BLACK SEA CHRONICLES / CMN. Geopolitical logbook at the Euxin Bridge11 th edition, Saturday, 13 April 2024-Weekly summary prepared by the experts of the Black Sea House Association / Black Sea House- Constanta, Coordinator Dorin POPESCU
Geopolitical logbook at the Euxin Bridge
11th edition, Saturday 13 April 2024
I. White Chronicles
Talks on new US support for Ukraine break out. The Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, has said that he will allow three separate bills on new US aid to Israel, Ukraine and “allies in the India-Pacific region” (Taiwan) to be discussed and voted on in the House during the week of 16-21.04.2024; there is even a possibility of a fourth bill, on “adopting measures to strengthen national security” (this last bill could contain measures on providing US aid on a “lend-lease” basis and using Russian assets seized on US territory). Mike Johnson’s proposal was presented at a closed meeting of Congressional Republicans on 15 April this year. The White House later said that, at first glance, Mike Johnson’s initiative would meet Ukraine’s needs for support and the projection of US solidarity with those needs. Pessimists, however, believe that the House Speaker’s proposal will delay by at least two months the promised new support to Ukraine at a critical time for its frontline resistance to the Russian military. Although his initiative has already generated hostile reactions among both Democrats and ultraconservative Republicans, Mike Johnson seems to have the tools to complete the initiative. Prediction: although it will generate new discussions and negotiations, the new US support for Ukraine will still be approved (under conditions that will limit its effect) in an estimated two months.
Energodar, “the perilous neighbourhood of a nuclear catastrophe”. The Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Grossi, will be visiting Moscow and Kiev in the near future, in the context of the recent and multiple attacks on Ukraine’s Energodar nuclear power plant (Zaporozhye region), currently occupied by Russian armed forces. At the request of the Russian Federation, a meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) was recently held on this issue. According to Grossi, “the world is in the perilous vicinity of a nuclear catastrophe; the nuclear security of the plant is at risk and these attacks increase the risks of a radiological and/or nuclear incident”. Russia accuses Ukraine of carrying out these attacks, while Ukraine mirrors Moscow’s accusation of staging false-flag attacks on the plant. At the UNSC meeting, Western countries (US, UK, France, Switzerland, Slovenia, Japan, South Korea) accused Russia of organising these attacks and called on it to withdraw Russian troops from the plant. Grossi said the attacks repeatedly violate the first principle of the 5-Point Plan he presented to the Security Council on 30 May 2023. The official stressed that he did not know who was responsible for the drone attacks (Russia or Ukraine) and could not speculate on the matter.
The (Russian) attacks on the Energodar Nuclear Power Plant will continue. According to Ukrainian officials, Russian attacks on the Energodar Nuclear Power Plant will continue; Ukraine’s permanent representative to the UN, Sergei Kislyta, recently stated that the Russian side’s objective is to use these attacks to take the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the plant off the international agenda. These attacks are a deliberate provocation by the Russian Federation which, according to Ukrainian military and civilian officials, will continue in the coming period. In this context, Ukraine is again officially calling for the demilitarisation of the Central and the evacuation of its territory by the Russian army. Prediction: regardless of the origin and purpose of the drone attacks on the Energodar NPP, the objective of launching these attacks has not yet been achieved; there are robust prospects that these attacks will continue without major dangers to the integrity of the NPP.
Ukrainian Battle for Patriot. Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenski has publicly expressed dissatisfaction that drone strikes on Russian energy targets (mainly oil refineries) would not be supported by allies (in particular the US, whose officials have been outspoken on the matter; in contrast, NATO’s Secretary General has assessed that such strikes are legitimate). The Ukrainian leader said that all these drone strikes were carried out with Ukrainian technology; none of the military equipment received from the West would be used for attacks on targets on Russian territory, according to President Zelenski. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitro Kuleba said Ukraine would be ready to give up drone strikes on Russian refineries in exchange for more Western-made air defence systems, with priority given to Patriot systems/batteries. Minister Kuleba said that the delivery of new Patriot systems and SPAM-T systems to Ukraine is currently under consideration. According to Minister Kuleba, four countries in Europe and Asia have Patriot systems that could be sent to Ukraine immediately. The Ukrainian official has also forwarded to his Western counterparts the option of “renting” Patriot systems from the Ukrainian armed forces. President Zelenski recently stated that Ukraine would need a total of 25 Patriot systems with 6-8 batteries each, and that “10 Patriot systems could significantly change the current situation on the front”. According to him, during March alone, Russia launched more than 400 missiles of various types, 600 Shahed drones and 3,000 guided aerial bombs, causing civilian casualties and serious damage to Ukrainian infrastructure; this pace continued at least as intensely during April.
