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How the US Lost Two EA-18 Fighter Jets in One Day
MS Daily brief-18 MAY 2026
- MS Daily Brief-en
- Romania’s Fleet and the Autonomous Naval Revolution: Toward NATO’s First Hybrid Fleet in the Black Sea
- NATO 3.0 and the Rebalancing of Euro-Atlantic Security
- Maritime Security Forum – Weekly Strategic Summary – 3
- The Gulf’s fragile trade lifeline: Fujairah and Khor Fakkan as a ‘bypass’ for Hormuz
- AMERICA’S MARITIME ACTION PLAN-Possible Implications for Romania
- Could Escalation in the Middle East Trigger a Structural Shift in Global Maritime Trade?
- Maritime Security Forum-Weekly Strategic Summary-2
- Is the Black Sea Becoming Europe’s Most Dangerous Maritime Region?
- Maritime Security Forum – Weekly Strategic Summary
- Could a Wider Middle East War Block the Red Sea and Reshape Global Maritime Security?
- The 2026 US-Iran war through the lens Zbigniew Brzezinski’s strategic thinking
- Liminal Maritime Aggression in the Black Sea: Romania at a Crossroads of Energy Security
- IRANIAN ATTACKS IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ: BETWEEN THE USE OF FORCE, ARMED ATTACK AND GREY ZONE OPERATIONS AS A FORM OF ZAHHAKIAN LIMINAL MARITIME AGGRESSION
- Romania: Between a Theoretical Threat and a Layered Defence
- The decline of Iran’s naval power in the current conflict. The destruction of major platforms and the survival of asymmetric capabilities
- Iran’s Islands and the Strategic Architecture of the Strait of Hormuz
- The possibility of establishing a special regime for the Strait of Hormuz: legal, maritime and geopolitical arguments
- The French nuclear deterrence initiative and European security: legal and strategic implications of a debate on Romania
- “The Stratified Conflict: Multidomain Warfare and Iran’s Strategic Dynamics in the Middle East”
- PHASES OF THE ATTACK ON IRAN AND MULTIDOMAIN WARFARE
- FOUR YEARS OF WAR IN UKRAINE
- Iran’s air defence system
- The need to reevaluate maritime doctrine following the introduction of maritime drones into the Romanian Navy
- Artificial Intelligence in Defense: Between Technological Enthusiasm and Operational Reality
- 2026 – Will the Munich Security Conference be without expectations?
- The implementation of naval drones in the Romanian Naval Forces – a necessity
- The multi-domain deadlock in the context of Romania and the Black Sea
- Integrated military cooperation for the protection of offshore energy platforms in the Black Sea
- NAVY ARSENAL – Explanatory Memorandum
- The Phantom Fleet and maritime security challenges
- China’s military leadership faces a serious problem
- The possibility of Romania initiating a project similar to Nordic-Baltic Eight
- From Davos to the White House: Donald Trump’s Peace Council and Romania’s dilemma
- THE US, CHINA, AND TUCIDIDES’ TRAP
- ATTACK ON OFFSHORE TARGETS IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE
- Operationalization of the European Maritime Security Hub in the Black Sea
- The European Maritime Security Hub in the Black Sea. A major challenge for Romania.
- “Resetting military strategy: multi-domain operations and the emergence of artificial intelligence S8NTH Strategic Engine as a decision-making accelerator”
- Securitate maritima – tancuri petroliere si industria de petrol si gaze
- Legal aspects of unmanned maritime systems
- Sub-conventional conflicts in the maritime domain in the Black Sea
- Network-centric warfare and its implications for the maritime domain
- Russian authorities temporarily suspend operations at the CPC terminal in the Black Sea. Possible implications for Romania?
- Deficiencies in Romania’s military procurement system
- THE IMPLICATIONS OF CYBER ACTIONS ON MARITIME SECURITY
- Combat Management System versus Command and Control (C2)
- IS ROMANIA PREPARED TO PROTECT ITS CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE?
- COMBATING NAVAL DRONES
- Podcasts
- Naval helicopters and their role in combating surface vessels
- The global influence of the Vatican and its role in world geopolitic-PDF
- The global influence of the Vatican and its role in world geopolitics
- The light corvette, an immediate solution to regional challenges
- Lessons learned applicable to the Romanian Naval Forces: strategic perspectives and needs for modernisation and equipment
- Russia’s strategic naval collapse (2022-2025) in the context of the war in Ukraine
- Russia’s strategic naval collapse (2022-2025) in the context of the war in Ukraine
- Can the empires of the world be “resurrected?
- The Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline A subject of negotiations?
- “The US Air Bases in Romania: Strategic Pawns in NATO’s Security Architecture and Global Geopolitics”
- Arctic Region – Melting Ice, Rising Tensions
- The Lepanto trap – what remains after the first naval battle?
- UK NATO and the Royal Navy A Defense Without America
- IS ROMANIA PREPARED FOR THE PROTECTION OF ITS OWN CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE?
- STRATEGIC CHANGES IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE MARITIME DOMAIN
- Romania, possible increase in security responsibilities
- How much does it cost? “War and Peace”
- Romania and Yalta 2.0- Dual Strategies and Reconfigurations of Influence
- WILL CHINA BE THE WORLD’S FIRST WORLD POWER IN THE NEXT DECADE?
- After three years of war, Russia is still an energy superpower?
- Maritime Critical Infrastructure
- Modernization of the Romanian Naval Forces: A Problem?
- Analysis of the Motivations of the Algerian Navy’s Choice of the Type 056 Corvettes from China
- Point Defense Missile Systems
- The Panama Canal: A Strategic Piece in the US Geopolitical Game
- Shipyards, an essential element of Romania’s maritime power
- Romania and Davos 2025
- THE RACE FOR ARCTIC RICHES
- Donald Trump’s geopolitical vision
- Greenland – a current and prospective geostrategic issue
- Strategic directions of Romania’s national defense in 2025
- The Regulatory borders of the Black Sea through the Cartography of European Union Law and International Law
- Event
- BLACK SEA CHRONICLES
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- Misterul ambarcațiunii identificate la Tuzla
- BLACK SEA CHRONICLES
- A TRINKET DEDICATED TO THE ROMANIAN FLEET – 1913
- MS Daily Brief-Fr
- A POSSIBLE VISION: REBUILDING MARITIME ROMANIA
- The Imperative of a Maritime Security Policy and Strategy for Romania
- MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
- Importance of National Security Policy and Strategy
- TOWARDS ENSURING MARITIME SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION
- ROMANIA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE BLACK SEA, THE DANUBE AND THE PLANETARY OCEAN
- The role of the maritime and inland waterway sector in Romania’s economy
- CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO MARITIME SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES, CONCLUSIONS FOR THE SITUATION OF ROMANIA
- THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY STUDIES AS A NEW FIELD OF GEOPOLITICAL REFLECTION AND RESEARCH
- Romania’s maritime resilience in the age of hybrid threats and the importance of a Maritime Security Strategy
- Romania: A centerpiece in the revitalization of the Silk Road for the 21st century
- CHINA OPTION
- 1st Black Sea Security Conference
- Regional Detension in the Middle East and North Africa
- POLAND-A possible way to follow
- The influence of Russia and the Ukrainian War in the Asia-Pacific area
- EVENTS
- Polemic at the mouth of the Danube
- To ensure security in the Black Sea region
- Geopolitical and Geostrategic Provocations in the Black Sea Region
- A NEW NATO STRATEGIC POINT IN THE BALKAN AND BLACK SEA AREA
- PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES – A POSSIBLE PLAYER IN THE WAR AT SEA?
- The war in Ukraine – reflections
- A new Black Sea strategy for a new Black Sea reality
- STATE IMMUNITY, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE
- Maritime security and the law of the sea
- Resilience and importance of the maritime sector in the Romanian economy
- Montreux Convention – a factor of stability or a catalyst for insecurity in the Black Sea Region
- The Black Sea in the Geopolitical equation
- Implications of war on the marine environment
- After a year of war, possible scenarios
- “SEA BLINDNESS”
- Does Romania need a Maritime Policy and a Maritime Strategy?
- Are missile ships still relevant in modern warfare?
- Do we need military science?
- War in Ukraine, how the nature of power is changing
- Maritime Romania
- The problem of Arabat and Genichesk
- Energy, freedom of navigation and the China-Russia relationship
- Winter militarization: Can Ukraine prevent Russia from regrouping as temperatures drop?
- THE INFLUENCE OF BLACK SEA CHARACTERISTICS ON THE ASSEMBLED OPERATIONS
- Fighters and actors in winter fatigue
- THE RELATIVE DOMINANCE OF RUSSIAN NAVAL POWER IN THE BLACK SEA
- HAS RUSSIA STARTED TO WAKE UP TO REALITY?
- The New European navigation channels – editorial
- Newsletter 18 August 2022
- Newsletter 18 july 2022
- Geostrategic and geopolitical maritime scenarios in the Middle East and North Africa
- Geopolitics
- Geopolitica
- Webinar
- Buletin informativ
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- Transforming the North-South ITC into a major transport corridor
- Newsletter 06 july 2022
- Newsletter
- THE NAVIGATION REGIME ON THE DANUBE AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR ROMANIA
- Buletin informativ- iulie 2022
- CONFERENCE “THE DYNAMCS AND COMPLEXITY OF ROMANIA’S MARITIME SECURITY” 29-30 september 2022
- Libertatea de navigație pentru porturile Ucrainei de la Marea Neagră
- Freedom of navigation for Ukraine's Black Sea ports
- Buletin informativ iunie 2022
- Buletin informativ mai 2022
- Buletin informativ aprilie 2022
- Buletin informativ martie 2022
The Maritime Security Forum Launches a New Project: “Strategic Debate”
READ ALSO THE ARTICLE FROM THE MARITIME SECURITY FORUM
Romania’s Fleet and the Autonomous Naval Revolution: Toward NATO’s First Hybrid Fleet in the Black Sea
Contents
Trump news in brief: the president says the planned attack on Iran has been postponed – for now 5
US extends sanctions waiver for Russian oil, as Brent crude prices rise due to supply crisis 8
Kiel Report May 2026 – Summary Maritime Security Forum.. 20
BREAKING NEWS: Drones strike the United Arab Emirates; Iran REFUSES to abandon its nuclear programme; Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on high alert for war | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine | Fantastic news! Stepnohirsk has been liberated! Large-scale offensive by HUR special forces
Trump claims that the planned attack on Iran has been postponed after Tehran presented a new proposal to end the war
The US President states that plans for a US military strike on Iran have been suspended because “serious negotiations are currently taking place”
Jason Burke in London, Saeed Shah in Islamabad and Andrew Roth in Washington
Monday, 18 May 2026, 23:07 CEST
Iran has made a new proposal for an agreement to bring a definitive end to the war in the Middle East, officials in the region said on Monday, with Donald Trump stating that he had postponed further military strikes to allow talks to continue.
But although the US president has regularly used social media to threaten Tehran and claim that a peace deal was within reach, there has been no sign of immediate progress in the stalled negotiations to end the war.
A ceasefire brought an end to most of the violence following six weeks of US and Israeli air strikes and Iranian retaliation, but little progress has been made since Trump declared the ceasefire to be “in critical condition”, with some reports in the Israeli press suggesting that a resumption of hostilities is imminent.
In a post on Monday, Trump said he had been asked by the leaders of several Gulf states to “postpone our planned military strike [on Iran], which was scheduled for tomorrow, given that serious negotiations are currently taking place”.
Trump claimed that leaders from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had contacted Washington regarding the possibility of reaching an agreement that would be “very acceptable” to the US and would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
The US President stated that he had instructed military leaders that “we will NOT be carrying out the planned attack on Iran tomorrow, but I have given them further instructions to be ready to launch a full-scale, large-scale attack on Iran at any time”.
The announcement came as the Iranian military spokesman, Esmail Baghaei, stated that Pakistan had conveyed Tehran’s latest proposal to the US.
There have been conflicting reports from Islamabad, which has been mediating between the two sides. A Pakistani source expressed pessimism, telling Reuters that Washington and Tehran “are constantly changing the rules of the game” and that time to reach an agreement is running out.
Other regional officials said that Iran had made or reiterated certain concessions, including the long-term suspension of its nuclear programme and the transfer of its highly enriched uranium to Russia, as well as the gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
The semi-official Tasnim news agency, citing an anonymous source close to the country’s negotiating team, reported on Monday that the US had agreed to lift sanctions on Tehran’s oil exports for the duration of the negotiations.
There has been no independent confirmation of these claims, and the talks have been marked by a series of misleading statements from Iran, the US and mediators in an attempt to present the negotiations to the public in their favour.
The rhetoric from both sides has remained provocative in recent days. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps threatened on Monday to impose permits on internet cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz, whilst other officials stated that this waterway would remain under Iranian “administration”, suggesting that Tehran would impose transit fees on shipping, something Washington has said it cannot accept.
Baghaei said Tehran was prepared for all scenarios, stating in a televised press conference: “As for their threats, rest assured that we know very well how to respond appropriately to even the slightest mistake on the part of the adversary.”
Axios reported that Trump was due to meet with national security advisers on Tuesday to discuss options for resuming military action.
However, speaking later on Monday at a White House event, Trump said there had been a “very positive development” and claimed that a deal was imminent that would leave Iran without nuclear weapons, something Tehran denies it is seeking.
“It looks like there’s a very good chance they’ll reach a deal. If we can do that without bombing the hell out of them, I’d be very happy,” Trump said.
Although US and Israeli air strikes have ceased and Iranian retaliation has been scaled back, drones have been launched from Iran towards Gulf countries hosting US military bases.
A drone attack caused a fire at a nuclear power plant in the United Arab Emirates, officials there said on Sunday, and Saudi Arabia reported intercepting three drones.
Iran stepped up attacks on the UAE this month after Trump announced a naval mission to try to open the Strait of Hormuz, which he suspended after 48 hours.
