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Ukraine MAIMS top Russian General with FPV drone as Putin’s major oil refineries are wiped out
MS DAILY BRIEF – August 22 th, 2025
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Daily appearance Monday-Saturday 09 AM (GMT +2)
Some information is presented when possible from several sources
Contents
News from Ukraine | Extraordinary news! Ukraine makes significant progress | Russians flee 1
Has Israel begun its offensive on Gaza, or will there be further “approvals”?. 1
The United Kingdom is among the 27 countries demanding immediate press access to Gaza 2
Russia rules out European troops in Ukraine, while Trump issues veiled threats. 4
Russia orders state-backed messaging app Max to be pre-installed on new phones. 11
Trump news in brief: 55 million US visa holders in limbo over new immigration restrictions 12
TRLG-122 guided artillery rocket now available for launch. 15
Poland to modernise 48 F-16 aircraft under a $3.8 billion modernisation agreement 15
Taiwan plans to increase defence budget to over 3% of GDP. 16
US Army seeks new solutions for air-ground coastal zone. 17
NATO to establish logistics base in Sweden, government announces. 18
Russia teaches drone warfare techniques in schools, says UK.. 18
Iran holds military exercises after humiliating losses in war with Israel 25
Russia launches missiles into the Sea of Japan during military exercises. 26
Turkish ports ask ships to declare they have no ties to Israel 27
Fifth authorised LNG ship docks at Russian Arctic LNG 2 terminal 27
Fire extinguished on US Navy ship off the coast of Japan’s Okinawa island. 30
Singapore and the US launch first modular attack ship for Indo-Pacific security. 30
New Zealand equips frigates with US MH-60R Seahawk aircraft to enhance maritime capabilities 32
Russia has received a batch of new Su-35S fighter jets. 36
Russia attacks a Flex manufacturing plant in the Transcarpathian region. 37
Taiwan’s drone build-up aims to offset China’s advantage. 42
DSEI Gateway: Inside the digital skills crisis in defence. 44
Sanctioned tanks sold for scrap in ‘unusually structured’ deals. 46
A Russian military enclave in NATO, Kaliningrad. 47
News from Ukraine | Extraordinary news! Ukraine makes significant progress | Russians flee
News from Ukraine | Wow! Ukraine strikes an airfield and a train in Crimea | First strike by Flamingo missiles
Has Israel begun its offensive on Gaza, or will there be further “approvals”?
Netanyahu is the last to “approve” the plan that has been the subject of daily announcements and which Israel knows will have serious consequences
Thursday, 21 August 2025, 19:58 CEST
Has begun its extensive offensive on Gaza, or is this just exaggeration?
After weeks of threats of a new large-scale offensive, strongly opposed by most of the international community, Israeli officials have been making daily announcements saying that the plan to occupy Gaza City has been “approved”; it has been approved by the Israeli Defence Forces, the security cabinet and the defence minister.
Later on Thursday, at an event with the Israeli army, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed his “approval” while ordering the immediate start of negotiations for the release of Israeli hostages remaining in Gaza. How many times, we wonder, does a plan have to be approved?
As is often the case in relations with Israeli officials, and especially with Netanyahu, it is difficult to distinguish truth from falsehood and to identify hidden intentions.
While Reuters reported that a Defence Ministry spokesperson suggested that the operation to capture Gaza City had begun, quotes from the briefing paint a more complex picture, including a reference to the second phase of Operation “Gideon’s Chariots,” the Israeli military offensive that began in May.
Recent military activity in Gaza has been described as “preliminary” to any new offensive. For its part, Netanyahu’s office issued an opaque statement saying that he had called for the acceleration of planning for an extended operation in Gaza City.
Given the deep divisions within Israeli society, with some 400,000 people recently demonstrating in favour of a ceasefire agreement and the release of the 20 hostages still held in Gaza, as well as ongoing contacts between mediators, Israel and Hamas, it is difficult to discern Netanyahu’s political intentions.
On the one hand, far-right members of his coalition have again threatened to withdraw in the event of a truce, demanding the conquest of the entire Gaza Strip and then the settlement of the coastal area by Jews. On the other hand, negotiations for a truce are continuing.
This week, Hamas said it had accepted a ceasefire proposal that would allow the release of about 10 living hostages in the first phase of a 60-day truce, while senior Israeli officials – but not an official “delegation” – met with mediators, even though Netanyahu hesitated to give Israel’s response, postponing, according to sources, a cabinet meeting at which the issue was to be discussed.
All this leaves big questions unanswered. While some Israeli and international analysts have speculated that the current moves on the ground are pressure on Hamas to improve any deal that might be taking shape, others – including Ronen Bergman, one of Israel’s most authoritative security analysts – suggest that Netanyahu would like to continue fighting for years to delay his legal proceedings and ensure his political survival.
Most agree that any new major campaign could have serious consequences. For Israelis, including senior defence figures, one concern is whether the hostages will survive, an issue that is fuelling mass demonstrations.
Others point out that, for all intents and purposes, the agreement reached by Hamas is one that Israel agreed to just a few weeks ago. Any offensive would be perceived by the international community as such: the most cynical of moves that would lead to an even deeper humanitarian catastrophe – if that can be imagined.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/21/has-israel-begun-gaza-city-offensive
The United Kingdom is among the 27 countries demanding immediate press access to Gaza.
Germany, Australia and Ukraine also sign a statement calling on Israel to end its blockade of international media access
Michael Savage Media Editor
Thursday, 21 August 2025, 15:41 CEST
The United Kingdom is among more than 20 countries calling on Israel to immediately grant international journalists access to Gaza to allow them to report on the “unfolding humanitarian catastrophe” in the war zone.
In a major escalation of pressure on Israel, 27 countries have signed a joint statement calling on it to end its media blockade and ensure the protection of journalists working in Gaza.
The United Kingdom, Germany, Australia and Ukraine are among the countries that have signed the statement by the Media Freedom Coalition (MFC), an international advocacy group that the United Kingdom helped to establish.
“Given the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza, we, the undersigned members of the Media Freedom Coalition, call on Israel to allow immediate access for independent foreign media and to ensure the protection of journalists working in Gaza,” the statement said.
“Journalists and media workers play an essential role in bringing the devastating reality of war to light. Access to conflict zones is vital to the effective fulfilment of this role. We oppose all attempts to restrict press freedom and block journalists’ access during conflicts.”
Governments have condemned the alleged , after an analysis indicated that at least 192 journalists and media workers have been killed in Gaza, the West Bank, Israel and Lebanon since the start of the war.
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), which compiled the data, said it was the deadliest period for journalistssince it began collecting data in 1992. The CPJ is investigating 130 additional cases of alleged killings, arrests and injuries of journalists.
Russia rules out European troops in Ukraine as Trump issues veiled threats
Thursday, 21 August 2025, 17:36 CEST
Lavrov’s comments cast doubt on the prospects for peace talks.
However, the White House continued to strike a positive tone on Wednesday.
Update on the war in Ukraine: Zelenskyy reveals the existence of a huge cruise missile, called Flamingo, with no prospect of peace in sight
Warren Murray, together with Guardian journalists and news agencies
Friday, 22 August 2025, 02:25 CEST
- As both sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine prepare for new fighting, Ukraine has tested a new long-range cruise missile, Zelenskyy said. The Ukrainian president announced that the huge missile, known as Flamingo, can strike targets up to 3,000 km (1,864 miles) away. “The missile was successfully tested. It is currently our most powerful missile,” Zelenskyy told reporters. Mass production could begin in February, he added.
- Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Thursday that large-scale Russian attacks in different parts of Ukraine show that Moscow is avoiding negotiations to end the war that has been going on for over three years. The latest offensive included 574 drones and 40 missiles, the Ukrainian president said, and was one of the largest to date.
- A missile strike on the American electronics company Flex in the Zakarpattia region in the far west of Ukraine was an “eloquent” indicator of Russia’s intentions in the peace initiatives led by Donald Trump, Zelenskyy said. “Now, the signals from Russia are, frankly, indecent. They are trying to back out of the need to hold meetings. They do not want to end the war. They are continuing with massive attacks.”
- “We believe that [the attack on Flex] was a deliberate attack on American property here in Ukraine, on American investments,” Zelensky said. “A very telling attack… just as the world is waiting for a clear answer from the Russians on their moves in the negotiations to end the war.” Nineteen people were injured in the attack. Zelenskyy said both sides were preparing for new fighting, citing Russian troop concentrations and Ukrainian preparations, including the launch of Flamingo missiles.
- Although he overturned years of Western policy of isolating the Russian leader, Trump has made little concrete progress towards a peace deal. On Thursday, the US president appeared to express frustration at Russia’s obstruction and suggested that Ukraine should have been armed long ago to “fight back” against Russia, writes Pjotr Sauer. In a social media post blaming his predecessor, Joe Biden, Trump said: “It is very difficult, if not impossible, to win a war without attacking the invading country… There is no chance of winning! That is the case with Ukraine and Russia.” Trump concluded by saying that “interesting times are ahead!”
- On Thursday, Moscow tried to further discourage any prospect of negotiations with Putin or peace on terms other than those imposed by Russia. Sergei Lavrov, Putin’s foreign minister, said that sending European troops to Ukraine to guarantee its security constituted “foreign intervention” and was totally unacceptable to Russia. He insisted that the Kremlin must have a veto over any support given to Ukraine after the war.
- Trump has set a new deadline – again two weeks – for assessing peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. “After that, we’ll have to maybe take a different approach,” Trump told right-wing media outlet Newsmax. Trump has failed to meet any of the deadlines he promised or threatened to secure peace or take action against Russia, which ranged from 24 hours to 10 weeks.
- In an attack on the western Ukrainian city of Lviv, one person was killed, three were wounded and 26 houses were damaged, Governor Maksym Kozytskyi said. Authorities in the Dnipropetrovsk region in south-eastern Ukraine reported damage to businesses, homes and gas pipes. A subsequent bombardment of the city of Kherson killed one person and wounded more than a dozen, a local official said.