Partners’ response to Patriot. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, recently said he is considering holding a meeting of EU foreign and defence ministers on the urgent delivery of air defence systems to Ukraine. According to him, Ukraine would vitally need 7 Patriot air defence systems, while the national armies of Western countries would have a total of about 100 Patriot systems. The European Parliament recently adopted a resolution refusing to discharge the EU Council budget until European leaders decide to support Ukraine with additional Patriot air defence systems. The decision was supported by 515 MEPs, 62 of whom voted against. Prediction: Kiev’s multiple insistent pressures on Western countries to continue deliveries of Patriot systems may have some limited results in the coming period; we anticipate further deliveries of Patriot systems to Ukraine.
The escalations in the Middle East bring the issue of airspace protection in Ukraine back into focus. In the context of the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel, Ukraine is publicly calling for support from the West similar to that which the West is giving Israel. Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenski has again called on Western allies to deliver new air defence systems to Ukraine, following the model of the West’s collective action in Israel: “Shahed drones sound the same in Ukrainian skies as they do in the skies of the Middle East. Decisive allied action there prevented the success of terror and the loss of infrastructure. The same is possible in protecting from terror Ukraine, a country which, like Israel, is not a NATO member. And we don’t need to activate Article 5 to do this, all that is needed is political will.” In this context, the British Foreign Secretary stressed that the same kind of support cannot be given to Ukraine as to Israel, as such support “will lead directly to the escalation of the conflict”. . President Zelenski called on NATO to convene a special Ukraine-NATO meeting on the urgent issues of Ukraine’s air defence and airspace protection.
Pressure eases on Ukraine over artillery ammunition. The decline in Ukraine’s air defence capability has significantly reduced the pressure on urgent provision of artillery ammunition to Ukrainian armed forces. Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala said in Washington that the Czech Republic has already collected the first 500,000 pieces of artillery ammunition for Ukraine and that under current plans it will collect and deliver an additional one million pieces of artillery ammunition to Ukraine within a year as part of an initiative supported by 20 countries in the coalition supporting Ukraine, including Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Canada.
Protecting Ukraine’s gas depots with EU air defences. Ukrainian Energy Minister German Galushchenko recently addressed his European colleagues at the informal meeting of energy ministers from EU countries with a proposal to use EU air defences to protect Ukraine’s gas depots: “We could use air defences in neighbouring countries to protect storage facilities, if you need them. It is simply a question of security of supply.” He said Ukraine has already offered European countries the possibility to use gas storage facilities in that country, so the protection of these storages “will be beneficial for European countries as well”. The Ukrainian minister said that “such a decision should still be taken at the political level, not at the level of energy ministries”.
Comprehensive reform plan for Ukraine. The European Commission has adopted a comprehensive reform plan for the next 4 years (Proposal for a Council Implementing Decision on the approval of the assessment of the Ukraine Plan), on the basis of which a €50 billion financial support programme for Ukraine for the period 2024-2027 will be implemented. The programme contains 69 proposals for reforms and 10 proposals for investments to be adopted in 15 areas, such as energy, agriculture, transport infrastructure, human capital, small and medium-sized enterprises, etc. The document contains 146 qualitative and quantitative indicators to be achieved. According to Ursula von der Leyer, “the Commission’s positive assessment of the implementation of this Plan paves the way for regular payments under the Ukraine Fund”. European funding through the Ukraine Facility will allow the payment of salaries and pensions, the provision of public services, support for the reconstruction of Ukraine, strengthening of the defence against Russian aggression, etc.