Analysts say the conflict is now at a stalemate, with both sides facing significant pressure to end the war, but lacking sufficient incentives to make the painful concessions necessary for a deal.
Trump, who faces mid-term elections in November that could yield unfavourable results for the Republican Party, held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping last week in Beijing, without obtaining any indication from China that it would help resolve the conflict.
White House officials fear that Trump’s foreign policy gamble on Iran and its effect on US fuel prices could jeopardise the Republicans’ chances of retaining control of Congress, at a time when voters are more concerned about the cost of living than conflicts abroad.
Iran is facing a deepening economic crisis and potential damage to its oil infrastructure. Inflation is soaring, and some officials fear a rise in public discontent with the radical regime.
The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), a monitoring group based in the US and the Netherlands, said it had documented at least 4,023 arrests in Iran between 28 February, when the war began, and 9 May.
The charges include espionage, threats to national security, and communicating or distributing conflict-related content to foreign media, the agency said.
There is growing concern over executions in Iran. Human rights groups have stated that, since the start of the war, Iran has executed 26 men considered “political prisoners” – 14 charged in connection with the January protests, one in connection with the 2022 demonstrations and 11 accused of links to banned opposition groups.
Six men have been hanged by Iran on charges of spying for Israel since the start of the war, according to reports in the official Iranian media.
HRANA said it had documented at least 3,636 casualties, including 1,701 civilians, as a result of US-Israeli attacks on Iran during the war.
Israel carried out fresh air strikes in southern Lebanon on Monday, Lebanese security sources and the state news agency said, whilst Hezbollah announced new attacks on Israeli forces, continuing the war in Lebanon despite the US-backed extension of the ceasefire, initially announced by Trump on 16 April.
A 45-day extension of the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel is now in force following a third round of talks hosted by the US.
With Reuters and Agence France-Presse
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/18/iran-new-proposal-deal-to-end-war-us-israel
How realistic is Iran’s threat to levy charges for the use of internet cables in the Strait of Hormuz?
The plan reported in the Iranian media to generate revenue from US technology firms would rely on intimidation and is legally questionable
Monday, 18 May 2026, 17:58 CEST
Could undersea cables – the lifelines of the global internet – become the next frontier in the US-Israel war against Iran?
Last week, two Iranian state-linked media outlets, Tasnim and Fars, suggested that Iran could use its control over the Strait of Hormuz – the 25-mile (40 km) stretch between Iran and Oman – to charge US tech companies for using the internet cables that cross the strait. Tasnim suggested that this could be a lucrative proposition, bringing Iran hundreds of millions of dollars each year.
At least seven cables lie beneath the waters of the strait, many of them vital to the massive expansion of AI currently underway in the Gulf states. But what exactly is Iran proposing, and is this a realistic plan of action?
What has Iran said it will do?
The Tasnim proposal, as it stands, has three parts: firstly, the imposition of licence fees on foreign companies for the use of submarine cables; secondly, obliging ‘tech giants’ (naming Meta, Google, Amazon and Microsoft) to ‘operate in accordance with the laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran’, which presumably implies ‘joint ventures’; and, thirdly, monopolising the repair and maintenance of these submarine cables, presumably charging the world for these services. This will “transform the Strait of Hormuz into a strategic hub for the generation of legitimate wealth”, it is claimed.
All of this, says Tasnim, is legally justified by Article 34 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This, it is claimed, allows Iran to claim part of the seabed in the Strait of Hormuz as its territory, even though the surface waters are used for international navigation.
Do other countries do this too?
Not in the same way. The Iranian press has cited the example of Egypt, which, according to Tasnim, generates between 250 and 400 million dollars annually by levying fees on submarine c . Egypt does indeed levy fees on cables crossing its territory and, in some cases, jointly owns and operates these cables through Telecom Egypt. Figures on revenue from this activity are not public, although it is estimated to account for a significant portion of Telecom Egypt’s total revenue. The difference, however, is that the cables in question actually pass through Egyptian territory, said Doug Madory, an internet infrastructure expert at Kentik. In fact, many of them cross Egypt overland, along motorways and oil pipelines.
Can Iran actually levy charges on submarine cables, and how would that work?
Highly doubtful. From a legal standpoint, there are sanctions-related considerations, said a former US State Department official specialising in the global internet. Furthermore, it would be impossible to levy charges on specific companies, as there is no way to separate their internet traffic.
Most of the cables in question do not terminate in Iran; they run under the sea, kilometres from the coast. “The only way they could levy transit fees on ships or undersea cables is through threats,” said Madory. “It’s not something we’ve seen before.”
How easy would it be for Iran to cut these undersea cables? “A suicide mission,” said Madory. The news is rife with reports of suspicious cable cuts in the Baltic Sea and the Red Sea, with some suggesting that cutting undersea cables could be a future tactic of war for the Houthis, Russia or China. However, Madory said that many of these stories are “hyperbolic”. Most cable cuts are likely the result of accidents – dragging anchors – rather than deliberate sabotage. As for Iran, it is highly unlikely that it could cut the cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz without being detected; it simply does not possess the necessary technology. It would have to do so openly, under constant US aerial patrols.
What would be the consequences of a cable cut in the Strait of Hormuz?
Such a disruption would disrupt internet traffic in the Persian Gulf – but it might not have a major impact on the rest of global connectivity. This is because the cables under the Strait of Hormuz mainly serve the countries of the Persian Gulf, Madory said – unlike the cables passing through Suez and Egypt, which carry much more significant traffic between Europe and Asia. Iraq and Iran, for example, have alternative land-based cables they can use to connect.
In theory, a break in a submarine cable could be easily repaired. Cable breaks happen all the time; there are several every week, said Madory, and over a dozen repair vessels are constantly working around the world to repair cables. However, if Iran were to threaten those repair vessels, they might not take the risk: “Cable repair vessels do not operate under fire.” This could make the disruption more prolonged.
Trump news in brief: the president says the planned attack on Iran has been postponed – for now
The president says he has instructed the US military to be ready for “a full-scale, large-scale attack on Iran at any moment” – key US political news from Monday 18 May
The Guardian team
Tuesday 19 May 2026, 03:03 CEST
Donald Trump says he has called off a planned attack on Iran at the request of Gulf states, so that negotiations can continue.
In a post on his Truth Social platform, the US president stated that leaders from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had contacted Washington regarding the possibility of reaching a deal that would be “very acceptable” to the US and would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
In the same post, Trump said he had instructed his military leaders “to be ready to launch a full-scale, large-scale attack on Iran at any time, should an acceptable agreement not be reached”.
But although the president has regularly used social media to threaten Tehran and claim that a peace deal is within reach, there has been no sign of immediate progress in the stalled negotiations to end the war.
A ceasefire brought an end to most of the violence after six weeks of US and Israeli air strikes and Iranian retaliation, but little progress has been made since Trump declared the ceasefire to be “in critical condition”, with some Israeli media reports suggesting that a resumption of hostilities is imminent.
Trump claims that the planned attack on Iran has been postponed for the time being
The US President stated that he had instructed military leaders that “we will NOT be carrying out the planned attack on Iran tomorrow, but I have given them further instructions to be ready to proceed with a full-scale assault on Iran at any time”.
The announcement came as Iran’s military spokesman, Esmail Baghaei, claimed that Pakistan had shared Tehran’s latest proposal with the US.
Trump’s approval rating drops to lowest level of his second term
Donald Trump’s approval rating has fallen to its lowest level of his second term, amid growing frustration over the cost of living and the US-Israel war against Iran.
As the US mid-term elections in November approach, the majority of American voters believe that Trump’s decision to go to war with Iran was a mistake, according to a new poll.
Trump takes steps to dismiss $10 billion lawsuit against the IRS, amid reports he is considering a settlement
Donald Trump has taken steps to dismiss a $10 billion lawsuit against the IRS, dropping his claims amid reports that he is considering a settlement with the federal government that would create a $1.7 billion fund to compensate allies for alleged government persecution.
The application was filed just two days before the 20 May deadline, by which the judge overseeing the case had asked the parties to provide information regarding the existence of a legitimate dispute – a requirement for any lawsuit – given that Trump controls the IRS.
Trump’s tough measures against immigration could cost up to $479 billion in tax revenue over a 10-year period
The Trump administration’s tough measures against immigration could cause the US to lose up to $479 billion in tax revenue over the next 10 years, as enforcement measures deter undocumented workers from filing their tax returns this year, according to tax experts.
Trump’s cuts to weather data could make forecasts less reliable, experts warn
As the US prepares for hurricane season and a summer of record-breaking heat, experts fear that the Trump administration’s cuts to climate and weather data programmes could make the federal government’s weather forecasts less reliable just when they are needed most.
Trump administration officials plan to repeal limits on ‘forever chemicals’ in drinking water
The Trump administration has announced a plan to remove Biden-era limits on drinking water for four PFAS “forever chemicals” and to delay the implementation of standards for two other compounds.
PFAS is a class of at least 16,000 compounds most commonly used to make products water-, stain- and grease-resistant. They have been linked to cancer, birth defects, weakened immunity, high cholesterol, kidney disease and a range of other serious health problems. They are called “forever chemicals” because they do not break down naturally in the environment.
The New York Times sues the Pentagon again over press restrictions
The New York Times has filed a second lawsuit against the Pentagon, arguing that its recent policy, which requires journalists to have official escorts whilst on Pentagon premises, is unconstitutional.
In a lawsuit filed on Monday in the US District Court for the District of Columbia, the Times argued that an interim policy introduced in the spring imposed “utterly unreasonable” restrictions on journalists seeking to cover the department’s activities.
What else happened today:
Three people were killed in a shooting at the Islamic Centre in San Diego, in an incident that authorities said they were investigating as a hate crime . Two suspects, aged 17 and 19, also died, apparently from self-inflicted gunshot wounds, officials said.
Cuba’s President, Miguel Díaz-Canel, warned that any US military action against his country would lead to a “bloodbath” with incalculable consequences for regional peace and stability. “Cuba is not a threat,” Díaz-Canel said in a post on X.
A jury ruled in favour of Sam Altman at the end of a long and bitter legal battle that pitted the world’s richest man against a leader of the AI boom.
US health authorities confirmed on Monday that a US citizen had contracted the Ebola virus after being exposed whilst working in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); officials also stated that they were taking “proactive measures” to protect US citizens in response to the ongoing Ebola outbreak in the DRC and Uganda.
The Greenlandic government has criticised the arrival of an American doctor in Nuuk alongside Donald Trump’s special envoy, Jeff Landry, stating that Greenlanders are not “guinea pigs”.
,,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/18/trump-news-at-a-glance-iran
US extends sanctions waiver for Russian oil amid rising Brent crude prices due to supply crisis
Democratic senators have described the extension as an “unwanted gift” for Vladimir Putin, as supply fears keep the price of Brent crude above $110 a barrel
Reuters
Tuesday, 19 May 2026, 03:14 CEST
The US has announced a further 30-day extension of the sanctions waiver, which allows the purchase of Russian oil transported by sea to help “energy-vulnerable” countries affected by the war in Iran, reversing plans not to grant an extension.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the Treasury was issuing the 30-day general licence after a previous exemption expired on Saturday. This will allow temporary access to Russian oil and petroleum products stranded on tankers, without breaching the US’s severe sanctions against major Russian oil companies, he said.
“This general licence will help stabilise the physical crude oil market and ensure that oil reaches the most energy-vulnerable countries,” Bessent said.
Bessent, who told the Associated Press last month that no further extension of the exemption from sanctions on Russian oil was planned, argued on Monday that the measure would help redirect existing supplies to the countries that need them most, allowing them to compete with China for previously sanctioned oil.
This marks the second time the Treasury has allowed the sanctions waiver to expire and subsequently extended it.
Two senior Democratic senators, Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire and Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, have strongly criticised the move, calling it an “indefensible gift” to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
“Every extra dollar the Kremlin earns from this licence helps Putin fund his illegal war against Ukraine and kill innocent Ukrainians,” they said in a statement. They argued that lifting US sanctions had led neither to a fall in domestic petrol prices nor to the stabilisation of global energy markets.
The Trump administration imposed sanctions last year on the major Russian oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil to put pressure on Russia to end the war in Ukraine, depriving Moscow of vital oil revenues.
However, after US-Israeli attacks on Iran caused global oil prices to rise, the Treasury issued the temporary licence for the first time in March in an attempt to alleviate the oil supply shortage and curb price rises by releasing sanctioned Russian oil and petroleum products that were stuck in storage tanks. The waivers do not apply to oil currently being pumped by Russia.
Analysts said the short-term waivers could help some countries dependent on oil supplies from the Gulf, but would not contribute significantly to lowering US petrol prices. “It is not yet clear whether these short-term authorisations have had a significant impact on US petrol prices,” said Stephanie Connor, a former policy director at the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, adding that British and European sanctions on purchases of Russian oil remain in force.
As with the previous waiver, the licence allowed the purchase of Russian crude oil and petroleum products loaded onto ships from 17 April onwards, limiting the volume of sales and prohibiting access to Russian oil loaded more recently.
Charles Lichfield, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Centre for Geoeconomics, said the waivers would boost Russia’s oil revenues, already buoyed by higher oil prices, whilst offsetting the impact of intensified Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries and other infrastructure.
“Given the data coming out of the Russian economy, which looks bad, this might be the time to really hit them with sanctions,” said Lichfield. “But I don’t see the administration having reached that conclusion.”
On Monday, benchmark Brent crude futures rose by around 2.6%, closing above $112 a barrel, due to growing concerns over tight supply.
Bessent, who is in Paris for a meeting of G7 finance ministers, said he wanted the G7 and other allies to enforce sanctions against Iran more rigorously.
