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MS DAILY BRIEF – August 8 th, 2025
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Daily appearance Monday-Saturday 09 AM (GMT +2)
Some information is presented when possible from several sources
Contents
Breaking news: Israeli warplanes BOMB Hezbollah; Power outages SHUT DOWN Iran | TBN Israel 1
Trump says he will meet with Putin despite Kremlin’s refusal to talk to Kiev. 3
Update on the war in Ukraine: Zelenskyy mobilises European allies ahead of Trump-Putin meeting 5
Kiev opens investigation into war crimes against notorious Russian prison chief. 6
Trump claims to have reached a “historic” peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan 10
The pointless trade war between America and China. 17
At the missile defence conference, the first rule at Golden Dome is not to talk about Golden Dome 20
The army is considering launching its new Air and Missile Defence Strategy in the autumn 21
Germany deploys new PEGASUS electronic surveillance aircraft to strengthen Air Force capabilities 29
Embraer and Lithuania sign new defence industrial alliance for European rearmament 32
The key pillar of Russia’s military resources is collapsing. The timing could not be worse. 36
Navigating the complexity of maritime sanctions: an overview from July 2025. 38
Houthis threaten 64 shipowners with attacks on vessels calling at Israel 43
Failed German offshore wind auction ‘shows politicians must finally act’ 44
Breaking news: Israeli warplanes BOMB Hezbollah; Power outages SHUT DOWN Iran | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine | Impressive! Ukraine strikes important radars in Crimea | Russian army remains blind
Netanyahu announces plan to take control of Gaza City, marking a new escalation in the devastating war
The plan will likely lead to the displacement of tens of thousands of Palestinians already suffering from starvation and comes after the prime minister said he wanted to take control of the entire territory
Guardian staff and agents
Friday, 8 August 2025, 05:21 CEST
Israel’s security cabinet has approved a plan to take control of Gaza City, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office said, marking a new escalation in the 22-month offensive that has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians, destroyed most of Gaza and pushed the territory into famine .
Ahead of the security cabinet meeting, which began on Thursday and lasted through the night, Netanyahu said Israel intends to take control of theand eventually hand it over to friendly Arab forces opposed to Hamas.
The announced plans do not go that far, likely reflecting the reservations of senior Israeli generals, who reportedly warned that this would endanger the approximately 20 hostages still in Hamas’ hands and further strain the Israeli military after nearly two years of regional wars. Many families of the hostages also oppose the plan, fearing that an escalation of the conflict will condemn their loved ones.
Israel has repeatedly bombed the Gazan town and carried out numerous raids there, only to return to different neighbourhoods as militants regrouped. Today, it is one of the few areas in Gaza that has not been turned into an Israeli buffer zone or subject to evacuation orders.
A large-scale ground operation could displace tens of thousands of people and further disrupt efforts to deliver food to the territory.
It is not known exactly how many people live in the city, which was the largest in Gaza before the war. Hundreds of thousands fled Gaza City following evacuation orders in the first weeks of the war, but many returned during a ceasefire earlier this year.
Palestinians, who face difficulties in accessing food due to the blockade imposed by Israel, are waiting to receive hot meals on 7 August. Photo: Anadolu/Getty Images
The families of hostages held in Gaza fear that an escalation could condemn their loved ones, and some have protested outside the security cabinet headquarters in Jerusalem. Former senior Israeli security officials have also spoken out against the plan , warning that it could lead to a stalemate with no significant military benefits.
An Israeli official previously said that the security cabinet would discuss plans to conquer all or parts of the Gaza Strip that are not yet under Israeli control. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity pending an official decision, said that whatever is approved will be implemented gradually to increase pressure on Hamas.
Palestinians, at least 90% of whom by war and nearly one in ten of whom , are bracing for more suffering. Almost nothing remains of the health system, and humanitarian aid agencies, such as the UN, have been largely blocked by Israel.
Aya Mohammad, a 30-year-old Palestinian woman who, after repeated displacements, returned with her family to Gaza City, said: “Where can we go? We have been displaced and humiliated enough.
Do you know what displacement means? Does the world know? It means your dignity is destroyed, you become a homeless beggar, searching for food, water and medicine.”
At least 42 Palestinians were killed on Thursday in Israeli air strikes and shootings in southern Gaza, according to local hospitals.
Asked in an interview with Fox News ahead of the Security Cabinet meeting whether Israel would “take control of the entire Gaza Strip,” Netanyahu replied: “We intend to do so, to ensure our security, to remove Hamas from this area and to allow the population to be free in Gaza.”
“We don’t want to keep it. We want to have a security perimeter,” Netanyahu said in the interview. “We want to hand it over to Arab forces that will govern it properly, without threatening us and providing the people of Gaza with a good life.”
The Israeli army’s chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, warned against occupying Gaza, saying it would endanger hostages and put additional pressure on the army after nearly two years of war, according to Israeli media.
The Israeli military offensive has killed at least 61,000 Palestinians, according to the Gaza health ministry, most of them civilians. The figure does not inclu’s thousands believed to be buried under rubble or the thousands killed by the indirect consequences of the war.
Of the 42 people killed on Thursday, at least 13 were seeking help in an Israeli military zone in southern Gaza, where UN aid convoys are regularly overwhelmed by looters and desperate crowds. Two other people were killed on roads leading to nearby locations run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, an American organisation supported by Israel, according to Nasser Hospital, which received the bodies.
The GHF said there were no violent incidents at or near its locations on Thursday. The Israeli military had no immediate comment. Israel does not allow foreign journalists into Gaza and has repeatedly targeted Palestinian journalists.
With Associated Press
Trump says he will meet with Putin despite Kremlin’s refusal to talk to Kiev
The US President contradicts reports that the meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy was a precondition for the US-Russia summit
Shaun Walker in Kiev and Andrew Roth in Washington
Friday, 8 August 2025, 00:37 CEST
Donald Trump has said he is ready to meet with Vladimir Putin despite the Russian leader’s refusal to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, rejecting speculation that direct talks between the two presidents in conflict were a precondition for a high-level summit between the US and Russia.
On Thursday, during a press conference in the Oval Office, Trump said that Putin does not need to meet with Zelenskyy first for the US and Russian presidents to meet.
“No, they don’t,” Trump said. “They want to meet with me, and I’ll do everything I can to stop the killing.”
This contradicts a New York Post article quoting a White House official as saying that Trump will only meet with Putin if the Kremlin leader meets with Zelensky, which Putin has previously rejected.
Contradictory messages – with White House and Kremlin officials sometimes contradicting each other on the leaders’ demands and the state of planning – suggest a new chaotic chapter in Trump’s chaotic efforts to negotiate a truce in the war in Ukraine.
Putin said he was not ready to meet with Zelenskyy, even though the Kremlin said preparations were underway for a bilateral summit with Donald Trump next week.
“I have nothing against it in general, it is possible, but certain conditions must be created for this,” Putin said of the meeting with Zelensky. “But, unfortunately, we are still far from creating such conditions.”
After Putin met with Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff at the Kremlin on Wednesday, reports from Washington suggested that the Russian president had agreed to meet first with Trump and then with Zelensky in a trilateral format.
And although the Kremlin seemed enthusiastic about the prospect of a summit, it denied that a trilateral summit with Zelensky had been discussed.
“We propose to focus first on preparations for a bilateral meeting with Trump,” Putin’s adviser Yuri Ushakov told reporters in Moscow. “
As for the trilateral meeting, which for some reason Washington mentioned yesterday, this was only a mention by the American side during the meeting in the Kremlin. But this was not discussed. The Russian side left this option completely without comment.”
No venue has been indicated for the possible bilateral summit, but Putin, who was meeting with Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the leader of the United Arab Emirates, at the Kremlin, suggested that the UAE could be a suitable place for the talks. “We have many friends who are willing to help us organise such events. One of our friends is the president of the United Arab Emirates,” he said.
The prospect of Putin and Trump trying to reach an agreement on Ukraine with no one else in the room is likely to alarm Kiev and European capitals, which have consistently said that Ukraine must be present at talks on its fate.
Instead, Russia is in favour of a “summit of major powers” where it could try to negotiate with Trump over the heads of the Europeans. Kirill Dmitriev, economic adviser to the Kremlin, said the meeting would be a good opportunity to talk directly with Trump to prevent “misinformation” about Russia that other countries are using to influence the American president. The summit could become “an important historical event,” he said.
Trump called Zelensky after Witkoff left Russia on Wednesday. NATO chief Mark Rutte and several European leaders also participated in the call.
On Thursday, Zelenskyy avoided criticising Trump, but said he would spend the day talking with European allies. “We in Ukraine have repeatedly stated that finding real solutions can only be truly effective at the leadership level. We need to decide on the timing for such a format, with a number of issues,” he wrote in a post on Telegram.
He later said he had spoken with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron. “I presented [to Macron] Ukraine’s position on the discussion between President Trump and European colleagues,” he said. “We are coordinating our positions and both understand the need for a common European vision on key European security issues.”
Zelenskyy has repeatedly called for direct talks with Putin, Trump or Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a mediator. Putin has so far rejected this possibility, suggesting that lower-level negotiating groups should first reach an agreement. However, little progress has been made in a series of direct talks in Turkey, with Moscow sending a lower-level delegation and not prepared for real talks.
White House officials said sanctions were still on the table, and on Wednesday announced additional tariffs on India based on its purchases of Russian oil. At the same time, however, Trump seemed satisfied with the outcome of Witkoff’s talks.
Ushakov said the talks were “official” and said they focused on a bright future for cooperation between Washington and Moscow. “It was reaffirmed that Russian- n relations could be based on a completely different, mutually beneficial scenario, which differs drastically from the way they have developed in recent years,” he said.
Trump said on Wednesday evening that the meeting could take place “very soon.” Other officials in Washington seemed less certain. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said a meeting could take place soon, “but obviously a lot has to happen before that can happen.”
If it takes place, it would be the first high-level meeting between US and Russian leaders since the meeting between Joe Biden and Putin in Geneva in 2021.
Update on the war in Ukraine: Zelenskyy rallies European allies ahead of Trump-Putin meeting
“Ukraine is not afraid of meetings; we expect the same courageous approach from Russia.” What we know on day 1,262
Warren Murray, with Guardian journalists and news agencies
Friday, 8 August 2025, 03:35 CEST
- Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Europe must participate in the peace process between his country and Russia, after a telephone conversation with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on Thursday. The Ukrainian president initiated a series of telephone conversations with European leaders ahead of a meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, expected to take place soon . The Kremlin has refused a trilateral meeting with Zelenskyy and Trump, and Zelenskyy said: “Ukraine is not afraid of meetings and expects the same courageous approach from Russia.”
- European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she had discussed with Zelenskyy the developments of the past few days and “the next steps on the path to a negotiated peace agreement and Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, as well as its reconstruction.”
- French President Emmanuel Macron reaffirmed France’s full support for a ceasefire in Ukraine and the launch of negotiations aimed at achieving a lasting and solid peace, after a “long discussion” with Zelensky and other European leaders. “I reiterated to the Ukrainian president France’s full support for the establishment of a ceasefire and the launch of talks towards a solid and lasting solution that respects Ukraine’s legitimate rights and guarantees its security and that of Europeans.”
- Zelenskyy said he discussed a new financial assistance programme for Ukraine with IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva. “We are ready to take the necessary steps quickly. The government is already working on this.” Ukraine’s current programme with the IMF, worth $15.5 billion, expires in 2027.
- Russian drone strikes wounded three women in the Bucha district of the Kiev region and set houses on fire, officials said on Friday morning. Kharkiv was hit by Shahed drones, causing fires, and on Thursday eight people were wounded in Russian shelling in the Donetsk region.
- The director of the notorious Taganrog prison, where officials are accused of overseeing the systematic torture and starvation of hundreds of Ukrainian prisoners, has been informed by the authorities in Kiev that he is suspected of committing a war crime, write Shaun Walker and Andrew Roth. Aleksandr Shtoda, head of the Sizo 2 pre-trial detention centre in Taganrog, has been officially placed under investigation.
A Russian state-owned explosives manufacturer circumvented sanctions by purchasing equipment manufactured by Siemens Germany through an intermediary that imports technology from China, Reuters reported, citing customs data and public procurement records.
- The equipment was destined for the recently expanded Biysk Oleum (BOZ) factory in southern Siberia, which produces TNT and HMX explosives and is on the Russian Defence Ministry’s list of suppliers.
- Reuters said it found no evidence that Siemens knowingly supplied BOZ. A Siemens spokesperson said it strictly complies with international sanctions and requires the same from its customers, but that some goods could end up in Russia without its knowledge. The company will report any sanctions violations to the authorities. Questions addressed to BOZ and its parent company remained unanswered, Reuters said.
- Russia does not produce many automated tools – and Konrad Muzyka, director of the Polish military consultancy Rochan, said that the continued supply of Western-made machinery was helping Russia prolong the war. “Without them, Russia’s ability to sustain or intensify its war effort would be more time-consuming, more costly and would place a greater burden on the labour market.”
Kiev opens investigation into war crimes against head of notorious Russian prison
Officials under the command of Aleksandr Shtoda are accused of systematically torturing and starving prisoners in Sizo 2 in Taganrog.
Juliette Garside and Artem Mazhulin
Thursday, 7 August 2025, 19:49 CEST
The director of Russia’s notorious Taganrog prison, where officials are accused of overseeing the systematic torture and starvation of hundreds of Ukrainian prisoners, has been informed by authorities in Kyiv that he is suspected of committing a war crime.
The Ukrainian National Police and the chief prosecutor for war crimes announced on Thursday that Aleksandr Shtoda, head of the Sizo 2 pre-trial detention centre in Taganrog, has been officially placed under investigation.
Shtoda was identified by the Viktoriia Project, an investigation by the Guardian and other media partners into the death of journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna in captivity in Russia, who was captured while working undercover in the occupied territories and transferred to Taganrog, where she spent nearly nine months.
She was last seen alive on 8 September 2024, and her body was repatriated earlier this year. Ukrainian investigators are still working to identify exactly where and how she died, although her remains showed numerous signs of torture. The announcement comes ahead of Roshchyna’s funeral, which will take place on Friday in Kyiv, and follows a decision by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to award her the Order of Freedom posthumously.
Shtoda took over the prison, located near the border with occupied Ukraine, in October 2022, after previously working there in leadership positions. After the large-scale Russian invasion, Sizo 2 was transformed from an institution housing juvenile prisoners and mothers with young children into a torture centre for prisoners of war.
In a statement, the Ukrainian National Police said: “During the period when the suspect headed Sizo No. 2 in Taganrog, Rostov region, a system of repressive treatment of illegally detained Ukrainian citizens, including civilians, was organised.”
They stated that their investigation, with operational support from other agencies, including the Ministry of Defence’s intelligence services, found that Roshchyna had been “subjected to systematic torture, humiliation, threats, severe restrictions on access to medical care, drinking water and food, and was deprived of the opportunity to sleep or sit down during the day”. They also found that she had been “subjected to physical punishment and psychological pressure” to cooperate with her abductors in Taganrog.
The police stated that Shtoda “personally ordered his subordinates to exert physical and moral pressure” on Roshchyna. “Being aware of her civilian status and the protection guaranteed by international humanitarian law, he deliberately violated the norms of the Geneva Convention and other international treaties.”
They concluded: “The actions of the accused have been classified as war crimes in accordance with international standards.”
The police statement was accompanied by photographs of Shtoda, although, in accordance with the convention, no reference was made to his name.
He was named in a video statement released on the same day by the prosecutor in charge of the Roshchyna case, Yurii Bielousov, who stated: “By his actions, Aleksandr Shtoda committed a war crime in the form of ill-treatment of a civilian, for which he is liable under Article 438(1) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which provides for imprisonment of up to 12 years. The investigation into this crime is ongoing and will identify all persons involved in its commission.”
A notice of suspicion is an official document issued by law enforcement agencies or a prosecutor to inform a person that they are officially suspected of committing a crime and marks the start of the preliminary investigation phase. Prosecutors may subsequently indict the person concerned, and a judge will decide whether to proceed to trial. People who are not physically in Ukraine can be tried in absentia.
Reporters Without Borders, an organisation that campaigns for the protection of journalists, welcomed the announcement as “a first step towards justice”. It added: “It is time for all those responsible for her death to be identified and held accountable. Their silence is unbearable.”
Shtoda was contacted for comment.
Trump news in brief: US tariffs hit highest level in nearly 100 years; Trump says he will meet with Putin
Brazil calls tariffs “unacceptable blackmail,” while other countries call for negotiations with the US; Trump contradicts reports that a meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy was a precondition for the US-Russia summit. Important political news from the US on Thursday, 7 August 2025
The Guardian team
Friday, 8 August 2025, 02:32 CEST
Leaders around the world scrambled to implement emergency measures after Trump’s tariff threats became reality at one minute past midnight Washington time on Thursday.
The Brazilian government said it was preparing a state aid plan for affected companies, while its president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, called the tariffs “unacceptable blackmail.”
Switzerland said it would seek new negotiations with the US after a last-minute mission by its president, Karin Keller-Sutter, to Washington failed to stop the imposition of 39% tariffs, which the Swissmem industry group described as a “nightmare scenario”.