Failed negotiations on security of navigation and exports of Ukrainian products through the Black Sea. Russia and Ukraine were reportedly close to concluding an agreement, with international mediation by Turkey, on the resumption of Ukrainian grain exports within the framework of the Black Sea Initiative on the safety of navigation in the Black Sea. The Turkish President had intended to announce publicly on 30 March this year that the parties had reached a consensus on the conclusion of this agreement, but the text was not able to obtain the final consensus of the parties; according to the international press, Ukraine rejected the final version of the text negotiated and proposed by Turkey. The agreement would have included guarantees for a free and safe navigation regime in the Black Sea aquarium. Prediction: Efforts to negotiate this agreement may be resumed by Turkey, in the context of preparations for the visit to Turkey of Russian President Vladimir Putin (date of visit not yet agreed).
A possible new Russian-Ukrainian prisoner exchange. A new Russian-Ukrainian prisoner exchange is currently being negotiated. According to Ukrainian and Russian media, the sides are also considering a 500/500 prisoner exchange. The Russian side rejects the option of a full prisoner exchange (which is supported by the Ukrainian side) as the number of Ukrainian prisoners would be higher than the number of Russian prisoners. The parties are also currently considering the possibility of setting up a joint commission to monitor the situation of missing servicemen on the Ukrainian front. The most recent prisoner exchange took place on 8 February this year, according to the 100/100 formula.
The Swiss peace summit and the Chinese dilemma. The Swiss authorities have announced that the Ukraine Peace Summit will take place in Switzerland on 15-16 June this year. China’s participation in this international meeting is still uncertain. The organisers are counting on broad international participation, but it is not known what the level of participation will be. The original plan to hold a summit for peace (with the participation of heads of state and government) seems to have been replaced by a high-level international meeting. Russia will not take part in this meeting as it was not invited. The organisers (Switzerland and Ukraine) believe that the meeting is likely to adopt “a roadmap for Russia’s further participation in the peace process”. . In response, Russia announced that Switzerland would de facto lose its neutral status and Moscow announced that it would change the venue of the Geneva International Security and Stability talks “from Switzerland to another country whose leadership can refrain from causing harm to the participants in this negotiating format”. Prediction: The Swiss Peace Summit does not seem to create the conditions for an internationally agreed political-diplomatic solution to the war in Ukraine.
The victory thesis is holding up in the Ukrainian public. According to the most recent survey in Ukraine, conducted by the Razumkov Centre, about 96% of Ukrainian citizens trust the Armed Forces, about 86% – the volunteer battalions, 85% – the State Emergency Service, 80% – the National Guard. Other indicators of trust: Border Service of Ukraine – 76%; Ministry of Defence – 67.5%; Security Service of Ukraine – 67%; civic organizations – 61%; Church – 60%; Presidency of Ukraine – 59%; local authorities – 54%; National Police – 53%; National Bank – 52%. Distrust rating: Do not trust the state apparatus – about 76% of respondents; do not trust political parties – about 76%; do not trust the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine – about 74%; do not trust the legal system – about 70%; do not trust the Government of Ukraine – about 65.5%; do not trust the Prosecutor’s Office – about 62%; do not trust the Anti-Corruption Agency – about 57%; do not trust the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office – about 56%; do not trust the National Anticorruption Bureau – about 55%; do not trust commercial banks – about 51%. About 13% of respondents trust political parties. About 45% of the respondents trust a political party that could emerge from the military, while only 21.5% would trust a party formed by volunteers, 20% – a party formed by intellectuals, etc. 38.7% of respondents believe that Ukraine is heading in the wrong direction (37.7% – in the right direction); 82.9% of respondents believe in Ukraine’s victory (59.5% believe, plus 23.4% – who rather believe in victory (don’t believe and rather don’t believe – 10.8%). 22% of those who believe in victory believe that victory will be achieved by the end of this year, while 34.5% – in a year or two. A clear majority (45.5%) of those who believe in victory believe that it will be possible to forcibly remove Russian troops from most of Ukraine’s territory and restore the existing borders by 2014.