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/19/us-extends-sanctions-waiver-russian-oil-second-time
Update on the war in Ukraine: A Chinese ship was struck whilst heading for the port of Odessa, says Zelenskyy
Civilian ships attacked by Russians in the Black Sea; Kyiv condemns nuclear exercises in Belarus, viewing them as a threat to NATO and global security. What we know on day 1,546
Warren Murray and news agencies
Tuesday, 19 May 2026, 02:22 CEST
Russian drones struck a Chinese vessel during attacks on civilian ships approaching the Ukrainian ports of Odessa on the Black Sea on Monday, Ukrainian authorities said. The Ukrainian navy described the Ksl Deyang as a Chinese-owned cargo ship, manned by a Chinese crew and flying the Marshall Islands flag. The Deyang was heading for the port of Pivdennyi in the Odessa region of Ukraine to load iron ore concentrate, Reuters reported, citing a source. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that a Russian drone had struck the Chinese-owned vessel. It appears to have continued sailing after the attack.
The Ukrainian port authority stated that another vessel sailing under the flag of Guinea-Bissau had been struck, whilst the governor of Odessa, Oleh Kiper, stated separately that a Russian attack had struck a civilian vessel flying the Panamanian flag that was heading towards the port of Chornomorsk in Ukraine. No one was injured, the crew extinguished the resulting fire, and the ship continued on its way.
Ukraine has observed attempts by Russia to export grain from occupied Crimea, involving American companies, Zelenskyy said. “In particular, we have recorded attempts to organise the export of grain from the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea – and, unfortunately, other forms of economic exploitation of the peninsula, involving entities from the United States.” Zelenskyy said that Moscow is also attempting to attract investment from “democratic countries” into Russian oil and gas projects in the Arctic.
On Monday, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry condemned the nuclear weapons exercises in Belarus, criticising their conduct as an “unprecedented provocation” to global security. “By turning Belarus into its nuclear base near NATO’s borders, the Kremlin is de facto legitimising the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide and setting a dangerous precedent for other authoritarian regimes,” the ministry said. Kyiv has urged its Western allies to tighten sanctions against Moscow and Minsk.
Vladimir Putin has few good options in Ukraine, said the head of Estonia’s foreign intelligence service, given that Moscow’s armed forces are unable to make significant advances on the battlefield and Western sanctions are eroding its resources. Kaupo Rosin told Reuters that Russia is losing more men than it is recruiting and that a general mobilisation would be extremely unpopular and could undermine stability. “All these factors together create a situation where some people in Russia, including at the highest levels, understand that they have a big problem. It’s hard to say what Putin thinks about this, but I believe all these factors are beginning to influence his decision-making… My message is to press ahead with [sanctions]. This is not the time to hesitate; we must simply carry on.”
Another head of a European intelligence service, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Reuters that there are increasingly clear signs of pressure on Russia, but no indication as yet that this would change Moscow’s calculations in the war. “I find it very hard to believe that they [Russia] would give up their objective of conquering the entire Donbas region… and, in practice, Russia is in no hurry.” The intelligence chief described Russian society as resilient. “It is an illusion to believe that Russia’s leadership is now eroding in any way or that Putin is somehow being challenged [domestically].” Democratic senators have harshly criticised an “unwanted gift” given to Putin after the Trump administration suspended sanctions on Russian oil for a further 30 days. “Every extra dollar the Kremlin earns from this licence helps Putin fund his illegal war against Ukraine and kill innocent Ukrainians,” said a statement from Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire and Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts. British and European sanctions on Russian oil purchases remain in force.US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent argued that the waiver – which allows the purchase of Russian oil already at sea as of 17 April – would “help stabilise the physical crude oil market and ensure that oil reaches the most energy-vulnerable countries”. Analysts said the waiver could help some countries that have run out of Gulf oil due to Trump’s war against Iran, but would do little to lower petrol prices in the US, whilst Democrats said it would not stabilise global markets either.Russian drones struck critical infrastructure belonging to the Ukrainian energy company Naftogaz in the Dnipropetrovsk region on Sunday night, the company said. Among the targets was a fuel station, Naftogaz said, adding that the station’s headquarters and equipment had been completely destroyed and that two employees had been injured. Russia launched 524 drones and 22 missiles at Ukraine on Monday, the Ukrainian air force said. Air defence units shot down or neutralised 503 drones and four missiles. In Russia, drones were shot down in regions such as Rostov and Belgorod in the south, the Interfax news agency reported, citing the defence ministry in Moscow. Two people were killed in Belgorod, local authorities said. Explosives found on Monday near the wreckage of a suspected Ukrainian military drone will be disposed of by detonating them on site, Lithuanian police said. Authorities had previously stated that the drone was unarmed. It was found crashed in the village of Samane and is believed to have veered off course whilst heading towards a Russian target.
‘Stay calm’: Japan is gripped by fears of a potential oil shortage. What is it and why are people worried?
Few had heard of this petroleum-derived chemical until recently, but the shortage caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has led to a sudden surge in concern
Gavin Blair in Tokyo
Tuesday, 19 May 2026, 01:47 CEST
The Japanese government is struggling to mitigate the economic impact of the war in the Middle East, as the oil shortage is driving up inflation, with the crisis threatening to undermine Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s considerable lead in the polls.
Against this backdrop, a new poll shows that Japan has seen a rise in concern over the shortage of naphtha, a petroleum derivative used in the manufacture of a wide variety of products.
But why this concern over a product that few had heard of just a few months ago?
What is naphtha?
The term usually refers to a range of highly flammable liquid mixtures derived from petroleum (and other sources) and is used in the production of petrol, as well as in a wide range of materials, including plastics, insulating foam, adhesives, medical supplies such as syringes, and solvents for printing inks.
Naphtha is used in manufacturing industries worldwide, but Asia is particularly vulnerable to the current disruptions as it is the largest export market for this product from the Middle East.
Why is the Japanese public concerned about something they didn’t know existed a few months ago?
Pronounced ‘nafusa’ in Japanese, the word has recently begun to appear in news reports about the impact the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is having on supply chains.
But the announcement made on 12 May by Japan’s largest snack manufacturer – Calbee – that the colourful packaging of its iconic crisps would become monochrome highlighted the gravity of the geopolitical consequences. Data shows that wholesale inflation in Japan accelerated in April to its fastest pace in three years, with the price of naphtha rising by 79.4%.
Calbee potato crisp packets with a black-and-white design and the current orange and yellow packaging. Photo: Kazuhiro Nogi/AFP/Getty Images
Although Japan has significant national reserves of petrol, there have been suggestions that the government is downplaying the risk of disruption to other industries. Japanese television networks and newspapers have broadcast segments and published articles explaining what naphtha is and how the shortage could affect daily life.
A poll conducted by Kyodo News over the weekend showed that over 70% of respondents expressed concern about a disruption to naphtha supplies.
What measures is the Japanese government taking in response?
Japan sources over 90% of its oil from the Middle East and is therefore highly sensitive to current supply issues.
After Calbee announced it would switch to black-and-white packaging, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary was forced to reassure the public that adequate stocks of oil for ink had been secured, following questions from the media.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has also made several statements insisting that Japan is seeking alternative sources of oil and has resisted calls to reduce consumption that some of Japan’s Asian neighbours have been forced to issue.
However, it is already being reported that the shortage of naphtha is affecting plastic production, which prompted Environment Minister Hirotaka Ishihara on Friday to reiterate his earlier assurances regarding the supply of ink: “We have secured the necessary supply of bin bags. Please remain calm and avoid panic buying.”
The Japanese media has also reported that, in contrast to the government’s claims, supply chain disruptions are already being felt in sectors such as construction, dry cleaning, food processing and paint manufacturing.
Is this affecting Takaichi’s popularity?
The cabinet’s approval rating fell by 2.5 percentage points to 61.3% in a poll published on Sunday by Kyodo News. But this should be viewed in the context of a decline from the very high figures during the ‘honeymoon’ period following her landslide victory in the February election. It is unclear how significant the impact of the Middle East crisis is and how much responsibility the public believes Takaichi bears for this situation.
Over 70% of those surveyed said the government should call on the public to save energy.
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/19/japan-naphtha-shortage-explainer-iran-crisis
From sanctioned cars to beauty clinics, Russian roubles have flooded China’s border towns since the start of the war in Ukraine
Suifenhe, a small town in China’s ‘Rust Belt’ – a region affected by economic decline – is a microcosm of the ever-changing trade relations between China and Russia
Amy Hawkins in Suifenhe
Tuesday, 19 May 2026, 03:14 CEST
Dressed to the nines in a dark blue tracksuit and colourful high-top trainers, Wang Runguo is bustling about. Pacing the gleaming floors of his car showroom, the 45-year-old, originally from one of China’s poorest provinces, is about to close yet another deal. It is a typical working day for the man whose salary has doubled in the last year thanks to a timely change of direction: from maize to cars; from China to Russia.
This time last year, Wang was working for an agricultural company that grew maize and soya beans for the domestic market. Now he is a manager at Xingyun International Automobile Export, a company founded in August 2025 to serve the booming industry of new car exports from Suifenhe, a small town in north-eastern China on the border with Russia. “Recently, China and Russia have grown closer,” says Wang. “As we grow closer, more and more cars are finding their way there.”
A manager at Suifenhe Hengchi International Trade, one of the city’s largest car dealers, puts it more bluntly: “The war between Russia and Ukraine… has been a good opportunity for our business.”
As Russian President Vladimir Putin visits China on Tuesday, Moscow is likely hoping that Beijing will continue to see the benefits of a close relationship.
And on China’s border with Russia, where the US is a distant concept but where Russians spend their money, local businesspeople say they are not concerned about Western sanctions.
China rejects Western sanctions and claims they do not comply with international law. Earlier this month, the Chinese embassy in the UK lodged “strong protests” in London over sanctions imposed on Chinese companies accused of supplying drones and military equipment to Russia. A Chinese government spokesperson said: “Normal trade and cooperation between Chinese and Russian enterprises should not be affected” by the sanctions.
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, just weeks after Xi Jinping and Putin declared a “no-limits” partnership, ties between the two countries have deepened. Bilateral trade has reached record levels, much to the displeasure of Western leaders who accuse Beijing of providing an economic lifeline to Moscow whilst it is engaged in a war of aggression.
Beijing has purchased over €316.5 billion worth of Russian fossil fuels since the start of the full-scale invasion, according to data compiled by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, far exceeding the purchases of any other country. And Chinese companies have rushed to fill the gaps in the Russian market left by the withdrawal of Western firms. Last year, exports to Russia from Heilongjiang, the province that includes Suifenhe, rose by 22 per cent.
“The dependence is mutual, but asymmetrical,” says Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia-Eurasia Centre. China now buys nearly 30% of Russia’s exports, whilst only about 3% of China’s exports go in the opposite direction.
However, in certain industries, Russia plays a much more significant role in China’s economic fortunes. One such sector is the automotive industry, which in China is facing oversupply and insufficient domestic demand. Vehicles are one of Suifenhe’s main exports.
Between 2021 and 2024, the market share of Chinese brands in the Russian car market rose from 7% to nearly 60%, according to data from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers. In 2024, China sold over 1 million vehicles to Russia, making it the largest destination for Chinese cars, although it has since slipped to second place, behind Mexico.
Additional volumes came from the export of vehicles manufactured in China but under foreign brands. Despite sanctions imposed on Russia, tens of thousands of cars from brands such as BMW, Honda and Volkswagen continue to be sold in Russia every year through third-party Chinese dealers.
Wang’s BMW, a second-hand model, sold for 120,000 yuan (US$17,600). It is cheap compared to prices in Russia, says the buyer, a businessman based in Russia. And it is too expensive for Chinese consumers, says Wang. It is a win-win situation.
Just as China has kept the Russian economy afloat, Russian roubles are also propping up many parts of China, where the economy relies heavily on exports and where domestic consumers are unwilling or unable to spend money.
Gao Bin, head of Suifenhe Hengchi International Trade, says the firm turned to exporting cars to Russia three years ago. The first car they transported across the border was a black Toyota Camry. “After the war started, there was demand in Russia,” he says. Last year, he sold over 7,000 cars in Russia, compared with just a few dozen on the domestic market. “Domestic sales have practically ground to a halt.”
Suifenhe, a town of just 60,000 inhabitants in an economically declining industrial region of China, is a microcosm of this relationship. Signs in the Cyrillic alphabet are everywhere, and prices are displayed in roubles just as often as in yuan. But most of the shops are boarded up. From certain hilltops you can glimpse the deserted Russian villages (binoculars help), although a multi-storey observation tower, designed to attract tourists, has been left abandoned and unfinished for years.
As the first place in China to allow the rouble as legal tender, Suifenhe has long been home to a large community of Russian businesspeople and visitors, boosted by the introduction of a visa-free regime for Russian tourists in September. It is just two hours from Vladivostok by train. And, according to local businesspeople, the Russians are the only ones spending money.
Ning Qiang, who runs a beauty salon catering exclusively to Russians, says that the number of customers has risen by around 50% since the visa-free policy was introduced. By 5pm on a Tuesday, he had seen three customers. “When relations between China and Russia are good, life is better for ordinary people,” he says. “The locals in Suifenhe don’t buy much.”
Heilongjiang saw a rise of over 60 per cent in the number of visitors from Russia in the first six months following the introduction of the visa-free policy, according to Chinese state media. Gabuev says that the difficulty of obtaining European visas is driving more and more Russians to travel eastwards. “And they mostly come back truly fascinated and eager to return. It’s a positive thing for the Chinese,” he says.
One of the Russian women spending her money in China rather than in Russia is Mariia Publichuk, a 36-year-old from Vladivostok who lives in Suifenhe with her eight-year-old daughter. Publichuk moved to Suifenhe last year so that her daughter could study Chinese. The pair spend their mornings at a local primary school, surrounded by the noise of Chinese children. In the evening, they sing and dance in Suifenhe’s central square, which echoes with competing soundtracks blaring from speakers dotted across the square. “English is the most useful language in the world,” says Publichuk. “And the second is Chinese.”
