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US to Iran: Open the Strait or Lose Power in 5 Days Explained

MS Daily brief-24 March 2026

Contents

BREAKING: US halts devastating military strike on Iran; IDF bombs Tehran | TBN Israel 1

News from Ukraine | Madness! Russia has lost its main forces near Hulaipole | Huge disaster 1

Update on developments in the Middle East over the last 24 hours – Maritime Security Forum   1

Trump’s ‘very good’ talks with Iran offer a respite on the oil and energy markets. 5

Israel launches new attacks on Tehran, whilst Trump suspends strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure  6

Von der Leyen urges the US and Iran to resolve the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, warning that distance offers no protection to Australia. 9

Ukraine war update: Russia is setting up bases for long-range drones in Belarus, says Zelenskyy  11

Trump news in brief: the president boasts of ‘intense talks’ with Iran, which Tehran claims never took place. 12

Banisadr and Ahmadinejad: A unity of opposites or the decline of hope for Iran – Maritime Security Forum   14

A spectre is haunting Europe: The new ‘Big Three’ – Maritime Security Forum.. 16

NATO and the New Era of Drone Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine and the Challenges of the Future – and the social challenges generated by the dynamics of modern conflict – Maritime Security Forum   17

The Challenges Facing the United States in Capturing and Holding Kharg Island – Maritime Security Forum.. 19

The Boxer Amphibious Training Group and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit: Deployment and Strategic Implications – Maritime Security Forum.. 21

Manila claims that a Chinese warship activated its fire-control radar on a Philippine warship – Maritime Security Forum.. 22

Oil prices have not risen enough to cause a collapse in demand, says US Energy Secretary. 23

Oil tankers pass through Hormuz in threes: Iranian waters are open to friendly nations. 24

Turkey destroys US-made AEGIR-W naval drone after it washes ashore on the Black Sea coast 25

The UK receives US approval for the $1 billion SSN-AUKUS submarine combat system and vertical launch capability. 27

Poland and Sweden launch new Baltic defence operations to protect shipping lanes and deter Russia  30

The US Navy deploys the modernised destroyer USS Mustin to Japan to bolster missile defence in the Indo-Pacific. 31

Putin has declared the beginning of the Russian economy’s decline. 33

At least four oil tanks are ablaze at the Russian port of Primorsk following a drone attack. 34

BREAKING: US halts devastating military strike on Iran; IDF bombs Tehran | TBN Israel

News from Ukraine | Madness! Russia has lost its main forces near Hulaipole | Huge disaster

Update on developments in the Middle East over the last 24 hours – Maritime Security Forum

Iran

Over the past 24 hours, Iran has found itself simultaneously under direct military pressure and in a declared retaliatory posture. Reuters reported that the Israeli military announced it was carrying out strikes in Tehran, which explicitly confirms the existence of attacks on Iranian territory during this timeframe. This is one of the clearest developments of the period under review and shows that the front is no longer merely one of threats, but of confirmed strikes right in the Iranian capital.

In response, Iran has in recent hours adopted a stance of explicit proportional retaliation. Reuters reports that the Revolutionary Guards have warned that, should Iran’s energy infrastructure be struck, Iran will respond by attacking Israeli power stations and other regional energy facilities that supply electricity to US bases. In the same message, the Iranian side sought to qualify its previous threats against desalination plants, suggesting that it does not intend to target civilian water infrastructure. Thus, over the past 24 hours, Iran has appeared not only on the defensive, but also adopting a declared logic of retaliation.

During this period, Iran also denied US claims regarding the existence of genuine talks with Washington to end the war. Reuters notes that this denial was enough to reignite market jitters and push oil prices up again, which shows just how much global economic sentiment now depends on the credibility – or lack thereof – of a potential diplomatic channel with Tehran.

Israel

In the last 24 hours, the most significant development regarding Israel is the official announcement of the strikes on Tehran, confirming that Israel has continued operations on Iranian territory. Reuters does not provide a full account of the targets struck in the Iranian capital in this report, but the mere fact of the public confirmation is crucial because it demonstrates the continuity of the Israeli campaign at a time when international discussion was also focusing on the possibility of a diplomatic pause.

On another front, Reuters also reported in the last 24 hours that an Israeli civilian on the border with Lebanon was killed by friendly fire, in the context of operations carried out by Israeli artillery to support its forces. The incident was officially acknowledged by the Israeli army as an operational error. Even if it does not directly concern Iran, this episode shows that Israeli military tension remains high on several fronts simultaneously and that the regional war is also incurring significant domestic costs.

As for a new major Iranian attack on Israel within this exact 24-hour window, the Reuters and AP sources consulted at present do not offer confirmation as clear as that regarding the Israeli strikes on Tehran. Therefore, our accurate assessment is that over the last 24 hours we have clear confirmation of Israeli strikes in Iran and of the Iranian threat of retaliation, but not the same solid confirmation, from verified sources, of a new Iranian strike already carried out during the same period.

The United States

Over the past 24 hours, the American narrative has been dominated by Donald Trump’s statements regarding a possible diplomatic opening and a temporary postponement of further escalation. The Associated Press reports that Trump stated that the United States had held “very strong” discussions with a high-ranking Iranian leader and that he had given Tehran a further five days to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, before any strikes. Meanwhile, Reuters notes that these claims were immediately called into question by an Iranian denial.

This means that, over the last 24 hours, the US position has shifted to a dual approach. On the one hand, the threat of using force against Iran’s energy infrastructure remains if the Strait of Hormuz is not fully reopened. On the other hand, the White House has floated the idea of a brief window for negotiations. From an analytical perspective, however, there is currently no converging confirmation that actual negotiations are already underway; what exists is a US statement followed by an Iranian denial.

Also in the last 24 hours, Reuters reported on rockets fired from the Mosul area in Iraq towards a US base in north-eastern Syria. This shows that, in addition to the pressure on the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, US military interests in the region continue to be exposed to other risks, including through actors or areas linked to the wider conflict.

The Gulf States

Over the past 24 hours, the Gulf states have sought to turn the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz into a formalised international security issue. Reuters reports that Bahrain has proposed a resolution to the UN Security Council that would authorise ‘all necessary means’, including force, to protect commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The draft is supported by Arab Gulf states and the United States and also provides for targeted sanctions against Iran. Even if its adoption is unlikely due to a possible Russian or Chinese veto, the initiative is highly significant, as it shows that Gulf states no longer view the crisis merely as a US-Iranian confrontation, but as a direct threat to the regional maritime and energy order.

At the same time, the state of energy and infrastructure insecurity in the region persists. Even though verified sources have not reported any new confirmed major Iranian strike against a Gulf state in the last 24 hours, the immediate context remains dominated by the Iranian threat to energy facilities and the Gulf states’ need to secure guarantees of naval protection and international legal safeguards.

The Strait of Hormuz

Over the past 24 hours, Hormuz has remained the main strategic focal point of the crisis. The Associated Press notes that Trump has given Iran a further five days to fully reopen the strait, whilst Reuters reports that the markets reacted immediately to the contradiction between the American message and Iran’s denial of any contact. In practice, this means that the situation in Hormuz continues to be perceived as unresolved and serious enough to immediately influence oil prices and the risk assessments of global economic actors.

From a political perspective, Bahrain’s initiative at the UN represents the most concrete development of the last 24 hours regarding Hormuz. It indicates that securing the strait is shifting from a mere military response to an attempt at international legal and political legitimisation.

The build-up of marines and US forces

As regards the US military build-up, sources verified over the last 24 hours reveal two levels of certainty. The first, already clear in the Reuters feed used in these reports, is that the US deployment in the region includes 2,500 marines and the USS Boxer, in the context of preparations to protect shipping and for regional response options. The second is that, within this strict 24-hour window, no new, equally precise update has appeared in Reuters or AP regarding the deployment of new airborne units or their exact location. Therefore, the precise wording is that the reinforcement of the US deployment with marines and naval assets remains confirmed, but there has been no comparable additional public data in verified sources regarding airborne forces in the last 24 hours.

Trump and the possibility of negotiations

In the last 24 hours, Donald Trump has been the main proponent of the idea that there might be a diplomatic window. AP reports that he spoke of ‘very strong’ contacts with a high-ranking Iranian leader and of the possibility of an agreement, which is why he extended the deadline for any strikes. Reuters, however, reports that Iran has denied the existence of such discussions. This contradiction is, in fact, one of the most significant developments of the period: not the existence of confirmed negotiations, but the competing narratives regarding their existence.

Analytically, this means that, at this stage, we cannot speak of verified negotiations, but rather of a possibility raised by Washington and rejected by Tehran. In practical terms, the market, the Gulf states and regional actors are forced to continue operating on the assumption that the risk of military escalation remains high.

Conclusion

Over the past 24 hours, developments in the Middle East have been marked by several clear events: Israel has confirmed strikes in Tehran, Iran has issued a clear warning of retaliation, threatening Israeli power stations and regional facilities linked to US bases, Trump has spoken of a five-day window for a possible agreement, and Iran denied the existence of negotiations. Meanwhile, Bahrain has sought to internationalise the security of the Strait of Hormuz at the UN, and the US military presence remains reinforced by 2,500 marines and the USS Boxer, with no comparable public updates in the last 24 hours regarding new airborne forces.

Oil price trends

The chart shows selected data from Reuters for Brent and WTI to illustrate price movements in the context of the recent escalation. Reuters notes that on 24 March, Brent rose to $101 per barrel and WTI to $89.71 per barrel after Iran denied the existence of talks with the US.

The correct analysis is as follows: following Trump’s statement regarding the ‘5 days’, oil prices first fell sharply, then recovered partially after Iran denied the talks. Reuters reports that Brent fell from the previous close of $112.19 to $99.94, and WTI from $98.23 to $88.13 following the announcement of the postponement. Subsequently, Reuters notes a session low for WTI at $84.37, after which the market recovered, with Brent rising to $101 and WTI to $89.71 amid renewed supply risks.

MARITIME SECURITY FORUM

Trump’s ‘very good’ talks with Iran offer a respite for the oil and energy markets

Andrew Roth in Washington

Tehran has denied the existence of negotiations that delayed US strikes, and Trump has been vague on the details, but the talks indicate a new peace effort by regional powers

Tuesday, 24 March 2026, 01:01 CET

There have been so many failed rounds of diplomacy between the US and Iran – the most recent seemingly led by Pakistan, after Washington had exhausted many other regional mediators – that it came as no surprise at all that President Trump’s claims of ‘very good’ talks with Tehran were initially met with scepticism – especially after Iran denied that any negotiations were taking place.

Nevertheless, standing next to Air Force One, Trump did his utmost to present this sudden détente, without much detail, as a US ultimatum to bomb Iran’s power stations if Tehran did not open the Strait of Hormuz. Few missed the fact that this sudden change of stance came just hours before US markets opened for what promised to be another tough round of trading on Monday.

Asked who the US was negotiating with in Iran, Trump replied: “We are dealing with a man whom I consider the most respected, not the Supreme Leader, from whom I have heard nothing.” Asked to name the person in question, Trump suggested he might be the target of attacks if he did so: “I can’t. I don’t want them to be killed.”

