US–RUSSIA–UKRAINE TENSIONS: BETWEEN THE PROSPECT OF AN END TO THE WAR AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY – Maritime Security Forum
INFORMATION ANALYSIS
Summary
The trilateral negotiations between the United States, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, held in Abu Dhabi on 10–11 November 2026, mark the resumption of a diplomatic process that had been suspended for approximately nine months. Their significance, however, extends beyond the immediate prospect of ending the war. The discussions explicitly raised the issue of the future European security architecture, transforming the negotiations on Ukraine into a process with implications for NATO, the European Union and the Eastern Flank states, including Romania. The concrete outcome of the meeting is an agreement in principle on a major exchange of prisoners of war. The number of prisoners was to be finalised on 12 November. No agreement was announced regarding a ceasefire, the status of the occupied territories or security guarantees.
An analysis of the official statements and the positions put forward in the negotiations suggests that the diplomatic process is unfolding simultaneously on three fronts: the cessation or suspension of military operations, the definition of Ukraine’s territorial and strategic status, and the negotiation of broader security mechanisms between Russia and the West. This overlap constitutes the main difficulty in the negotiations. A limited military agreement can be negotiated without resolving all political issues, but a lasting peace requires credible guarantees against a resumption of hostilities. At the same time, any new agreement on European security would affect the interests of states not directly involved in the trilateral negotiations. The central thesis of this analysis is that the Abu Dhabi negotiations should not be interpreted solely as a process aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. They also represent a test of how the United States, Russia, Ukraine and their European partners can address the continent’s security without compromising state sovereignty, existing obligations and the principles of the international legal order.
I. What was actually negotiated in Abu Dhabi
The meeting on 10–11 November was organised through US mediation. The US delegation was led primarily by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, the Russian delegation was led by Vladimir Medinsky, and the Ukrainian delegation by Rustem Umerov. The agenda announced prior to the meeting included an end to the war, post-conflict security guarantees, de-escalation measures and humanitarian issues. The negotiations yielded varying results depending on the area.
Area Status as at 12 November
Prisoner exchange Agreement in principle; details to be worked out
General ceasefire No agreement
Occupied territories Fundamental differences
Security guarantees for Ukraine Discussions, with no definitive mechanism
Protection of energy infrastructure Subject of negotiation, with no confirmed public agreement
Navigation in the Black Sea Possible sector-specific measures, with no confirmed agreement
Participation of European states Separate consultations; no full inclusion in the trilateral format
European security architecture Introduction of the issue into the diplomatic process
Reuters confirmed that, although representatives of the parties spoke of progress, the territorial issue remained unresolved. Jared Kushner identified a lack of mutual trust as one of the main obstacles. This discrepancy between procedural progress and political outcome is crucial. The resumption of dialogue and the agreement on a prisoner exchange are verifiable developments, but they do not demonstrate the existence of a compromise on the terms for ending the war.
II. The Russian Federation’s Objectives: from Ukrainian territories to European security
The Russian position comprises several categories of demands that must be analysed separately. The first category concerns Ukrainian territories. Moscow continues to demand the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from regions claimed by Russia, including territories still under Kyiv’s control. In particular, the issue of the Donbas remains a key stumbling block. The second category concerns Ukraine’s military and geopolitical status. Russia is demanding that Ukraine renounce NATO membership and accept restrictions on its military capabilities and military cooperation with Western states. The third category concerns the European security architecture. The composition of the Russian delegation, including the participation of diplomats previously involved in negotiations with the United States and NATO, indicates the importance Moscow attaches to this area. From a strategic perspective, these objectives are not identical.
Territorial control relates to the outcome of the war and the balance of power on the ground. Limiting Ukraine’s military capabilities concerns Ukraine’s post-conflict security. The reconfiguration of European security concerns relations between Russia and NATO member states, including states that are not parties to the conflict. Extending the negotiations to the latter area could allow Moscow to pursue broader security objectives than those achievable through a bilateral agreement with Ukraine. This is a strategic interpretation of public positions, not evidence of a secret agreement between Washington and Moscow. A fundamental difficulty is that Russian territorial claims do not acquire international legal legitimacy simply by being included in negotiations. The annexation of territories through the use of force is not recognised as a legal means of acquiring sovereignty.
