From Davos to the White House: Donald Trump’s Peace Council and Romania’s dilemma in today’s international order
AUTHOR: Admiral (rtr) PhD. Aurel POPA
The article strictly reflects the author’s analysis and not the position of the Maritime Security Forum
Donald Trump’s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026 must be understood cumulatively, in the sense that it is far from being a circumstantial intervention, tending to be a strategic act of positioning at a symbolic point of contemporary globalism. For over three decades, Davos has functioned as an agora for the economic, financial, and institutional elites who shaped the post-Cold War liberal order: trade liberalization, the integration of global production chains, the multilateralization of regulation, and the progressive transfer of powers to supranational bodies or transnational governance mechanisms. At the heart of this discourse was not only the reaffirmation of the “America First” doctrine, but also the explicit formulation of an initiative which, if it materialises, would have the potential to become the institutional architecture of the new order currently in the making: the proposal to establish a “Peace Council”.
The idea itself, seemingly simple, contains a significant change. The post-war international order was based on normative universalism, in the sense that peace had to be guaranteed by law, aggression prohibited regardless of the balance of power, and collective security managed by universal institutions. In contrast, the “Peace Council” proposed by Trump brings the logic of power concentration back to the center of the system. In this project, peace is no longer the product of universal rules, but the result of direct negotiation between actors capable of imposing or guaranteeing stability. We are moving from peace through norms to peace through geopolitical agreement.
This reorientation is inseparable from the economic and strategic message conveyed at Davos. Trump presented prosperity as the result of the renationalization of the economy, the repatriation of industries, internal energy control, and selective protectionism. Europe was described as an example of the vulnerability caused by excessive regulation and structural dependence. This opposition served as a justification for a new international political economy, in which global interdependence is no longer seen as a guarantee of peace, but rather as a source of strategic vulnerability. From this point on, the reconfiguration of security through a Peace Council becomes the institutional complement to economic renationalization.
Geopolitically, the initiative signals the explicit acceptance of multipolarity. The United States no longer claims the role of sole guarantor of global order, but rather that of the leading actor in a core group of major powers that negotiate their interests with each other. China and Russia are implicitly recognized as inevitable participants in the governance of peace, and Europe is invited to take its place as an actor only if it assumes the necessary strategic coherence. In this configuration, the UN and the classic multilateral system are relativized because international law would no longer precede political decision-making, but would instead become a technique for stabilizing compromise between powers.
We are talking about a change that has direct consequences for medium and small states. Security is negotiated, conditional, and dependent on positioning. The advantage moves away from those who invoke norms and converges towards those who are integrated into the mechanisms of negotiation.
For Romania, this transformation project creates both opportunity and risk. Located on the eastern flank of Europe, at the interface between the Euro-Atlantic space and the area of Russian power projection, Romania is a territory of strategic interest in any negotiation of regional stability. Control of access to the Black Sea, its role in energy and logistics infrastructure, and the presence of American bases and NATO facilities give it the potential to be an effective regional security hub in a negotiated peace settlement. In a Peace Council dominated by the major powers, Romania would not be a global co-decision-maker, but it could be an indispensable pivot state for the implementation of regional security arrangements. The potential gain would be the strengthening of security guarantees and the attraction of strategic investments in military, energy, and digital infrastructure.
However, these gains are not automatic. They are directly proportional to the Romanian state’s ability to maintain its strategic coherence, institutional predictability, and diplomatic credibility. Today, norms no longer guarantee security, and states that are not important enough to be included in the negotiation equation are vulnerable. In this scenario, Romania must decide whether it wants to be a direct participant in the negotiated peace or the subject of negotiations between others.
This is precisely where the significance of the Romanian president’s decision not to immediately accept Donald Trump’s invitation to sign the treaty of accession to the Peace Council comes in. In general, this treaty proposal remains open to other states, although the subsequent negotiation process for possible accession may be difficult or disadvantageous. Between an act of administrative prudence and a gesture of strategic positioning, by postponing and invoking the need for compatibility with existing commitments within the UN, EU, and NATO, Romania is sending the message that it is not abandoning traditional multilateralism for an alternative construction that is still legally and institutionally unclear.
Externally, this decision signals Euro-Atlantic continuity and respect for the existing international legal order. Romania is perceived as a state that does not prematurely validate a project that could undermine the universal principles of collective security. At the European level, it strengthens its credibility as an actor that does not fracture EU solidarity at a time of strategic redefinition. At the American level, however, this caution comes at the cost of losing political capital in an administration that operates transactionally and values quick reactions as a sign of loyalty.
If the Romanian president had signed the treaty, his reception at the White House would have been a consecration. Romania would have been presented as an ally that was the first to understand the direction of the new American order and voluntarily placed itself at the core of the architecture proposed by Washington. The gesture would have generated privileged access, political visibility, and priority in bilateral negotiations on regional security and strategic investments, but it would have simultaneously produced tensions with European partners and signaled explicit acceptance of an alternative order to traditional multilateralism.
By not signing, Romania chose the continuity of the existing order and avoided premature alignment. In this scenario, any meetings at the White House would not have been ceremonies of consecration, but rather meetings of clarification. Romania remains a respected ally, but one that is not yet fully aligned with the new American vision. This position preserves European capital, but reduces immediate political capital in Washington. In an order where the rules are still being negotiated, the difference between “first in” and “waiting” is the difference between contributing to the drafting of a construction plan and adapting to it later.
The Peace Council’s proposal, the Davos speech, and Romania’s dilemma are not separate episodes, but parts of the same historical transition process. The international order, based on universal norms and multilateral institutions, is entering a phase of contestation. In its place, an order of direct negotiation between centers of power is emerging, in which international law will be a technique for stabilizing geopolitical compromise, and security will be conditioned by strategic positioning. The Peace Council, thus established by treaty, will be an intergovernmental international organization for peace management, which seems to subordinate states precisely through what is most important to humanity—peace.