- In the Russian-occupied part of Ukraine’s Donetsk region, two people were killed and at least 21 wounded in a Ukrainian bombardment, a Russian-installed official said.
- Kim Jong-un held a ceremony to decorate North Korean troops who fought for Russia , the KCNA news agency said on Friday. The North Korean leader has sent about 15,000 soldiers to the war, according to South Korea, of whom about 600 have been killed.
European leaders rushed to protect Ukraine in risky negotiations with Trump – but did they succeed?
Ashifa Kassam, European affairs correspondent
Thursday, 21 August 2025, 06:00 CEST
It has been called the “Great European charm offensive.”
Russia orders state-backed messaging app Max to be pre-installed on new phones
Thursday, 21 August 2025, 19:38 CEST
The initiative to promote domestic apps comes after Russia announced this month that it had begun restricting some calls on WhatsApp, owned by Meta Platforms, and on Telegram, accusing foreign platforms of not sharing information with law enforcement authorities in cases of fraud and terrorism.
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/aug/21/russia-max-app-phones
Trump news in brief: 55 million US visa holders in limbo due to new restrictive immigration measures
Friday, 22 August 2025, 02:04 CEST
Here are the most important news items in brief.
The Trump administration will check 55 million US visa holders for possible violations of the law
Court rejects $500 million civil fraud fine against Donald Trump
Pentagon asks civilian employees to help with ICE deportations
California moves closer to gerrymandered maps after key measures are adopted
JD Vance defends Trump’s bill for the Georgia midterm elections
New details emerge on Trump’s tariffs on the EU
Trump administration officials urge Fed to fire governor
The Trump administration is stepping up pressure on the Federal Reserve to dismiss Governor Lisa Cook after the economist said that “HYPERLINK “https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/aug/20/lisa-cook-trump-resign-fed-reserve-governor” has no intention of being intimidated” into resigning.
Judge rules that Trump’s former lawyer is illegally serving as a federal prosecutor in New Jersey
A federal judge ruled on Thursday that Donald Trump’s former lawyer , Alina Habba, is illegally serving as chief federal prosecutor in New Jersey.
In his order disqualifying Habba from prosecuting three defendants who challenged her appointment, US District Chief Judge Matthew Brann wrote: “The executive branch has perpetuated Alina Habba’s appointment as United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey through a series of unprecedented legal and personal measures.”
What else happened today:
- Donald Trump delivered a speech to law enforcement officers at a police headquarters in a Washington, D.C., park after announcing that he would join federal officers and the military on the streets of the city as part of a forced takeover of local police forces.
- Trump plans to leave Russia and Ukraine to organise a meeting between the leaders of the two countries without playing a direct role for the time being, according to administration officials familiar with the situation, taking a step back in negotiations to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
- The president has again called for the release of a former Colorado election official who was convicted for her role in violating election data in an attempt to find fraud, threatening to take “tough measures” if she is not released from prison.
- With Trump’s “big and beautiful bill” set to change how families and students finance higher education starting in July 2026, a new poll suggests that most students expect to be affected by the bill.
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/22/trump-administration-news-today
TRLG-122 guided artillery rocket now available for launch
In the new test, ROKETSAN’s 122 mm TRLG-122 laser-guided artillery rocket was launched for the first time from a pickup truck, successfully hitting the maritime target.
The use of the highly mobile pickup truck as a launch platform and the hit on the static maritime target could give the TRLG-122 a new advantage in the market, as 122 mm artillery rockets are mostly launched from larger trucks.
It can be seen that the containers are mounted either on a fixed launcher or on one with a height setting for use on a pickup truck only. Although there are two containers on the pickup truck in the video, the maximum number could be four or six, given the payload capacity of such vehicles.
A pickup truck is much easier to transport compared to an 8×8 truck, offering more transport options, while its firepower is considerably lower. Ease of deployment is an advantage, as pickup trucks armed with high-precision artillery rockets can be deployed more easily in unexpected locations for an element of surprise.
In addition, a smaller vehicle is considerably easier to conceal. Recent images from the Turkish Ministry of Defence already show practices of concealing important vehicles, such as the HİSAR-A low-altitude air defence vehicles, using dense nets.
TRLG-122
The TRLG-122 is a development of the TRG-122 guided artillery rocket, incorporating a new fuselage and guidance section with a laser seeker to further increase accuracy. Each ROKETSAN MLRS rocket can carry 12 or 24 TRLG-122 rockets, which can reach a range of 30 km.
In addition, the TRLG-122 missile design was subsequently adopted for the development of the UAV-122 air-launched missile for UCAVs (launched from AKINCI and Bayraktar TB3 UCAVs). The UAV-122 is available in GNSS/INS-only, laser-guided and TV-guided configurations and has a range of over 50 km.
Source: here
Poland to modernise 48 F-16 aircraft under a $3.8 billion modernisation agreement
Poland and the United States have signed a $3.8 billion agreement to modernise 48 Polish F-16C/D Block 52+ fighter jets to the more modern Viper configuration.
The Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze Nr. 2 facility in Poland will carry out the modernisation work, with Lockheed Martin as the prime contractor for the modernisation effort. This is part of Warsaw’s ambition to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2026. Poland purchased the 48 F-16 aircraft for $3.5 billion in 2003, with the last ones delivered between 2006 and 2008.
The United States has approved a mid-life upgrade at the end of 2024, although it has not provided all the details of the package. The programme includes AN/APG-83 SABR AESA radars, upgraded mission computers, integrated electronic warfare systems, advanced displays, inertial navigation systems and a test munitions store, including AGM-158 JASSM, GBU-53/B and AIM-9X training missiles.
Additional upgrades include:
- Advanced helmet-mounted devices
- Electronic warfare enhancements
- Advanced Sniper targeting pod with digital video interface
- Automatic ground collision avoidance system
Structural modifications that will extend the aircraft’s service life to 12,000 flight hours
The upgrade should keep Polish F-16 aircraft in service until the 2040s, when the country will have more F-35A Lightning II aircraft. This will also strengthen NATO’s eastern flank.
Source: here
Taiwan plans to increase defence budget to over 3% of GDP
Taiwan’s government plans to increase its defence budget for 2026 to over three per cent of GDP, the prime minister said on Thursday, amid US pressure to invest more in its own protection.
Taipei has stepped up investment in military equipment and weapons over the past decade in response to growing pressure from China, which claims the democratic island as part of its territory and has threatened to take it by force.
Prime Minister Cho Jung-tai said the latest increase was “another concrete demonstration to the world and the people of Taiwan of our determination and capability to protect our sovereignty and national security.”
The proposed spending must be approved by the opposition-controlled parliament before it can take effect.
Taiwan’s cabinet has allocated NT$949.5 billion (US$31.1 billion), or 3.32% of GDP, for defence spending next year, budget documents show.
This represents a 22.9% increase over this year.
The 2026 budget includes NT$135.9 billion for the Coast Guard Administration and military pensions, expenditures that were not included last year.
“Our total defence budget is calculated using NATO models and standards,” Cho told reporters.
Cho gave the figure of 3.23% during the press conference, but the cabinet later confirmed to AFP that 3.32% was the correct number.
Cho said total spending for 2026 had been budgeted at just over NT$3 trillion — an increase of NT$110 billion, or about 3.8%, from 2025.
President Lai Ching-te had previously promised to increase defence spending to over three per cent of GDP, as Washington has been pressuring the island and other governments around the world to spend more on their own security.
Military expert Chieh Chung said that if spending on the coast guard and pensions were eliminated, the defence budget would represent 2.84% of GDP.
“As for Washington’s reaction, I think it will welcome Taiwan’s decision to increase its defence budget, but it is still far from what they would be satisfied with,” said Chieh, an analyst at the Strategic Foresight Association.
Tariff talks
The announcement comes as Taipei seeks to reach an agreement with the administration of US President Donald Trump on lower tariffs on Taiwanese shipments to the United States.
Trump imposed a temporary 20% tariff on imports from Taiwan this month as part of his global trade war. Negotiations are ongoing.
The China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) party, which controls the island’s legislature with the help of the Taiwan People’s Party, has drastically cut Lai’s government budget for 2025 and frozen some defence spending.
Chieh said that a KMT-proposed increase in military personnel benefits was not included in the government’s 2026 budget plan, which could be an obstacle.
“Apart from this issue, the KMT is not expected to cause too many difficulties,” he said.
The KMT has supported increasing the defence budget, but “the priorities should be addressing personnel shortages, asymmetric warfare capabilities and modernising training,” said Chance Hsu, deputy director for international affairs at the KMT.
Although Taiwan has a domestic defence industry and is modernising its equipment, it would be outgunned in a conflict with China and relies heavily on arms sales from the US to bolster its security capabilities.
Source: here
US Army seeks new solutions for air-ground coastal zone
The US Army has launched an open call for solutions capable of operating in the Air-Ground Coastal Zone, the area from the ground up to several thousand metres, where small drones and unmanned ground vehicles are increasingly being used.
The request is for unmanned ground vehicles for demining and mobility, as well as drone swarm systems, sensor targeting, fire coordination and attack operations.
The proposed technologies must demonstrate interoperability with the army’s NGC2 command and control stack to enable faster and more efficient decision-making.
NGC2 is a modular, open-architecture system that connects sensors, vehicles, command posts and personnel.
Submissions are now open and will close on 5 September 2025.
The selected technologies will be delivered to the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) at Fort Carson, Colorado, in early 2026.
The US Army has emphasised that it welcomes contributions from across the industry, particularly from small businesses and non-traditional defence contractors.
The open call uses flexible procurement authorities to support rapid prototyping, iterative development, and potential future acquisitions.
Soldiers will use the technologies in training scenarios, including a rotation at a combat training centre, with evaluations focused on usability, mission effectiveness and interoperability with NGC2 systems.
Solutions that demonstrate strong potential may advance development, prototyping or collaborative testing.
Areas of interest
The initiative targets eight key capability areas to improve operational effectiveness in combat, intelligence, support, cyber and information domains.
For movement and manoeuvre, solutions should include unmanned systems for route clearance, breach crossing and friendly force concealment.
