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MS Daily brief-29 April 2026

- MS Daily Brief-en
- Is the Black Sea Becoming Europe’s Most Dangerous Maritime Region?
- Maritime Security Forum – Weekly Strategic Summary
- Could a Wider Middle East War Block the Red Sea and Reshape Global Maritime Security?
- The 2026 US-Iran war through the lens Zbigniew Brzezinski’s strategic thinking
- Liminal Maritime Aggression in the Black Sea: Romania at a Crossroads of Energy Security
- IRANIAN ATTACKS IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ: BETWEEN THE USE OF FORCE, ARMED ATTACK AND GREY ZONE OPERATIONS AS A FORM OF ZAHHAKIAN LIMINAL MARITIME AGGRESSION
- Romania: Between a Theoretical Threat and a Layered Defence
- The decline of Iran’s naval power in the current conflict. The destruction of major platforms and the survival of asymmetric capabilities
- Iran’s Islands and the Strategic Architecture of the Strait of Hormuz
- The possibility of establishing a special regime for the Strait of Hormuz: legal, maritime and geopolitical arguments
- The French nuclear deterrence initiative and European security: legal and strategic implications of a debate on Romania
- “The Stratified Conflict: Multidomain Warfare and Iran’s Strategic Dynamics in the Middle East”
- PHASES OF THE ATTACK ON IRAN AND MULTIDOMAIN WARFARE
- FOUR YEARS OF WAR IN UKRAINE
- Iran’s air defence system
- The need to reevaluate maritime doctrine following the introduction of maritime drones into the Romanian Navy
- Artificial Intelligence in Defense: Between Technological Enthusiasm and Operational Reality
- 2026 – Will the Munich Security Conference be without expectations?
- The implementation of naval drones in the Romanian Naval Forces – a necessity
- The multi-domain deadlock in the context of Romania and the Black Sea
- Integrated military cooperation for the protection of offshore energy platforms in the Black Sea
- NAVY ARSENAL – Explanatory Memorandum
- The Phantom Fleet and maritime security challenges
- China’s military leadership faces a serious problem
- The possibility of Romania initiating a project similar to Nordic-Baltic Eight
- From Davos to the White House: Donald Trump’s Peace Council and Romania’s dilemma
- THE US, CHINA, AND TUCIDIDES’ TRAP
- ATTACK ON OFFSHORE TARGETS IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE
- Operationalization of the European Maritime Security Hub in the Black Sea
- The European Maritime Security Hub in the Black Sea. A major challenge for Romania.
- “Resetting military strategy: multi-domain operations and the emergence of artificial intelligence S8NTH Strategic Engine as a decision-making accelerator”
- Securitate maritima – tancuri petroliere si industria de petrol si gaze
- Legal aspects of unmanned maritime systems
- Sub-conventional conflicts in the maritime domain in the Black Sea
- Network-centric warfare and its implications for the maritime domain
- Russian authorities temporarily suspend operations at the CPC terminal in the Black Sea. Possible implications for Romania?
- Deficiencies in Romania’s military procurement system
- THE IMPLICATIONS OF CYBER ACTIONS ON MARITIME SECURITY
- Combat Management System versus Command and Control (C2)
- IS ROMANIA PREPARED TO PROTECT ITS CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE?
- COMBATING NAVAL DRONES
- Podcasts
- Naval helicopters and their role in combating surface vessels
- The global influence of the Vatican and its role in world geopolitic-PDF
- The global influence of the Vatican and its role in world geopolitics
- The light corvette, an immediate solution to regional challenges
- Lessons learned applicable to the Romanian Naval Forces: strategic perspectives and needs for modernisation and equipment
- Russia’s strategic naval collapse (2022-2025) in the context of the war in Ukraine
- Russia’s strategic naval collapse (2022-2025) in the context of the war in Ukraine
- Can the empires of the world be “resurrected?
- The Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline A subject of negotiations?
- “The US Air Bases in Romania: Strategic Pawns in NATO’s Security Architecture and Global Geopolitics”
- Arctic Region – Melting Ice, Rising Tensions
- The Lepanto trap – what remains after the first naval battle?
- UK NATO and the Royal Navy A Defense Without America
- IS ROMANIA PREPARED FOR THE PROTECTION OF ITS OWN CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE?
- STRATEGIC CHANGES IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE MARITIME DOMAIN
- Romania, possible increase in security responsibilities
- How much does it cost? “War and Peace”
- Romania and Yalta 2.0- Dual Strategies and Reconfigurations of Influence
- WILL CHINA BE THE WORLD’S FIRST WORLD POWER IN THE NEXT DECADE?
- After three years of war, Russia is still an energy superpower?
- Maritime Critical Infrastructure
- Modernization of the Romanian Naval Forces: A Problem?
- Analysis of the Motivations of the Algerian Navy’s Choice of the Type 056 Corvettes from China
- Point Defense Missile Systems
- The Panama Canal: A Strategic Piece in the US Geopolitical Game
- Shipyards, an essential element of Romania’s maritime power
- Romania and Davos 2025
- THE RACE FOR ARCTIC RICHES
- Donald Trump’s geopolitical vision
- Greenland – a current and prospective geostrategic issue
- Strategic directions of Romania’s national defense in 2025
- The Regulatory borders of the Black Sea through the Cartography of European Union Law and International Law
- Event
- BLACK SEA CHRONICLES
- BLACK SEA CHRONICLES
- Misterul ambarcațiunii identificate la Tuzla
- BLACK SEA CHRONICLES
- A TRINKET DEDICATED TO THE ROMANIAN FLEET – 1913
- MS Daily Brief-Fr
- A POSSIBLE VISION: REBUILDING MARITIME ROMANIA
- The Imperative of a Maritime Security Policy and Strategy for Romania
- MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
- Importance of National Security Policy and Strategy
- TOWARDS ENSURING MARITIME SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION
- ROMANIA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE BLACK SEA, THE DANUBE AND THE PLANETARY OCEAN
- The role of the maritime and inland waterway sector in Romania’s economy
- CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO MARITIME SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES, CONCLUSIONS FOR THE SITUATION OF ROMANIA
- THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY STUDIES AS A NEW FIELD OF GEOPOLITICAL REFLECTION AND RESEARCH
- Romania’s maritime resilience in the age of hybrid threats and the importance of a Maritime Security Strategy
- Romania: A centerpiece in the revitalization of the Silk Road for the 21st century
- CHINA OPTION
- 1st Black Sea Security Conference
- Regional Detension in the Middle East and North Africa
- POLAND-A possible way to follow
- The influence of Russia and the Ukrainian War in the Asia-Pacific area
- EVENTS
- Polemic at the mouth of the Danube
- To ensure security in the Black Sea region
- Geopolitical and Geostrategic Provocations in the Black Sea Region
- A NEW NATO STRATEGIC POINT IN THE BALKAN AND BLACK SEA AREA
- PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES – A POSSIBLE PLAYER IN THE WAR AT SEA?
- The war in Ukraine – reflections
- A new Black Sea strategy for a new Black Sea reality
- STATE IMMUNITY, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE
- Maritime security and the law of the sea
- Resilience and importance of the maritime sector in the Romanian economy
- Montreux Convention – a factor of stability or a catalyst for insecurity in the Black Sea Region
- The Black Sea in the Geopolitical equation
- Implications of war on the marine environment
- After a year of war, possible scenarios
- “SEA BLINDNESS”
- Does Romania need a Maritime Policy and a Maritime Strategy?
- Are missile ships still relevant in modern warfare?
- Do we need military science?
- War in Ukraine, how the nature of power is changing
- Maritime Romania
- The problem of Arabat and Genichesk
- Energy, freedom of navigation and the China-Russia relationship
- Winter militarization: Can Ukraine prevent Russia from regrouping as temperatures drop?
- THE INFLUENCE OF BLACK SEA CHARACTERISTICS ON THE ASSEMBLED OPERATIONS
- Fighters and actors in winter fatigue
- THE RELATIVE DOMINANCE OF RUSSIAN NAVAL POWER IN THE BLACK SEA
- HAS RUSSIA STARTED TO WAKE UP TO REALITY?
- The New European navigation channels – editorial
- Newsletter 18 August 2022
- Newsletter 18 july 2022
- Geostrategic and geopolitical maritime scenarios in the Middle East and North Africa
- Geopolitics
- Geopolitica
- Webinar
- Buletin informativ
- Newsletter 18 july 2022
- Transforming the North-South ITC into a major transport corridor
- Newsletter 06 july 2022
- Newsletter
- THE NAVIGATION REGIME ON THE DANUBE AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR ROMANIA
- Buletin informativ- iulie 2022
- CONFERENCE “THE DYNAMCS AND COMPLEXITY OF ROMANIA’S MARITIME SECURITY” 29-30 september 2022
- Libertatea de navigație pentru porturile Ucrainei de la Marea Neagră
- Freedom of navigation for Ukraine's Black Sea ports
- Buletin informativ iunie 2022
- Buletin informativ mai 2022
- Buletin informativ aprilie 2022
- Buletin informativ martie 2022
The Maritime Security Forum Launches a New Project: “Strategic Debate”
We are pleased to present the conclusions of last week’s debate
Maritime Security Forum-Weekly Strategic Summary
THIS WEEK’S TOPIC IS The Black Sea Becoming Europe’s Most Dangerous Maritime Region?
We invite you to comment on the topic in the dedicated section at the end In the website menu, you can find the topics under the Strategic Debate section
Contents
News from Ukraine | DESTROYED! Ukraine ends imports of Russian oil | Russia’s defeat is imminent 1
Developments in the Middle East – Maritime Security Forum.. 1
Developments in Ukraine – Maritime Security Forum.. 2
Trump hails the ‘special relationship’ at the welcoming ceremony for King Charles’ state visit 5
US Ambassador to Ukraine, appointed by Trump, resigns after less than a year in office. 7
Trump news in brief: The President’s Justice Department is targeting James Comey (again) 9
BREAKING NEWS: Iran faces an EXPLOSIVE internal threat; US tightens blockade; Russia SUPPORTS Iran | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine | DESTROYED! Ukraine ends imports of Russian oil | Russia’s defeat is imminent
Developments in the Middle East – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 24 hours, developments in the Middle East must be viewed in the context of a key geopolitical factor: the intensification of Iran–Russia coordination, evidenced by the Iranian foreign minister’s official visit to Moscow and direct contacts with the Russian leadership. This development has direct implications for the dynamics of the Gulf crisis and for indirect negotiations with the United States.
The Iranian foreign minister’s official visit to Moscow and his meeting with Vladimir Putin confirm the strengthening of the political and diplomatic axis between Iran and Russia. During the discussions, the Russian side expressed support for Iran in the context of pressure from the US and Israel, emphasising the need for a diplomatic solution and reaffirming the bilateral strategic partnership.
This meeting is not an isolated event, but forms part of a broader framework of cooperation. Russian and Iranian officials discussed coordinating their positions on the crisis in the Persian Gulf, including the situation in the Strait of Hormuz and the deadlock in negotiations with Washington. Russia has signalled its willingness to support diplomatic solutions and even to play an indirect mediating role, in parallel with the channels already activated through Pakistan and Oman.
The strategic significance of the visit is twofold. Firstly, Iran is seeking political and diplomatic support at a time when negotiations with the US are stalled and naval pressure in Hormuz continues. Secondly, Russia is consolidating its role as a global player in the Iranian dossier, using this crisis to expand its influence and create additional geopolitical leverage vis-à-vis the West.
At the same time, military and technological cooperation between the two states is on the rise. Iranian officials have indicated a willingness to expand defence cooperation with partner states, including Russia, within frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This direction confirms that the bilateral relationship goes beyond the diplomatic level and is entering a phase of deeper strategic coordination.
Placing this development within the regional context shows that the situation in the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a naval crisis, but part of a broader geopolitical competition. Iran is maintaining pressure on maritime traffic, the United States is responding with a naval presence and economic pressure, whilst Russia is offering political support and attempting to capitalise diplomatically on the situation.