For Romania, the issue is not whether this transformation is desirable, but how it will be managed. Today, peace is no longer guaranteed by universal norms; the advantage lies with states that remain indispensable to regional stability. The decision to postpone accession to the Peace Council was an act of legal and diplomatic prudence. But in the medium term, Romania will have to decide whether to remain exclusively within the paradigm of traditional multilateralism or to build a negotiable position in the new concerted peace.
In the model proposed by the Trump administration, the presidency of the Peace Council is the central mechanism for governing negotiated global security. It no longer derives from procedural rotation, as in the UN Security Council, but from permanent member status as a financier. The payment of a $1 billion contribution as a “participation fee” is the instrument by which a position in the decision-making hierarchy of the new order is purchased.
“Each member state will have a term of no more than three years from the entry into force of this charter, with the possibility of renewal by the president,” the document states, as first reported by Bloomberg News. “The three-year term does not apply to member states that contribute more than $1,000,000,000 in cash to the peace council in the first year after the charter comes into force.”
The status thus obtained will control the council’s agenda, the initiation of peace negotiations, the appointment of mediators, the validation of agreements, and, crucially, the distribution of security guarantees. It is an executive, strategic presidency with real authority over negotiated peace. Thus, the nature of international leadership is fundamentally changing. In the UN order, states are formally equal, and leadership is temporary and administrative. In the Peace Council, leadership belongs exclusively to those who have purchased permanent access. Legitimacy in legal universality will be directed toward the financial and strategic capacity to support the institution.
In this context, if this project is realized, Romania loses three distinct things by not signing.
First, it loses the opportunity to enter the permanent core, i.e., the group of states that will participate in decisions. Without a signature and without financial contribution, Romania can never access the council’s leadership cycle. Thus, it remains outside the mechanism where future security arrangements will be negotiated.
Second, it loses the founding moment. In international institutions, founding states always have long-term advantages: privileged access to the initial architecture, influence in drafting the statute, symbolic positioning as “co-architect of the order.” Not signing at the initial stage means that Romania, if it subsequently wishes to join, will enter a structure already configured by others, without the ability to adjust the rules.
Thirdly, it loses immediate political capital in Washington. In an administration built on transactional logic, rapid signing would have been interpreted as an unreserved strategic commitment. This would have generated priority access to the US presidency of the council, accelerated bilateral favors, and preferential positioning in the Black Sea security mechanism. By postponing, Romania remains a respected ally, but not a privileged one.
At the same time, it is worth noting that Romania does not lose immediate security by not signing. It remains under the umbrella of NATO and the strategic partnership with the US. But it loses the opportunity to transform this security into a negotiable status in the new emerging order. By signing, Romania would have entered the organisation where peace will be decided, and by not signing, Romania remains in the area where decisions made by others are applied.
This is the real stake of the rotating presidency among permanent financing members:
not an honorary position, but the right to lead cycles of global stability. And Romania, by not signing, has chosen to remain for the moment outside the core where these cycles will be led.
If the Romanian president had signed the treaty to join the Peace Council, his visit to the White House would have had the character of a political consecration. He would have been welcomed as the leader of a state that quickly understood the direction of the new American order and voluntarily placed itself in the organization initiated by Washington. The protocol would have been elevated, public messages would have emphasized the “shared vision of peace” and “deepened strategic partnership,” and Romania would have been presented as an example of an ally that does not hesitate.
In the logic of the Trump administration, such a gesture would have created direct political capital. The White House rewards quick loyalty with access, visibility, and priority in bilateral negotiations. Romania would have been treated as a state “in the inner circle” of the new initiative. In practical terms, this would have translated into accelerated promises on regional security, investments in military infrastructure, expanded energy cooperation, and favorable positioning in possible negotiations on the Black Sea and the eastern flank.
But this type of reception would also have had a deeper meaning: Romania would have been perceived as a state that explicitly accepts the transition from the normative order to the negotiated order of power. The White House would have read the signature as a declaration of unreserved strategic alignment. This brings advantages, but also costs, as Romania would have been seen in European capitals as an actor validating an alternative architecture to the UN and the EU, which would have created tensions with traditional European partners.
In the scenario where the Romanian president did not comply with the request or postponed the decision, the reception at the White House – if it took place – would have the character of a clarification meeting, not a celebration. The protocol would remain correct, but not symbolically privileged. The implicit message would be that Romania is a valuable but cautious ally, still calculating its position in the new architecture.
The Trump administration interprets the speed of the decision as a sign of trust and loyalty. The lack of a firm response is read as strategic reserve. Consequently, Romania would be treated as a state “under observation,” being important regionally but not yet fully aligned with the new American vision.
Of course, this does not mean a deterioration in bilateral relations, but it does mean a loss of political momentum. In an administration that operates on transactional logic, the window of opportunity matters enormously. An ally that does not respond immediately is not penalized, but neither is it prioritized.
At the same time, this position was well received in European capitals. Romania was perceived as a state that does not renounce the traditional Euro-Atlantic alliance and does not prematurely validate a structure that could undermine the UN or NATO. From this point of view, prudence means European credibility, even if it reduces immediate capital in Washington.
Instead of a conclusion
Romania needs security in this area, which at the moment can only be strongly guaranteed by the US. In my opinion, the project means whether we like it or not the future of the new multipolar world order. Romania will probably join this project as a member without substantial benefits. Soon, the big states of England, France, and Germany will not remain on the sidelines and will join as permanent members. Why is Romania hesitating and missing opportunities? The start has already been missed, but it can still be remedied.