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The Phantom Fleet and maritime security challenges

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The Phantom Fleet and maritime security challenges

Author: Cam. (rtr.) Dr. Constantin CIOROBEA – Admirals’ Club

  1. Introduction

Maritime transport is vital to the global economy and represents one of the oldest and most important means of trading goods globally, accounting for over 80% of international trade. It is used for transporting goods over long distances due to its low costs, high transport capacity and global access. Maritime transport is also facilitated by the “ ” principle of “ ” promoted by the UN, which ensures access for all states, whether coastal or landlocked, an aspect that has transformed maritime transport into a global industry, enjoying the fundamental principle of free trade.

Current geopolitical developments, marked by the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar global order, intense strategic competition and persistent regional conflicts, are directly affecting maritime transport. Thus, international sanctions imposed on Iran, Venezuela and the Russian Federation regarding the export of petroleum products have given rise to a dangerous phenomenon in maritime transport, namely the “Ghost Fleet”. These ships circumvent maritime rules and international sanctions, sail under flags of convenience, have unknown owners, are poorly maintained and, in most cases, uninsured. Their use is a calculated strategy to support oil exports worldwide, but especially to China and India.

The emergence of this new phenomenon in international maritime transport requires in-depth analysis, starting with an explanation of the phenomenon of the “ “ Ghost Fleet”, a presentation of how it operates and its impact on international trade, but also on maritime security.

  1. The role of international organisations

[1]In presenting this situation, characterised by a continuous increase in the number of ships operating at the limits of legality or sometimes even without complying with international rules specific to this field, it is necessary to present the legislative framework governing activity at international level and the role and place of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). The organisation is a UN agency responsible for regulating maritime transport. This organisation was established to facilitate cooperation in the field of international maritime navigation, ensure maritime safety, prevent pollution of the seas and oceans, and develop international conventions on maritime navigation. It is the global authority that sets standards for the safety, security and environmental performance of international maritime transport[2] . The organisation has five main committees: the Maritime Safety Committee, the Marine Environment Protection Committee, the Legal Committee, the Technical Cooperation Committee and the Facilitation Committee. This organisation sets global standards for maritime safety, security and pollution, and in 2023, the IMO officially defined the practices “ Ghost Fleet”, highlighting the increasing risks posed by ships operating outside established norms. The condemnation of these practices was largely based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[3] . Although a basic principle of UNCLOS is the freedom of the “high seas”[4] , the exercise of this right is regulated by rules that are imposed on ships, owners and states to comply with safety and environmental standards. Ships must be registered in the flag state’s maritime register, have an undisputed owner and hold maritime and cargo insurance for the entire duration of the voyage, continuously transmit their position, and much more. The regulations presented are very clear and ensure freedom of navigation and trade, but they also allow for interpretations that may affect these international rules. This is because the principle of state sovereignty is fundamental to the UN, which leaves enforcement rules to individual states, such as how fraudulent registrations, lack of technical checks and insurance are enforced and prosecuted. This creates space for less conscientious shipping companies to exploit loopholes. It should also be noted that the US is among the few states that have not officially ratified UNCLOS.

All these aspects highlight the fact that the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea do not cover such activities that are on the edge of legality. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has also failed to prevent the fraudulent use of flags or the existence of flagless ships, with the positions of national representatives divided between those supporting Western sanctions on Russia, Venezuela and Iran and those opposing the move.

  1. Characteristics of ships in the “Ghost Fleet”

The phenomenon of exploiting loopholes in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea has gained particular momentum since international sanctions were imposed, particularly on oil from Russia, Venezuela and Iran, in order to facilitate the trade of sanctioned products while avoiding responsibility. To this end, a veritable “Phantom Fleet”  of ageing oil tankers with obscure ownership has been created, flying flags of convenience. As Michelle Wiese Bockmann, a maritime analyst, pointed out, “Since the beginning of March (2025), the percentage of Iranian oil and gas tankers using fraudulent flag registries has risen to nearly 40 per cent, up from 30 per cent just two months earlier. This leaves hundreds of ships without a flag and invalidates their maritime insurance and safety and seaworthiness certificates.”[5] These tankers are exploiting legislative loopholes and the impossibility of monitoring the mid-Atlantic for the transfer of oil loaded in Russian Baltic ports to larger tankers, often with their[6] transponders turned off. The tankers then sail to China or India.