Maritime Security Forum
Developments in Ukraine – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 24 hours, the situation in Ukraine has been characterised by a sustained high level of Russian air strikes, constant pressure on the eastern front and continued Ukrainian strikes within the Russian Federation targeting logistics and energy infrastructure. The conflict remains in a phase of intense attrition, with no decisive territorial changes, but with sustained operational activity across all fronts.
In the air, the Russian Federation continued the combined use of Shahed-type drones, cruise missiles and glide bombs. Air raid alerts were activated overnight in several regions, including around Kyiv. Ukrainian air defences reported multiple interceptions, though some strikes affected energy infrastructure and industrial buildings. Russian tactics remain based on successive waves, designed to overwhelm defences and deplete stocks of interceptors.
In the north-east, Kharkiv continues to be one of the most targeted areas. Guided bomb and drone strikes have caused damage in residential neighbourhoods and industrial facilities. Proximity to the border allows Russia to make effective use of tactical aviation and long-range artillery.
In the south, the Odessa area and Black Sea infrastructure remain under pressure. Ports and logistics hubs are constant targets, playing a critical role in exports and supply. Meanwhile, the Danube ports of Izmail and Reni remain vulnerable, frequently associated with attack alerts or Russian operations in the vicinity.
On the ground, the most intense fighting continues in the east, in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Pokrovsk, Lyman and Kupiansk sectors remain the main axes of Russian pressure. Russian forces are continuing localised attacks using infantry, artillery and tactical drones, attempting gradual advances. No major operational breakthroughs have been confirmed in the last 24 hours.
Ukrainian forces are maintaining an elastic defence and making intensive use of FPV drones to halt Russian assault groups and correct artillery fire. In many sectors, these systems provide a tactical advantage through rapid response and precision.
In the south of the front, Kherson remains under constant artillery and drone fire from the eastern bank of the Dnieper. Civilian infrastructure and local transport are periodically affected, and the population remaining in the city faces constant risks.
Within the Russian Federation, Ukraine has continued strikes on energy and logistics infrastructure. Fuel depots, railway junctions and oil facilities in southern Russia, as well as the Black Sea- , remain frequent targets. The Tuapse area continues to be significant in this context, due to its role in oil exports.
Technologically, the conflict remains dominated by drones and unmanned systems. Russia is using swarms of drones to overwhelm air defences, whilst Ukraine is combining FPV drones, maritime drones and long-range systems for strikes deep into enemy territory. The use of robotic ground platforms for logistics and evacuation continues to expand.
Externally, Ukraine continues to request air defence systems, interceptors and artillery ammunition. Western partners are discussing the expansion of industrial production and the consolidation of medium-term support.
Maritime Security Forum
King Charles praises NATO and urges the defence of Ukraine in a major speech delivered during Trump’s visit
In remarks marking the 250th anniversary of American independence, he told US lawmakers: “The actions of this great nation matter”
Chris Stein in Washington and Caroline Davies in London
Wednesday, 29 April 2026, 00:26 CEST
King Charles praised the importance of Britain’s “special relationship” with the US in an address to Congress, in which he made direct reference to the importance of NATO, the defence of Ukraine and the climate crisis.
In a speech that will be interpreted as a veiled plea to Donald Trump to return to the US’s traditional alliances with Europe and to restore his country’s role as a defender of liberal values, Charles said: “America’s words carry weight and significance, just as they have since independence. The actions of this great nation matter even more.”
Charles’s appearance before a joint session of Congress – the first royal address of its kind in 35 years – was billed as the centrepiece of his four-day state visit to the United States, where he and Queen Camilla are taking part in celebrations marking the 250th anniversary of independence.
Charles praised the historic bond between the two nations, saying: “The alliance that our two nations have built over the centuries – and for which we are deeply grateful to the American people – is truly unique.”
However, in remarks that appeared to draw an approving reaction from Democratic MPs, he cited the roots of “the principle that executive power is subject to checks and balances” in one of the UK’s founding legal documents, the Magna Carta.
He also called for “unwavering resolve” regarding “Ukraine and its extremely courageous people”, to “ensure a truly just and lasting peace”.
Speaking from the podium of the House of Representatives before an audience of MPs from both parties and senior military officials, he also emphasised the importance of taking action against the climate crisis.
“The alliance of our nations is truly unique”: King Charles calls for unity in a speech delivered in the US – video
He referred to the “natural wonders” of the United States, speaking of what Teddy Roosevelt called “the glorious legacy of this country’s extraordinary natural splendour, on which much of its prosperity has always depended”.
“Yet, even as we celebrate the beauty that surrounds us, our generation must decide how to address the collapse of critical natural systems, which threatens far more than the essential harmony and diversity of nature.
We ignore at our own peril the fact that these natural systems—in other words, nature’s own economy—form the foundation of our prosperity and national security.”
He also highlighted the importance of trade between the two nations at a time when Trump has threatened to impose additional tariffs on the UK. “On a broader level, we celebrate the $430 billion in annual trade that continues to grow, the $1.7 trillion in mutual investment that fuels that innovation, and the millions of jobs on both sides of the Atlantic supported by both economies.”
He said: “From the depths of the Atlantic to the Arctic ice caps, which are melting at a catastrophic rate, the commitment and expertise of the armed forces of the United States and its allies lie at the heart of NATO, committed to mutual defence, protecting our citizens and interests, and ensuring the safety of North Americans and Europeans against our common adversaries.”
Charles also backed AUKUS, the trilateral agreement with Australia, which he called “the most ambitious submarine programme in history”.
“We are not embarking on these remarkable endeavours together out of sentiment. We are doing so because they build greater shared resilience for the future, thereby ensuring greater security for our citizens for generations to come,” he said.
It was the first speech of its kind delivered by a member of the British royal family since Queen Elizabeth II addressed the House in 1991, and Charles described the world as having become “more unstable and dangerous” since then, making the alliance of nations more important than ever.
Charles’s remarks were couched in diplomatic terms, and he remained subtle regarding the differences of opinion between the US and Keir Starmer’s government, which include Britain’s refusal to join the US and Israel in bombing Iran, as well as Trump’s complaints about British trade policy.
The speech followed a lavish arrival ceremony at the White House, during which Trump declared that “Americans have no closer friends than the British”, against the backdrop of a military parade and a flypast by fighter jets.
However, reflecting the sensitivity surrounding the visit, the King’s arrival at the White House took place in private, for fear of a public row between the two men similar to the one that occurred during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit last year.
In a speech delivered later that day at a lavish state dinner at the White House hosted by Trump, Charles said: “Tonight we are here to renew an indispensable alliance.”
At the same event, Trump told the assembled guests that Iran had been “militarily defeated”, in his first public comments on this sensitive issue during the royal visit.
The President added: “Charles agrees with me even more than I do – we will never let that adversary have a nuclear weapon.”
Congressional leaders welcomed the King’s visit, with Senate Majority Leader John Thune stating in a speech delivered on Tuesday on the floor: “The special relationship between the two nations has been a long and fruitful one, and I think it is fair to say that, throughout our nation’s history, we have had no better ally than the United Kingdom.”
His Democratic counterpart, Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, addressed some of the tensions that have arisen between the Trump administration and Starmer’s government regarding the US’s role in global alliances.
“King Charles III’s visit should serve as a reminder to the President of the United States and to every elected official in this country: friends and allies matter. And, above all, for Europe’s security, NATO matters,” said Schumer.
“I encourage His Majesty to emphasise to the President the absolute importance of NATO. I hope he will succeed in getting Trump to listen and understand what is at stake.”
Against the backdrop of Trump threatening to scrap a trade deal he signed with Starmer and impose a “heavy tariff” if Britain does not withdraw the digital services tax applied to American companies, the King described the long-standing trade ties between the two nations as “solid foundations on which to continue building for future generations”.
He spoke before a Republican-controlled Congress, yet one deeply divided on a range of issues, as lawmakers look ahead to November, when voters will cast their ballots in mid-term elections that could return the Democrats to power.
However, the work of the two chambers has occasionally touched on subjects that Buckingham Palace would usually prefer to avoid. In a near-unanimous vote, Congress passed a bill last year requiring the disclosure of files relating to disgraced financier Jeffrey Epstein, shortly after the King stripped his brother, Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor, of his royal title amid concerns over their relationship. He was subsequently arrested on charges relating to his dealings with Epstein whilst serving as a trade envoy between 2001 and 2011.
The House of Representatives’ Oversight Committee has asked Mountbatten-Windsor to answer questions about Epstein, who died in 2019 whilst awaiting trial on sex trafficking charges, and some MPs have said he should be issued with a summons if he does not appear voluntarily.
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2026/apr/28/king-charles-speech-congress
Trump hails ‘special relationship’ at welcome ceremony for King Charles’ state visit
The US President says Americans “have had no closer friends than the British”, against the backdrop of recent tensions between the two nations
Caroline Davies and Jamie Grierson
Tuesday, 28 April 2026, 20:30 CEST

Donald Trump praised the “special relationship” between the US and the UK whilst hosting a military welcome ceremony for King Charles and Queen Camilla at the White House.
Against the backdrop of recent tensions between London and Washington, the US president, speaking on the second day of Charles’ state visit, said: “In the centuries since we won our independence, Americans have had no closer friends than the British.”
He paid tribute to the “essence” of the “special relationship” in the post-World War II era, saying: “This understanding of our nation’s unique bond and its role in history is the essence of our special relationship, and we hope it will always remain so.”
Charles’s delicate diplomatic visit comes against the backdrop of Trump’s public criticism of Keir Starmer regarding the war in Iran. Officials at Downing Street hope that the royal family’s soft power diplomacy will help heal the rift.
During the official welcome ceremony, Trump said it was an “extraordinary privilege” to host the royal couple, called Charles a “very elegant man”, praised the late Queen Elizabeth II as a “very special woman” and revealed that his mother, Mary, had a “crush” on the King when he was younger.
President and Melania Trump organised an unprecedented military ceremony for their royal guests, with Charles and Camilla watching the parade in Washington DC alongside their hosts, a group of invited dignitaries and hundreds of spectators.
The royal couple arrived in Washington on Monday for the start of a four-day state visit to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence.
Later on Tuesday, Charles is expected to allude to recent tensions between Britain and the US when he delivers a speech – a rare occurrence for a monarch – before the US Congress.
His address to both houses on Tuesday comes after Trump threatened to scrap a trade deal signed by Britain and the US, mocked the Royal Navy and insulted the British prime minister.
The King is expected to emphasise that, although Britain and the US have not always agreed on everything over the past 250 years, the foundations of “their democratic, legal and social traditions” – stretching back to the Magna Carta – are such that “time and again, our two nations have always found ways to come together”.
Whilst Trump is threatening to impose “a substantial tariff” on the UK if it does not scrap the digital services tax levied on American tech firms, Charles will highlight the importance of trade and technology agreements that will play a vital role in the continuation of the economic partnership between the two countries.
The King is expected to make a brief reference to the assassination attempt against Trump at a dinner with the press in Washington on Saturday evening, and to offer “the highest regard and friendship of the British people to the people of the United States” on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of American independence.
During the welcome ceremony, Charles and Camilla stood on a platform alongside the President and First Lady, whilst the national anthems of the United Kingdom and the United States were performed by The President’s Own United States Marine Band and a 21-gun salute was fired in tribute by the Presidential Salute Battery.
Guests included senior members of the Trump administration, including Vice President JD Vance and his wife, Usha Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth and Steve Witkoff, Special Envoy for Peacekeeping Missions.
US Ambassador to Ukraine, appointed by Trump, resigns after less than a year in office
Julie Davis is stepping down amid reports that she had become dissatisfied with Donald Trump, a claim denied by the State Department
The Guardian team and news agencies
Wednesday 29 April 2026, 02:10 CEST

The US acting ambassador to Ukraine is to resign after less than a year in post, the State Department has said, amid a lull in US-brokered efforts to reach a ceasefire and end Russia’s invasion.
