” the statement said.
The ship, named The Skipper, was called The Adisa when it was sanctioned.
The 2022 Treasury statement mentioned it along with eight other ships said to be part of a “vast, complex, and interconnected global network of front companies used to facilitate oil shipments” for a smuggling network.
The operation involved “blending oil to conceal the Iranian origin of shipments and exporting it worldwide in support of Hezbollah and IRGC-QF” through a network of shell companies in the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, and Singapore, the statement added.
This is a typical modus operandi for a ghost fleet, used by countries such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela to circumvent sanctions.
Sailing under various flags
In a recent interview with RFE/RL, Benjamin Hilgenstock, a senior economist at the KSE Institute in Kyiv, said: “When a ship becomes a ghost tanker, then these strange special-purpose vehicles from the Marshall Islands appear as owners, or these ship managers from the United Arab Emirates appear who are constantly changing.”
The Skipper, launched in 2005, appears—according to publicly available data—to be currently owned by a Nigeria-based company called Thomarose Global Ventures.
Another typical tactic for ships in a ghost fleet is to frequently change the flag under which the ships are registered.
The Skipper was sailing under the Guyanese flag when it was captured by US forces. But Guyana claims that the ship was not actually registered in that country.
“There have been cases where crews have been arrested when the ship did not have a proper flag,” Hilgenstock said.
Iran’s economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues and has used its secret tanker fleet to avoid sanctions.
Dalga Khatinoglu, an Iranian energy expert living in Azerbaijan, told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda on December 11 that ghost tankers linked to the IRGC’s oil export operations take significant risks.
He suggested that the seizure of these ships is particularly damaging to the IRGC’s finances, as the Guard is responsible for exporting about one-third of Iran’s oil to fund its own budget.
As part of its “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, the Trump administration has made reducing Tehran’s oil exports a priority.
In November, it sanctioned six more ships, with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent saying the move was a continuation of efforts to “cut off funding for the Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons development and support for terrorists.”
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) has estimated Iran’s revenues from crude oil exports at approximately $43 billion for 2024, up $1 billion from the previous year.
Source: here
Trump approved Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s “ghost fleet”
Donald Trump not only allowed Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” to develop, but also actively supported these efforts by providing information. This information comes from an extensive investigation published by the American magazine The Atlantic.
According to the findings of US journalists, after taking office in January 2025, the White House significantly changed its attitude towards Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy facilities. Unlike the Joe Biden administration, which restricted such actions because of the risks of escalation and the impact on the global oil market, Donald Trump’s team saw these maneuvers as an effective way to undermine the Russian economy.
In this context, it appears that the United States has, “in certain circumstances,” shared reconnaissance details and coordinates of energy targets located deep within Russian territory, without protesting against the targeting of commercial vessels used by Moscow to export oil outside the scope of sanctions.
Kiev has changed its tactics
In October, Washington also imposed increased sanctions on Russia’s largest oil companies, Lukoil and Rosneft, a measure that has greatly limited their ability to export. According to The Atlantic’s analysis, these decisions have allowed Ukraine to intensify what Western officials call “kinetic sanctions”: drone attacks targeting refineries and logistics hubs in the Russian oil sector.
Ukraine strikes Russian oil infrastructure in the Caspian Sea for the second time
Ukrainian drones struck two Russian oil platforms in the Caspian Sea, an official from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said on Friday.
The source said that SBU drones struck the Filanovsky and Korchagin oil platforms, both owned by the Russian company.
The Filanovsky platform — part of Russia’s largest oil field in the Caspian Sea — was attacked earlier this week. It was the first such attack since the war began, as Ukraine steps up its campaign to disrupt Russian oil and gas production.
According to preliminary information, the drones damaged critical equipment on both platforms and suspended production, the source added.
Reuters was unable to immediately verify the report. Reuters contacted Lukoil for comment.
It was unclear where Ukraine launched the attack from — the Caspian Sea is more than 700 km (435 miles) from the country’s nearest border.
Kiev has carried out numerous drone strikes on Russian oil facilities this year in an effort to undermine Moscow’s ability to finance its war in Ukraine.
The strikes have mainly targeted oil refineries, many of them located in the European part of Russia.
Ukraine expanded its campaign last month to target unregulated tankers carrying Russian oil through the Black Sea. Three such ships have been hit by Ukrainian naval drones in the past two weeks.
Source: here
North Korean leader Kim greets troops returning from mission in Russia, state media reports
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un presides over the 13th plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency, December 12, 2025.
SEOUL, Dec. 13 (Reuters) – North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attended a welcome ceremony for an army engineering unit that had returned home after completing its duties in Russia, the North Korean news agency KCNA reported on Saturday.
In a speech delivered by KCNA, Kim praised the officers and soldiers of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) 528th Engineering Regiment for their “heroic” conduct and “mass heroism” in carrying out orders issued by the ruling Korean Workers’ Party during a 120-day mission abroad.
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Video footage released by North Korea showed soldiers in uniform disembarking from an aircraft, Kim embracing a soldier sitting in a wheelchair, and soldiers and officials gathered to welcome the troops.
KCNA said the unit was sent in early August and carried out combat and engineering tasks in Russia’s Kursk region during Moscow’s war with Ukraine.
Last month, Russia’s Defense Ministry said North Korean troops who helped Russia repel a major Ukrainian incursion into its western Kursk region are now playing an important role in clearing the area of mines.
Under a mutual defense pact between the two countries, North Korea sent about 14,000 soldiers to fight alongside Russia in Kursk last year, and more than 6,000 were killed, according to South Korean, Ukrainian, and Western sources.
Kim said nine soldiers were killed during the mission, describing their deaths as a “heartbreaking loss” and announcing that the regiment would receive the Order of Freedom and Independence. The nine fallen soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, along with other state honors, KCNA said.
The welcome ceremony took place on Friday in Pyongyang and was attended by high-ranking military officials, leaders of the ruling party, the soldiers’ families, and large crowds, according to the report.
In his speech, Kim said the regiment cleared dangerous areas under combat conditions and demonstrated “absolute loyalty” to the party and state. He also praised the political indoctrination, discipline, and unity among the troops, calling their performance a model for the armed forces.
North Korea has publicly honored its troops who fought for Russia in the war in Ukraine. In August, Kim praised them in a meeting with officers involved in overseas operations, while state media previously showed him laying out coffins draped with the national flag, which appeared to be the repatriation of soldiers killed alongside Russian forces.
Source: here
Philippines says fishermen injured, boats damaged by China in South China Sea
An aerial view of a Chinese Coast Guard ship sailing near the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, August 13, 2025. REUTERS/Adrian Portugal.
MANILA, Dec. 13 (Reuters) – The Philippine Coast Guard announced on Saturday that three Filipino fishermen were injured and two fishing boats suffered “significant damage” when Chinese coast guard ships fired water cannons at a disputed shoal in the South China Sea.
The Manila Coast Guard said nearly twenty-four Philippine fishing boats near Sabina Reef were targeted with water cannons and blocking maneuvers on Friday. A small Chinese coast guard boat also cut the anchor ropes of several Philippine boats, endangering their crews, it said.
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“The PCG calls on the Chinese Coast Guard to adhere to internationally recognized standards of conduct, prioritizing the preservation of life at sea over law enforcement claims that endanger the lives of innocent fishermen,” the Manila Coast Guard said in a statement.
The Chinese Embassy in Manila did not immediately respond to a request for comment outside of business hours. On Friday, China’s coast guard announced that it had driven away several Philippine vessels and taken “control measures.”
That statement, Philippine Coast Guard spokesman Jay Tarriela said Saturday, was an admission of an illegal act.
“They have admitted this wrongdoing to ordinary Filipino fishermen,” Tarriela said by telephone.
Philippine coast guard ships it deployed to assist the injured fishermen were also repeatedly blocked from reaching Sabina Shoal.
“Despite these unprofessional and illegal interferences, the PCG managed to reach the fishermen this morning and provided immediate medical care to the injured, along with essential supplies,” the statement said.
Sabina Shoal, which China calls Xianbin Reef and the Philippines calls Escoda Shoal, is located in the Philippine exclusive economic zone, 150 km (95 miles) west of Palawan province.
China claims almost the entire South China Sea, a waterway that carries over $3 trillion in trade annually. The areas it claims overlap with the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
An international arbitration tribunal ruled in 2016 that Beijing’s sweeping claims had no basis in international law, a decision that China rejects.
Source: here
Taurus Neo and the future of the European rocket industrial base
Modernization of Taurus, replacement of the engine, and reorganization of the Taurus supply chain.
Photo: Saab
In October 2024, reports first indicated that the Bundeswehr was interested in acquiring the Taurus Neo land attack cruise missile, the successor to the Taurus KEPD 350, which had been widely discussed in the context of possible deliveries to Ukraine.
On December 17, 2025, the German Parliament will meet to vote, among other things, on the allocation of funding for the Taurus Neo. It is important to note that this funding does not yet constitute a firm order for missiles. Instead, it supports preparations for subsequent series production, apparently providing between €400 million and €500 million for this effort.
This post outlines how Taurus Neo will differ from its predecessor and analyzes what the project reveals about Europe’s missile industrial base.
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Taurus KEPD 350
The Taurus KEPD 350, in its original configuration, is powered by an American P8300-15 turbofan engine from Williams International in Michigan, providing high thrust with relatively low fuel consumption.
The missile is equipped with a robust midcourse guidance suite that combines a satellite-assisted inertial measurement unit, terrain contour matching (TERCOM), and image-based navigation via an imaging infrared seeker, which compares encountered landmarks with pre-stored maps. This system is an early precursor to AI-assisted image-based navigation used in modern drones and missiles, although it lacks the learning, feature abstraction, and online adaptability of AI-based systems. Terminal guidance uses the same IIR to home in on specific target points, delivering very high levels of accuracy, as repeatedly demonstrated in test launches.
The KEPD 350 is equipped with the MEPHISTO multi-effect warhead from German manufacturer TDW, which combines a shaped charge primary warhead with a secondary penetrating warhead capable of defeating buried and hardened targets.
Around 2018, half of the German KEPD 350 fleet underwent a mid-life upgrade, replacing the original satellite receiver with a more jam-resistant M-Code GPS receiver, also fitted to the KEPD 350K export variant supplied to South Korea. The remaining missiles in Germany’s inventory will be overhauled under a second modernization contract awarded in 2025.
Germany’s new cruise missile: Taurus Neo
Taurus Neo will likely introduce major changes to most of the components used in the Taurus KEPD 350.
The biggest change concerns the engine, which is to be completely replaced. This task is difficult because high-performance turbofan engines are hard to find, especially in Europe, which has long neglected its mini-turbofan industry. Early reports suggested that German-Swedish manufacturer Taurus Systems GmbH might procure a replacement from Japan, while hartpunkt reports now indicate that German engine manufacturer ADW might be the preferred supplier.
ADW’s product portfolio includes several mini turbojet engines suitable for small cruise missiles and drones (< 2 kN thrust), but no turbofan engines for large, heavy missiles such as the Taurus Neo, which require significantly higher thrust (> 6 kN). Therefore, the development of a new turbofan would be necessary. This is feasible for a company with ADW’s experience in mini-jet engine technology, but the project involves a certain level of risk, which the Bundeswehr seems willing to accept.
A newly developed engine would likely be state-of-the-art, meaning that modest performance gains can be expected from advanced manufacturing and improved materials compared to the Williams International turbofan, which is over two decades old, increasing the missile’s range by perhaps 10 to 20 percent. If much greater range is desired, a structural modification will likely be necessary to provide additional internal fuel volume.