According to Windward/SAFETY4SEA, “ This combination (sanctions avoidance, AIS transponder manipulation and sailing under false flags) has become common practice. Approximately 400 tankers use fraudulent registration numbers according to International Maritime Organisation data, and nearly 300 are already under sanctions. Together, they are part of a larger ghost fleet of approximately 1,000 tankers transporting sanctioned oil for Russia, Iran and Venezuela.”[7] Such a ship that is part of the Ghost Fleet is more than 15 years old and does not have a well-defined ownership, as it is very difficult to identify the real owner. The ships are involved in the transport of sanctioned oil from Iran, Venezuela and, to a greater extent, Russia and . In order to avoid the sanctions imposed, they engage in various deceptive practices by exploiting the lack of involvement of flag states or loopholes in international law.

By turning off or manipulating the information transmitted by the Automatic Identification System (AIS), when the system is turned off, ships disappear from real-time maritime situations. “The AIS system is mandatory for ships operating in many countries, including the United States, Canada, Europe, and Australia, among others. And many international organisations, such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), have recommended the use of AIS transponders to enhance maritime safety.[8] “By manipulating AIS data, the ship is presented as sailing in international waters, but in reality it is in the territorial waters of a sanctioned state, or is stationary and transferring sanctioned products. These practices of transshipping Russian oil take place in anchorage areas in Malta, Ceuta (the Spanish autonomous city on the Moroccan side of the Strait of Gibraltar), as well as Kalamata in Greece and Alexandria in Egypt. There are similar areas for Iranian crude oil, with ships flying false flags anchored in international waters near the Riau archipelago, south of Singapore, where these ships transfer sanctioned petroleum products. The waters of the United Arab Emirates are also used for such activities.

Sailing under the flag of another country, known as a “flag of convenience[9] “. Under international law, every ship must be registered in a country, which becomes the “flag state” and is legally responsible for enforcing navigation and environmental safety standards, as well as the rights of seafarers employed on the ship. Operators of ships in the Ghost Fleet exploit this system by registering ships in countries with limited maritime experience and limited capacity for oversight and enforcement, or by frequently changing the flag state to blur responsibility. Some ships even go so far as to use a ‘flag of convenience’, deliberately concealing their nationality and ownership, which is a serious violation of international rules.

Ship-to-ship transfers are another way to avoid sanctions, used mainly to conceal the origin of the cargo. Ships no longer call at ports to load cargo, and oil is transferred from one ship to another in the middle of the sea or ocean, usually with the AIS system turned off. By mixing sanctioned oil with oil already on board, the route of the sanctioned oil is concealed before it is transported to its destination port. However, in addition to avoiding sanctions, these practices create significant risks to the safety of navigation and the environment, given that the ships are over 15 years old and in poor technical condition.

Ships subject to sanctions avoid ports and inspections in order to remain out of sight of the authorities. When ships enter ports, they are usually subject to checks on their documents, insurance, rights and the level of training of their crew members. That is why ships subject to sanctions minimise the number of port calls or enter ports with weak authorities that do not carry out such checks.

Sailing without insurance is another way in which ghost ships operate, given that all ships are required to have insurance covering oil spills, environmental damage and crew injuries while at sea. Ghost ships have fraudulent insurance or are uninsured, and when accidents occur (oil spills, fires or collisions), it is impossible to identify the owner or obtain financial guarantees. This forces coastal communities and taxpayers to bear the costs of clean-up, thus transferring the effects of illegal shipping to public liability.