Julie Davis has become frustrated with President Donald Trump over his lack of support for Ukraine, the Financial Times reported, citing anonymous sources. The State Department denied the existence of such disagreements and stated that she is stepping down.
Trump has pressed Kyiv to reach a peace deal with Russia, stating that the country could cede territory to secure an agreement. So far, the president has failed to end the war through ceasefire negotiations, which are now largely stalled as Washington has turned its attention to the war with Iran.
“It is false to suggest that Ambassador Davis is resigning ‘due to differences with Donald Trump’,” said State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott. “She will continue to proudly promote President Trump’s policies until she officially leaves Kyiv in June 2026 and retires from the department,” he said.
Davis, the most senior official at the US embassy, is chargé d’affaires but is not a Senate-confirmed ambassador. She has also served as US ambassador to Cyprus since 2023, holding a dual role during her posting in Kyiv.
She was appointed by the Trump administration in May last year, after her predecessor, fellow career diplomat Bridget Brink, resigned.
Brink, who had been appointed by then-President Joe Biden and is now standing as a Democrat for Congress, said she had become concerned about Trump’s “policy of appeasement” towards Russia and the way he “put pressure on the victim, Ukraine”.
Since taking office in January 2025, Trump has repeatedly blamed Ukraine for Russia’s invasion of the country more than four years ago and has had a tumultuous relationship with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/29/us-ambassador-ukraine-trump-steps-down-julie-davis
The toll of the war in Ukraine: New problems for Russian oil after the Tuapse refinery was hit again
Putin condemns drone attack; King Charles addresses US Congress – Ukrainians need your 9/11 spirit; US chargé d’affaires leaves Kyiv. What we know on day 1,526
Warren Murray with Guardian editors and news agencies
Wednesday 29 April 2026, 02:37 CEST
- A Ukrainian drone strike has caused another major fire at the Russian oil refinery in the city of Tuapse – the third attack on the Black Sea port in less than two weeks. Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, condemned it as an “attack on civilian infrastructure”, but Kyiv claims the campaign is aimed at disrupting Russia’s oil industry and reducing the revenues that help Moscow fund the war – thereby making these facilities a legitimate target in the war. Following this attack, thick black smoke rose once again from the direction of the Tuapse refinery, which has an annual production capacity of around 12 million tonnes.
- The refinery halted production on 16 April due to damage caused by drones in the port, which made it impossible to ship the output, industry sources told Reuters. The head of the Tuapse district, Sergei Boiko, ordered people living near the refinery on Tuesday to evacuate by bus to a local school. Following an attack on 20 April, black rain fell over the town and a popular seaside resort, leaving behind an oily residue. Putin sent an emergency minister to Tuapse.
- King Charles delivered a speech to the US Congress in which he made direct reference to the defence of Ukraine, write Chris Stein and Caroline Davies. Charles said: “Immediately after 9/11, when NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time, and the UN Security Council stood united in the face of terror, we answered the call together – just as our people have done for over a century, shoulder to shoulder, through two world wars, the Cold War, Afghanistan and moments that have defined our shared security. Today, Mr President, that same unwavering resolve is needed to defend Ukraine and its extraordinarily brave people. It is needed to ensure a truly just and lasting peace.”
- Last week, the King’s son, Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex, visited Kyiv and urged the “American leadership” to honour its obligations in the Ukrainian conflict, as the US was one of the countries that persuaded post-Soviet Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security commitments. Trump dismissed these comments, saying that Harry “does not speak on behalf of the United Kingdom”, but he will find it harder to ignore the remark by the king, of whom he is an ardent fan.
- The US acting ambassador to Ukraine is to step down after less than a year in the post, the State Department has said, amid a lull in US-brokered efforts to secure a ceasefire and end Russia’s invasion. The Financial Times, citing anonymous sources, claimed that Julie Davis had become frustrated with Donald Trump over his lack of support for Ukraine – her predecessor left for the same reason – but the State Department said she was simply stepping down from the department.
- The winner of the Hungarian elections, Péter Magyar, has proposed a meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian president, to discuss the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minority in western Ukraine. Magyar does not share the open hostility towards Ukraine and support for Russia of his defeated rival, Viktor Orbán, but he remains opposed to Ukraine’s rapid accession to the EU and asserts that the treatment meted out by Kyiv to ethnic Hungarians in western Ukraine will be crucial to the restoration of relations.
- Orbán has been accused of exaggerating and distorting the extent of the grievances between Ukraine’s ethnic Hungarian population and the government in Kyiv. Ethnic Hungarians are among those fighting for Ukraine against Russia. Among them is the head of Ukraine’s drone force.
Trump news in brief: The President’s Justice Department is targeting James Comey (again)
The new indictment is the latest instance in which Trump’s Justice Department has used its power to target the president’s political enemies – in brief, the top US political stories from 28 April 2026
The Guardian team
Wednesday 29 April 2026, 03:00 CEST
On Tuesday, the Department of Justice brought new criminal charges against James Comey, the former director of the FBI.
Comey was charged in the US District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina over a photograph he posted on Instagram during a holiday last year, in which shells were arranged to form ‘86 47’. The post was interpreted as a threat against Donald Trump. The number 86 can be used as a slang term for ‘get rid of’, and Trump is the 47th president. Comey subsequently deleted the post and apologised, saying he had not realised the numbers were associated with violence.
Comey has been charged with two offences – threatening the president and transmitting that threat, via social media, across state lines. Both charges carry a penalty of a fine and up to five years’ imprisonment.
The new charge marks the latest instance in which Trump’s Department of Justice has used its power to target the US president’s political enemies. The Department of Justice also brought criminal charges against Letitia James, the New York State Attorney General, last year, based on flimsy allegations of mortgage fraud. The case was dismissed for the same reason that Comey’s previous case was dismissed.
The Department of Justice is charging former FBI Director James Comey over an Instagram post featuring seashells
The indictment, made public on Tuesday, states that a reasonable person “would interpret this as a serious expression of intent to harm the President of the United States”.
Comey has long been the target of Trump’s wrath due to his investigation into Trump’s ties with Russia, and Trump’s allies have called for the former FBI director to be punished. Even though the post was widely perceived as a non-violent expression of opposition to Trump, federal law enforcement officials investigated the matter and questioned Comey.
Trump hails ‘special relationship’ during welcome ceremony for King Charles’ state visit
Donald Trump praised the “special relationship” between the US and the UK whilst hosting a military welcome ceremony for King Charles and Queen Camilla at the White House.
Against the backdrop of recent tensions between London and Washington, the US president, speaking on the second day of Charles’ state visit, said: “In the centuries since we won our independence, Americans have had no closer friends than the British.”
FCC orders review of ABC licences following Jimmy Kimmel’s joke about Melania Trump
The US media regulator announced on Tuesday that it is accelerating the review of eight local broadcasting licences used by ABC, in a move that critics see as a clear example of political and regulatory retaliation against a television station that is out of favour.
The United Arab Emirates leaves OPEC, a victory for Trump as the oil cartel weakens
The United Arab Emirates has left the OPEC oil cartel after 60 years of membership, a major blow to the group and its de facto leader, Saudi Arabia, as global energy markets face the biggest supply crisis in history.
King Charles praises NATO and urges defence of Ukraine in a key speech during Trump’s visit
In a speech that will be interpreted as a veiled plea to Donald Trump to return to the United States’ traditional European alliances and restore his country’s role as a defender of liberal values, Charles said: “America’s words carry weight and significance, just as they have since independence. The actions of this great nation matter even more.”
Conspiracy theories surrounding the press dinner shooting are spreading in an era of fragmented politics
After an armed man attempted to enter the ballroom where Donald Trump was due to speak to White House journalists on Saturday, conspiracy theories immediately spread regarding the possibility that the event had been staged.
Conspiracy theories about the attacker at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner emerged against the backdrop of some of Trump’s former allies having publicly discussed, for several weeks, a conspiracy theory regarding the staging of a previous assassination attempt at a rally in Pennsylvania during his 2024 campaign.
US to issue ‘America250’ passports featuring Donald Trump
The limited-edition documents, presented as a commemoration of the 250th anniversary of US independence, will feature a photograph of Donald Trump on the inside cover, surrounded by the text of the Declaration of Independence and the US flag, with his signature rendered in gold. A separate page features the famous painting of the Founding Fathers signing that very document.
What else happened today:
Applicants seeking a temporary visa for the United States must now declare to a consular officer that they have not suffered any harm and that they are not afraid to return to their country of origin, according to new guidelines issued by the State Department. If they answer in the affirmative or refuse to answer any of these questions, the chances of their application being rejected will increase dramatically.
The Trump administration this week blocked the development of two authorised wind energy projects in the US, with an agreement to pay millions of dollars in reimbursements to the companies behind them, provided those funds are reinvested in oil and gas.
Federal agents under the Trump administration have once again raided the Twin Cities in Minnesota, primarily targeting alleged childcare fraud, after the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s so-called ‘Operation Metro Surge’ effectively ended at the start of the year.
Todd Blanche, the acting attorney general, has engaged in a “flagrant, shocking and ongoing violation” of a law requiring the Department of Justice to make the so-called Epstein files fully public, according to a lawsuit filed in Washington DC.
A US soldier accused of making $400,000 by using inside information to bet on the ousting of Venezuela’s deposed president Nicolás Maduro pleaded not guilty to fraud charges on Tuesday.
,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/28/trump-news-latest-updates-today
Around the Caspian: the mirages of the Middle Corridor and the new Russian Federation–Afghanistan route – Maritime Security Forum
Context: Two competing directions of connectivity are emerging in the Eurasian space: (1) the consolidation of the ‘Middle Corridor’ (the trans-Caspian route) as an alternative to routes crossing the Russian Federation; (2) Russia’s search for complementary routes, including through Central Asia to Afghanistan, against the backdrop of the reconfiguration of trade flows and geopolitical risks in the region.

Photo: https://clubferoviar.ro/coridorul-nord-sud-primeste-finantare-de-400-milioane-dolari/
The Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian route) – what is being publicly stated: Western actors and regional partners are promoting the idea that the China–Kazakhstan–Caspian Sea–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey–Europe route could see a significant increase in volume, with estimates of around 10 million tonnes per year by 2027 and projections of over 11 million tonnes per year around 2030, if investment and operational coordination materialise.
The role of the EU and European investors (in the regional narrative): From the project promoters’ perspective, European partners are becoming a catalyst (through commercial interest, industry events, business contacts and potential funding), and 2026 is presented as a turning point from ‘interest’ to more substantial transport volumes, including through the development of infrastructure and logistics services.
Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan Coordination: At the diplomatic level, bilateral discussions have covered both the transport component (TMTM/Trans-Caspian) and related infrastructure projects (e.g. fibre-optic communications and undersea power cables in the Caspian Sea), with an impact on logistical and digital connectivity.
Geopolitical implication suggested by supporters: In the regional media, the Middle Corridor is described as a potential repositioning of the Europe–Asia link, in the sense of reducing Russia’s role as a ‘mandatory transit route’. At the same time, the implicit political message is one of diversifying dependencies (transport, investment, technology) in relation to Moscow.
Limitations and risks (frequent criticisms): Cautious assessments emphasise that a cross-border multimodal infrastructure of this scale requires substantial investment, interoperability, coordination between numerous states and the reduction of logistical bottlenecks. Consequently, the key question remains how quickly the Middle Corridor can become a truly viable alternative to the established routes through Russia.
Analysis by perspective: Russia, NATO and the EU
1) The Russian Federation’s perspective: For Moscow, the expansion of the Middle Corridor is perceived as an attempt to redirect Eurasian trade flows away from Russian territory and to weaken the economic leverage of transit. In this context, Russia is emphasising its strategy of ‘alternative routes’ and of strengthening ties with states in Central Asia and the wider neighbourhood, including through projects linking Russian markets to Afghanistan.