His description of the terms of the deal was equally vague. Iran would not have a nuclear weapon, he said, but control of the Strait of Hormuz would be held by “perhaps me, me and the Ayatollah… whoever the next Ayatollah is. And there would also be a form of regime change, a very serious regime change.” Once again, envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, his son-in-law, were leading the talks.

The reported US counterpart is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, who was previously a commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and has constantly provoked and mocked Trump on social media since the outbreak of hostilities.

Ghalibaf has already denied that he or anyone in the Iranian government is holding talks with the United States and claimed that Trump is attempting to mitigate the financial damage caused by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. “No negotiations have taken place with the US, and fake news is being used to manipulate the financial and oil markets and to break the deadlock in which the US and Israel find themselves,” Ghalibaf said.

Although any negotiations face an uphill struggle, it is clear that they are moving forward with renewed momentum from Pakistan, a US ally with which Iran has close ties, as well as from other regional powers outside the Gulf, including Egypt and Turkey.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry said that in recent days it had received messages from “some friendly countries indicating a US request for negotiations aimed at ending the war”, according to spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei, but denied that any direct talks were currently underway between Iran and the United States.

The talks were met with a lukewarm reception by international leaders, including Keir Starmer, who stressed that the UK had been aware of the talks from the outset.

Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli leader who has been trying to persuade Trump to offer Israel additional support in the conflict, said on Monday that he had spoken to Trump and tried to present a potential deal as one that could protect Israel’s interests.

Trump “believes there is a chance to capitalise on the massive achievements of the IDF and the US military to achieve the war’s objectives through an agreement – an agreement that protects our vital interests,” Netanyahu said in a statement.

However, Israel, which has taken the lead in the successive assassinations of Iranian leaders since 28 February, may not yet be ready to conclude a deal. Israel “continues to strike, in Iran and in Lebanon,” he said.

The latest negotiations could also be another way for Trump to buy time, particularly regarding the oil and energy markets. The Pentagon continues to deploy marines and airborne troops into position, and in the coming days the US will prepare for an attack or a potential occupation of the islands or the Iranian coastline, which would allow the Strait of Hormuz to be reopened – a likely contingency plan for Trump should he fail to secure a diplomatic triumph at this stage.

,,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/24/trumps-very-good-talks-with-iran-buy-him-time-with-oil-and-energy-markets

Israel launches new attacks on Tehran, whilst Trump suspends strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure

The Israeli military says it will continue operations in accordance with the Israeli government’s directives until further notice

Lorenzo Tondo in Jerusalem

Monday, 23 March 2026, 18:30 CET

The Israeli army has stated that it has launched a new wave of attacks on Tehran, after Donald Trump signalled a pause in US strikes against energy infrastructure following talks with Iran that he described as productive.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) said they would continue operations in accordance with the Israeli government’s directives until further notice.

Around 40 minutes after Trump announced he had extended the deadline for striking Iranian power stations by five days, describing talks with Tehran as “productive”, the IDF stated on X that “another wave of attacks targeting the infrastructure of the Iranian terrorist regime in Tehran has just begun”.

The IDF told The Guardian that energy infrastructure would be spared, suggesting that Israel might follow Washington’s lead in suspending any attacks on Iranian power stations and related sites.

An IDF official told the Times of Israel that the army could not comment on the US president’s announcement regarding negotiations with Iran, stating that it was a “political matter” and noting that the IDF “acts in accordance with the directives of Israel’s political leadership and will continue to strike Iran according to its plans until further notice”.

Al Jazeera Arabic’s correspondent in Tehran reported that the scale and volume of the explosions in the Iranian capital were “unprecedented”.

Israel has not recently threatened to strike such facilities, but Defence Minister Israel Katz said on Sunday that attacks on Iran and the “infrastructure on which it relies” would intensify significantly.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards said on Monday that they had launched a new attack on targets in Israel.

Before Israel launched its latest attacks on Iran, Trump wrote on social media that Washington and Tehran “have had, over the past two days, very good and productive conversations”.

He added that he had “instructed the Department of War to postpone any military strikes against Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure for a period of five days, subject to the success of the ongoing meetings and discussions”.

Trump changes his mind on Iran deadline | Latest news

The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the talks between the US and Iran or Washington’s decision to refrain from attacking certain Iranian targets.

On Monday, in a statement on Telegram, the Israeli military said it had struck a number of military bases and weapons targets in a new round of attacks on Iran, including a headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ ground and air defence forces, a Quds Force base and an intelligence centre, as well as a missile production facility belonging to the Ministry of Defence, alongside other research and production centres.

The Guardian has been unable to independently verify these claims.

The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) stated that, in the last 24 hours, it had recorded at least 206 attacks across 15 provinces in Iran, resulting in at least four casualties (fatalities and injuries, both civilian and military).

With the killing of a child on Monday, it is estimated that at least 15% of all human casualties in Iran so far have been under the age of 18.

At least six people were killed in attacks on homes in the city of Tabriz, according to Fars.

Since American and Israeli bombs began falling on Iran, estimates of the total number of casualties (military and civilian) in the country have exceeded 1,500, with some human rights groups reporting figures as high as 3,230 as of 21 March.

Previously, the IDF stated that it had destroyed or rendered inoperable approximately 330 of Iran’s estimated 470 ballistic missile launchers since the start of the war, with more than half being struck in air strikes and others being deactivated after the entrances to underground depots were targeted.

The army said the air force continues to track the remaining launchers, as the number of rockets fired at Israel has fallen to around 10 a day in recent days, down from around 90 at the start of the conflict.

Meanwhile, Israel has continued its military campaign in Lebanon. On Monday, Israeli strikes hit the southern suburbs of Beirut, the first attack on the Hezbollah stronghold in recent days, whilst the Israeli army said it had captured two members of the Iran-backed group in southern Lebanon. Lebanon’s Health Ministry reported that one person had been killed.

The Israeli army also announced that it was “striking Hezbollah infrastructure in Beirut”, having previously urged residents to leave the southern suburbs.

The state news agency added that Israeli forces had positioned themselves in the southern village of Aita al-Chaab, deploying a large crane equipped with surveillance cameras pointing towards the neighbouring town of Ramiyah.

On Monday, Bezalel Smotrich, Israel’s far-right finance minister, called for the annexation of parts of southern Lebanon, stating that Israel should “exercise sovereignty” over the areas under its control, signalling an expansionist vision that has alarmed critics at home and abroad.

Speaking on an Israeli radio programme, Smotrich stated that the military campaign in Lebanon “must end with a completely different reality, both in terms of Hezbollah’s decision and the change to Israel’s borders”.

“I say here categorically… in every room and in every discussion: the new Israeli border must be the Litani River,” he added.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/23/israel-launches-new-strikes-on-tehran-as-trump-pauses-iran-energy-attacks

Von der Leyen urges the US and Iran to resolve the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, warning that distance offers no protection to Australia

Following the signing of the trade agreement in Canberra, the President of the European Commission warns that “the situation is critical” for global energy supplies

Tom McIlroy Political Editor

Tuesday 24 March 2026, 05:15 CET

The US and Iran must sit down at the negotiating table to immediately end the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz and halt hostilities in the Middle East, says the head of the European Commission.

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, has stated that Iran’s efforts to block this strategic waterway by attacking unarmed commercial vessels and critical infrastructure “must be condemned”.

During her visit to Australia to sign a new free trade agreement, von der Leyen stated that an end to the war is necessary to halt growing global economic disruption. Around 20% of the world’s oil supply passes through the strait.

“Iran must immediately cease its threats, the laying of mines, drone and missile attacks, and other attempts to block the strait to commercial shipping,” she said on Tuesday in Canberra.

“The situation is critical for… allies in the energy supply sector worldwide.

“We are all feeling the knock-on effects on gas and oil prices … but it is extremely important that we reach a negotiated solution that puts an end to hostilities in the Middle East.”

Later, in an address to the Australian parliament, she warned that the country could no longer rely on distance to protect itself from war and chaos.

“Countries that have built their economic models on the premise of the stability and security they provide are facing a new reality.

“The world we live in is brutal, harsh and unforgiving. It seems to be turned upside down. What we knew to be certainties is being called into question. Yesterday’s safety net has been torn away.”

The comments came amid reports that Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, were in contact with the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, regarding possible peace negotiations.

But, after more than three weeks of conflict and against the backdrop of rising oil prices affecting consumers worldwide, von der Leyen compared this suffering to the repercussions felt in Europe following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The first female foreign political leader to address both houses of the Australian parliament, she stated that economic shocks had demonstrated that diversification is necessary for advanced democracies and called for cooperation between Australia and the EU to counter China’s export-driven economic growth model.

“Against the backdrop of a tense geopolitical situation, we know from our own experience that the more you develop domestic energy, the faster you become independent and, thus, can protect yourself from energy price shocks,” von der Leyen said.

“We are in a race to electrify our economies. Future generations will judge us on this.”

The free trade agreement will allow nearly 98% of Australian goods to enter the EU duty-free. Producers will benefit from increased access to around 450 million consumers.

A derogation from the rules on geographical indications will allow Australian wine and cheese producers to continue using European product names, such as prosecco and feta.

Farmers will benefit from preferential access for beef and lamb, whilst tariffs on dairy, horticultural and manufactured goods will be eliminated.

Champagne, wine, spirits, biscuits, chocolate and European pasta are expected to become cheaper in Australia, as are car parts, machinery and equipment.

Australia has agreed to enhanced cooperation on critical minerals, avoiding a dual pricing structure for products considered essential for smartphones, electronics and aircraft.

Both Australia and the EU will remove tariffs on green goods, including energy-efficient products, renewable energy technology and batteries.

The agreement does not include carbon border adjustments or provisions on deforestation.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said that managing geopolitical challenges would be easier through enhanced cooperation.

He said that a new defence and security agreement signed with the EU would intensify collaboration in the fields of defence industry, maritime security, cybercrime, terrorism and countering hybrid threats.

“This reflects our shared commitment to stability and security, anchored in sovereignty,” said Albanese.

Australia has also agreed to begin negotiations to join ‘Horizon Europe’, the EU’s research and innovation funding programme.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/24/ursula-von-der-leyen-iran-us-hormuz-crisis-australia

Ukraine war update: Russia is setting up bases for long-range drones in Belarus, says Zelenskyy

The Ukrainian president vows to respond to this move, which would involve Belarus more directly in the war; the EU is outraged at Hungary over its sharing of intelligence with Russia. What we know on day 1,490

The Guardian team

Tuesday 24 March 2026, 05:03 CET

Russia plans to open four control stations for long-range attack drones in Belarus, Zelenskyy said on Monday, adding: “There will be responses to this. And they will be felt.” Zelenskyy has repeatedly warned in recent months that Belarus is becoming increasingly involved in Russia’s war and added in comments on X that he had instructed the head of the service to inform partners in Kyiv of these plans. Speaking later in his evening video address, the president said that, at the start of the war, Belarusian assistance had temporarily exacerbated the damage caused by Russian attacks, until Ukraine took measures against it. “We now have information from our intelligence services that Russia intends to continue using Belarusian territory and the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine to build ground control stations for long-range drones,” he said. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment outside office hours.