It follows that these sanctioned vessels, which are part of this Ghost Fleet, do not have similar characteristics and cannot be classified into a single category. Even if they may have basic similarities and meet the established criteria, the international community must be concerned about issues relating to navigation safety, compliance with technical safety rules and standards for ships, and their behaviour. Thus, Lloyd’s List Intelligence presents a gradual differentiation of these ships in the Ghost Fleet/Dark Fleet, ranging from “light grey” to “black”.[10]

Ships considered to be in the “light grey” category can be considered to be properly registered, the actual owner is unknown, and the ships are used to transport oil subject to sanctions. Maritime and cargo insurance is also known, and is part of the International Group of 12 institutions/’Top 12 Maritime Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs’[11] covering 95% of the global fleet. However, monitoring of these ships has revealed that they are engaged in ship-to-ship transfers in an area considered to be at high risk of evasion and circumvention of sanctions.

Ships considered to be in the “grey” category are usually, but not always, registered in open registers, including Panama, and in some cases have marine and cargo insurance with the International Group. There are irregularities in the use of AIS transponders, ships have long periods of presence in international waters off West Africa, Southeast Malaysia and Ceuta, near Gibraltar, areas known for ship-to-ship transfers of US-sanctioned oil belonging to Venezuela, Iran or Russia.

Ships considered to be in the ‘dark grey’ category are listed in an open register of flag states considered to be high risk, according to the ‘Grey List’ and ‘Black List’ published in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control/Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control”[12] (an agreement on the inspection of ships while in port, concerning navigation safety, technical supervision and environmental protection). Under the provisions of the convention, lists are drawn up of countries with lower levels of technical supervision and navigation safety management. The flag countries included on these lists are Cameroon, Togo, Comoros, Tanzania, Belize, Sierra Leone, Saint Kitts and Nevis, the Cook Islands, and Palau. There are often frequent, inexplicable gaps in AIS signals, frequent changes in flag status (frequent changes in registrations) and no known insurance.

Ships considered to be in the “grey-speckled” category – Different shades of risk are identified within shipping companies by the ISM (International Safety Management[13] ) or by the technical manager (the person who oversees the safe, efficient and cost-effective technical operations of a ship). Some ships belonging to a shipping company may have behavioural aspects that meet the specific criteria of the Ghost Fleet, as presented in the Lloyd’s List, while other ships behave normally.

Ships considered to be in the “ ” or “black ” category are assessed as having the highest risk because they meet most, if not all, of the criteria specific to maritime transport practices subject to sanctions. These include sailing under a false flag and falsely claiming to be registered, as well as other fraudulent representations of ship class and/or insurance, along with the usual irregularities regarding frequent changes of flag state , manipulation of AIS transponders and falsification of registration numbers. This practice allows ships to broadcast or display misleading details about their location or identity. False maritime identification numbers are transmitted, similar to how inserting a new SIM card can change a mobile phone number. The owner and technical management structures are either unknown or excessively complex to identify, and they have no known insurance. The vessels do not call at ports that comply with the Paris Memorandum of Understanding, usually taking on cargo through ship-to-ship transfers in international waters, often with their AIS turned off.

  1. Security challenges and courses of action to prevent the phenomenon of the “Ghost Fleet”

It is estimated that approximately 700 ageing, anonymously owned oil tankers are currently being used for illicit shipping, and their growing threat to global maritime safety and the environment should not be underestimated. “ This fleet has tripled in size since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and now accounts for up to 18 per cent of all ships transporting oil internationally.”[14] This leaves hundreds of ships without flags, maritime transport insurance, and maritime safety and seaworthiness certificates to continue transporting goods.

In order to block transport by ships in the ghost fleet, action must be taken against those who buy oil from areas under various sanctions and those who process it, against port authorities that do not carry out the necessary inspections and detain ships that do not meet the criteria, but action must also be taken directly against owners and ships that violate international laws or conventions.