The tariffs are now at a level not seen in the US for nearly 100 years, with Americans set to pay an average of 18.3% more for imported products – the highest rate since 1934 – according to the Budget Lab at Yale, an independent policy research centre.
Despite the uncertainty, the White House is confident that businesses will step up new investment and restart hiring in ways that can rebalance the US economy as a manufacturing powerhouse.
Here is a summary of today’s important news:
60 countries rush to respond to Trump’s latest tariffs
More than 60 countries around the world are rushing to respond to the latest round of tariffs imposed by Donald Trump, which came into effect on Thursday.
Industry representatives from rich and poor countries have warned that jobs will be lost as the tariffs have disrupted a decades-old global trading system, with rates ranging from 10% to 39%, 40% and 41% for Switzerland, Brazil and Syria.
The Guardian has also compiled a complete list of countries affected by the new tariffs.
Trump says he will meet with Putin despite Kremlin’s refusal to talk to Kiev
Donald Trump has said he is ready to meet Vladimir Putin despite the Russian leader’s refusal to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy , dispelling speculation that direct talks between the two presidents in conflict were a prerequisite for a high-level summit between the US and Russia.
Trump calls for Intel chief’s resignation
Donald Trump has called for the resignation of Intel’s chief executive, claiming that Lip-Bu Tan has ties to the Chinese Communist Party, which led to a drop in the American chipmaker’s shares.
Trump calls for a new census exclusively for the US
Donald Trump has announced that he has ordered the Department of Commerce to conduct a new census that excludes undocumented immigrants from the official count. In a post on Truth Social, Trump said the census would be “based on current facts and figures” and would use “the results and information obtained from the 2024 presidential election.” He added that “people who are in our country illegally will not be counted.”
Scientists condemn Trump’s energy chief’s plan to “update” climate reports
US Energy Secretary Chris Wright is facing increasingly intense criticism from scientists who say their “worst fears” have been confirmed after Wright revealed that the Trump administration will “update” the US’s main reports on the climate crisis.
US judge orders halt to construction of ‘Alligator Alcatraz’
A federal judge on Thursday ordered a temporary halt to the construction of an immigration detention centre – built in the middle of Florida’s Everglades and dubbed “ Alligator Alcatraz ” – while lawyers debate whether it violates environmental laws.
Democrats are concerned about Trump’s plan for the Qatari plane
Democratic leaders are sounding the alarm over President Donald Trump’s plan to divert funds from the US nuclear arsenal to turn a luxury jet gifted by Qatar into a new Air Force One.
In a letter obtained by the Guardian, SenatorsWarren , Tammy Duckworth, Ed Markey and Adam Schiff, along with Representatives John Garamendi and Jamie Raskin, demanded answers from Troy Meink, the secretary of the Air Force.
Senators request UnitedHealth documents after Guardian investigation
What else happened today:
- The Trump administration is forcing a senior FBI official who opposed requests to disclose the names of agents who investigated the 6 January insurrection to resign.
- The Fort Bliss military base in Texas is preparing to receive 1,000 immigrants for the Trump administration’s mass deportation operation and crackdown on immigration.
- JD Vance met with Republican lawmakers in Indiana to encourage them to redraw the state’s congressional map to make it more favourable to the Republican Party.
- Donald Trump said he would nominate White House economic counsellorto the Federal Reserve Board of Governors for a four-month term.
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/08/trump-administration-news-updates-latest
Trump claims to have reached a “historic” peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan
The two sworn enemies have gone to war twice over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan finally conquered in 2023.
Agents
Friday, 8 August 2025, 03:20 CEST
US President Donald Trump announced that he will host the leaders of Armenia and AzerbaijanHYPERLINK “https://www.theguardian.com/world/azerbaijan”on Friday for what he called a “historic peace summit” aimed at ending decades of hostility between the two former Soviet republics.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev “will join me at the White House for an official peace signing ceremony,” Trump wrote on his social media platform Truth Social on Thursday.
Declared enemies for decades, the two countries have twice gone to war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, which Azerbaijan recaptured from Armenian forces in a lightning offensive in 2023, triggering the exodus of more than 100,.
The two countries have held talks aimed at securing a peaceful solution, including last month in the United Arab Emirates, but no concrete results have been achieved.
“These two nations have been at war for many years, resulting in the deaths of thousands of people,” Trump wrote.
“Many leaders have tried to end the war, unsuccessfully, until now, thanks to ‘TRUMP’. My administration has been involved with both sides for some time,” he added, saying he was “very proud of these courageous leaders for doing the right thing.”
The American leader, who expressed his belief that his mediation efforts in various international conflicts deserve the Nobel Peace Prize, added that Washington will sign bilateral agreements “with both countries to pursue economic opportunities together” that could unlock the potential of the South Caucasus region.
The potential agreement could end decades of conflict and pave the way for the reopening of key transport corridors in the South Caucasus, closed since the early 1990s.
According to officials who spoke to the Associated Press, the agreement would grant the US concession rights to develop the corridor and name it the “Trump Route for Peace and International Prosperity.”
It would link Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan region, separated from the rest of the country by a 32 km (20 mile) strip of Armenian territory.
The transit corridor would eventually include a railway line, oil and gas pipelines and fibre optic lines, allowing the movement of goods and, eventually, people.
The transit corridor is expected to eventually include a railway line, oil and gas pipelines and fibre optic lines, allowing the movement of goods and, eventually, people. The agreement does not provide for the US to pay for the construction of the transit corridor, but for it to be developed by private companies.
The agreement was reached after a visit earlier this year by Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, to the Azerbaijani capital, Baku, and further talks between the parties.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have been fighting for control of the Nagorno- for nearly four decades . During the Soviet era, the region, which is mostly populated by Armenians, had autonomous status within Azerbaijan. Long-standing tensions between Christian Armenians and mostly Muslim Azerbaijanis erupted with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
With Agence France-Presse and Associated Press
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/08/armenia-azerbaijan-peace-deal-trump-summit-claim
The Secret Service’s request to raise the river level was made “without the knowledge” of JD Vance, his office says
The decision to alter the flow of the Ohio River “was made solely by agents,” the security agency said in a statement
Friday, 8 August 2025, 04:20 CEST
A spokesperson for JD Vance said that he and his staff were unaware that the Secret Service had decided earlier this month to ask military engineers to raise the water level of the Little Miami River ahead of a family boat trip that took place on his birthday.
“The Secret Service often takes protective measures without the knowledge of the vice president or his staff, as was the case last weekend,” the spokesperson said.
The statement followed the publication of a Guardian report on Wednesday that revealed the Secret Service had asked the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in Louisville, Kentucky, to raise the water level of a lake to allow Vance’s boat trip to go ahead. The USACE said on Wednesday that the decision was made to “ensure the safe navigation” of Vance’s security team.
The Secret Service provided additional information on Thursday, emphasising in a “revised” statement to the Guardian that the vice president’s office “was not involved in the decision” and that the water level adjustment was “operationally necessary” to allow access for motorised boats, local law enforcement and emergency response teams.
“These decisions were taken solely by agents as part of our standard advance planning process and did not involve the Vice-President’s Office,” the Secret Service said in a statement. A public safety boat is believed to have sunk during a joint reconnaissance mission with the Secret Service ahead of the trip, prompting the Secret Service to request the water level be raised.
Vance’s office did not initially respond to the Guardian’s request when asked about the water level change in connection with his boat trip. But the publication of the Guardian article sparked some controversy.
Marcy Kaptur, a Democratic congresswoman from Ohio’s 1st district , posted a tweet asking for more information about the USACE’s decision, saying: “Outrageous! Probably why he wasn’t available to discuss his Big Bonanza for Billionaires bill, which will destroy Ohio manufacturing jobs and our rural hospitals. The Army Corps of Engineers should share the information with the appropriate congressional committee.”
The news also drew comparisons to an embarrassing episode for another vice president, Al Gore, who was investigated in 1999 after a local utility company dumped millions of gallons of water into the Connecticut River to prevent him from failing during a canoe trip.
It is not unprecedented for the USACE to modify flows to accommodate public use — for example, for community events on the river and for training emergency response personnel.
USACE regulations governing requests for so-called “diversions” — or any change in normal practices — require approval and documentation demonstrating why the diversion is justified. This process also ensures that the risks associated with any diversion — including the risk of flooding or other environmental impacts — are detailed.
The USACE said in a statement on Wednesday that the Secret Service’s request “met the operational criteria outlined in the Caesar Creek Lake Water Control Manual and did not require a deviation from normal procedures.”
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/07/jd-vance-ohio-river-level
The path to negotiations has been disrupted: Ukrainian Armed Forces BEK attacks Russian Navy base in Novorossiysk – RUSSIAN source
Yesterday’s visit to Moscow by US Special Presidential Envoy Steve Witkoff and subsequent reports from the White House and the Kremlin about urgent preparations for a meeting between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump have seriously alarmed the head of the Kiev regime and his associates. Sources in the Bankova office claim that Kiev intends to disrupt the upcoming negotiations between Russian and American leaders at any cost.
In fact, militants of the Kiev regime took the first step in this direction last night, attempting to attack the Russian Navy base in Novorossiysk using unmanned boats and kamikaze drones.
However, this calculation did not pay off. The Black Sea Fleet’s air and coastal defences repelled the attack without any losses. Nevertheless, in the coming days and nights, the enemy may make repeated attempts.
According to sources, an urgent meeting of the heads of the Ukrainian special services is being prepared in Kiev, the main topic of which will be the organisation of sabotage and terrorist attacks on the territory of the Russian Federation.
Andriy Yermak is currently focusing on the issue of disrupting the negotiations; for Bankova, this is the most negative scenario, with territorial concessions and a transition to the electoral cycle. The President’s Office is preparing a meeting with the SBU and GUR on possible cases of disruption of negotiations and prolongation of the confrontation with the Kremlin. – writes the Telegram channel “Rezident”.
Let us recall that earlier, the head of the Kiev regime, Zelensky, personally announced that he had sanctioned the SBU to carry out new operations on the territory of the Russian Federation. Thus, it can be said that in the coming days, as the meeting between Trump and Putin is being prepared, the likelihood of provocations from Ukraine increases many times over.
Source: here
The Art of Governance
Welcome to The Blueprint, our monthly science and technology summary. Written and edited by Dr. Mann Virdee.
Thoughts from your correspondent on recent developments in science and technology in the United Kingdom (UK)
Governance is both an art and a science. One thing that characterises good governance is knowing which battles to fight and when. More importantly, good governance means defending something – and having a deal you are willing to die for.
This is a matter of balance, which changes over time during the life of a Parliament. At the beginning, there is the so-called ‘honeymoon period’, when there is some goodwill and more political capital to spend. However, as time passes, this generally erodes – and it can become harder to do the difficult things.
It seems that the current iteration of Her Majesty’s Government (HM) has not struck this balance correctly. Their first six months or so were wasted; they seemed unprepared for office or faced unexpected institutional barriers, despite having had sufficient time to prepare.
Now, more than a year into their term, their priorities seem strange, sometimes unrelated. The myriad plans, strategies, speeches and rhetoric are laudable (“I support builders, not blockers”) and suggest coherence and focus – but the reality often does not match.
Take the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, for example. The UK’s planning system is one of the main barriers to building the infrastructure the country needs. Sir Keir Starmer, the leader of the Labour Party, acknowledged this, writing: “Why does it take so long to build anything in the UK? You can blame our outdated planning system that slows us down.”
The Planning and Infrastructure Bill contained some strong provisions to address these issues. It was the beginning of a response to a seemingly intractable problem. And yet, as the bill progressed through Parliament, Her Majesty’s Government made concessions – a “tactical retreat” – to speed up the passage of this flagship legislation.
I have no doubt that they would argue that this is a perfect example of a government that “knows which battles to pick” and would plead the merits of a slightly watered-down bill earlier rather than a stronger one later.
Perhaps. But here is the risk: now that Her Majesty’s Government has made concessions, campaign groups will know that they can continue to press on. These concessions will not be enough. Her Majesty’s Government has not shown the strength or desire to stand up to those who are blocking it.
I was pleased to see that Lord Hunt of Kings Heath tabled an amendment to the bill based on recommendations in my recent briefing paper. But if Her Majesty’s Government has already acknowledged this, then it is unlikely that such provisions to strengthen the bill will succeed when it is debated at committee stage.
You don’t need to be a time traveller to know what will happen: the bill will have to be watered down even further to speed up its passage, and the resulting final bill will be so watered down that it will be ill-suited to the scale of the infrastructure challenge facing the UK – meaning that further legislation will have to be introduced at a later stage. And so the cycle begins again.
Technological innovations, developments and stories you may have missed
Hydrogen-powered steel railway line built in Austria
Austrian national railway company ÖBB has built the world’s first hydrogen-powered steel railway line at Linz Central Station.
Personalised CRISPR therapy administered to a baby with a genetic disease
In an innovative case, a baby with a severe genetic disease has received personalised CRISPR therapy designed to correct the specific mutation causing the disease. The treatment appears to have been effective.
Artificial intelligence photonic processor installed in a supercomputing facility
A German supercomputing centre has implemented the world’s first photonic artificial intelligence (AI) processor. Developed by Q.ANT, a deep-tech company based in Stuttgart, the new native processing server brings analogue photonic computing to a high-performance computing environment for the first time.
Brain implant translates thoughts into speech in real time
A man with a significant speech impairment can now speak expressively and sing with the help of a brain implant. A world first, the device translates his neural activity into words almost instantly. It transmits changes in intonation when he asks questions, emphasises words and allows him to hum a series of notes in three different pitches.
How not to fix an artificial intelligence institute
Alex Chalmers
If you are not familiar with the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of the Alan Turing Institute, read Alex’s article. See also: “Reforming the Alan Turing Institute” by Ben Johnson and Julia Willemyns, which calls for a complete replacement of the board of directors, giving priority to leaders in the fields of artificial intelligence, defence and start-ups.
HS2 was doomed to be a mess, say insiders – because of a “problem in this country”
Kate Lamble
This article argues that HS2 was doomed to failure due to a combination of ambitious engineering goals, complex planning negotiations with communities and a cumbersome planning system.
“If you want to repeal the Online Safety Bill, you’re on the side of predators. It’s as simple as that.” – Peter Kyle, Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology
The new Online Safety Bill is designed to protect children from harmful online content. However, civil liberties groups have argued that the law – while well-intentioned – is flawed, jeopardises privacy and freedom of expression, and creates security risks. Many therefore consider this statement to be overly simplistic and controversial.
Source: here
Moving towards détente?
Despite the deep animosity caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a sound strategy requires Washington to seek to normalise relations with the Kremlin. The United States and Russia share many fundamental interests, including strategic stability and the continued flow of maritime trade.
Twenty years ago this month, a remarkable and inspiring series of events took place off the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia’s Far East, events that should resonate with sailors regardless of their nationality and remind leaders of what is possible when Russia and the United States cooperate in naval affairs. After seven Russian sailors were trapped in the Priz AS-28 submersible, 190 metres below the surface of the sea, sailors and officers from the US Navy and sister services acted to save their lives. The operation was successful and wrote a new chapter in the long history of naval cooperation between the US and Russia.
Naval ties between the United States and Russia date back to the exploits of John Paul Jones in 1787–1788, which were intended to help secure Crimea for Tsarina Catherine. The Russian Navy sent two cruiser squadrons, one to each coast of the United States, in September 1863 to show its support for the Union during the American Civil War and, at the same time, to warn the British not to intervene on the side of the Confederacy. During the Second World War, most of the financial aid in the form of loans and leases sent to support the Soviet war effort against the German Wehrmacht crossed the North Pacific in a maritime logistical effort of extraordinary strategic importance.
There is a humanitarian imperative to continue international submarine rescue—a model that proved its effectiveness two decades ago in the rescue of the Priz-class submarines. A return to this kind of cooperation is just one of the benefits that would result from normalising naval relations between the United States and Russia.
Source: here
The pointless trade war between America and China
The Trump administration’s tariff policy reveals a dangerous zero-sum approach to competition with China.
The latest round of tariff escalations between Washington and Beijing reads like a Greek tragedy, complete with arrogance, miscalculation and an inevitable return to square one. President Donald Trump’s announcement of additional tariffs on foreign automobiles, copper, steel and aluminium, along with 30% tariffs on all imports from China, is not strategic brilliance, but strategic bankruptcy and the triumph of domestic political theatre over coherent foreign policy.
The current trajectory of Sino-US relations reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of economic interdependence in the 21st century. Despite rhetorical flourishes about “bringing back manufacturing” and achieving “economic independence,” the reality remains stubbornly complex.
China’s Minister of Commerce, Wang Wentao, recently acknowledged the “ups and downs” of bilateral relations, while emphasising their economic interdependence – a diplomatic understatement that nevertheless captures the fundamental contradiction of current policy.
The idea that the United States can simply decouple from China through tariff barriers ignores the complex network of supply chains, technological integration and financial flows that have evolved over decades.
Indeed, American companies have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in Chinese operations, while Chinese firms have become an integral part of the global value chains that American consumers rely on for everyday goods. Tariff increases may generate headlines and political talking points, but they cannot address these structural realities without imposing enormous costs on American businesses and consumers.