2) The NATO perspective: From a Euro-Atlantic security perspective, routes bypassing the Russian Federation are associated with reducing logistical vulnerabilities to sanctions, political deadlocks or economic pressure. At the same time, connectivity projects around the Caspian Sea may raise concerns regarding the protection of critical infrastructure (ports, ferries, railway hubs, data/power cables) and the stability of transit states, particularly in the context of regional strategic competition.
3) The European Union’s perspective: For the EU, the Middle Corridor is presented as an option for diversifying Europe–Asia supply chains and reducing dependence on northern routes. The stakes are primarily economic (time, cost, predictability), but also political (strategic resilience). In practice, success depends on investment, standardisation, port and rail capacity, as well as cooperation with transit states in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The ‘Russia–Afghanistan Route’ component (via Turkmenistan): Against the backdrop of discussions on the Middle Corridor, a proposed trade/transit corridor has also emerged that would connect Russia (Tatarstan) – Turkmenistan – Afghanistan, with the stated aim of facilitating direct flows of goods. In this context, both the need for more stable routes and specific trade opportunities (e.g. exports of halal products) are cited, for which an increase in volumes is projected by 2025 (including a figure of USD 51.7 million for imports from Tatarstan to Afghanistan, according to the cited reports).
The North–South International Transport Corridor – the backdrop: In regional discussions, the North–South ITC is treated as a broader framework (land and maritime branches, including the trans-Caspian component) that may gain relevance when alternative routes are affected by geopolitical tensions. In this logic, the corridors are not merely ‘competitors’, but also complementary options for the redistribution of trade flows.
The role of Turkmenistan (logistics and the ‘North–South’ corridor): Official statements from Ashgabat emphasise the modernisation of transport and logistics infrastructure and the increased attractiveness of North–South routes. At the same time, there are reports of increases in containerised transport via the international corridors crossing Turkmenistan (“North–South”, “Lazuli”, “East–West”), with figures cited for 2025 (number of shipments and breakdown by transit/export/import).
Data cited for 2025: According to the figures cited, 21 containerised freight shipments were carried out, of which 10,470 units were in transit, 6,450 were exports and 4,400 were imports, a level presented as being 10,200 containers higher than in the comparable period of 2024. These figures are used to argue that Turkmenistan is seeking to capitalise on its position as a transit hub.
Conclusion (from the Russian perspective): Within this corridor architecture, Russian representatives emphasise the growing relevance of the North–South axis for the landlocked states of Central Asia and for the diversification of trade routes, particularly in the face of sanctions pressure and issues on traditional routes. The key message is that ‘North–South’ could become a pragmatic tool for maintaining and redirecting flows, and initiatives such as the Russia–Turkmenistan–Afghanistan route follow the same logic of adaptation.
Conclusion: Overall, around the Caspian Sea, there is a competition between routes (and between narratives) in which logistical connectivity is used both as an economic tool and as a strategic lever – with Russia, NATO and the EU interpreting the same projects through different lenses.
Maritime Security Forum
“If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu”: the EU’s view on the risk of strategic marginalisation – Maritime Security Forum
Context: In the recent European debate, the idea that the EU risks being “left on the sidelines” in major negotiations (particularly those related to Russia’s war against Ukraine) is used as an argument for accelerating strategic autonomy: greater defence capabilities, a coherent diplomatic stance and financial instruments to support long-term resilience.
1) The foreign policy stake: “a seat at the table”. Some analyses in the German press (e.g. Berliner Zeitung) argue that a delay in reopening channels of dialogue with Moscow could reduce Europe’s ability to protect its interests when ceasefire or post-conflict security arrangements are being formulated. From the EU’s perspective, the central issue is not ‘dialogue for dialogue’s sake’, but avoiding a scenario in which European security arrangements are negotiated without the Union’s institutional and political participation.
2) The transatlantic relationship: autonomy without a rupture. In the same vein, there is also the argument that the EU must define its own interests more clearly and increase its freedom of action, including in the event of a change of direction in Washington. For the EU, this translates into: strengthening the European pillar within NATO, developing the defence industry, closer coordination on sanctions, and an energy policy that reduces external vulnerabilities.
3) The cost of marginalisation. In practical terms, being an ‘observer’ in a dossier such as Ukraine would mean for the EU: bearing the consequences (migration, energy, defence spending, reconstruction) without an equivalent capacity to shape the political outcome and the security architecture that will follow.
Otherwise, the authors warn, Europe risks being an observer – and not the most profitable one.
4) The ‘menu’ metaphor as a warning to middle powers. The phrase “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu” was echoed in Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos (January 2026), as a warning that in a more transactional international order, actors who do not actively participate in negotiations become the subject of negotiation.
5) Response to the Russian narrative regarding the EU’s ‘duality’. Moscow frequently criticises the fact that the EU supports Ukraine (politically, militarily and financially) whilst simultaneously claiming a role in defining a diplomatic solution. From the EU’s perspective, support for Ukraine is presented as a condition for deterrence and for achieving a lasting peace (not merely an operational pause), whilst participation in negotiations is necessary to ensure that any agreement respects the principles of European security and international law.
6) Internal EU cohesion: a legitimate debate, but a political vulnerability. Discussions regarding the level of support for Ukraine, channels of dialogue and economic/energy costs reflect European pluralism. However, from a strategic perspective, the fragmentation of the EU’s message can be exploited by external actors. Hence the pressure for common positions, stable financial mechanisms and a credible decision-making timetable.
7) The energy dimension. Pressure on prices and security of supply keep energy as a sensitive issue for European unity. Differences in energy mix, infrastructure and historical dependencies mean that some capitals favour pragmatic short-term solutions, which sometimes complicates rapid convergence towards a common line at EU level.
8) Ukraine on the EU agenda: Cyprus (23–24 April 2026). At the informal summit of EU leaders in Cyprus (Ayia Napa / Nicosia), the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, was included in the programme for an exchange of views with European leaders. The discussion follows the same logic of ‘a seat at the table’: the EU aims to remain a key player in supporting Ukraine and in shaping the parameters of a future solution.
9) The financial instrument: the €90 billion loan. The press reported that Member States had approved a support package in the form of a €90 billion loan for Ukraine (for 2026–2027), which also allowed for a more visible political presence and involvement at the meeting in Cyprus. For the EU, this type of instrument serves two purposes: (a) Ukraine’s short-term fiscal stabilisation; (b) a strategic signal of continued support, which strengthens the EU’s position in any discussion regarding the end of the war.
Conclusion (EU perspective): The metaphor “if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu” encapsulates a real strategic anxiety within the EU: the costs of the war and regional instability are borne primarily by Europeans, so the EU needs the political, military and financial capacity to influence the outcome. In practice, this means: internal unity, predictable support for Ukraine, energy resilience and the strengthening of strategic autonomy – so that any future negotiations cannot bypass Europe’s security interests.
Maritime Security Forum
“Go, find him and bring me his hat”: The most overlooked battle of the Falklands War returns to the spotlight – euronanal.ro

While the world watched the images from Goose Green and Port Stanley, another battle was unfolding beneath the icy waters of the South Atlantic – invisible, without famous heroes, with over two hundred torpedoes, bombs and mortars fired at whales, shipwrecks and schools of krill. A book published in 2020 finally tells the true story. And it asks a question that has never lost its relevance: what do you do with a submarine you cannot find?
The book: ‘Go Find Him and Bring Me Back His Hat’ – Sciaroni and Smith rehabilitate ASW
“Go Find Him and Bring Me Back His Hat: The Royal Navy’s Anti-Submarine Campaign in the Falklands/Malvinas War”, published in December 2020 by the British publisher Helion & Company in the Latin America@War series, is a 72-page A4-format work that has succeeded in filling a huge gap in the historiography of the Falklands War. The authors – Argentinean Mariano Sciaroni, a lawyer and expert in the military history of Argentina with a master’s degree in geopolitics and strategy from the Argentine Military Academy, and the British Andy Smith, a researcher specialising in naval operations from 1982 – have built this work on the basis of interviews with veterans from both sides, declassified British and Argentine official documents, and unpublished primary sources.
The title comes from the order given by the British commander of the Landing Force to his anti-submarine commanders in the early hours of the campaign: ‘Go, find him and bring me his hat.’ A simple, almost cowboy-like order, which concealed an extremely complex reality: how do you find a modern diesel-electric submarine lying motionless on the seabed in a chaotic acoustic environment, full of whale carcasses and krill swarms indistinguishable by sonar from a real submarine?
“This is a gripping analysis of what it meant to serve in the most intense operations since the Second World War. An insightful review of the cultural shifts and the constant exhaustion of crews in search of an invisible enemy.” — Baird Maritime, review
Structured in ten short chapters, rich in archive photographs, colour maps, technical profiles of aircraft and submarines, escort tables and interviews drawn directly from veterans’ testimonies, the book gives equal attention to both sides for the first time: both the British perspective of the frustrating sonar hunt and the Argentine perspective of the submariners operating with a faulty fire-control system, torpedoes with reversed polarity and a non-functional firing computer.
The strategic context: Why the Argentine submarines were the number one threat
When the British Task Force weighed anchor from Portsmouth on 5 April 1982, the admirals’ primary concern was not the Argentine air force – although this would later prove its extraordinary lethal capability with its Exocets. Their primary concern was submarines. At that time, Argentina had three submarines: the ARA Santa Fe, an old American S-2 from the Second World War era; the ARA Salta and the ARA San Luis, two modern German Type 209 submarines with diesel-electric propulsion, capable of diving to a depth of 500 metres and employing the ‘lay on the bottom’ tactic – lying on the seabed with engines shut down, effectively invisible to sonar.
The British General Staff’s conclusion was clear: if the Argentine submarines were operating to specification and had properly trained crews, victory was impossible without neutralising them first. The aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible – the heart of the entire operation – could not be exposed to a torpedo attack without warning. The order given to the crews of the frigates and ASW helicopters was effectively a blank cheque: find and destroy the Argentine submarines, by any means necessary, before they find you.

Martín Otero, CC BY 2.5, via Wikimedia Commons
ARGENTINE SUBMARINE FORCES: ARA Santa Fe – American S-2 WWII, neutralised off South Georgia on 25 April 1982 by helicopter attacks. ARA Salta – German Type 209, out of action and undergoing repairs at the start of the war. ARA San Luis – German Type 209, 1,200 tonnes, 36 crew, commander: Capt. Fernando Azcueta. The only Argentine vessel to have actively engaged the British Task Force throughout the war.
ARA San Luis: The submarine that held an entire fleet at bay
A faulty submarine, a junior crew and a capable commander
The ARA San Luis was far from the image of a combat-ready submarine. At the time of departure from port, the vessel was undergoing incomplete repairs. The fire-control computer was inoperative – the crew had to calculate firing solutions manually, whilst submerged, using a periscope that transmitted incorrect azimuth data to the console. The SST-4 wire-guided torpedoes were affected by a polarity error – a technician had reversed the gyroscope power cables, causing the torpedoes to veer off course immediately after launch. Argentina’s most e and best submarine officers were in Germany at the time, undergoing training. The San Luis set sail with junior officers in key positions.
And yet. The commander of the San Luis, Captain Fernando Azcueta, demonstrated remarkable tactical skill under impossible circumstances. For 36 days, the ship patrolled the total exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, systematically evading British anti-submarine efforts. It periodically allowed the ship to settle on the seabed with its engines shut down, becoming virtually invisible to the frigates’ active sonars. It let the British crews hunt whales, wrecks and krill swarms for tens of hours without revealing its position.