Berlin: “China’s word carries weight in Russia”. While the US accuses China of giving support to the Russian Federation in multiple areas, including intelligence data, the German chancellor is making an important visit to China with a business delegation. In Beijing, Chancellor Olaf Scholz said he had asked China’s president to exert his influence on Russia to end the war in Ukraine, as “China’s word carries weight in Russia”. President Zelenski publicly praised this approach. According to the German official, the Chinese President would support the holding of the peace conference in Switzerland. During the Chinese leader’s discussion with the European official, the two officials reiterated the relevance of respecting the UN principle of non-use of nuclear weapons and refraining from attacks on nuclear targets; the Chinese President put forward four principles for resolving the war in Ukraine and not allowing the conflict to escalate and get out of control: Cooperation to achieve peace and avoid narrow interests (1); Cooperation for successive de-escalations (2); Creating conditions for peace negotiations and avoiding further escalations (3); and Minimizing the negative effects of the conflict on global economic markets (4), respectively. Prediction: the Chinese principles remain as vague as China’s famous Peace Plan proposed in 2023 and will most likely meet the same fate (failure).
Slovakia is in favour of Ukraine’s neutrality. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said Slovakia will not ratify documents on Ukraine’s NATO membership. According to him, the best solution for the interests of Ukrainian citizens would be to obtain a neutral status for Ukraine. At the same time, he said that Slovakia is ready to develop relations with all international partners who can maximally ensure Slovakia’s sovereign interests on the international arena. Fico will visit countries including China, Azerbaijan, Brazil and Cuba in the coming period.
The new mobilization law builds limited solutions to urgent needs on the front. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recently adopted the new Law on Mobilization (Law No. 10449/2024 On Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on the Conduct of Military Service, Mobilization and Military Registration ), which is primarily aimed at registering all persons with military obligations and updating their personal data to simplify and expedite the mobilization process. On 16 April this year, the President of Ukraine signed this Law. The new law contains, inter alia, the following provisions: Men between 18 and 60 years of age are obliged to update their registration data within 60 days. Citizens must apply in person to recruitment offices to obtain military documents. Men must carry their military documents with them and present them at the request of the police or employees of the Territorial Recruitment Centres. Without these documents, men will not be able to obtain their passports or benefit from consular services abroad. Local authorities are obliged to support the mobilisation. Recruitment offices will be able to ask the police for help in detaining men who evade mobilisation. Instead of compulsory military service, the law introduces “basic military training”; this will start on 1 September 2025. Those who evade mobilisation may be deprived of their driving rights by the courts. Persons who have not completed military service or basic military training will not be able to work in the public administration, the prosecutor’s office or the police. The law does not contain provisions on demobilisation of troops. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is empowered by this law to prepare and submit to the Supreme Rada a draft law on “improving the mechanisms of rotation of military personnel under martial law, their dismissal and medical and social rehabilitation”.
Pro-European referendum in the Republic of Moldova. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova has given a positive opinion to the initiative to hold a referendum on EU accession on 20 October this year; it is (according to the Court) constitutional and will contain the question: “Are you in favour of Moldova joining the European Union?”. The constitutional referendum on the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the European Union was initiated by President Maia Sandu at the end of 2023. The purpose of the referendum and the amendment of the Constitution is to declare the aspirations for European integration, to set the direction of orientation towards the European value area, and to establish European integration as a strategic objective for the Republic of Moldova. According to the President of the Constitutional Court, Domnica Manole, the results of the referendum initiated by Maia Sandu will have supreme legislative power (and will not go through an additional vote in Parliament). At the moment, pro-Russian parties in the Republic of Moldova are in favour of boycotting the referendum, even if it were to take place at the same time as the presidential elections. Prediction: Moscow has an interest in sabotaging the referendum and has the technological, informational, logistical and human resources in the Republic of Moldova to periodically cause problems in the process of organising and holding the referendum; multiple problems, generated by Moscow, may periodically arise in the process of preparing and holding the referendum.