Perhaps nowhere is strategic confusion more evident than in the technology sector. Discussions about export controls on AI chips — imposed in January 2025 and then repealed by the Trump administration in May — exemplify the absence of a coherent long-term strategy. Such policy shifts signal not flexibility, but weakness, undermining American credibility with allies and adversaries alike.
The fundamental flaw in America’s technology policy toward China is the assumption that technological dominance can be maintained solely through export controls and sanctions. History suggests otherwise.
During the Cold War, restrictions on technology transfers did not prevent the USSR from developing nuclear weapons or launching Sputnik. Today’s China, with its massive domestic market, substantial investment in research and development, and growing indigenous innovation capacity, is far better positioned than the Soviet Union ever was to develop alternatives to restricted American technologies.
The persistence of trade tensions, despite the obvious economic costs, reflects deeper political dynamics in both countries. In the United States, attacks on China have become one of the few bipartisan activities in Washington, providing politicians with a convenient scapegoat for economic anxieties and social dislocation that stem only partly from Chinese trade practices. The manufacturing job losses that fuel anti-China sentiment began long before China’s rise and reflect broader trends in automation, globalisation, and technological change.
Similarly, in China, resistance to American pressure has become an integral part of the Communist Party’s legitimacy discourse. The party’s ability to resist foreign pressure — especially from former colonial powers and their American successor — resonates deeply with Chinese historical memory and nationalist sentiment. This creates a political dynamic in which compromise appears as weakness and escalation as strength.
What is notably absent from current policy discussions is any serious analysis of what successful management of Sino-American relations might look like. Historical precedents suggest that relations between great powers deteriorate when they lack common enemies and when nationalist economic interests dominate domestic politics — exactly the situation we face today.
The specific framework of the Cold War that many policymakers consciously and unconsciously apply to China is fundamentally inappropriate. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is deeply integrated into the global economy and does not pose an ideological challenge to American domestic institutions. The competition is primarily economic and technological, not existential. This suggests that reheated isolationist strategies are likely to prove both ineffective and counterproductive.
A more sophisticated approach would recognise that American and Chinese interests, while competitive in some areas, remain complementary in others. Climate change, pandemics, nuclear proliferation and international financial crises require sustained cooperation between the world’s two largest economies.
The current approach of treating every aspect of the relationship through the lens of strategic competition makes such cooperation increasingly difficult.
The way forward requires abandoning the illusion that one side can achieve a decisive victory over the other. Instead, both countries must develop mechanisms to manage competition while preserving areas of cooperation.
This involves establishing clear rules of engagement for economic competition, setting up channels for regular high-level communication, and developing crisis management mechanisms to prevent tactical disagreements from escalating into strategic confrontations.
Therefore, the current trajectory of Sino-US relations is not in the long-term interests of either country. The United States is squandering its technological advantages through ill-conceived export controls, while imposing unnecessary costs on American businesses and consumers.
China is sacrificing the benefits of continued integration with the global economy in favour of a defensive nationalist stance.
Both countries are allowing domestic political considerations to drive policies that make little strategic sense. The result is a relationship characterised by mutual escalation with no clear objectives – a modern version of the myth of Sisyphus, in which both sides are condemned to push the rock of competition up the mountain, only to watch it roll back down again.
The tragedy is not that the United States and China are competitors—competition between great powers is inevitable and can be healthy. The tragedy is that both countries are competing poorly and in ways that diminish their interests while destabilising the global system on which they both depend.
Until leaders in Washington and Beijing acknowledge this fundamental reality, we can expect more of the same: tactical victories that amount to strategic defeats and political theatre masquerading as serious governance.
About the author: Leon Hadar
Dr. Leon Hadar is a contributing editor at The National Interest, a senior researcher at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, and a former researcher in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He has taught at American University in Washington, DC, and the University of Maryland, College Park. A columnist and blogger for Haaretz (Israel) and Washington correspondent for The Business Times in Singapore, he is a former United Nations bureau chief for The Jerusalem Post.
Source: here
Japanese defence minister welcomes decision on Australian frigates, but analysts warn risks remain
“Japan and Australia are special strategic partners, and this was a major step toward further strengthening security cooperation with Australia,” said General Nakatani, Japan’s defence minister.
The JS Yahagi frigate of the Mogami class of the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF). (Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force)
MELBOURNE — Australia’s selection of Japan’s upgraded Mogami-class frigate is a testament to Japan’s performance and track record in shipbuilding and will further strengthen the country’s defence industry capabilities, according to Japan’s defence minister.
Speaking at the regular press conference following the weekly cabinet meeting on Tuesday, General Nakatani said that the design quality of the frigate played a role in Australia’s decision to purchase it.
“They are truly state-of-the-art warships that bring together the remarkable technological capabilities of the Japanese defence industry,” Nakatani said, adding that “Japan’s production capacity for military vessels and our long history of continuous production… were a major factor [in the selection].”
Nakatani also said that Australia’s decision marks a major step in strengthening security cooperation between the two countries.
“Japan and Australia are special strategic partners, and this was a major step toward further strengthening security cooperation with Australia,” he said.
The first three of the 11 Royal Australian Navy frigates will be built in Japan by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, with the rest to be built in Australia at the Henderson Defence site in Western Australia.
Nakatani said a final agreement for the transfer of production to Australia is expected to be concluded by 2026, and the effort to transfer the construction of eight frigates to Australia would be an opportunity to strengthen Japan’s defence industry.
However, analysts speaking to Breaking Defense said there were still some risks to the programme, as the Japanese defence industry has no experience in foreign exports and transferring production overseas, given that this is Japan’s first major success in defence exports.
Collin Koh, senior researcher and coordinator of the maritime affairs department at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told Breaking Defense that Japan’s shipbuilding industry is considered one of the most advanced and productive in Asia and the world, noting that it has built a steady stream of ships for the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF).
“This is not limited to surface ships, but also includes submarines and fleet support vessels. The Mogami class has been introduced steadily over the years since the first ship was commissioned, attesting to the efficiency of Japan’s shipbuilding,” he said.
He warned, however, that it has only built ships for the JMSDF so far, and the lack of experience with an export order could raise concerns about its ability to complete the programme without problems.
Australian naval analyst Alex Luck said Australian shipyards would need to be expanded to handle work on two other shipbuilding programmes, for medium and large Australian landing ships, which are already underway at the facility.
He told Breaking Defense that shipyards in western Australia have not previously handled a project of this complexity, with major Australian shipbuilding recently taking place at various shipyards in southern Australia.
Luck also noted that Australia does not have a good track record with shipbuilding projects, with previous projects plagued by delays and cost overruns, and warned that domestic construction in Australia would almost certainly lead to cost increases.
“This will likely attract closer scrutiny and, combined with significant potential for delays, will call into question the overall procurement strategy and possibly contribute to incentives to procure more hulls from [Japan].”
Source: here
At the missile defence conference, the first rule at Golden Dome is not to talk about Golden Dome
The organiser of the Space and Missile Defence Symposium said that the Pentagon had asked them to move the discussion about the Golden Dome project to another event.
SMD 2025 — The Trump administration’s “Golden Dome” initiative to create a complete anti-aircraft and missile shield over the US will be the Pentagon’s most ambitious weapons programme since Ronald Reagan’s (ultimately failed) Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s.
However, discussions about the massive project were largely reduced at a conference dedicated to missile defence after government and industry sources said the public relations team of the Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD) had officially banned Defence Department officials and military personnel from discussing the planned effort.
“We cannot comment on OSD guidance to senior officials. We were asked to include our discussions about Golden Dome in the Golden Dome industry symposium [of the Missile Defence Agency] that followed the symposium, and we agreed,” Bob English, a senior vice president of media operations for the Space and Missile Defence Symposium, told Breaking Defense at the annual gathering of Army, Space Force and industry missile defence experts in Huntsville, Alabama.
The industry summit is scheduled to take place on Thursday, but although it is not classified, it is not open to the press. Politico previously reported on the apparent SMD ban.
When Breaking Defense asked the Pentagon about the restrictions on the SMD, a defence official responded in a statement suggesting that “operational security” was the impetus.
“The Golden Dome for America remains a strategic imperative for the Department of Defence. As we continue to gather information from industry, academia, national laboratories, and other government agencies to support Golden Dome for America, it would be imprudent for the Department to release additional information about this programme at this early stage, given the operational security of this initiative,” the official said. “We are doing our duty to fulfil the president’s vision. The Golden Dome for America office is examining current and future solutions across the services and across agencies to identify the most effective ways to modernise and rapidly implement the capabilities our nation needs to protect our homeland.”
This development follows a ban imposed by the Pentagon on appearances by officials and state officers at think tank events, which led to a series of conflicting interpretations about who could say what, where and to whom at the SMD Symposium.
“There was some initial confusion and different interpretations of the initial guidance. After consulting with the OSD PAO [Office of Public Affairs], they clarified that the guidance was only about moving the Golden Dome discussions,” English said.
U.S. government and industry officials widely expressed confusion over the decision — with speculation ranging from concerns about exceeding the recently appointed Golden Dome programme plan presented to the Department of Defence by General Michael Guetlein, to Congress’s anger that members had not yet been informed, despite the administration asking them to allocate billions of dollars to the effort.
The Golden Dome programme is expected to involve numerous air and missile defence programmes across the military services, as well as the revival of the SDI-era programme for the development of space-based interceptors. Initial funding for this effort, as part of the government’s reconciliation package, amounts to $25 billion.
Less restricted were defence companies, which took advantage of the conference to highlight capabilities they considered useful for the expanded defence shield.
But for government and military officials, the ban on discussing the effort led to some amusing moments on the SMD 2025 stage as they struggled to talk about the capabilities of the Golden Dome programme without mentioning its name.
For example, several Defence Department and military officials spoke about ongoing activities that are in line with President Donald Trump’s “January executive order,” which mandated the Golden Dome initiative.
Lieutenant General Sean Gainey, head of the Army Space and Missile Defence Command (SMDC), spoke at length about the Army’s role in defending the country and its future plans to coordinate with the Nordic Command, the Missile Defence Agency and the US Space Command in developing “a next-generation defensive architecture that will keep our nation safe for years to come.”
Source: here
The Army is considering launching its new Air and Missile Defence Strategy in the autumn.
“The main thing, from the perspective of lessons learned, is the complexity, mass and attempt to search for and hunt down missile defence and air defence systems,” said the head of the Army’s Space and Missile Defence Command, Lieutenant General Sean Gainey.
SMD 2025 — In the next three months, the US Army will publish its Air and Missile Defence Strategy (AMD) 2040, which will include lessons from Ukraine and the Middle East, along with a shift in focus to national defence, according to a three-star general.
“One of the important areas… is looking at the lessons learned from Ukraine and the Middle East and applying them to the modernisation of AMD,” Army Space and Missile Defence Command chief Lt. Gen. Sean Gainey told reporters on Tuesday.
“The main thing, from a lessons learned perspective, is the complexity, the mass and the attempt to seek and hunt down air and missile defence,” he added later. “There are resources on the battlefield, so all of those lessons learned are being taken into account as we move forward.”
Gainey and other service leaders began working on the updated AMD strategy under the Biden administration. But since President Donald Trump returned to the White House in January, the conflict in the Middle East has intensified and there has been a policy shift toward focusing attention on homeland defence under the Golden Dome.
“In the next three months, we will release the 2040 strategy to law enforcement,” Gainey said. “We’ve gone through all the commitments, we’ve gotten to the final commitment at the general officer level… So we feel very comfortable in taking this document to the chief of staff and the secretary of the army in the next two months.”
Although he did not detail the entire plan, he offered some clues about what might be inside.
For example, the Army plans to increase its AMD force structure by 30% over the next eight years. This change, Gainey said, includes three additional Patriot battalions, five Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) battalions and seven unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) batteries.
The service is also preparing to defend against an evolving complexity of threats, which includes a mix of drones and different types of missiles launched simultaneously in an attempt to overwhelm defences and operators. This challenge, he explained, is being addressed in the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) plans to disaggregate formations and make them easier to survive.
“They are hunting AMD assets out there, and all the lessons learned are being taken into account in our modernisation effort going forward.”
And when it comes to threats, Gainey noted that Group 3 and above drones (those weighing more than 23 kg) are closer to the challenge posed by cruise missiles, and defeating them is now part of the integrated air and missile defence portfolio.
“As we develop our Integrated Battle Command System, one of the things that PEO is doing in that process is taking the capabilities we use against counter-drones and integrating them into our broader IBCS capability,” the three-star general explained. “[This] then gives the operator the opportunity to not necessarily use a high-performance Patriot interceptor… but can use a drone-type interceptor, [such as] a Coyote, at a lower cost, focused on a unidirectional attack drone threat.”
Source: here
The US is deploying a high-altitude surveillance balloon in Alaska to strengthen its defence posture in the Arctic
According to information published by US Northern Command on 6 August 2025, a high-altitude balloon was launched on 4 August from the Malemute launch area of Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska as part of the large-scale military exercise ARCTIC EDGE 2025. This operation, conducted with the support of Aerostar, aims to strengthen US and allied preparedness for the Arctic, validate advanced technology for lighter-than-air (LTA) aircraft, and enhance interoperability in one of the most strategically and environmentally sensitive regions of the world.
Aerostar’s high-altitude balloon operates at altitudes of up to 30,000 metres, providing long-endurance surveillance, EO/IR imaging, SIGINT and secure communications relay, ideal for persistent awareness of the Arctic domain (Image source: US Department of Defence).
The launch demonstrates a growing reliance on stratospheric platforms to support persistent surveillance, communications and data collection in areas where conventional systems are often degraded or unavailable.
According to American Military News, ARCTIC EDGE 2025 is organised by the US Nordic Command and NORAD and brings together the US Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Canadian Armed Forces under a unified joint training framework. The exercise reflects an urgent shift in defence posture toward high-latitude operations as the Arctic becomes more contested and climate change accelerates the opening of new operational frontiers. ARCTIC EDGE focuses on operations across all domains, combining land manoeuvres, air mobility, maritime security, space communications and cyber defence in an extremely complex, cold-weather environment.
The Aerostar high-altitude platform system (HAPS) used during the exercise represents a new generation of stratospheric ISR technology. These balloons are designed to operate at altitudes between 18 and 30 kilometres, well above commercial aviation corridors and most radar detection areas. The system consists of a zero-pressure balloon envelope made of ultra-light polyethylene, filled with helium or hydrogen and designed to maintain altitude using solar-powered flight control units and a variable ballast system. The onboard avionics include real-time telemetry systems, high-capacity batteries, precision altitude control modules and autonomous flight navigation software.
The payload compartment can be adapted to mission requirements and includes modular sensor packages such as high-resolution electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) imaging systems, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) for all-weather reconnaissance, electronic support measures (ESM), signal intelligence (SIGINT) receivers and long-range communication relays. The collected data is transmitted to ground stations via encrypted and secure data links or satellite backhaul systems, ensuring continuous command and control integration within broader multi-domain operations. Depending on wind conditions and mission configuration, these systems can remain airborne for 30 to 60 days, providing persistent area coverage at a much lower operational cost than satellites or long-endurance unmanned aerial systems.
In terms of operational utility, the deployment of high-altitude balloons provides the US military and its allies with an extremely flexible and resilient ISR capability. These platform- s can be launched quickly in response to emerging threats, linger over restricted or remote areas with minimal signalling, and provide theatre-level situational awareness without the overflight permissions typically required for manned aircraft. In Arctic environments, where extreme weather, magnetic disturbances and limited infrastructure limit the effectiveness of traditional ISR assets, stratospheric balloons offer a sustainable and autonomous alternative. They can act as persistent sentinels over key chokepoints such as the Bering Strait or the Northern Sea Route, monitor ice drift and ship traffic, or extend line-of-sight communications to units operating beyond satellite or ground coverage.
This capability contrasts sharply with the Chinese surveillance balloons that attracted international attention in early 2023 after several of them entered the airspace of the US and its allies without authorisation. The Chinese balloons, which also operate at altitudes of around 18,000 metres, were equipped with sensors believed to collect images, signal information and electromagnetic data from US military installations. Unlike the Aerostar deployment, which is transparent, defensive and cooperative, the Chinese programmes have been widely seen as a violation of sovereignty and a breach of international norms. The US response, which included shooting down several intruding balloons and quickly declassifying information, signalled the beginning of a new era in strategic competition, in which stratospheric platforms are playing an increasingly important role in both surveillance and counter-surveillance doctrines.
The broader context of this development must be understood in the context of accelerated militarisation and geopolitical tension in the Arctic region. The Arctic is home to vast untapped natural resources, approximately 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas, and lies at the centre of emerging shipping routes that have become navigable due to the retreat of sea ice. Russia has significantly expanded its Arctic military footprint, building new bases, airfields and deep-water ports, while deploying Arctic-adapted weapon systems, including the Bastion-P coastal defence missile and MiG-31 interceptors stationed on Novaya Zemlya. Moscow considers the Northern Sea Route an internal waterway and is increasing its control over maritime transport in the region, while conducting regular joint exercises with Arctic Brigade forces.