Russian missile and drone strikes triggered air raid alerts across Ukraine on Tuesday, with the attacks killing two people in Poltava and a third in Zaporizhzhia, regional military administrations said. Air raid alerts were issued across Ukraine, with the exception of the Odessa region, according to regional authorities. “As a result of the enemy attack on the community in Poltava, damage was caused to residential buildings and a hotel. Fires broke out,” Vitali Dyakivnych, head of the Poltava regional military administration, posted on Telegram. “Unfortunately, two people died and seven were injured as a result of the attack,” he said, later revising the number of injured to 11. Further south, Russia carried out a “massive combined missile and drone attack” in Zaporizhzhia, according to Ivan Fedorov, head of the regional military administration. One person died and five were injured, he said. Six apartment blocks and two private houses, a shop, non-residential buildings and an industrial infrastructure facility were damaged, he added.

The European Commission has asked Hungary for clarification following reports that its foreign minister had passed on sensitive information about EU negotiations to Russia. On Saturday, the Washington Post quoted current and former European security officials who claimed that Péter Szijjártó regularly rang his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, during breaks in EU meetings to provide him with “first-hand reports on what had been discussed” and to suggest possible courses of action. On Monday, European Commission spokesperson Anitta Hipper said: “A relationship of trust between Member States, as well as between them and the institution, is fundamental to the EU’s work. We expect the Hungarian government to provide clarification.” Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is one of the few EU leaders maintaining close ties with Russia amid the war in Ukraine. The US media report has sparked outrage in Brussels, where many officials remain furious that Hungary continued to block a €90 billion ($104 billion) loan for Ukraine at a meeting of EU leaders last week. Szijjártó described the report as “fake news” and “nonsensical conspiracy theories”. But Hungary’s Minister for European Affairs, János Bóka, said: “It is perfectly normal for Hungary’s foreign minister to speak on the phone with his Russian counterpart.” Germany described the allegations as “very serious”. “Discussions within the EU, including those between the foreign ministers of the EU’s , are confidential,” said a spokesperson for the German Foreign Ministry. “We will not tolerate any breach of this confidentiality,” he added. Ukraine’s military intelligence services have “irrefutable” evidence that Russia continues to supply intelligence to Iran, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Monday, asserting that such activity can only prolong the war in the Middle East. “Russia is using its own signals and electronic intelligence capabilities, as well as some of the data obtained through cooperation with partners in the Middle East,” he said on X. Speaking later in his evening video address, Zelenskyy said there was “growing evidence” of Russia’s ongoing efforts to provide intelligence to Iran. “This is clearly a destructive activity and must be stopped, as it only leads to even greater destabilisation. It is in the interest of all responsible states to ensure security and prevent more serious problems,” he said. “Markets are already reacting negatively, and this is significantly complicating the fuel situation in many countries. By helping the Iranian regime to survive and strike with greater precision, Russia is effectively prolonging the war.” Last week, the Kremlin dismissed as “fake news” a Wall Street Journal report claiming that Russia had shared satellite imagery and advanced drone technology with Iran.Senior US officials travelled to Kyiv this week for a meeting of the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, with both sides hoping to move forward soon with a first investment project, US and Ukrainian officials said. The fund, established as part of a minerals agreement signed in April, began operations in December. Focused on investments in critical minerals and other strategic sectors, it is expected to reach $200 million by the end of the year. Ukrainian officials hope to announce three initial investment projects this year. “We are working hard to present the first transaction to the investment committee for approval. For now, we believe everything is on track,” said a Ukrainian official. The official noted that the fund aims to finance investments this year in three priority areas – critical minerals, hydrocarbon extraction and dual-use technologies.UN Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo told the Security Council on Monday that approximately 15,364 civilians, including 775 children, have been killed in Ukraine since the large-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. US Under Secretary of State Christopher Landau told the Council that the US remains committed to working with Russia and Ukraine to end the war. “We reiterate our call on both sides to negotiate in good faith, in a spirit of flexibility, compromise and a duty to protect and preserve the lives of their citizens,” Landau said. Delegations from the US and Ukraine recently held two days of bilateral talks in Miami, Florida, to find ways to end the four-year war, although the war in Iran has overshadowed these efforts.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/24/ukraine-war-briefing-russia-setting-up-long-range-drone-bases-in-belarus-zelenskyy-says

Trump news in brief: the president boasts of ‘intense talks’ with Iran, which Tehran claims never took place

Trump suggested that a deal to end his war against Iran could soon be reached, something Tehran has denied – the main US political news from Monday 23 March, in brief

The Guardian team

Tuesday 24 March 2026, 02:00 CET

Donald Trump claimed that talks had taken place between the US and Iran over the past day, during which the two sides had reached “major points of agreement”, which appears to avert a potentially serious escalation of the conflict.

Tehran has denied the claim, in which Trump also speculated that an agreement to end the war could soon be reached. A spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that no talks had taken place with the US since the bombing campaign began 24 days ago.

In a series of presidential announcements made on Monday, Trump first posted on social media that he had extended the deadline by five days, stating that the US and Iran had held “very good and productive discussions” in recent days, then told reporters in Palm Beach, Florida, that his special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, and his close adviser and son-in-law, Jared Kushner, had held “very, very intense discussions” with the Iranians the day before.

Trump’s threat over the weekend to “hit and destroy” Iran’s power stations and energy infrastructure if Tehran did not allow shipping to pass freely through the Strait of Hormuz, as well as Iran’s threat to destroy infrastructure in the Middle East in retaliation, have sparked fears of a deepening conflict and a global economic crisis.

Trump claims to have had “productive” discussions with Iran, but Tehran denies any contact

Later on Monday, Trump highlighted the prospects of a deal with Iran, saying: “We’re giving them five days, and then we’ll see where that takes us. And I would say that, at the end of that period, I think it could very well turn out to be a very good deal for everybody.”

Read the full article

TSA queues stretch for hours as Trump sends ICE agents to US airports

Security queues stretched for hours on Monday at US airports, where Transport Security Administration (TSA) screening officers, who had not received their pay, refused to turn up for work, and ICE agents sent by Donald Trump were reportedly seen in dozens of cities.

The President said over the weekend that immigration officers could help manage the long queues, but in Atlanta there was little immediate impact from their presence. Meanwhile, airport staff showed creativity in trying to manage thousands of disgruntled passengers.

Read the full article

Senate confirms Trump loyalist Markwayne Mullin as Secretary of Homeland Security

The US Senate confirmed Markwayne Mullin as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security on Monday, promoting the Republican senator to a role in which he will be one of the public faces of Donald Trump’s campaign against undocumented immigrants.

Read the full article

Bets on a ceasefire between the US and Iran show signs of insider trading, experts say

Several accounts on the online platform Polymarket bet on a ceasefire between the US and Iran over the weekend, which appears to indicate insider trading, according to experts.

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US to pay French energy firm nearly $1 billion to scrap wind farm plan

As the fuel crisis triggered by the war in Iran drives up global fossil fuel prices, the Trump administration has announced it will pay French energy giant TotalEnergies $1 billion to scrap plans to build wind farms off the US east coast.

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US Supreme Court appears set to restrict postal voting ahead of mid-term elections

The US Supreme Court appeared poised on Monday to restrict how postal votes can be counted if they arrive after election day, which would affect laws in more than a dozen states in this mid-term election year.

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Trump erects a statue of Christopher Columbus in the White House grounds

A statue of Christopher Columbus has been erected in the White House grounds, in Donald Trump’s latest attempt to portray the controversial explorer as a founding hero of the US.

The President ordered the 4-metre-tall statue, which weighs a tonne, to be placed in front of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building on Pennsylvania Avenue. It is a replica of a monument dedicated to Columbus that was toppled and thrown into Baltimore’s inner harbour by protesters in the city, amid the widespread anti-racism protests of 2020.

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What else happened today:

The pilot and co-pilot of an Air Canada Express regional aircraft died after it collided with a fire engine whilst landing at New York’s LaGuardia Airport, in an incident that led to the airport’s closure.

Hawaii is assessing the extensive damage caused by the worst flooding the islands have seen in over 20 years. Floodwaters caused by heavy rain lifted houses and cars, flooded farms and swept through grocery stores across the islands, leaving behind a thick layer of mud.

A California sheriff, who is standing as the Republican candidate for governor, has seized over 650,000 ballot papers from last year’s election, escalating an ongoing dispute with state officials.

Prediction markets face renewed bipartisan scrutiny in the US Senate, as companies such as Kalshi and Polymarket continue to fight state-led efforts to regulate online betting.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/23/trump-news-latest-updates-today

Banisadr and Ahmadinejad: A unity of opposites or the decline of hope for Iran – Maritime Security Forum

Far from offering a coherent or progressive vision, Banisadr and Ahmadinejad seem rather like two sides of the same failed coin, symbols of the confusion and stagnation that have marked Iran’s recent decades. Instead of bringing about genuine dialogue or reforms, both have perpetuated a political of exclusion and dogma, blocking any attempt at modernisation or opening up to the world.

A man out of place

During the revolution, the Iranians’ attention was captured by the appearance of a young man whose presence was more caricature than leadership. Instead of inspiring, he raised questions about the seriousness and competence of those who gathered around Khomeini. Such figures, more colourful than visionary, became symptomatic of the incoherence of the Iranian political scene.

Iran has become a place where the ‘leader’s mistakes’ are not only excusable, but are even turned into principles of governance. A lack of accountability, exacerbated by arbitrary decisions, has meant that progress has been stifled by fear and conformity.

Two birds do not live in the same nest, and in post-revolutionary Iran, progressive values have found no place alongside religious dogmatism. Anyone who has tried to change anything has come up against the wall of conservatism, and pluralism has never had the chance to take root.

Former Ambassador Maryasov emphasised opposition to any dominant ideology, but the reality in Iran is that dogma itself has been turned into an instrument of repression: ideology has supplanted debate, and pluralism has been replaced by uniformity.

It was in vain to insist on appointing Western-educated technocrats: the system remained impervious to competence, preferring ‘spiritual purity’ over professionalism. Iran chose to isolate itself from progress, under the pretext of religious authenticity, and the result was stagnation.

So-called ‘spiritual purity’ became the supreme criterion, and specialists were held in contempt. Iran has turned into a society where competence is viewed with suspicion, and ignorance is elevated to the status of a virtue.

Iran’s recent history is not one of progress, but of regression, where tradition and dogma have stifled any modern initiative.

Banisadr, the eternal student at the Sorbonne, saw his dreams shattered by the brutality of Iranian reality. His rise to power was illusory, and his desperate flight from the country, hidden beneath a hijab, remains a symbol of the failure of reformism in a state dominated by force and terror.

The son of a blacksmith, a special forces soldier, president and a Khomeinist more radical than Khomeini himself

Ahmadinejad’s journey, from blacksmith’s son to president, is not a story of meritocratic success, but of rise through submission to religious dogma and repressive structures. Western values were rejected, and Iran chose isolation, at the cost of economic and social stagnation.