The United Kingdom and other countries have therefore taken consistent action to revoke the permission to use the flag from the governments of countries such as Barbados, the Cook Islands, Gabon and Panama, which offer flag registration services for oil tankers subject to sanctions. As a result, ships that have used these fraudulent registers, which the International Maritime Organisation has determined do not exist, have become flagless, effectively stateless. And according to Windward data, “By August (2025), at least two-thirds of sanctioned tankers had used false flags.”[15] Thus, in December 2025, Gambia took drastic measures against ships in the Ghost Fleet, removing 72 ships with fraudulently issued certificates from its register, according to public reports[16] . This action left these ships without flag rights and thus stateless.

As some of these nations begin to respond to requests to revoke flag use, ship owners are turning to fraudulent flag registries. They are using the flags of countries such as Guyana, Curacao, St Maarten and Eswatini for these ships without permission, or worse, continuing to sail without authority under the former flag state.

The execution of on-board inspections (right of visit) and the arrest of the ship, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“… a warship which encounters a foreign ship on the high seas, …, may only subject it to control if it has serious grounds for suspecting that the ship: … d) is without nationality[17] “).

Relevant in this regard is the action taken by US forces in January 2026 to arrest a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the North Atlantic after a chase lasting several weeks. The incident exposes the legal grey areas, military risks and strategic calculations that explain why Russia chose restraint over confrontation, even though a ship sailing under its flag was seized on the high seas. From shadow fleets and sanctions avoidance to the limits of naval power and fears of escalation, the seizure reveals how modern maritime power is exercised.

The US Coast Guard attempted to board the Bella 1, which was sailing under the flag of Guyana  , as it was heading to Venezuela to load oil. The crew refused to comply and abruptly changed course towards the Atlantic, triggering a chase in the Atlantic Ocean. During the chase, the ship’s legal status was eroded. Reports during the chase indicate that the tanker repeatedly changed flags and submitted registration requests, raising serious doubts about the validity of its documents. At times, the ship was effectively flagless, according to the provisions of Art. 92/United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, “No change of flag may be made during a voyage or a stopover, except in the case of an actual transfer of ownership or change of registration.[18] “

The area in which the mission was carried out was also chosen with great care, the North Atlantic region, one of the most closely monitored regions in the world (the area between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom), where US and NATO surveillance systems, air patrols and naval assets are in operation. The Russian Federation had to project a powerful naval force, thousands of kilometres from its own coastline, in order to block the boarding and arrest of the ship. In the absence of such capabilities, Russia resorted to diplomatic action, issuing diplomatic protests and public statements demanding appropriate treatment for the crew members and the cessation of military action. If we analyse the way in which Russia’s protests were made, referring to the ship ‘Marinera’/ under the Russian Federation flag, but without mentioning anything about the ship “Bella 1” / originally under the Guyana flag, (as if they were different ships), we can conclude that they tacitly recognised the illegal nature of the actions of the ship “Bella 1”. After the arrest of the “Marinera” ship, the US continued its campaign of sanctions to interrupt the flow of Venezuelan oil, which it considered illegal. Thus, on 20 January 2026, the United States armed forces intercepted a seventh ship, the “Sagitta” oil tanker, a ship considered to be part of Russia’s “Phantom Fleet”[19] , the U.S. Southern Command announced on social media platform X. The “Sagitta” is owned by Sunne Co. Limited, based in Hong Kong, sanctioned by the US, and sailed under the Panamanian flag.

On 22 January 2026, French maritime authorities in the Mediterranean Sea carried out an inspection on board the Grinch, suspected of operating under a false flag, and the ship was then escorted to port for further inspection and verification[20] .

The establishment of a regional structure for the protection of critical infrastructure is another way of responding to suspicions of sabotage against critical maritime infrastructure. The damage to two important data transmission cables in November 2024 (one connecting Sweden and Lithuania, the other Finland and Germany) under suspicion of sabotage led to the establishment of a regional structure for the protection of critical infrastructure. The United Kingdom will lead a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), while NATO will also monitor Russian ships belonging to the “Ghost Fleet” in Northern European waters in real time to protect critical submarine infrastructure[21] . British Defence Minister John Healey said that this expeditionary force “helps protect underwater cables and pipelines from both deliberate acts of sabotage and cases of extreme negligence”[22] . In order to protect critical infrastructure, Finnish authorities seized the Russian tanker Eagle S after local authorities opened a criminal investigation into what they consider to be a serious criminal act. Authorities believe that the ship cut a data transmission cable by dragging its anchor along the seabed.