Meanwhile, China has declared itself a “quasi-Arctic state” and is investing heavily in polar infrastructure, dual-use scientific missions and underwater mapping projects. Beijing’s “Polar Silk Road” concept aims to integrate Arctic sea lanes into its “Belt and Road” initiative, raising concerns among NATO members and Arctic Council states about dual-use technologies and potential intelligence-gathering operations. The United States and Canada, along with other Arctic allies such as Norway and Denmark, have responded by modernising Arctic infrastructure, increasing naval patrols and investing in ISR capabilities specifically tailored for polar operations.
In this context, the use of high-altitude balloons during ARCTIC EDGE 2025 is not only a technical milestone, but also a strategic signal. It demonstrates the commitment of the United States and its partners to maintain domain awareness, deter malign activity, and respond flexibly to emerging threats in a region where geographic isolation and extreme conditions have historically favoured adversaries. Stratospheric ISR platforms, once considered niche or experimental, are now becoming essential assets in the 21st century defence toolkit, particularly in the Arctic, where the battle for presence, influence and access is rapidly intensifying.
Source: here
Spain concludes talks with the US on F-35 fighter jets and renews interest in European alternatives.
According to El Pais on 6 August 2025, Spain has officially ended all efforts to acquire the US-built Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jet, including both the F-35A conventional take-off version for the Air and Space Forces and the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing version for the Navy. Government sources confirmed in early August 2025 that preliminary contacts had been suspended indefinitely. Although Spain had allocated €6.25 billion in its 2023 budget for “replacement aircraft for the AV-8B and C-15M, phase 2,” the funds were originally expected to finance a joint purchase of 45-50 F-35A fighter jets for the Air Force and 12-15 F-35B aircraft for the Navy.
The decision to cancel the US option on the F-35 reflects a deliberate shift, as the Spanish government aims to avoid increasing dependence on non-European suppliers, particularly at a time when other European countries are also pursuing strategic autonomy. (Image source: F-35 Demonstration Team)
Spain’s decision to cancel the F-35 purchase was driven by a combination of budgetary rules, industrial policy and strategic concerns. The government’s €10.471 billion defence plan stipulates that 85% of funds must be invested in European programmes, making the US-built F-35 incompatible with current spending priorities. Although Spain had allocated €6.25 billion in 2023 for a fighter jet to replace the AV-8B Harrier and C-15M Hornets and had submitted a non-binding request for information, these efforts have been suspended. Officials cited restricted access to critical F-35 systems, which limits national control and prevents the integration of local technologies. The cost of the infrastructure needed to maintain the aircraft and a unilateral price increase were also cited as negative factors. The government aims to avoid dependence on non-European suppliers and instead support European initiatives such as Eurofighter and FCAS, aligning procurement with industrial participation and strategic autonomy objectives. The decision is also in line with Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s resistance to NATO’s 5% of GDP defence spending target, limiting the government’s financial flexibility while strengthening the focus on European autonomy in defence. The measure effectively removes the only fifth-generation aircraft currently available from Spain’s procurement roadmap and forces the Armed Forces to reassess alternative avenues for their future air combat capabilities.
Spanish interest in the F-35 programme has existed for nearly two decades. In 2008, Lockheed Martin confirmed discussions with Spain regarding a possible future acquisition. In 2014, the Spanish Council of Ministers approved €47.6 million to extend the life of the Harrier aircraft until 2034, postponing their replacement. Despite this, the F-35 continued to be studied as a possible successor. In 2017, both the Air Force and the Navy identified the F-35 as their preferred candidate to replace their ageing Hornet and Harrier fleets. A non-binding request for information was issued, and by 2019, both branches had entered into an early analysis of the aircraft. In 2021, the Ministry of Defence publicly rejected any plans to join the F-35 programme, reaffirming Spain’s commitment to the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). However, Lockheed Martin maintained informal dialogue with Spanish authorities, and in 2023, the aircraft reappeared in budget documents and reports by defence publications such as Janes. By 2025, the decision to definitively cancel the F-35 option was made following internal political opposition, limited industrial profitability, and strategic concerns about dependence on foreign-controlled systems and software.
The implications of this decision vary significantly between the Air Force and Space Force and the Navy. The most immediate effect concerns the Navy, which plans to withdraw its fleet of AV-8B Harrier II aircraft in 2030. The Harrier, currently operated from the LHD Juan Carlos I, has no European replacement with STOVL capabilities. The F-35B is the only aircraft in production with these characteristics. Its rejection means the loss of fixed-wing carrier-based aviation for the Spanish Navy for at least a decade. Given that the US Marine Corps and the Italian Navy are also retiring their Harrier aircraft by 2030, the Spanish Navy will become the last global operator of this type, raising concerns about long-term maintenance and spare parts. Navantia has been tasked with conducting a feasibility study for a new aircraft carrier equipped with catapults and arresting systems. Such a platform would allow for the future operation of conventional navalised fighter aircraft, such as the Rafale M, or, eventually, an FCAS variant capable of carrier operations. The deadline for the construction of such a ship is currently extended to at least 2040, which means that between 2030 and the completion of the new aircraft carrier, the Navy will lack fixed-wing aviation capability. Only helicopters and, potentially, unmanned systems such as the SIRTAP drone, currently being evaluated for naval integration, would operate from the Juan Carlos I during this period.
The Air and Space Forces are under less immediate pressure but still face long-term capability gaps. Spain has already replaced its oldest EF-18A/B Hornet aircraft with 45 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft under the Halcón I and II programmes. The withdrawal of the remaining Hornet aircraft is scheduled to take place around 2035, allowing time for further assessments. General Francisco Braco, Chief of Staff of the Air and Space Forces, ruled out ordering more Eurofighter aircraft to avoid excessive dependence on a single type, citing operational risks if a structural problem were to immobilise the entire fleet. The F-35A had been seen as a temporary fifth-generation solution until the FCAS system becomes available. Admiral General Teodoro López Calderón, Chief of the Defence Staff, said in July 2025 that Spain has no alternative with comparable stealth or sensor fusion technology. While acknowledging the importance of such capabilities, he also recognised the long time frame involved. The FCAS system is not expected to become operational before 2040, in the most optimistic scenario. Braco also referred to the potential of the French Rafale F-5 aircraft as an intermediate option, which would sit between the Eurofighter and the F-35 in terms of capabilities. The Rafale F-5 is still under development and is not expected to be available before the late 2020s or early 2030s.
The Eurofighter Typhoon remains a key pillar of Spanish combat aviation, but it has limitations. Spain has a 14% industrial share in the Eurofighter consortium, with final assembly lines in the country and approximately 3,000 direct jobs supported. The aircraft offers high performance in traditional air-to-air and multi-role operations. However, its lack of stealth, limited sensor fusion and absence of short take-off capability rule it out as a viable replacement for the Navy’s Harrier aircraft. The Ministry of Defence has already reduced its order from 87 to 73 units, cancelling Tranche 3B. Although new upgrades are underway, including improved radar and avionics, concerns remain about the exclusive reliance on a fourth-generation aircraft for strategic missions. The Typhoon cannot operate from aircraft carriers without significant design changes, limiting its relevance for future naval operations unless it is paired with a Catobar-capable ship and a specific adaptation.
The Rafale, produced by Dassault Aviation, has emerged as another option to consider for both the Navy and the Air and Space Forces. The Rafale M, currently operated from the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, is compatible with Catobar launch and recovery systems. Its potential adoption by Spain would depend on the outcome of the new aircraft carrier study. The Rafale’s sensors and electronic warfare suite, including the SPECTRA system, the RBE2 AESA radar and the OSF front optronics, are entirely under French control and are continuously upgraded, giving Spain unrestricted access to hardware and software, a key consideration given concerns about the US-controlled architecture of the F-35. The Rafale F-5, planned as a future variant for the French Air Force, has been mentioned as a possible solution for Spain, depending on availability. Its multi-role design allows it to transition between air superiority, deep strike, reconnaissance and nuclear deterrence missions without requiring platform specialisation. Although not stealth, the Rafale offers a high degree of survivability and system integration, making it a candidate for a long-term partnership if interoperability and delivery schedules align.
Spain remains a committed partner in the FCAS programme alongside France and Germany, with Indra Sistemas representing Spanish industrial interests. The FCAS is intended to provide a sixth-generation fighter aircraft with stealth characteristics, advanced mission systems based on artificial intelligence and manned and unmanned capabilities. However, internal disagreements over industrial distribution, particularly recent statements by France seeking to produce 80% of the aircraft domestically, have caused friction. By mid-2025, no definitive solution had been reached and production deadlines remain uncertain. The FCAS is not expected to offer a naval variant in its initial phases, further limiting its relevance to the Navy in the short term. Nevertheless, the programme remains Spain’s long-term strategic objective for replacing its Eurofighter aircraft and strengthening European technological independence. The development of a future conventional aircraft carrier could ultimately align with a naval FCAS derivative, but this would require additional funding, coordination and industrial commitments beyond current planning.
In conclusion, Spain’s definitive suspension of the F-35 programme reflects both domestic political priorities and long-term industrial strategy. The Navy will lose its fixed-wing transport aviation capability by 2030, with no immediate replacement. The Air Force maintains operational continuity with the Eurofighter until 2035, but no fifth-generation aircraft will be available to replace the F-18 before the FCAS is ready. The Eurofighter and Rafale offer partial solutions, but neither meets all operational requirements. The FCAS programme remains the cornerstone of Spain’s future air combat doctrine, although its uncertain timetable and unresolved internal disputes complicate planning. Spain’s current choices imply reduced technological capability in the short term, but aim to preserve European sovereignty in defence and industrial participation in the coming decades.
Source: here
US drone manufacturer Draganfly unveils modular precision drone with combat-tested Mjolnir munitions
According to information released by Draganfly on 5 August 2025, Draganfly Inc. has successfully demonstrated its integrated tactical attack system during a closed-door demonstration event hosted at the Pentagon under the auspices of the US Department of Defence’s Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack Systems (LUCAS) initiative. The capability demonstrated combined Draganfly’s Group I unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with the Mjolnir modular munitions system developed by MMS Products Inc., providing a tactical solution tailored for scalable and autonomous attack missions in modern conflict environments. The event was attended by senior US military leaders and international defence delegations seeking next-generation technologies capable of increasing lethality, flexibility and survivability on the battlefield.
The Draganfly drone with the Mjolnir system performs precision strikes using modular anti-personnel and anti-armour munitions (Image source: Draganfly/YouTube)
The demonstration highlighted the platform’s autonomy from surveillance to attack and showcased a multi-drop payload launcher that enables precision munitions delivery with high operational effectiveness. The Draganfly UAV successfully deployed Mjolnir munitions in a series of engagements simulating battlefield threats, confirming both the accuracy and flexibility of the integrated system. The configurations demonstrated included air-launched effects for anti-personnel, anti-vehicle and armour-piercing missions, delivering rapid, precision effects in a variety of operational scenarios. This marks a continuation of the 2024 development agreement between Draganfly and MMS, which aims to co-produce unmanned aerial attack solutions optimised for the emerging requirements of joint forces.
From a technical perspective, the Mjolnir modular munitions system is a lightweight, drone-compatible and fully modular attack solution designed to extend the combat potential of small UAV platforms. Each munition weighs approximately 2.3 to 2.5 kg and features an internal guidance stabiliser, a programmable electronic fuse and an interchangeable warhead system. Current ammunition variants include high-fragmentation models for anti-personnel use, explosive-formed penetrators (EFP) for defeating light vehicles and field fortifications, and shaped charge variants capable of penetrating light to medium armour. These warheads are mounted in a compact, cylindrical ammunition body with a standardised interface to allow seamless integration between multiple drone types. The ammunition is designed to detonate on impact or with a user-defined delay, increasing versatility during urban or underground operations. The multi-drop launcher mounted on the Draganfly UAV can carry up to four individual munitions and allows for sequential or simultaneous launch, providing flexibility during dynamic target engagement.
In terms of operational applications, the Draganfly-Mjolnir system represents a strategic evolution in tactical drone warfare, addressing both mitigation and precision requirements. Its compact form factor and low acoustic and visual signatures make it particularly well suited for reconnaissance and attack missions in contested or excluded environments where manned systems face high risks. The system can be deployed for hunter-killer operations, enemy logistics disruption, high-value target suppression, or surveillance in support of special operations forces. In low-intensity conflicts or hybrid warfare environments, it enables scalable and cost-effective precision strikes without requiring extensive logistical footprints or long pre-mission planning cycles. In addition, its modularity supports rapid adaptation to mission-specific threats, allowing a single drone type to carry munitions tailored to the evolving operational picture.
The tactical implications of such a system are significant. Unlike traditional munitions that require larger platforms, Grupa I drones equipped with Mjolnir offer precision strike capability from a class of drones previously limited to ISR roles. In coordinated group or swarm operations, these drones could be used to overwhelm enemy air defences, target dispersed or mobile units, or provide persistent air attack options without exposing manned resources. Their low cost and high adaptability make them ideal for forward-deployed units operating in austere environments or for integration into broader chain-of-command architectures where speed and responsiveness are critical. In addition, their ability to operate semi-autonomously or be integrated into C2 networks improves coordination with ground elements in real-time combat situations.
Draganfly CEO Cameron Chell emphasised that the successful Pentagon demonstration serves as a major validation of the company’s direction in tactical drone innovation. He noted that the integrated system reflects the company’s commitment to providing mission-ready technologies designed to enhance operational efficiency, reduce the cost per engagement and increase the survivability of warfighters in the face of modern threats, both peer and non-peer. Thanks to its success in the LUCAS programme, Draganfly is now positioned to lead a new generation of tactical drone solutions that combine kinetic autonomy, modular lethality and battlefield adaptability.
As modern military forces seek flexible, rapidly deployable strike capabilities that can operate in both symmetric and asymmetric threat environments, systems such as those demonstrated by Draganfly and MMS have the potential to reshape how small combat drones are used in combat. The Pentagon’s emphasis on easy-to-use, plug-and-play combat drones under the LUCAS initiative signals a broader shift in US and allied defence doctrine towards the deployment of high-volume, low-cost, precision-capable platforms, enabling more distributed and resilient force postures in future conflicts.
Source: here
Germany deploys new PEGASUS electronic surveillance aircraft to boost Air Force capabilities
According to information published by HENSOLDT on 5 August 2025, Germany has officially begun operational deployment of its Persistent German Air Surveillance System (PEGASUS), setting a new standard in national airborne electronic intelligence (SIGINT) capability. Developed in strategic collaboration with HENSOLDT, Lufthansa Technik Defense and Bombardier Defense, PEGASUS is based on the Bombardier Global 6000 aircraft platform and incorporates the Kalaetron Integral SIGINT suite. This advanced system enables real-time signal detection, adaptive threat analysis and data fusion in complex operational environments and marks Germany’s return to sovereign airborne electronic intelligence capabilities after a hiatus of more than a decade.
The German PEGASUS aircraft provides advanced electronic surveillance and real-time threat detection for the Air Force (Image source: HENSOLDT)
PEGASUS is a software-defined, multi-domain ISR platform equipped to address the entire spectrum of electromagnetic threats. The core of the system, HENSOLDT’s Kalaetron Integral, combines signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) capabilities in a single modular suite. It features ultra-wideband digital receivers capable of scanning frequency ranges from HF to SHF, enabling it to detect and intercept both analogue and modern digital waveforms, including frequency hopping, burst transmissions and encrypted signals. These receivers are supported by powerful onboard digital signal processors (DSPs) capable of real-time demodulation, decryption support (when authorised) and spectral analysis. This allows mission crews to identify and classify transmitters such as air defence radar systems, missile guidance signals or military command communications with extreme accuracy and speed.
The system integrates a digital antenna system using AESA (Active Electronic Scanned Network) technology, which provides spatial filtering, direction finding (DF) and beam steering without mechanical movement. Using interferometric and time difference of arrival (TDOA) techniques, PEGASUS can triangulate transmitter positions with sub-kilometre accuracy at long ranges. The antenna systems are integrated into the Global 6000 aircraft fuselage, maintaining the aircraft’s aerodynamic profile while supporting 360-degree signal coverage. Kalætron Integral also incorporates on-board artificial intelligence algorithms trained on electromagnetic signatures, enabling the platform to autonomously classify new types of transmitters, recognise electronic configurations of the order of battle and issue alerts for emerging threats within seconds.
To support data-intensive operations, PEGASUS is equipped with high-performance onboard servers and mission systems that enable parallel signal processing and target correlation. Data collected in flight is securely transmitted in real time to ground command elements via multiple redundant communication channels, including line-of-sight (LOS) data links, SATCOM terminals and encrypted IP networks. The mission systems are protected against electromagnetic interference (EMI) and h s designed to operate in GPS-denied or jammed environments, a key feature in today’s contested battlefields. Onboard operators have access to a mission suite with modular touchscreen workstations, advanced visualisation tools and tactical data fusion capabilities, enabling rapid coordination with other platforms such as fighter aircraft, drones and maritime assets.
The PEGASUS platform is housed on the Bombardier Global 6000, a high-performance business jet that provides the endurance, range and altitude required for sustained surveillance missions. With a maximum range of over 11,000 km and a service ceiling exceeding 15,000 metres, the aircraft can remain on station for long periods of time, operating outside the range of most ground-based threats. Its low acoustic and radar signatures further enhance its survivability and discretion during sensitive intelligence gathering operations. Internally, the platform is equipped with multiple mission workstations, high-speed data links and secure satellite communications, enabling the live transmission of collected information to ground stations or directly to joint command structures.