Mission command technologies are expected to enable data-driven decision-making, extended communications and automated common operational pictures.
Intelligence tools include sensor networks, loitering platforms, and predictive information flow analysis, supported by target recognition and acquisition systems that provide low-signature early warning and anticipatory observation capabilities.
In the event of fires, the US Army is looking for drone swarms, soldier-to-sensor targeting and autonomous direct-fire platforms.
Support includes autonomous casualty evacuation, resupply, predictive maintenance and warehouse automation.
Protection focuses on unmanned aircraft countermeasures, as well as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection.
Finally, information tools address network vulnerability detection, penetration testing, and automated disinformation monitoring.
Source: here
NATO to set up logistics base in Sweden, government announces
The Swedish government will host a NATO logistics headquarters in the city of Enkoping, northwest of Stockholm, for troop movements in Northern Europe, it announced on Thursday.
“NATO’s presence in Sweden strengthens our security and deterrence. The logistics centre helps defend NATO’s northern flank,” Defence Minister Pal Jonson said.
According to the government, the base will have around 70 personnel in peacetime.
“In a state of heightened alert and, ultimately, war, the headquarters will be able to expand to 160 employees,” a government statement said.
The armed forces have been tasked with preparing and establishing the base so that it is operational by the end of 2027.
Jonson told public television station SVT that work on the centre “will involve transporting various supplies, such as fuel, ammunition and spare parts.”
“The aim is to be able to transport large quantities of equipment and personnel within Swedish territory,” Jonson said.
The Nordic country abandoned two centuries of military non-alignment and applied for NATO membership following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, becoming its 32nd member in March 2024.
Source: here
Russia teaches drone warfare techniques in schools, says UK
British defence intelligence services have revealed that Russia is integrating training on unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into its national education system.
Over 2,500 teachers have been trained as part of the initiative, and courses are already being held in over 500 schools and 30 colleges equipped with practice centres.
The programme stems from a May 2024 plan by Education Minister Valery Falkov to train one million UAS specialists by the end of the decade, the British agency said.
London stressed that the initiative reflects the Kremlin’s strategic efforts to expand autonomous technologies and integrate them into military doctrine.
He also warned that teaching students to operate drones is part of Russia’s broader efforts to make its society more military-focused, with lessons from the war in Ukraine influencing how drones are used and deployed more quickly.
Expansion of UAS units, recruitment
The UK update comes after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in June that a separate branch for unmanned systems is being developed within the armed forces.
Putin said the new subsidiary “ensures their rapid and high-quality deployment and development,” as drones play an increasingly important role in Russia’s three-year invasion of Ukraine.
In August, Moscow reportedly met up to 110% of its monthly military recruitment targets.
The deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence service, Vadym Skibitskyi, said that up to 35,000 Russian soldiers are being recruited every month, which is about two-thirds of the 343,000 recruits planned for the year.
In July, it was discovered that the Kremlin was targeting children as young as 13 through video games, competitions and school projects to teach them defence skills, including unmanned missile operations.
These state-backed initiatives are organised in conjunction with the government-supported Agency for Strategic Initiatives, which supports vocational and social programmes for young people.
Source: here
Top 100 drone defence companies in 2025
In an era where unmanned systems define the next frontier of warfare and intelligence, The Defense Post reveals the definitive list of the top 100 companies developing drone technology in the air, on land and at sea.
Editor 13 June 2025
1 hour read
NX70 micro-drone. Image: NOVADEM
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In an era where unmanned systems are defining the next frontier of warfare and intelligence, The Defense Post reveals its definitive list of the top 100 companies developing drone technology in the air, on the ground and at sea.
Inclusion in this ranking is not just recognition – it is a mark of distinction, proof of a company’s innovation, impact and sustained leadership in the rapidly evolving defence landscape.
This ranking reflects a rigorous and independent assessment of global drone technology companies, based solely on drone-related revenue and their significant contributions to unmanned systems.
Our methodology took into account annual revenues, research and development investments, growth trajectory and future-oriented innovation, providing a comprehensive picture of the companies that are truly shaping the future of autonomous defence technologies.
To ensure fairness and clarity, this list excludes companies owned or controlled by the state (with a government stake of 50.1% or more).
In addition, companies with opaque ownership structures or documented alignment with sanctioned regimes — particularly those with close ties to the Russian government — were not considered for inclusion, regardless of their technological capabilities.
We decided to include companies such as Aselsan because, although they may have indirect links to the state — such as being owned by a foundation (in the case of Aselsan, the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation) — they are not majority-owned by a government entity in a formal or direct capacity and operate with significant independence in product development, partnerships and international sales, meeting our inclusion criteria.
For companies included in this year’s list, please contact us to find out how you can use the promotions related to this ranking. Official digital badges, plaques, magazine covers and licensing packages are available. To obtain customised materials or to find out about promotional opportunities related to the ranking, please contact our licensing team directly.
If you believe we have made an error regarding certain products or solutions from these companies, please contact us.
Welcome to the future of unmanned defence. This is the list that sets the standard.
| Rank | Company | Country |
| 1 | General Atomics | United States |
| 2 | Aeronautical systems Northrop Grumman | United States |
| 3 | Baykar | Curcan |
| 4 | RTX | United States |
| 5 | Elbit Systems | Israel |
| 6 | Anduril Industries | United States |
| 7 | BlueHalo | United States |
| 8 | Leonardo | Italy |
| 9 | Teledyne FLIR | United States |
| 10 | AEVEX Aerospace | United States |
| 11 | Aurora Flight Sciences | United States |
| 12 | L3Harris Technologies | United States |
| 13 | BAE Systems | United Kingdom |
| 14 | Lockheed Martin | United States |
| 15 | AeroVironment | United States |
| 16 | Rheinmetall AG | Germany |
| 17 | Aselsan | Turkey |
| 18 | Thales Group | France |
| 19 | Kratos | United States |
| 20 | Scut AI | United States |
| 21 | QinetiQ Group | United Kingdom |
| 22 | TAF drones | Ukraine |
| 23 | In situ | United States |
| 24 | WB Group | Poland |
| 25 | Autonomy on the margins | United States |
| 26 | Aeronautica Ltd. | Israel |
| 27 | Skydio | United States |
| 28 | Quantum-Systems GmbH | Germany |
| 29 | Perception | Israel |
| 30 | Parrot drones | France |
| 31 | Red Cat Holdings | United States |
| 32 | Overwatch Group | United States |
| 33 | Schiebel GmbH | Austria |
| 34 | High-performance drone operations (PDW) | United States |
| 35 | Aeryon Labs | Canada |
| 36 | Takever | Portugal |
| 37 | Firestorm Laboratories | United States |
| 38 | UVision Air Ltd. | Israel |
| 39 | DeltaQuad | Netherlands |
| 40 | Neros | United States |
| 41 | Xtend | Israel |
| 42 | May | Sweden |
| 43 | Beta Technologies | United States |
| 44 | IdeaForge Technology Limited | India |
| 45 | DroneVolt SA | France |
| 46 | Delair | France |
| 47 | SYPAQ systems | Australia |
| 48 | Aerospace Platform | United States |
| 49 | Aerovel | United States |
| 50 | Val HAPS | United Kingdom |
| 51 | Primoco UAV SE | Czech Republic |
| 52 | Tactical UAV Systems Ltd. | United Kingdom |
| 53 | Threod Systems AS | Estonia |
| 54 | Drone Teal | United States |
| 55 | Light Air | United States |
| 56 | UCONSYSTEM Co., Ltd. | South Korea |
| 57 | DefSecIntel Solutions OÜ | Estonia |
| 58 | Defendtex | Australia |
| 59 | Newlyweds | France |
| 60 | Unmanned defence systems (UDS) | Lithuania |
| 61 | Survey helicopter | France |
| 62 | Flightwave Aerospace | United States |
| 63 | Inspired Flight Technologies, Inc. | United States |
| 64 | Elistair | France |
| 65 | Ukrspecsystems | Ukraine |
| 66 | InstantEye Robotics | United States |
| 67 | Urban aeronautics | Israel |
| 68 | CopterPix Pro | Israel |
| 69 | PteroDynamics | United States |
| 70 | Dragonfly Innovations | Canada |
| 71 | Atlas UAS | Latvia |
| 72 | Landing | Estonia |
| 73 | UAVision | Portugal |
| 74 | UAVs | United States |
| 75 | Paras Defence and Space Technologies Ltd. | India |
| 76 | Dhaksha Unmanned Systems | India |
| 77 | Autonomy Granta | Lithuania |
| 78 | ZIYAN Tech | China |
| 79 | Alpine Eagle | Germany |
| 80 | Altus LSA | Greece |
| 81 | Dairy cows | South Africa |
| 82 | Ascent AeroSystems | United States |
| 83 | Nearthlab | |
| 84 | Airlogix | Ukraine |
| 85 | Alpha unmanned systems | Spain |
| 86 | Skyfish | United States |
| 87 | Aurea Avionics | Spain |
| 88 | Hoverfly Technologies | United States |
| 89 | Sabrewing Aircraft Company | United States |
| 90 | Arctic Horizons | Canada |
| 91 | Black Swift Technologies | United States |
| 92 | ElevonX | Slovenia |
| 93 | Acecore Technologies | Netherlands |
| 94 | WaveAerospace | United States |
| 95 | Woot Tech Aerospace | United States |
| 96 | Colugo Systems | Israel |
| 97 | Rotron Aerospace Limited | United Kingdom |
| 98 | Sonin Hybrid | United States |
| 99 | Insta Group Oy | Finland |
| 100 | ALTI unmanned | South Africa |
Source: here
Iran holds military exercises after humiliating losses in war with Israel
Iran launched its first solo military exercises since June’s war with Israel on Thursday, state media reported, seeking to reassert its image of strength after heavy losses.
Iranian naval units fired missiles and drones at targets in open waters in the Indian Ocean as part of the “Sustainable Power 1404” exercise, state television reported.