Preparing capabilities for towing operations is becoming increasingly important for countries with access to the sea, given that the ships in the Ghost Fleet are in increasingly poor technical condition and the possibility of environmental disasters cannot be ruled out. We must also consider the possibility that, citing technical problems, a ship may intentionally drop its anchor (leave it in the water) then let the anchor drift (the anchor is not fixed to the seabed), thus intentionally damaging critical maritime infrastructure (submarine cables or pipelines), but without the flag state bearing the consequences of these hybrid actions, nor the shipowner being held liable, given that these ships are uninsured. If the authorities do not intervene effectively in such cases, coastal communities and taxpayers will bear the costs of repairing critical infrastructure or cleaning up pollution. To avoid such a situation, on 9 January the German authorities were forced to intervene. The tanker “Eventin”, part of the Ghost Fleet according to a list compiled by the environmental protection organisation Greenpeace, suffered engine failure and was adrift in the Baltic Sea. The intervention of the German authorities was necessary, and the ship was towed to the port of Sassnitz.[23]

Monitoring maritime traffic and blocking suspicious ships from entering territorial waters, the German authorities boarded and inspected the tanker “Arcusat”, then forced the ship, suspected of being part of the Ghost Fleet, to stay away from territorial waters, citing irregularities in its documentation and identity. This is the first known case of a European state intervening to block an oil tanker from entering its territorial waters, according to Bloomberg.[24] Regarding the flag state, The Moscow Times reports: “ … all records of the Arcusat have disappeared and there are no reports of its delivery to a customer. As for the flag under which the tanker sails, somewhere it is listed as the flag of Tanzania, and elsewhere as that of Cameroon.”[25]

The case of the Kairos tanker is relevant to highlight the importance of monitoring maritime traffic and blocking suspicious vessels from entering territorial waters. The ship was hit by a Ukrainian maritime drone in November 2025 while sailing near Turkey. The explosion started a fire on board and left the ship without power. Turkish authorities intervened, extinguished the fire and took the tanker in tow. According to Bulgarian officials, “the tugboat Timur Bey took the tanker out of Turkish waters and appears to have released it about six miles off the Bulgarian coast. How and why the tow was abandoned remains unclear and is now under investigation.”[26] What is certain is that the incident highlighted the environmental, legal and security risks posed by uninsured, but more importantly, flagless ships in the “Ghost Fleet”.

Another important initiative for monitoring maritime traffic, blocking access to suspicious vessels and enforcing UNCLOS provisions was launched in January 2026 by the North Sea and Baltic Sea coastal states[27] (14 states excluding Russia). The initiative represents a common guideline for interdiction operations. The states call on the entire international maritime community to ensure that crew members are trained and able to use traditional navigation skills when satellite navigation is inoperative or jammed. Shadow fleet owners are also warned that they must comply with IMO conventions, that they may only use one flag, and that sailing under two or more flags is equivalent to operating as a stateless ship, according to Article 92/2 of UNCLOS (a ship sailing under the flags of several states, which it uses as it wishes, cannot claim any of these nationalities vis-à-vis any third state and may be treated as a ship without nationality[28] ).