It appears that the Taurus Neo will also receive a new IIR seeker. This makes sense, given that the original Taurus seeker was designed in the late 1990s, based on cooled mid-wave infrared sensors with relatively low pixel resolution, limited processing power, and a narrow spectral range. Replacing it with a more modern solution will provide better image recognition and noise rejection, ultimately increasing the missile’s accuracy in both the mid-course and terminal phases of flight. As for the IIR sensor, it is also very likely that the missile’s mission planning software will integrate AI solutions, similar to other modern missile systems.
The warhead system could remain largely unchanged and will most likely retain the advanced vacuum and layer counting warhead system used in the Taurus KEPD 350 for the time being. However, the mechanical fuse of the penetrating warheads (called PIMPF) could be replaced with an electronic fuse similar to that used in the American JASSM and JASSM-ER cruise missiles. This would improve reliability, safety in maneuverability, and accuracy of detonation timing.
If weight or, more importantly, space becomes an issue in the Taurus Neo, it might be possible to consider removing the main warhead with a shaped charge. This would reduce lethality against more complex types of targets, particularly those incorporating layered steel and concrete elements ( ), although the vast majority of targets, including hardened ones, could still be engaged with great effectiveness.
Finally, strengthening the missile against electronic warfare appears to be a priority for Taurus Neo, which is reasonable given Russia’s demonstrated ability to easily eliminate Ukrainian missile systems, including those supplied by the West that incorporate advanced M-Code satellite receivers (e.g., some GMLRS variants). However, with TERCOM and improved image-based navigation, Taurus Neo should already be capable of operating in GPS-denied environments.
Taurus Neo and the European missile industrial base
After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the demonstrated need for large numbers of missile systems, it became clear years ago that Germany’s missile arsenal would require quantitative expansion if Germany were serious about providing the conventional backbone of the continent. At the same time, Germany has delayed committing to new missile orders, and to date, there are no confirmed orders.
In 2022 and 2023, the lack of orders could be explained in part, if not primarily, by limited political will to invest in “offensive” missile capabilities and a clear preference for prioritizing missile defense. By mid-2024, this explanation had weakened, as publicly available data suggested that the industry was ready to resume production, and a change in the German government in 2025 appeared to create a more favorable environment for missile procurement.
The fact that, by the end of 2025, there is still no firm order for new Taurus missiles seems to be significantly related to the radically changed security environment in Europe, which not only sees Russia as an existential threat but has also lost confidence in the United States as a reliable partner in the defense industry and a trusted ally.
Political scientists know that basing arguments on counterfactuals is risky. However, it is plausible that if the geopolitical rift between Europe and the United States in 2025 had not occurred, Germany would not have made such an effort to decouple the Taurus Neo supply chain from American manufacturers, even at the cost of development risk and longer delivery times. In that case, 2025 might have seen a firm order for Taurus Neo, not an allocation of funds for production preparation.
In terms of delivery timing, this matters. Already in 2024, when Taurus Neo was first mentioned publicly, it was stated that the first deliveries were not expected before 2029. At this stage, certification of a new production line and delivery of the initial rockets will likely be delayed until the early 2030s, even if next week’s funding vote will allow the manufacturer to ramp up its capabilities ahead of a formal contract by stockpiling critical materials, purchasing necessary equipment and facilities, and likely hiring and training workers.
Germany’s decision to reorganize the Taurus supply chain costs time it does not have, while simultaneously revitalizing Germany’s and Europe’s rocket industrial base in key areas. Given the persistent uncertainty about the future military and industrial defense role of the United States, the decision seems justified.
Source: here
Russia strikes Odessa and Chornomorsk ports: Three Turkish ships damaged in the attack
Russia attacked two Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea on Friday, damaging three Turkish ships, including one carrying food supplies. This happened a few days after Moscow threatened to “cut Ukraine off from the sea.” The attack was reported by Ukrainian officials and a ship owner.
Last week, Russian leader Vladimir Putin promised retaliation following Kiev’s maritime drone attacks on oil tankers in Moscow’s “ghost fleet.” These ships are used to export oil, considered the main source of funding for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Friday’s incident occurred a few hours after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggested to Putin that at least a limited ceasefire for energy facilities and ports would be desirable. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted images on social media of a major fire aboard a ship in the port of Chornomorsk in the Odessa region. Firefighters were trying to extinguish the flames.
“This proves that the Russians are not only ignoring the diplomatic opportunity, but are continuing the conflict to destroy normality in Ukraine,” Zelensky commented.
The ship’s owner, Cenk Shipping, reported that the Cenk T was attacked at around 4 p.m. Ukrainian time. “At this time, there are no reports of casualties or injuries among the crew. Based on the information available, the damage appears to be limited,” a statement said. The Russian Defense Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
NAVIGATION SAFETY JEOPARDIZED
“The attack targets civilian logistics and commercial transport,” said Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Kuleba. Russia attacked Ukrainian ports using drones and ballistic missiles. Kuleba specified that an employee of a private company was injured in the attack on the port of Odessa and that a cargo ship was damaged there.
The Ukrainian Navy spokesman announced that three ships were damaged in total, all of which were owned by Turkey. No further details were provided. The Turkish Foreign Ministry confirmed the damage in the port of Chornomorsk, noting that there were no casualties among Turkish citizens.
The ship was identified by its design and bow name, which match the images in the Cenk T. ship file. “We reiterate the need for an agreement to prevent the escalation of the conflict in the Black Sea and the suspension of attacks that threaten the safety of navigation and energy and port infrastructure,” the Turkish ministry’s statement said.
The large Black Sea ports in the Odessa region are an essential economic artery for Ukraine, which is a major exporter of goods. In addition to Russia’s “ghost fleet” of oil tankers, Kiev has increased pressure on Moscow by targeting ships in the Caspian Sea this week, including vessels carrying military equipment and a major oil platform.
Source: here
Turkish-owned RoPax on fire after Russian attack on Odessa region
RoPax on fire after Russian attack on Ukraine’s port region (Telegram)
A Turkish-owned RoPax carrying cargo to Ukraine was set on fire during a Russian attack at noon on the Odessa Sea region. Reports indicate that one person, possibly a dock worker, was injured, but there were no fatalities.
The Ukrainian Air Force issued the alert at around 3 p.m. local time, reporting high-speed targets coming from the south. At least two ballistic missiles are believed to have been launched, as well as a drone strike. This followed a nighttime bombardment of the same region, which reportedly left more than 90,000 families without electricity. The missiles targeted Odessa and Chornomorsk, while the drones also targeted Pividennyi.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry confirmed a strike on the ships, reporting that the crew and truck drivers were being evacuated. Photos and videos posted online show the front section of the ship in flames, with Ukrainian firefighters working to control the blaze.
The ship is the Cenk Cenk TT, owned by Turkey’s Cenk RoRo. Built in 1978, the ship previously operated for Stena and has been owned by the Turks since 2021. It has a displacement of 21,000 GT/8,400 dwt and a capacity to carry up to 130 trucks. Security consultants Vanguard quote the ship’s owners as saying that the ship was carrying “essential food supplies.”
The Turkish ministry, in its statement, reiterated its “concerns about maritime security and freedom of navigation as the ongoing war in our region spreads to the Black Sea… We stress again the importance of urgently ending the war between Russia and Ukraine and recall the need for an arrangement to ensure the safety of navigation in the Black Sea and for the parties to suspend attacks targeting energy and port infrastructure to prevent escalation.”
Vanguard quotes the Ukrainian Navy as reporting that a total of three ships were damaged in today’s attacks on two of Ukraine’s ports. Details about the other ships have not been confirmed, and the damage appears minor compared to the Cenk T, which continued to burn late into the night.
Source: here
Anatomy of the “most difficult” issue in the peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine: territory
President Volodymyr Zelensky says territory remains the “most difficult” issue in ongoing peace talks to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. Vladimir Putin says the Trump administration’s controversial 28-point plan “could serve as the basis for a final peace agreement.” He continues to insist that Ukraine withdraw from the parts of the Donbas region it still holds. Ukraine has so far refused to cede the territory, despite pressure from Washington. Although the most recent meeting between Russian and American negotiators failed to break the deadlock, both Kiev and Moscow appear to be shifting their positions to focus on territory as the main red line. Using maps, charts, and military theory, Meduza analyzes each side’s position and what it might take to end the war.
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Where has this round of peace talks left us?
The latest round of peace talks began on November 19, after reports emerged that Russia and the United States were quietly drafting a new plan to end the war in Ukraine. The 28-point proposal emerged that same day and immediately drew criticism for resembling a Kremlin “wish list.” Two days later, Vladimir Putin publicly stated that the plan could serve as “the basis for a final peace agreement.”
The ensuing negotiations were chaotic, with phone calls between negotiators leaked to the press and delegations crossing continents for face-to-face meetings. Volodymyr Zelensky and his European allies proposed amendments to narrow the plan down to 28 points, but the public has yet to see an updated proposal, and territorial issues remain a major sticking point.
Putin has repeatedly insisted that Ukraine withdraw its troops from the parts of Donbas it still controls, which Kiev says it will not do. According to Zelensky, the territory remains “the most difficult” issue in the ongoing talks. After a five-hour meeting in the Kremlin on December 2, President Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law Jared Kushner failed to secure any compromise from Putin. Kremlin adviser Yuri Ushakov told reporters after the talks that territory remains the “main issue” for the Russian side. “Some American proposals are acceptable to the Russian Federation, and some are not,” he said.
Donald Trump’s desire to strike a deal to end the war has generated a cyclical and volatile negotiation process, in which the US alternately pressures both sides — a strategy outlined in 2024 by Keith Kellogg, Trump’s future (and now departing) envoy to Ukraine.
As for Russia and Ukraine, their real objectives in the negotiations remain less clear. Earlier in the process, it seemed that Moscow and Kyiv were fighting to convince Trump that the other side was the real obstacle to peace and therefore deserved American punishment. Meanwhile, both Moscow and Kiev were prepared to continue fighting unless their opponent completely surrendered their positions. However, the latest round of talks suggests that neither Russia nor Ukraine is opposed to peace in principle, and their terms for ending the war appear to be converging. Most likely, Trump’s pressure is not the only influential factor here: developments on the front lines, economic considerations, and domestic politics are also at play.
What does Trump’s 28-point plan say about territorial control?
According to the document that reached the press, “territories” are point 21 in the Trump administration’s peace plan. It states that:
- Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian, including by the United States.
- Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen on the line of contact, which will represent de facto recognition on that line.
- Russia will give up other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.
- Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of the Donetsk region they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.
Are Russia and Ukraine willing to compromise on territory?
Although Putin seems determined to control the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which together form the Donbas, he has not officially abandoned his goal of conquering Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. (Russia officially annexed all four territories in September 2022.) Instead, he repeats the same line about Ukraine withdrawing “from the territories it occupies.”
However, there are signs that Russian authorities are considering a compromise in line with Trump’s plan. After Putin met with Trump in Alaska in August, Kremlin officials stopped explicitly demanding the surrender of all four regions. Then, in his leaked conversation with Ushakov, Witkoff said, “I know what it will take to make a peace deal: Donetsk and maybe a land swap somewhere.” He did not mention the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. (Russia already occupies the entire Luhansk region, as well as Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.)
It remains unclear whether Putin would accept the status of the territories to be ceded to Russia under the American proposal. Specifically, he may object to the creation of a demilitarized buffer zone and/or the lack of international recognition that these territories are part of Russia. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Russian official recently told NBC that there are “three pillars” on which Moscow will not compromise: “One is the territory of Donbas. The second is the limitation of Ukraine’s armed forces. The third is the recognition of the territory by America and Europe.”