Three attacks, zero hits, hundreds of British rounds wasted
On 1 May 1982, the San Luis detected the British frigates HMS Brilliant (Type 22) and HMS Yarmouth (Type 12) using passive sonar and launched an SST-4 from a distance of 9,500 yards. The guidance wire snapped immediately. Brilliant detected the attack – sonar operators heard and confirmed the sound of the SST-4 torpedo – and the two frigates, together with three Sea King helicopters from Hermes, launched a furious pursuit that lasted 20 hours. They used depth charges, torpedoes and mortar rockets. They shot down several whales. They did not find the San Luis.

“HMS YARMOUTH F101” by TimWebb is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
On 8 May, San Luis believed it was under attack by a British submarine and fired a Mark 37 anti-submarine missile at a detected contact. An explosion was heard. The contact was lost. It was almost certainly a school of krill. On 11 May, the San Luis detected the Type 21 frigates HMS Alacrity and HMS Arrow emerging from the Falkland Channel. It fired an SST-4 at the Alacrity – the guide wire failed again. Another SST-4 failed to leave the torpedo tube. Arrow later recovered its decoy with a clear impact hole. The torpedo had struck – and failed to explode.
“The San Luis was not a superb submarine, nor was its crew superb. But, with a competent commander employing standard tactics, it managed to hold off a dozen anti-submarine frigates from one of the world’s most capable fleets.” — Naval History magazine, USNI
The overall tally of the British ASW campaign, as presented by Sciaroni and Smith with data from both sides: 31 torpedoes launched, 49 depth charges dropped, 21 mortar rounds fired – all against sonar contacts that turned out to be the ocean’s ordinary biological, geological or thermal phenomena. The San Luis returned home undamaged. No one in the Task Force had ever actually managed to detect it – they kept it in their vicinity based on its engine noise, but every time it settled on the seabed and stopped its propulsion, it simply vanished from the sonar picture.
Type 22 frigates – the Task Force’s ASW workhorses and their legacy in Romania
What was a Type 22 frigate in 1982
The Royal Navy’s Type 22 frigates formed the backbone of the British anti-submarine campaign in 1982. Designed specifically for anti-submarine warfare, they represented at that time the Royal Navy’s most modern ASW platform: active sonar, Lynx helicopters armed with Mk 46 torpedoes, and the capability to detect and engage targets throughout the entire underwater sphere. HMS Brilliant, directly involved in the pursuit of the San Luis on 1 May, was a Type 22 Batch 1. HMS Sheffield, sunk by an Exocet on 4 May, was a Type 42 – a distinct class, geared towards air and naval defence.

Royal Navy official photographer, OGL v1.0, via Wikimedia Commons
The Type 22 class was built in three successive batches (Batch 1, 2 and 3), with increasing displacement and improved capabilities. Batch 3, the largest and most capable vessels, displaced 5,300 tonnes and incorporated Sea Wolf and Exocet missile systems, dual helicopters (two Lynx or one EH101), advanced sonar systems and a modernised combat management system. Following their decommissioning from the Royal Navy in 2011, 14 ships from the entire class survived to serve under other flags: Brazil, Chile and Romania.
HMS Coventry and HMS London – the journey to Romania
Romania acquired two Type 22 frigates under a contract signed on 14 January 2003: HMS Coventry (F98) and HMS London (F95). The price paid: £116 million for both ships, together with a limited modernisation package, managed by BAE Systems and Fleet Support Limited. The contract generated considerable controversy – Romania subsequently claimed, in a statement reproduced in The Guardian, that it had paid three times the fair price – but the acquisition remains, to this day, the most significant qualitative leap for the Romanian Navy in the post-Cold War era.

MAPN, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons
HMS Coventry (F98) carries a story with an added layer of symbolic significance: she was named Coventry in honour of the Type 42 destroyer HMS Coventry (D118), sunk by Argentine Skyhawks on 25 May 1982 during the Falklands War. Ships of the same class that fought alongside her in that war. The depths of the South Atlantic swallowed one Coventry. The Black Sea received another in 2004.
King Ferdinand and Queen Maria – what they are today
HMS Coventry became King Ferdinand (F221), entering service on 9 September 2004 with the hull number F221, the flagship of the Romanian Navy. HMS London became Queen Maria (F222), entering service on 21 April 2005. Both are Type 22 Batch 3 frigates, the most modern in the class: length 148.2 m, beam 14.75 m, maximum draught 6.4 m, displacement 4,900 tonnes, four Rolls-Royce turbines with a maximum speed of 30 knots.
However, the armament initially delivered to Romania was substantially reduced compared to the original specifications: the Sea Wolf and Exocet missile systems had already been removed by the Royal Navy prior to the sale. Romania installed a 76 mm OTO-Melara gun in the forward position where the Exocet had been mounted. At the time of writing (2026), neither frigate is yet equipped with missile systems or complex anti-submarine weapons compatible with NATO standards. The IAR-330 Puma Naval helicopters, adapted for maritime missions, serve as the primary detection and attack platform for both vessels.
SPECIFICATIONS TYPE 22 BATCH 3 FRIGATES (ROMANIA): Length: 148.2 m. Beam: 14.75 m. Displacement: 4,900 t. Propulsion: 4 x Rolls-Royce turbines. Maximum speed: 30 knots. Range: 4,500 nautical miles. Crew: 250. Current armament (Romania): 1 x OTO-Melara 76 mm gun, 2 x BMARC 30 mm guns (Regina Maria), 2 x 3-tube anti-submarine torpedo launchers, 1 x IAR-330 Puma Naval. Flagship: Regele Ferdinand (F221).
HMS London: From the NATO flag in the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea
Regina Maria – formerly HMS London (F95) – has an even richer history than her sister ship. Originally christened Bloodhound, she was renamed London at the request of the Mayor of London, continuing a long-standing Royal Navy tradition of granting cities the privilege of naming some of its warships. In 1988, the ship was deployed to the Baltic Sea to test anti-submarine detection equipment against Soviet vessels – precisely the environment in which ASW expertise counted for the most.
Its finest hour: 1991, the Gulf War. HMS London served as the flagship of the Royal Navy Task Force in the Persian Gulf, coordinating British naval operations during Operation Desert Storm. From 1991 to 2003, the ship’s fortunes declined – she was decommissioned on 14 January 1999, sold to Romania in 2003, and renamed Regina Maria on 21 April 2005. In 2005, it took part in Trafalgar 200 – the bicentenary commemoration of Nelson’s battle – as a representative of the Romanian Naval Forces.
It is a subtle irony of naval history: the ship that had coordinated British operations against the Iraqi fleet in the Persian Gulf now patrols the Black Sea, in a geopolitical context where Russia – not Iraq – is the source of regional instability, and where the ASW lessons from Sciaroni and Smith’s book are more relevant than ever.
What the book teaches us: ASW lessons that remain valid in 2026
The great value of Sciaroni and Smith’s book is not historical – it is technical and doctrinal. The authors demonstrate with precision an uncomfortable truth: The Royal Navy, one of the most capable in the world, equipped with state-of-the-art ASW frigates, Lynx helicopters, Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft and its own nuclear submarines, has never managed to locate and destroy a single conventional diesel-electric submarine, with a poorly trained crew and a faulty weapons system. Why?
The book’s answer is systematic. The first factor: the physical environment of the shallow waters around the Falklands – variable temperatures, a rocky and uneven seabed, and abundant marine life (krill, whales, whale carcasses) – creates an extremely noisy sonar environment, in which a submarine that settled on the seabed and shut down its propulsion became practically indistinguishable from the seabed itself. The second factor: fatigue. The crews of the ASW frigates, kept on constant alert for weeks, were making errors of judgement and misinterpreting sonar contacts. The third factor: the psychology of pressure. Knowing that the San Luis was somewhere nearby and that a single functional torpedo could sink an aircraft carrier, British commanders preferred to fire at any uncertain contact, wasting ammunition and – more importantly – revealing the position of their own ships through the noise of the explosions.
The conclusions are directly applicable to any naval theatre of operations in shallow waters from 2026 onwards – including the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the South China Sea and the Persian Gulf. Modern diesel-electric submarines, equipped with AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) which allows them to remain submerged without starting their diesel engines, are exponentially harder to detect than the San Luis of 1982. Russia operates the Kilo class in the Black Sea. Iran operates diesel submarines in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. China is building non-nuclear submarines in series.
“The lesson of the San Luis is not that Argentina nearly won the war. The lesson is that a single small vessel, with faulty weapons and a poorly trained crew, paralysed the ASW of one of NATO’s most capable fleets for 36 days.” — War on the Rocks, Falklands 2025 ASW analysis
Conclusion: Why the book matters to the Romanian Navy
“Go Find Him and Bring Me Back His Hat” is a book about 1982. But its lessons are about 2026. For the Romanian Navy, which operates two Type 22 frigates – exactly the type of ship that formed the backbone of the British ASW campaign in 1982 – Sciaroni and Smith’s book is more than just a read of historical interest. It is an operational study document.
King Ferdinand and Queen Maria are capable platforms. But they are platforms with incomplete weapon systems, lacking Sea Wolf missiles, lacking Exocet missiles and lacking specialised ASW helicopters to the standard of those in 1982. Their modernisation – announced and resumed multiple times over the last 20 years, blocked by bureaucracy, changes of contractors (Naval Group, Damen, BAE Systems) and budgetary constraints – remains the most urgent priority for the Romanian fleet. Not for abstract reasons of NATO prestige. For concrete reasons: the Black Sea has Russian Kilo-class submarines in Sevastopol. And, unlike the San Luis of 1982, these have torpedoes that work.
HMS Coventry took its name from a ship sunk in the South Atlantic. King Ferdinand now patrols the Black Sea under that name. It would be fitting for those commanding these ships to know, in the finest detail, what anti-submarine warfare looked like in the war that gave rise to their names.
Sources: Helion & Company (the book’s publisher), Amazon.com, Naval Historical Foundation, Baird Maritime, USNI Naval History Magazine, Wikipedia (ARA San Luis, Romanian frigate King Ferdinand, Romanian frigate Queen Maria, HMS London F95), Military Factory, Euro-SD, Marinarii.ro, War on the Rocks.
Source: https://euronaval.ro/go-find-him-bring-back-hat-falklands-asw-fregata-tip-22-romania/
The United Arab Emirates leaves OPEC: Impact, Motivations and Global Implications – Maritime Security Forum
A decision that rocks the oil market and geopolitical relations in the Gulf
The context of the United Arab Emirates’ decision to leave OPEC
On 28 April 2026, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) officially announced its withdrawal from the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), marking a historic moment with the potential to shift the balance of the global energy market. This decision comes against a backdrop of tension, fuelled by the energy crisis triggered by the war in Iran, which has brought to light the differences between the Gulf states, as reported by Reuters.
Motivations and official reactions
The UAE’s Minister of Energy, Suhail Mohamed al-Mazrouei, emphasised that the decision was the result of a detailed analysis of national energy strategies. He stated that the decision had not been discussed with the de facto leaders of OPEC or with Saudi Arabia, emphasising the unilateral nature of the action: “This is a policy decision; it was taken after a careful analysis of current and future policies regarding production levels.”
Impact on the oil market and OPEC
The UAE’s departure from OPEC represents a significant blow to the group, given that the UAE was one of the most important producers and a long-standing member. The group, known for its efforts to maintain a united front despite geopolitical disagreements over production quotas, now finds itself weakened, with its unity called into question. Immediately following the announcement, oil price rises were tempered, indicating the market’s sensitivity to such moves.
Regional challenges: The war in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz
OPEC producers in the Gulf are facing major difficulties in transporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint through which approximately 20% of the world’s crude oil passes. Iranian threats and attacks on ships have hampered exports, prompting the UAE to state that leaving OPEC would not have a major impact on the market due to these logistical constraints.
OPEC+ and the decline in global influence
OPEC and its allies, including Russia (OPEC+), controlled almost half of the world’s oil before the Iranian conflict. In March 2026, OPEC+’s market share fell to 44%, from 48% in February, a trend that is intensifying against a backdrop of production bottlenecks. The UAE, the fourth-largest producer, leaving the group amplifies this decline in global influence.