But for anyone whose livelihood depends on yuan rather than roubles, times are tough. The manager of a local logistics centre handling cross-border and domestic transport says this has been the worst year since he started working there six years ago. The war in the Middle East has driven up fuel prices for his lorries, and orders are falling. “Not even during the pandemic… was it like this,” says Wang, who refuses to reveal his first name. “This year, across all sectors… demand from China is falling. Quite simply, people no longer have money in their pockets.”
National statistics paint a similar picture. Despite the trade war between the US and China, which last year saw US tariffs on Chinese goods rise to 145%, Chinese goods continue to be exported abroad in staggering quantities. Last year, China’s trade surplus reached a record high of $1.2 trillion. In the first three months of 2026, exports rose by nearly 15% compared with the same period last year, whilst domestic retail sales in March increased by just 1.7% compared with the same period last year.
US President Donald Trump left Beijing last week after a lavish two-day summit, with promises of “fantastic trade deals”. However, there were few public announcements regarding tariffs. On Saturday, China’s Ministry of Commerce stated that the two sides would set up a trade council to discuss “tariff reductions”, but offered no further details.
China’s long-term goal is to make its economy less dependent on exports. In March, its Premier, Li Qiang, said that China “must adhere to the strategic approach of expanding domestic demand”.
Structural issues such as an ageing population, a declining property sector and a lack of consumer confidence following the pandemic make this transition difficult to achieve. Exporting goods, whose prices are kept low partly due to China’s cheap energy supplies from Russia, is much easier.
Despite the economic slowdown, Beijing continues to hold the upper hand in the relationship between China and Russia. China has options for international trade that Russia does not. Bloomberg recently reported that 90% of Russia’s sanctioned technology is imported from China. And with Trump in the White House, Xi is under less pressure than ever regarding his relationship with Putin. The war in Ukraine was barely mentioned at last week’s US-China summit. “Trump’s request to Xi Jinping to contribute to peace efforts in Ukraine is not a particularly serious form of pressure,” says Gabuev. “Not that Xi Jinping feels he has any obligation in this regard.”
In Suifenhe, even the most ardent Russophiles see Russia as a country in decline, despite their own town’s struggling economy.
On the outskirts of the town, in a dilapidated and almost uninhabited village, a house built in the style of a Russian wooden log cabin, painted in bright blue and yellow, stands out against the grey. Its occupant is Song Lu, a 67-year-old retired artist whose family has lived in Suifenhe for generations. Passionate about Russian art and crafts, he spends his spare time building models of traditional Russian wooden carriages and has even constructed a blue log cabin sauna in the garden in front of his house. “The Russians might find it hard to admit, but in reality, China has already become the big brother,” he says.
Additional research by Lillian Yang
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/19/russia-china-border-increase-trade-ukraine-war
Greece seeks to clarify how a naval drone loaded with explosives ended up near the island of Lefkada – Maritime Security Forum
The incident, treated by the Greek authorities as a serious maritime security issue, has triggered a technical and diplomatic investigation, amid fears that the repercussions of the war in Ukraine may become increasingly visible in the eastern and central Mediterranean.
The Greek authorities stepped up their investigations following the discovery, in the west of the country, of an unmanned naval drone carrying explosive material. According to reports in the Greek press, the device was found near the island of Lefkada, in an area that is sensitive both in terms of maritime traffic and its impact on a major tourist destination.
The investigation was expanded after bomb disposal experts neutralised the payload via a controlled detonation. The drone was subsequently transferred for technical examination, and specialists analysed components such as the navigation system, GPS data, serial numbers and other metadata capable of indicating the device’s route, launch point and possible mission.
The Greek Minister of Defence, Nikos Dendias, publicly stated that the device was a Ukrainian-made unmanned surface vehicle and described the situation as “extremely serious”, primarily due to the risks to the freedom and safety of navigation. Meanwhile, other reports in the Greek press indicate that Athens is awaiting further clarification and official explanations, whilst the final technical assessment was to form the basis for any diplomatic action.
In his statements, Dendias also sought to convey a message of institutional control: on the one hand, he maintained that the authorities know what type of platform they are dealing with; on the other hand, he insisted that Greece is developing its own capabilities in the field of drones and anti-drone systems, precisely to respond to a form of conflict that is rapidly changing the rules of maritime and coastal security.
The circumstances of the discovery. According to reports in the Greek press, the drone was reportedly spotted after it veered off course, possibly due to a technical fault or loss of orientation. It was found by a fisherman in a coastal cave in the Lefkada area, which heightened public concern: this was not simply a piece of wreckage, but an active or recently active system, which had ended up in an area frequented by commercial, tourist and recreational vessels.
Technical data and details under investigation. The Greek press reported that the explosive payload was in the region of 100 kilograms, although some technical details remained unconfirmed officially in the initial phase. It is precisely this combination of high danger and the lack of a complete public picture that has fuelled concerns regarding the exact origin, the operational objective and how such a device could have come so close to the Greek coastline without being intercepted earlier.
Security implications. The incident goes far beyond the scope of a mere technical accident. It raises issues regarding maritime surveillance, the capacity for early detection of asymmetric threats, and the vulnerability of certain European Union coastal states to the collateral effects of a conflict waged at a great distance. For Greece, which has a very extensive coastline and is strategically dependent on freedom of navigation, tourism and maritime transport, the appearance of an explosive drone in the Ionian Sea signals a paradigm shift: the risks of hybrid warfare are no longer confined to established conflict zones.
The domestic political fallout. The opposition was quick to use the case to criticise the government in Athens, arguing that the official response lacked transparency and that the public had not been given a full account of the incident’s origins, course and true significance. At the same time, the government sought to avoid public escalation before the technical assessment was completed, precisely so as not to turn a security investigation into a diplomatic crisis fuelled by speculation.
Criticism from PASOK circles emphasised the idea that the mere presence of such a platform near Lefkada demonstrates how easily Greece can be drawn into the dynamics of an external conflict, even without direct involvement. For this reason, the case has become not only a defence issue, but also one of public communication and strategic risk management.
Ultimately, the central fear expressed in the Greek public debate is that the Mediterranean could gradually become a secondary arena for the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, through isolated actions, strikes on maritime targets or the emergence of autonomous systems that have slipped out of control. If such a trend is confirmed, the pressure on coastal states to adapt their security doctrines and rapid response mechanisms will increase significantly.
At the same time, voices from the nationalist political spectrum have interpreted the incident in a much harsher light, suggesting that the possibility of a deliberate act cannot be ruled out. However, until the expert assessments and any bilateral clarifications are finalised, such an interpretation remains at the level of political speculation, not a proven conclusion.
Conclusion. The case of the drone discovered near Lefkada demonstrates how quickly threats arising from external conflicts can reach Greece’s vicinity and how difficult it is to immediately draw the line between an accident, a failed operation and a strategic message. From the perspective of the Greek authorities, the stakes are not merely identifying the origin of the device, but also preventing a recurrence of an incident that has called into question the safety of navigation, the protection of the coastline and the stability of a region essential to Greece’s economy and geopolitical position.
Maritime Security Forum
Submarine competition in the Indo-Pacific: the United States’ underwater advantage under pressure from China’s rise – Maritime Security Forum
The strategic competition between the United States and China is entering a phase in which the underwater domain is becoming one of the few areas where Washington still retains a clear qualitative military advantage, though not necessarily a sustainable one at the current pace. In the context of the Indo-Pacific confrontation, attack submarines and strategic nuclear platforms are no longer merely instruments of discreet deterrence, but veritable power multipliers, capable of influencing freedom of manoeuvre, control of maritime lines of communication, the protection of forward bases, and the credibility of a potential response around Taiwan or in the chain of islands in the Western Pacific.
The geostrategic stakes. In the 21st century, naval competition is not limited to the tonnage of surface fleets. The real stakes lie in control of contested maritime space and the ability to project power in conditions of increasing battlefield transparency. As sensors, satellites, drones and precision strikes reduce the freedom of operation of traditional naval task forces, the submarine remains one of the few platforms capable of combining survivability, long-range strike capability and strategic ambiguity. This is precisely why the underwater competition between the US and China must be understood not as a technical aspect of naval modernisation, but as an indicator of the future balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
The American advantage: still real, but eroded. The United States continues to possess the most sophisticated submarine force in the world, and its qualitative superiority in terms of acoustic stealth, sensor integration, operational experience and interoperability with allies remains significant. However, the central issue is no longer whether the US currently has the best submarines, but whether it can maintain this advantage quickly enough in a context where the pace of production, maintenance and industrial regeneration has itself become a strategic variable. Public data shows that production of the Virginia class remains below the required level, at around 1.1–1.2 submarines per year, well below the target needed to simultaneously meet the requirements of its own fleet and the commitments undertaken through AUKUS.
The US’s structural vulnerability: the industrial base. The most serious American weakness is not doctrinal, but industrial. Production delays, recruitment and retention difficulties in shipyards, the overlap between the Virginia and Columbia programmes, as well as the accumulation of maintenance backlogs, reduce the effective availability of a component essential for deterrence in the Pacific. From a geostrategic perspective, this means that American technological superiority risks being undermined by the inability to translate technical advantage into a critical mass available when needed. In the event of a simultaneous crisis or a protracted conflict, the difference between ‘platforms on paper’ and ‘combat-ready platforms’ may become decisive.
China’s rise: from coastal defence to challenging maritime space. The evolution of China’s submarine force marks a major strategic transition. Whereas in the past Beijing relied mainly on conventional submarines useful for defending nearby waters, the current trend indicates a shift towards nuclear-powered platforms capable of long-range missions, strategic deterrence and remote access denial. Public assessments from 2026 suggest that by 2035 China could have around 80 submarines, of which over 40 would be nuclear-powered, reflecting a structural shift in its maritime doctrine: from regional defence to systemic competition for control of the wider maritime domain.
China’s production pace and the scale effect. The most significant signal is not merely the emergence of the new Type 093B, Type 095 or Type 096 classes, but the industrial pace that makes them possible. IISS analyses indicate that, between 2021 and 2025, China launched more nuclear submarines than the United States, and the expansion of the facilities at Huludao suggests that Beijing treats undersea competition as a long-term strategic priority. This dynamic does not yet signify qualitative parity with the US fleet, but it produces a cumulative mass effect that could seriously complicate the operational planning of the US and its allies.
AUKUS and the expansion of the allied strategic geometry. The Western response lies not only in submarine production, but also in the geographical redeployment of the submarine presence. AUKUS aims to transform Australia into a forward node of the Anglo-American submarine architecture, both through the rotation of American and British submarines to Western Australia and through the gradual development of the SSN-AUKUS programme. From a geostrategic perspective, Perth and HMAS Stirling take on particular significance: they provide additional strategic depth compared to Guam, reduce pressure on exposed bases in the Western Pacific, and expand the flexibility of support and maintenance in an area that is harder to saturate with missile strikes. However, the effectiveness of this gamble depends directly on the US and British industrial capacity to actually deliver the promised platforms.
The Taiwan scenario and the issue of strategic timing. In a potential conflict over Taiwan, US submarine forces would play a critical role in striking Chinese ships early, tracking Beijing’s nuclear submarines, protecting reinforcement routes, and imposing operational uncertainty on the PLAN. But this is precisely where the strategic paradox arises: the more the US submarine force is called upon to track China’s expansion in the wider Pacific, the fewer platforms remain available for the direct mission of contesting an amphibious operation or blocking Chinese sea lanes. In the short term, the American advantage remains credible; in the medium term, however, China’s production rate and its combination with anti-access systems, long-range missiles and sensor networks may erode the operational window on which Washington relies today.
The technological dimension: between stealth and underwater transparency. The competition is no longer played out exclusively between manned submarines. It is shifting increasingly towards a military ecosystem comprising distributed sensors, unmanned underwater vehicles, advanced oceanographic mapping and real-time data integration. From this perspective, the idea that the ocean remains a sanctuary of invisibility is becoming increasingly less valid. China is investing not only in quieter submarines, but also in underwater detection and monitoring infrastructure, whilst the US and its allies are banking on the combination of conventional platforms and unmanned systems. This suggests that future underwater superiority will not necessarily belong to the actor with the best individual submarines , but to the one that integrates platforms, sensors, logistics and data more effectively into a coherent combat system.
Geostrategic conclusions. At present, the United States still retains the decisive underwater advantage, but this can no longer be taken for granted or considered permanent. China has not yet matched American technological superiority in the submarine domain, but is catching up through volume, industrial pace, doctrinal learning and the integration of underwater competition into a broader strategy of challenging the US-led maritime order. Consequently, the central issue is not whether Beijing will immediately match the performance of every American submarine, but whether it will succeed in making American intervention in a major regional crisis sufficiently costly, slow and risky. If this trend continues, the Indo-Pacific will enter a phase in which naval superiority will no longer be decided solely on the surface, but in the depths, and the balance of power will depend increasingly on the resilience of industrial bases, the speed of military regeneration, and the ability of alliances to translate technological superiority into effective operational presence.
Maritime Security Forum
Kiel Report May 2026 – Summary of the Maritime Security Forum
Kiel Report No. 8 / May 2026 examines, in a comparative analysis, how Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland have accelerated their military procurement following the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine. The analysis is based on an update of the Kiel Military Procurement Tracker database and examines not only the volume of orders but also their structure, the origin of suppliers, delivery times and, above all, the extent to which these procurements reflect the transformation of modern warfare. The report’s central argument is that Europe is spending more on defence today, but not necessarily spending more wisely, and that increased budgets do not automatically translate into adequate capabilities for tomorrow’s conflicts.