PEGASUS provides the German Air Force with a sovereign, flexible and deeply integrated ISR tool that significantly enhances situational awareness and threat anticipation. The ability to conduct persistent remote surveillance and collect high-resolution SIGINT data enables mission planners and decision-makers to map the enemy’s electronic order of battle, monitor hostile force movements and prepare countermeasures in real time. PEGASUS enhances the effectiveness of other platforms, including fighter aircraft, unmanned systems and ground-based air defence units, by providing them with actionable intelligence and electronic threat mapping. In coalition scenarios, PEGASUS can seamlessly integrate with NATO’s common ISR architecture, improving the Alliance’s ability to operate in highly contested electromagnetic domains. In addition, its rapid re-tasking capability ensures that operators can dynamically adjust surveillance parameters in response to new threats without compromising the mission at hand.
The deployment of the PEGASUS mission also has substantial geopolitical significance, as it comes at a time when the security environment in Europe is increasingly volatile. Following Russia’s renewed aggression in Eastern Europe, hybrid warfare, cyber attacks and electronic interference have become standard components of conflicts in the grey zone. For Germany, which has not had an airborne SIGINT platform since the cancellation of the Euro Hawk programme in 2013, the PEGASUS mission represents a strategic leap forward in regaining autonomous intelligence capabilities. The platform allows Germany to independently monitor the electronic activities of potential adversaries, verify compliance with arms control agreements and support NATO operations with domestically collected information. This reduces dependence on allied resources, such as the US RC-135 Rivet Joint mission or the NATO AGS Global Hawk fleet, while contributing valuable sensor diversity to joint operations.
Furthermore, the PEGASUS programme serves as a catalyst for strengthening Germany’s defence industrial base. With over 30 German defence companies involved in development and integration, including SMEs specialising in cyber security, software engineering and electronic systems, the programme ensures that critical technological know-how remains within national borders. This is particularly important as European defence initiatives such as the EU Strategic Compass and PESCO emphasise greater autonomy in intelligence and command capabilities. PEGASUS not only addresses an urgent operational gap, but also aligns with Germany’s broader political goal of achieving strategic sovereignty in defence technologies.
With the operational deployment of the PEGASUS system, Germany now joins the select group of nations capable of independently conducting complex airborne SIGINT missions, both in peacetime and in crisis environments. As electronic warfare continues to dominate the battlefield of the 21st century, the importance of this capability cannot be overstated. PEGASUS is not only a technological achievement, but also a strategic asset that strengthens Germany’s role as a credible and capable contributor to NATO’s collective defence posture.
Source: here
Germany strengthens NATO’s air transport and tanker capabilities with delivery of Airbus A400M aircraft
According to information published by Airbus Defence on 3 August 2025, the 50th A400M Atlas military transport aircraft was officially delivered to the German Air Force. This important delivery marks a significant improvement in Germany’s strategic and tactical air transport capabilities, as the latest aircraft is configured with a central hose drum unit (HDU) mounted in the cargo ramp and underwing refuelling modules mounted on each wing tip. These systems enable the A400M to operate as a true multi-role tactical tanker aircraft, capable of performing in-flight refuelling operations for a wide range of platforms, including fast aircraft, tiltrotor aircraft, helicopters and even other A400M aircraft, significantly increasing operational flexibility, force projection and the sustainability of joint missions.
The A400M is a tactical transport and tanker aircraft capable of carrying 37 tonnes and refuelling aircraft in flight (Image source: Bundeswehr)
The German Air Force continues to expand its air refuelling capabilities to meet NATO interoperability standards and support high-readiness deployments in multiple theatres of operations. The HDU unit and Cobham 908E dual underwing refuelling modules enable simultaneous fuel delivery to two receivers at a rate of up to 2,000 litres per minute, depending on the aircraft being refuelled. This modular air-to-air refuelling system allows the A400M to switch between transport and tanker roles with minimal response time. Operational tests have demonstrated successful fuel transfers to Eurofighter Typhoon, Panavia Tornado, Lockheed Martin F-35 (via NATO partners) and CV-22B Osprey aircraft, validating the A400M’s performance in multi-domain operations and enhancing Germany’s ability to support allied air forces during high-speed missions.
From a technical point of view, the Airbus A400M Atlas represents a new generation of military air transport platform, filling the gap between the smaller C-130 Hercules and the larger C-17 Globemaster III. It is powered by four Europrop International TP400-D6 turboprop engines, each delivering 11,000 horsepower – the most powerful turboprop engines ever installed on a Western aircraft. The six-bladed scimitar propellers rotate in opposite directions on each wing to enhance aerodynamic efficiency and reduce asymmetric torque. The aircraft features a high-wing configuration, full fly-by-wire flight controls, a modern speed control cabin and tactical systems that include terrain following radar, night vision-compatible avionics and a self-protection system with missile warning and infrared countermeasure systems (DIRCM).
The A400M is capable of carrying up to 37 tonnes of payload or up to 116 fully equipped paratroopers. It can accommodate heavy and oversized military cargo such as Boxer 8×8 armoured vehicles, NH90 or CH-53 helicopters and pallets compatible with standard NATO logistics formats. The aircraft’s cargo compartment, with a length of 17.71 metres, a width of 4 metres and a height of 3.85 metres, is equipped with a computerised cargo management system ( ) and a roller floor that can be reconfigured during flight. It is designed to take off and land on short, unpaved runways of up to 750 metres and to operate in austere environments without the need for established ground infrastructure. The A400M can fly at Mach 0.72 at altitudes of up to 40,000 feet, and its range without refuelling extends to approximately 8,900 kilometres when carrying lighter loads. It is also fully certified for air-to-air refuelling, both as a tanker and as a receiver aircraft, making it one of the most flexible platforms in the European air mobility arsenal.
This 50th delivery marks a generational shift from the previous German A400M models, which were initially used in a basic configuration focused exclusively on air transport missions. The early aircraft did not have the full tactical suite, air-to-air refuelling capabilities and self-protection systems that are now standard in current builds. Many of the first 30 A400M aircraft required substantial upgrades as part of capability upgrade and modernisation programmes coordinated with OCCAR and Airbus. These upgrades include the installation of HDUs, wing-mounted modules, avionics enhancements, secure satellite communications and the integration of mission management systems compatible with NATO’s Link 16 data link network. The latest aircraft is equipped with full software and hardware compliance with SOC 1 and SOC 2 capability standards, representing full operational readiness for global missions.
This delivery also comes against a backdrop of growing geopolitical uncertainty and increased operational demand for strategic air transport within NATO and the European Union. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, NATO has strengthened its eastern posture through rotational deployments, forward-positioned forces and expanded logistics corridors. As the framework nation for NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and one of the main European contributors of troops, Germany needs a robust, adaptable and high-volume air transport capability to fulfil its commitments. The A400M fleet enables rapid deployment of forces to the Baltic States, Eastern Europe and the Arctic, as well as participation in deterrence operations as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. At the same time, the platform supports operations outside the region in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, where Germany continues to provide strategic air transport, troop rotation and humanitarian logistics under EU and UN mandates.
In addition, the growing importance of strategic mobility in the Indo-Pacific has placed particular emphasis on aircraft such as the A400M, which can operate independently over long distances. As Europe recalibrates its defence posture to address hybrid threats, high-intensity conflicts between equals and expeditionary scenarios, the German Air Force’s A400M fleet is emerging as a central pillar of Germany’s contribution to allied deterrence and response frameworks. With 48 of the 53 aircraft ordered already delivered and a modernisation campaign underway to bring all airframes to maximum mission capability, the German Air Force is on track to operate one of the most capable and flexible air transport and refuelling fleets in Europe. The A400M’s ability to seamlessly transition from heavy transport, tactical launches, air-to-air refuelling and medical evacuation makes it an essential factor in both conventional and hybrid warfare operations, strengthening Germany’s role as a leading logistics nation and force multiplier within NATO.
Source: here
Embraer and Lithuania sign new defence industrial alliance for European rearmament
According to information published by Embraer on 2 August 2025, the Brazilian aerospace company has confirmed its intention to create a comprehensive industrial partnership with Lithuania, consolidating its strategic expansion in Europe. The announcement comes after the Lithuanian government selected the C-390 Millennium as its next-generation multi-mission military transport aircraft. In recent weeks, Embraer officials have made a high-level visit to Lithuania, where they interacted with national institutions and defence-related industries to initiate discussions on the ing support and establishing a long-term operational presence.
The C-390 Millennium is a versatile tactical transport aircraft capable of carrying up to 26 tonnes, performing air-to-air refuelling, medical evacuation, parachute drops and operating from semi-prepared runways (Image source: Embraer).
Embraer is a global leader in aerospace innovation, with a solid defence portfolio that includes the A-29 Super Tucano light attack and training aircraft, the KC-390 Millennium transport aircraft and advanced radar and ISR solutions developed through its Defence and Security division. The company has proven expertise in mission systems integration, complex aerostructure management and turnkey logistics support. Its platforms are operated by more than 60 armed forces worldwide, including NATO members and strategic partners in the US, reinforcing its growing relevance in transatlantic defence networks.
Embraer’s initiative reflects its commitment not only to delivering the C-390 Millennium with comprehensive support solutions, but also to contributing directly to Lithuania’s ambition to develop sovereign defence industrial capabilities. The partnership is actively supported by both the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Economy and Innovation, underscoring an intergovernmental approach to defence industry development. Embraer is exploring potential cooperation in critical sectors such as maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), software and systems engineering, and component manufacturing.
The Embraer C-390 Millennium is a high-performance tactical air transport platform designed to replace medium transport aircraft such as the C-130 Hercules. The aircraft is powered by two International Aero Engines V2500-E5 turbofan engines, each producing 14,460 kg of thrust, allowing a maximum speed of Mach 0.8 and a range of 4,000 km/h with a payload of 23 tonnes. The aircraft can operate at altitudes of up to 10,144 m and from short or semi-prepared runways of up to 1,200 m. The C-390 is equipped with a full glass cockpit, five multifunctional LCD displays, dual mission computers and an integrated avionics suite provided by Rockwell Collins, enabling advanced navigation, terrain awareness and low-altitude flight capabilities in contested airspace.
Its cargo compartment is fully compatible with standard NATO pallets (up to 7 x 463L pallets) and can carry a wide range of payloads, including light armoured vehicles, helicopters, artillery systems and up to 80 fully equipped soldiers or 66 paratroopers. It supports both rear ramp and side door operations for simultaneous deployment of troops and cargo and is certified for air delivery of cargo up to 19 metric tonnes. Air-to-air refuelling capabilities are supported by a detachable probe system, and the aircraft itself can be configured as a tanker with Cobham pods under the wings. Survivability is enhanced by ballistic protection in critical areas, self-sealing fuel tanks, redundant systems and compatibility with electronic warfare suites for self-defence.
This development has significant implications for the US and broader NATO defence industrial base. As Lithuania ramps up local defence production with Embraer’s support, it reduces long-term logistical dependencies while contributing to the resilience of the allied supply chain in Eastern Europe. Given that Embraer’s s increasingly interoperate with US standards and suppliers, this Lithuanian collaboration could open up future opportunities for transatlantic co-production and facilitate joint sustainment operations within NATO’s logistics command structures. The expansion also indirectly supports US security objectives by strengthening the defence self-reliance of allies on NATO’s eastern flank.
The scope of the Lithuania-Embraer partnership could include local production or assembly of C-390 subcomponents, such as hydraulic and electrical systems, avionics racks or cargo handling elements, as well as mission management and fleet monitoring software packages. With the support of Lithuania’s technology and precision engineering sector, the future collaboration could also involve the joint development of secure communications modules and modular mission kits for C-390 variants. If successful, Lithuania could position itself as a key hub for MRO services and spare parts distribution to C-390 operators in Northern and Eastern Europe.
Lithuania’s strategic location on the border with Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad has made it a focal point of NATO’s eastern defence posture since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Its membership in the Enhanced Forward Presence initiative, along with recent increases in defence spending and military modernisation, underscore its central role in regional deterrence. Deepening industrial ties with Embraer aligns with Lithuania’s broader ambition to transform itself from a defence consumer to a defence contributor. At a time of high geopolitical tensions and persistent hybrid threats in the Baltic region, this announcement signals a tactical and industrial shift that strengthens NATO’s collective resilience.
Source: here
China deployed a Z-10 attack helicopter to intercept a US Navy MH-60R Seahawk aircraft near the Taiwan Strait.
According to the Global Times on 1 August 2025, Chinese state television CCTV broadcast images of an aerial confrontation between a Changhe Z-10 attack helicopter belonging to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a foreign military aircraft identified as a US Navy MH-60R Seahawk. The images were published on the 98th anniversary of the founding of the PLA and showed the Z-10 intercepting the Seahawk helicopter in the airspace above the Taiwan Strait.
The MH-60R Seahawk is a multi-mission maritime helicopter, primarily used by the US Navy for anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. It is a robust and reliable aircraft, capable of operating from both land and sea. The MH-60R integrates a sophisticated mission system that combines data from various sensors to create a complete picture of the situation. This allows for effective tracking, targeting and engagement of surface and submarine threats.
The strategic rationale behind the use of attack helicopters such as the Z-10 in maritime interceptions appears to be linked to Beijing’s efforts to project a broader posture in key areas of th , such as the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea. (Image source: Chinese Ministry of Defence)
According to PLA pilot Kong Xianghui, the foreign aircraft approached to within approximately five kilometres of what China considers its territorial waters. The Z-10 issued several radio warnings before engaging in an aerial confrontation that reportedly lasted over an hour. At one point, the Seahawk reportedly entered cloud cover and then emerged approaching from the left, closing to an estimated distance of 500 metres before changing course. There was no collision, and the foreign aircraft eventually left the area. The US Department of Defence and the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet, based in Japan, which oversees operations in the Western Pacific, had not provided any public response at the time of publication.
This encounter is consistent with an observable pattern of increased Chinese helicopter interceptions in areas near China’s eastern maritime borders. In May 2025, Chinese state television reported that army aviation units had carried out 11 separate interceptions over a 10-day period in the East China Sea. The encounters were attributed to foreign aircraft approaching China’s coast, prompting PLA helicopters, mainly Z-10 and Z-19 platforms from the Eastern Theatre Command’s land aviation corps, to scramble. These events were described by the Chinese side as defensive missions intended to prevent surveillance or proximity flights by foreign forces. In one incident, pilot Wang Ling recounted approaching a foreign helicopter from aboard a ship in low visibility and circling the originating vessel. The foreign aircraft responded with a sharp turn and retreat after approaching to within 10 metres. The next day, the same aircraft returned and was intercepted again above the clouds, where it was apparently forced to turn back.
A separate incident occurred in February 2025 over the South China Sea, near Scarborough Shoal, where a Chinese Navy Z-9 helicopter intercepted a Philippine fisheries surveillance aircraft. According to the Philippine Coast Guard, the Chinese helicopter approached within three metres of the aircraft, which was conducting a routine patrol flight with journalists on board. The Philippine government issued an official protest, describing the incident as dangerous. The US ambassador to the Philippines also issued a statement criticising the manoeuvre and calling for compliance with international norms. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not confirmed the specific details of that encounter, but has repeatedly defended such approaches as protective actions within its claimed jurisdiction. In subsequent state media reports, these types of incidents were classified as part of increasingly frequent law enforcement air operations in waters considered sensitive by Beijing, particularly around Taiwan and in disputed areas of the South China Sea.
Tensions escalated further in July 2025 following a series of confrontations between Chinese and Japanese military aircraft over the East China Sea. Japan reported that Chinese JH-7 fighter-bomber aircraft approached its YS-11EB electronic surveillance aircraft on several consecutive days. China, in turn, accused Japanese aircraft of entering its air defence identification zone and engaging in provocative actions. These incidents followed large-scale PLA exercises conducted in April 2025 under the code name “Strait Thunder–2025A,” during which the PLA deployed over 70 aircraft and 19 military vessels in operations around Taiwan. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence, 37 of these aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, an unofficial border long used as a de facto buffer. China does not recognise the legitimacy of this border. Both Chinese aircraft carriers, Liaoning and Shandong, were confirmed to be participating in the manoeuvres, which extended into the second island chain. The exercises were interpreted as demonstrations of regional force posture and took place in the broader context of increased PLA naval and air activity in areas close to Taiwan and Japan.
The legal framework surrounding these incidents is contested. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), states have sovereignty up to 12 nautical miles from their coasts and exclusive economic rights up to 200 nautical miles. The Convention allows for the innocent passage of ships, including military vessels, through territorial seas, provided they refrain from launching aircraft, conducting surveillance or engaging in other non-peaceful activities. The United States considers the Taiwan Strait to be international waters and frequently conducts freedom of navigation and overflight operations in the area. China claims jurisdiction over the Strait and opposes such operations, although it has not officially declared the Strait to be internal waters. These differing interpretations have led to a series of confrontations, with China considering the activity of US Navy ships or aircraft in the Strait to be a violation of the law, and the United States invoking legal passage under international law. Between 2020 and 2024, US Navy ships and aircraft conducted regular transits of the Strait, including nine in 2024 and eleven in 2023. In April 2025, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS William P. Lawrence, capable of operating two MH-60R helicopters, was the last US warship publicly known to have transited the strait before the August encounter with the helicopter.