The United Arab Emirates’ involvement on the international stage
The United Arab Emirates is establishing itself as a regional hub for business, finance and diplomatic influence, being one of Washington’s closest allies. A firm foreign policy and the strengthening of relations with the United States and Israel – including through the 2020 Abraham Accords – have transformed the UAE into a regional actor with strategic leverage. The UAE leadership regards the relationship with Israel as a vital channel to Washington and a source of regional influence, particularly following the attacks suffered during the war with Iran.
Political implications: A victory for the US and Donald Trump
The UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC is seen as a diplomatic victory for US President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly criticised the organisation for manipulating oil prices. Trump has emphasised that the US defends the Gulf states, but that they ‘take advantage’ of American military support by imposing high oil prices. The UAE’s decision can be seen as a response to this pressure and as a repositioning within the global energy market.
Market reconfiguration and the UAE’s prospects
Leaving OPEC allows the United Arab Emirates to fully capitalise on its advantages: low production costs, reduced carbon emissions and the opportunity to gain a share of the global market as the geopolitical situation normalises. Furthermore, this move could benefit consumers and the global economy, with the potential to ease pressure on oil prices.
Conclusions and implications
- OPEC fragmentation: The UAE’s decision undermines OPEC’s unity and negotiating power, foreshadowing possible further exits from the group.
- Volatility in the oil market: The oil market will remain sensitive to developments in the Gulf and to the decisions of major producers, with the potential for sharp price fluctuations.
- Geopolitical realignment: The UAE is consolidating its role as an independent and influential player, with privileged relations with the US and Israel, which may generate new alliances and rivalries in the region.
- Impact on consumers: In the medium term, the UAE’s exit could lead to a diversification of supply and lower prices for consumers, although global spare capacity remains low.
- Global energy outlook: The UAE’s decision reflects the global trend towards flexibility and adaptability in the face of energy and geopolitical crises, with an emphasis on efficiency and sustainability.
In conclusion, the United Arab Emirates’ withdrawal from OPEC marks a turning point for the oil market and the geopolitical balance of the Gulf region, with effects that will be felt both regionally and globally. As a Romanian proverb goes, ‘Where there are many, power grows, but division also lurks.’ The future of energy will depend on how the major powers manage this new fragmentation.
Maritime Security Forum
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard takes power during the war, diminishing the role of the Supreme Leader. The radical shift in power in Iran: amplification, structuring and implications – Maritime Security Forum
From clerical primacy to the dominance of security in the context of the war with the US and Israel
The context of the power shift in Iran
Two months after the outbreak of war with the United States and Israel, Iran is facing a historic moment: there is no longer an unchallenged clerical arbiter at the pinnacle of power. This abrupt break with the past may, paradoxically, strengthen Tehran’s position at a critical juncture, when the resumption of negotiations with Washington is under discussion.
From supreme leader to the dominance of the Revolutionary Guards
- The collapse of the traditional model: Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has been built around a supreme leader with total authority over all state decisions. The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day of the conflict and the promotion of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei (who was seriously injured), marked the beginning of a new order, in which the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) dominate the political and military scene, and the absence of an authoritative arbiter becomes evident.
- Mojtaba Khamenei’s role: Although Mojtaba formally remains at the top of the system, internal sources reveal that his role is limited to legitimising decisions taken by IRGC generals, without issuing directives of his own. Communication takes place via IRGC advisers or through restricted audio channels, due to heightened security.
- Restricted decision-making structure: The pressure of war has concentrated power within a hard-line inner circle, comprising the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the Supreme Leader’s office and the IRGC, which controls both military strategy and major political decisions.
Negotiation and influence under the new conditions
- Lack of a unified command: Foreign officials, such as the Pakistani official involved in mediating the peace talks, point to a lack of a unified decision-making structure in Iran, leading to response delays of 2–3 days in dialogue with the US.
- Obstacles to an agreement: Analysts emphasise that it is not internal strife that is blocking the negotiations, but the differences between what Washington is offering and what the IRGC is willing to accept. Flexibility is perceived as a sign of weakness by both sides, which maintains the deadlock.
- Diplomacy and key players: Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf – a former IRGC commander – are Iran’s diplomatic representatives in talks with the US. On the ground, IRGC Commander Ahmad Vahidi is the central interlocutor, including at decisive moments such as the announcement of the ceasefire.
- Iran’s proposals: Iran has submitted a new proposal to Washington, favouring phased talks and postponing the nuclear issue until the end of the conflict. The US insists that the nuclear issue be addressed from the outset.
Consolidation of institutional power
- Institutional consensus: Real power is not imposed by Mojtaba, but stems from institutional consensus, with the IRGC and the SNSC at the helm. Radicals, such as Saeed Jalili and hardline MPs, employ aggressive rhetoric but lack decisive institutional influence.
- Dominance of the Guards: Mojtaba owes his rise to the IRGC, which has marginalised the pragmatists and backed him as the guardian of the radical agenda. This dominance heralds a more aggressive foreign policy and harsher internal repression.
- Ideology and strategy: The Revolutionary Guard, guided by revolutionary Islamism and a rigid security vision, prioritises centralised control and resistance to Western pressure, particularly on the nuclear issue and regional influence.
- Reorganisation of power: There has been a shift from clerical power to the dominance of the security sector – “from divine power to hard power”, as Aaron David Miller, a former US negotiator, puts it.
- Consolidated decision-making: Major decisions are taken within the security institutions, with Mojtaba as the central convening figure, not as the sole decision-maker.
- Internal cohesion: Despite military and economic pressures, Iran has shown no signs of fracture or capitulation. The strategic consensus is to avoid a return to large-scale war, to maintain leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, and to emerge from the conflict stronger politically, economically and militarily.
Conclusions and implications
- Decisive reorganisation of power: Iran has shifted from a model centred on clerical primacy to a leadership dominated by the security institutions and the IRGC, which will profoundly influence domestic and foreign policy.
- Stability and cohesion: Although the absence of an authoritarian supreme leader could have led to instability, institutional consensus and the dominance of the IRGC have ensured the system’s cohesion.
- Implications for negotiations: The IRGC’s power and lack of flexibility suggest that negotiations with the US will be difficult, with a clear preference for maintaining strategic leverage and adopting a hardline stance.
- Foreign policy and internal repression: The dominance of the Guards signals a more aggressive foreign policy and heightened internal repression, with the possibility of escalating regional tensions.
- Paradigm shift: This institutional transformation marks a turning point for Iran, which will henceforth be governed by ‘hard power’, not clerical influence. The future will depend on how the security elites manage external and internal pressures.
The dilemma facing Iran: institutional unity brings stability, but the risk of fragmentation remains ever-present behind the apparent consensus. The paradigm shift in Iran will influence not only the course of the war, but also the geopolitical balance of the region.
Maritime Security Forum
Ukrainian drone diplomacy: expansion, challenges and implications for Romania – Maritime Security Forum
Detailed analysis of Kyiv’s strategy, obstacles and regional impact
Drone diplomacy: a strategic asset for Ukraine
Drone diplomacy is winning Ukraine valuable allies, but now it must deliver
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has turned Ukraine’s expertise in military drones into a highly effective diplomatic tool. During official visits to the Middle East and Europe, he has signed strategic agreements that have highlighted Kyiv’s military capabilities, thereby strengthening the country’s influence on the international stage.
Expanding the network of alliances
In April, Ukraine succeeded in concluding defence and technological cooperation agreements with Germany, Norway and the Netherlands, strengthening existing security partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. These diplomatic successes were followed by agreements signed with Turkey, Syria and Azerbaijan, aimed at cooperation in the fields of defence and energy.
Zelenskyy’s strategy aims both to strengthen relations with Western allies and to expand influence in the ‘Global South’, with the aim of reducing Russia’s diplomatic impact and diversifying sources of support for Ukraine.
Drones – a bargaining chip in modern warfare
The war in Iran has highlighted the essential role of drones in contemporary conflicts, giving Ukraine a diplomatic advantage at a time when US support is becoming increasingly uncertain. Ukraine has developed innovative, effective and low-cost methods to counter drone attacks, avoiding exclusive reliance on expensive defensive systems such as the Patriot.
In addition to defending its territory, Ukraine has invested in long-range attack drones, used to strike Russian energy infrastructure, thereby strengthening its position on the technological and diplomatic fronts.
Domestic challenges: export controls and technology protection
Although Ukrainian drone manufacturers have significant spare capacity, strict military export regulations limit the expansion of international collaborations. External drone production, including in Germany and the UK, is primarily dedicated to Ukraine’s military needs.
Ukraine faces the dilemma of protecting intellectual property to prevent Russia from copying the systems developed, whilst maintaining a balance between domestic wartime requirements and export opportunities.
Technology, human resources and adaptation to new threats
Ukraine’s air defence relies largely on the skills of human operators, who coordinate interceptor drones, machine guns and jamming systems. However, the emergence of faster and more sophisticated Russian jet-powered drones necessitates the development of autonomous systems, an area in which European companies are making rapid progress.
Military exports could bring considerable economic benefits to Ukraine, reducing dependence on Western support and stimulating post-conflict growth.
Strategic objectives and concerns regarding Western support
Zelenskiy aims for drone diplomacy to facilitate energy supply agreements and strengthen Ukraine’s missile defence. The conflict between the US, Israel and Iran has raised concerns regarding the availability of Patriot systems, which are essential for defence against Russian ballistic missiles.
The $4 billion agreement with Germany includes the delivery of Patriot systems and collaboration on the development of a European ballistic missile defence system, but significant technological challenges remain.
Underlying these efforts is uncertainty regarding the reliability of long-term US support, which is prompting Ukraine to diversify its partners and strengthen its autonomy.
Conclusions and implications for Romania
- Strengthening regional security: Ukrainian drone diplomacy can help bolster military cooperation and defensive capabilities in Eastern Europe. Romania, situated on the border with Ukraine and in close proximity to conflict zones, stands to benefit from the transfer of expertise and innovative technologies for air defence and surveillance.
- Economic and industrial opportunities: Romania’s involvement in partnerships with Ukraine in the field of drones could stimulate the national defence sector and the IT industry, creating new jobs and facilitating access to advanced technologies.
- Geopolitical risks: The evolution of Ukraine’s drone diplomacy influences the regional balance, and Romania must carefully manage its relationship with NATO, the EU and regional partners to avoid escalating tensions with Russia.
- Adapting to new threats: Romania can learn from the Ukrainian model of low-cost defence by investing in operator training and the development of autonomous solutions to counter drones and ballistic missiles.
- Proactive diplomacy: Against a backdrop of uncertainty regarding US support, Romania should strengthen its bilateral relations with Ukraine and other European states, actively participating in regional security and technological innovation initiatives.
In conclusion, the drone diplomacy launched by Ukraine redefines how states in the region, including Romania, can approach security, international cooperation and technological development in a geopolitical context marked by uncertainty and rapid change. Adaptation, innovation and collaboration are the keys to transforming current challenges into sustainable opportunities for Romania’s security and prosperity.
Maritime Security Forum
The Strait of Malacca: A vital artery of global trade and current challenges – Maritime Security Forum
An in-depth analysis of the impact of the Hormuz crisis on the world’s busiest maritime strait and the regional implications
The impact of the Hormuz crisis on the Strait of Malacca
The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has drawn attention to the vulnerability and importance of other strategic maritime routes for international trade, particularly the Strait of Malacca, which is recognised as the world’s busiest waterway. Events in the Strait of Hormuz have prompted Asian states to reassess the security of these routes, given their dependence on maritime transport for economic and energy flows.
Geographical and strategic characteristics of the Strait of Malacca
Stretching approximately 900 kilometres, the Strait of Malacca offers the shortest maritime route between East Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Situated at the intersection of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, this strait is a vital transit point for the global transport of goods and energy.