The report’s central finding is that Germany has become the leading European military buyer among the three states analysed, reaching approximately €85 billion in orders by 2025, compared to around €25–26 billion in the United Kingdom and a comparable level in Poland. However, the authors point out that the exceptional volume of German orders is not accompanied by a commensurate doctrinal and technological transformation. A significant proportion of German procurement continues to go towards established conventional systems, munitions, logistical equipment or very large-scale conventional rearmament packages, whilst investment in capabilities associated with the new paradigm of warfare — drones, autonomous systems, real-time data fusion, anti-drone defence, AI integration and digital command — remains relatively modest in relation to the total scale of the financial effort.
The strategic comparison between the three states is particularly relevant. The United Kingdom appears to be an intermediate case: at the doctrinal level, London seems to have understood the lessons of the war in Ukraine more clearly than Berlin and places a stronger emphasis in its official documents on autonomy, unmanned systems, the integration of emerging technologies and the adaptation of forces to new forms of conflict. However, the report shows that this doctrinal ambition has not yet translated sufficiently clearly into a commensurate shift in procurement patterns. In contrast, Poland is presented as the most dynamic and coherent case: although it is continuing a massive conventional rearmament programme, Warsaw is also increasing the share of investment in capabilities associated with modern warfare and is seeking to link foreign procurement to the development of domestic production, which indicates not merely a purchasing policy but a broader strategy for building military and industrial resilience.
Another major conclusion concerns the industrial base and the logic of the European defence market. In all three states, a strong ‘home bias’ persists, that is, a marked preference for domestic suppliers or for internally controlled partnership arrangements. Truly pan-European procurements remain limited, confirming that Europe’s defence market is still fragmented and far from genuine strategic integration. At the same time, delivery times are long — generally between two and four years, and in many cases full capability is only available after four or five years. In the case of Germany, the report also highlights an additional problem: the proportion of orders for which there is no clear, publicly communicated delivery deadline is increasing. This lack of transparency raises questions regarding planning, monitoring and the ability to translate orders into concrete military effects within a timeframe compatible with current security risks.
Implications and conclusions. From a broader strategic perspective, the report suggests that Europe’s main problem is no longer merely a lack of resources, but the quality of procurement decisions and the speed of doctrinal adaptation. If European states continue to invest predominantly in capabilities designed for the logic of yesterday’s warfare, there is a risk that they will obtain larger forces, but not necessarily ones that are more relevant to the current operational environment. In this regard, Germany appears to be the most problematic link: it is the actor with the highest volume of procurement, but also the one that is slowest to translate this effort into a technological and doctrinal reorientation. The United Kingdom offers a more advanced strategic direction, yet practical implementation remains incomplete, whilst Poland is the clearest example of alignment between threat perception, doctrine, procurement and industrial base. The report’s overall conclusion is firm: Europe is rearming, but not in a sufficiently unified, rapid or intelligent manner. In the coming years, the key will not only be how much is spent, but what is purchased, who manufactures it, how quickly it is delivered, and whether these investments truly prepare European forces for modern warfare, characterised by autonomy, mass, speed of adaptation, digital interconnectivity and industrial resilience.
Maritime Security Forum
The resurgence of nuclear confrontation and the crisis of European strategic autonomy – Maritime Security Forum
The withdrawal of US troops from Germany and the uncertainty surrounding intermediate-range missiles are not merely a tactical dispute between allies, but a symptom of a deeper shift: the onset of a new phase of nuclear competition, in which the main actors are simultaneously recalibrating their deterrence, freedom of action and strategic influence.
US President Donald Trump’s announcement regarding the withdrawal of 5,000 US troops from Germany and the suspension of the agreement on the deployment of US intermediate-range systems on German territory must be interpreted beyond its immediate operational dimension. The real issue is not merely the redeployment of troops or the postponement of capabilities, but the strategic signal sent simultaneously to three audiences: European allies, Russia and China. As far as allies are concerned, the message is that the US guarantee can no longer be taken for granted as automatic or immune to domestic political cycles in the United States; on the adversarial front, the signal is that the transatlantic space can be subjected to pressure by exploiting political differences; and on the global front, the decision indicates that Washington is reordering its priorities in a world where the Indo-Pacific is competing directly with Europe for American strategic attention.
The underlying issue is that this development comes at a time when the old mechanisms of nuclear stability are eroding, and the major players are simultaneously rethinking their doctrines, deterrence architectures and instruments of pressure. The expiry of the New START treaty on 5 February 2026 has left, for the first time in more than half a century, the nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia without binding and verifiable legal limits. At the same time, the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference is taking place in a climate of heightened mistrust, marked by the modernisation of arsenals, the challenging of existing agreements and the resurgence of discourse on the political utility of nuclear weapons.
The United States: from guarantor of the Euro-Atlantic order to a power that makes its commitment conditional
For Washington, the decision regarding Germany is part of a broader logic of reassessing the cost-benefit ratio of the American presence in Europe. The Trump administration is signalling that military commitment to allies is no longer seen merely as an instrument of strategic stability, but also as a political lever used to secure compliance, burden-sharing and diplomatic alignment. At the same time, this approach reflects a real strategic constraint: the United States must simultaneously manage competition with Russia in Europe, the conflict in the Middle East and systemic rivalry with China in the Indo-Pacific. In this context, the temptation to ‘ ’ – to reduce direct exposure in Europe and transfer more responsibility to allies – becomes structural, not merely circumstantial.
Europe and Germany: the strategic vulnerability of prolonged dependence
For Germany and, more broadly, for Europe, the current crisis highlights the fundamental limitation of the post-Cold War security model: the disproportionate dependence on the US military guarantee. The fact that an agreement with such far-reaching strategic implications was constructed primarily in a bilateral format, without sufficient political and institutional anchoring at NATO level and without a credible link to a parallel arms control initiative, has made the entire architecture vulnerable to changes in Washington. For Berlin, the problem is not only the loss of a conventional long-range strike capability, but also the erosion of strategic predictability. For the European Union, the lesson is even harsher: without industrial, doctrinal and decision-making autonomy, Europe remains exposed to both Russian pressure and the volatility of US policy.
Russia: exploiting the vacuum in arms control and Western fragmentation
From Moscow’s perspective, the erosion of transatlantic cohesion is a strategic gain in itself. For several years, Russia has been pursuing not necessarily conventional superiority over NATO as a whole, but rather the fragmentation of Western political will and the increase in the costs of a collective response. In this context, the Iskander-M deployments in Kaliningrad and Belarus, coercive nuclear rhetoric and ambiguity regarding escalation thresholds function as instruments of psychological and military pressure on Europe. The absence of a new arms control regime following the expiry of New START provides Moscow with a more permissive environment for intimidation, modernisation and negotiating from a position of strength. Russia does not need Europe to believe in an inevitable nuclear war; it is sufficient for European leaders to perceive the costs of escalation as too high to act in a unified and rapid manner.
China: the actor transforming the nuclear issue from a bilateral into a trilateral equation
Although the crisis described appears to centre on Euro-Atlantic relations and US–Russia relations, the factor that is most profoundly altering the strategic equation is China’s nuclear rise. Beijing is rapidly expanding and modernising its arsenal, narrowing the scope within which Washington could treat strategic stability as an almost exclusively bilateral issue with Moscow. This development complicates any future arms control architecture: the United States wants to include China within a broader framework, whilst Beijing rejects the logic of parity and insists that its arsenal remains inferior to those of the US and Russia. The result is a transition from a relatively stable system, based on mutual limits between two superpowers, to a more fluid system, in which strategic calculations are influenced simultaneously by three major nuclear centres and by emerging technologies that compress decision-making time.
Strategic implications: Europe between rearmament, autonomy and the return of nuclear risk
The immediate implication is that Europe is entering a phase of strategic insecurity more complex than that of the last thirty years. This is not merely about a possible reduction in the American presence, but about the combination of three destabilising trends: the erosion of arms control, the proliferation of relevant nuclear actors, and the return of intermediate-range weapons and dual-capable systems to the centre of strategic calculation. For Europeans, this means that simply increasing defence spending is not enough. A strategy will be needed that combines strengthening conventional deterrence, investing in missile defence, increasing industrial and diplomatic resilience, and relaunching credible arms control and risk-reduction initiatives. Without such a combination, Europe risks becoming both a battleground for confrontation between the major powers and the actor least capable of shaping the rules of the game.
Conclusions
The current situation does not necessarily indicate the imminence of a nuclear war, but it confirms the onset of a historical phase in which the nuclear risk is once again becoming a political instrument and a central variable in the competition between the major powers. The United States is using the flexibility of its commitment to reallocate its resources and discipline its allies; Russia exploits any transatlantic rift to amplify its coercive power; China is transforming strategic stability from a bilateral equation into a trilateral one, which is more difficult to manage; and Europe is discovering that dependence on an external protector can no longer substitute for its own strategic will. In this sense, the real issue is not merely whether certain troops remain in Germany or not, or whether certain missiles are deployed or not, but whether Europeans can build their own strategic position in a world where deterrence, arms control and power competition are simultaneously being reconfigured.
The practical conclusion is clear: Europe needs not just more defence, but a comprehensive strategy. This should include three converging strands: reducing exclusive dependence on American decisions by strengthening NATO’s European pillar; building a genuine capacity for negotiation and initiative in the field of arms control, including in relation to new technologies and dual-use systems; and articulating a foreign policy that treats European security not as a derivative of other global priorities, but as an autonomous strategic interest. Without this recalibration, Europe will continue to react to the decisions of others; with it, it can once again become an actor capable of influencing the security architecture of its own neighbourhood.
Maritime Security Forum
First Chinese submarine delivered to Pakistan: strengthening the Beijing–Islamabad axis and implications for the naval balance in the Indian Ocean – Maritime Security Forum
The commissioning of the first Hangor-class submarine, built in China for Pakistan, represents more than a mere fleet modernisation. It signals the deepening of a strategic relationship that is already essential to the balance of power in South Asia and to maritime competition in the Indian Ocean. For Islamabad, this programme offers a real increase in deterrence capability and freedom of action at sea; for Beijing, it confirms Pakistan’s role as a key partner through which China extends its naval influence towards the Arabian Sea and the sea lanes linking the Gulf to the rest of the Indo-Pacific.
The commissioning ceremony for the submarine PNS/M Hangor took place on 30 April 2026 in Sanya, in the presence of Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, Chief of the Navy Naveed Ashraf and Chinese military officials. The choice of location is not without symbolism: Sanya, on Hainan Island, is home to one of the People’s Liberation Army’s most important submarine bases and reflects the strategic, not merely commercial, nature of Sino-Pakistani naval cooperation.
Capabilities and military relevance. The Hangor class is an export variant of the Chinese Yuan/039A-class submarines, featuring conventional propulsion and an Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, which allows it to remain submerged for significantly longer than conventional diesel-electric submarines. With a displacement of approximately 2,800 tonnes and the capability to deploy torpedoes, advanced sensors and anti-ship missiles, these platforms enhance Pakistan’s ability to conduct submarine warfare, threaten surface vessels and complicate the adversary’s naval planning. In operational terms, the major advantage lies not only in firepower, but also in the increased difficulty of detection and the extended underwater endurance in sensitive areas such as the Arabian Sea.
Technical and military characteristics and mission profile
| Characteristic | Indicative data | Military relevance |
| Type | Conventional attack submarine, export variant of the Chinese Type 039A/039B (Hangor) class | Platform optimised for submarine warfare, anti-access/area denial and covert strikes in coastal and offshore environments. |
| Propulsion | Diesel-electric with Stirling-type AIP system | Enables greater underwater endurance, reduced acoustic signature and longer patrols without frequent surfacing. |
| Displacement | Approximately 2,800 tonnes | A favourable compromise between stealth, endurance and weapon load. |
| Dimensions | Length approx. 76 m; beam approx. 8.4 m; draught approx. 6.2 m | Configuration suitable for discreet operations in the Arabian Sea and in narrower transit areas. |
| Maximum speed | Up to approximately 20 knots submerged | Provides tactical flexibility for interception, evasion and rapid repositioning. |
| Crew | Approximately 36 personnel | Ensures the operation of a modern platform with a relatively compact crew, which is important for sustainability and rotation. |
| Main armament | 6 × 533 mm torpedo tubes; compatible with heavy torpedoes and anti-ship missiles; some sources also mention the potential to launch cruise missiles | Enables it to strike surface ships, engage underwater targets and maintain a credible deterrent posture. Some capabilities remain unconfirmed by official public sources. |
| Sensors and survivability | Modern sonars, sensor suites and, according to some reports, acoustic countermeasures and an optronic mast | Enhances detection, survivability and response capabilities in contested anti-submarine environments. |
| Procurement programme | 8 submarines; the first 4 built in China, the next 4 in Pakistan, with technology transfer | Expands not only Pakistan’s naval power, but also its industrial base and maintenance autonomy. |
Missions it can perform. In the publicly known configuration, the Hangor-class submarine can carry out anti-ship combat missions against surface vessels, anti-submarine missions, covert patrol and maritime surveillance, protection of maritime communication lines, access denial operations in sensitive areas of the Arabian Sea and the northern Indian Ocean, as well as deterrence missions through stealthy presence. Depending on the final configuration of the armament and on-board systems, the platform may also be suitable for naval mining, covert insertion of special forces or precision strikes from a distance; however, some of these applications depend on capabilities that have not been fully confirmed officially.
The industrial and technological dimension. The agreement signed in 2015 for eight submarines, estimated to be worth around $5 billion, has implications that go beyond the actual delivery of the vessels. Four submarines are being built in China, and another four are to be built in Pakistan as part of a technology transfer arrangement. This approach is important for Islamabad as it offers not only new capabilities but also a foundation for industrial and operational learning. However, analysts have already pointed out that the real test is not the launch ceremony, but the ability of the Pakistani shipyards in Karachi to produce the forthcoming vessels on time and to the required standard.
Asif Ali Zardari’s description of the programme as a “historic moment” should also be read as a political message, both domestic and foreign. Domestically, the Pakistani authorities are seeking to project the image of a navy undergoing modernisation and of a state capable of protecting its maritime and economic interests. Externally, the message is that Pakistan is strengthening its deterrence against India and consolidating its status as China’s privileged strategic partner.