III. Ukraine’s position: sovereignty, territorial integrity and effective guarantees
For Ukraine, the central issue is to avoid an agreement that would temporarily suspend hostilities without preventing their resumption. Kyiv seeks to bring the attacks to an end, protect its energy infrastructure, secure shipping through the Black Sea, secure the release of prisoners and obtain credible international guarantees. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has rejected Russian demands for the voluntary cession of territories under Ukrainian control and for the limitation of defence capabilities. Kyiv maintains that fundamental territorial issues require negotiations at the level of the leaders of the two states.
From a legal perspective, three situations must be distinguished.
A ceasefire along the current line of contact does not automatically imply recognition of Russian sovereignty over the occupied territories. It may constitute a temporary military measure, without prejudice to the parties’ legal claims. The acceptance of a provisional territorial regime may involve mechanisms for administration, monitoring or demilitarisation, but does not necessarily amount to a transfer of sovereignty. Legal recognition of the annexations would raise fundamentally different issues, including in relation to the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force and to international obligations not to recognise situations created by serious breaches of international law. This distinction is crucial for the assessment of any future agreement.
From a strategic perspective, Ukraine must seek not only to bring hostilities to an end, but also to avoid a post-conflict arrangement in which its military, economic and institutional vulnerabilities could facilitate a new confrontation.
IV. The United States’ Strategy: Mediating the Conflict and Negotiating a New Security Framework
The US position is particularly significant because Washington simultaneously fulfils several roles: diplomatic mediator, the main provider of Western military capabilities to Ukraine, and a central player in NATO’s security architecture. The resumption of negotiations has been presented by the US administration as part of efforts to achieve a lasting solution. However, the agenda set out by US representatives goes beyond a cessation of hostilities and includes ongoing consultations on security, military transparency, crisis communication and mutual risk-reduction mechanisms. This approach can be interpreted in terms of three strategic objectives.
The first is to identify measures that will help reduce violence before all disputes are resolved. Prisoner exchanges and potential agreements on energy infrastructure or maritime navigation are examples of sector-specific measures. The second concerns the establishment of a post-conflict security mechanism to reduce the risk of a resumption of hostilities. This could include ceasefire monitoring, military transparency measures and international guarantees. The third involves examining the relationship between Ukraine’s security and European security as a whole. From this perspective, Washington views the conflict not only as a territorial dispute, but also as an issue of strategic relations between Russia and the West.
However, there is a potential contradiction between these objectives. A swift ceasefire agreement may reduce immediate human casualties, but, if not accompanied by credible guarantees, it may preserve the conditions that allowed the conflict to erupt or escalate.
Conversely, attempting to negotiate all European security issues simultaneously may prolong the diplomatic process and allow military operations to continue. Consequently, the effectiveness of US mediation depends on the ability to distinguish between measures that can be adopted immediately and structural issues that require far more complex negotiations.
The significance of the announced meetings in Moscow and Dublin
Following the meeting in Abu Dhabi, US representatives announced their intention to continue consultations with Vladimir Putin in Moscow and subsequently with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Dublin. At the time of writing, these meetings represent announced diplomatic steps, not results that have already been achieved. The order of the consultations is of procedural relevance. Washington is seeking to identify positions that can be adjusted at the level of political leadership, beyond the remit of the technical delegations. However, there is insufficient public information to conclude that the United States and Russia have already agreed on the parameters of a deal that Ukraine would simply have to accept. This distinction is essential: the existence of bilateral consultations does not constitute evidence of a definitive agreement.
V. Europe and NATO: participation in consultations, but not in direct negotiations with Russia
One of the most sensitive aspects of the Abu Dhabi meeting is the distinction between European participation in consultations and actual participation in trilateral negotiations. On 10 November, representatives of the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, the United States and NATO held separate consultations ahead of direct talks with Russia. The official statement issued by the Council of the European Union reaffirms respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and freedom of decision-making, as well as the need for credible security guarantees. The document states that NATO must remain the central pillar of Euro-Atlantic collective defence. This position represents an important legal and strategic milestone, but it does not mean that Russia has accepted these principles. Indeed, according to Reuters, the Russian delegation did not agree to direct meetings with European and NATO representatives during the summit.