Ahmadinejad’s populism did not bring prosperity, but deepened the gulf between Iran and the rest of the world. Poverty has persisted, and Islamic ultra-conservatism has replaced any real debate or reform. Iran has shut itself away within the confines of its own prejudices, becoming an increasingly isolated state.

For Ahmadinejad, ‘returning to Khomeini’s path’ meant banning music, films and any Western influence, which has transformed Iran into a rigid society, suffocated by censorship and the fear of change. The repression of those who do not comply with Islamic dress codes is proof that there is no place for individual freedom in today’s Iran.

Public discontent with Ahmadinejad stems not only from poverty, but also from a lack of prospects. Iranians want change, but the system denies them any chance, perpetuating a vicious circle of frustration and resignation.

Iran has turned the expectation of the Messiah into a pretext for hunting down heretics and fuelling conflict with ‘global arrogance’. Instead of seeking dialogue, Iran has chosen to sow the wind and reap the whirlwind, isolating itself further and further.

The West, viewed as an enemy, is the scapegoat for all internal problems, and diplomatic relations have been sacrificed on the altar of dogma. Iran refuses to learn from its mistakes, perpetuating a cycle of isolation and decline.

He who sows the wind reaps the whirlwind – and Iran has come to live with the consequences of its own choices, paying the price for dogmatism and a lack of vision.

Today’s Iran is an example of a country captive to its own rigidity, where progress is blocked by fear, and the future remains suspended between empty promises and grim realities. “Where there is no head, woe betide the feet,” says a Romanian proverb, and Iran seems to confirm this popular wisdom, wandering aimlessly through the labyrinth of its own dogmas.

Maritime Security Forum

A spectre is haunting Europe: The New “Big Three” – Maritime Security Forum

The latest crisis in the Middle East, superimposed on the war in Ukraine, shows just how much Russia is contributing to the fragmentation of transatlantic relations. Whilst Europeans and the EU are trying to persuade Donald Trump not to abandon Ukraine, Moscow’s actions serve as a catalyst for discord and mistrust. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has firmly rejected Washington’s request to participate in the ‘opening’ of the Strait of Hormuz, but one cannot ignore the destabilising role of Russia, which exploits every Western vulnerability to expand its influence. Trump, by calling NATO a “paper tiger”, is playing into Moscow’s hands, which has been undermining the alliance’s unity for years. The coming weeks will be decisive not only for the operation against Iran, but also for how Russia will attempt to exploit any rift within the West.

Transatlantic relations are undergoing a profound crisis, exacerbated by Russia’s interventions and manipulations, which seek to destabilise the West. Europeans understand that if the US cannot break the deadlock, they will be even less able to counter Moscow’s manoeuvres, which act with cynicism to impose their will. Trump’s defeat could be seen as an opportunity to restore Western unity, but Russia will continue to exploit any weakness, seeking to impose its anti-European and anti-democratic agenda.

Any failure on Trump’s part in the Iranian venture will be used by Russia as an argument against the credibility and power of the United States. Moscow, unable to isolate China, will attempt to mask its own geopolitical failures by shifting the blame onto the West. In reality, Russia has neither the resources nor the prestige required to moderate US-China relations, but is merely attempting to conceal its international marginalisation under the guise of an illusory ‘triumvirate’.

Its supposed control over Iranian oil and gas resources is more of an illusion propagated by Russia, which hopes to destabilise the global economy and provoke a recession that would benefit its own interests. Moscow seeks only to exploit any crisis to mask its economic and technological vulnerabilities, particularly in the context of competition with the United States and China. Russian companies lack the capacity to influence global markets, and the Kremlin’s strategy boils down to obstructionism and propaganda.

Europe faces the prospect of a new ‘Big Three’, in which Russia aspires to be at the global negotiating table, but reality shows that Moscow lacks the power to dictate the terms. Recalling the precedent of Yalta-Potsdam, Russia dreams of a return to past glory, but in fact risks being marginalised, just like the ‘old’ Europe it despises. Russia’s isolation from the West, prolonged by its own actions in Ukraine, only serves to highlight the Kremlin regime’s lack of vision and capability.

Russia’s participation in this configuration is dictated by a desire to conceal its failure to isolate China and to remain relevant in the face of a world that no longer tolerates its aggression. Moscow hopes to become a mediator in US-China relations, but it has neither the credibility nor the necessary influence. The proposal to convene a summit of the ‘five permanent members’ of the UN Security Council is nothing more than a desperate attempt to secure a consolation prize, whilst real global diplomacy is shifting beyond Russia’s sphere of influence.

Regardless of Trump’s preferences, America will reduce its military presence in Europe, and Russia will attempt to capitalise on this withdrawal to expand its influence. However, following the Ukrainian experience, it is clear that bilateral relations can only be built on a foundation of mutual distrust, due to Moscow’s aggression and lack of respect for international law . The spectre of Russian revisionism haunts Europe, bringing back into focus the danger of curtailing a united Germany, as well as the risk that Russia will exploit any opening to undermine continental stability.

Western experts warn that the renationalisation of European defence would play into Russia’s hands, as it does not want a united and strong Europe. There is even a recommendation to collectively fund rearmament, precisely to prevent the fragmentation that would favour Moscow’s interests. The EU’s decision to allocate billions to defence shows that Europe is aware of the Russian threat and of the need not to let Berlin or other capitals fall into the trap of division orchestrated by the Kremlin.

The collective loan for Ukraine, blocked in Brussels, is proof of the difficulty in countering Russia’s manoeuvres, which exploit any hesitation to promote its revanchist agenda. The Poles and the French are cautious, mindful of a past in which Berlin, under pressure from Moscow, imposed harsh measures on Greece. Russia remains an actor that exploits every European rift and does not hesitate to capitalise on any weakness to impose its interests.

European politics is entering an extremely dangerous period, in which Russia is playing the role of saboteur of continental unity and stability. A passive approach of simply weathering Trump’s presidency and countering Tehran’s ambitions will not be enough if Europe does not confront the challenges from Moscow head-on. European capitals must abandon historical illusions and prejudices, reject the temptation to compromise with Russia, and adopt a creative foreign policy based on the defence of democratic values and solidarity against Russian revisionism.

The Maritime Security Forum

NATO and the New Era of Drone Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine and Future Challenges – and the social challenges generated by the dynamics of modern conflict – Maritime Security Forum

From Vulnerability to Innovation: How the Alliance Must Transform to Face a Modern Conflict

NATO Facing a New Type of Conflict

NATO is not prepared for the era of cheap, mass drone warfare, and Ukraine is becoming the model the alliance must urgently adopt.

Defence experts warn that NATO is at a critical juncture: modern warfare is no longer dominated solely by high-performance weapons, but by a devastating combination of precision and volume, achieved through cheap drones, produced rapidly and deployed on a massive scale. For example, in the conflict in Ukraine, modified commercial drones have been used to identify and strike targets with remarkable precision, and the massive deployment of these devices has succeeded in overwhelming traditional air defence systems, forcing adversaries to expend costly interceptors to counter attacks that cost only a fraction of the value of the defensive munitions. At the same time, saturation tactics involving dozens or hundreds of drones simultaneously prevented radar networks from reacting effectively, demonstrating that volume and adaptability can radically shift the balance on the battlefield.

The harsh reality: the cost-volume disparity

Recent briefings by the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and the fighting in the Middle East have highlighted a major discrepancy: The United States and its allies are investing millions of dollars in interceptors – missiles specifically designed to destroy enemy drones – to shoot down drones, i.e. unmanned aerial vehicles, which cost only tens of thousands of dollars. This strategy leads to the rapid depletion of ammunition stocks. According to a 2024 CEPA report, Russia and Iran are able to produce up to 1,000 drones a day, each with an estimated cost of between $20,000 and $50,000, giving them a significant numerical and economic advantage. The traditional paradigm of warfare – that is, the classic model of ‘ ’ direct confrontation between armies equipped with similar technology – is thus destabilised, forcing Western forces to rethink their strategic approaches. Source: CEPA, 2024.

US General Gordon “Skip” Davis emphasises that adversaries no longer choose between precision and scale; they combine them effectively, overwhelming sophisticated defences with volume, not with individual technology.

Cheap drones and the strategy of attrition

Cheap drones are not designed for a quick victory, but to wear down air defence systems, deplete stocks of interceptors and force defensive capabilities to operate at their limits. In practical terms, this pressure means there is a risk that NATO could run out of sufficient defensive resources in a short space of time, which could leave critical infrastructure vulnerable and make it difficult to maintain the logistical pace required for resupply. For example, in the conflict in Ukraine, the massive use of cheap drones forced the military to rapidly deplete available interceptors and seek alternative solutions for protecting energy networks and communications. Thus, traditional NATO doctrines and logistical processes, centred on expensive and hard-to-replace systems, are becoming obsolete in the face of an adversary that relies on volume and adaptability, calling into question the alliance’s long-term resilience.

The systemic problem and the Ukrainian lesson

Clarifying key concepts

To understand NATO’s challenges, it is important to define three essential terms:

Hardware refers to the physical equipment used in defence, such as missiles, drones, radars or air defence systems.

Doctrines are the rules and principles that guide how armies organise and use their resources in combat.

Software infrastructure refers to the computer programmes that coordinate and optimise the operation of equipment, providing real-time information and facilitating integration between different systems.

Experts emphasise that NATO’s problem lies not only in the physical equipment, but also in how it is integrated and rapidly adapted to new types of conflict. The Alliance has built high-performance systems, but these are difficult to scale and integrate effectively, unlike Ukraine, which has been forced to innovate rapidly under the pressure of war.

Structured comparison: the NATO approach vs the Ukrainian approach

NATO has relied on cutting-edge technologies, complex systems and traditional doctrines, which assume that every piece of hardware operates within a well-organised and predictable system. This model offers robust protection, but is rigid and difficult to adapt to massive attacks involving cheap drones.

Ukraine, by contrast, has adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach. Under the pressure of the conflict, it has combined advanced defence systems with innovative, often improvised solutions that can be produced quickly and integrated easily. Thus, effectiveness has not merely meant expensive technology, but adaptability and scale, which has enabled resilience to be maintained even in the face of intense attacks.

Concrete examples of Ukrainian innovation

Over the past four years, Ukraine has developed a layered air defence model. It has combined high-performance systems, such as Patriot missiles, with low-cost interceptor drones, some costing between £2,000 and £5,000, which have proved essential in repelling Russian attacks.

In addition to drones, Ukraine has used mobile radar systems, which can be moved quickly to avoid detection and destruction by the enemy. These radars allow drones to be identified and tracked, even when attacks are massive and dispersed.

Furthermore, tactics to disperse resources have been vital: equipment and personnel are spread across a wide area, reducing the risk that a single strike could cause major losses . This strategy has enabled Ukraine to remain operational and adapt rapidly to changes on the battlefield.

Through these solutions, Ukraine has demonstrated that success depends not only on state-of-the-art technology, but also on creativity, adaptability and the ability to rapidly integrate diverse resources.