The Z-10 helicopter used in the interception is a tandem-seat attack platform developed by Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation. It is mainly operated by the PLA Ground Forces and features a narrow fuselage, a five-bladed main rotor and a nose-mounted electro-optical targeting system. The Z-10 is armed with a 30 mm automatic cannon and can carry air-to-ground guided missiles, air-to-air missiles and unguided rockets. Designed for battlefield support missions, it is capable of low-altitude, high-speed flight and has been increasingly used for interception missions near China’s coastal regions, particularly under the Eastern Theatre Command. The choice to deploy a Z-10 in the Taiwan Strait incident suggests that the encounter took place close enough to shore for a land-based helicopter to reach the scene and that command authority belonged to PLA Army aviation units rather than naval forces.
The MH-60R Seahawk is a multi-role naval helicopter derived from the UH-60 Black Hawk and configured for shipboard operations. It is equipped with sensors for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and maritime surveillance, including radar, sonar and electro-optical systems. The helicopter can launch Mk 54 torpedoes, AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and sonobuoys, and support missions such as search and rescue, communications relay and logistics. The MH-60R is launched from a variety of US Navy ships, including destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers. In the August 2025 incident, the Seahawk in question was likely launched from the USS William P. Lawrence, which had previously sailed through the Taiwan Strait. Only the United States and South Korea operate the MH-60R in Northeast Asia, and South Korean helicopters are not scheduled to become operational until 2026, making a US origin the most likely.
The Z-10 and MH-60R differ significantly in terms of function, deployment and mission profile. The Z-10 is optimised for ground attack missions, focusing on close air support and anti-armour operations. It lacks the extended range, endurance and maritime integration required for sustained maritime operations. Its systems are designed for visual targeting and short-duration engagements. The MH-60R, on the other hand, is a long-range naval platform designed for persistent operations in open waters, with advanced sensors and weapons suited for detecting submarine and surface threats. In a close-range engagement, the Z-10 has advantages in direct fire armament and manoeuvrability, particularly due to its nose-mounted gun and air-to-air missile capability. However, the Seahawk’s broader suite of sensors, its ability to operate from mobile maritime platforms and its longer mission range make it a fundamentally different asset with strategic utility in multi-domain naval operations. Each platform reflects the respective priorities of its armed forces: the Z-10 supports defence and control missions near the coast, while the MH-60R provides extended range and surveillance capabilities within US naval operating groups.
Source: here
The key pillar of Russia’s military resources is collapsing. The timing could not be worse.
- Russia’s oil and gas revenues – a key source of funding for the war – fell by 27% in July.
- EU sanctions and flexible price caps are reducing Moscow’s energy revenues.
- Trump is targeting India with tariffs on Russian oil imports. Delhi could use this to seek an easing of trade relations.
Russia’s oil and gas revenues have fallen recently, putting additional pressure on Moscow to end the war in Ukraine.
In July, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s administration collected 787.3 billion roubles, or 9.8 billion dollars, in oil and gas revenues — 27% less than a year ago, according to the country’s Finance Ministry on Tuesday.
The decline in energy tax revenues is putting even more pressure on Russia’s budget, which posted a deficit of 3.7 trillion rubles, or 1.7% of GDP, in the first half of the year. Oil and gas remain vital to Russia’s economy and to financing its war, now in its fourth year.
This funding is now under threat on several fronts.
Last month, the European Union unveiled its 18th package of sanctions against Russia. It replaced the fixed cap of $60 per barrel on Russian oil with a more flexible mechanism that limits prices to 15% below global market averages, effectively reducing Moscow’s revenue for every barrel exported.
But the pressure is not only coming from Europe.
Trump targets India over Russian oil
Trump has recently toughened his rhetoric – and trade threats – against countries buying Russian oil, singling out India, a major buyer of the fuel.
Last week, Trump announced a 25% tariff on Indian goods and a “penalty” on Russian oil purchases.
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“I think I’m going to raise this issue substantially in the next 24 hours because they’re buying Russian oil, they’re fuelling the war machine,” Trump told CNBC in a telephone interview on Tuesday.
On Wednesday, the US president doubled that rate to 50%. The higher tariff would take effect within 21 days.
India’s Foreign Ministry responded on Monday, saying its energy imports are focused on ensuring “predictable and affordable energy costs” for Indian consumers.
Trump said last week that he wanted a deal to end Russia’s war with Ukraine by 8 August.
“Putin will stop killing people if you cut the price of energy by another $10 a barrel. He won’t have a choice because his economy is in such a bad state,” Trump said on CNBC on Tuesday.
Even with Trump’s ultimatum, Russia is likely to dig in, according to Tatiana Orlova, senior emerging markets economist at Oxford Economics.
“The Russian leadership seems to view the resilience of the economy in the first three and a half years of the war as proof that it is immune to further sanctions,” Orlova wrote in a note on Wednesday.
She estimates that there is a 70% probability that Russia will continue the war.
If this happens, Washington will likely respond with additional sanctions, targeting Russia’s energy sector in particular, she said.
“The Russian economy is rapidly losing momentum, and additional ‘biting’ sanctions could push it into recession, depending on the severity of the new measures,” she added.
India could make a deal for trade relief
Although most analysts believe it is unlikely that India will drastically reduce its Russian oil imports, some say it could be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with Washington.
“Some reduction in Russian oil imports as part of a larger deal is not far-fetched, given that Russian crude’s share of total crude imports has risen from negligible to about 38% since 2022,” wrote Vishnu Varathan, head of macro research for Asia, excluding Japan, at Mizuho.
Varathan cited “the looming threat of relentless geo-economic pressure from the US” as a key factor for Delhi to reduce its dependence on Russian oil as part of a trade deal with Trump.
Crude oil futures rose briefly following Trump’s tariff threats but ended lower on Wednesday as weak fundamentals persisted.
US crude futures have fallen about 10% since the start of the year, with global supply remaining strong as OPEC increases production. Demand from China, a major importer, is also weak amid a prolonged economic slowdown.
Analysts at ING said the market could absorb modest price increases if India cuts Russian oil imports and turns to other suppliers. But they warned that more extensive withdrawals could be disruptive.
“If India were to stop buying Russian oil amid tariff threats, we believe the market could cope with the loss of this supply,” ING commodity strategists wrote in a note on Wednesday.
However, the greater risk is if other major buyers of Russian oil start to avoid purchasing this commodity.
“This would require OPEC to quickly and aggressively use its available production capacity to balance the market. This could lead to a significant increase in prices,” they wrote.
Source: here
Navigating the complexity of maritime sanctions: an overview from July 2025
Overview
July clearly showed that the shipping industry is now the main battleground for the enforcement and circumvention of sanctions. Fewer high-risk tanker movements, mostly from Russia and directed towards concentrated demand in China and India, carried a disproportionate share of value. At the same time, both physical (kinetic) and digital (signalling) disruptions weakened confidence in vessel identity and route accuracy.
Key conclusions
- Sanctioned oil tankers transported approximately 180 million barrels in the seven months to July, representing approximately $8.6 billion at a cap of $47.60, with approximately 85 million barrels from Russia and approximately 120 million barrels destined for China/India.
- The number of sanctioned vessels has increased from approximately 370 to approximately 1,650 since July 2020, and the number of connected companies has increased from approximately 60 to approximately 500, demonstrating rapid exposure to the network.
- Russian-flagged vessels doubled to over 320 by mid-2023, the Comoros increased to approximately 140-150, and Panama accelerated in 2025, highlighting the adaptive opacity of flag switching.
Market analysis
July 2025 confirmed that the shipping industry is the main arena for the application and circumvention of energy sanctions related to Russia. On 18 July, the EU launched its 18th package of sanctions against Russia. It lowered the G7 oil price cap from $60 to $47.60 per barrel, banned the transhipment of refined oil through third countries, and tightened controls around the “shadow fleet” by targeting individual vessels and restricting dual-use or military-related upstream technologies. The aim was to limit the shipping routes and intermediaries that enable opaque flows of crude oil. Three days later, on 21 July, the United Kingdom imposed new designations on 135 oil tankers and associated facilitators, identifying them as key nodes in the hidden shipping networks that keep Russian oil moving.
The US pressure in July further restricted the space in which maritime actors associated with sanctions evasion could operate. At the end of the month, the US designated Iranian oil magnate Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani and his shipping network, describing them as major players in the broader “shadow fleet” linking Iranian and Russian oil movements. This move froze their US assets and signalled increased scrutiny of the cross-border logistics of oil tankers and intermediaries operating in unclear or dual roles. This action, combined with ongoing adjustments to US policies since early July, such as changes to General Licence 13N, reinforced that a combination of ship ownership, charter chains and sanctioned cargo flows poses a direct risk of designation and may expose associated maritime service providers to secondary consequences.
Implications for the shipping industry
In July, risks in shipping increased as security incidents heightened exposure to sanctions. Ships were still transiting areas flagged for heightened military tensions in early July, with the UKMTO warning of increased danger in the Gulf of Aden, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman and urging extreme caution in transits between 28 June and 4 July. The summary for the week of 5-11 July included large-scale attacks in the Red Sea, including the sinking of the MAGIC SEAS after a multi-vector impact and the earlier loss of the ETERNITY C, highlighting how violent incidents can blur the chains of identity and ownership of ships. At the same time, electronic interference remained a complicating factor for reliable AIS and positioning data. The 12-18 July report noted that while broader trends of spoofing were diminishing, localised pockets of interference persisted. By the 19-25 July heat map, overall anomalies had diminished, but significant disruptions still affected tracking and attribution confidence.
The WTS report for 25 June to 23 July, prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), shows that maritime transport remains vulnerable to both violent and non-violent disruptions. Violence in the Red Sea, including the attack with missiles, RPGs and unmanned surface vessels on the MAGIC SEAS, which was subsequently abandoned, along with ongoing piracy and armed robbery incidents in South America, have made it difficult to verify sanctions, undermining reliable data on ship identity and routing. At the same time, persistent electronic interference ‘hot spots’ from mid-July continued to affect AIS and positioning signals. The combined effect means that operators must now treat incident awareness, signal anomalies and ownership transparency as integrated inputs to avoid unintended exposure.
July reduced maritime risk in various regions. A suspicious, low-signature approach in the Gulf of Aden and the multi-vector attack on ETERNITY C in the Red Sea showed how tactical threats reduce route predictability and weaken confidence in vessel identity. At the same time, continued piracy and armed robbery in South America added similar pressure on global travel integrity. Shipping operators must now combine signals such as unusual approaches, violent incidents and degraded positional data with sanctions and counterparty information to assess the risk of interdiction and avoid blind spots.
During that period, 109 vessels (including 84 oil tankers) and 49 shipping companies were targeted by enforcement measures. Most of the tonnage involved flew the flags of Panama (29) and Comoros (9), and 10 vessels remained under Russian registration.
Figure 1. Annual exports (by country of origin) for oil tankers that were sanctioned in July 2025 (Russian exports highlighted) – Kpler.
Chart 2. Annual exports (by country of destination) for tankers that were sanctioned in July 2025 (imports from China highlighted) – Kpler.
In the months leading up to July, sanctioned tankers transported approximately 180 million barrels of crude oil on a 7-month basis. Approximately half of this total, around 85 million barrels, was of Russian origin. China and India together absorbed most of the downstream flow, around 120 million barrels, creating a concentration of high-risk flows in a small set of Asian demand centres. This pattern makes illicit shipments easier to detect, as there are fewer of them, but it also raises the stakes: disruptions or sanctions on these narrow corridors can manifest quickly, and businesses operating there face greater secondary risk. Trading and compliance teams now need to connect origin and destination data in real time and, in particular, conduct stress tests on exposure along the China/India axis to avoid being caught off guard.
Chart 3. Ships and companies sanctioned in the last five years (July 2020 – July 2025) – Kpler.
Since July 2020, the number of sanctioned actors in the maritime transport sector has risen sharply. The number of sanctioned vessels rose from around 370 to around 1,650 by July 2025, while the number of affected companies rose from around 60 to nearly 500, with the fastest growth occurring after mid-2024. This difference, which rapidly expands corporate exposure alongside an even faster increase in sanctioned tonnage, shows deeper involvement between networks and a stronger influence of law enforcement in complex ownership and management structures. It is becoming increasingly difficult for any individual actor to claim to be isolated from these flows.
Chart 4. Sanctioned vessels by flag state in the top 10 countries over the last two years (July 2023 – July 2025) – Kpler.
Since July 2023, the number of sanctioned ships has roughly doubled. The largest increases were in the Russian and Comoros registers, with Panama also accelerating in 2025. The tonnage under the Russian flag increased from around 160 to over 320 ships, the Comoros fell from almost zero to around 140-150, and Panama’s share has increased more recently. Iran and China remain important and growing contributors. This pattern reflects both a broader network of en e enforcement and adaptive behaviour on the part of those seeking to evade sanctions: pressure on some registers has led them to change flags or hide behind layers of convenience registrations. This makes it increasingly important to verify and validate a ship’s flag status and history.
Chart 5. Total number of ships and companies added to sanctions lists in the last twelve months (August 2024 – July 2025) – Kpler.
Sanctions activity in July showed a shift in direction. Over the last twelve months, additions to the list have been uneven but revealing: January and May 2025 saw sharp increases in the number of ships added to the list (around 140 and 170 respectively), while company designations did not keep pace, with around 65 firms added in January and only around a dozen in May. This pattern suggested initial waves of targeting at the asset level, with slower or more selective follow-up of upstream networks. In July, this trend partially reversed: new vessels added to the list fell to around 110, but company designations rose to around 48, indicating a phase in which enforcement is shifting from mass identification of vessels to deeper attribution of their corporate links.
Taken together, the flows of sanctioned tankers in the run-up to July amount to approximately 180 million barrels of crude oil, worth approximately $8.6 billion at a price cap of $47.60. Of these, approximately $4 billion is linked to Russian-origin oil, and approximately $5.7 billion is destined for concentrated demand in China and India. This concentration has two clear effects on the market. First, it reduces the hiding space: with fewer high-risk flows, each circumventing shipment stands out more. Second, it shifts much of the economic burden onto buyers in narrow Asian hubs, who effectively underwrite a significant portion of the sanctioned origin value — increasing their risk premiums and complicating downstream trade finance.
At the same time, the rapid increase in the number of sanctioned vessels and expanding and interconnecting corporate networks, together with dynamic flag changes, are increasing liquidity frictions. Counterparties are proactively reducing their risks or demanding higher compensation for opacity, creating a feedback loop that reduces net revenues from these cargoes and redirects trade to actors willing to absorb higher compliance or reputational costs.
Conclusion
July clearly showed that sanctioned maritime oil flows are no longer diffuse background activities, but concentrated value chains. Approximately $8.6 billion worth of crude oil was moving through an increasingly small number of high-risk tankers, with Russian-origin barrels and demand from China and India forming the main pressure points for both law enforcement and systemic risk. Layered security issues such as attacks, signal interference and suspicious approaches have weakened confidence in the identity and routing of vessels, turning routine voyages into high-friction events where evasive behaviour is easier to detect but harder to absorb.
At the same time, the rapid increase in the number of sanctioned vessels, the slower but growing correlation with their corporate backers, and frequent flag changes mean that passive compliance is no longer sufficient. Each counterparty must be continuously reassessed, regardless of ownership links, flag origin, and origin-destination chains. Firms that fail to integrate sanctions information with real-time threat data face cascading consequences: lower prices for opaque cargoes, higher risk premiums in tightly concentrated corridors, and the risk of reputational damage or secondary designations.
The immediate priority is clear. Screening systems must be reorganised to combine vessel identity, flag legitimacy and regional security alerts; exposure along the China/India route should be stress tested; and opaque chains should be identified and either isolated or closed before enforcement actions expose them.
Source: here
Houthis threaten 64 shipowners with attacks on vessels calling at Israel
The organisation called the Centre for the Coordination of Humanitarian Operations, linked to the rebel militia in Yemen, said the ships would be targeted if they were within range.
The Houthi rebel regime in Yemen claims to be targeting an anonymous group of 64 commercial shipowners with attacks on ships within range of Houthi weapons.
A statement posted on the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre (HOCC) website claimed that the Houthi regime in Yemen was imposing “sanctions on 64 companies that violated the naval blockade against the Israeli enemy.”
The statement, taken from a report by the Houthi propaganda network, the former Saba news agency, was published in the “Recent Events” section of the HOCC website.
In the report, the Houthi-backed HOCC said it had sent “prior penalty notices to shipping companies with vessels heading for Israeli-occupied ports, warning them of the consequences of violating the naval blockade” and that “all fleets of these companies” are “prohibited” from transiting the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.
The HOCC stated that ships linked to the 64 companies that received letters “are subject to attack in any area within the range of the Yemeni Armed Forces.”