Based on negotiations between Ukraine and the United States, it appears that Kiev remains opposed to the idea of a land swap. Zelensky has also said that the territorial issue should only be discussed after a ceasefire is in place. (Meanwhile, Kremlin officials insist that a ceasefire can only happen after Ukraine withdraws its troops.)
Compared to statements made a year ago, it seems that some progress has been made. In 2024, Ukraine was still promoting a peace formula that called for the complete restoration of territorial integrity and the complete withdrawal of Russian troops. And the Kremlin argued that Ukraine should immediately withdraw its forces from Donbas, as well as from the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, otherwise “every subsequent proposal will be worse.”
Why is a small piece of Donbas such a major point of contention?
The parts of Donbas that remain under Kyiv’s control are mainly in the Kramatorsk and Sloviansk agglomerations — and have limited strategic value, especially compared to the areas Russia already occupies in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
The 28-point plan calls for Russia to relinquish territories it controls outside Crimea and the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. However, exchanging the occupied areas in the Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions for the rest of Donbas would not have given the Russian army any noticeable military advantage. Kramatorsk is separated from Kharkiv by the Severskiy Donets River and from Nipro by a sparsely populated, hilly plain interrupted by rivers and ravines.
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, fewer than 700,000 people lived in the Ukrainian-controlled areas of Donbas. Many of them subsequently evacuated as the front line crept westward.
Population density in the Donetsk region in 2020, according to data from the European Commission’s GHSL project. The current front line is superimposed on the map.
Meduza/OSM/GHSL/
Part of the territory northeast of Kramatorsk was devastated during the fighting and occupation in 2022. The region’s economy and industry were destroyed, and the front line now runs through Ukraine’s largest and most important industrial asset — the main producer of coking coal for the ferrous metals industry, the Pokrovsk Coal Company.
The Seversky Donets–Donbas Canal would be of great importance to a Russian-controlled Donbas, as it is the main source of water for Donetsk and other cities. The canal originates from a water intake facility near the Ukrainian-controlled city of Sloviansk. However, seizing the entire canal would not guarantee a solution to the water crisis in Donetsk, as the reservoirs that feed it are located in the Ukrainian-controlled Kharkiv region. Moreover, some reservoirs have now dried up because their hydraulic systems have been destroyed.
However, these points are largely secondary, as these territories have greater symbolic than practical significance. It is no wonder that even the issue of security guarantees seems somehow less important than the Donbas issue.
How could the two sides reach a peace agreement?
In recent decades, economists and historians have developed rationalist explanations for war using game theory. These arguments reduce war to a competition for certain “benefits” (or “goods”) — whether it be control over territories, borders, or other states, or tangible commercial advantages, increased security, and so on. Typically, a state participating in this “competition” acts on the basis of incomplete information, particularly when it comes to the intentions and strength of its adversary, as well as its own relative military capabilities. In many cases, a state (regardless of its political system) believes that its theoretical advantages will allow it to obtain certain “benefits” by force, not through negotiation. Likewise, lacking complete information, the adversary believes it can mount a defense. These dynamics often contribute to the outbreak of wars.
War itself is then a process of acquiring missing information—about a state’s own power, the capabilities of its adversary, and the intentions of potential allies and enemies—through a series of battles.
Political scientist Dan Reiter studied the outcomes of military conflicts through the lens of game theory in his monograph How Wars End. And many elements of his model are applicable to the Russia–Ukraine war. (Meduza used Reiter’s model to analyze an earlier round of peace negotiations here.)
According to Reiter, the results of battles influence proposals for ending the war, which may change accordingly. (For example, if a state sees virtually no chance of victory, it is inclined to make concessions to end the war.) Final peace plans emerge when both sides acquire sufficient information about their military prospects and decide that the risks of continuing the war outweigh the benefits. So, if one side does not achieve a series of decisive victories, the process of reaching this “equilibrium” is prolonged.
When the Kremlin launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it expected an immediate and total victory (hence the initial attempt to encircle Kyiv). It acted on lessons learned from the 2014–2015 Donbas War, when the Ukrainian army was unable to resist Russia’s invasion. The war in Syria also taught the Russian command that the Aerospace Forces were an effective tool for suppressing pockets of resistance and that tactical battalion groups deployed by brigades and regiments were well suited for combat operations. It is also likely that Kremlin officials believed that Ukrainian society and the government would not mobilize and deploy a fighting force, and that the West would offer Ukraine only symbolic support.
All of these assumptions proved to be false. Thus, after a series of unsuccessful battles, the Russian command adopted a new strategy in mid-2023 that no longer envisaged a quick victory. Since then, the Kremlin has attempted to overwhelm Ukraine in a war of attrition. As a result, Putin succeeded in convincing Kyiv and its Western allies that any violation of Ukraine’s sovereign territory would be a victory for Russia (this is partly due to the exaggerated expectations of Ukraine and the West in 2023, when Kyiv was still seeking to liberate all territories occupied by force).
According to Reiter’s model, if a state is fighting for a “good” that it considers “indivisible,” then it will tend to seek an absolute outcome, even if the chances of achieving it are low and the risks are high. In the current context of the Russia-Ukraine war, the issue of sovereignty has been diluted, with control over the entire Donbas becoming an “indivisible good” for both sides. Kyiv has no plans to cede the Donbas without a fight, and the Kremlin could not declare a victorious end to the war without conquering the entire region. (After all, “protecting the people of Donbas” was a pretext for Russia’s invasion in 2022.)
Based on the fighting in recent months, the Kremlin has drawn new conclusions, leading it to believe that its manpower and, to some extent, its equipment and organizational advantages mean that it can expect to occupy the remaining 21.6% of the Donetsk region in the near future (approximately one year). However, the invading forces have captured half of the necessary territory in the last 12 months (approximately 12%), with Russia advancing mainly in the Zaporizhzhia region and within its own internationally recognized borders, pushing Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region.
The other Ukrainian territories that Russia claims to have annexed but does not fully control, the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, may not be as symbolically important to the Kremlin. (Even though the Constitution now lists them as “new subjects” of the Russian Federation.) Perhaps more importantly, the Russian military cannot seriously hope to completely conquer these two regions: that would mean crossing the Nipro River, which seems technically impossible given Ukraine’s current tactics (massive attacks on communications and logistics) and the current balance of power.
In his book, Reiter argues that fighting for an “indivisible good” can complicate reaching a peace agreement, but does not preclude ending a war. Historical examples of this include:
- Germany finally ceding Alsace-Lorraine to France in the 1918 armistice that ended World War I;
- Finland ceding parts of Karelia to the Soviet Union in the 1944 Moscow Armistice;
- The Korean War ended despite South Korea’s refusal to sign the 1953 armistice with the US, North Korea, and China because it insisted on a unified Korean Peninsula.
Kiev also seems to have learned from its experience on the battlefield. Although it has so far failed to stop the slow advance of the Russian army, Ukraine does not appear vulnerable to a quick and crushing defeat. This is due to the tactics developed by both sides — namely, the massive use of reconnaissance drones, artillery, and kamikaze drones as the primary means of inflicting damage. Drone warfare prevents the enemy from concentrating large numbers of troops along the front line, ruling out deep breaches and the encirclement of large formations (in other words, a crushing defeat). The country’s major cities — Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, and Nipro — are also not at risk of being captured quickly.
All these facts give Kyiv hope that, even if it does not achieve an “absolute” result, it could end the war on more favorable terms. If Ukraine manages to hold out for another year, Russia may make even greater concessions due to the rising costs of the war. (As Reiter explains, rising costs can cause a state to accept a “limited” outcome rather than an absolute one, even if it is still winning battles.)
As Reiter notes, third parties also influence how wars end. In this case, much depends on allies. If the EU manages to raise hundreds of billions of dollars to support Ukraine (for example, by using frozen Russian assets as collateral for loans to Kyiv, as is currently being discussed), and the US agrees to continue selling arms to Europe, then there may still be hope.
However, there are also risks. The Russian army’s plans include not only attacking areas of Donbas still under Ukrainian control, but also advancing into the Zaporizhzhia region. This offers both military (forcing the Ukrainian army command to deploy precious reserves to this area) and political advantages. If the war ends with the Zaporizhzhia region divided along the front line, then Ukraine risks losing a significant amount of territory in the coming months.
And there is always the risk that if Ukraine suffers further defeats, Putin will make the proposed peace terms even worse for Kyiv.
According to Reiter, concerns about the enemy’s compliance with a peace treaty often cause a state to ignore the results of battles and pursue absolute victory, perceived as the most durable of all guarantees. Capturing an “asset” that strengthens the chances that the war will not resume — such as an important strategic position or an economic facility critical to the enemy — may convince the winner to accept a limited victory. But because there is no way to ensure eternal compliance with a peace treaty, many wars become cyclical.
The “guarantee problem” was the biggest obstacle during the initial Russia–Ukraine peace talks in the spring of 2022. However, this issue seems to have become less significant over the past three and a half years, especially when compared to issues of sovereignty and territory. Kyiv continues to insist on its proposal to join NATO, and the Kremlin insists that Ukraine radically reduce the size of its army. But the war-weary camps seem willing to settle for weak guarantees from the United States. Together with formally unresolved territorial disputes, this increases the risk of a new war under even less favorable conditions for both sides (e.g., after the enemy has had a chance to recover and rearm, or in the midst of an internal crisis).
However, all empirical models have their limitations, and because large interstate wars are relatively rare, the available data remains limited. Every war is unique, as are the conditions of the peace that follows. Nevertheless, we can cautiously assume that, since both sides have filled in much of the “incomplete information,” the war between Russia and Ukraine may be nearing its end. However, empirical data show that the final stages of achieving a “logical” armistice may be protracted. In the case of the Korean War, this happened only two years after the front line stabilized.
Source: here
NSS is strategy
Finally: clarity, hierarchy, and a foreign policy with backbone.
The recently published National Security Strategy is superb. What makes the document powerful is not the prose, but the clarity. For the first time in decades, America has a strategy based not on theories, slogans, or airy-fairy talk about an “international community,” but on the concrete interests of a real nation: ours.
In Newsweek last year, I argued that America needed to shake off its post-Cold War primacy hangover with what I called stoicism in foreign policy: humility, hierarchy, and a sober respect for the nation-state, focused on changing what can most easily be changed and prioritizing the most concrete threats. The world of think tanks—even conservative ones—treats these arguments as eccentric, premature, or impolite. But the new NSS not only acknowledges this logic; it fits abruptly like a long-overdue correction. For those of us who have been making this argument from the margins, the document seems revolutionary not because it reflects us, but because it pulls the center of gravity toward reality.
It is not an editorial; it is a plan for governing.
Many commentators, desperate to pigeonhole the document into familiar categories, have been quick to label it “realistic” or “restrained.” But that completely misses the point. America First, as presented here, is not realism in the master’s seminar sense. It is realism in the statesman’s sense: clarity about ends, honesty about means, and an unconditional commitment to the fate of the republic.
The NSS captures this in one of its most important lines: America First is “pragmatic without being ‘pragmatic,’ realistic without being ‘realistic,’ principled without being ‘idealistic,’ muscular without being ‘bellicose,’ and restrained without being ‘dovish.'” This is not just a doctrinal statement; it is a moral one. Intellectual schools of foreign policy have their uses, but the real task of strategy is simpler and older: to determine what is necessary for the survival and flourishing of the nation and then to do it, without distraction, excuses, or illusions.