Attacking ships in the “Ghost Fleet” is the most decisive action against these ships, but at the same time the greatest security challenge. Thus, in November 2025, Ukraine attacked two sanctioned, unloaded oil tankers in the Black Sea, 28-35 nautical miles off the coast of Turkey. The ship “Virat” had been under sanctions since January 2025, and “Kairos” was added in July. Both ships were registered in Gambia, despite the fact that they had been removed from that register for fraudulent certification. Their lack of legitimate flag state protection complicated insurance, salvage and jurisdictional responsibility after the attacks. Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Oncu Keceli said the attacks on the Kairos and Virat took place in Turkey’s exclusive economic zone and “posed serious risks to navigation, life, property and environmental safety in the region.”[29]

Russia’s response to international efforts to prevent the phenomenon of the “Ghost Fleet” may in turn generate other security challenges. A first measure taken by the Russian Federation to prevent boarding and arrest of ships was to transfer the ships to Russian registers, which grants them the right to fly the Russian flag.

Escorting important ships, in January 2026, a Russian convoy consisting of the sanctioned ships MYS ZHELANIYA and SPARTA IV, escorted by the destroyer RFS Severomorsk, was observed sailing towards the Mediterranean Sea. According to Ivan Khomenko, “The ships officially declared Port Said, Egypt, as their port of destination. However, historical data indicates that SPARTA IV often heads for the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria, even though it has declared Egypt as its destination. The position of the ship MYS ZHELANIYA suggests Libya as a potential destination, although this remains unconfirmed.”[30]

The Russian Federation has also taken some action to protect Russian-linked oil tankers, particularly in the Baltic Sea. This was the case with a Russian fighter jet that briefly entered NATO airspace in May 2025 to defend a tanker without a Russian flag, which the Estonian Navy had unsuccessfully attempted to inspect. 

Another measure taken by the Russian Federation was to redirect oil transport to the “Northern Sea Route (NSR)” from Baltic Sea ports. As a result, one third of Arctic maritime traffic on this route involves sanctioned ships from Russia’s shadow fleet, warns a new report. The figures include 38 sanctioned tankers, often poorly maintained, uninsured and frequently without ice classification[31] . Russian officials have also stopped publishing data on activity on the route, further reducing the information available and increasing the risk. A report by the Bellona Foundation, an international environmental NGO based in Oslo, found that from just 13 ships in 2024, “in the last year, 100 sanctioned ships, often ageing and poorly insured, have used the Russian route from the North Sea”[32] .

The intensification of on-board inspections and the arrest of sanctioned vessels reflects the intention of the US and European countries to apply sanctions directly and firmly. The arrest of ships was combined with sanctions against shipowners transporting oil under sanctions. The arrested ships were monitored, and these practices were well documented, revealing that they manipulated or turned off their AIS transponders to hide the movements of the ships and their maritime identification numbers. There were also situations where ships sailed under false flags, being clearly stateless. If all these elements converge, direct intervention becomes possible under specific, documentable conditions, without being considered an escalation or a violation of the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 

  1. Conclusions

The emergence of the Ghost Fleet highlights the limitations of the current international maritime regulatory system and the need for coordinated, proactive and tailored responses to new strategic realities. The Ghost Fleet is made up of ships that operate outside the established rules for maritime transport, like a car driving on the road without registration plates, insurance or regular technical inspections. But while such a car is easy to spot on the road, ships in the Ghost Fleet cannot be easily identified as they usually operate on the high seas and avoid entering the ports and territorial waters of states that can carry out checks. Sanctioned ships operate without complying with international standards, exploiting loopholes in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and seafarers’ rights, and pose a complex and multidimensional threat at the intersection of maritime, energy, environmental and geopolitical security.

In addition to the dangers to navigation safety and the environment, sanctioned vessels also pose a real threat to global security and coastal regions. There have been cases where such ships have endangered or even destroyed telecommunications cables, energy pipelines or other critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Black Sea, the South China Sea, the Norwegian coast and the Taiwanese coast.

The Ghost Fleet should not be seen merely as a solution used by certain countries to circumvent sanctions. It is a destabilising phenomenon that erodes transparency, increases environmental and operational risks, and challenges the legislation governing maritime activity. Furthermore, this phenomenon is not just an economic problem, but represents a broader security challenge that requires integrated solutions. Preventing this phenomenon requires several courses of action, including expanding satellite monitoring of the maritime situation, deepening international cooperation with flag states and port authorities, strengthening the insurance and certification regime for ships, enforcing port access bans and building public-private surveillance partnerships. The international legal framework on flag state responsibility needs to be updated, but action must also be taken to sanction operators, brokers and insurance companies.