This raises an issue of representation.
Ukraine is the party directly affected by the war. The United States is the main mediator. Russia seeks to discuss European security as a whole. However, the European states, which could be affected by any new arrangements, do not participate equally in all stages of the negotiations. From the perspective of international law, this situation must be analysed in the light of the principle that a treaty does not create obligations or rights for a third State without its consent, as enshrined in Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Consequently, a potential US–Russia agreement could not automatically alter the obligations of Romania or other NATO members. However, the political implications of such an agreement could be considerable, even in the absence of direct legal obligations. For example, commitments made by an ally regarding the deployment of its own forces or the use of military capabilities may, in practice, influence the collective defence posture. This is why European participation is not merely a diplomatic issue of representation, but also one concerning the effectiveness and legitimacy of the future security framework.
VI. The territorial issue: the central obstacle to negotiations
The territorial differences between Russia and Ukraine are more complex than a mere dispute over the line of contact. Russia claims territories over which it does not exercise full control, whilst Ukraine considers that accepting these claims would violate its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Reuters confirms that this issue remained the main obstacle in Abu Dhabi. When analysing the possibilities for negotiation, four legal and political models must be distinguished.
1. A ceasefire without altering the territorial status
This model involves the suspension of hostilities along an agreed line, without recognising annexations. Its advantage is that it allows for an immediate reduction in human casualties without a definitive resolution of the sovereignty issue. The drawback lies in the risk of the ceasefire turning into a protracted state of unresolved conflict.
2. Interim arrangements for disputed territories
Measures such as the withdrawal of certain categories of weaponry, international monitoring, humanitarian corridors or special administrative mechanisms could be considered. These are theoretical possibilities, not proposals agreed upon in Abu Dhabi. Their viability would depend on the consent of the parties, the mandate of the monitoring institutions and guarantees of implementation.
3. A definitive territorial agreement
Such an agreement would require the resolution of issues relating to sovereignty, constitutionality and compatibility with international law. Merely negotiating a territorial change does not remove the prohibition on the use of force to acquire territory. Furthermore, the provisions of the Ukrainian Constitution concerning changes to the state’s territory would need to be examined.
4. Postponing the territorial settlement and adopting a security agreement
This model would allow for the separate negotiation of security measures, leaving the status of the territories to a later stage. The difficulty lies in the fact that security and territory are interdependent. The line of contact, the deployment of forces, access to infrastructure and verification mechanisms cannot be completely separated from the issue of territorial control. Legal assessment: a ceasefire can be agreed without recognising annexations. However, a lasting peace requires a regime that is sufficiently clear to prevent territorial ambiguities from becoming new grounds for confrontation.
VII. Security guarantees: the decisive issue of the post-conflict period
Any potential agreement concerning Ukraine cannot be assessed solely on the basis of the date on which hostilities cease. The key issue is what happens if the agreement is breached. The Associated Press reported that Ukraine and its partners had discussed guarantees comparable, in terms of political effect and deterrence, to the collective defence mechanism provided for in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, no such arrangement has been adopted for Ukraine. Possible guarantees must be distinguished according to their legal and operational nature.
Type of guarantee Possible content Main limitation
Political Declarations of support and consultations Does not guarantee intervention
Military Supply of arms, training and intelligence Depends on subsequent decisions by states
Conventional Treaty with precise obligations Requires ratification and enforcement mechanisms
Operational International monitoring and verification Requires access and the safety of observers
Economic Reconstruction and conditional sanctions Effects may be delayed
Collective Multilateral assistance commitments Requires consensus and clear rules for activation
A credible system should establish at least the following: what constitutes a breach, who determines it, what measures are triggered, within what timeframe they are applied, and what the obligations of each guarantor are. Without such clarifications, the guarantees risk remaining mere political declarations. There is also an additional difficulty: Russia is calling for restrictions on certain Ukrainian military capabilities, whilst Ukraine regards maintaining an army capable of defending itself as a prerequisite for its security. This conflict of views cannot be resolved solely through diplomatic means. It concerns the effective capacity for deterrence following the cessation of hostilities.