Image generated with Microsoft Copilot
Regional implications. For Pakistan, the new Hangor-class submarines provide a more credible tool for maritime deterrence and enhance the ability to protect maritime communication lines in the Arabian Sea. For India, however, the programme confirms that its rivalry with Pakistan can no longer be separated from its competition with China. The strengthening of the Pakistani navy through Chinese technology forces New Delhi to respond simultaneously to two pressures: one direct, coming from Pakistan, and one structural, represented by the expansion of China’s naval presence and influence in the Indian Ocean. Consequently, Pakistan’s submarine modernisation is also accelerating India’s race for conventional submarines with AIP and for a more robust maritime nuclear deterrent.
The impact on the Indian Ocean. From a geostrategic perspective, the Hangor programme strengthens China’s position in a maritime space that India considers vital to its own security. Through these submarines, Beijing is not gaining a new formal naval base, but is consolidating its strategic access to the Arabian Sea via an ally dependent on its technology and military support. At the same time, India’s response — including its approach to Germany for six new conventional submarines — indicates that the regional naval balance is entering a new phase, in which underwater competition will carry greater weight than a simple comparison of surface fleets.
Strategic dependence and military integration. Chinese military equipment deliveries are already playing a decisive role in the modernisation of the Pakistani forces, and the Hangor programme confirms that this relationship is no longer a one-off arrangement, but one of long-term strategic integration. Beijing is supplying Pakistan not only with naval platforms, but also with fighter aircraft, drones, frigates and other systems that are gradually shaping its military architecture. This dependence enhances the coherence of the bilateral relationship, but also reduces Islamabad’s strategic autonomy, as it becomes increasingly tied to China’s industrial, technological and political choices.
SIPRI data illustrates the extent of this dependence: between 2021 and 2025, approximately 80% of Pakistan’s arms imports came from China, and Pakistan absorbed the lion’s share of Beijing’s major arms exports. This military interdependence transforms the Sino-Pakistani relationship into a regional pillar of power, with a direct impact on India’s strategic calculations and on how external actors — including the US and European states — view competition in the Indian Ocean.
Conclusions. The commissioning of the first Hangor-class submarine marks an important stage in the transformation of the Pakistani navy, but its real significance is broader: it indicates the deepening of the strategic Beijing–Islamabad axis and the shift of an increasingly significant part of regional competition into the underwater domain. For Pakistan, the immediate gain is a more credible capability for deterrence and maritime control; for China, the advantage lies in consolidating an indirect but influential presence in the vicinity of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean; for India, the programme represents yet another signal that the regional naval balance is becoming increasingly linked to China’s military rise. If the current pace continues, the Indian Ocean will become not only a vital route for global trade, but also one of the main theatres of strategic rivalry between India and China, with Pakistan acting as a regional multiplier of Beijing’s influence.
Maritime Security Forum
The closure of the Kerch Bridge and the disruption of the rail link to occupied Crimea: a sign of Russian logistical vulnerability in the Black Sea – Analysis by the Maritime Security Forum
The temporary closure of the Kerch Bridge on the night of 15–16 May caused visible disruptions to the rail link between the Russian Federation and occupied Crimea, affecting both civilian transport and perceptions of the security of one of Moscow’s most important logistics hubs in the Black Sea region. According to reports in the Ukrainian press, citing statements from the rail operator, by 11:00 am 12 passenger trains were already delayed, with delays reaching up to 7–8 hours. Ukrainska Pravda and BlackSeaNews reported that traffic resumed only after approximately 11 hours of restrictions.
The operator Grand Service Express, which manages the ‘Tavria’ trains, indicated that passengers on journeys delayed by more than four hours were to receive water and food, a sign that the disruption was not treated as a mere routine delay, but as a major disruption to a sensitive transport route. Some reports mentioned 12 trains affected at the time of the morning assessment, whilst other Russian sources spoke of 8 or 13 trains at different times, suggesting a fluid situation and a continuous update on the operational impact.
The restrictions began around 02:27, and road traffic resumed after 13:00. During the same period, air raid alerts were reported in occupied Crimea and Sevastopol, and the Russian Ministry of Defence claimed to have intercepted over a hundred drones over Crimea, the Black Sea and several regions of the Russian Federation. Even though these figures come from official Russian sources and cannot be fully verified independently, they reinforce the perception that the closure of the bridge was linked to an air threat or heightened security situation.
The strategic significance of the Kerch Bridge. The bridge is not merely a piece of civilian infrastructure, but a vital artery linking mainland Russia with occupied Crimea. It supports passenger flows, commercial supplies and, in a broader sense, the logistical mobility necessary to maintain Russian control over the peninsula and to sustain forces in the southern theatre of war. For this reason, any disruption, even a temporary one, has implications that go beyond the immediate effect on traffic: it signals vulnerability, slows down logistical operations and forces the Russian authorities to expend additional resources on protection, verification and control.
Immediate effects on transport. At the time of reporting, seven trains heading for Crimea and another five leaving the peninsula were experiencing significant delays. Even though this concerns civilian passenger transport, such disruptions have wider implications: they congest access infrastructure, generate additional logistical costs, affect the predictability of traffic and convey to the public the impression that the bridge remains a constant point of pressure. In a militarised area such as Crimea, the strict separation between civilian and strategic impacts is becoming increasingly difficult.
Military and strategic implications. The incident confirms that the Kerch Bridge remains one of the most sensitive points in Russia’s southern logistics network. Even when not directly struck, the mere necessity of closing it in the face of aerial threats causes a chain reaction of disruptions and highlights Russia’s difficulty in guaranteeing the uninterrupted operation of vital infrastructure. For Ukraine, this type of indirect effect is significant because it forces Moscow to redeploy air defences, increase security measures and accept higher operational costs to maintain an essential route. For Russia, however, the recurrence of such incidents erodes the image of full control over Crimea and fuels the perception that the peninsula remains under constant pressure.
Conclusion. The temporary blockage of the Kerch Bridge not only caused rail delays but also provided yet another demonstration of the fragility of a link that Russia treats simultaneously as a political symbol, a logistical corridor and a strategic objective. In a theatre of operations where infrastructure becomes an integral part of warfare, every disruption of this kind has effects that extend beyond its immediate duration: it reduces the fluidity of transport, amplifies psychological pressure and confirms that the security of occupied Crimea depends on infrastructure that is becoming increasingly difficult to protect completely.
Maritime Security Forum
The Strait of Hormuz between energy leverage and strategic constraint: to what extent can Iran exploit a global chokepoint? – analysis by the Maritime Security Forum
The threat of disrupting energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz may have coercive effects in the short term, but, once it turns into a protracted crisis, it risks eroding the very power base of the actor attempting to use it.
Against the current backdrop of tensions between the United States and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is once again at the centre of the global security architecture, not merely as an energy transport route, but as a tool for strategic pressure with systemic repercussions. Any indication of a possible restriction on traffic through this maritime passage has effects that immediately extend beyond the regional theatre: it influences market expectations, alters the risk assessments of major Asian importers, forces naval powers to recalibrate their deterrence posture, and amplifies the global economy’s sensitivity to geopolitical shocks. At the same time, reports of possible arms transfers or indirect military support to Iran, attributed to Western sources, further complicate the strategic equation, as they introduce the dimension of competition between the major powers into the crisis.
Although Washington is attempting to turn military and economic pressure into a negotiating advantage, its ability to rapidly coerce Tehran remains limited by the costs of a prolonged escalation on the global economy, on regional alliances and on its own global strategic agenda. However, Iran does not have absolute control over the game either. Geography offers it significant leverage, but not decisive leverage; and the value of this leverage depends on how it is used. In geostrategic terms, the difference between threatening disruption and actually causing a lasting disruption to energy flows is fundamental: the first option can generate deterrence, whilst the second can trigger accelerated adaptation by adversaries and gradually reduce the utility of the coercive tool.
The logic of energy leverage: why the threat is often worth more than its use
Recent history shows that the coercive use of energy interdependence frequently produces a paradoxical effect: the actor attempting to turn others’ dependence into a strategic weapon eventually exhausts its own source of influence. The case of the Russian Federation is relevant. In the initial phase of the war against Ukraine, Moscow relied on Europe’s energy dependence to limit Western cohesion and increase the political cost of supporting Kyiv. In the short term, this strategy produced tensions and volatility. In the medium term, however, it accelerated precisely the process the Kremlin would have wished to avoid: the diversification of supply sources, the reconfiguration of European energy infrastructure, and the structural decline of Russian energy influence.
That is why the analogy with Russia is useful for understanding Iran’s calculation. If Tehran believes that the mere prospect of a global oil crisis will force its adversaries to accept favourable political terms, then its gamble is based on the psychological effect of the threat. If, however, Iran goes beyond this phase and causes a prolonged disruption, then the major consumer economies, naval actors and markets will begin to adapt: strategic reserves will be activated, alternative routes and infrastructure will be prioritised, military and e protection of commercial traffic will be stepped up, and the international consensus against Iran’s coercive behaviour may strengthen. In other words, maximum leverage exists before the instrument is fully utilised, not afterwards.
From this perspective, the strategic issue for Iran is not whether it can trigger a crisis, but whether it can turn a crisis into a sustainable political advantage without triggering a counterbalancing coalition stronger than the immediate gain it seeks.
Furthermore, oil and natural gas operate under different market dynamics, and this difference matters strategically. Oil flows are, in principle, more flexible than those of gas via pipelines, but this flexibility is limited by transport capacity, refinery profiles, logistical costs and the time required for redirection. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most sensitive energy chokepoints: in 2025, approximately 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products transited through this passage, equivalent to around a quarter of global maritime oil trade, and options for bypassing the strait remain limited. At the same time, a critical portion of global LNG exports also passes through the Strait of Hormuz, particularly from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. This means that a major disruption would affect not only oil prices, but also the energy security of key importers in Asia and the stability of industrial supply chains dependent on gas and petrochemicals.
In this context, China’s position takes on particular significance. Beijing has a structural interest in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, as a significant portion of the energy flows transiting the strait are destined for Asia, and China is among the main beneficiaries of these routes. This is precisely why any suggestion of potential Chinese military support for Iran is analysed with the utmost care in Western capitals, even though many of the reports that have appeared in the public domain remain disputed or insufficiently confirmed by independent sources. From a geostrategic perspective, the mere perception of Chinese involvement may be enough to transform a regional crisis into an episode of systemic competition between the major powers.
In the short term, buffer mechanisms exist: strategic reserves, partial re-routing of certain flows, limited bypass capacity via pipelines, and commercial adjustments by major traders and refineries. But these mechanisms have finite capacity and cannot, in the long term, substitute for the normal functioning of a corridor through which a major portion of the world’s energy passes. Recent assessments show that, although there are a few alternative routes capable of partially bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, their total capacity remains well below the usual volume of traffic. In scenarios of widespread disruption, prices rise not only due to physical shortages, but also through risk reassessment, higher maritime insurance costs, logistical congestion and competition for immediately available barrels. In the spring of 2026, the volatility of energy markets confirmed precisely this reality: it is not only the actual shortage that matters, but also the anticipation of the crisis’s duration and the pace at which the global system can adapt.
Iran’s calculation appears to be based on the premise that its adversaries, particularly the United States, will be more sensitive to the economic and political costs of an energy crisis than Tehran is willing to bear the costs of a regional escalation. This premise is not without logic, but it is incomplete. In practice, a major energy crisis may generate not only pressure for compromise, but also pressure for a tough response. If the disruption becomes severe and visible enough, Western leaders may conclude that inaction is more costly than controlled escalation. Thus, the instrument designed to deter may end up legitimising further coercive measures against Iran, both militarily and diplomatically.
Why a prolonged energy crisis could affect Iran more than its adversaries
For Tehran, the major risk is that the exploitation of the Strait of Hormuz could shift the political and strategic balance in exactly the opposite direction to that desired. A prolonged disruption to maritime traffic and energy markets could strengthen the arguments of those advocating a tougher policy of coercion against Iran, including the expansion of military measures to protect shipping, the intensification of sanctions, and the strengthening of cooperation between Western actors, the Gulf monarchies, and Asian partners dependent on energy imports. From a military perspective, the United States and its allies retain a clear advantage in terms of naval projection, ISR, precision- e strikes and the protection of maritime lines of communication. Therefore, if Iran is banking on a war of attrition around a chokepoint, it must take into account that its adversary possesses superior resources to sustain escalation over the longer term.
Moreover, Iran itself depends on the functioning of regional sea lanes for exports, budget revenues and the maintenance of vital economic channels. A prolonged crisis in the Strait of Hormuz would affect not only consumer economies, but also Tehran’s own ability to monetise exports, sustain internal stability and avoid further deterioration of the socio-economic situation. Internationally, such a development would reduce Iran’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre, as even those actors who do not automatically align with the US position have an objective interest in keeping open a passage connecting the Gulf to the global economy. The longer the crisis drags on, the greater the likelihood that Iran will lose tacit support, exhaust its negotiating options and turn a geographical advantage into a strategic vulnerability.
Conclusions. The Strait of Hormuz offers Iran real leverage, but not a decisive strategic solution. Geographical control over an energy chokepoint of global importance allows Tehran to create uncertainty, increase its adversaries’ costs and temporarily influence the political calculations of the major powers. However, this leverage is effective primarily as a credible threat, not as a tool for prolonged blockage. Once transformed into a protracted crisis, it tends to trigger precisely the mechanisms that reduce its usefulness: market adaptation, the mobilisation of strategic reserves, the strengthening of naval coalitions, and the legitimisation of additional coercive measures against the actor perceived as the source of destabilisation.