The use of the ‘right of visit’ and the arrest of ships in the Ghost Fleet is a more radical but apparently effective measure, given that Russia has begun to transfer some ships to its own naval register, granting them the right of flag and thus ensuring transparency in terms of responsibility.

For the Black Sea, the existence and actions of the Ghost Fleet pose additional risks, given that the presence of these ships brings even more uncertainty to the maritime situation in an area in the immediate vicinity of a conflict zone, and such ships without a flag are attacked by the forces in conflict. Russia is increasingly using hybrid actions, including on maritime communication routes, through cyber attacks, the deployment of sea mines and the jamming of maritime space. The presence and actions of the Ghost Fleet complement the range of hybrid actions by directly threatening critical maritime infrastructure (ports, offshore installations, submarine cables and pipelines) and increasing insecurity on maritime communication routes.

Under these circumstances, Romania must take action to protect critical maritime infrastructure, and a first step could be to expand mine countermeasures by establishing a monitoring centre for permanent surveillance of the situation in the maritime area of interest. This centre will analyse maritime traffic in real time and exchange information on transport vessels with allies or partners, identify the location of critical infrastructure, integrate sensors on the seabed belonging to Romania or to gas exploitation and transport companies, enabling it to act in several directions to protect critical infrastructure and national interests in the maritime environment.

Romania is at a special moment, and its critical geostrategic position between Europe, Asia and the Middle East and the changing balance of power in the Black Sea opens up both opportunities and risks. NATO and the EU are increasingly relying on Romanian infrastructure for surveillance, logistics and deterrence in the region. This situation can ensure Romania’s increased strategic importance at the regional level within the EU and NATO, but under these conditions, our country must also assume additional responsibilities. Romania is in a unique position: the risks are real, and the opportunities are historic. If it moves towards the accelerated modernisation of its Naval Forces with capabilities adapted to modern maritime challenges, consolidates its partnerships and takes on an active role in Black Sea security, it can become an important regional pillar.

The lack of a strategic vision could marginalise Romania at precisely the moment when it has the chance to make a difference. That is why now is one of those moments when regional security can be built, even if it will require significant costs. And the statement by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when presenting the Law on the establishment of the right to multiple citizenship in Ukraine in July 2025, is worth noting. “Today, we have defined the criteria for the states with which Ukraine will be able to establish simplified procedures for acquiring citizenship and introduce the institution of multiple citizenship. Priority will be given to countries that are among Ukraine’s closest and most reliable allies.”[33] Without commenting on human rights issues, I can conclude that, in Ukraine’s view, Romania is not among the countries considered close or reliable.

It is increasingly clear that Romania needs to develop its own vision for security in the Black Sea region within NATO and the EU, but also through cooperation with Turkey, promoting a common strategy among the riparian states, becoming the EU’s important voice in the Black Sea, and increasing its influence in the field of energy security and maritime affairs. If Romania seizes this historic opportunity and acts intelligently, it can move from being a country on the eastern flank to a central pivot in the wider Black Sea region.

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[1] https://www.imo.org/en/about/pages/default.aspx

[2] https://moverdb.com/ro/organizatie-internationala-de-timp-de-razboi/

[3]https://lege5.ro/gratuit/g44donrr/conventia-natiunilor-unite-asupra-dreptului-marii-din-10121982

[4] Art. 87 UNCLOS – The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or landlocked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions set out in the provisions of the convention and other rules of international law/ https://lege5.ro/gratuit/g44donrr/conventia-natiunilor-unite-asupra-dreptului-marii-din-10121982

[5] A flagless fleet is threatening the seas – MAY 2025/ Michelle Wiese Bockmann, https://www.ft.com/content/7a89f7ae-cf3b-4e53-88bb-b87916f3eeef

[6] The AIS (Automatic Identification System) transponder is used to transmit and receive information about the ship, such as its position, speed and course. This technology helps prevent collisions and promotes safe navigation.