VIII. The Black Sea: a potential area for a sectoral agreement
One aspect that has not been sufficiently highlighted in the public debate is the potential role of the Black Sea in the negotiation process. Ukraine has included the security of maritime navigation and the protection of agricultural exports amongst its objectives. According to Reuters, Kyiv is awaiting a response regarding the possibility of a sectoral cessation of hostilities affecting grain shipments via the Black Sea. No agreement to this effect was announced in Abu Dhabi. This aspect warrants separate analysis, as maritime security may be an area where economic and humanitarian interests allow for practical measures even in the absence of a territorial agreement.
What might a maritime agreement entail?
A possible mechanism could include a ban on attacks on commercial vessels, the protection of civilian port infrastructure, the exchange of information on sea mines, and the establishment of procedures for reporting incidents. Verification mechanisms could also be considered, possibly involving international organisations and coastal states. These elements represent options for consideration, not provisions of an existing agreement. The main issue would be the precise definition of protected civilian targets and the conditions under which a commercial vessel might be considered to be involved in military activities. In the absence of clear rules, the parties might interpret the same incidents differently, thereby compromising the functioning of the mechanism.
Implications for Romania
For Romania, a maritime agreement would have implications for the port of Constanța, transport on the Danube, the safety of navigation and energy infrastructure in the western Black Sea. A verifiable reduction in attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure could improve the predictability of trade flows and reduce the vulnerability of transport operations near the Danube Delta. However, an agreement limited to grain shipments would not automatically eliminate the threats posed by sea mines, naval drones or attacks on energy infrastructure. From the perspective of the Strategic Maritime Ecosystem concept, security cannot be reduced to the absence of attacks on ships.
It requires the simultaneous functioning of port infrastructure, transport, communications, energy systems, surveillance mechanisms and institutional cooperation. Consequently, any potential maritime agreement should be assessed in terms of its effects on the entire regional system, not merely in terms of reducing the number of incidents.
IX. Romania in the context of a possible reconfiguration of European security
For Romania, the negotiations are relevant beyond the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relationship. Any change to NATO’s military posture in Eastern Europe, to deterrence mechanisms or to the security regime in the Black Sea could influence the national strategic environment. The first concerns collective security. Romania is a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, and its obligations cannot be altered by an agreement concluded exclusively between the United States and Russia. The second concerns military infrastructure and the allied presence. Any US commitments regarding its own forces or capabilities could have practical effects on regional defence, even if they did not automatically alter existing treaties. The third concerns maritime and economic security. Stabilising transport in the Black Sea could have favourable effects, but an agreement that does not include verifiable measures regarding maritime threats would leave significant vulnerabilities unresolved.
Bilateral non-aggression pacts and their implications
The Russian proposal regarding the possibility of bilateral non-aggression pacts with NATO states must be examined carefully. From a legal perspective, such a pact should not be confused with the general obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force, already enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The additional legal significance of such a pact would depend on its specific content: verification measures, military transparency, incident resolution procedures and any mutually agreed limitations. From a strategic perspective, the issue would arise if such pacts were to include commitments incompatible with collective defence obligations or were to create substantial differences between the security guarantees of allied states. There is no agreed text that would allow one to assert that this is already the case. For Romania, the fundamental legal criterion is the compatibility of any new arrangement with existing international obligations and with the principle of the sovereign equality of states.
X. Scenarios for the progress of the negotiations
Based on the information confirmed on 12 November, four working scenarios can be identified. These do not represent probabilistic forecasts, but possibilities contingent upon the decisions of the parties. Scenario A – Humanitarian progress and sectoral agreements Negotiations continue through prisoner exchanges, measures concerning energy infrastructure and possible agreements on commercial shipping. Territorial issues remain unresolved. Indicators: the establishment of a timetable for exchanges, verification mechanisms and the announcement of sectoral measures.
Scenario B – General ceasefire and protracted political negotiations
The parties agree to suspend military operations, without a definitive resolution of the status of the occupied territories.
Indicators: agreement on a line of separation, the establishment of monitoring and the definition of safeguards against the resumption of hostilities.
Scenario C – Extension of negotiations to European security
Discussions on Ukraine are integrated into a broader process concerning military transparency, arms control and risk reduction between Russia and NATO. Indicators: the formal participation of European representatives, distinct negotiating mandates and written proposals on security mechanisms.