Geopolitical merry-go-round in Baku. The process of withdrawal of Russian military “peacekeepers” from the Nagorno-Karabakh region has begun, following Azerbaijan’s military settlement of the conflict. The withdrawal is expected to take place over several days. Russian military checkpoints will be taken over by Azerbaijani police. France has withdrawn its ambassador from Azerbaijan for consultations amid the successive strains in bilateral relations between Paris and Baku. Senior military officials from Turkey and Azerbaijan confirmed in Baku plans to develop military intelligence exchanges between the two countries.
War comes, rifts remain. According to a recent poll conducted in Moldova by WatchDog Association, 48.1% of respondents consider the Russian Federation a threat to Moldova’s security (about 44% of respondents consider the Kremlin’s policies as no threat, and 8% – did not know or did not want to answer). 46.7% of respondents believe that Moldova’s status of neutrality, enshrined in the Constitution, can protect the country in the event of a military conflict, while about 41% believe that neutrality cannot protect the country (12.5% did not know or did not want to answer). 34% of respondents said they would vote for Moldova’s membership in NATO if such a referendum were held, while 47.5% of respondents would be ready to vote against NATO membership (10% were undecided and about 7% would not participate in such a plebiscite). 26% would support the possibility of a referendum on Moldova joining Russia, while 57.5% would vote against. 41% of respondents believe that things are moving in the right direction in the Republic of Moldova, and 45% – in the wrong direction; the optimistic perception prevails among Romanian-speaking respondents. Among politicians, Maia Sandu has the highest level of trust – 46%, followed by Ion Ceban (37%) and Igor Dodon (36%). Almost 23% of respondents said they are Romanian citizens. The clear leader in the preferences of voters with Romanian citizenship in the Republic of Moldova who say they will participate in the presidential elections in Romania is NATO Deputy Secretary Mircea Geoană – 52%, followed by Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu – 17% and Senator Diana Șoșoaca (15%). One of the conclusions of the sociological survey is the still high impact of Kremlin propaganda in the Republic of Moldova on security issues.
II. Code Reds
Russia continues its efforts to destabilise Moldova. The Kremlin’s point man at the moment is Yevgeny Gutu, the Bashkan of Gagauzia. During a new trip to Russia, Gutva signed an agreement with the Russian state bank PromSviazBank (PSB) , according to which PSB will open accounts for about 5,000 employees of the Gagauz authorities and 20,000 pensioners from Gagauzia, who will receive cards for the Russian Mir payment system. Gutu asked the Russian bank’s management to provide “humanitarian programmes”. aid” and “additional financing” for pension and salary payments in the public sector of ATU Gagauzia; according to it, bank accounts opened with PSB by civil servants and pensioners will be replenished with 2,000 Moldovan lei free of charge. According to it, Russia has promised to support ATU Gagauzia in 3 directions/areas: benefits on export of products to Russia; discounts on Russian gas; access to Russian payment infrastructure, and the signing of the Agreement is a guarantee of Russian support in the social/banking area. The new agreement is part of Russian propaganda efforts to legitimise its interests and presence in the Republic of Moldova, especially in the Gagauz autonomous region. To counterbalance the rapprochement of the Gagauz leadership with the Russian Federation, President Maia Sandu paid a working visit to the autonomous region in Comrat on the day the Bashkan was still in Moscow. President Maia Sandu’s visit to the University of Comrat was accompanied by a street protest by Russian forces against her presence in the region. The Bashkan condemned President Maia Sandu’s visit to Comrat, saying that “the power in Chisinau is afraid of the Gagauz and behaves like occupiers towards us”.