This also explains why so many critics, especially in Europe, reacted to the strategy with alarm and theatrical indignation. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk lamented: “Dear American friends, Europe is your closest ally, not your problem.” A chorus of think-tankers joined in. But these reactions say more about European expectations than about the strategy itself. Far from rejecting Europe, the NSS places Europe exactly where it belongs: not above America’s fundamental interests, not below them, but in a hierarchy of priorities.
The truth is that criticism of Europe is based on selectively projected fantasies. For years, and even now, Europe has condemned America’s pursuit of its own interests, especially in the Western Hemisphere, while expecting the United States to support its defense, restrain its adversaries, and bear the political and financial costs of its own hesitations. Yet the same Europe that demands America’s unwavering commitment has repeatedly sided with China, ignored the obvious vulnerabilities of its energy policy, and treated the alliance with the US as a kind of moral entitlement rather than a strategic relationship.
The NSS simply seeks to restore symmetry. It recognizes Europe’s historical and cultural importance and the enduring value of the alliance, while making it clear that sovereign nations have sovereign responsibilities. States are not students. They respond to incentives. They pursue interests. They can and must be pushed, not coddled. The United States expects Europe to contribute not because we care less about Europe, but because we believe Europe can do more.
The most striking aspect of the NSS is that it breaks the silence on the Western Hemisphere in particular. For decades, major think tanks have ignored the region. They maintain chairs for Europe, Asia, and the Middle East; host conferences on Indo-Pacific architecture and European burden-sharing; publish white papers on the Gulf, NATO, Taiwan. Yet the hemisphere, the region that most directly shapes the survival of the American republic, has been treated largely as an afterthought. The very few people who work on hemispheric issues can assure you: this is the most revolutionary development in US foreign policy in recent years. The NSS finally acknowledges what has long been obvious: Asia may be the global priority, but the hemisphere is the civilizational one.
The NSS finally says aloud what many of us have been arguing in whispers: proximity shapes power. If the United States wants to compete with China—economically, technologically, militarily—it must simultaneously secure the space in which its own republic exists. A great power does not project power globally while losing authority regionally. China seems to understand this instinctively. It does not confront nuclear competitors while tolerating cartel leadership at its own doorstep. It does not talk about deterrence while allowing mass migration that tests the civic and economic foundations of the nation itself. A republic that cannot control its borders cannot control its destiny. A country that allows hostile powers to infiltrate its hemisphere cannot act with clarity abroad.
Every statesman since John Quincy Adams and Alexander Hamilton has understood that the Western Hemisphere is not a sentimental concern; it is a strategic condition for national survival. What the NSS offers is not just nostalgia for the Monroe Doctrine, nor a revival of the Cold War, nor a concession to diaspora pressure groups. It offers something much simpler: recognition that the United States must secure its neighborhood if it intends to remain a sovereign power. As the Founders believed, as the early republic believed, as any serious strategist has believed, the hemisphere matters most because geography is not an academic abstraction. And that is part of the philosophical simplicity of America First. It starts with what is right in front of us, not with what flatters our moral vanity.
Some critics dismiss this as too transactional or insufficiently moral. But the NSS proves the opposite. It is moral precisely because it is responsible. It understands that before the United States can lead a coalition in Asia, or influence outcomes in Europe, or broker peace in the Middle East, it must remain a functioning republic. A country that does not trust its sovereignty, is not secure within its borders, is not rooted in its own civilizational heritage, is not a country capable of bearing the burdens of a great power. America First is not isolationist. It is not primatism. It is republican in the deepest sense. It is a strategic doctrine based on the conviction that the American people deserve a government that protects them before protecting the world.
The genius of the NSS is that it refuses to anthropomorphize states or sentimentalize alliances. It does not treat allies as fragile ornaments or adversaries as cartoon antagonists. It does not pretend that the United States can forever subsidize those who refuse to subsidize themselves. It rejects the frivolity of the last 30 years: the fantasy that America could dominate the world at no cost, without prioritization, and without consequences at home.
Bottom of form
Top of form
Bottom of form
The NSS asks more of Europe because Europe has the wealth, population, and institutions to do more—and because the alliance must be reciprocal if it is to endure. It reframes Asia not as an arena for ideological crusades, but as the central theater of economic and technological competition. It approaches the Middle East not as a moral mission, but as an area of interest. And it treats Africa not as a canvas for liberal guilt, but as a landscape of opportunities and risks.
Not all disruption is destructive. Any honest historian knows that the most destabilizing act can be simply to face reality after decades of refusing to see it. The NSS forces that judgment. It is not a manifesto or a theory. It is a strategy built not for the world we wished for, but for the world we actually inhabit.
Ultimately, its power lies in restoring American governance to its proper foundation: a sovereign people deserve a sovereign strategy. For the first time in a long while, we finally have one.
Source: here
Black Sea tanker attacks endanger civilian seafarers, warns ITF
The International Transport Workers’ Federation has condemned recent attacks on ships operating in the Black Sea after the third Ukrainian marine drone attack on a tanker belonging to the Russian secret fleet, warning that civilian sailors should never be treated as targets in conflicts.
An oil tanker transiting Ukraine’s exclusive economic zone en route to Novorossiysk was struck and disabled by Ukrainian maritime drones in what is believed to be the third such incident in recent weeks involving ships described as part of Russia’s “shadow fleet.” The attacks follow similar attacks on the tankers Kairos and Virat on November 28 and 29.
“Seafarers are not a weapon of war,” said Mark Dickinson, vice president of the ITF Seafarers’ Section and general secretary of Nautilus International. “They are civilians just doing their jobs, often in extremely difficult and precarious conditions.”
Although the ships involved may be linked to sanctions evasion or broader geopolitical tensions, the ITF stressed that the civilian crews on board are not participating in conflicts. Many are multinational seafarers working in difficult conditions, often with poor wages and weak protections, the organization said.
Dickinson highlighted the vulnerability of crews working under the Flag of Convenience system, where ship owners register ships in countries with no real oversight. “This leaves them with little real power to refuse dangerous voyages and often without clear information about where the ship is headed or the risks involved,” he said.
The ITF warned that crews working on ships without robust regulatory frameworks face increased exposure to exploitation and unsafe working conditions — risks that are amplified when conflicts spill over into shipping trade routes.
“Many of these seafarers are already working at the bottom of an industry that too often fails them,” Dickinson said. “That vulnerability cannot be used to excuse violence. No political or military objective justifies endangering civilian crews.”
Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Black Sea has been transformed into an active danger zone for commercial shipping, where civilian sailors face the real and ongoing threat of mines, drones, and missile attacks. The attacks have sent shockwaves through the maritime industry, with war insurance costs for ships sailing to the Black Sea rising dramatically.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded with stern warnings that Moscow will intensify attacks on Ukrainian facilities and ships.
The shadow fleet — a collection of aging tankers, often with opaque ownership structures — has become central to Russia’s efforts to circumvent Western sanctions on its oil exports. Ukraine’s targeting of these ships is a strategic effort to disrupt this trade route and put economic pressure on Moscow’s war effort.
The ITF has reiterated its call on all parties involved in conflicts to respect international humanitarian and maritime law, reduce tensions, and take all necessary measures to protect civilian seafarers.
“Seafarers keep global trade moving, even in times of war and crisis,” said Dickinson. “They should not be treated as expendable or collateral damage. The ITF condemns any attack that harms or endangers seafarers anywhere in the world, and we will continue to speak out until their safety is fully respected.”
The ITF continues to monitor the situation closely and stands ready to support any seafarers affected by incidents in the Black Sea or other conflict-affected waters.
Source: here
“We are Russia’s next target,” warns NATO chief, stressing that “the time for action is now”
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned allies during a speech in Berlin on December 11, 2025, that “We are Russia’s next target and we are already in danger.”
While NATO allies, spurred for years by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, committed at the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague to invest 5% of GDP in defense annually by 2035, Rutte’s message in Berlin had a greater sense of urgency.
“When I became NATO secretary general last year, I warned that what is happening in Ukraine could also happen to allied countries, that we must shift to a war mentality,” he said. I fear that too many are complacent and content; too many do not feel the urgency, and too many believe that time is on our side. It is not; the time for action is now.”
“We must be prepared,” Rutte said, “because at the end of this first quarter of the21st century,conflicts are no longer fought from a distance; conflict is at our doorstep.
“Russia has brought war back to Europe, and we must be prepared for the scale of war that our grandparents and great-grandparents endured.”
Rutte also pointed out that, with China’s support, Russia will not exhaust its military resources in Ukraine.
“How is Putin able to continue his war against Ukraine? The answer is China,” Rutte said. “China is Russia’s lifeline. China wants to prevent its ally from losing in Ukraine. Without China’s support, Russia would not be able to continue this war.”
Regarding a possible peace plan for Ukraine, Rutte said: “President Trump wants to end the bloodshed now, and he is the only one who can bring Putin to the negotiating table, so let’s put Putin to the test; let’s see if he really wants peace or if he prefers the slaughter to continue.”
In mid-December, European leaders continued to meet and discuss a possible peace plan with Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelensky. However, the peace plan currently being presented by the Trump administration would mean that Ukraine would have to withdraw from the eastern Donbas region to create a so-called “free economic zone,” while Russian forces would remain free in the parts of Donbas they currently occupy: a concession that Zelenskyy told reporters in Kyiv on December 11 that Ukraine cannot make. Zelensky also commented that he does not see how this unoccupied zone could be monitored, undoubtedly believing that Putin would exploit this to advance Russian forces even further.
Ukraine has called for a freeze on the entire front line, including in Donbas, in the event of a ceasefire.
Source: here
US Navy activates second MQ-4C Triton drone squadron to enhance high-altitude surveillance
In early November 2025, the US Department of War announced that the US Navy had established Unmanned Patrol Squadron Eleven, equipped with MQ-4C Tritons. This move makes VUP-11 the Navy’s second operational Triton squadron, reinforcing the growing role of unmanned aircraft in maritime patrol and reconnaissance.
In early November 2025, the US Department of War announced that the US Navy had advanced its unmanned aviation capabilities by establishing Unmanned Patrol Squadron Eleven. Known as VUP-11, the unit becomes the Navy’s second operational squadron flying the MQ-4C Triton, a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aircraft system designed to support maritime patrol and reconnaissance missions over vast ocean areas.
The MQ-4C Triton is a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aircraft system developed by Northrop Grumman for the US Navy, designed to provide persistent maritime surveillance and real-time intelligence over vast ocean regions. (Image source: US Department of War)
The MQ-4C Triton is the US Navy’s most advanced unmanned platform, designed to deliver persistent, theater-level maritime ISR. Manufactured by Northrop Grumman and derived from the US Air Force’s RQ-4 Global Hawk, the MQ-4C has been extensively adapted for maritime operations. The aircraft has reinforced wings, de-icing systems, and reinforced fuselage components, allowing it to operate in harsh ocean environments for extended periods. Capable of flying at altitudes above 50,000 feet (15,240 m) for over 24 continuous hours, the Triton can surveil vast swaths of maritime space while simultaneously transmitting critical real-time information to joint commanders and fleet assets.
The MQ-4C’s mission profile is built around sustained ISR and maritime domain awareness (MDA). It can identify and track surface vessels, monitor exclusive economic zones (EEZs), support anti-submarine warfare (ASW) coordination, and conduct large-scale intelligence gathering. The aircraft is equipped with the AN/ZPY-3 Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS) radar, which can scan over 2.7 million square miles (7 million square kilometers) in a single mission. Complementing this radar are high-resolution electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors and advanced electronic support measures (ESM), which enable the aircraft to intercept, classify, and geolocate signals of interest. This makes the Triton invaluable for both strategic deterrence and tactical support in times of peace and crisis.