“These exercises are taking place about a month after the Iranian-Russian exercise under the name Casarex 2025, which took place in the northern waters of Iran (the Caspian Sea). The Sustainable Power exercises… are taking place in the southern waters of Iran,” state television said.
Israel attacked Iran in a 12-day air war, briefly joined by the United States, bombing key nuclear facilities and killing senior military commanders and nuclear scientists.
Israel largely destroyed Iran’s air defences during the war, and much of its stockpile of ballistic missiles is believed to have been damaged by Israeli strikes.
Since then, the Islamic Republic has declared that it is prepared to counter any future attacks.
“Any new adventure by the enemy will be dealt a heavy blow,” the Defence Ministry said in a statement on Thursday.
US President Donald Trump has threatened to attack Iran again if it reactivates its nuclear facilities, including uranium enrichment plants.
Tehran suspended negotiations with Washington aimed at limiting the country’s nuclear ambitions after Israeli and American air strikes. Iran denies any intention to develop atomic bombs.
Iran believes that the time for “effective” nuclear talks with the US has not yet come, its top diplomat said on Wednesday, although Tehran will not completely halt cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog.
Source: here
Russia fired missiles into the Sea of Japan during military exercises
Udaloy-class ship (Project 1155) Marshal Shaposhnikov Russian Ministry
The Russian Pacific Fleet fired cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles during exercises in the Sea of Japan, which also involved aircraft and drones, the Russian Defence Ministry announced on Thursday.
“Kalibr and Uran missiles were launched from the frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov in the Sea of Japan, and the sailors successfully hit their target,” the ministry said.
“The manoeuvre was carried out by ships and vessels of the Pacific Fleet, as well as by aircraft and drones of the fleet’s naval aviation,” it said.
The Defence Ministry published images of the frigate launching the missiles.
Reuters reported earlier this month that there is growing desire in Japan to relax its decades-old commitment not to produce, possess or host nuclear weapons on its territory – known as the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles.”
Source: here
Turkish ports require ships to declare they have no ties to Israel
Turkish port authorities have begun informally requesting shipping agents to provide letters stating that ships have no links to Israel and are not carrying military or dangerous goods destined for the country, according to two shipping sources.
The sources said that the harbour master’s office had verbally asked port agents to provide written assurances, adding that there was no official circular on the matter.
One of the sources said the instruction applies to ports in Turkey.
The letter of guarantee should state that the owners, managers and operators of the ships have no ties to Israel and that certain types of goods, including explosives and radioactive materials or military equipment, are not on board en route to Israel, the second source said.
The Ministry of Transport did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Last year, Turkey suspended trade with Israel worth $7 billion a year because of its war in Gaza with the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas.
Source: here
Fifth authorised LNG ship docks at Russian Arctic LNG 2 terminal
Russian Arctic LNG 2 project, Novatek
A liquefied natural gas tanker targeted by US sanctions docked on Thursday at the Russian port of Arctic LNG 2, according to ship tracking data from LSEG and Kpler, making it the fifth tanker of its kind to call at the project this year.
Loading resumed at the end of June at the Arctic LNG 2 project, which was sanctioned because of Moscow’s war in Ukraine, with four cargoes heading east to Asia via the Northern Sea Route, also on board sanctioned tankers.
The fifth ship, Buran, which docked on Thursday at the Arctic LNG 2 plant, was previously called North Air, its name being changed in April after it was targeted by US sanctions last August.
The Equasis maritime database showed that Buran’s ship manager or commercial manager is Angara OOO, registered in Moscow, the successor to White Fox Ship Management.
The current registered owner of Buran is LNG Alpha Shipping, with an address pointing to Angara. The United States imposed sanctions on both White Fox and LNG Alpha last year because they targeted Russia’s oil and gas revenues.
Reuters was unable to find contact information for Angara and LNG Alpha.
Arctic LNG 2, 60% owned by Novatek, was set to become one of Russia’s largest LNG plants, with a final production capacity of 19.8 million tonnes per year.
However, its prospects have been clouded by sanctions and it has faced difficulties in selling LNG from the project.
Last year, the plant loaded eight cargoes onto several authorised LNG ships, according to Kpler data, with some ships offloading the fuel into two storage facilities.
Source: here
OPINION | Kim Jong-un is building destroyers that his grandfather could never build – for what purpose?
North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un watches as a Choe Hyon-class destroyer of the Korean People’s Army fires a missile during tests (date of photo unknown). North Korean state media
When a warship capsized during its launch at a North Korean shipyard in May – a disaster watched by President Kim Jong-un – it was easy to miss the main message. North Korea is pursuing its most ambitious naval modernisation project in recent years.
The capsized ship, which was righted a few weeks later, was the second Choe Hyon-class destroyer, the largest warship ever built by the country. North Korea aims to build a third destroyer by October 2026, with Kim promising to deploy two more Choe Hyon-class destroyers each year.
North Korea has long wanted to modernise its navy. However, its previous efforts have focused on developing nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Its conventional naval forces have been largely neglected as the regime has directed resources towards developing nuclear weapons and missiles, as well as its ground forces.
The navy still relies on approximately 60 diesel-powered coastal submarines and mini-submarines, most of which date back to the 1960s and 1970s, while its surface forces consist only of small patrol boats and corvettes for operations along the coast, so as not to project power far from shore. These vessels have long been considered incompatible with the South Korean Navy.
Pyongyang has long adopted an asymmetric warfare strategy to compensate for its lack of quality.
Pyongyang began to turn its attention to modernising its conventional naval forces in the second half of 2023, when Kim warned of “unstable waters” off the Korean peninsula and called for a major improvement in the “modernity and combat capability of the navy.”
When Kim visited Vladivostok, he toured a Russian Pacific Fleet frigate. North Korea subsequently built a new naval base and expanded existing shipyards to accommodate larger and more sophisticated vessels. It launched both the first and second Choe Hyon-class destroyers at the newly expanded shipyards.
However, North Korea’s naval modernisation programme makes no sense from a military point of view. The country has long adopted an asymmetric warfare strategy to compensate for its lack of quality.
Nuclear-tipped missiles, nuclear-powered submarines and long-range artillery allow Pyongyang to credibly threaten Seoul’s political survival. The redundancy, reinforcement and concealment of these deterrence mechanisms prevent South Korea from launching a counterattack. A robust naval modernisation programme should complement these deterrence mechanisms.
Choe Hyon-class destroyers are equipped with a vertical launch system that can carry tactical ballistic missiles or land-attack cruise missiles. But they have no role in an asymmetric warfare strategy.
Kim uses the launch of destroyers – successful or not – to demonstrate his regime’s ability to innovate and correct its mistakes.
North Korea cannot mass-produce and maintain a large number of destroyers (to put things in perspective, South Korea has 13 destroyers). Unlike land-based weapons, ships cannot be hidden in mountainous terrain to ensure their survival or underwater, like nuclear-powered submarines. Warships are easy targets, so it makes no sense for them to carry nuclear-tipped missiles when North Korea can place them on platforms that are easier to survive.
Then there is the drain on resources. North Korea cannot win a naval arms race against its enemies because the technological nature of naval warfare favours the side with more resources at its disposal.
Kim is also calling for a massive modernisation of the country’s main battle tanks. He wants drones and better artillery. Simultaneously modernising North Korea’s army and navy will only exacerbate resource depletion, as land and sea weapons are not interchangeable.
The new destroyers, however, make a lot of political sense. Large, modern warships give national leaders a special sense of achievement. The North Korean president will soon enter his 15th year in office, and leaving a legacy that can rival those of his father and grandfather is extremely important.
Transforming the navy from a coastal force into a maritime force was a task that neither his father nor his grandfather could accomplish. He is using the launch of the destroyers — successful or not — to demonstrate his regime’s ability to innovate and correct its mistakes.
Naval modernisation also serves Kim’s ambition to link defence to economic development by protecting North Korea’s fishing industry and maritime sovereignty. The goal of the Eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, set in 2021, is for the military to play a greater role in economic development.
Even so, North Korea still has a long way to go before its naval ambitions can match the capabilities of its enemies.
Source: here
Fire extinguished on a US Navy ship off the coast of the Japanese island of Okinawa
A fire that broke out on board the San Antonio-class amphibious transport ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18), anchored near the White Beach naval base off the coast of Okinawa Prefecture in southern Japan, has been extinguished, the US Navy announced on Wednesday.
In a statement, the US Navy said the fire was extinguished with the help of the Japan Self-Defence Forces, the Japan Coast Guard and the crew of the amphibious transport ship USS San Diego (LPD 22) of the San Antonio class, which is anchored at White Beach Naval Base.
The fire broke out on Wednesday, 20 August, at around 4 p.m. local time and was declared extinguished at 4 a.m. this morning. The Navy said the cause of the fire is under investigation and that two sailors were treated for minor injuries.
The crew of the New Orleans will remain on board.
Source: here
Singapore and the US launch first modular attack ship for Indo-Pacific security
According to information published by Singapore shipbuilder Strategic Marine, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 20 August 2025 with US company Eureka Naval Craft. The aim is to jointly develop and build the Aircat Bengal MC, the world’s first modular surface attack vessel based on a surface effect ship design. This 36-metre platform, to be built in Singapore, is designed to deliver innovative performance in multi-mission naval operations, combining modular adaptability, high-speed endurance and advanced autonomy.
The Aircat Bengal MC is a 36-metre high-speed surface effect vessel combining reconfigurable mission modules, 50-knot performance, a 40-tonne payload capacity and autonomous operation for attack, ISR, mine warfare and humanitarian roles (Image source: Eureka Naval Craft).
The Aircat Bengal MC is designed to meet dual-use requirements for both military and civilian operations. Mission profiles range from anti-surface warfare and intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance to mine countermeasures, humanitarian support and deterrence in the grey zone. At the heart of the concept is a modular mission area capable of accepting containerised payloads, allowing operators to switch from attack or rec reconnaissance to aid or logistical support in a matter of hours. The vessel can reach speeds of over 50 knots, offers a range of approximately 1,000 nautical miles and is optimised for littoral and archipelagic operations, where speed and adaptability are essential.