According to The Moscow Times, the Strait of Malacca is the busiest waterway in the world, traversed annually by tens of thousands of ships, mostly oil tankers and container ships. Data from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies shows that nearly 22% of global maritime trade passes through this strait, particularly oil shipments from the Middle East to major Asian economies such as China, Japan and South Korea.
The importance of the Strait of Malacca for oil transit is also highlighted by the US Energy Information Administration, which emphasises that the role of this route is greater than that of the Strait of Hormuz. In the first half of 2025, approximately 23.2 million barrels of oil per day were transported through Malacca, accounting for 29% of global seaborne shipments, exceeding the volume transiting through Hormuz during the same period.
Maritime flows and logistical challenges
Malaysia’s Maritime Department reported that over 102,500 vessels transited the Strait of Malacca in 2025, compared to 94,300 in 2024, the majority of which were oil tankers. However, some large vessels avoid the strait due to delays and opt for alternative routes through southern Indonesia.
The strait faces significant challenges: at its narrowest point it is only 2.7 kilometres wide, which increases the risk of collisions, accidents and oil spills. The shallow depth (25–27 metres) limits access for very large vessels, although even VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers) can successfully transit the area.
Security risks: Piracy and illegal activities
The Strait of Malacca has long been a hotbed of piracy, a reputation that has been established since the 16th century, when local pirates and privateers frequently attacked merchant ships carrying spices, gold and other valuable goods to European and Asian markets. Today, this threat persists, with a high number of documented attacks—at least 104 incidents in 2025, according to the ReCAAP Information Centre, confirming that ‘where there is great wealth, temptation arises’. However, regional authorities have stepped up patrols and international cooperation, helping to reduce these incidents in the first quarter of 2026, a sign that “where there are many, strength grows”. Furthermore, the strait is not only a breeding ground for piracy, but also for sophisticated illegal activities, such as clandestine oil transhipments. This practice involves the transfer of fuel between tankers at sea, often at night or in areas difficult to monitor, with the aim of concealing its origin and evading international sanctions or customs duties. Such operations undermine the integrity of global trade, placing additional pressure on the authorities in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand to coordinate their monitoring and enforcement efforts. Against the backdrop of these challenges, the Strait of Malacca remains a telling example of the proverb ‘water flows, stones remain’: the heavy flow of ships, global economic interests and security pressures mean that problems persist, even as solutions evolve. Regional cooperation and investment in surveillance technology, such as maritime drones and advanced radar systems, are essential to deter both piracy and the illegal trafficking of energy resources, helping to maintain stability and security on one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.
Strategic importance for China and global energy flows
The Strait of Malacca is a critical link in China’s energy and economic security, holding unrivalled importance on the global geopolitical map. According to Vortexa, no less than 75% of China’s offshore crude oil imports from the Middle East and Africa pass through this maritime route, making it a veritable ‘energy lifeline’ for the Asian giant. China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca translates not only into vulnerability to potential blockades or regional conflicts, but also into constant pressure on Beijing to diversify its oil supply sources and routes. Persistent fears, fuelled by the tense situation in Iran and potential conflicts in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, have reignited the debate over the risk of this vital artery being blocked or controlled by hostile forces. In the event of a major conflict, China’s ability to maintain its energy supply could be severely affected, with direct implications for its economy and regional stability. For this reason, Beijing is investing heavily in alternative projects, such as the China-Myanmar oil pipeline, deep-water ports and strategic oil reserves, in an attempt to reduce its dependence on this essential route. Beyond its importance to China, the Strait of Malacca remains a world-class transport hub, through which approximately 21% of global maritime trade passes. This enormous volume confirms the strait’s status as an international strategic chokepoint, where the interests of major economies—China, Japan, South Korea, as well as Western nations—intersect and overlap. For this reason, any disruption to traffic in the Malacca Strait could trigger a chain reaction, ranging from rising oil prices to the destabilisation of global markets. In conclusion, the Strait of Malacca is not merely a shipping route, but a barometer of energy security and the geopolitical balance in Asia. As an old Chinese proverb goes, ‘when the winds of change blow, some build walls, others build windmills’: China faces a strategic decision between strengthening security along this route and seeking alternatives to secure its energy future. In this context, the role of Malacca will continue to be essential, and developments in the region will be closely monitored not only by Beijing, but also by the entire international community.
Regional reactions and management policies
The Hormuz crisis has sparked intense debate in the region regarding the taxation of maritime traffic, reflecting tensions and concerns regarding the security and stability of energy routes. The Indonesian Minister of Finance, Purbay Yudhi Sadev, initially proposed levying a tax on ships transiting the strait, arguing that this revenue could be used to modernise maritime infrastructure, increase monitoring and response capabilities, and protect the environment from pollution risks. However, the proposal met with firm opposition from the main coastal states and global industry operators, who considered that the introduction of additional taxes could destabilise trade flows and increase transport costs. Ultimately, the idea was rejected as impractical, as it could have sparked economic conflicts and negatively impacted regional competitiveness. Officials from Singapore and Malaysia emphasised that keeping the strait open and free of charges is a shared and strategic objective, guaranteeing the right of passage to all states, including the US and China, and promoting the principle of ‘freedom of navigation’, which is essential for the normal functioning of global trade. This regional consensus demonstrates diplomatic maturity and a shared interest in economic stability, confirming the Romanian proverb “where there is harmony, there is prosperity”.
Singapore has given assurances that it will not participate in blocking the strait or imposing transit fees, reaffirming its commitment to the international principles of freedom of navigation. Furthermore, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand have stepped up their cooperation efforts by organising joint patrols aimed at preventing incidents of piracy, smuggling and illegal activities, as well as effectively monitoring and managing maritime traffic. In doing so, these states demonstrate that regional solidarity and partnership are key to maintaining the safety and uninterrupted operation of this strategic waterway, which serves as the vital link between the Middle East, Asia and the rest of the world. Recent investments in surveillance technology, the use of maritime drones and advanced radar systems, alongside coordinated patrols, contribute to strengthening a climate of security, making the Strait of Malacca a model of effective management of modern risks and challenges. Against the backdrop of these efforts, it can be said that ‘there is strength in numbers’, and regional cooperation is becoming a model for other areas with heavy traffic and similar vulnerabilities.
Conclusions
The Strait of Malacca is increasingly establishing itself as a central element in the architecture of global trade and energy security, reflecting a true strategic hub where the interests of the world’s major economies intersect. With over 102,500 ships passing through the area in 2025, compared to 94,300 the previous year, the strait remains essential for oil and cargo flows, despite the limitations of its width and depth that make it vulnerable to accidents and oil spills. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has highlighted Asian nations’ growing dependence on stable maritime routes, amplifying concerns that any blockade or regional conflict could dramatically affect energy supplies, particularly for China, which imports 75% of its offshore crude oil from the Middle East and Africa via this vital artery.
In addition to the logistical risks posed by heavy traffic and limited infrastructure, the Strait of Malacca faces major security challenges. Piracy, with a history dating back to the 16th century, continues to be a real threat, as evidenced by the 104 attacks documented in 2025. Furthermore, sophisticated illegal activities, such as clandestine oil transhipments, undermine the integrity of global trade and complicate the task of regional authorities. These risks compel the coastal states — Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand — to coordinate their efforts through joint patrols, investment in technological surveillance (maritime drones, advanced radar systems) and the strengthening of regional partnerships, confirming the proverb ‘unity is strength’.
From a geopolitical perspective, the strait is not merely a maritime corridor, but a veritable barometer of the Asian balance of power, where any disruption can trigger a chain reaction: rising oil prices, destabilisation of global markets and heightened diplomatic tensions. Proposals to impose charges on maritime traffic, prompted by the Hormuz crisis, were rejected, underlining the regional consensus on maintaining freedom of navigation and economic competitiveness. Singapore, Malaysia and other relevant actors have reaffirmed their commitment to international principles, prioritising cooperation and solidarity in the face of modern challenges.
Consequently, the Strait of Malacca is not merely a maritime route, but an irreplaceable pillar of global trade and energy security, a space where logistical pressures, security challenges and strategic interests constantly overlap. The future of this artery will depend on the ability of the littoral states to foster harmony and adapt management policies to emerging challenges, so as to ensure stability not only for Asia but for the entire global economy.
Maritime Security Forum
The Transit of an LPG Tanker through the Strait of Hormuz: Context, Implications and Conclusions – Maritime Security Forum
The geopolitical and operational context of transit through the Strait of Hormuz
Amid heightened regional tensions, a ship carrying liquefied natural gas (LNG) has managed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz for the first time since early March, marking a significant development for the energy sector and global trade flows. According to an AFP report, this passage took place after Iran effectively blocked the strait, raising major concerns regarding the stability of maritime routes and the energy supply of states dependent on resources from the Persian Gulf.
Details of the transit and the vessel’s behaviour
The SPG Mubaraz, operated by the United Arab Emirates’ national oil company ADNOC, left the Persian Gulf with a cargo of 132,890 cubic metres of LNG, loaded from Das Island on 2 March. Data analysed by AFP shows that, at the end of March, the tanker switched off its AIS transponder for a period of approximately one month, resuming the signal off the coast of India one day prior to reporting. This tactic of ‘invisibility’ on radar reflects the precautions taken by operators in the context of the uncertainties and security risks in the area.
The SPG Mubaraz, operated by the United Arab Emirates’ national oil company ADNOC, left the Persian Gulf with a cargo of 132,890 cubic metres of LNG, loaded from Das Island on 2 March. This significant volume of liquefied natural gas demonstrates not only ADNOC’s technological capabilities and advanced logistics, but also the importance of the United Arab Emirates as a supplier of energy resources to global markets, particularly in the context of tensions in the Persian Gulf region. Data analysed by AFP shows that, at the end of March, the tanker switched off its AIS transponder for a period of approximately one month, resuming the signal off the coast of India one day prior to the report. This tactic of ‘invisibility’ on radar reflects the precautions taken by operators in the context of the uncertainties and security risks in the area, where any incident could have major consequences for energy flows and geopolitical stability. The practice of disabling the AIS transponder, used for real-time identification and tracking of vessels, is common in high-risk areas as a protective measure against piracy, attacks or military interception. In this case, the decision to operate ‘under the radar’ highlights the vulnerability of strategic maritime routes and the need for adaptive strategies on the part of energy companies. Furthermore, this action underscores the pressure LNG operators face to keep supply chains active, even amid regional instability. Thus, the transit of the Mubaraz SPG becomes an example of resilience and adaptability in the face of geopolitical challenges, offering a valuable lesson on the importance of risk management and international collaboration for global energy security.
Analysis and estimates regarding the crossing
According to Kpler analyst Charles Costeruss, the SPG Mubaraz’s passage through the strait is believed to have taken place over the weekend of 18–19 April, a period during which several vessels, including seven LNG carriers, attempted to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Although this information has not yet been officially confirmed , it indicates operators’ attempts to resume commercial activities despite the blockade imposed by Iran.
This assessment offers a nuanced picture of developments in the region: the chosen period coincides with a moment of relative diplomatic easing, following the temporary ceasefire agreement between the United States, Israel and Iran. The fact that seven LNG carriers attempted to transit simultaneously reflects not only the pressure from the Asian energy market, but also the determination of shipping companies to keep their supply chains active, despite considerable risks. The blockade imposed by Iran was a test of resilience for operators, who resorted to ‘invisibility’ tactics on radar and synchronisation with periods of relative stability to minimise exposure to potential conflict.
Furthermore, this collective attempt to resume transit through the Strait of Hormuz suggests that the international energy industry is willing to accept a high degree of uncertainty to ensure the continuity of LNG flows to global markets. In the absence of official confirmation, the information provided by Kpler and Charles Costeruss becomes all the more valuable for operators and decision-makers in the sector, offering a barometer of the risks and opportunities on this strategic route.
In conclusion, the passage of the SPG Mubaraz, alongside other LNG vessels, marks a phase of adaptation and courage in the face of geopolitical challenges. This action opens up new perspectives on how energy sector players manage uncertainties and demonstrates that, even in the context of blockades and tensions, global trade finds ways to move forward.