What sets the MQ-4C apart from previous maritime patrol systems is its ability to deliver uninterrupted ISR without putting crews at risk. The platform serves as a key enabler of the US Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept, which emphasizes flexibility, resilience, and broad situational awareness in contested environments. Paired with the P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime (MMA) manned aircraft, the MQ-4C forms a complementary team. While the Poseidon provides ASW capabilities, rapid attack- , and manned decision-making, the Triton provides long-endurance ISR coverage, allowing the fleet to maintain persistent surveillance over key maritime chokepoints, sea lanes, and emerging hot spots such as the South China Sea and Arctic approaches.
The establishment of a second MQ-4C drone squadron is more than just an expansion of force. It reflects a deliberate strategic decision to increase operational resilience and global ISR presence. With VUP-19 already operating from NAS Jacksonville, Florida, to support ISR operations in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Middle East, the establishment of VUP-11 at NAS Whidbey Island brings new coverage capabilities to the Pacific and Arctic regions. These regions are increasingly vital to U.S. strategic priorities, particularly in the context of intensifying naval activity by China and Russia.
This bi-coastal MQ-4C architecture allows the US Navy to conduct near-continuous ISR operations across multiple theaters without over-relying on human resources. In contingency or crisis scenarios, Tritons can be flexibly redeployed between coasts or theaters to maintain ISR continuity. As adversaries deploy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, Tritons provide the US Navy with the persistent surveillance it needs to penetrate and monitor contested spaces while reducing risk to personnel.
The designation VUP-11 revives the legacy of Patrol Squadron 11 (VP-11), known as the “Proud Pegasus,” which served for nearly five decades until its deactivation in 1997. The new unit also includes experienced personnel from the recently decommissioned Fleet One Air Reconnaissance Squadron (VQ-1), the “World Watchers,” who bring deep expertise in signals intelligence (SIGINT) and airborne reconnaissance operations. This combination of historical lineage and operational experience shapes VUP-11 into a particularly capable force.
Commander Nathen Whisler, executive officer of VUP-11, emphasized the importance of this lineage. “The Dark Horse name and insignia connect us to the successes of VP-11 Proud Pegasus, while also recognizing the contributions of the sailors transitioning from VQ-1 World Watchers,” he said. “As we begin to create our own legacy, we recognize that we stand on the shoulders of giants and build on the foundation laid by those who came before us.”
Although initial flight operations at NAS Whidbey Island are expected to begin in 2026, full operational capability (FOC) for VUP-11 is projected for 2027. The squadron’s development will continue in parallel with the evolving capabilities of the MQ-4C. The next major configuration, known as Increment 2, will expand the aircraft’s mission set to include multi-intelligence (Multi-INT) roles, including advanced SIGINT collection, electronic intelligence (ELINT), and targeting support. These upgrades will bring the MQ-4C closer to performing missions traditionally carried out by manned platforms such as the EP-3 Aries.
For the US Navy, VUP-11 is not just a new squadron. It is a critical node in a growing unmanned ISR architecture designed to provide global awareness, decision-making advantage, and maritime dominance. As a senior ISR official involved in Pacific planning told Army Recognition, “With Triton, we gain an uncompromising persistent presence. Whether it’s early warning, threat mapping, or support for kinetic operations, this platform ensures that US commanders see the full picture before adversaries act.
Source: here
The US Navy is considering the Coast Guard patrol ship as a new class of frigate after the cancellation of the Constellation
The US Navy is considering the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter as the basis for a new class of frigates after canceling most of the Constellation-class ships.
On December 12, 2025, Breaking Defense reported that the US Navy is considering the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter (NSC) as the basis for a new class of frigates after canceling most of the Constellation class program. Private remarks attributed to US Navy Secretary John Phelan indicate a preference for an American-designed hull and tighter limits on design changes in an effort to control growing requirements, shorten development timelines, and bring the first ship of the new class to market by 2028.
The Legend class, or National Security Cutter (NSC), is a US Coast Guard ship designed for long-range patrols, extended autonomy operations, and multi-mission maritime security tasks, rather than for top-tier naval combat. (Image source: US Coast Guard)
A US Navy spokesperson declined to expand on the remarks from the private dinner, beyond mentioning the secretary’s public comments, in which Phelan emphasized that the replacement should be a ship designed in America and that he wants tighter control over future change orders, including requiring any major changes to receive direct approval at the highest level. The US Navy’s procurement leadership linked this approach to a broader effort to shorten lead times by stabilizing designs before construction begins, with the stated goal of having the first ship of the new class of frigates in the water by 2028. This approach reflects a certain dissatisfaction with previous practices that allowed requirements to evolve during construction, contributing to delays and cost overruns. Taken together, the remarks and possible adaptation of the ship suggest that the US Navy is now prioritizing speed, predictability, and industrial stability as it resets its frigate strategy.
The Constellation class originated as the FFG(X) program, intended to deliver a new class of frigates to the US Navy capable of escort, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare missions, while reducing the operational demand for larger destroyers. In April 2020, the Navy awarded Fincantieri Marinette Marine a $795 million contract for the detailed design and construction of the lead ship, with options supporting an initial acquisition for multiple ships. The selected design was derived from the Franco-Italian FREMM, and early planning emphasized limiting changes to maintain schedule and cost discipline. Over time, the Navy expanded the program to six contracted ships, while long-term force planning anticipated at least 10 hulls in the first production batch. The program was conceived as a way to rapidly introduce a modern frigate, leveraging an existing design rather than pursuing a development from scratch.
As the Constellation class matured, the level of modification increased substantially, eroding the benefits of using a parent design and introducing cumulative challenges. By 2025, the ship was described as having only about 15% in common with the FREMM baseline, effectively making it a largely unique platform. Progress on the main ship’s construction was reported to be about 10% complete in April, and the estimated delivery date was pushed back to 2029, far exceeding initial expectations. Cost estimates followed a similar trajectory, moving from early figures of approximately $1 billion per ship to estimates closer to $1.4 billion. These results reinforced concerns among Navy leadership that the program structure allowed for repeated design changes, which in turn generated delays and higher costs that were difficult to reverse once construction had begun.
In parallel, on June 5, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security announced the cancellation of the construction of an 11th Legend-class cutter: this means that the NSC production line is not currently structured as an ongoing program, making the Navy’s decisions particularly important for industrial continuity. The decision to cancel most of the Constellation-class ships, as only two of these frigates are expected to remain, has immediate implications for the force structure and operational planning of the US Navy. The service said it would terminate, for convenience, the last four ships that had not begun construction, while continuing work on the first two hulls because their future status is still under review. This outcome leaves the US Navy without the scalable class of frigates it had intended to use, increasing its reliance on existing surface combatants to fulfill escort and presence missions.
At the same time, the Navy must manage the industrial consequences of cutting a major program, particularly at the Marinette shipyard, where workforce stability and supplier continuity have become central concerns. The cancellation of the Constellation class not only forces the US Navy to quickly identify a replacement, but also creates a narrower acquisition path, where program discipline becomes more critical. This means the service must solicit design decisions in advance, limit requirements growth, and accept compromises earlier than usual, as there is little margin to absorb delays without affecting force structure. If problems arise during the development of the replacement frigate, the Navy would have fewer immediate options to fall back on, especially given that destroyer production is already heavily constrained and optimized for other mission priorities. In this sense, cancellation forces a more decisive and less iterative approach than the Navy has often taken in surface combat programs.
At the same time, the absence of a parallel or cover program increases the consequences of failures during the transition period. With the Constellation class truncated and no other class of frigates already in production, the Navy will have to rely on existing surface combatants to cover escort, patrol, and presence missions more than planned. These slots have added operational demand for destroyers, which are more expensive to operate, but also for the National Security Cutter (NSC) itself, as the cancellation of the 11th hull in June 2025 confirmed that the production line was not being kept warm for an incremental expansion. As a result, if an NSC-derived frigate encountered integration or cost issues, the Navy would risk a production gap, not a smooth transition. This forces the US Navy to ensure that the selected class is mature enough to absorb changes without triggering cascading redesigns, as there are now fewer safety nets.
However, a frigate derived from the National Security Cutter could make sense in terms of speed, as it is based on a hull form already built in the US and which has accumulated operational experience in extensive missions. The Legend/NSC class is currently a cutter of approximately 4,600 long tons, with a length of 418 ft, a beam of 54 ft, and a draft of 22.5 ft, and uses combined diesel and gas propulsion, including an LM2500 gas turbine. Performance figures frequently associated with the class include speeds in excess of 28 knots, an advertised range of approximately 12,000 nautical miles, and endurance cycles of 60 to 90 days. In its Coast Guard configuration, the ship is equipped for a wide range of missions and is typically described as having a 57 mm gun and Phalanx CIWS, along with sensors and data links designed to support situational awareness and interoperability. These basic characteristics represent the starting point for any Navy-specific adaptation.
Adapting the NSC into a Navy frigate would require careful decisions regarding combat system integration, as each added capability affects the ship’s displacement, power margins, and overall balance. Industrial concepts previously associated with NSC-based patrol frigates illustrate the range of possible modifications, from relatively limited changes to more extensive variants. One such concept, often referred to as the Patrol Frigate 4921, has been described as adding a 12-cell Mk 56 launcher for ESSM, upgrading the main gun to a 76 mm Super Rapid, integrating Harpoon launchers and a torpedo launcher, and modifying the sonar arrangements to include a towed array. These additions were associated with a reduction in range from 12,000 to approximately 8,000 nautical miles, highlighting the trade-offs between combat capability and endurance. For the US Navy, the challenge would be to define a stable configuration early on, as reopening design decisions during construction would risk recreating the problems perceived in the Constellation class.
Source: here
France is developing a new launch system to enable its IDEI frigate to carry up to four times more missiles
The Naval Group is developing a French cold-launch vertical launch system to increase the missile capacity of the foreign-invested frigate by up to four times, according to Mer et Marine on December 12, 2025.
As reported by Mer et Marine on December 12, 2025, Naval Group is working on a cold launch missile system for the FDI frigate that could increase the ship’s missile capacity from 16 to up to 64 surface-to-air missiles. The system uses existing vertical launch spaces on the ship to support a higher density of missiles and alternative types of missiles, including CAMM and CAMM-ER.
With payloads approaching or exceeding dozens of medium- and long-range missiles, the FDI could have capabilities typically associated with much larger destroyers, such as the US Arleigh Burke class. (Image source: French Navy)
According to the article, Naval Group is developing a new French cold launch system for the FDI frigate to significantly increase the number of missiles the ship can carry, while avoiding dependence on US-made vertical launch systems. By using this cold launch architecture, the FDI’s surface-to-air missile load could increase from a baseline of 16 Aster missiles to configurations of up to 64 missiles, and potentially more if short-range systems are included. The approach is explicitly designed to integrate CAMM and CAMM-ER missiles without requiring the Lockheed Martin ExLS launcher. Rather than modifying the hull or sacrificing other mission areas, the solution exploits margins already built into the ship to maintain customer interest, allowing for different combinations of air defense and attack missiles.
The FDI’s forward deck configuration, central to this growth path, was designed from the outset around three separate pits for vertical launch systems (VLS) instead of a fixed, enclosed configuration. A large rectangular pit can accommodate two Sylver A50 modules installed side by side, providing space for 16 Aster missiles, either Aster 15 or Aster 30, depending on the equipment selected. In front of it are two square pits, each designed to receive a single launch module, which constitute the main reserve volume for future expansion. These front pits can accommodate either the Sylver A50 or the longer Sylver A70 launcher, which is required for missiles such as the MdCN naval cruise missile. As these spaces were integrated during the design phase, they can be reallocated to increase missile capacity without redesigning the ship.