[7] Windward: The dark fleet is no longer invisible / https://safety4sea.com/windward-the-dark-fleet-is-no-longer-invisible/

[8] https://ro.pcm-cable.com/info/is-the-ais-transponder-mandatory-87609278.html

[9] https://shipbreakingplatform.org/issues-of-interest/focs/

[10]Lloyd’s List Intelligence / Shifty Shades of Grey https://image.info. lloydslistintelligence .com/Web/MaritimeInsightsIntelligenceLimited/%7Bcf88b663-f7c5-4871-99e6-aa61dfa46b47%7D_Whitepaper_-_Shifty_Shades_of_Grey.pdf

[11] https://www.shipuniverse.com/top-12-maritime-protection-and-indemnity-pi-clubs/

[12] https://parismou.org/system/files/2025-06/Paris%20MoU%20including%2046th%20amendment%20.pdf

[13] https://portal.rna.ro/s e rvicii/certificare-ism-isps/ism (aims to ensure the safe operation of ships and prevent pollution by implementing a safety management system by shipping companies, covering risks, top management responsibilities, staff competence and compliance verification)

[14] A flagless fleet is threatening the seas – MAY 2025/ Michelle Wiese Bockmann, https://www.ft.com/content/7a89f7ae-cf3b-4e53-88bb-b87916f3eeef

[15] https://safety4sea.com/windward-shadow-fleet-finds-protection-under-russian-flag/

[16] https://maritime-executive.com/article/gambia-joins-comoros-and-others-in-false-flag-crackdown

[17] Art. 110 – Right of visit/ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (abbreviated UNCLOS)/ https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiD o c u ment/26155

[18] Art. 92/ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (abbreviated UNCLOS)/ https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/26155

[19] https://news.usni.org/2026/01/20/u-s-forces-seize-sanctioned-tanker-in-southcom

[20] https://www.msn.com/en-za/news/other/britain-helps-france-seize-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker-in-commando-style-raid-in-the-med/ar-AA1UKeMy

[21] https://news.usni.org/2025/01/07/uk-to-lead-joint-expeditionary-force-nato-effort-to-track-russian-shadow-fleet

[22] https://news.usni.org/2025/01/07/uk-to-lead-joint-expeditionary-force-nato-effort-to-track-russian-shadow-fleet

[23] https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/ue/petrolierul-din-flota-fantoma-a-rusiei-aflat-in-deriva-pe-marea-baltica-a-fost-dus-de-germani-in-portul-sassnitz-3076979

[24] https://adevarul.ro/stiri-externe/europa/petrolier-rusesc-fortat-sa-si-schimbe-cursul-dupa-2501554.html

[25] https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/01/16/evropeiskie-strani-vpervie-ne-pustili-rossiiskii-tanker-v-baltiiskoe-more-a184716/ Russian service The Moscow Times

[26] https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/putin-s-ghost-ship-appears-in-nato-waters/ar-AA1RPBQC

[27]https://maritime-executive.com/article/european-nations-warn-shadow-fleet-shipowners-to-play-by-the-rules

[28] https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/26155

[29] https://www.euronews.ro/articole/turcia-condamna-ucraina-pentru-atacarea-celor-doua-petroliere-fantoma-rusesti-in

[30] https://united24media.com/latest-news/russian-warship-escorts-sanctioned-ship-near-nato-days-after-us-seized-a-similar-one-14898

[31] https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russias-arctic-shipping-route-turns-dark-fleet-corridor-used-100-sanctioned-vessels

[32] https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russias-arctic-shipping-route-turns-dark-fleet-corridor-used-100-sanctioned-vessels

[33] https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-defines-criteria-for-countries-eligible-1759952931.html

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