Exporting expertise and the danger of political stagnation

The Ukrainian experience, built out of necessity rather than theory, is now being exported to partners in the Middle East. However, whilst militaries are heeding these lessons, there are concerns that NATO’s political systems and governments are not moving as quickly. Defence procurement remains slow, fragmented and often focused on outdated technologies unsuited to this new type of conflict.

Davis warns that this gap between military interest and government response could prove costly, as civilian infrastructure (energy networks, ports, communications) becomes increasingly vulnerable to drone attacks.

Emerging vulnerabilities and strategic direction

Cheap drones can disrupt not only armies but also economies. Naval and underwater threats at critical points, such as the Strait of Hormuz, remain poorly defended, creating additional risks for global trade. A relevant example is the 2019 drone attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, which caused oil prices to rise and disrupted global trade routes, highlighting the vulnerability of maritime infrastructure and the impact on international markets.

The future of warfare will be determined by the ability to produce, integrate and deploy weapons on a large scale, rapidly and cost-effectively, not merely by who possesses the most advanced technology. NATO must fundamentally rethink everything: from procurement to training, from software to strategy. To meet these challenges, the alliance could invest in specialised anti-drone defence systems, adapt training programmes to include scenarios involving autonomous weapons, and develop strategies for the rapid acquisition of emerging technologies. Thus, an effective response to new threats will depend on the flexibility and speed with which these changes are implemented.

Conclusion: A paradigm shift for NATO

To survive and remain a relevant actor, NATO must move beyond its reliance on technological superiority and adopt a strategy based on the integration of resources, scale and sustainability. The lesson from Ukraine is unequivocal: only those who adapt quickly and innovate pragmatically can meet the new challenges of warfare involving affordable drones. A failure to adapt means not only the risk of losing on the battlefield, but also increased vulnerability to the economic and social threats generated by the dynamics of modern conflict.

Maritime Security Forum

The Challenges Facing the United States in Capturing and Holding Kharg Island – Maritime Security Forum

From the American perspective, Kharg Island represents a strategic point of utmost importance in the context of a conflict with Iran. The Trump administration faced a major dilemma: the occupation of Kharg could tip the balance of the war, but could also draw the US into a spiral of escalation with consequences that are difficult to predict.

Kharg, a small island situated approximately 32 kilometres off the Iranian coast, is home to around 20,000 inhabitants, most of whom are involved in the oil industry. Its importance stems from the fact that approximately 90% of Iran’s oil exports originate from here. For the United States, control over Kharg would provide an unprecedented lever of pressure on the Iranian regime, potentially cutting off almost all of Tehran’s oil revenues and forcing it to accept American terms for a cessation of hostilities.

However, planning such an operation is complex. Iran has managed to capitalise on the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz, redirecting its own exports and blocking other Gulf states’ access to global markets. This has led to a rise in oil prices, thereby strengthening Iran’s financial position despite sanctions and the military conflict. The US, on the other hand, responded with air strikes on targets on Kharg and mobilised significant expeditionary forces in the region, clearly signalling its intention to consider a rapid and precise amphibious invasion.

The operation to capture the island would involve a series of coordinated military actions: air strikes to neutralise Iranian defences, the landing of marines using specialised vessels and MV-22 Osprey aircraft, and the rapid seizure of key facilities – particularly the airport and oil infrastructure. The United States would provide constant air support to reduce Iranian resistance and prevent reinforcements from being brought onto the island.

However, beyond the initial conquest, maintaining control over Kharg becomes a real challenge. Iran could resort to ‘scorched earth’ tactics, setting fire to oil facilities, contaminating the environment and affecting the health of American troops – a scenario similar to that in Kuwait in 1991. Furthermore, the distance from US bases in Kuwait and the proximity to Iranian territory expose US forces to significant logistical and military risks: drone attacks, short-range ballistic missiles, interference from Iran’s ‘mosquito fleet’, including unmanned surface vessels, as well as possible attacks with Lancet-type loitering munitions, already successfully tested by Russia in Ukraine.

The Americans would be forced to ensure a constant supply flow under the constant threat of enemy fire, both by air and by sea. Limited air defences and the vulnerability of the airport runway mean that any disruption to supplies would jeopardise the entire operation. A mission to hold the island could last more than two weeks, exceeding the logistical capacity of a standard expeditionary unit, which would quickly turn initial success into a war of attrition.

In this context, the US risks facing a scenario similar to that in Ukraine: a war of attrition, with constant casualties, under the threat of drones and missiles, a far cry from the speed of ‘shock and awe’ campaigns to which the US military was accustomed. Iran could respond by extending the conflict to the oil infrastructure of other Gulf states, increasing global economic pressure and amplifying the political costs for Washington.

For the United States, the success of the operation would represent a major strategic lever: depriving Iran of its oil revenues could force the regime to accept negotiations on American terms. But the risks are just as great: escalation of the conflict, human and material losses, as well as domestic and international pressure to end a costly and difficult-to-manage war.

In conclusion, from the US perspective, the capture and retention of Kharg Island represents both a strategic opportunity and a potential trap. “He who does not measure his steps risks breaking his neck,” says an old Romanian proverb, and for Washington, every decision regarding Kharg must be weighed with the utmost caution and strategic realism.

In conclusion, from the US perspective, the capture and retention of Kharg Island represent both a strategic opportunity and a potential trap. For Washington, every decision regarding Kharg must be weighed with the utmost caution and strategic realism.

Further conclusions

Analysis of the operation on Kharg Island highlights a fundamental truth of modern conflicts: tactical advantage does not guarantee strategic victory. Although control of Kharg could provide the US with a decisive lever of pressure against Iran, the logistical costs, military risks and potential for escalation transform any initial success into a long-term challenge. Recent experience of wars of attrition, such as the one in Ukraine, shows that adaptability, resilience and efficient resource management are key elements for survival and success. Ultimately, any intervention must be underpinned not only by military force, but also by a robust diplomatic strategy that minimises losses and maximises the chances of regional stability. As another Romanian proverb goes, ‘The year does not bring what the hour brings’ — in a volatile geopolitical environment, decisions must be taken with care, anticipating both the risks and the opportunities that may arise unexpectedly.

Maritime Security Forum

The Boxer Amphibious Training Group and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit: Deployment and Strategic Implications – Maritime Security Forum

This week, the Boxer Amphibious Training Group, comprising three key ships – USS Boxer (LHD-4), USS Comstock (LSD-45) and USS Portland (LPD-27) – and their crews, set sail from San Diego, California, bound for the Persian Gulf. According to information obtained by USNI News, the USS Boxer departed on Wednesday, with the other two ships following on Thursday. These ships are accompanied by approximately 2,200 marines and sailors from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), in addition to the 2,000 sailors operating the ships. This represents one of the US’s most robust amphibious force structures, ready to intervene rapidly in the tense situation in the Middle East.

In recent months, marines from the 11th MEU have conducted integrated training off the coast of California with the three ships, completing certification exercises designed to ensure the group’s interoperability and operational effectiveness. This intensive training is a mandatory step prior to deployment, designed to simulate combat scenarios and test the forces’ ability to respond rapidly to logistical and military challenges.

The Boxer Amphibious Group is being deployed against the backdrop of the escalating US-Israeli conflict with Iran, which has now entered its fourth week. Over the past two months, the United States has bolstered its naval presence in the Middle East, sending two aircraft carrier strike groups prior to the outbreak of the conflict on 28 February. The Pentagon recently ordered the deployment of elements from the Tripoli Amphibious Training Group, with marines on board, to the region, demonstrating Washington’s determination to maintain control over the flow of energy resources and prevent a strategic blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Meanwhile, the USS Tripoli (LHA-7), the USS New Orleans (LPD-18) and elements of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit are approaching the Middle East, having recently transited the Strait of Malacca – a critical chokepoint for military and commercial vessels. The USS San Diego (LPD-22) has temporarily remained in port at Sasebo, Japan, after operating alongside the other ships earlier this month.

Tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen significantly, contributing to a rise in global oil prices. The Trump administration has asked the military to draw up plans for escorting tankers, but the Pentagon has not provided details on when or how these escorts will be implemented.

Meanwhile, the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit have been deployed since August and remain in the Western Hemisphere, with the possibility of an extended mission, as suggested by General Francis Donovan, head of US Southern Command, to US lawmakers.

Estimated time of arrival in the Persian Gulf

Given the distance of over 12,000 km between San Diego and the Persian Gulf and the average speed of amphibious ships (approximately 20 knots), the Boxer Amphibious Group can reach the operational area in around 18–21 days, taking into account stopovers at strategic ports for refuelling and resupply. It is therefore estimated that the units will be ready for deployment in the Persian Gulf by early April 2026.

Conclusions and strategic implications

The deployment of the Boxer Amphibious Training Group and the 11th MEU sends a clear message of determination and rapid response capability from the US, in a volatile regional context. The combined amphibious and expeditionary force is prepared to respond to both logistical challenges and military threats, providing Washington with leverage to protect its energy and security interests in the Middle East. However, as the contextual analysis highlights, tactical advantage does not guarantee strategic victory. The success of the operation depends not only on military strength, but also on the efficient management of resources, adaptability, cooperation with allies and a sound diplomatic strategy. In the spirit of the Romanian proverb ‘Don’t count your chickens before they hatch’, any decision regarding intervention must be weighed with caution and realism, anticipating both the risks and the opportunities that may arise suddenly on the international stage.

Maritime Security Forum

Manila claims that a Chinese warship activated its fire-control radar on a Philippine warship – Maritime Security Forum

Philippine Navy BRP Miguel Malvar (FFG-6) on 8 April 2025. Photo by the Philippine Navy

Details of the incident

In early March 2026, a tense incident took place in the South China Sea, involving a Chinese Type 056A-class corvette, the Guang’an (622), and one of the Philippine Navy’s newest warships, the BRP Miguel Malvar (FFG-6). According to the Philippine Navy, the Chinese corvette directed its Type 347 fire-control radar at the Philippine frigate during a sovereignty patrol near Sabina Shoal on 7 March. This gesture is considered particularly provocative and risky, as fire-control radars are used to guide gun and missile systems, and their activation may foreshadow the launch of weapons, suggesting a direct and immediate threat to the targeted vessel.

Official reactions and interpretations

The Naval Defence Command in Manila described China’s action as “alarming and escalatory,” emphasising that it represents a pattern of coercion that endangers lives, disrupts lawful operations and calls into question the sovereignty of coastal states. However, China claimed, according to a post shared on the Philippine Navy’s Facebook page, that the activation of the fire-control radar was intended to de-escalate the situation following a radio provocation by the BRP Miguel Malvar. The current incident is reminiscent of a similar confrontation in 2020, when a Philippine corvette had a tense exchange with another Chinese Type 056A off the coast of Palawan.

The context of naval encounters and Manila’s strategy

Encounters between Philippine and Chinese warships receive less media coverage compared to those involving maritime security agencies, such as the Philippine Coast Guard. Manila has preferred to deploy white-hulled vessels to avoid escalation with Beijing, a strategy that has sometimes caused confusion between the Navy and maritime authorities regarding the timing and location of patrols. With the arrival of new frigates and corvettes over the past year, the Philippine Navy has stepped up its presence in the South China Sea and joint patrols, demonstrating an enhanced capacity to respond. In December, the BRP Diego Silang (FFG-7) was deployed alongside a corvette to counter a Chinese frigate approaching Philippine territorial waters off Luzon.