What the HOCC called violations by shipping companies included both port calls and commercial activities with Israel. The HOCC also published an update from Saba, quoting Houthi leader Mahdi al-Mashat, who said the regime is dedicated to “freedom of navigation for all except the Zionist entity and those who support it in its aggression against our people in Gaza.”
“All shipping companies must comply with the instructions and decisions of our armed forces, and anyone who ignores them will bear responsibility for this,” the Houthi leader was quoted as saying, with the report noting that the Houthis had advised “everyone to refrain from dealing with the assets of the Zionist entity.”
The HOCC describes itself as “affiliated with and under the supervision of the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,” referring to the Yemeni Armed Forces controlled by the Al-Ansar rebel movement in Yemen. The HOCC claims to “contribute to mitigating the effects and repercussions on civilians and civilian property in the theatre of military operations… by respecting international humanitarian law.”
Maritime security and risk analysis firm Ambrey mentioned the existence of HOCC in a letter to its shipping clients in March 2024, shortly after the first deaths of commercial sailors caused by a Houthi missile attack on the bulk carrier True Confidence.
The social media account of the head of the consulting department at UK-based private security firm EOS Risk Group, Martin Kelly, stated that the 64 shipping companies listed as sanctioned by the Houthi-backed HOCC had called at Israeli ports after 27 July, when the Houthis declared that they would target any ship with commercial links to Israel or Israeli ports.
The ships attacked by the Houthis in early July 2025, Eternity C and Magic Seas, were Greek-owned commercial vessels sailing under the Liberian flag in the Red Sea, and Houthi spokesmen claimed that the shipowners had visited Israeli ports.
Source: here
Failed German offshore wind auction ‘shows politicians must finally act’
Germany’s latest tender for offshore wind capacity for two sites, N-10.1 and N-10.2, both in the North Sea, has failed and attracted no bids.
The North Sea sites would have been sufficient for 2.5 GW of offshore wind capacity, but in a “clear signal” that Germany’s offshore wind farm auction design is not fit for purpose, no developers submitted bids.
Industry associations were quick to criticise the German government’s failure to address the issue of the auction design, despite repeated warnings from many of them about the adverse effects of negative auctions and the urgent need to adopt bilateral contracts for difference (CfDs) of the type widely and successfully used in other countries.
“The auction for offshore wind farms in Germany is based on negative auctions. It offers no revenue stabilisation and exposes bidders to risks beyond their control,” said WindEurope. “The uncapped negative auction or ‘second auction component’ further intensifies the financial pressure on offshore wind farm developers, requiring them to pay large sums for the right to develop an offshore wind farm.”
“The outcome of the auction should be a wake-up call for the German government. Negative auctions add costs that make offshore wind energy more expensive and reduce the number of companies willing and able to participate in auctions. It is time to change the auction model so that Germany can meet its offshore wind energy targets and remain industrially competitive.”
The type of revenue stabilisation offered by contracts for difference (CfDs) means lower financing costs and greater visibility of future revenues. Denmark was the latest country to switch to the CfD auction framework after a failed auction there. Germany is swimming against the tide. CfDs have proven to be the right model for financing offshore wind energy. They reduce financing costs and provide society with competitive electricity prices.”
The CEO of the German Wind Energy Association, Stefan Thimm, said the failed auction was “an alarming signal” and reiterated his call for the federal government to reform the auction structure.
Mr Thimm said: “The industry has been warning for years about burdening companies with too much risk. The current auction system forces developers to take risks independently of their will, without protection.”
“The result is a clear signal – developers are not interested in investing in the German market under these conditions. The German government is missing an opportunity to create significant value and jobs in Germany and Europe. If the regulatory framework is right, industry will invest. A change of course is urgently needed.” Mr Thimm said the government must also act to address bottlenecks and allow ports to expand to handle offshore wind projects.
“The federal government must pave the way for a reliable CfD (contract for difference) system alongside long-term electricity supply contracts. CfDs reduce electricity generation costs by up to 30%. Without reform, further auctions could fail – and with them, the energy transition.” He noted that now, after the auction for zones N-10.1 and N-10.2 has failed, the Federal Network Agency is obliged to organise a new auction for zones, “so the legislator must ensure better conditions.”
The CEO of VDMA Power Systems, Dr. Dennis Rendschmidt, joined the call for change. He said that the failed auction shows that the dynamic bidding process used in Germany and until recently in Denmark “must now be buried, as the industry has been demanding for three years.”
Dr Rendschmidt said that Germany needs the kind of sustainable market framework that CfDs offer, just like the rest of the EU. “The (new) market framework must be harmonised across Europe,” he said.
Thomas Young Hwan Westring Jensen, regional director for Europe at Aegir Insights, said the auction’s failure should come as no surprise, after the previous German auction, held in June this year, achieved much lower bid levels than previous rounds, with only two developers prepared to bid. He noted that the June auction was for a more attractive site, N-9.4.
“The latest auction can only be seen as a major blow, not just for the German market, but also for the offshore wind sector in Europe,” he said. “It sends a clear signal to policymakers that high concession payments are a thing of the past and that support must be reintroduced if Europe wants to continuously develop its offshore wind capacity.”
Mr Jensen said the failed auction could put future offshore wind development in Germany on hold. “Reintroducing a support mechanism such as CfDs will require an amendment to the WindSeeG (Offshore Wind Energy Act),” he said.
“It will take some time to determine how a CfD system will be financed,” he said, noting that Germany could use climate and transformation funds, but this could delay other critical initiatives, such as much-needed grid upgrades and electrification.
Dr Rendschmidt said the WindSeeG “must be amended this year” so that contracts for difference (CfDs) can be used for tenders taking place in 2026.
RWE Offshore Wind CEO Sven Utermöhlen said: “Like many other players in the industry, we are convinced that the issue of auction design needs to be addressed urgently. Investors need long-term planning perspectives. This is why other countries are successfully relying on bilateral contracts for difference (CfDs). These enable economically viable investments.”
“We welcome the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ initiative to take honest stock of the energy transition. This should be a good basis for adapting the framework conditions for offshore wind energy. The common goal is to ensure that Germany remains an attractive location for investment. Offshore wind energy is a central component of the energy transition. It must remain economically viable.”
Source: here
Small state diplomacy
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Small state diplomacy is a subset of diplomacy. It is sufficiently identifiable to warrant examination in its own right. At the same time, it also helps to provide insight into the broader themes, objectives and methods of diplomacy in general.
Small states form an integral part of the international order. Approximately two-thirds of the members of the United Nations fall into this category. They operate in the same general political and economic environment as all other states. In their foreign policy, they pursue the same goals of security, prosperity and well-being for their citizens. They also conduct their diplomatic activities using the same set of diplomatic tools as larger states.
Although all states share the full definition of sovereignty and autonomy, certain characteristics influence how small states operate in the international system. They have a limited set of human and material resources that they can devote to diplomatic tasks. The range of issues they face is more limited. However, these are no less urgent or intense than those of larger states. The effects of their actions on the international order also tend to be more concentrated.
Small states recognise the valuable role that multilateral diplomacy plays in strengthening their engagement and amplifying their voices, thereby balancing the conditions of competition. However, the numerous structures and complex processes of multilateral diplomacy place demands on their resources. For example, the resources needed to gain support for their positions may be insufficient.
Despite limited resources, this initial disadvantage can often be circumvented, reduced and turned into a strategic advantage. This requires a foundation of collective solidarity and the rule of law, a strict focus on limited objectives and the adoption of creative solutions.
What is a small state?
According to the World Bank, 50 countries are listed as small states: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iceland, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Swaziland, East Timor, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
Without a single definition of a small state, what criteria should we use to decide whether a state is small? Territorial size? Economic power or potential? Security posts or military force? Interaction with other states? Relative power indices?
There are two main approaches: quantitative and qualitative.
Quantitative definitions start from the criterion of absolute size – based on demographic, geographic or economic factors – individually or in various combinations. Qualitative definitions start from relationships and the assumption that most relationships are between unequal states. These approaches offer separate but complementary perspectives on the conduct of small state diplomacy.
Quantitative definition
Size is an important factor affecting how states manage constraints and threats to their sovereignty. Quantitative definitions analyse absolute size in terms of demographic, geophysical or economic conditions. For example, the Commonwealth definition focuses on demographic size: small states are sovereign countries with a population of 1.5 million or less.
Using this definition, there are just over 30 small states in the Commonwealth. However, within the Commonwealth, this list includes larger member countries such as Botswana, Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia and Papua New Guinea, as they share many of the same characteristics as small states (Commonwealth website). With limited resources, these states face unique development challenges, including limited economic diversification, isolation and isolation with associated high transport costs, limited human capacity and institutional in , susceptibility to natural disasters and environmental change, openness and income volatility.
Classification based on quantitative definitions is often used in the context of development cooperation. It focuses the diplomatic exercise on identifying the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of small states and on those measures and programmes that can help them mitigate or avoid them. This approach is useful in directing attention to very small and vulnerable states. It can also highlight the concerns of small states with serious exposure to the effects of natural disasters (e.g. climate change in the case of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)).
Qualitative definition
The qualitative approach focuses on perceptions resulting from unequal relationships. It considers a much larger number of states to be small, states whose sense of smallness is essentially circumstantial and subjective. It conceptualises the entire community of states, from the extremely small and weak (microstates) to the massive and most powerful (superpowers).
Approached in this framework, the study of small state diplomacy includes a wider variety of foreign policy options and diplomatic methods, for example, how small states manage development and security and how they try to overcome their initial handicaps in specific circumstances. This approach allows for a broader appreciation of the value and uses of multilateral processes in small state diplomacy, beyond the value and use of these processes in development cooperation.
Characteristics of small states
In its report on small states, the World Bank notes: “To address the unique constraints of small states, international development institutions need to develop innovative solutions tailored to address their interlinked development and financing challenges.” ( World Bank )
Openness, insularity, resilience, weakness and dependence are important factors influencing the engagement of small states in the international system, according to the Commonwealth Advisory Group report, “A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability“.
Small states are exposed to a high degree of economic openness, often with a dependence on strategic imports (particularly food, energy and industrial supplies); a dependence on a narrow range of exports or services; and susceptibility to external economic shocks. Vulnerability is therefore often considered a key element in defining them.
A class-based definition (DiploFoundation course on small states, 2010) encapsulates the ideas of qualitative and quantitative elements, characteristics and the problem of vulnerability: A small state is one whose geographical, economic or demographic conditions contribute to perceived weakness and vulnerability in the international context. A small state may be robust internally but vulnerable externally.
These characteristics and vulnerabilities are often reflected in the way small states conduct their diplomacy.
Source: here
The second space race is heating up! NASA is trying to beat the Russia-China duo to develop the first nuclear reactor on the Moon
In the 1960s, the US won the space race to the Moon, defeating the Soviet Union in the greatest space rivalry of the time. Now, almost five and a half decades later, Washington is determined to win the new “space race” once again by installing the first nuclear reactor on the Moon.
The stakes couldn’t be higher. The first country to install a nuclear reactor on the Moon will have access to a constant source of energy on the lunar surface and could therefore establish a permanent colony on the Moon.
Not only that, but the first ship to establish a nuclear reactor and a colony “could declare a no-go zone” on the Moon.
The first space race to the Moon was between the US and the former Soviet Union. This time, the rivalry is between the US on one side and Russia and China on the other.
NASA prepares for the new space race
NASA’s acting administrator, Sean Duffy, has issued a directive to accelerate efforts to place a nuclear reactor on the Moon.
NASA has discussed building a reactor on the lunar surface, but this would set a clearer timeline for the ambitious project, which could be the first stepping stone for establishing human colonies on the Moon and beyond, on Mars and even in outer space.
NASA’s Artemis I lunar rocket. Credit: NASA.
“To properly develop this critical technology so that it can support a future lunar economy, high-power energy generation on Mars, and to strengthen our national security in space, it is imperative that the agency act quickly,” Duffy wrote in the directive, according to the New York Times.
A lunar day is equivalent to four weeks on Earth, which means two weeks of continuous sunshine followed by two weeks of cold darkness. These extended periods mean that spacecraft and colonies could not rely entirely on solar power for their batteries. Therefore, a nuclear reactor is needed for power generation on the Moon.
In addition, the directive orders the agency to solicit proposals from industry for a 100-kilowatt nuclear reactor to be launched by 2030. NASA has previously funded research on lunar nuclear reactors, but those projects were for a much smaller reactor, a 40-kilowatt reactor.
“Building even a modest lunar habitat to house a small crew would require megawatt-scale power generation. Solar panels and batteries alone cannot reliably meet these requirements,” said Dr Sungwoo Lim, senior lecturer in space applications, exploration and instrumentation at the University of Surrey.
“Nuclear power is not just desirable, it is inevitable,” he added.
The directive points out that China and Russia are already working on placing a reactor on the Moon by the mid-2030s as part of a partnership to build a base there. If this happens, the directive warns, China and Russia “could declare a no-fly zone,” which would prevent US action there.
“This is about winning the second space race,” a NASA official told Politico.
Russia-China plan for a nuclear reactor on the Moon
In particular, last year, the head of the Russian space agency revealed plans for a joint project with China to build a nuclear power plant on the Moon by 2035.
At a conference, Roscosmos Director General Yuri Borisov revealed that Russia and China are seriously considering installing a nuclear reactor on the lunar surface between 2033 and 2035.
The collaborative effort stems from a memorandum of mutual understanding signed in March 2021 between Russia’s Roscosmos State Space Corporation and the China National Space Administration (CNSA), which highlights cooperation in establishing the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS).
Earlier this year, in May, Roscosmos and CNSA signed an agreement to build a lunar power plant dedicated to fundamental space research.
NASA aims to surpass Russia and China
China aims to send an astronaut to the Moon by 2030 and build a nuclear reactor there by 2033-2035.
However, NASA has set an even more ambitious timetable. It aims to have the first moon landing since Apollo 17 (1972) take place by mid-2027. NASA’s project to return to the moon is called Artemis.
In addition, NASA aims to install the first nuclear reactor on the Moon by 2030, around the same time that China plans its first manned moon landing.
However, many experts warn that NASA’s schedule is too ambitious and perhaps even politically motivated to align the moon landing with Trump’s second term (which ends in January 2029).
Many of the necessary components, including the Starship lunar module being developed by SpaceX, are still unproven.
Russia-China still in the game
Despite NASA’s ambitious timetable, which aims to beat the Russia-China combination in the second space race to the Moon by almost half a decade, some experts believe that Moscow and Beijing are still in the game and could beat NASA this time around.
Space exploration historian Alexander Zheleznyakov told TASS in an interview that US efforts to accelerate the development and deployment of a nuclear reactor on the Moon are unlikely to surpass a similar initiative by Russia and China.
“There has been previous work in this area — perhaps this project will be revived. But I think they will not be able to surpass Russia and China,” he said.
Jeleznyakov stressed that Russia has substantial technological power for such projects.
“Recently, Mikhail Kovalchuk, president of the National Research Centre of the Kurchatov Institute, mentioned that a prototype of a lunar nuclear reactor could be developed by the early 2030s. Of course, there will be questions about how to deliver it to the Moon, but overall, our resources are much more robust than those of the US,” Jeleznyakov stressed.
He also pointed out that China often hides its progress in its space programme.
Earlier, on 12 June, Roscosmos head Dmitry Bakanov also said that Russia’s nuclear power plant would be the first on the Moon.
It remains to be seen who will win this second race to the Moon. However, what is certain is that, as in the 1960s and the Cold War era, once again, the space race is not fuelled by a desire to push scientific boundaries, but to promote narrow geopolitical objectives.
“It seems we are returning to the days of the first space race, which, from a scientific perspective, is a little disappointing and worrying,” Dr Simeon Barber, a planetary science expert at the Open University, told the BBC.
“Competition can drive innovation, but if there is a narrower focus on national interests and establishing responsibility, then the bigger picture, which is exploring the solar system and beyond, can be lost,” he added.
Source: here
AMCA vs. KAAN vs. KF-21: India, Turkey and Korea’s fighter jets battle for air supremacy – who’s leading the pack? OP-ED
Fifth-generation fighter jets have been the talk of South Asia. A Royal Navy F-35 fighter jet was grounded in Thiruvananthapuram, India, for 37 days after an in-flight emergency forced it to land on 14 June.
It finally flew back to the UK on 22 July.
It called into question the logistical and maintenance capabilities of the Western world and the leading defence manufacturer, Lockheed Martin.
In the context of India’s Operation Sindoor, Pakistan threw a spanner in the works by announcing plans to purchase fifth-generation Chinese FC-31 aircraft by the end of 2025.
This situation has angered Indian security analysts, who have suggested intermediate options for the Indian Air Force (IAF). Sensing an opportunity, Russia has offered its Su-57 “Felon” aircraft with full technology transfer (ToT) and the option of manufacturing in India.
China has introduced a large number of fifth-generation J-20 fighter jets into production and is already flight testing two sixth-generation fighter jets.
While President Trump has launched a tariff war against India, New Delhi has realised the uncertainty of the American defence supply chain.
Tense statements have been made by Indian authorities, rejecting the F-35 as a possible option for the Indian Air Force. Meanwhile, media leaks have indicated that the KF-21 Boramae, developed domestically in South Korea, could become a potential candidate for the Indian Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme, as New Delhi seeks to address gaps in its combat air fleet.