From a geopolitical perspective, the real stake is not merely freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, but the ability of key players to turn energy interdependence into a strategic advantage without triggering an uncontrolled spiral of escalation. For the United States, the key lies in maintaining the credibility of deterrence without incurring disproportionate costs in a theatre that competes with other global priorities. For China and the major Asian economies, the priority is to safeguard energy flows without direct involvement in a militarised confrontation. For the Gulf states, the challenge is to avoid a situation where their own security and prosperity become hostages to the rivalry between the great powers and Iranian calculations. As for Iran, the geostrategic lesson is clear: the Strait of Hormuz may be a bargaining chip, but it cannot replace a sustainable strategy for breaking out of isolation, achieving regional stability and preserving its own freedom of action. In the absence of such a strategy, the excessive use of maritime coercion risks turning an exceptional geographical advantage into a catalyst for its own vulnerability.
Maritime Security Forum
Why the denuclearisation of North Korea is no longer a realistic objective: strategic implications and perspectives – analysis by the Maritime Security Forum
Given that Pyongyang has turned its nuclear arsenal into a constitutional pillar of the regime’s survival, and the strategic environment in North-East Asia has shifted in its relative favour, the complete denuclearisation of North Korea can no longer realistically be treated as a starting point for diplomacy, but at best as a distant, improbable prospect dependent on major political shifts.
The North Korean issue must now be understood in different terms from those of previous diplomatic cycles. For Kim Jong-un’s regime, the nuclear weapon is no longer merely a bargaining chip, but the concentrated expression of the regime’s security, strategic autonomy and international standing. The fact that Pyongyang has enshrined the ‘irreversible’ nature of its nuclear status in its constitution and has continued to expand its doctrine and command architecture indicates a fundamental shift: denuclearisation is no longer perceived in Pyongyang as a matter for compromise, but as a denial of its own formula for political survival.
Unlike during the 2018–2019 summit period, when Kim Jong-un could still test the hypothesis of a limited trade-off between sanctions, external legitimacy and partial nuclear constraints, North Korea now finds itself in a relatively stronger strategic position. Deepened cooperation with Russia, the de facto easing of international pressure through changes in the behaviour of Moscow and Beijing, and progress in the field of nuclear delivery systems and the ‘ ’ doctrine have reduced the incentives for major concessions. In the regime’s logic, time no longer automatically works in Washington’s favour, but may work in favour of the gradual consolidation of North Korea’s nuclear status.
From the US perspective, the persistence of the ‘complete denuclearisation’ formula has political and normative value: it protects the global non-proliferation regime, avoids legitimising a dangerous precedent, and maintains cohesion with Seoul and Tokyo. However, this formula is increasingly incompatible with the strategic reality on the ground. Even in 2026, Washington continued to officially reaffirm the goal of denuclearisation, including in coordination with its allies and in dialogue with Beijing, but this declaratory stance does not alter the fact that Pyongyang no longer treats the abandonment of nuclear weapons as a negotiable option.
Consequently, the relevant strategic question is no longer whether Washington can achieve the denuclearisation of North Korea quickly, but whether it can build a framework of deterrence, risk management and, eventually, arms control that reduces the likelihood of crisis and escalation. Such a shift does not entail formal recognition of North Korea as a legitimate nuclear power, but it does imply accepting that viable diplomacy will have to start from managing an existing capability, not from the fiction of its immediate elimination.
Why North Korea has even fewer reasons today to give up its nuclear weapons
The harsh reality is that North Korean denuclearisation no longer seems achievable either through coercive pressure or through traditional economic incentives. For Kim Jong-un, the lesson drawn from the last two decades is simple: regimes that relinquish hard security guarantees become vulnerable, whilst those that acquire a credible deterrent capability expand their room for manoeuvre. From this perspective, the nuclear arsenal is perceived in Pyongyang not merely as a weapon, but as a mechanism to block the scenario of regime change.
In 2018–2019, North Korea had not yet accumulated the full range of advantages it possesses today. Its nuclear and ballistic capabilities were still under development, its relationship with Russia lacked the strategic depth it has today, and China maintained a certain tactical distance. Today, however, the evolution of its programmes has altered the parameters of deterrence. US public assessments and specialist analyses indicate that North Korea’s nuclear forces are becoming increasingly capable of threatening both US regional allies and, in certain scenarios, the US mainland. At the same time, Pyongyang is seeking to strengthen its survivability and retaliatory capacity, which boosts the regime’s confidence in its own deterrence strategy.
The geopolitical dimension is just as important as the military one. The war in Ukraine has created a rare strategic opportunity for Pyongyang: Russia needs external support and is more willing to offer in return political and economic access and, according to some Western assessments, transfers of expertise or sensitive technology. China, for its part, does not want the North Korean regime to collapse and prefers to treat the Peninsula as a strategic buffer zone in its rivalry with Washington. Even if Beijing and Moscow do not form a perfectly coherent alliance with Pyongyang, the mere fact that coordinated pressure on North Korea has diminished drastically reduces the likelihood that sanctions and isolation will produce the result desired by the West.
Added to this is the dimension of strategic perception. From Pyongyang’s perspective, the US insistence on denuclearisation, combined with its history of interventions against hostile regimes, confirms that the nuclear weapon is the only ultimate guarantee against external coercion. Even when Washington signals a willingness to engage in dialogue, the fundamental problem remains the lack of convergence on the subject of the negotiations: for the US, denuclearisation remains the stated goal; for North Korea, recognition of the nuclear reality is the minimum condition for any substantive discussion.
Beyond denuclearisation: what strategy remains possible for Washington
If the United States wishes to reopen a credible diplomatic channel, it will need to shift from the maximalist paradigm of the immediate elimination of the nuclear programme to one focused on strategic stability. This may include verifiable freezes on certain programmes, selective transparency, notification mechanisms, risk-reduction measures, and discussions on limiting certain categories of delivery systems or doctrines. Such an approach does not mean abandoning non-proliferation principles, but rather adapting the tools to an adversary that has long since passed the stage where complete disarmament could be achieved through conventional diplomatic exchanges.
The key will be the distinction between tacit recognition and formal recognition. Formal recognition of North Korea as a legitimate nuclear state would seriously undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty and set a dangerous strategic precedent for other cases. In contrast, a tacit, operational-level recognition — that is, the negotiation of limits, notifications or risk-control measures without legal validation of nuclear status — could offer a more realistic diplomatic space. This would be an imperfect solution, but less dangerous than maintaining a declaratory framework completely divorced from reality.
At the same time, any adjustment to US policy towards Pyongyang must be integrated into the broader equation of extended deterrence. For South Korea and Japan, the major risk is that softening the language on denuclearisation will be perceived as the beginning of a strategic accommodation with Pyongyang. Therefore, any diplomatic overture will need to be accompanied by a strengthening of security guarantees, trilateral coordination, and conventional and anti-missile capabilities. In other words, diplomatic realism towards North Korea cannot work without strategic compensation in relation to allies.
Conclusions and outlook
Geopolitically, the North Korean issue confirms the onset of a phase in which the non-proliferation order is being challenged not only by the ambitions of an isolated regime, but also by the changing international environment. Competition between the major powers, the weakening of the consensus on sanctions, and the strategic utility that Russia and China attribute to maintaining North Korea as a lever of pressure on the United States considerably reduce the chances of a return to the diplomatic model of the 1990s or even the 2018–2019 period. In geostrategic terms, Pyongyang is no longer merely a regional issue, but a piece in the power equation between Washington, Beijing and Moscow.
In the medium term, the most likely outcome is not denuclearisation, but the consolidation of the status quo: North Korea will seek to expand its arsenal both quantitatively and qualitatively, to make its doctrine more credible, and to use its nuclear status to gain political advantages without accepting disarmament. In parallel, the United States and its allies will seek to combine strengthened deterrence with the exploration of risk management approaches and, potentially, limited arms control. The prospect of future negotiations thus depends not on a return to the slogan of denuclearisation, but on the ability of the actors to strike a new balance between strategic realism, allied credibility and the protection of the global non-proliferation regime.
The key conclusion is that the denuclearisation of North Korea can no longer serve as a credible operational strategy, even if it remains a useful normative framework for the international order. Effective policy will need to distinguish between the legal-political ideal and strategic reality: the former requires maintaining non-proliferation as a principle, the latter demands the clear-headed management of a de facto nuclear power. In other words, the challenge is no longer how to return North Korea to a nuclear-free state, but how to prevent an already established strategic reality from turning into a permanent crisis or a destabilising precedent for other regions of the world.
Maritime Security Forum
The collision involving the KSL Deyang in the Black Sea: location, legal and maritime significance, and geopolitical implications in the context of Putin’s visit to Beijing – Maritime Security Forum
Operational context and location. On the night of 17–18 May 2026, the cargo ship KSL Deyang, owned by a Chinese company, with a crew of Chinese nationals and sailing under the flag of the Marshall Islands, was struck by a Russian drone in the Black Sea, whilst en route to the port of Pivdeni in the Odessa region, where it was due to load iron ore concentrate. According to publicly available information, the vessel was not carrying cargo at the time of the strike, sustained only limited damage, there were no casualties, and the fire caused by the impact was extinguished by the crew. The location of the incident is crucial: it occurred in the Ukrainian maritime corridor off the coast of Odessa, that is, in an area that has become a critical hub for Ukraine’s exports and, by extension, for the competition between the Russian blockade and Kyiv’s attempt to keep commercial access to the sea open.
The legal and maritime significance of the incident. A key detail, often omitted in press reports, is that the vessel was not flying the Chinese flag, but the flag of the Marshall Islands. Under international maritime law, it is the flag state that legally represents the vessel, and this aspect substantially alters the diplomatic nature of the incident. Ramming a vessel owned by a Chinese company and operated by a Chinese crew is not, from a formal point of view, equivalent to ramming a vessel flying the Chinese flag. This distinction affords Beijing room for manoeuvre and a form of plausible deniability: it can treat the episode as an incident of commercial and navigational security, not necessarily as a direct affront to its maritime sovereignty. It is precisely this nuance that explains why an apparently serious event can be absorbed politically without a major public rift between Moscow and Beijing.
The fact that the strike was attributed to a Shahed/Geran-type drone adds a further symbolic dimension. In a strategic cooperation framework where Russia uses Iranian-made systems and China is Moscow’s main economic and technological backer, striking a vessel with commercial ties to China using a weapon associated with the Russian-Iranian axis is, at least in terms of perception, deeply uncomfortable for the entire network of anti-Western partnerships. However, symbolic value does not automatically equate to political intent: the incident can be exploited geopolitically regardless of whether it was the result of an error, operational negligence or a deliberate signal.
The drone used was an Iranian Shahed (in the Russian-produced variant, known as Geran). This is by no means a neutral detail: Iran, Russia and China are strategic partners, and an Iranian-Russian weapon striking a Chinese vessel is symbolically unwelcome for the entire axis. Newspapers
Political timing: the incident and Putin’s visit to Beijing. The timing lends the episode a significance that goes beyond a tactical incident. The Kremlin confirmed that [Vladimir Putin]() was due to make an official visit to China on 19–20 May 2026, just a few days after US President [Donald Trump]()’s visit to Beijing. According to official statements, the talks between [Vladimir Putin]() and [Xi Jinping]() were to focus on strengthening the strategic partnership, economic cooperation and major regional and international issues. In this context, the striking of a vessel with economic ties to China just before [Vladimir Putin]()’s trip to the Chinese capital creates an obvious diplomatic dissonance: Moscow is going to Beijing to reaffirm the partnership, but arrives there following an incident that calls into question the security of Chinese maritime interests in the Black Sea.
The sequence of events is significant: following the US-China talks in Beijing between 9 and 12 May, came the attack on the KSL Deyang on the night of 17–18 May, the Ukrainian public announcement on 18 May and, immediately afterwards, [Vladimir Putin]’s visit to Beijing on 19–20 May. Politically, this sequence of events turns the incident into a test of the asymmetry in the Russian-Chinese relationship. Russia is increasingly dependent on China for economic and technological resilience under sanctions, which means that the Kremlin leader arrives in Beijing from a position of strategic need rather than equality. Consequently, any incident that exposes the vulnerability of Chinese interests ahead of such a visit takes on a geopolitical significance disproportionately greater than the actual material damage.
Interpretative scenarios. There are several ways in which the episode can be interpreted, and none can be conclusively demonstrated based solely on publicly available information. The first possibility is an operational error within a massive wave of attacks, a hypothesis supported by the scale of the Russian strikes on the Odessa region that same night. The second is that of an indirect signal to China: not necessarily an attack against Beijing, but a reminder that trade routes entering Ukrainian ports remain vulnerable. The third is the interpretation that the real target of the message was Ukraine and its supporters, and the Chinese component was accidental but politically exploitable. Finally, there is also a more speculative reading of an incident that deliberately complicates China’s position just ahead of the meeting between [Vladimir Putin]() and [Xi Jinping](). The most prudent conclusion is that we are dealing with an episode that may be simultaneously the product of a large-scale operation and an event of strategic value that can be immediately exploited by all parties involved.
China’s difficult position. For Beijing, the incident creates a delicate contradiction. If it reacts too harshly in public, it risks undermining the narrative of its strategic partnership with Russia just as [Vladimir Putin]() arrives in the Chinese capital to reaffirm that very relationship. If it ignores it completely, however, it sends a signal to Chinese shipping companies and economic actors that the state is unwilling to visibly protect commercial interests exposed in an active theatre of conflict. The most likely option is, therefore, discreet management: any clarifications through bilateral channels, without public escalation and without turning the case into an obstacle to the broader agenda of relations with Moscow. This caution also confirms a broader geopolitical reality: for China, Russia remains a useful partner in the competition with the West, even if it is an awkward and increasingly dependent one.