Previous escalations and standoffs

Clashes between the two navies continued last year, including an incident off Scarborough Shoal, where two Chinese frigates shadowed a Philippine corvette. Scarborough Shoal, located 75 nautical miles west of Palawan, was a significant flashpoint between Manila and Beijing in 2024. The Philippine Coast Guard attempted to maintain a presence on the shoal during a five-month standoff with its Chinese counterparts. However, a blockade that cut off maritime supply routes for Philippine patrol vessels forced Manila to withdraw from Sabina in August 2024, thereby ceding control of the formation to Chinese military forces, the Coast Guard and maritime militias.

Conclusions and strategic implications

The incident between the Chinese corvette and the BRP Miguel Malvar highlights the persistent tensions in the South China Sea and the risk of rapid escalation between regional actors. The use of fire-control radar, even in response to a radio provocation, amplifies uncertainty and danger, reflecting a dynamic of coercion and intimidation that can have serious consequences for regional stability.

Manila’s strategy of alternating between military vessels and white-hulled ships, as well as the intensification of joint patrols, demonstrates the Philippines’ desire to defend its sovereignty without directly provoking Beijing. However, the recent incident highlights the limitations of this approach and the need for internal coordination between naval and maritime authorities.

In the spirit of the proverb ‘Don’t count your chickens before they hatch’, Philippine decision-makers must carefully weigh every action and reaction, anticipating both the risks and opportunities that may arise on the international stage. Stability and security in the South China Sea depend on dialogue, regional cooperation and the avoidance of provocations that could lead to unpredictable escalations.

Maritime Security Forum

Oil prices have not risen enough to cause a collapse in demand, says US Energy Secretary

HOUSTON, 23 March (Reuters) – Global oil prices have not risen enough to cause a collapse in demand, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said on Monday at the CERAWeek energy conference in Houston, Texas, even though markets continued to fluctuate, and global oil prices remained close to $100 a barrel due to the US-Israel war against Iran.

The world is experiencing one of the most severe energy crises in recent decades, following the closure of a key shipping channel and attacks on energy infrastructure in the Middle East, which have caused long-term damage. Oil prices have risen to their highest levels in years, and fuel prices in the US are soaring, creating potential problems for President Donald Trump’s Republican Party ahead of the mid-term elections in November.

The Trump administration is taking steps to calm the markets, including releasing oil from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve in collaboration with other members of the International Energy Agency. On Monday, Wright stated that the US would release between one million and one and a half million barrels per day of oil, eventually reaching 3 million bpd.

The CEO of Abu Dhabi oil giant ADNOC, Sultan Al Jaber, speaking shortly after Wright, said that rising oil prices were slowing global economic growth and added that no country should be able to close the Strait of Hormuz. This chokepoint, which Iran has effectively closed, accounts for around 20% of global oil consumption.

Asked whether a US victory in Iran would mean the country would no longer have control over the strait, Wright told CNBC in an interview on the sidelines of the conference: “We need to be in a position where their ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz either disappears or is dramatically reduced compared to what it has been in recent years, recent decades.”

Wright said that Asia had been hardest hit by the market shocks and that supplying refineries had been a priority for the Trump administration.

“We want to get oil into Asian refineries and have as little refinery downtime as possible,” he said.

Wright said that Venezuela is “significantly better off” than it was a few months ago, following the capture of President Nicolas Maduro in January and the US takeover of the OPEC country’s oil exports, with around 200,000 bpd of crude production restored so far.

Following a visit to Caracas last month, during which he met with interim President Delcy Rodriguez and toured oil fields, Wright said that elections would take place in Venezuela “eventually”, without providing further details.

US NUCLEAR ENERGY

The US is set to see three next-generation nuclear reactors producing heat – a precursor to delivering electricity to the grid – by 4 July, Wright said.

Several so-called small modular reactors and other forms of advanced nuclear power are under development in the country, but none are currently commercially operational.

Wright said that new nuclear power would be a key supplier of electricity to the US grid, which is struggling to keep pace with demand from data centres and the electrification of industries such as transport.

Source: here

Three oil tankers pass through Hormuz: Iranian waters are open to friendly nations

Three oil tankers passed simultaneously through the Strait of Hormuz in Iranian waters. Photo: Vessel Finder

More and more oil tankers are passing through the Strait of Hormuz in Iranian waters. Previously, Tehran stated that the ban applies only to vessels associated with the United States and Israel.

According to AIS data, three oil tankers passed through the Strait of Hormuz simultaneously this morning. The oil tanker Bright Gold indicates that it is coming from Sharjah and heading towards China. The vessel can carry up to 45,000 tonnes of fuel.

Accompanying the Bright Gold are the tankers Lenore and Jag Vasant. The former is carrying up to 300,000 tonnes of oil, and the latter up to 54,000 tonnes of liquefied gas bound for India.

In addition, another Indian tanker, the Pine Gas, is currently passing through the Strait of Hormuz. It can also carry liquefied gas — up to 58,000 tonnes.

Judging by their routes, the tankers are passing through Iranian territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. And this is not the first instance of tankers passing through in recent weeks.

As reported by EADaily, ships have passed through the Strait of Hormuz. However, every passage through Iran’s territorial waters is coordinated with Tehran and paid for.

“Iran has created a de facto ‘safe’ shipping corridor through its territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz, offering passage to vetted vessels in exchange for payment. In at least one case, a payment of $2 million was reported,” reported the specialist publication Lloyd’s List.

Dimitris Maniatis, CEO of Marisks, stated that currently each ship’s passage is considered on a case-by-case basis, and some governments are contacting the Iranian authorities to obtain permission to pass safely.

For example, the Indian authorities are taking action, as the country is on the verge of a shortage of liquefied natural gas, which is widely used there.

Source: here

Turkey destroys US-made AEGIR-W naval drone after it washes ashore on the Black Sea coast

The Turkish Navy’s explosive ordnance disposal units neutralised a US-made AEGIR-W unmanned surface vessel, developed by Sierra Nevada Corporation, after it washed ashore on Türkiye’s Black Sea coast, eliminating a real explosive threat near civilian areas.

The drone was discovered on 20 March 2026 and destroyed less than 24 hours later by the S.A.S. Group Command in Istanbul, after being towed out to sea, highlighting rapid decision-making in the face of an explosive threat. The incident, which took place in the Unye district of Ordu, demonstrated Turkey’s ability to detect, assess and destroy autonomous maritime systems posing an immediate operational risk in the Black Sea region.

The US-made AEGIR-W naval drone was towed approximately four kilometres offshore before being destroyed in a controlled detonation, described as significant and consistent with a potential payload of up to 300 kilograms of explosives. (Image source: X/DylanMalyasov and ALiBakr53)


On 21 March 2026, the Ordu Governor’s Office confirmed that Turkish explosive ordnance disposal specialists had destroyed a US-made AEGIR-W unmanned surface vessel (USV) after it had washed ashore on the Black Sea coast in the Unye district of Ordu. The vessel was first spotted on 20 March, at around 16:00 local time, on a beach in the Yuceler neighbourhood, where civilians identified an unusual object and alerted the authorities. Gendarmerie units secured the area, established a perimeter and restricted access whilst awaiting specialist inspection teams. The naval drone was subsequently identified as a military-grade autonomous surface vessel, developed by Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC), an American defence company. Its presence off a populated coastline triggered a full explosive ordnance response, reflecting the assumption that any such system brought ashore could contain live munitions or sensitive systems on board.

The incident occurred within a broader pattern in which several unmanned aerial systems have entered Turkish waters since 2022, due to increased naval activity in the Black Sea following the start of the war in Ukraine. The inspection carried out on 21 March 2026 by the Istanbul Group Command S.A.S., an explosive ordnance disposal unit of the Turkish Navy responsible for underwater threats, mines and unidentified explosive devices, established at around 14:00 local time that the American unmanned vessel remained operational and was carrying explosives, confirming that it posed a potential threat. The decision-making process prioritised risk mitigation over recovery, given the potential for anti-handling mechanisms and the possible instability of the payload.

These unmanned systems are often configured to prevent exploitation in the event of capture, which increases the likelihood of detonation during handling. The presence of live munitions necessitated an immediate escalation from containment to neutralisation, with the Turkish authorities opting for offshore destruction as the safest option. Civil defence measures included the evacuation of nearby residential areas and the temporary restriction of maritime activity in the area. The operational timeline from discovery to destruction remained under 24 hours, indicating a rapid response cycle. The AEGIR-W was towed approximately four kilometres offshore before being destroyed in a controlled detonation, a distance chosen by the S.A.S. Group Command to mitigate the effects of the explosion on coastal infrastructure and population centres.

The explosion was described as significant, consistent with an explosive payload of up to 300 kilograms, which aligns with the drone’s maximum payload capacity. The detonation eliminated both the explosive threat and the possibility of recovering the on-board electronics, sensors or communications systems. The approach reflects Turkey’s standard handling procedures for unmanned maritime systems encountered outside controlled environments, where the risk of recovery outweighs the potential intelligence gain. The evacuation of homes in the surrounding area indicates that blast radius calculations took worst-case scenarios into account, rather than nominal payload assumptions. No casualties or structural damage were reported following the operation.

The AEGIR-W is part of a family of unmanned surface vessels designed for multi-role maritime operations, including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare and strike missions. AEGIR-W measures nearly 10 metres in length, is powered by a diesel propulsion system and can exceed speeds of 25 knots, maintaining a range of up to 900 kilometres or over 500 nautical miles. Its payload capacity of up to 300 kilograms allows for both sensor integration and explosive configurations, depending on mission requirements. The vessel can operate autonomously or under remote human control, allowing for flexibility in contested environments. Its design emphasises modularity and attractiveness, meaning it is intended for deployment in scenarios where loss is acceptable from an operational perspective, which increases the likelihood that the systems will be abandoned, deactivated or jettisoned if control is lost.

The route by which the vessel reached Turkish waters remains unresolved, with several plausible scenarios based on the operational context in the Black Sea. One possibility is a loss of control during tests or operational deployment linked to the war in Ukraine, where unmanned surface vessels are used extensively for attacks on naval targets and infrastructure. Another scenario involves navigation failures or electronic jamming leading to uncontrolled drifting over long distances, made possible by the system’s range and autonomy. There is no confirmation of direct engagement by opposing forces prior to deployment, and no record of the system’s official transfer or deployment to Ukraine in declared inventories. The absence of identification markings or tracking data complicates attribution and reduces the ability to link the system to a specific mission profile.

The investigation is ongoing, focusing on reconstructing the trajectory and potential mechanisms of loss of control, but reflects a broader operational trend in the Black Sea, where several unmanned systems are extending beyond their intended theatres and entering Turkish maritime areas. Since the end of 2025, several aerial and maritime drones and sea mines have been detected along the Turkish coast, including in Trabzon, Artvin and areas near Istanbul and Balıkesir. Some systems were carrying explosive payloads, whilst others were assessed as reconnaissance or test assets, but all required the intervention of specialist disposal units. In several cases, fishermen or civilians were the first to identify these objects, indicating limited early detection in open waters.