Scenario D – Continuation of negotiations without a reduction in military confrontation
Diplomatic dialogue is maintained, but the parties fail to reach a compromise on territories and security guarantees. Military operations continue. Indicators: the absence of verifiable commitments, new attacks on infrastructure and the persistence of incompatible claims. These scenarios are not entirely mutually exclusive. For example, humanitarian agreements may be implemented in parallel with the continuation of military operations and discussions on European security.
XI. The international law dimension: what should a lasting agreement contain?
The current negotiations raise the issue of the relationship between the political resolution of a conflict and international legal obligations. The UN Charter enshrines the prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state. Article 51 recognises the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack. These rules remain applicable regardless of any negotiations taking place. At the same time, international law does not prohibit the conclusion of ceasefire agreements, armistices or provisional security arrangements. On the contrary, such instruments can help to reduce violence and protect the civilian population. The problem arises when an agreement would entail the recognition of territorial situations resulting from serious breaches of peremptory norms or would impose obligations on states that have not given their consent. A sustainable agreement should be assessed against at least five criteria: compatibility with the UN Charter, respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty, clarity of security obligations, the existence of verification mechanisms, and provisions regarding the consequences of breaching the agreement.
The role of anticipatory international law
The negotiations provide a relevant example of the application of an anticipatory approach to international security. Traditionally, ceasefire agreements aim to resolve existing claims and prevent the immediate resumption of hostilities. A proactive approach would further examine the risks that might arise in the coming years: the development of autonomous combat systems, the militarisation of civilian infrastructure, the vulnerability of energy networks, cyber-attacks, maritime security and possible shifts in the regional military balance. From this perspective, an agreement should not only regulate known military behaviours, but also provide for procedures to adapt to future threats. For example, verification mechanisms might require periodic updates regarding unmanned systems, surveillance technologies and the protection of critical infrastructure.
This is not a proposal put forward by the negotiators, but a direction for legal and strategic analysis.
XII. Key indicators for the coming days
To assess the progress of the negotiations, the following should be monitored in particular:
- Prisoner exchange: confirmation of the number, timetable and actual implementation of the exchange.
- Consultations in Moscow: any changes to the Russian position regarding the ceasefire and the occupied territories.
- Consultations with Ukraine: Kyiv’s reaction to any proposals arising from the US-Russian meetings.
- European involvement: the existence of an agreement on the formal inclusion of the EU and European representatives in the security negotiations.
- The Black Sea: a possible agreement on commercial transport, ports and energy infrastructure.
- Security guarantees: the emergence of written proposals, with concrete obligations and enforcement mechanisms.
- The military situation: an effective reduction in attacks, not merely declarations of intent to de-escalate.
XIII. Final assessment: negotiations on Ukraine and the future of the European security order
The Abu Dhabi negotiations represent a significant resumption of diplomatic dialogue, but the results confirmed as of 12 November are limited. The agreement in principle on the exchange of prisoners demonstrates that the parties can identify areas of cooperation even whilst the war continues. However, there is no public compromise on territorial claims, a general ceasefire or security guarantees. The strategic importance of the negotiations also lies in the expansion of the agenda to include European security. For Russia, this allows for the discussion of claims that go beyond the territory of Ukraine. For the United States, it offers the opportunity to examine broader risk-reduction mechanisms. For Ukraine, the issue is ensuring that any new security architecture safeguards its sovereignty and defence capabilities. For European states, including Romania, it is essential that any arrangements are not established without the participation and consent of those affected. There are thus two dimensions that must be kept distinct: ending the war in Ukraine and regulating future security relations between Russia and the West. They are interdependent, but they are not legally identical and must not be treated as though they could be resolved through the same commitments. A ceasefire may represent a necessary step towards protecting human lives. However, it is not, in and of itself, equivalent to a lasting peace. From the perspective of Romania and Black Sea security, the future agreement must also be examined in terms of its effects on collective defence, maritime security, critical infrastructure and the capacity to prevent further confrontations. Key conclusion: the outcome of the negotiations should not be assessed solely on the basis of its ability to halt military operations, but also on the extent to which the future arrangements will be able to prevent the resumption of war, respect international law and ensure a stable, verifiable European security system that is compatible with state sovereignty.
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