According to Mer et Marine, Naval Group’s cold launch system is positioned as a national alternative to the US-made Extensible Launch System (ExLS) for CAMM missile integration. ExLS was examined as a possible solution for CAMM-ER integration, which led to temporary uncertainty about its adoption on the ISD. The clarified direction is that ExLS is not mandatory, as the cold launch solution developed in France will be designed to directly accommodate CAMM and CAMM-ER. This keeps the integration of launchers under French control while providing high missile density. The objective is to complement the Aster family by adding a dense layer of short- and medium-range interceptors, not to replace existing long-range capabilities. This approach also allows navies to remain flexible in the launcher ecosystem and industrial dependencies.
The distinction between hot and cold launch explains why this system allows for a greater number of missiles. Aster missiles use hot launch, which means that the propellant ignites inside the launcher cell, requiring management of heat, exhaust gases, and internal pressure, which imposes constraints on the launcher’s structure and spacing. CAMM missiles use a cold launch method, in which the missile is ejected from its container before the engine ignites, reducing thermal stress inside the launcher. This allows for a simpler launcher design, optimized for a denser load of smaller missiles. The French cold launch system, described as structurally simpler than the existing Sylver, is said to become operational in the early 2030s, in line with future frigate deliveries discussed in countries such as Sweden. Cold launch is therefore presented as a practical way to increase the number of ready-to-fire missiles in a limited deck space, which could strengthen a country’s interest in ISD.
The missiles involved cover distinct roles and engagement ranges, which explains the logic behind combining them. The Aster 15 is designed for short- and medium-range air defense, with engagement ranges of around 30 km, while the Aster 30 extends this role to longer-range defense, typically associated with ranges exceeding 100 km. Aster 30 Block 1 NT offers anti-ballistic missile performance against targets with ranges of up to approximately 1,500 km. CAMM (Common Anti-Air Modular Missile) is a short- to medium-range interceptor, providing defense against aircraft, UAVs, and cruise missiles with an operational range of over 25 km, while CAMM-ER extends this range to approximately 45 km. MdCN is a long-range cruise missile for ground attack, with the ability to strike targets hundreds of kilometers inland from reserve positions. The combination of these missiles could allow the IDF to allocate different interceptors depending on the type of threat and distance.
Applied to the IDF’s forward pits, the cold launch solution translates into major numerical gains. A cold launch module is described by Mer et Marine as being capable of accommodating up to 24 CAMM missiles. If both front square pits are equipped with cold launch modules, the ship could carry 48 CAMM missiles, in addition to 16 Aster missiles in two Sylver A50 modules, for a total of 64 surface-to-air missiles. Other combinations are also possible, such as three Sylver A50 modules for 24 Aster missiles, paired with a cold launch module for 24 CAMM missiles, or configurations combining anti-aircraft missiles with a Sylver A70 module carrying eight MdCN missiles. Additional short-range systems, such as a RAM RIM-116 launcher with 21 missiles or a modular launcher carrying eight Mistral missiles, could increase the total number of anti-aircraft missiles ready for use to approximately 85. This expansion is matched by the FDI’s combat system, including the Sea Fire fixed-array AESA radar and Captas-4 towed sonar, preserving the ship’s multi-mission character.
In terms of market relevance, expanding the FDI’s missile storage would significantly improve the frigate’s capabilities. With projected payloads approaching or exceeding dozens of medium- and long-range SAM missiles, the FDI could compete with the air defense capabilities typically associated with much larger destroyers or air defense cruisers. For example, US Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with Mk 41 VLS can carry 90+ missiles of various types, while modern European air defense frigates, such as the British Type 45, have 48 large SAM cells optimized for area defense. An FDI with an extended set of VLS and CAMM launchers, capable of accommodating 64 or more air defense missiles, would allow it to cover not only self-defense, but also provide escort air defense for battle groups, defend key maritime approaches, and support engagements against saturation attacks. In regional competitions where potential adversaries operate advanced destroyers (such as Turkey’s TF-2000 or US/NATO destroyers) or large frigates (such as the Spanish F110 class with 48+ cells), the improved FDI model could match or exceed the air defense depths of many 4,000–8,000+ t class contemporaries, giving it a competitive advantage as a compact but heavily armed ship.
Source: here
US Special Forces seize Chinese cargo linked to Iranian missile program
US special forces boarded a ship in the Indian Ocean and seized Chinese dual-use components linked to Iran’s missile program, according to US officials quoted by the Wall Street Journal.
On December 12, 2025, the Wall Street Journal announced that US special forces boarded a ship in the Indian Ocean last month and seized military-related items believed to have been transferred from China to Iran. US officials described the action as a maritime interdiction aimed at slowing Iran’s attempts to rebuild parts of its missile arsenal after a 12-day conflict in June 2025. The boarding took place several hundred miles off the coast of Sri Lanka, the cargo was removed, and the ship was allowed to continue on its , while the name and ownership of the ship were not disclosed.
The seized material was described as dual-use components potentially useful to Iran’s missile program, and US officials linked the timing to Iran’s intensified efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal ahead of a new confrontation with Israel. (Image source: US Navy)
Speaking on condition of anonymity to the WSJ, US officials said that a US special operations team carried out the seizure with the support of conventional forces after US authorities tracked the shipment in advance. The seized material was described as potentially useful for Iran’s conventional weapons, and US officials characterized the items as dual-use components with both civilian and military applications. One official said the shipment was destroyed after seizure, and officials said information indicated the cargo was destined for Iranian companies specializing in the procurement of components for Iran’s missile program, linking the interdiction directly to supply chains, not to a single completed weapons system.
In the same report, the ban was described as notable because it was the first time in recent years that US military forces had intercepted Chinese-origin cargo bound for Iran. US officials linked the timing to Iran’s intensified efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal amid fears of a new confrontation with Israel, and to the broader damage they said they had inflicted on Iran’s nuclear and missile facilities during the June war involving Israel and the United States. They also said that negotiations with the United States over Iran’s disputed nuclear program had not resumed after being interrupted by the conflict, and the WSJ noted that spokespeople for Iran and China’s foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
US officials also included the operation in a broader maritime law enforcement framework covering both military-related shipments and authorized energy flows related to Iran. They said the boarding took place weeks before the United States captured an authorized tanker off the coast of Venezuela used to transport oil from Venezuela to Iran, and according to Reuters, the US plans to intercept other ships carrying Venezuelan oil after this seizure. That tanker action was described as the first time since 2019 that a cargo of oil or a tanker from Venezuela, under US sanctions, had been intercepted, and the overall approach was presented as a more aggressive maritime action than US officials had considered typical in recent years. US officials also said the interdiction took place in the context of the United Nations reimposing an international ban on arms trade with Iran at the end of September.
Previous known seizures include a January 2024 operation by US Central Command off the coast of Somalia that seized Iranian-made ballistic missile and cruise missile components assessed to be destined for Houthi militants in Yemen. Seizures of Iranian oil shipments by the US occurred in 2020 and 2023, with US authorities saying the proceeds benefited the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while Chinese sales of products suspected of supporting Iran’s missile program have come under increasing scrutiny in the United States. This analysis was described as including pressure in November, when two Democratic lawmakers urged US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and CIA Director John Ratcliffe to investigate a large shipment of chemicals from China to Iran, characterized as potentially useful for rocket propellants, reinforcing the focus on chemical inputs and components rather than complete weapons.
China-Iran defense relations are long-standing, beginning with China’s recognition of the post-1979 Iranian regime. China then supplied missiles and weapons in the 1980s, despite the US embargo, with Iran importing aircraft, artillery, and tanks, including J-6 fighter jets, T-59 and T-69 tanks, and HY-2 “Silkworm” anti-ship missiles, while some reports mention that China secretly supplied some weapons through North Korea. During the “Tanker War” of the 1980s, Iran reportedly launched Silkworm missiles at US ships as well as Kuwaiti targets, and US pressure included a freeze in October 1987 on high-tech transfers to China, intended to discourage missile sales to Iran, while Chinese arms transfers to Iran peaked in 1987 at $539 million, followed by a Chinese promise in March 1988 to the United States regarding Silkworm sales, which did not cover other cruise missiles and conventional weapons.
After a UN-brokered armistice in August 1988, the second phase saw a decline in transfers, but this was followed by an increase in the 1990s to $318 million as Iran sought to rebuild its military forces, with major acquisitions that reportedly included apparently, dozens of fighter jets, hundreds of missiles and related technologies, as well as military vessels, alongside Iran’s tendency to use Chinese equipment and technology to advance domestic arms production, particularly missile manufacturing based on Chinese designs. Reports mention a visit by a high-level Iranian delegation in April 1983 to Beijing, linked to a reported $1.3 billion deal for J-6 fighter jets, T-59 tanks, artillery, and small arms, followed by a reported $1.6 billion deal in March 1985, including F-6 fighter jets, T-59 tanks, anti-tank guns, and rocket launchers, plus subsequent acquisitions such as up to 200 M-7 short-range ballistic missiles with a range of approximately 150 kilometers, 72 F-7 fighter jets, 10 Houdong missile boats later used by the IRGC Navy as capital ships armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, acquisitions of anti-ship missiles from C-801 to C-701, and factory production of the Nasr-1 based on China’s C-704.
From the late 1990s to the 2010s and 2020s, constraints imposed by international measures and the continuation of technological paths led to a shift toward exercises, dual-use components, and economic interdependence. However, we can mention UN Security Council Resolution 1737 of 2006, which called on states to prevent transfers of materials used in nuclear or ballistic missile programs, Resolution 1747 of 2007, which restricted arms-related purchases from Iran and urged vigilance in supplying items to Iran; and Resolution 1929 of 2010, which called on states to prevent the supply of most major conventional weapons and requested inspections of suspicious ships. After Resolution 2231 approved the 2015 nuclear agreement, major Chinese arms transfers to Iran virtually ceased, but Tehran and Beijing signed an agreement in 2015 allowing Iran to use China’s BeiDou 2 satellite navigation system and a 25-year strategic agreement signed in 2021 providing for cooperation in training, research, defense industries, and potential co-production. The flows continued, such as Chinese parts in drones, chemical precursors such as sodium perchlorate linked to solid fuel supply chains , which led to US Treasury sanctions in April 2025 against Iranian and Chinese entities linked to such transfers.
Source: here
Iran launches Hadid-110: Invisible attack drones at 500 km/h signal a new phase in drone warfare in West Asia
Unveiled in the Sahand 2025 exercise, the Hadid-110 marks a major shift in Iran’s drone warfare doctrine toward a high-speed platform capable of penetrating layered air defense systems.
Hadid 110
Iran has officially introduced its Hadid-110 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in a strategic move that marks a significant turning point in the evolution of Tehran’s drone warfare doctrine, signaling a deliberate shift from the use of mass-produced drones to high-performance speed-based platforms designed to compress the enemy’s response cycle and erode the effectiveness of the art of building layered air defense in West Asia.
Unveiled to the public during the high-profile Sahand 2025 military exercises, the Hadid-110 is billed as Iran’s fastest stealth combat drone to date, with speeds exceeding 500 kilometers per hour and specifically designed to operate in highly contested airspace where slower munitions are increasingly vulnerable.
Hadid 110 drone
The emergence of these jet-powered UAVs comes amid an increasingly tense regional security environment, from the Persian Gulf to the Levant, as drone warfare has evolved from a support capability to a key tool for deterrence, strategic coercion, and geopolitical signaling.