From a technical standpoint, the vessel incorporates Eureka Naval Craft’s proprietary Surface Effect Ship hull form, which reduces hydrodynamic drag, provides smoother navigation at sea and maintains speed and manoeuvrability where conventional fast attack vessels would be forced to slow down. A large stern deck, capable of carrying over 40 tonnes, allows for the integration of heavy payloads such as missile launchers, unmanned aerial systems, mine warfare equipment or humanitarian cargo. The platform will integrate Greenroom Robotics’ GAMA autonomy suite, fully compatible with the US Navy’s unmanned maritime autonomy architecture, enabling both optional piloted and fully unmanned operations and ensuring interoperability with allied navies.
Strategic Marine, founded in 2001 and headquartered in Singapore, has established itself as a regional leader in specialised shipbuilding. The company has delivered offshore support vessels, patrol boats, crew transfer vessels and high-speed ferries to multiple continents. Recent contracts include six Supa Swath offshore vessels for Mainprize Offshore with options for additional construction, an inspection vessel for Odyssey Group and new StratCat 27 crew transfer vessels for customers in Korea. Strategic Marine has also expanded its capability to deliver advanced hull forms and recently delivered its first SES platform to support offshore energy operations, further strengthening its expertise in high-performance vessel construction.
From a market perspective, Aircat Bengal MC is positioned to attract Indo-Pacific navies and maritime security agencies facing complex archipelagic geographies and growing challenges in the grey zone. Countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam require scalable, rapid-response platforms that can adapt quickly to changing threats. Singapore itself has emphasised modularity and autonomy in the future architecture of its fleet, while Australia and New Zealand, with their need for long-range sovereignty patrols and rapid response assets, represent other potential customers. The ship’s non-ITAR SES technology also makes it an attractive option for foreign military sales, without the export restrictions typically associated with US-built warships.
Tactically, the Aircat Bengal MC offers a combination of speed, endurance and modular payload that changes the coastal warfare equation. Its ability to operate unmanned reduces risk to crews in contested waters, while modular payloads allow commanders to reconfigure the vessel from attack to ISR or mine countermeasures without lengthy refit periods. The combination of high payload capacity and rapid redeployment makes it a force multiplier for coastal defence, maritime interdiction or humanitarian operations. Operationally, it increases flexibility and reduces the cost of maintaining diverse, mission-specific fleets.
Compared to traditional ships such as corvettes or frigates, the Aircat Bengal MC offers a fundamentally different approach to maritime force design. Conventional ships offer long-range firepower and fleet integration, but at the cost of high acquisition and operating costs, long construction times and limited adaptability once delivered. The Bengal MC offers a scalable and reconfigurable solution that bridges the gap between long-range combat vessels (RHIBs) and corvettes. It is faster than most traditional warships, more agile in littoral environments and adaptable to missions beyond combat, providing navies with a disruptive capability to operate at lower costs while maintaining deterrence and operational range.
With construction set to begin in Singapore, the Aircat Bengal MC represents a bold step toward modular, high-speed, and autonomous naval capabilities. As Indo-Pacific navies continue to seek flexible platforms to counter diverse and rapidly evolving threats, this joint development between Strategic Marine and Eureka Naval Craft may emerge as one of the most significant innovations in surface warfare for the coming decade.
Source: here
New Zealand equips frigates with American MH-60R Seahawk aircraft to enhance maritime capabilities
According to information published by the New Zealand government on 21 August 2025, the country unveiled a comprehensive $1.6 billion defence modernisation package that includes the purchase of five MH-60R Seahawk maritime helicopters and two long-range Airbus A321XLR aircraft. The announcement marks a key move in New Zealand’s effort to overhaul its ageing defence fleet and align itself more closely with regional partners such as Australia. This acquisition is the first major initiative under the new Defence Capability Plan and is part of a broader strategy to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP within eight years.
New Zealand’s new MH-60R Seahawk helicopters will enhance frigate operations with advanced anti-submarine warfare, surface attack capabilities and multi-sensor surveillance, significantly increasing the range of maritime defence and interoperability with allied navies (Image source: Lockheed Martin).
The MH-60R Seahawk, often referred to as the world’s most advanced naval helicopter, brings a significant improvement in multi-domain capability. Each aircraft is equipped with AN/AQS-22 ALFS (Airborne Low Frequency Sonar), considered the only submarine detection sonar in service with the ability to detect modern silent submarines at extended ranges. It is also equipped with AN/APS-153(V) radar with automatic periscope detection and discrimination modes, giving it superior surface surveillance capability. The onboard mission suite includes an integrated self-defence system, electronic support measures (ESM) and Link 16 data connectivity for real-time battlefield awareness. In terms of armament, the MH-60R can deploy Mk 54 lightweight torpedoes with precision delivery for anti-submarine warfare and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles for attacking small surface targets such as fast attack craft. Defensive countermeasures include the AN/AAR-47 missile warning system and chaff dispensers or signal flares for survival in high-threat environments.
Operationally, the MH-60R represents a quantum leap in maritime awareness and attack capability for the Royal New Zealand Navy. The aircraft will be carried aboard the Navy’s ANZAC-class frigates and, eventually, any future offshore patrol or multi-role vessels. Its extended range of over 800 kilometres, combined with high endurance and multi-sensor fusion, enables the MH-60R to patrol large portions of the exclusive economic zone, intercept illicit maritime activities and provide early warning of underwater threats. Tactically, it enables layered anti-submarine defence, extending the engagement limits well beyond the range of surface ships’ sensors and weapons. In joint operations, it provides full interoperability with the Royal Australian Navy’s fleet of 24 MH-60Rs, as well as with US Navy carrier strike groups operating in the Indo-Pacific. This improves both deterrence and operational tempo during multilateral maritime exercises and deployments.
The acquisition of the Airbus A321XLR also addresses New Zealand’s long-standing limitations in strategic airlift and VIP transport capabilities. The current fleet of Boeing 757s, acquired in the early 2000s, has suffered from recurring maintenance issues and limited availability. With a range of over 8,700 kilometres and a maximum payload of approximately 23 tonnes, the A321XLR offers both logistical flexibility and efficiency. It is ideal for operations in the Pacific Islands, humanitarian assistance missions and high-level diplomatic deployments. The aircraft’s common features with Airbus commercial fleets also ensure simplified maintenance, global logistical support and easier crew training through existing civil aviation infrastructure. In a military configuration, the aircraft can be quickly reconfigured between cargo, medical evacuation and passenger roles, enhancing its operational versatility.
The timing of this announcement is extremely important. New Zealand’s defence outlook has changed dramatically in recent years due to evolving regional dynamics. China’s growing military presence in the South China Sea and its economic and political influence over the Pacific islands have reshaped the security calculus for smaller nations in the region. This includes increased Chinese naval visits to island nations, investments in dual-use infrastructure, and intelligence-gathering activities in areas traditionally dominated by interests aligned with the West. In addition, the Pacific has become a theatre of strategic competition involving the United States, Australia and, increasingly, the United Kingdom and Japan. For New Zealand, which has traditionally maintained a limited defence posture, this environment has exposed critical vulnerabilities in terms of surveillance coverage, maritime domain awareness and force projection capability.
Domestically, recent Defence Force reports have highlighted operational pressure caused by ageing equipment and limited force availability. The new acquisitions aim to restore credibility to New Zealand’s ability to protect its maritime interests, respond to crises in the South Pacific, and contribute significantly to allied operations in the broader Indo-Pacific. The choice of American and European platforms, both battle-tested and widely used by allies, also signals a renewed commitment to collective security frameworks and a deliberate rejection of acquisitions that do not address the risks.
By choosing the MH-60R and A321XLR models, New Zealand is not only filling long-standing capability gaps, but also signalling a transformation of its defence posture. These platforms offer interoperability, coverage and combat relevance in a region where strategic competition is intensifying. The $1.6 billion investment reflects a deeper recalibration of New Zealand’s defence priorities, positioning the country to better navigate the geopolitical challenges of the next decade.
Source: here
Japanese aircraft carrier JS Kaga hosts first British F-35B landings during major Indo-Pacific allied exercise.
Between 4 and 12 August 2025, the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force participated in a major multilateral exercise in the Western Pacific, involving the navies of Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Spain and Norway. The objectives set by the JMSDF were to improve tactical capabilities through complex exercises covering anti-submarine warfare, trans-punto evolutions, coordinated flight operations and combined photographic exercises, with resources from all six participating nations involved in integrated series over nine days of operations. A notable event occurred when British and American F- fighter aircraft performed landings and take-offs from the deck of the JS Kaga, marking the first time a British fighter aircraft had ever landed on a Japanese warship.
During the inter-base take-off phase on 8 August 2025, two British F-35B aircraft from 809 NAS and two American F-35B aircraft from VMFA-242 landed and took off from the JS Kaga, marking the first time a British fighter jet has operated from a Japanese warship during exercises. (Image source: British Navy)
Participating units included, for Japan, the helicopter/light aircraft carrier JS Kaga, the Akizuki-class destroyer JS Teruzuki and an unnamed JMSDF submarine. The UK’s carrier strike group joined the event as part of Operation Highmast, bringing HMS Prince of Wales, a Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier, HMS Dauntless, a Type 45 destroyer, HMS Richmond, a Type 23 frigate, and RFA Tidespring, a refuelling tanker. Australia, in turn, provided HMAS Brisbane, a Hobart-class air warfare destroyer, while Norway sent HNoMS Roald Amundsen, a Fridtjof Nansen-class frigate, and Spain sent SPS Méndez Núñez, an F-100-class guided missile frigate. Finally, the American contingent included the USS George Washington, a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, the USS Robert Smalls, a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser, the USS Shoup, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, and the USS America, an America-class amphibious assault ship.