Turkey’s response procedures have evolved towards rapid containment, inspection and destruction, reflecting the assumption that any unidentified system poses a potential threat. This pattern demonstrates how autonomous systems, once deployed in conflict, can create secondary security risks far from their intended targets. The repeated appearance of such systems along the Turkish coast introduces operational, legal and security implications for maritime control in the region. From an operational perspective, it complicates Turkey’s coastal surveillance by introducing unidentified objects with unknown payloads and origins. From a security standpoint, each incident carries the risk of explosive detonation, intelligence exposure, or disruption to civilian maritime activity. The accumulation of such events suggests a persistent pattern, not as a result of deliberate action, but as a consequence of drifting towards adjacent regions without direct intent, driven by the prevailing sea currents along the Black Sea coast.

Source: here

The UK receives US approval for the $1 billion SSN-AUKUS submarine combat system and vertical launch capability.

The US State Department has notified Congress of a potential $1 billion foreign military sale to the United Kingdom, covering support for SSN-AUKUS submarines and weapon systems, including AUKUS-specific vertical launch tubes, common weapon launchers, simulation equipment, software, training and embedded personnel from the US and the UK.

Notified to Congress on 20 March, the package covers vertical launch tubes, common weapon launchers, software, simulation systems and embedded personnel. The agreement expands on a previous $50 million contract as part of a large-scale integration effort involving major US shipbuilders and combat systems firms. It targets the core architecture that will govern how the UK’s next-generation attack submarines detect, decide and deliver weapons.

US approval of a potential $1 billion package advances the UK’s SSN-AUKUS programme, bolstering next-generation submarine combat systems, launch capability, training and trilateral interoperability between the UK, the US and Australia (image source: Army Recognition Group).

The notification revises a previously implemented non-MDE case from $50 million to approximately $1 billion and names Huntington Ingalls Industries, General Dynamics Electric Boat, General Dynamics Mission Systems, Progeny Systems, Lockheed Martin and Systems Planning and Analysis among the main contractors, signalling that this is a major design and integration effort, not a routine support package.

What the UK is purchasing is not a missile store, but the mechanisms that enable a future SSN to detect, decide, launch, control and safely rearm. The published list includes vertical launch tubes, common weapon launchers, multiple support modules with full cartridges, network input/output units, servers, switches, custom electronics, test equipment, software, source code and technical documentation, all related to the federated tactical submarine warfare system. From a military perspective, this is the physical and digital kill chain, from the combat system command to the release of the weapon.

The notification does not specify exactly which munitions are planned for the AUKUS SSNs, and this distinction matters. Even so, the direction is clear: the Royal Navy’s Astute-class submarines currently operate Tomahawk land-attack missiles and Spearfish heavy torpedoes, whilst the US Navy states that the Virginia-class payload tubes use large-diameter launchers, each capable of firing six Tomahawks from multiple fully tilted canisters. This leads to a strong analytical conclusion that the specific work on AUKUS vertical tubes and canisters is intended to provide the future class with greater magazine depth and payload flexibility compared to a configuration using only the torpedo room.

Vertical loading capability allows a submarine to retain the 533 mm space for torpedo tubes for anti-submarine or anti-surface engagements, whilst keeping land-attack munitions or other encapsulated payloads in reserve, thereby enhancing first-strike options and mission endurance. A common weapon launcher also reduces the penalty of platform-specific integration by standardising interfaces, safety locks, control logic and testing across variants of the combat systems, which is exactly the kind of design choice that enables faster certification, cleaner upgrades and better interoperability between allied fleets.

The Royal Navy’s core weapons suite demonstrates the kind of combat effect this architecture is built for. Official Royal Navy data states that Astute-class submarines can carry up to 38 weapons in six 21-inch tubes; The Tomahawk Block IV gives them a strategic land-attack range of approximately 1,000 miles with in-flight retargeting, whilst the Spearfish can engage targets at 14 miles or up to 30 miles at lower speeds. The upgraded Spearfish missile features a new warhead, a safer propellant system, improved electronics and a fibre-optic guidance link, enhancing the submarine’s ability to track both surface and submerged targets with high precision.

Equally important is the combat system architecture. NAVSEA describes SWFTS as a federation of independent electronic systems integrated into a common combat system, and current US submarine engineering documentation explicitly links the AN/BYG-1 interfaces, the Weapon Launch Console, the Payload Support Electronics System, the Tube Control Panel and the Common Weapon Launcher to that environment. The inclusion of servers, switches, custom electronics, software and even source code shows that London is not merely purchasing equipment; it is purchasing the capability to integrate, test, troubleshoot, train on and evolve the weapons system over time, which is essential for a sovereign SSN force that must remain relevant against rapidly changing underwater and attack threats.

That is why the contract clearly falls under the AUKUS I pillar. The original FMS package was already defined as support for the design and production of next-generation nuclear attack submarines for the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy, within the framework of the trilateral AUKUS partnership, and the new package specifically adds AUKUS-tailored elements of launchers, tubes, training and embedded personnel. Official AUKUS documents state that the AUKUS SSN will use a common design for the UK and Australia, based on a British design and incorporating technology from all three nations, with the UK providing lead design approval.

The broader logic of the programme is now well established. Under the AUKUS roadmap, Australian military and civilian personnel have begun integrating into US and UK submarine forces and industrial bases from 2023; SRF-West at HMAS Stirling is planned from 2027, with one British and up to four American submarines; The United States intends, in the early 2030s, to sell Australia three Virginia-class submarines, with up to two more possible; and the first British AUKUS SSN is scheduled for the late 2030s, followed by the first Australian-built submarine in the early 2040s. A contract centred on launch systems, training and integrated personnel is therefore not peripheral to AUKUS; it is one of the mechanisms that make the path viable.

The industrial significance is equally important. The UK says that the AUKUS SSN entered detailed design and long-lead work in March 2023, construction will take place at Barrow, the reactors will be built at Raynesway, and Australia is investing £2.4 billion in infrastructure and sharing the design of the Rolls-Royce submarines. Since then, London has allocated major additional funding and plans for up to 12 SSN-AUKUS vessels, whilst recent statements from the UK and Australia highlight the expansion of integrated industrial personnel and training channels.

Strategically, the announcement is more significant than its bureaucratic wording suggests. Washington presents it as a strengthening of a NATO ally and maritime security in north-western Europe, but the same shared launch architecture and combat system also underpin the Indo-Pacific AUKUS framework, where the UK and Australia are already deepening submarine rotations, workforce development and industrial integration. In this sense, this $1 billion deal should be interpreted as a convergence of combat systems: an early, costly, but necessary to ensure that future British and Australian SSNs can share weaponry logic, training standards, upgrade paths and operational practices in both Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.

Source: here

Poland and Sweden launch new Baltic defence operations to protect maritime routes and deter Russia

Poland and Sweden have launched a new phase of joint Baltic defence operations, aligning surveillance, infrastructure protection and combat readiness to counter growing regional threats. Defence Ministers Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz and Pål Jonson confirmed the expansion at Gdynia Naval Base, launching coordinated maritime and air activities in the Baltic Sea.

The initiative strengthens NATO’s northern flank by integrating Swedish capabilities into allied planning and accelerating joint response capacity in a region under sustained pressure from Russia. By synchronising procurement, operations and information sharing, both nations are positioning their forces to detect, deter and respond more rapidly to emerging threats to critical maritime routes and underwater infrastructure.

A meeting held on 12 March 2026 coincided with a visit by a Swedish Navy submarine to Gdynia, symbolising the strengthening of interoperability and recent defence agreements between the two countries. The effort directly strengthens NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltic Sea, now effectively an inland sea of the Alliance following Sweden’s accession.

The Polish-Swedish framework focuses on building joint military capabilities through joint procurement, coordinated training and industrial cooperation. Both nations are aligning their naval modernisation strategies, particularly in the fields of anti-submarine warfare, maritime domain awareness and the protection of underwater infrastructure. This reflects growing concern over hybrid threats, including the risks of sabotage to undersea cables, pipelines and energy infrastructure, as well as vulnerabilities increasingly exploited in grey-zone operations.

A key structural component of the partnership is the rotating command of NATO-aligned Baltic maritime security responsibilities. Germany currently leads this framework, with Poland and Sweden scheduled to take command sequentially. This arrangement is designed to ensure continuity in operational planning, whilst distributing leadership among the frontline NATO states most exposed to Russian military activity.

In terms of capabilities, Sweden brings advanced expertise in submarine warfare, including its A26-class stealth submarine programme, whilst Poland is accelerating naval modernisation through its Orka submarine procurement and coastal defence initiatives. Combined operations between Swedish submarines and Polish surface assets are expected to significantly improve the effectiveness of anti-submarine warfare in the shallow and complex maritime environment of the Baltic Sea.

The presence of a Swedish submarine in Gdynia underscores the growing interoperability at the tactical level. Joint exercises are increasingly focusing on multi-domain operations, integrating naval, air and cyber capabilities. This includes coordinated responses to unmanned aerial threats, following recent incidents involving Russian drone activity over the Baltic regions. These developments highlight the evolving threat spectrum, where conventional and hybrid tactics converge.

Industrial cooperation is also a central pillar of the partnership. Both governments have committed to expanding collaboration between their defence industries, potentially involving the co-development of naval systems, sensors and command and control architectures. This aligns with broader European efforts to strengthen the resilience of the defence industry and reduce dependence on external suppliers. The initiative could also complement Poland’s expanding defence procurement ecosystem and Sweden’s export-oriented defence industry strategy.

From a strategic perspective, the partnership strengthens NATO’s northern flank by integrating Sweden more deeply into regional defence planning, alongside Poland, one of the Alliance’s fastest-growing military powers. The transformation of the Baltic Sea into a NATO-dominated operational space shifts the balance of maritime control, complicating Russia’s naval manoeuvrability vis-à-vis Kaliningrad and the Gulf of Finland.

The emphasis on protecting critical infrastructure reflects the lessons learnt from recent incidents in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, where underwater assets have become prime targets for hybrid warfare. Enhanced surveillance networks, including seabed sensors and unmanned systems, are likely to form part of the roadmap for joint capabilities. This is in line with NATO’s broader initiatives on maritime resilience.

From the perspective of a defence analyst at the Army Recognition Group, the Baltic Sea has become one of NATO’s most critical operational theatres, as it directly connects the allies of Northern and Eastern Europe, whilst also serving as a vital corridor for military mobility, energy flows and digital infrastructure. Control and security of this maritime space enable the rapid reinforcement of the Baltic states and ensure uninterrupted logistical support in crisis scenarios. Any disruption, whether through a naval blockade, cyberattacks or sabotage of seabed infrastructure, would immediately affect NATO’s ability to sustain operations on its eastern flank.