The Georgian Dream becomes the Russian Dream. Massive protests have accompanied the new attempt by the Tbilisi government to adopt a Law on Foreign Agents (the Law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence”) in Parliament, following the Russian model. Massive protests (with blockades of main streets/Rustaveli Boulevard and the participation of several thousand protesters) have taken place and are taking place in front of the Georgian Parliament building. Demonstrators showed their support for the country’s pro-European President Salome Zurabishvili. According to her, “Georgia will not resign itself to further Sovietisation. Civil society is protesting massively against the Russian law. Peaceful demonstrations defend the European future”. There were clashes between police and demonstrators. Arrests were made on charges of public order violations. The opposition reported serious abuses by the police. The President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Theodoros Rousopoulos, urgently asked the Venice Commission for its opinion on the so-called Law “On the Transparency of Foreign Influence” and the respect of the Council of Europe standards in this field, as the authors of the draft law claim that it would fully respect the European standards in this field. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has previously called on the Georgian Parliament to abstain from voting on the law. The ambassadors of the EU (Paweł Herczyński), the US (Robin Dunnigan) and the UK (Mark Clayton) met with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze on the draft law. The current draft law “will take Georgia further away from the EU instead of bringing it closer”, said European Council President Charles Michel. The European Union has called for the law to be scrapped, arguing that it runs counter to the reform programme Georgia needs to undertake to make progress towards EU membership. Against all Western and domestic reactions, the Georgian government insists on the benefits of the law and its supposed “European” nature. Against street protests, lawmakers have already passed the first reading of the draft law. “The Georgian dream has become the Russian dream”, sums up the political situation in Tbilisi, President Salome Zurabishvili. She addressed French President Emmanuel Macron and European Council President Charles Michel, asking for the situation in Georgia (which she calls a “Russian provocation”) to be discussed at a special meeting of the European Council on 17-18 April.
Frontline issues. At the moment, according to experts, Ukraine is facing three major problems on the frontline: a shortage of ammunition, a lack of well-trained military structures and a significant reduction in air defence capacity. The Russian military is stepping up its mixed drone and missile strikes as Ukraine’s air defence response capability weakens considerably. In the coming period, Russia could gain an artillery fire capability about 10 times greater than that of the Ukrainian army. At a correlated ratio of 5:1, the Russian army could launch a new offensive, and a ratio of 10:1 could facilitate tactical successes along the established attack direction. Ukrainian Army Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Srskii has not ruled out a strong Russian counteroffensive in the direction of Ciasov Iar, which could endanger the largest remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donetsk (Kramatorsk and Slaviansk, including the Ukrainian troops’ eastern command base in Kramatorsk). In the direction of Cisaov Yaroslavl, Russian troops would concentrate reserves from other directions (e.g. Liman); the Russian army would aim to fully occupy the city by 9 May this year. The precariousness of troop readiness (a problem identified by Oleksandr Srskii as a major one) will remain after the adoption of the law on tightening mobilisation. The destruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has caused serious problems in the functioning of the 500 units of Ukraine’s military-industrial complex (employing about 300,000 people) producing ammunition, mines, armoured technology, anti-tank weapons, electronic warfare systems, drones, etc. According to US Army European Command Commander Christopher Cavoli, the Russian military currently has about 470,000 troops in Ukraine, 15% more than at the time of the invasion; according to his recent statements to the US Congress, “Ukraine, without American support, will soon run out of artillery shells and air defence systems”.
Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure continue and are having devastating effects. On 11 April this year, they took out of operation the most powerful power plant in the Kiev region, the Trypilska thermal power plant, which was completely destroyed by the Russian strikes. According to Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenski, Russian forces managed to destroy the Trypilska thermal power plant because Ukraine was left completely without interceptor missiles to protect it, amid a lack of help from allies. Combined missile and drone strikes targeting Ukraine’s energy system (in particular thermal and hydropower plants) resulted in the loss of about 7 gigawatts of power generation capacity and important thermal power plants and transmission capacity. According to Russian officials, the strikes are aimed at destroying Ukraine’s combat capability and are a response to recent Ukrainian attacks inside Russia. “It is cheaper to give Patriot systems to Ukraine now than to rebuild power plants like Trypilska later,” High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell recently told the French publication Le Monde .
III. Grey alerts
In the short term, medium-intensity alerts concern: further escalations in the war in Ukraine; hybrid actions by the Russian Federation to destabilise the political situation in some countries of the region, with priority to Moldova, Georgia and Armenia.
IV. Black Swans
Breakdown of the front in southern and eastern Ukraine; one side taking the strategic initiative.