In the past, Japan had invited India to join the sixth-generation Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a project to develop a sixth-generation fighter jet.
This trilateral effort, led by Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy, aims to share the substantial costs and technological challenges of developing this advanced aircraft.
Meanwhile, European partners France, Germany and Spain, part of the sixth-generation fighter aircraft system Future Combat Air System (FCAS), were arguing over the division of labour, which led to uncertainty.
As Turkey promotes its fifth-generation TAI Kaan fighter jet, Pakistani technical teams are working closely on the programme in Turkey, with the option of turning it into a possible joint programme.
Turkey’s open support for Pakistan during Operation Sindoor still has repercussions in the Indian security system. It is interesting to compare the three independent programmes of the middle powers: Kaan, KF-21 and AMCA.
TAI TF Kaan
TAI Kaan, also known as the Turkish Air Force’s “Turkish fighter jet,” is a twin-engine, stealth air superiority fighter aircraft designed to replace the Turkish Air Force’s fleet of F-16 Fighting Falcons.
BAE Systems supported the development and technology transfer. By the end of 2022, the system functionality review (SFR) and system requirements review (SRR) had been completed.
The prototype completed its first flight on 21 February 2024. To date, only one prototype has been produced. TAI has announced that the second KAAN prototype is under construction and will fly in the last quarter of 2025.
In 2024, it was announced that Turkish corporations TÜBİTAK (air weapons and electronic warfare systems) and Aselsan (radar and avionics) would support TAI in the development and construction of the aircraft. TAI’s Advanced Carbon Composites fuselage factory, which was tasked with producing fuselages for Lockheed Martin’s Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) programme, has been tasked with developing the fuselage.
The aircraft’s systems and capabilities include an integrated internal radio frequency system (IRFS), which includes the MURAD AESA front radar with GaN-based transistors, electronic warfare capabilities such as broadband spectrum monitoring, directional jamming, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging modes, including ISAR, dot-SAR, and strip-SAR.
The system also integrates cognitive operational mechanisms and neural network-based decision support systems.
The integrated electro-optical system (IEOS) includes an infrared search and track (IRST) system, an electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) and a distributed aperture system (DAS) for global day/night imaging and an infrared missile warning system (MWS).
There is an Integrated Communication, Navigation and Identification System (ICNI), a Self-Protection Suite, an RF Decoy Distribution System (CMDS) and a digital radio frequency memory-based jamming system (DRFM). The Wingman-type autonomous operations framework (OKU) allows KAAN to control accompanying platforms, such as ANKA-III and Super-ŞİMŞEK, using encrypted data links.
The aircraft’s computing systems provide capabilities for autonomous mission execution, drone task assignment and coordination with other air, land and naval platforms, as well as with air defence systems.
The system enables intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, targeting and air superiority through collaborative aircraft and, by redu , reduces the workload of on-board pilots. The aircraft is expected to have eight internal and six external hardpoints (three on the wing).
Rolls-Royce has offered technology transfer for the EJ200 engine and joint development of a derivative for the TF-X programme. In May 2022, Turkey announced that it was imperative for them that the engine be produced in Turkey with intellectual property rights.
Therefore, it was decided that ten General Electric F110 engines would be delivered to TEI as the first batch, in accordance with the agreement between Tusaş Engine Industries (TEI) and GE Aerospace for the initial development of the aircraft.
On 2 July 2022, the Defence Industry Agency published the invitation to tender for the domestic development of the engine. It stated that TRMotor, a subsidiary of TAI, had submitted its proposal and that Turkish Air Engine Company (TAEC), a consortium formed by Kale Group and Rolls-Royce, would soon submit its bid.
On 15 January 2025, Haluk Görgün, president of the Defence Industry Agency, stated that after 2030, KAAN will fly with a completely indigenous engine. On 15 May 2025, TEI, the Turkish aerospace engine manufacturer supported by the Turkish state, published the first official image and technical data of the TEI-TF35000 model.
The next phase involves detailed design and qualifications to be carried out between 2022 and 2029. Production of the first aircraft, called Block-0, will be completed in 2026, and the first flight will be made in 2026-2027. By this date, TAI aims to manufacture three prototypes.
The Block-1 configuration is planned to be developed by 2029. The manufacture of 10 Block-1 fighter aircraft is planned in Phase 2, and the aircraft will be delivered to the Turkish Air Force between 2030 and 2033.
In Phase 3, between 2034 and 2040, development and mass production activities are planned for other TF-X blocks, with the goal of producing two aircraft per month. The cost of the aircraft could exceed $100 million per unit.
In July 2023, at the 16th International Defence Industry Fair, a memorandum of understanding was signed to include Azerbaijan in the project. On 22 July 2025, Turkey announced Egypt’s participation in the Kaan programme, including co-production of the aircraft. This agreement reflects a strategic shift and a focus on practical industrial collaboration between the two nations.
Indonesia signed a purchase contract for 48 KAAN missiles on 26 July. The total delivery of the order is expected to be completed with domestically produced engines in approximately 10 years. According to Turkish media reports, the contract is valued at 10 billion US dollars. Turkey will provide cooperation in production engineering and technology transfers.
It has been stated that Saudi Arabia is considering purchasing 100 KAAN fighter jets and that the United Arab Emirates is also interested in KAAN. Ukraine’s ambassador to Ankara has openly expressed his country’s interest in Kaan.
Turkey has offered Malaysia the opportunity to participate in the Kaan project. It appears that Turkey and Pakistan are set to establish and operate a joint factory to produce the Kaan aircraft. The collaboration could be mutually beneficial, with Turkey benefiting from lower production costs and Pakistan gaining access to advanced technology.
KAI KF-21 Boramae
The KAI KF-21 Boramae “Fighting Hawk”, formerly known as the KF-X, is a South Korean fighter aircraft development programme with the initial aim of producing multi-role fighter aircraft for the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF).
The fuselage uses stealth technology but carries weapons externally, and features such as internal compartments will be introduced later with the KF-21EX programme. It is South Korea’s second indigenous fighter development programme after the FA-50.
The programme is led by the South Korean government, which owns 60% of the programme’s shares. Indonesia took a 20% stake in the programme in 2010 and has participated in the programme through Indonesian Aerospace since the start of KF-21 development in 2011.
The remaining 20% is owned by private partners, including manufacturer Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). In August 2024, Indonesia’s stake was reduced to 7.5% at the request of the Indonesian government.
In April 2021, the prototype was unveiled. The first test flight took place on 19 July 2022, and manufacturing is scheduled to begin in 2026. The six prototypes (including two two-seaters) will be tested for performance verification.
At least 40 aircraft are planned to be delivered by 2028, with South Korea expecting to deploy 120 such aircraft by 2032. They will also be available for export. The ROKAF will begin replacing its F-4D/E Phantom II and F-5E/F Tiger II aircraft with the KF-21. Subsequently, the F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-15EX Eagle II aircraft will also be replaced.
KF-21
The original goal of the programme was to develop a single-seat, twin-engine, multi-role fighter with stealth capabilities that would surpass both the Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon, but less than those of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II.
The goal is to be superior to the F-16 Fighting Falcon, with a 50% longer range, a 34% longer airframe life, better avionics, an AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar, more effective electronic warfare and data link capabilities.
In May 2016, the US government and Lockheed Martin provisionally agreed to transfer 21 technologies to KAI under the terms of offset trade, which is part of a contract with South Korea for the introduction of the F-35A.
Subsequently, the US government blocked the transfer of four vital technologies: the AESA radar, IRST, electro-optical targeting pod (EO TGP) and radio frequency jamming technology (RF jammer). South Korea was forced to develop these technologies domestically.
Although KAI was the main manufacturer, numerous other domestic and foreign companies were contracted to supply components or assistance for the aircraft.
Several of these companies had worked with KAI on the T-50 model. For certain sensitive technologies, such as AESA radar, EO TGP, IRST and RF jamming, foreign companies were consulted only for testing assistance and technical advice to avoid arms trade restrictions.
Hanwha Aerospace has signed an agreement with General Electric to manufacture General Electric F414 engines for the KF-X aircraft.
Under the contract, Hanwha will manufacture key parts, assemble the engines locally and supervise the installation of the engines on the aircraft. The AESA radar was developed in collaboration with Hanwha Systems under the leadership of the Korean Defence Development Agency (ADD).
Elta Systems contributed to the testing of the demonstration prototype of the AESA radar hardware. Saab provided technical advice to LIG Nex1, which is developing multifunctional radar (MFR) software for AESA radars.
IRST is based on the processor unit (PU) designed by Hanwha Systems and a Leonardo main sensor unit (SHU) called SkyWard-K, with a modified back-end and Korean software replacing the original programme. American aerospace contractor Texstars has been selected by KAI to develop transparent hood and windscreen films for the KF-X.
The Triumph Group has been selected by KAI to supply airframe-mounted auxiliary power systems (AMAD) for the KF-X. Cobham has been awarded contracts to supply missile launchers, communications antennas, external fuel tanks and oxygen systems. MBDA has been contracted to integrate the Meteor beyond visual range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) into the aircraft.
Elbit Systems has been contracted by Hanwha Systems to supply terrain following/avoidance (TF/TA) systems for the aircraft. There are many other technology suppliers.
All six prototypes are already being used for flight testing. The aircraft has completed most of its basic flight tests, including supersonic flight, night refuelling and operational capabilities in all weather conditions and over long distances.
The KF-21 Block I will have air superiority capabilities with limited air-to-ground functions and will enter service in 2026. The KF-21 Block II will be a multi-role fighter aircraft, incorporating attack and reconnaissance capabilities, and is scheduled for deployment in 2028.
Blocks I and II are designed to operate as advanced 4.5+ generation fighter aircraft, offering greater survivability through reduced radar cross section (RCS), more sophisticated avionics and relatively cost-effective performance compared to alternative platforms in their class.
The KF-21 Block III will be developed as a 5.5+ generation fighter aircraft with internal weapon bays, improved stealth materials for radar absorption and a modernised AESA radar with state-of-the-art avionics. It will support unmanned team operations, network-centric warfare and improved situational awareness.
A domestically developed Korean engine is also planned to replace the current F414-GE-400, reducing external dependence. The aircraft can carry an external payload of 7,700 kg in 10 hardpoints. The weapons are mostly of Western origin.
The two-seat KF-21EA will serve as an electronic warfare aircraft comparable to the EA-18G Growler. The KF-21EX is an advanced planned variant of the KF-21 Boramae, which aims to significantly improve the aircraft’s attack capability, survivability and operational effectiveness, particularly in a manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) configuration.
It will have an internal weapons bay. The aircraft will also receive several stealth-focused enhancements, including a re-profiled canopy, a low-RCS radome and new conformal antennas to improve its survivability against radar threats. The KF-21N will be a carrier-based version of the fighter.
Forty KF-21 Block I aircraft have been ordered, with deliveries expected to be completed by 2028. Eighty KF-21 Block II aircraft are planned to be ordered and delivered by 2032.
Indonesia’s planned purchase of 48 aircraft is on track despite some issues. South Korea has courted India for the project. The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) is reportedly considering Russian Sukhoi Su-57 and KF-21 aircraft for its multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) programme.
KAI has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Peruvian Air Force Maintenance Service (SEMAN) to manufacture components for KF-21 fighter jets in Peru. In 2024, the Philippines announced its interest in purchasing 40 fighter jets.
The KF-21 is currently being offered to the Polish Air Force, which has expressed interest in purchasing 32 more multi-role fighter jets to strengthen its combat capabilities.
A possible involvement of Saudi Arabia in the KF-21 fighter jet project has also been discussed. In April 2025, the United Arab Emirates signed a letter of intent to continue cooperation on the programme.
India’s UNCLE status
India’s AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) programme is considered urgent due to the decline in the country’s fighter squadrons, the modernisation of rival air forces and the need to maintain a technological advantage in air combat.
The programme aims to replace ageing aircraft and introduce a fifth-generation fighter jet, addressing both operational and strategic requirements.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) has been left with 29 fighter squadrons out of the authorised number of 42, with several more scheduled to be retired in the coming years. The IAF has been forced to extend the service life of its MiG-21 fleet, with the last of these squadrons due to be retired in mid-September 2025.
The IAF plans to include a total of 120 AMCA aircraft. This includes 40 AMCA Mk 1 (partially stealth) and 80 AMCA Mk 2 variants.
The AMCA is a fifth-generation, single-seat, twin-engine, multi-role stealth aircraft designed by the Aeronautic Development Agency (ADA), an aircraft design agency within the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
The AMCA is intended to perform a variety of missions, including air supremacy, ground attack, suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) and electronic warfare (EW) missions. It is intended to replace the Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighter jet, which forms the backbone of the IAF’s fighter fleet.
The AMCA design is optimised for low radar cross-section and supercruise capability.
As of July 2025, the prototype development phase is underway, following the completion of the feasibility study, preliminary design stage and detailed design phase. The AMCA programme, initially launched in 2010 as a 20-tonne class fighter aircraft, is now a 25-tonne class fighter aircraft.
Design work was completed in 2023, and approval for the prototype development project, worth ₹15,000 crore (US$1.8 billion), was received from the CCS in March 2024. A total of five prototypes will be built. The first three prototypes will undergo flight tests for development, while the next two will focus on weapon tests. The prototype will be launched every 8-9 months.
The initial plan was to form a special purpose vehicle (SPV) consisting of ADA, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and a private company for the development and production of AMCA.
At Aero India 2025, a full-scale engineering model of the AMCA was demonstrated to the public for the first time. As revealed during the event, ADA presented a 10-year development roadmap, starting with the phase that began in April 2024.
The prototype launch is planned for late 2028 or early 2029, followed by the first flight in 2028, certification by 2032 and entry into service in 2034. Each prototype will cost ₹1,000 crore (US$120 million).
Proposal for the AMCA industrial partnership model
The government has not yet decided on a production partner for the aircraft, as the ADA has proposed transferring responsibility to private sector companies rather than HAL, given the company’s “less than stellar delivery performance.”
Several meetings have been held, and HAL has insisted on an additional assembly line dedicated to AMCA, if necessary. In the meantime, the government has moved to an “industrial partnership model” instead of the initial plans for an SPV.
The ADA’s pressure to change production partner is to avoid any further delays following failures to secure development funding and the lack of US government authorisation for licensed production of the engines. The private sector partner would be responsible for the development, production and lifetime maintenance of the aircraft and aviation engine.
The Ministry of Defence has formed a group of experts to examine the increased role of private sector companies in the development of the AMCA. A high-level committee has evaluated a “clear strategy and production-business model” to accelerate the development of the AMCA.
The committee is tasked with developing a “time reduction plan” to take AMCA from inception to launch, as well as developing indigenous high-thrust engines. On 27 May 2025, the Ministry of Defence approved the “Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) Programme Implementation Model.”
According to the model, the ADA will issue an Expression of Interest (EOI) for the development of the AMCA through an industrial partnership. Both private and public sector companies can bid either as an independent entity or as a consortium or joint venture to win the contract.
Currently, the prototype is expected to be launched by 2028-2029, with the first flight by 2029, entry into service by 2034 and series production by 2035.
It appears that HAL will evaluate the responses of 24 companies to select a partner firm to form a consortium. This consortium, structured according to the public-private partnership (PPP) model, will then bid to become the designated consortium for the development of the AMCA.
On 18 June 2025, the ADA launched an EOI, which aims to select Indian companies for the development of prototypes, flight testing and certification of the AMCA.
The document calls for “reputable” Indian companies that comply with Indian laws and have experience in the aerospace and defence sector. The bidder must set up dedicated facilities for the serial production of the aircraft.
The bidder must complete the development, prototyping, flight testing and certification of the AMCA within eight years of signing the contract. The deadline for responding to the EOI is 16 August, before which a pre-EOI meeting is scheduled.
The strategic imperative for AMCA’s success
Both the Kaan and the KF-21 have flown, but the programmes have their limitations. The deadlines are not very favourable. They depend heavily on Western technology and systems.
The French Air Force does not currently operate any fifth-generation fighter aircraft. The Dassault Rafale is a highly advanced 4.5-generation fighter aircraft with some stealth features. It could be India’s interim model through the acquisition of several F-4/5 Rafale variants.
The early success of the AMCA is a strategic imperative for India, enhancing its air combat capabilities and reducing its dependence on foreign platforms.
The AMCA is intended to provide a technological advantage over adversaries and enable India to compete in modern air warfare. The programme aims to reduce dependence on foreign technology and boost indigenous aerospace capabilities.
India must quickly decide on a major private player to be the prime integrator. The integrator must then form a consortium of private industries, as has been done in most programmes around the world.
Adherence to the planned AMCA induction schedule is crucial to address operational gaps and maintain a credible deterrent.
Essentially, the AMCA is not just a fighter jet project; it is a national security priority that requires swift and decisive action to maintain India’s air dominance and strategic posture.
In the race for fifth-generation fighter supremacy, India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) stands out from Turkey’s TAI Kaan and South Korea’s KAI KF-21 due to its strategic focus on indigenous technology.
While all three programmes reflect the ambitious aspirations of middle powers, the AMCA’s focus on self-reliance offers unique advantages in a volatile geopolitical world.
Source: here