Iran’s official narrative presents the Hadid-110 as a transformative leap in asymmetric warfare, but the absence of independent verification of its performance has triggered a wide range of assessments, from cautious admiration to analytical skepticism among global defense observers.
However, what is strategically indisputable is that the Hadid-110 reflects Iran’s increasingly mature understanding of the modern air defense ecosystem, particularly the need to combine speed, limited visibility, and high-precision strike impact to offset the numerical advantage and technology of the adversary.
By introducing this platform into multinational military exercises involving members and observers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Tehran ensured that the Hadid-110’s appearance was not just a technical demonstration, but also a clear geopolitical statement.
The 2025 Sahand exercise, which took place in Iran’s East Azerbaijan region, involved the participation of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus, as well as observers from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Azerbaijan, and Iraq, creating a rare forum in which Iran could interact simultaneously with allies, competitors, and potential export partners.
In this multi-country context, the live demonstration of the Hadid-110 underscores Tehran’s intention to present its drone program not as a catalyst for offensive instability, but rather as a sovereign deterrent capability integrated into its doctrine of counterterrorism and defensive high-precision strikes.
Iran’s message throughout the exercise emphasized the suitability of these UAVs for operations against high-value targets such as radar installations, command and control nodes, and critical infrastructure, consistent with its long-term emphasis on anti-access and area denial strategies.
However, despite the framing of the narrative, the emergence of the Hadid-110 actually marks a deeper recalibration of the Iranian military industry’s strategy, which now increasingly prioritizes qualitative improvement over mere numerical saturation.
Speed, stealth, and destructive power: Examining the technical architecture of the Hadid-110
The core of the Hadid-110’s operational potential lies in the power of its engine, described as a compact jet engine that allows a continuous speed of over 500 kilometers per hour, with some claims reaching approximately 517 km/h.
This performance profile places the Hadid-110 in a completely different category from the widely used fan-powered roaming munitions employed by Iran, such as the Shahed-136, which typically operate at speeds of around 185 km/h.
The strategic logic behind this speed difference is obvious, as high speeds directly shorten detection and interception windows, thus putting additional pressure on the command and control loop of the adversary’s air defense system.
The drone’s structure uses a delta wing configuration optimized for aerodynamic efficiency at high subsonic speeds, while also supporting low radar visibility through angular shaping and special surface treatment.
Iran claims that the Hadid-110’s radar cross section is between 0.01 and 0.02 square meters, a figure that, while not equivalent to fifth-generation manned aircraft, could make it difficult to detect by older radar systems that are still widely used in the region.
“The drone would carry an explosive payload of approximately 30 kilograms and have a flight endurance of up to one hour, placing it in the tactical attack category,” according to one assessment, which places the Hadid-110 squarely in the realm of high-precision strikes.
With a range of approximately 350 kilometers and a service ceiling of approximately 9.1 kilometers, the platform is optimized for regional missions, not intercontinental coverage, thus reinforcing its role as an active theater-level attack.
The payload capacity allows for a variety of warhead configurations, including explosive and possibly sensor-guided variants, allowing for the adjustment of the attack’s impact on hard or time-sensitive targets.
In contrast to the highly resilient ISR platform, the Hadid-110’s limited flight duration affirms its doctrinal classification as high-speed roaming ammunition, designed to be launched, penetrated, attacked, and destroyed in a short period of operation.
Comparatively, the platform falls between Russia’s Lancet and Israel’s Harop systems, but differs in its emphasis on speed over long hover times.
Although the specifications presented appear impressive, questions regarding engine reliability, thermal signature management, and resilience to electronic interference remain a determining factor for survival on the actual battlefield.
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From battlefield necessity to local dominance: The historical evolution of the Hadid-110
The Hadid-110 is the latest manifestation of Iran’s drone development trajectory, which began under conditions of acute scarcity during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, when international isolation forced Tehran to experiment with basic unmanned reconnaissance systems.
In the decades that followed, Iran’s UAV ecosystem matured through a combination of local innovation, reverse engineering, and iterative feedback from the battlefield, gradually transforming drones from tactical curiosities into strategic instruments of the country.
A critical acceleration occurred in the early 2010s, following the capture of the American RQ-170 Sentinel drone in 2011, which provided Iran with extraordinary exposure to its low-observability design philosophy and sensor integration.
The lessons of the incident reverberated throughout Iran’s aerospace sector, triggering a wave of stealth-oriented projects that later became the basis for platforms such as the Shahed-191, Shahed-171, and ultimately the Hadid-110.
The IRGC Aerospace Force became the main institutional driver of this transformation, establishing specialized units focused not only on UAV operations but also on rapid prototyping, local production, and doctrinal integration.
First publicly displayed in February 2025 at a defense exhibition attended by the country’s top leadership, the Hadid-110 is presented as a symbol of technological self-sufficiency under sanctions pressure and a manifestation of Iran’s strategic resilience.
“The Hadid-110, also known as Dalaho, was developed for attack missions and built on a stealth platform powered by jet engines,” according to a statement, which presented the system as both an operational asset and a political message.
The choice of name itself has symbolic significance, with “Hadid” meaning “iron” symbolizing resilience and strength, while alternative references such as “Dalahu” have roots in this platform in Iran’s geography and national identity.
Most importantly, Hadid-110 reflects lessons learned from Iran’s recent operational experience, particularly the involvement of large-scale drones, where slower platforms experience high interception rates by modern air defense systems.
The reported 12-day conflict involving Israel, in which Iran launched over a thousand UAVs with limited penetration rates, is believed to have reinforced Tehran’s assessment that the effectiveness of future drones depends less on numbers and more on survivability and speed.
By prioritizing speed and low radar visibility, the Hadid-110 represents an effort to restore uncertainty into adversaries’ defense calculations, forcing them to cope with shorter engagement times and increased pressure between sensors and shooters.
Hadid 110
Launch flexibility and tactical integration in the Iranian operational domain
One of the most strategically significant features of the Hadid-110 is its ability to operate without relying on fixed-route infrastructure, a design choice that reflects Iran’s expectations of an initial attack on a known airbase.
These UAVs can be launched via rail systems or solid-fuel rocket assistance, allowing deployment from trucks, hidden locations, or potentially from maritime platforms.
Images from the Sahand 2025 exercise show the drone being thrown into the air before transitioning smoothly to jet propulsion, revealing a launch profile optimized for rapid deployment and survivability.
This flexibility enhances the IRGC’s ability to conduct operations across Iran’s diverse terrain, including mountainous areas that often limit conventional air operations.
“The Hadid-110 is powered by jet engines and, according to reports, can fly at up to 517 kilometers per hour,” according to a report, which highlighted its integration into training exercises with ground forces.
From a strategic perspective, the autonomy of such a launch complicates the adversary’s targeting cycle, as mobile launch units are inherently more difficult to detect and destroy.
In a crisis scenario, Hadid-110 launchers spread along Iran’s southern coast are theoretically capable of threatening naval assets operating in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman, thereby extending Tehran’s deterrent presence.
The compatibility of these drones with networked command structures demonstrates their potential for integration with ISR assets, enabling near real-time target updates and adaptive attack execution.
This capability reflects Iran’s broader emphasis on layered, decentralized warfare designed to impose cumulative costs on technologically superior adversaries.
Regional and Global Strategic Implications of the Hadid-110
The operation of the Hadid-110 introduces new variables into the security dynamics of West Asia, particularly in an environment already saturated with air defense systems.
For Gulf states operating Patriot and similar interceptors, the emergence of these faster and less detectable UAVs could necessitate costly upgrades or doctrinal adaptations.
In the Israeli context, the speed of the Hadid-110 could challenge existing interception frameworks by narrowing the engagement window and increasing the interceptor utilization rate.
“Iran’s UAS fleet has become a significant military export, prompting countries such as Israel and Ukraine to address the threat of slow but abundant drones, as well as fast and invisible drones,” according to one analysis.
Beyond the immediate regional impact, the platform also has implications for Iran’s strategic partnerships, particularly with Russia and China, which have expressed interest in cost-effective UAV solutions.
Speculation about technology sharing highlights the potential relevance of the Hadid-110 beyond Iran’s borders, especially in conflicts requiring precision strike assets that can be sacrificed.
However, dependence on local components under international sanctions raises questions about production scalability and long-term sustainability.
The emergence of high-speed, low-visibility attack UAVs such as the Hadid-110 has further accelerated the dynamics of the regional arms race, where defensive advantages were increasingly temporary, forcing adversaries into a continuous cycle of sensor upgrades, interceptor acquisitions, and improved networked combat management, which has significantly increased the costs of air and missile defense.
At the strategic level, the Hadid-110 contributes to Iran’s goal of creating decision paralysis among adversaries by covering the spectrum of threat perception with various UAV profiles, thereby undermining the effectiveness of deterministic defense planning.
From a global perspective, the system reinforces a trend in which mid-level military powers leverage relatively affordable unmanned attack platforms to compensate for the asymmetry of conventional air power, signaling the gradual erosion of the West’s monopoly on high-speed attack capabilities, previously reserved for manned fighter jets.
Validation, perception, and the future of Iran’s stealth drone doctrine
Although Tehran’s public presentation portrays the Hadid-110 as a transformative capability, the absence of independently verifiable performance data compels defense analysts to approach its purported capabilities with layered skepticism, not unchallenged acceptance.
“This capability has not been verified by independent sources” remains a significant analytical caveat in professional assessments, reflecting the structural limitations generated by Iran’s limited transparency and controlled information environment.
The historical precedent in Iran’s aerospace program, where the stated range, endurance, or sensor performance is then tempered by empirical observations, further reinforces the need for rigorous verification before drawing final conclusions about the Hadid-110’s actual effectiveness.
However, even taking into account the possible exaggeration in the official disclosure, the basic design philosophy of the Hadid-110 remains a rational and coherent response to the rapid evolution of modern layered air defense systems.
“It is designed for a specific mission: penetrating the air defense layer and destroying sensitive targets such as air defense systems, command centers, radars, and critical infrastructure,” according to a statement.
Viewed in this context, the Hadid-110 symbolizes Iran’s planned transition from reliance on quantity-based attrition tactics to a more nuanced unmanned attack posture, emphasizing speed, ambiguity, and selective survivability as force multipliers.
In an operational environment increasingly shaped by unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and shorter decision cycles, the Hadid-110 should be understood not just as a weapons platform, but as a strategic signal that Tehran intends to remain a disruptive and adaptive actor in the evolution of the global air power equation.
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Turkey firmly retains ownership of the S-400 “Triumf,” and negotiations with the United States on the F-35 continue
Ankara rejects any failures of the Russian-made S-400 system, even as negotiations on lifting sanctions and reintroducing Turkey into the F-35 program enter a critical phase in Washington, testing NATO’s security doctrine and the legal mandate of the United States.
S-400 Triumph
Turkey has once again drawn a hard line against its Russian-made S-400 air defense system, even as negotiations with the United States on the possibility of returning to the F-35 Lightning II fighter program reach a climax amid a new diplomatic climate in Washington.
The latest approach by the Turkish Ministry of Defense, revealed at the time of the resumption of diplomatic engagement with the United States, shows how Ankara’s strategic calculation continues to prioritize sovereign defense autonomy over absolute compliance with the will of the alliance, even as pressure from Washington mounts and US legal constraints remain strong.