In coordination with the US Navy’s George Washington Carrier Strike Group, the Marine Corps Amphibious Training Group based on the USS America, and the Kaga’s own working group, a total of 11 ships and 23 aircraft conducted interoperability training. On 8 August 2025, two British F-35B Lightning II aircraft from 809 Naval Air Squadron and two USMC F-35B aircraft from VMFA-242 landed and took off from the Kaga, marking the first time a British fighter aircraft has operated from a Japanese warship. The exercises also included tactical interceptions, a series of maritime attacks with British fighter jets and air combat manoeuvres, along with multinational fly-bys and cross-boarding of personnel to improve mutual understanding. An emergency diversion occurred when a British F-35B landed at Kagoshima Airport following a technical issue, remaining on the ground for inspection during the exercise. The activity concluded with the arrival of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Dauntless at Yokosuka Naval Base for a scheduled visit, while HMS Richmond and RFA Tidespring continued to Busan, Republic of Korea, and SPS Méndez Núñez returned to Spanish command for a stopover in the Philippines before returning to Spain.
The broader context of the exercise included previous multinational training in 2025, such as Exercise Pacific Stellar in February and Talisman Sabre in July, in which both George Washington and Prince of Wales participated. These previous exercises focused on large-scale allied operations, and the August exercise expanded the scope of cooperation by integrating fifth-generation aircraft onto Japan’s largest surface ships. Commodore James Blackmore, commander of the UK’s rrier Strike Group, said the reunion of large deck ships from Japan, the UK and the US, with escorts from Spain, Norway and Australia, demonstrated close-range interoperability. The Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez conducted joint operations with Kaga and Teruzuki, including exchanges of liaison officers that both navies described as improving integration. The series of deployments and visits related to Operation Highmast also included future port calls in Tokyo and Busan, as well as a Pacific Future Forum and a Defence and Security Industry Day in Japan, broadening the political and industrial dimensions of the naval engagement.
The Izumo class, to which JS Kaga belongs, was designed in the 2000s as part of a medium-term defence programme to replace the ageing Shirane-class destroyers. The class was designated as helicopter destroyers or multi-purpose operational destroyers, with the ability to carry helicopters for anti-submarine and search and rescue roles, as well as for transporting troops and vehicles. However, initial design features, such as a flat, large flight deck, suggested future adaptability for fixed-wing aircraft. The programme produced two ships, JS Izumo, commissioned in 2015, and JS Kaga, commissioned in 2017, both built at Japan Marine United shipyards. Each ship is 248 metres long, has a displacement of approximately 27,000 tonnes at full load and incorporates five landing pads for simultaneous helicopter operations. Initially intended to carry up to 14 helicopters, further modifications were planned to support the operation of the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing aircraft.
The conversion programme for the JS Kaga began with an initial phase at JMU Kure in March 2022, which was more extensive than the work originally carried out on its sister ship, the Izumo, including remodelling the bow into a rectangular shape and other modifications to air operations; this phase was completed in early 2024. (Image source: Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force)
JS Kaga, hull number DDH-184, was laid down in October 2013, launched in August 2015, and commissioned in March 2017. The construction cost was approximately $1.05 billion, and its namesake refers to Kaga Province, although the ship’s name is written in hiragana rather than kanji, which distinguishes it from its World War II predecessor. With a length of 248 metres and a width of 38 metres, it is the largest ship in the JMSDF. Propulsion is provided by four General Electric/IHI LM2500IEC gas turbines on two shafts, producing speeds of over 30 knots. Sensors and combat systems include the OYQ-12 combat direction system, FCS-3 fire control, OPS-50 AESA radar, OPS-28 surface search radar and OQQ-23 bow sonar, complemented by the , NOLQ-3D-1 electronic warfare suite and various decoy systems. Armament is limited to two Phalanx CIWS missiles and two SeaRAM missiles for close-in defence.
The JS Kaga can carry up to 28 aircraft, although the initial configuration provided for seven anti-submarine warfare helicopters and two search and rescue helicopters. In addition, the ship can accommodate 400 soldiers and 50 vehicles, such as 3.5-tonne trucks, giving it a limited transport role. Its flat deck allows helicopter operations similar to those of amphibious assault ships, and although it does not have a ski jump ramp, subsequent modifications have remodelled the bow to allow the safe operation of F-35B aircraft. Since entering service, the Kaga has participated in multiple deployments, including Indo-South East Asian exercises in 2018 and joint operations with the US and allied navies. In May 2019, the ship hosted US President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during a visit to Yokosuka, illustrating its use for high-profile diplomatic functions in addition to its operational duties.
The conversion of the Kaga into a fixed-wing operations capable ship began in March 2022 at JMU Kure, and prior to conversion, the cost of this ship was estimated at approximately 115 billion yen, or approximately 1.05 billion US dollars. Unlike its sister ship, Izumo, the modifications to the Kaga included a more extensive remodelling of the bow into a rectangular shape and additional changes to the internal compartments to support F-35B operations. The first phase, focused on external modifications, was completed in early 2024, followed by flight tests in October 2024 off the coast of San Diego, where US Marine Corps F-35B aircraft landed and took off successfully from its deck. The second phase, involving internal modifications, is scheduled to begin in late 2026 and be completed by the end of fiscal year 2027. Once completed, the Kaga will join the Izumo in operating F-35B aircraft, expanding the JMSDF’s range in fixed-wing transport aviation for the first time since World War II.
Japan plans to purchase 42 F-35B aircraft, which will initially be based at Nyutabaru Air Base in Kyushu, near the port of Kure on Kaga Island. Deliveries began in 2024, with plans to establish a squadron of approximately 20 aircraft by 2025, with additional deliveries continuing until 2028. A new base is under construction on Mageshima to support F-35B operations, although it is not expected to be completed before 2030. The integration of F-35B aircraft with the Izumo class is a central element of Japan’s defence modernisation programme, part of a larger acquisition of 147 F-35 aircraft, which includes both A and B variants. For the Kaga, this represents a transition from a helicopter destroyer to a light aircraft carrier, positioning it as a regional asset comparable in size to Italy’s Cavour, although smaller than American supercarriers such as the Nimitz class. The completion of its conversion is scheduled to allow routine operations with the F-35B starting in 2028.
Source: here
Russia has received a batch of new Su-35S fighter jets
The Russian Air Force has received a batch of new Su-35S multi-role fighter jets.
This was reported by the press service of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which also published photos and videos of the aircraft.
This is the fourth batch of aircraft of this type to be delivered in 2025.
The exact number of fighter jets delivered has not been officially disclosed. However, based on the published images, it can be assumed that there are two or three aircraft.
The fighter jets were manufactured as part of the aggressor country’s state defence order.
It appears that the aircraft underwent a full cycle of factory testing in various modes of operation before being shipped to the customer. They have already flown to their home airfield.
The previous batch of such fighter jets was transferred to the Russian Air Force at the end of June. And before that, in May and at the end of March.
The Su-35S fighter jet is designed to achieve air superiority and destroy ground and surface targets day and night, in simple and complex weather conditions, at long distances from its home airfield.
These fighter jets are being built in Russia as part of a major defence order announced in 2024, which is scheduled to be completed by 2030.
In June 2022, Russian propaganda media reported that “the missile has successfully passed all comprehensive tests and will soon be available for Russian fighter jets.”
As a reminder, on 7 June, the Ukrainian Air Force shot down a Russian Su-35S fighter jet in the Kursk region as it approached the Ukrainian border.
Source: here
Russia attacks an American Flex factory in the Transcarpathian region
On 21 August 2025, Russia attacked the American company Flex’s factory in the Transcarpathian region.
The SPRAVDI – Stratcom centre reported this on X.
Currently, 15 people have been injured, two of them critically.
According to Ukraine’s State Emergency Service, a large fire covering an area of approximately 7,000 square metres was caused by a Russian missile strike.
“At the time of the strike, approximately 600 workers were inside, but they managed to reach shelters,” SPRAVDI reported.
The Flex factory is located in western Ukraine, more than 800 kilometres from the front line.
The Flex factory in Mukachevo before the attack. Photo credit: TechnoClass
The Mukachevo factory has 3,500 employees, with over 200,000 employees worldwide. The company manufactures products for global brands such as Google, Microsoft, Nike and Lenovo.
Source: here
Ukrainian secret services destroy a Russian vessel in the Kherson region with a precision strike
Soldiers of the Ukrainian Defence Intelligence Service destroyed a Russian vessel in the Kherson region using precision weapons.
The press service of the Ukrainian Defence Intelligence Service reported on this and published the corresponding video.
On 20 August 2025, following an operation by Ukrainian intelligence officers in the Black Sea near the temporarily occupied port of Zaliznyi in the Kherson region, an air-launched missile destroyed a vessel belonging to the Russian invaders.
VIDEO: https://youtu.be/MC9gl5GLzW8
It appears that all five members of the Russian crew were killed in the attack.
“A precision strike with destructive missiles on an enemy target in the Black Sea was possible thanks to laser designation by a drone, which also recorded the successful destruction of the military vessel with Muscovites,” the Ukrainian Defence Intelligence Service said.
The published images show ammunition approaching the enemy boat, followed by a powerful explosion. Most likely, the strike was carried out by a Bayraktar TB2 attack drone, as indicated by the distinctive interface.
Source: here
Artificial intelligence is ready to overturn centuries-old military command structures
Autonomous artificial intelligence agents that perceive, decide and act are now considered mature enough to be implemented in military command systems
This US Army command post, seen from a drone, is equipped with modern technology but uses a centuries-old structure. Image: Colonel Scott Woodward, US Army via The Conversation
Despite two centuries of evolution, the structure of a modern military general staff would be recognisable to Napoleon. At the same time, military organisations have struggled to incorporate new technologies as they adapt to new domains – air, space and information – in modern warfare.
Military headquarters have grown in size to accommodate the expanded information flows and decision points of these new facets of warfare. The result is a decline in marginal returns and a coordination nightmare — too many cooks in the kitchen — that risks jeopardising mission command.
AI agents – autonomous, goal-oriented software based on extensive linguistic models – can automate routine tasks, compress decision-making timelines, and enable smaller, more resilient command posts. They can reduce personnel while increasing efficiency.
As a researcher in international relations and a reserve officer in the US Army studying military strategy, I see both the opportunity offered by technology and the acute need for change.