The increasing emphasis on protection against Russian threats is driven by both conventional and hybrid risk vectors. Russia maintains significant anti-access and area denial capabilities in Kaliningrad, including long-range air defence systems, anti-ship missiles and electronic warfare assets that can challenge NATO’s freedom of movement in the Baltic Sea. At the same time, Moscow has demonstrated an increasing willingness to conduct grey-zone operations, such as GPS jamming, infrastructure disruption and the use of unmanned systems to probe NATO’s defences. Strengthening maritime surveillance, anti-submarine warfare and infrastructure security is therefore essential to maintaining the credibility of deterrence.

For Russia, the Baltic Sea represents a vital but increasingly constrained strategic operational environment. It provides critical access routes for the Baltic Fleet and serves as a forward position for projecting power towards Northern Europe and NATO’s eastern members. Heavily militarised, Kaliningrad functions as a strategic stronghold, enabling Russia to deploy layered anti-access capabilities designed to restrict NATO’s naval and air operations. However, Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO has significantly altered this equation, effectively encircling Russian positions and limiting its room for manoeuvre. Consequently, Russia is likely to rely more heavily on asymmetric tactics and hybrid operations to compensate for its growing geographical and operational disadvantage.

From an operational perspective, the Polish-Swedish alliance introduces a more coherent regional defence architecture, capable of a rapid response and a sustained presence. By synchronising command structures, procurement strategies and training cycles, both countries are moving towards a de facto integrated maritime defence zone in the Baltic Sea.

This development signals a shift from national defence postures towards collective regional deterrence, where interoperability and shared capabilities are decisive. As Russia continues to test NATO’s cohesion through hybrid and conventional means, the Poland-Sweden axis is becoming a critical pillar in securing Northern Europe’s maritime domain, with long-term implications for alliance-wide force projection and crisis response.

Source: here

US Navy sends modernised destroyer USS Mustin to Japan to bolster missile defence in the Indo-Pacific

The return of the USS Mustin to Yokosuka brings a modernised Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer back to the US Navy’s most important maritime theatre after nearly five years in San Diego.

After nearly five years in San Diego, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer has returned to US 7th Fleet operations under the command of Destroyer Squadron 15. The deployment follows a major modernisation period, bringing upgraded Aegis air defence and multi-mission strike capabilities back to one of Washington’s most critical maritime theatres. This move reflects a broader US strategy to maintain highly trained naval forces positioned near key points in the Indo-Pacific.

The USS Mustin is returning to Yokosuka to bolster the US’s forward naval presence in the Indo-Pacific, bringing multi-mission combat, air and missile defence, anti-submarine warfare and strike capabilities, to support deterrence, rapid response and alliance operations against the backdrop of growing strategic competition with China (image source: US War Report).

The significance lies in both the timing and the geography: the Navy announced that the USS Mustin is returning to Destroyer Squadron 15 in Yokosuka as part of a scheduled rotation in the Pacific, replacing the cruiser USS Robert Smalls, and explicitly linked the deployment to the defence of Japan, regional deterrence and the need to maintain credible forward-deployed combat forces in a contested Indo-Pacific environment. The Seventh Fleet’s area of operations spans more than 124 million square kilometres and includes the East China Sea, the approaches to Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and the wider Western Pacific.

The Mustin itself is a valuable asset for that set of missions. Commissioned in 2003, DDG 89 is a Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class destroyer measuring 509.5 feet, with a displacement of between 8,300 and 9,700 tonnes, and is built around the Aegis combat system. The class features SPY-1 radar, a 96-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system, AN/SQQ-89 sonar, a 5-inch gun, electronic warfare systems, torpedoes and twin helicopter hangars for on-board MH-60 operations. In practical terms, this makes the Mustin a multi-role surface combatant, capable of conducting anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, strike and missile defence missions from a single hull.

This breadth of capability explains why the ship is returning to Japan. A San Diego-based destroyer can support operations in the Pacific, but a Yokosuka-based destroyer is already in the decisive theatre. It can respond more rapidly to events in the East China Sea, can advance towards the Taiwan Strait without spending weeks in transit, can escort high-value assets, monitor contested maritime routes, and can integrate immediately with Japanese and allied naval forces. In a region where military signalling and crisis response are measured in hours and days, not months, forward bases are in themselves a force multiplier.

The Navy has not publicly detailed the exact modernisation package completed during the Mustin’s time at the US shipyard, but the DDG 51 modernisation path is designed to refine precisely the capabilities required in the Western Pacific. The Navy’s destroyer modernisation framework adds improved ballistic missile defence processing, better radar performance in congested coastal environments, cooperative engagement capability, ESSM integration, CIWS Block 1B, SEWIP upgrades for electronic warfare, Nulka decoys and vertical launch support for newer variants of the Standard missile, including the SM-3 on the upgraded ships. Even without a public system-by-system list for the Mustin, the service description of a ‘major modernisation period’ strongly suggests a return to Japan with a more relevant combat capability than the ship had upon departure.

China’s military activity increased in 2025 in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the waters around Japan and beyond the First Island Chain, according to CSIS tracking based on regional data. Around Taiwan, the PLA maintained record levels of air and maritime pressure, whilst China kept up the pressure on Japan and expanded its operations on the high seas. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, stated in April 2025 that Beijing’s actions near Taiwan were not “just exercises” but rehearsals, highlighting why an advanced Aegis destroyer in Yokosuka is important: it provides a survivable sensor and fire platform, where deterrence must be visible every day.

The value of the Mustin is not limited to a Taiwan contingency: its ballistic missile defence and air defence capabilities also matter within the broader regional architecture underpinning the defence of Japan and forward-deployed US forces. The 2022 US National Defence Strategy emphasises deterrence against the PRC through posture, capabilities and allied cooperation, whilst emphasising integrated air and missile defence and support for allies facing grey-zone coercion in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. From an operational perspective, a BMD-capable destroyer in Yokosuka provides commanders with a mobile defensive node capable of protecting ports, battle groups, logistics lines and allied forces, whilst maintaining freedom of manoeuvre under missile threat conditions.

Its anti-submarine profile is equally important. The Arleigh Burke IIA-class destroyers are equipped with twin helicopter hangars and organic aviation support, which substantially improves anti-submarine capabilities compared to previous classes. In an Indo-Pacific environment where Chinese and North Korean underwater activity remains a persistent concern, the ship’s MH-60 helicopters, onboard sonar, ASROC and networked signalling make the Mustin more than just an escort vessel; they transform it into a protective asset for aircraft carrier strike groups, amphibious forces and independent surface action groups operating across the Philippine Sea and near Japan.

There is also an alliance management dimension to this deployment. The Seventh Fleet states that it conducts over 1,000 theatre security cooperation engagements annually, and Yokosuka is the main forward centre for this activity. A ship such as the Mustin can link up with Japanese, Australian, South Korean and other partners’ operations as a leading contributor to air defence, strike and command and control, helping to translate political alignment into usable military interoperability. This matters because deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is cumulative: presence, exercises, shared tactical imagery and routine cooperation shape Beijing’s risk calculations long before any crisis begins.

Seen in this light, Mustin is returning to Japan for three interrelated reasons: to restore the surface firepower previously deployed following a rotation change, to position a modernised, multi-role combatant near the region’s most likely flashpoints, and to support the US doctrine of advanced, allied, denial-based deterrence in the Pacific. The ship brings a combination of Aegis air defence, ballistic missile defence, anti-submarine range, strike capability and networking that fits the region’s threat picture unusually well. A single destroyer does not, on its own, shift the balance of power, but in the Western Pacific, a modernised destroyer permanently based at Yokosuka is a practical expression of the strategy.

Source: here

Putin has declared the beginning of the decline of the Russian economy

The trend in the main macroeconomic indicators of the Russian economy at the start of 2026 has turned negative.

According to The Moscow Times, this was stated by President Vladimir Putin at an economic meeting on Monday, 23 March.

President Vladimir Putin said at an economic meeting on Monday

“In January this year, Russia’s gross domestic product was 2.1% lower than last year. Industrial output fell by 0.8%,” Putin quoted Rosstat’s statistics as saying.

“In fact, there is nothing unexpected for us here,” Putin said, adding that the government must bring the country “back onto the path of sustainable economic growth”, whilst preventing a rise in inflation or destabilisation of the labour market.

As for the federal budget, which in January-February recorded a deficit of 3.5 trillion roubles and faced a decline in total revenue, it is necessary to take “balanced decisions” and ensure “long-term stability”, Putin stressed. He added that the state of the budgetary system is an “important condition” for economic growth.

The decline in GDP in January, previously reported by Rosstat, was the first for Russia in 2023. Last year, according to official statistics, the country’s economic growth slowed by nearly five times, reaching 1%, and was half the decline in the government’s initial forecasts. Of the 28 main industries, 21 ended the year in the red: mining fell by 1.6%, metallurgy reduced output by 2.1%, and clothing and footwear factories by 3.5%; for the first time in 15 years, food production fell by 0.5%.

For the current year, the authorities initially planned for growth of over 2%, then revised the forecast down to 1.3%, but this may still be too optimistic. According to Bloomberg, the Ministry of Economic Development is considering the possibility of reducing it to 0.7% and, furthermore, is preparing a budget freeze, as revenue from raw materials halved at the start of the year, with the exception of military and protected sectors, which include, amongst other things, social services.

The economic slowdown promises a decline in non-oil and gas revenues for the budget, despite the tax reform, which includes an increase in VAT and taxes for small businesses, warns Ilya Sokolov, head of the Budget Policy Department at the Gaidar Institute.

According to his calculations, compared with the plan, the treasury could lose 500 billion roubles in VAT and 100–200 billion roubles in income tax. Given that budget expenditure is likely to exceed the plan by around 1 trillion roubles, the deficit, instead of the planned reduction, could rise to nearly 8 trillion roubles, Sokolov estimates.

Source: here

At least four oil tanks are on fire at the Russian port of Primorsk following a drone attack

Satellite images indicate that at least four oil tanks are on fire at one of Russia’s largest oil export terminals, Transneft – Primorsk Port, following the Ukrainian attack.

This was reported by Radio Liberty, according to Ukrinform

It is noted that at least four oil tanks are on fire at the Primorsk port terminal in the Leningrad region.

Earlier, the governor of the Leningrad region, Alexander Drozdenko, reported a fire in a single fuel tank.

According to him, a total of over 70 UAVs were shot down over the region that night.

The ASTRA Telegram channel has geolocated eyewitness videos and photographs showing large-scale smoke from a fire in the port. Both were taken in the village of Yermilovo, Vyborg District, Leningrad Region.

ASTRA also reported that NASA FIRMS satellite imagery revealed a fire signature across the entire tank farm of the Primorsk oil port.

The Port of Primorsk is Russia’s largest oil port on the Baltic Sea, located in the Vyborg District of the Leningrad Region, approximately 8 km from the town of Primorsk, on the north-eastern coast of the Gulf of Finland.

It is the terminus of the Baltic Pipeline System, owned by Transnafta, and is the main export terminal for crude oil and petroleum products.

As reported by Ukrinform, the Defence Forces have struck key facilities in the Russian Federation’s fuel and energy infrastructure. Specifically, these include the ‘Transneft – Port of Primorsk’ oil terminal in the Leningrad region and the ‘Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim’ refinery in Ufa.

Source: here

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