S-400 “Triumph”
The issue of S-400 ownership has reemerged as one of NATO’s most critical issues, not only because of the advanced military technology involved, but because it captures the broader struggle between a country’s strategic freedom and alliance-based interoperability in an increasingly multipolar global security environment.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has injected new political momentum into US-Turkey relations, with both sides expressing cautious optimism that the long-frozen dispute could finally move toward a solution through pragmatic dialogue.
However, despite this positive diplomatic tone, the S-400 system remains a non-negotiable obstacle for Washington, finding itself at a point of conflict between America’s legal mandate, NATO’s security doctrine, and Turkey’s assertiveness in maintaining the strategic capabilities it considers essential to the country’s air defense posture and layered missile defense.
From Ankara’s perspective, the S-400 issue is not just about a single weapons system, but rather about rejecting what it sees as external coercion that erodes Turkey’s right to diversify its defense partnerships and act independently against the regional threat environment covering the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, the Black Sea, and the Middle East.
As far as Washington is concerned, Turkey’s continued possession of the S-400 is seen as a fundamental breach of NATO’s integrated defense ecosystem, which risks exposing the alliance’s most sensitive fifth-generation technology to adversaries’ intelligence exploitation.
This impasse is now evolving into a strategic paradox, with both sides openly acknowledging the value of restoring defense cooperation, but at the same time continuing to insist on a position that remains structurally incompatible within the existing legal and security framework.
The Turkish Ministry of Defense expressed this position during a press conference, stating that “there are no new developments regarding the S-400 air defense system,” despite ongoing negotiations aimed at lifting US sanctions and bringing Turkey back into the F-35 program.
The statement, while seemingly procedural, has significant strategic implications, signaling that Ankara is willing to endure continued isolation from the world’s most advanced fighter jet ecosystem rather than relinquish control over the state-of-the-art air defense resources it already possesses.
At the same time, Turkish officials have emphasized that diplomatic negotiations with Washington are continuing “on the removal of sanctions and obstacles to the acquisition of the F-35 and the reintroduction of our country into the (F-35) program,” describing the talks as a broader effort to rebuild bilateral defense relations in the “spirit of the alliance.”
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reinforced the narrative by expressing confidence that Ankara and Washington would resolve the sanctions issue “in the near future,” an expression that subsequently became an important reference point in market speculation, diplomatic signals from the alliance, and regional defense planning.
However, Ankara’s optimism continues to clash with the reality of US law, which cannot be changed by rhetoric, as the regulation explicitly prohibits Turkey from owning or operating the S-400 system if the country wishes to return to the F-35 program.
The US ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, reiterated these constraints in an unusually harsh tone, stating that “under US law, Turkey can no longer operate or possess the S-400 system in order to return to the F-35 program,” thus emphasizing the rigidity of Washington’s position, regardless of political will.
These legislative obstacles remain the most decisive factor shaping the course of negotiations, as they place the burden of compromise squarely on Ankara while limiting the White House’s room for flexibility even under a more transactional administration.
The result is a high-stakes strategic stalemate, in which progress is no longer measured by policy changes, but by whether either side is willing—or able—to redefine the fundamental assumptions shaping the alliance’s security in the post-Ukraine and post-Middle East escalation era.
The origins of the S-400 crisis and Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 program
To fully understand the depth of the current impasse, it is important to trace the origins of Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400, as well as the ripple effects that occurred after the country was removed from the F-35 program.
In 2017, Turkey signed an agreement with Russia to purchase the S-400 Triumph air defense system in a deal worth approximately $2.5 billion, equivalent to approximately RM11.75 billion, making it one of the most important defense procurement decisions in the country’s modern history.
The decision was driven by a combination of strategic frustrations, including repeated failures to secure more favorable terms for the US-made Patriot missile system, concerns about technology transfer restrictions, and the urgent need for air defense caused by the prolonged conflict on Turkey’s southern border.
Deliveries of the S-400 began in July 2019, triggering an immediate harsh reaction from the United States and other NATO members, who considered the system fundamentally incompatible with the alliance’s integrated air and missile defense architecture.
At the heart of Washington’s objections is the belief that operating the S-400 alongside NATO platforms — particularly the F-35 — would create an unacceptable intelligence risk by allowing adversaries to study the radar signatures and electromagnetic emissions of fifth-generation aircraft.
The S-400’s advanced radar, designed to detect and intercept targets at ranges of up to 400 kilometers, is considered particularly problematic because of its potential ability to track stealth aircraft under certain operating conditions, thereby shifting the balance of volatility that underpins NATO’s technological advantage.
Turkiye, as a Tier 3 partner in the F-35 program, has invested over US$1 billion (approximately RM4.7 billion) and is positioned to purchase up to 100 F-35A aircraft, while also contributing to the aircraft’s global supply chain through local production of critical components.
The industry’s role includes manufacturing landing gear components, fuselage structures, and engine components, making Türkiye not only a customer but also a player in one of the most complex multinational defense programs ever developed.
However, in July 2019, the United States officially suspended Turkey’s participation in the program under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), describing the S-400 transaction as a “significant” involvement with Russia’s defense sector.
By December 2020, sanctions had been imposed on Turkey’s Defense Industry Presidency, including asset freezes and visa restrictions on senior officials, effectively cutting off Ankara’s access to the entire F-35 ecosystem in terms of training, maintenance, supply chain, and operational integration.
The process of removing the Turkish company from the F-35 supply chain—often referred to as the “dismantling” process—is estimated to cost between $500 million and $600 million, equivalent to approximately RM2.35 billion to RM2.82 billion, when production responsibilities are transferred to other partners.
Turkey has reacted defiantly, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan describing the decision as “unfair” and insisting that the S-400 will remain operational as a stand-alone system, without integration into NATO’s command network.
Ankara argues that the decision is driven by necessity, not ideology, while stressing that the continuing security threat from Syria, missile proliferation in the Middle East, and instability in the Eastern Mediterranean require an immediate and credible air defense solution.
This episode has become one of the lowest points in US-Turkey relations in recent decades, further exacerbating existing disputes over Syria, differences in regional policy directions, and perceptions of mutual suspicion within the alliance.
The F-35 fighter jets, built entirely for Turkey in the United States, were never delivered to the Mediterranean country after Washington imposed sanctions following Ankara’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system.
Strategic and military implications for NATO defense
Beyond bilateral tensions, Turkey’s continued possession of the S-400 has much broader implications for NATO’s collective defense posture, as well as for the integrity of the alliance’s integrated air and missile defense networks.
The effectiveness of NATO operations depends on interoperability, mutual situational awareness, and the seamless exchange of classified sensor data between allied platforms, all of which can be compromised when a non-NATO system with non-transparent data paths is involved.
The S-400 architecture, developed outside NATO standards and supported by Russian technical doctrine, introduces uncertainty into alliance planning because it has the potential to create information blind spots and operational friction that are difficult to fully map.
From a military-technical perspective, the main concern is not that the S-400 will automatically compromise NATO systems, but that its coexistence with allied platforms creates an unacceptable margin of risk that adversaries can gradually exploit through training patterns, spectrum exposure, and long-term data collection.
The F-35, in particular, operates on the basis of an ecosystem of networked sensors, data aggregation, and stealth design principles, which assume a controlled electromagnetic environment and are devoid of adversarial collection systems.
Allowing a country to operate both the S-400 and the F-35 would call into question the basic assumptions of fifth-generation warfare, where dominance is achieved through information superiority, not just kinetic performance.
For NATO planners, Turkey’s position raises uncomfortable questions about alliance discipline and precedents that could prompt other members to consider diversifying their defense procurement outside the approved framework.
However, despite these concerns, Turkey remains NATO’s second-largest military contributor, hosting critical infrastructure, controlling access to the Black Sea through the Bosphorus Strait, and playing an essential role in regional security from the Balkans to the Caucasus.
This duality—a strategic interest that is difficult to replace but overshadowed by policy differences—forces NATO to balance law enforcement with pragmatism, resulting in a prolonged stalemate rather than a firm solution.
Thus, the S-400 issue is less about the system itself and more a reflection of how NATO is adapting in an era where alliance members are increasingly demanding an autonomous defense strategy in an increasingly fragmented global order.
Trump 2.0 and the reopening of strategic space for compromise
Donald Trump’s return to the presidency has reshaped the diplomatic environment surrounding the S-400 and F-35 disputes by introducing a more transactional and leadership-centered approach to alliance management.
Tom Barrack described the resumed negotiations as “the most fruitful conversation we’ve had on this issue in nearly a decade,” highlighting how personal compatibility at the highest levels can reopen channels that have long been considered frozen.
Barrack also expressed hope for “a breakthrough in the coming months that meets the security needs of the United States and Turkey,” a formulation that implicitly acknowledges that solutions may require a creative and unconventional approach.
This new dialogue reflects a broader shift in Washington’s foreign policy posture, which tends to prioritize burden sharing, strategic flexibility, and bilateral transactions over rigid multilateral enforcement mechanisms.
From Ankara’s perspective, Trump’s pragmatic approach opens up opportunities to negotiate exceptions, transitional arrangements, or parallel paths of capabilities that maintain national defense priorities and ease tensions within the alliance.
However, even under the Trump administration, the legal constraints of CAATSA remain binding as long as Congress does not amend or grant an exception, thus limiting the US executive’s scope to change the fundamental requirements.
This reality underscores the structural challenges of negotiations, where political will alone is not sufficient to overcome the statutory obstacles embedded in US defense policy.
Still, keeping the dialogue going has constant strategic value as a signal, because it convinces markets, defense planners, and regional players that escalation isn’t inevitable and that compromise is still on the table.
Alternatives to air power and Turkey’s “hedging” strategies
Alongside the F-35 negotiations, Turkey has accelerated its hedging efforts to reduce the risk of capability gaps caused by continued isolation, diversifying its air power portfolio and bolstering local capability development.
Ankara’s plan to acquire Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Qatar and Oman, with an initial series of 12 aircraft from each country, represents a temporary solution to compensate for the Turkish Air Force’s lack of capacity.
Although the Typhoon does not have the fully stealth characteristics of the F-35, the aircraft’s advanced radar, electronic warfare systems, and air-to-air performance can provide a “credible temporary” solution in high-intensity operating scenarios.
At the same time, Turkey continues to advance its local fifth-generation fighter jet program, which is positioned as a long-term alternative to reduce dependence on external suppliers and the political conditions associated with strategic acquisitions.
This layered strategy reflects Turkey’s defense doctrine, which increasingly emphasizes resilience, autonomy, and flexibility in the face of geopolitical uncertainty, including shifts in the Black Sea power dynamics, pressures in the eastern Mediterranean, and the risk of escalation in the Middle East.
The S-400 in this framework is not an anomaly, but rather a component of a more diverse resilience architecture designed to operate independently of alliance approval when necessary.
As negotiations with the United States continue, Turkey’s message remains consistent that engagement is welcome, compromise may be possible, but fundamental defense decisions regarding sovereignty will not be subject to unilateral review.
The future test of NATO in a multipolar world
The impasse over Turkey’s S-400s and possible return to the F-35 program has become the clearest test of NATO’s ability to adapt in a world where alliance cohesion must coexist with the strategic autonomy of member states.
Whether these issues are resolved through creative compromises, legal adjustments, or continued deadlock, they will shape not only the US-Turkey relationship, but also the future norms of defense cooperation among allied nations.
In an era of increasingly fierce competition between superpowers, the proliferation of advanced weapons systems, and shifting geopolitical alignments, the ultimate outcome of this crisis will have an impact far beyond Ankara and Washington.
For now, Turkey is holding its ground, the United States is maintaining its legal position, and NATO is closely watching as one of the alliance’s most complex internal challenges continues to unfold at the intersection of law, strategy, and power politics.
Source: here