Geostrategic implications for the Black Sea and for Romania. The incident must be situated within the concrete geography of the maritime war in the north-western Black Sea. The Ukrainian maritime corridor leading to Odessa and Pivdeni operates in close proximity to Romanian maritime space and the logistical infrastructure that absorbs some of the traffic diverted by the war. For this reason, any attack on commercial vessels waiting at or near Ukrainian ports has not only a local impact but also regional repercussions. For Russia, putting pressure on commercial traffic represents a continuation of its strategy to undermine Ukraine’s economic viability. For Ukraine, keeping the corridor open is vital for exports and for demonstrating that Moscow cannot fully reinstate the blockade. For NATO and the littoral states, including Romania, the problem is that the military and commercial risks are coming dangerously close to their own areas of interest. Geostrategically, this means three things: rising insurance and transport costs in the western Black Sea basin, increased pressure on the port of Constanța as a fallback route, and the persistent risk that debris, navigational errors or targeting incidents could cause collateral damage in the vicinity of allied territory.
What to watch for next. The significance of the incident will depend less on the damage caused to the vessel and more on subsequent reactions. Three indicators are key: the tone of any Chinese public statements, the way in which the joint communiqué between [Vladimir Putin]() and [Xi Jinping]() implicitly addresses or sidesteps the issue of maritime security, and, above all, the subsequent commercial behaviour of shipowners and operators linked to China in relation to Ukrainian ports. If Chinese commercial traffic to the Ukrainian corridor declines, Russia will have achieved an intimidating effect even without explicitly acknowledging its intention. If, on the contrary, flows continue relatively normally, the episode will be absorbed as a war incident without major strategic consequences for the Moscow–Beijing relationship.
Conclusions. The strike on the KSL Deyang is an episode of limited material significance, but far more important symbolically, diplomatically and strategically than the actual damage suggests. It shows that the war in the Black Sea no longer affects only Russian-Ukrainian relations, but is beginning to increasingly visibly impact the commercial and reputational interests of third parties, including China. Coinciding with [Vladimir Putin’s]() visit to Beijing, the incident highlights the real asymmetry of the Russian-Chinese partnership: Moscow needs Chinese support to sustain its war economy, yet at the same time continues to act in ways that may create costs and diplomatic discomfort for Beijing. From a geopolitical perspective, the episode confirms that the Russia–China relationship is solid, but not without friction and tactical incompatibilities. From a geostrategic perspective, it shows that the Black Sea has become not only a regional theatre of war, but also a space where the security of trade routes, great power competition and the vulnerabilities of NATO’s periphery intersect. For Romania, the lesson is clear: proximity to this theatre no longer means merely passive exposure to risks, but the need for greater attention to maritime security, port resilience and the way in which developments in the north-western Black Sea can rapidly spill over into the regional economy and security.
Viewed as a whole, the incident confirms that any major diplomatic engagement between Moscow and Beijing now takes place under the pressure of battlefield realities and the collateral effects of the war on trade, technology and maritime security. [Vladimir Putin’s]() visit to China is unlikely to be derailed by this episode, but the episode does diminish the symbolic weight of the narrative of a perfectly aligned partnership with no mutual costs. In this light, the KSL Deyang becomes more than just a slightly damaged vessel: it becomes an indicator of how the war in Ukraine is beginning to directly interfere with the broader geometry of relations between the major powers.
Maritime Security Forum
Ukrainian strikes deep into Russian naval and logistical infrastructure: expanding the range of action and geostrategic implications – Maritime Security Forum
AFU / Volodymyr Zelensky
Published on 17 May 2026, based on reports in the specialist press and video footage distributed by the Ukrainian side.
The recent wave of Ukrainian strikes confirms a significant development in the war: Ukraine is no longer limiting itself to targets close to the front line, but is increasingly effectively attacking naval, air and logistical infrastructure deep within Russian territory. The targets mentioned in open-source reports include a Russian Border Guard patrol vessel, a Be-200 amphibious aircraft, a Ka-27 naval helicopter, port cranes in Berdiansk, a naval communications tower in Crimea and a cargo ship which the Ukrainian side claimed was carrying ammunition. The significance of this type of operation lies not only in the specific material damage inflicted, but in demonstrating an increasingly credible capability to simultaneously strike platforms, infrastructure and logistical hubs that support Russia’s power projection in the Black Sea basin and beyond.
The targets struck and their military relevance. From a strictly operational perspective, the choice of targets is revealing. Striking a Be-200 aircraft and a Ka-27 helicopter indicates Ukraine’s interest in degrading patrol, surveillance and response capabilities in the maritime domain. Although the Be-200 is best known for firefighting and special missions, it can be integrated into patrol and support activities, and its relative rarity gives it disproportionate value. The Ka-27 remains a relevant platform for naval and anti-submarine missions. At the same time, the attacks on a cargo ship loaded with ammunition and on port infrastructure in Berdiansk suggest a strategy of logistical interdiction: it is not only combat platforms that are targeted, but also the supply lines that sustain Russian military operations in the occupied territories.
The technological evolution of attacks. Video footage and open-source assessments indicate that some Ukrainian long-range drones are being adapted for more complex mission profiles than simple precision strikes. There are references to the use of configurations combining unguided munitions or FPV drones carried by a mother platform, which expands tactical options for saturating defences, destroying lightly protected targets and increasing flexibility at range. In strategic terms, this suggests that Ukraine is attempting to compensate for the imbalance in manpower and resources through innovation, rapid adaptation and the exploitation of the vulnerabilities of a much larger adversary, one that is not always sufficiently resilient in defence.
The message conveyed by the Ukrainian president through the publication of the images is clear: Kyiv wishes to demonstrate that it can inflict real costs on Russia not only at the front, but also deep within the territory it controls. Beyond the inevitable propaganda dimension, such material also serves to signal to Western partners that investments in long-range strike capabilities and unmanned systems are having a tangible impact on Russian military infrastructure.
The significance of the strike on the patrol vessel. One of the most interesting aspects of the episode is the location of the Svetlyak-class patrol vessel in the Caspian Sea, a long way from the Ukrainian coast. If the information is correct, the strike has geostrategic value beyond its immediate tactical effect. It signals that areas previously considered relatively safe within Russia’s strategic depth can no longer be treated as absolute sanctuaries. For Moscow, this means additional pressure on the deployment of air defence, the protection of naval assets, and the calculation of platform positioning in secondary maritime basins. For regional observers, including the Caspian littoral states and actors with an interest in Eurasian energy and logistics corridors, the signal is that the war is producing effects of insecurity that extend beyond the classic Black Sea theatre.
Geostrategic implications. The reported strikes around Moscow and on other targets far from the front line reinforce the perception that Russia is entering a phase of distributed vulnerability, in which the simultaneous protection of political centres, energy infrastructure, air bases and naval assets is becoming increasingly costly. Geostrategically, this has at least four consequences. Firstly, it reduces Russia’s ability to separate the front in Ukraine from the rest of its strategic space. Secondly, it forces Moscow to expend more resources on internal defence and logistical dispersion, rather than concentrating them exclusively on the offensive. Thirdly, it amplifies the relevance of the Black Sea as a theatre of competition between logistics, maritime interdiction and strikes deep into enemy territory. Fourthly, it sends a message to Russia’s partners and rivals that numerical superiority does not automatically guarantee invulnerability if the adversary manages to combine cheap technology, mobility and the element of surprise. For the Black Sea littoral states, including Romania, the lesson is clear: the conflict continues to expand the scope of risks, and port infrastructure, commercial traffic and regional air security remain exposed to the spillover effects of the war.
Conclusion. Overall, the series of strikes shows that Ukraine is attempting to transform Russia’s maritime space and strategic depth into a permanently contested environment. From a military perspective, the objective is the gradual degradation of Russian naval logistics, surveillance and mobility. From a geostrategic perspective, the stakes are even higher: forcing Russia to defend too many critical nodes simultaneously, increasing the cost of the war, and demonstrating that the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and even peripheral areas, such as the Caspian, can no longer be clearly separated within a compartmentalised security framework. This development does not in itself tip the balance of war, but it confirms that war is increasingly becoming a contest of operational ranges, technological adaptation and logistical resilience.
Maritime Security Forum
Global oil stocks are shrinking at a record pace: the implications of the Strait of Hormuz crisis in the IEA’s assessment – Maritime Security Forum
According to the latest report from the International Energy Agency (IEA), the crisis caused by the disruption of flows through the Strait of Hormuz has produced one of the most severe disruptions to the oil market in recent decades. The agency’s assessment indicates not only an accelerated contraction in supply, but also a simultaneous deterioration in demand, against a backdrop of high prices, trade uncertainty and a slowdown in economic activity. In other words, the oil market is facing not just a supply shock, but a broader realignment of the global energy balance, in which volatility, logistics costs and the reconfiguration of trade flows are becoming structural factors, not merely cyclical ones.
In the May 2026 edition of its oil market report, the IEA estimates that global oil demand will contract in 2026 by approximately 420,000 barrels per day, to a level of around 104 million barrels per day, i.e. approximately 1.3 million barrels per day below the level anticipated before the outbreak of the current regional crisis. The sharpest decline is expected in the second quarter, when demand is projected to fall by approximately 2.45 million barrels per day compared with the same period last year. From a strategic perspective, this indicates that high energy prices are beginning to have a real, demand-destroying effect, particularly in the most cost-sensitive sectors, such as petrochemicals and aviation.
The immediate economic impact. IEA data suggests that the petrochemical and aviation sectors are among the first to be affected, but the implications are broader. Rising energy costs, reduced refining margins and pressure on transport costs are passed on through the supply chain to industry, logistics and consumers. In such a context, oil ceases to be merely a strategic commodity and returns to its position as a key determinant of the global economic pace. For importing economies, this means additional inflationary pressure, higher costs for industry and an increased likelihood of an economic slowdown.
The supply shock. In parallel with the weakening of demand, the supply side remains severely affected. The IEA reports that global oil production fell further in April by approximately 1.8 million barrels per day, to around 95.1 million barrels per day, bringing the cumulative supply losses since February to approximately 12.8 million barrels per day. Gulf countries affected by the restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz are operating at levels some 14.4 million barrels per day below pre-crisis levels. These figures indicate a systemic disruption, not merely a temporary regional disruption.
For energy markets, the significance of these losses lies not only in the gross volume of unavailable production, but also in the fact that a large proportion of this supply was destined for shipping routes essential to Asia. Thus, the issue is not merely whether oil is available, but whether it can be transported in a timely, safe and cost-effective manner. From this perspective, the Strait of Hormuz functions not only as a geographical passage but also as a critical hub for global energy stability.
The IEA highlights that, with restrictions on traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remaining in place, cumulative supply losses from Gulf producers have already exceeded one billion barrels. This assessment is significant because it shows that we are no longer dealing with isolated volatility, but with a substantial reduction in the global system’s capacity to absorb shocks without significant economic and strategic consequences.
Price volatility. Price movements confirm the market’s nervousness. According to the IEA, North Sea Dated crude fluctuated in April within a range of nearly $50 per barrel and averaged around $120.36 per barrel, up by approximately $16.50 from the previous month. At one point, prices rose to around $144 per barrel, before falling below $100 amid conflicting signals regarding possible negotiations between the United States and Iran. This volatility shows that the market is driven not only by physical realities, but also by political expectations and perceptions of risk.
The collapse in stocks and its significance. One of the most important warning signs is the pace at which global stocks are falling. In March, global stocks fell by approximately 129 million barrels, and in April by a further 117 million barrels. The decline in onshore stocks was particularly steep, indicating that consumer nations and commercial players were forced to draw heavily on reserves to compensate for the lack of regular flows from the Gulf. In strategic terms, the accelerated depletion of stocks means a reduction in the room for manoeuvre of importing economies and an increase in their vulnerability in the face of a prolonged crisis.
In particular, onshore stocks fell sharply in April, with OECD member states bearing the brunt of this adjustment. This development suggests that traditional shock-absorbing mechanisms – commercial reserves, strategic stocks and logistical flexibility – are being used intensively and cannot indefinitely substitute for a return to normal energy flows. If the disruption persists, the costs of rebuilding these stocks will themselves become a major economic and political issue.
Market adaptation and its limits. The report shows that producers in the Atlantic basin – including the United States, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela – have increased exports to partially offset losses from the Gulf, whilst Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have redirected some of their exports via terminals located outside the Strait of Hormuz. However, these measures have a limited cushioning effect on the global market. They may reduce immediate pressure, but they cannot fully replace the Gulf’s geographical and logistical role in the gl energy architecture. Consequently, the reconfiguration of trade flows mitigates the crisis, but does not resolve it.
Regional impact: Asia as the main shock absorber. Asian refineries have reduced imports and cut back on processing, and seaborne crude oil imports have fallen sharply in China, Japan, South Korea and India. This confirms that Asia remains the region most exposed to a prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, as its dependence on maritime energy flows from the Gulf is structural. From a strategic perspective, such a development could accelerate trends already in evidence: diversification of sources, investment in larger strategic reserves, intensified competition for long-term contracts, and more active involvement by Asian states in the protection of energy routes.
Spillover effects on refined products. The IEA warns that the pressure no longer affects only the crude oil market, but is spreading increasingly visibly to refined fuels as well. High margins on middle distillates indicate persistent tensions in sectors such as transport, aviation and industrial logistics. Consequently, even if certain volumes of crude oil are redirected or offset, the problem is gradually shifting downstream, where refining, distribution and final consumption feel the effects of a prolonged energy crisis most directly.
Conclusions and implications. The IEA’s baseline scenario assumes a gradual resumption of flows through the Strait of Hormuz from June onwards, but even under these conditions the oil market is expected to remain in deficit until the fourth quarter of 2026. This means that volatility will persist, and the effects of the crisis will not disappear with any eventual improvement in maritime traffic. The major implication is that global energy security is entering a phase of prolonged vulnerability, in which maritime geography, the protection of chokepoints and states’ ability to manage their reserves become just as important as the actual level of production. From a geostrategic perspective, this episode confirms that the Strait of Hormuz remains one of the main levers through which a regional crisis can generate global effects, simultaneously affecting markets, security policies and the balance of power between major importing economies and producing states.
Maritime Security Forum