This need stems from the reality that today’s command structures still mirror, in both form and function, Napoleon’s field headquarters – industrial-era architectures built for large armies.
Over time, these headquarters have grown in size, making coordination difficult. They have also led to extended command posts that modern precision artillery, missiles and drones can target effectively, and electronic warfare can easily disrupt.
Russia’s ” So-called “graveyard of command posts in Ukraine” vividly illustrates how static headquarters, where adversaries can deploy precision artillery, missiles and drones, become vulnerable on a modern battlefield.
This satellite image shows the electronic emissions of a brigade combat team training at Fort Irwin, California. The bright red areas represent emissions from command posts. Image: Col. Scott Woodward, US Army / The Conversation
The role of artificial intelligence agents
Military planners now see a world in which AI agents – autonomous, goal-oriented software that can perceive, decide and act on its own initiative – are mature enough to be deployed in command systems.
These agents promise to automate the fusion of multiple sources of information, threat modelling, and even limited decision cycles in support of a commander’s objectives. There is still a human being involved, but people will be able to issue commands faster and receive more timely and contextual updates from the battlefield.
These AI agents can analyse doctrine manuals, develop operational plans and generate courses of action, which helps accelerate the pace of military operations. Experiments—including our efforts at the Marine Corps University—have demonstrated how even basic language models can accelerate personnel estimates and introduce creative, data-driven options into the planning process. These efforts point to the end of traditional personnel roles.
There will still be people—war is a human activity—and ethics will continue to be a factor in the decision-making algorithms. But the people who remain deployed will likely gain the ability to navigate massive volumes of information with the help of artificial intelligence agents.
These teams will probably be smaller than modern staff. Artificial intelligence agents will enable teams to manage multiple planning groups simultaneously.
For example, they will be able to use more dynamic “red team” techniques – playing the role of adversity – and vary key assumptions to create a wider range of options than traditional plans.
The time saved by not having to create PowerPoint slides and update staff estimates will be transferred to contingency analysis – addressing “what if” questions — and building operational assessment frameworks — conceptual maps of how a plan is likely to unfold in a given situation — that give commanders more flexibility.
Designing the next military staff
To explore the optimal design of this AI-augmented staff, we led a team of researchers from the Futures Lab at the bipartisan think tank Centre for Strategic & International Studies to explore alternatives.
The team developed three basic scenarios that reflect what most military analysts consider to be the key operational challenges in modern great power competition: joint blockades, firepower attacks, and joint island campaigns. Joint action refers to coordinated action between multiple branches of an armed force.
In the example of China and Taiwan, joint blockades describe how China could isolate the island nation and either starve it or create conditions for an invasion. Powerful attacks describe how Beijing could launch missile salvos – similar to what Russia is doing in Ukraine – to destroy key military centres and even critical infrastructure.
Finally, in Chinese doctrine, a Joint Island Landing Campaign describes the cross-strait invasion that their military has refined over decades. Any personnel augmented with AI agents should be able to handle combat functions in these three operational scenarios.
The research team found that the best model kept people informed and focused on feedback loops. This approach—called the Adaptive Personnel Model and based on the pioneering work of sociologist Andrew Abbott—integrates AI agents into continuous human-machine feedback loops, drawing on doctrine, history, and real-time data to develop plans on the fly.
In this model, military planning is continuous and never complete, focusing more on generating a menu of options for the commander to consider, refine and implement. The research team tested the approach with several AI models and found that it outperformed the alternatives in every case.
AI agents are not without risks. First, they can be overly generalised, if not downright biased. Foundational models — AI models trained on extremely large datasets and adaptable to a wide range of tasks — know more about pop culture than they do about warfare and require refinement. For this reason, it is important to conduct a comparative analysis of agents to understand their strengths and limitations.
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Secondly, in the absence of training in the fundamentals of artificial intelligence and advanced analytical reasoning, many users tend to use models as a substitute for critical thinking. No intelligent model can replace a poor or, worse, lazy user.
Taking advantage of the “agency” moment
To take advantage of AI agents, the US military will need to institutionalise agent construction and adaptation, include adaptive agents in war games, and revise doctrine and training to account for human-machine teams. This will require a number of changes.
First, the military will need to invest in additional computing power to build the infrastructure necessary to run AI agents in military formations.
Second, they will need to develop additional cybersecurity measures and conduct stress tests to ensure that agent-augmented personnel are not vulnerable when attacked across multiple domains, including cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.
Third, and most importantly, the military will need to radically change how it educates its officers. Officers will need to learn how AI agents work, including how to build them, and begin using the classroom as a laboratory to develop new approaches to the ancient art of military command and decision-making.
This could include modernising some military schools to focus on artificial intelligence, a concept outlined in the Artificial Intelligence Action Plan published on 23 July 2025.
Without these reforms, the military will likely remain stuck in the trap of the Napoleonic general staff: adding more people to solve increasingly complex problems.
Benjamin Jensen is a professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University’s Advanced War College and a resident scholar at the American University’s School of International Service.
Source: here
Taiwan’s drone buildup aims to offset China’s advantage
Whether plans for mass production of drones will have a deterrent or disappointing effect depends on overcoming deep structural gaps.
Taiwan’s plan to purchase tens of thousands of domestically built drones signals a deliberate attempt to gain an asymmetric advantage over China. However, production delays and training deficiencies raise questions about the effectiveness of stockpiling more drones to shift the strategic balance across the Taiwan Strait.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence plans to purchase nearly 50,000 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) between 2026 and 2027, with the aim of strengthening asymmetric capabilities amid growing military pressure from Beijing.
According to a government tender announcement, the Armament Bureau will procure drones in five categories, ranging from short-range multi-rotor platforms to long-range fixed-wing systems with payloads between 2.5 and 10 kilograms, all manufactured domestically and excluding parts from mainland China.
The initiative aligns with Taiwan’s new doctrine of treating drones as disposable munitions, similar to recent US military practice. The announcement came after televised demonstrations of indigenous drone models, including first-person view (FPV) attack drones, bomb launch platforms and electro-optical/infrared sensor reconnaissance systems.
Analysts say the specifications match existing prototypes, indicating synchronised development and procurement. However, experts warn that Taiwan’s limited training infrastructure and logistics base could reduce operational effectiveness. A government audit revealed gaps in operator qualifications and night flight training, and strategic experts have called for tiered licensing and maintenance systems to support implementation.
This move comes as Beijing steps up military activity around Taiwan, which it considers a renegade province. Washington, while not recognising Taiwan as a sovereign state, remains legally obliged to provide defensive weapons.
Taiwan’s push for “precision mass” highlights the persistent imbalance, with production gaps risking turning ambition into symbolism rather than deterrence.
The concept of precision mass is at the heart of Taipei’s UAV programme. Aaron Barlow and others argue in a January 2025 article in War Quants that precision mass marks a shift in modern warfare, in which cheap, “good enough” munitions, such as FPV drones and loitering munitions, are used in overwhelming numbers to achieve effects once reserved for state-of-the-art systems.
Barlow and others note that, unlike surgical strikes, precision mass favours raw volume over refined targeting to saturate defences and degrade adversary capabilities.
Ukraine has used FPV drones and loitering munitions to compensate for its disadvantage in conventional artillery firepower against Russia, but these have not been able to completely replace artillery. Bill Murray points out in an article in Small Wars Journal (SWJ) in May 2025 that drones remain hampered by weather, limited payload and susceptibility to electronic warfare.
In contrast, Murray points out that artillery provides massive firepower in all weather conditions, with decisive range and destructive effect, making reliance on drones more a reflection of limited resources than a doctrinal discovery.
Heavy artillery and saturation missile attacks retain a destructive power that drones cannot match. Drones excel at improving targeting and striking exposed assets, but their performance is limited and their effects are localised.
In contrast, massed artillery can pulverise fortified defences and cover large areas with firepower — capabilities that Taiwan may need to slow a beach landing or disrupt troop concentrations.
However, Aadil Brar notes in a report published this month for the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) that Taiwan’s drone programme aims to develop asymmetric capabilities to disrupt the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during an invasion, rather than to match platforms one-to-one.
Brar mentions that Taipei is aiming for an annual production capacity of 180,000 drones by 2030, but doubts remain about whether this goal can be achieved in just three years.
Even so, he points out that Taiwan has sought to expand production by stimulating local manufacturers and through partnerships with foreign players, including the US and Germany, to modernise systems and secure supply chains.
Structural challenges remain significant. According to the June 2025 DSET report by Hong-Lun Tiunn and others, Taiwan’s drone production faces obstacles such as high costs due to dependence on non-Chinese parts, limited procurement opportunities beyond a key contract from the Ministry of National Defence, and a lack of foreign government orders.
Tiunn et al. also highlight barriers to certification and fragmented inter-agency planning. They add that over 4,300 restricted flight zones further hinder testing and market access.
They stress that critical technologies – flight control, positioning and communications chips, as well as thermal and gimbal cameras – still depend on imports from the US. In addition, they say that supply chains remain exposed to US export controls and, paradoxically, to materials for batteries and rare earth magnets sourced from China.
In a January 2025 article, Harun Ayanoglu of the Central European Asian Studies Institute (CEAS) notes that Taiwan’s inability to export weapons, including combat drones, deprives it of operational testing and feedback from the battlefield. These weaknesses undermine Taipei’s efforts to achieve self-sufficiency.
Despite scepticism, Brar adds that these efforts have already drawn limited responses from Beijing, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stepping up training against drones — electronic warfare exercises, swarm jamming exercises, and targeting drone command centres — while China has also imposed sanctions on American drone companies involved in Taiwan’s ecosystem.
These reactions show that even Taiwan’s modest efforts carry strategic weight, but they also underscore Beijing’s ability to adapt — raising questions about how long Taipei can remain ahead in the drone competition.
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From February 2024 in War on the Rocks Strategic debates highlight a deeper dilemma. Tommy Jamison quotes Lee Hsi-ming in an article, who argues that while Taiwan should be grateful for US support, it must also develop its ability to resist China on its own.