Implications for LNG and oil trade
The Strait of Hormuz is a chokepoint of major strategic importance for global trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG), being considered the link between producers in the Persian Gulf and markets in Asia, Europe and other parts of the world. Approximately 20% of total global LNG trade typically passes through this maritime route in peacetime, underscoring the strait’s essential role in ensuring global energy security. Blocking or destabilising this vital route can have knock-on effects, causing not only logistical delays but also significant fluctuations in energy prices on international markets, thereby amplifying economic uncertainty and volatility. Since 1 March, over 70 oil tankers loaded with crude oil, the majority of which originated in Iran, have managed to transit the Strait of Hormuz, even amidst the tensions and heightened risks in the region. This highlights not only the fundamental importance of this maritime artery for energy supplies to Asian and global markets, but also the determination of operators to maintain active trade flows, despite geopolitical challenges. Any incident or blockage in the strait has the potential to trigger rapid reactions on international markets, where LNG and crude oil prices can experience dramatic spikes, with a direct impact on production, transport and consumption costs on a global scale. In the current context, where the safety of maritime routes is being tested by political, military and economic factors, the Strait of Hormuz is becoming not merely a trade corridor, but a true barometer of global energy stability. Any disruption to traffic – whether resulting from conflict, a blockade or diplomatic tensions – can rapidly destabilise the delicate balance between global energy supply and demand. Thus, dependence on this artery highlights the need for strategic solutions and international cooperation to ensure the security and continuity of the energy flow, in the spirit of the Romanian proverb ‘Better safe than sorry’.
Diplomatic and military context
The passage of the LNG vessel comes against a backdrop of intense military and diplomatic developments that have tested the stability of the entire region. In recent months, tensions between the United States, Israel and Iran have reached alarming levels, creating a climate of uncertainty for maritime operators and global energy markets. Against the backdrop of these tensions, the three states managed to reach a mutual ceasefire agreement for a period of two weeks, a rare gesture that paved the way for the reopening of commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. This maritime corridor, vital for the flow of LNG and oil to Asia and the rest of the world, had previously been blocked due to the risks of conflict and attacks on oil infrastructure and nav . The temporary agreement did not come easily; it was preceded by a serious escalation of violence. On 28 February, the United States and Israel carried out coordinated military strikes on Iranian facilities, seeking to limit Tehran’s military capabilities and send a message of resolve in the face of provocations. Iran did not remain silent, responding with attacks on US bases in several countries across the region, which amplified fears of a wider regional conflict. In this context, any resumption of transit through the Strait of Hormuz was viewed with the utmost caution, and LNG vessel operators adopted ‘invisibility’ tactics on radar and timed their crossings to coincide with periods of relative stability, to reduce the risk of exposure to hostilities. Consequently, the resumption of commercial transit represents not only a temporary diplomatic victory, but also a moment of adaptability and courage for the international energy industry, demonstrating that, in the face of major challenges, global players are willing to cooperate and find solutions to maintain supply chains. This episode underscores the importance of dialogue and collective risk management, in the spirit of the Romanian proverb ‘Paza bună trece primejdia rea’ (‘Good precautions ward off danger’), and highlights just how fragile the stability of strategic maritime routes is – any incident or blockage can have major repercussions on energy trade and on the international geopolitical balance.
Conclusions and outlook
The passage of an LNG tanker through the Strait of Hormuz symbolises not only the partial resumption of commercial activity, but also the courage and ingenuity of maritime operators in managing geopolitical risks. This event represents a moment of adaptation, illustrating the energy industry’s ability to find solutions even under the pressure of major threats such as blockades, military conflicts or diplomatic tensions. The operators’ flexibility is reflected in the adoption of innovative tactics, such as ‘invisibility’ on radar and synchronisation with periods of relative stability, designed to minimise exposure to danger and ensure the continuity of trade flows.
The event highlights the continued dependence of global markets on the stability of maritime routes in the Persian Gulf, as well as their vulnerability to regional conflicts. The Strait of Hormuz, the link between producers in the Persian Gulf and markets in Asia, Europe and other regions, thus becomes a barometer of global energy stability. Any disruption to traffic – whether resulting from conflict, a blockade or diplomatic tensions – can rapidly destabilise the delicate balance between global energy supply and demand, with a direct impact on LNG and crude oil prices, as well as on global production, transport and consumption costs.
The resumption of transit is a positive sign for the industry, indicating operators’ determination to keep supply chains active and respond to pressures from the Asian and global markets. At the same time, this episode highlights the need for sustainable diplomatic solutions and security measures adapted to modern challenges. Without stable guarantees, every incident in the Strait of Hormuz can have major repercussions on energy trade and the international geopolitical balance, affecting not only maritime operators but also economies and consumers worldwide.
Only through international cooperation, diplomatic dialogue and innovative security strategies can the continuity of energy supplies be ensured. The passage of an LNG tanker through the Strait of Hormuz is not just a temporary victory, but also a demonstration of the industry’s resilience in the face of uncertainty – an example of how global trade finds ways to move forward, even in the most difficult of times.
Maritime Security Forum
Italy is modernising its PPA warships into full-fledged combat vessels with Aster missiles and anti-submarine warfare systems – Maritime Security Forum
Italy is radically transforming its Thaon di Revel-class vessels, upgrading them from a limited patrol role to full-spectrum combatants capable of acting as front-line warships. This development not only enhances the Italian Navy’s combat capability but marks a qualitative leap in fleet standardisation, ensuring top-tier performance in the air, surface and underwater domains. Through this approach, Italy demonstrates a strategic vision that responds to the complex challenges of the contemporary maritime environment, where threats are increasingly diverse and overlapping.
The modernisation brings on board an integrated combat system, which significantly expands defensive and offensive capabilities: air defence is strengthened, anti-ship strike capability is enhanced, and anti-submarine warfare performance is raised to levels competitive with the world’s most modern ships. These improvements enhance the ship’s survivability on the battlefield and operational flexibility, aligning the Italian Navy with global trends that prioritise multi-domain operations and preparedness for high-intensity conflicts.
The amendment signed in Bonn on 21 April 2026, worth approximately €392 million (2014 economic conditions) and with a Fincantieri share of around €62 million, is not limited to armaments and sensors. The package includes major enhancements to cyber defence and the acquisition of remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UMVs), expanding the role of the vessels in complex coastal missions, such as mine countermeasures, surveillance of subsea infrastructure and post-incident operations. Thus, the ships become versatile assets, useful both in combat and in protecting energy resources, data and port infrastructure.
The modernisations target both ships already delivered and those under construction or being fitted out, reducing configuration differences within the class and ensuring operational consistency. For a navy situated in the heart of the Mediterranean, where threats from the air, underwater, and from missiles or drones are becoming increasingly complex, this standardisation of capabilities is vital. In an environment where ‘the number of ships’ is no longer sufficient, but rather their equipment and interoperability matter, Italy is taking a decisive step towards a modern naval force adapted to current needs.
The innovative PPA design, based on a ‘ready-to-upgrade’ modular philosophy, allows for the gradual addition of capabilities, keeping the ships relevant in the long term. With a length of 143 metres, a range of 16.5 metres and a maximum speed of 32 knots, these ships can operate for 30 days without refuelling, feature CODAG propulsion, a flight deck for SH90/EH101 helicopters and a spacious hangar, making them ready for a wide range of missions.
The Full Combat System configuration brings sophisticated sensors, advanced weapons, electronic equipment and underwater architecture on board, transforming the ships from simple patrol vessels into platforms capable of intense fleet operations, escort, defence and surveillance.
Leonardo’s combat architecture lies at the heart of the upgrade, providing integrated combat management, advanced communications, navigation, friend-or-foe identification (IFF), infrared surveillance, fire control, electronic support and dual-band radar. These are complemented by SAAM-ESD surface-to-air missiles, Teseo anti-ship missiles, decoy launchers, torpedo detectors and launchers, as well as towed active sonar, ensuring comprehensive coverage against modern threats.
Leonardo’s Kronos Dual Band radar, which combines C-band and X-band AESA, enhances the ship’s combat capability, providing 360-degree surveillance, effective missile guidance and support for electronic attack. This enables the ships to rapidly detect and engage threats such as aircraft, anti-ship missiles, UAVs and ballistic trajectories, ensuring robust air defence.
The Full Combat System configuration, featuring Sylver A50 vertical launch modules for Aster missiles, provides state-of-the-art air defence. The Aster missiles, with vertical launch, extreme manoeuvrability and active RF guidance, can counter a wide range of threats – from aircraft and UAVs to ballistic missiles – providing complete coverage of the operational area.
By integrating Aster and Teseo Mk2/E missiles, PPA ships take on a credible escort role for transport, amphibious and logistics groups, contributing to the defence of NATO and EU naval formations. In areas of tension such as the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean or the Black Sea, this capability becomes essential for maintaining maritime security.
The MBDA Teseo Mk2/E missile, with a range of over 350 km, enables the ship to strike surface and coastal targets from a distance, expanding freedom of manoeuvre and ly reducing dependence on aircraft or submarines. This arsenal transforms PPA ships into platforms with a genuine capacity for deterrence and power projection.
Naval artillery remains a key element. The Leonardo 127/64 LW Vulcano system, with guided munitions and an extended range of up to 100 km, provides precise support for amphibious operations, coastal interdiction and warning fire, enabling commanders to apply scalable effects with a reduced risk of collateral damage.
The secondary Leonardo 76/62 Super Rapid gun, with DART guided ammunition, provides rapid in-ship defence against air and anti-missile threats, complementing the ship’s defensive layer.
The anti-submarine package – active sonar, detection and torpedo launchers, plus shipboard helicopters – ensures the protection of ship groups, underwater surveillance and the ability to respond rapidly to submarine threats. These systems extend the detection and engagement range, making PPA ships suitable for complex missions to protect strategic points.
The integration of ROVs and UMVs reflects adaptation to the modern maritime environment, where mine countermeasures, port inspection and monitoring of underwater infrastructure are increasingly important. Thus, the ships serve not only in combat but also in protecting critical resources.
The signed amendment simultaneously strengthens three layers: the individual survival of the ship, its contribution to fleet defence, and its utility in hybrid maritime competition. For Italy, this package supports the Finantirgii-Leonardo naval industrial chain and maintains a modular growth path, adaptable to the evolution of missiles, drones and underwater threats.
By standardising the Thaon di Revel class around the Full Combat System configuration, the Italian Navy achieves operational coherence and a force of multi-role ships capable of patrolling, escorting, striking, defending against air threats, hunting submarines and supporting seabed security missions. This significantly improves readiness and interoperability in both national and allied operations.
Conclusions and outlook
The modernisation of the PPA ships demonstrates Italy’s ability to respond to the geopolitical and technological challenges of the contemporary maritime environment. By integrating the most advanced weapon systems, sensors and autonomous platforms, the Italian Navy is consolidating its role as a strategic actor in the Mediterranean and on the international stage. This development not only ensures the fleet’s survivability and operational efficiency but also contributes to the protection of critical infrastructure and the maintenance of energy security – issues of increasing relevance in the current global context, marked by instability and intense competition.
In the spirit of the Romanian proverb “Where there is strength, there is no haggling”, Italy demonstrates that investment in technology, flexibility and interoperability is the key to a modern fleet capable of dealing with both conventional and hybrid threats. Standardisation and modularity offer not only efficiency but also long-term resilience, whilst collaboration with the national industry ensures the sustainability and continuous evolution of naval capabilities.
In conclusion, the modernisation of the Thaon di Revel class is more than a simple technological upgrade – it is a strategic commitment to maritime security, the protection of national interests and the consolidation of Italy’s role as a trusted partner in NATO and EU operations. Thus, the Italian Navy becomes a model of adaptability and innovation, and foresight and preparedness are essential for survival and success on the world’s seas.
Maritime Security Forum