Lee criticises what he calls Taiwan’s “American Complex,” whereby leaders purchase high-quality, high-visibility assets such as fighter jets, frigates, and amphibious assault ships that have limited utility in the current environment.
During the Cold War, Taiwan and the US enjoyed a technological advantage over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with the Kuomintang even considering plans to retake the mainland. This idea was always impossible to achieve, and the balance has since shifted heavily in Beijing’s favour.
Drawing inspiration from Afghanistan and Ukraine, Lee argues that Taiwan should instead focus on developing capabilities — such as precision strike — that would allow it to defend itself without US support. Lee says Taiwan’s task is to frustrate Beijing’s political ambitions for forced reunification through credible deterrence.
Taiwan’s drone efforts are not just about the number of drones purchased, but whether they can be integrated effectively and used in combat situations. Training, resilient supply chains and wartime production will be crucial to demonstrating their real strategic value.
The extensive capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in countering drones mean that Taiwanese drones will face serious obstacles in real conflict. However, as seen in Ukraine, even limited effectiveness can impose costs on a more powerful adversary, buying time and complicating plans.
Ultimately, Taiwan’s programme will be judged less on the basis of procurement figures and more on whether its drones can function as true force multipliers under pressure — a verdict that will decide whether the drone surge offers deterrence or is merely symbolism.
Source: here
DSEI Gateway: Inside the digital skills crisis in defence
The latest DSEI Gateway article, written by George Fitzmaurice, assesses the digital skills challenge facing the defence sector and potential solutions.
Few sectors are changing as fast as technology, and most others, including defence, need to catch up to remain relevant. This game of catching up, driven by the rapid evolution of military capabilities and an ongoing effort to digitise the sector, has created an urgent need for specialised talent and skills in industry and government.
However, the defence sector is struggling to secure these skills. The National Audit Office found that, at the end of March 2024, digital and cyber skills were both significant ‘weaknesses’ among the Ministry of Defence (MoD) workforce, despite being priority areas.
Experts in the United Kingdom (UK) have been vocal about the skills issue, with Julian David, chief executive (CEO) of TechUK, referring to the problem at a March 2025 hearing of the Parliamentary Defence Committee, stating:
One thing I would like to bring into this discussion is digital skills, which are going to become an increasingly important part of any defence capability or capability that we have. This is not really addressed in the current Ministry of Defence and in the wider UK defence environment. Nor is it addressed in the reserve. There needs to be a particular focus on this.
The digital skills gap was also highlighted in Her Majesty’s Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR), published on 2 June, which noted that the digital transformation of the Ministry of Defence had been hampered, in part, by a ‘persistent lack of key digital skills across the armed forces and public administration’..
The defence industry is also facing difficulties in finding and accessing the right talent. For example, Indra, a Spanish defence company, has complained of a lack of skills in new technologies, according to a Euronews report.
Why is defence struggling with digital skills?
There are a number of reasons why effectively acquiring digital skills is a challenge for the defence sector, according to Fred Sugden, associate director for defence and national security at TechUK, reasons highlighted during a conversation with DSEI Gateway.
A general lack of skills in technology and engineering, for example, means that the defence sector is forced to compete more aggressively with others seeking the same expertise, such as the financial, software engineering and technology sectors, Sugden said.
This puts defence, particularly the government, at a disadvantage because “it can’t necessarily compete with other industries when it comes to salaries,” Sugden noted, which reduces the pool of talent available.
“There is a lot of competition for a fairly limited number of qualified people in this field,” he added.
Another significant issue is the numerous barriers to entry into the defence sector, according to Nick Walrond, managing director of the Government and Defence department at Sanderson recruitment.
“Security clearance processes are definitely an issue,” Walrond told DSEI Gateway. “This means that skills acquisition is not an agile process when you include the security clearance requirement for many roles.”
In line with this, Walrond noted a “rigidity” in the defence environment that is likely to discourage those accustomed to working in digital fields. He also pointed out that defence roles are often unable to offer hybrid working models, which is off-putting for digital workers more accustomed to a hybrid setup.
What does this mean for defence?
The lack of digital skills puts pressure on the defence sector in several ways, forcing it to implement projects less efficiently and preventing it from achieving broader government or national objectives.
“The best people go to the best opportunities that are most accessible to them – these are kind of the classic forces of market demand,” Walrond said.
With fewer talented people, defence suffers from operational risk. “Capability cannot be delivered, projects go off track, costs rise,” Walrond said, adding that he has a “gut feeling” that the sector as a whole may try to overcome the problem by putting additional pressure on costs.
Sugden added that a lack of digital skills will hamper attempts to achieve certain military ambitions, such as those in the SDR, noting that any increase in the UK’s military readiness will “require a skilled workforce to deliver this.”
What can defence do to change things?
Change at government level is essential to solve the skills crisis, with education a necessary focal point. For example, Sugden says his firm has suggested introducing technology-dedicated apprenticeship programmes or apprenticeship programmes leading to a defence-focused diploma.
“This would involve the UK Government working with universities that already have a presence or focus on defence, or creating technology certifications focused on specific digital skills in defence,” Sugden said. “Working with employers to find out their digital skills requirements would also be essential to this strategy. He added that this would also help address the challenges employers face in attracting new people with the necessary digital skills.”
Walrond reiterated some of Sugden’s views, suggesting that Her Majesty’s Government should make skills a critical issue for resilience, stating: “This SDR is looking at setting up munitions factories to ensure that we don’t go without munitions – well, I would consider digital skills to be just as important.” He added:
We should perhaps set up talent pools and centres of excellence to serve the UK defence sector with digital, data, cyber and artificial intelligence skills, and this could be achieved through collaboration, through partnerships with schools, universities, large technology firms and so on.
Defence technology does not seem cool enough in Walrond’s view either. Defence needs to work from a marketing perspective to make it “really attractive to the new generations coming through,” he said.
Among other ideas – such as simplifying the security process and levelling pay disparities between the public and private sectors – Walrond suggested that Her Majesty’s Government adopt a long-term perspective on the workforce challenge by integrating digital skills into public procurement processes.
As for businesses themselves, which do not have the power to create legislation, Walrond advised them to engage in collaborative partnership ecosystems, stating that: “if you [businesses] can work with collaborative partners, you have access to a wider community of skills, and this can mitigate the digital skills problem.”
Adopting sector-specific training and development programmes is also essential for companies, Walrond added, explaining that a long-term approach is needed because it is “very difficult to bring someone into this sector with no prior exposure.”
He listed some of the outreach activities his own firm is involved in to illustrate this tactic, such as programmes aimed at early life and re-engagement with the armed forces.
George Fitzmaurice is a UK defence reporter at Clarion Defence & Security. He previously worked as a reporter for ITPro and as an intern at the New Statesman.
DSEI Gateway is a platform dedicated to SME members, providing exclusive and tailored information on military requirements, concrete opportunities and access to key decision-makers. For more information, please visit this link.
Source: here
Sanctioned tanks sold for scrap in ‘unusually structured’ deals
As the fleet of grey oil tankers continues to expand, market observers have noted that some of these vessels have recently arrived at scrapyards – often under contracts that deviate from industry norms.
Sources in the shipbroking and market sectors told Riviera that 15 grey oil tankers were scrapped between 2024 and 2025, eight of which were sanctioned. All sanctioned vessels were scrapped this year amid tightening Western restrictions.
The sources added that nine other sanctioned tankers had been sold for scrap but had not yet been scrapped. “Although some of these may end up back in the grey fleet, more are expected to be scrapped soon,” one source said.
Irregular contracts
According to BRS Shipbrokers, leaving the grey fleet is difficult unless the vessels are sold to other grey fleet operators. Cash buyers and scrapyards usually conduct transactions in US dollars, which means that trading in sanctioned or grey ships exposes them to the risk of exclusion from the US financial system if enforcement measures are taken.
Observers of the recycling market have noted that sanctioned tankers can only be sold if a buyer is willing to circumvent the sanctions – sometimes by trading in less common currencies. Such transactions are often small, leading sellers to scrap prices well below market levels, while scrapyards face the possibility of regulatory scrutiny.
Sources also pointed out that most of these off-market scrapping transactions had unusual features compared to standard transactions. Some contracts, for example, included unusually long payment terms and lacked certain guarantees typical of normal agreements.
With regard to shipyards ready to handle authorised tonnage, sources pointed out that they are not aligned with the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships. Analysts also pointed out that none of these shipyards have yet been prosecuted by the US – a factor that makes them more willing to take the risk, although this does not rule out retroactive enforcement.
Market observers have suggested that the IMO, together with regulators such as OFAC, consider measures to facilitate the safe and efficient handling of grey fleet vessels heading for recycling yards.
Expansion of the grey fleet
In early August, Riviera reported – citing BRS Shipbrokers – that the grey fleet is expanding at a rate of around 30 ships per month. The brokerage now estimates the fleet at 1,140 vessels with a total of 127 million dwt, including oil tankers over 3,000 dwt but excluding specialised carriers and gas carriers. At the end of December 2024, the fleet stood at 930 vessels (110 million dwt), showing a sharp increase since the beginning of the year.
BRS continues to estimate that 977 vessels over 34,000 dwt, totalling 126 million dwt, now belong to the grey fleet. This represents 17% of the global tanker fleet in this size category, including 166 VLCCs and 133 Suezmax vessels – meaning that the grey fleet accounts for 18% of total global tanker capacity.
A year ago, only 191 tankers (approximately 25% of the grey fleet) were considered sanctioned, mainly due to links with Iran, Russia or Venezuela through their owners or operators. Today, this figure has risen to 886 vessels – representing 78% of the fleet.
Source: here
A Russian military enclave within NATO, Kaliningrad
Doctor in geopolitics and graduate in international relations, he teaches in secondary schools, as well as at Paris 1 University and ENSTA Bretagne. In addition to numerous articles on Kaliningrad, the subject of his thesis, he has published various atlases with Autrement, including L’Atlas de l’Europe, un continent dans tous ses états and the annual edition of Le Grand Atlas. Co-author of the programme “Le Dessous des Cartes” since its inception, he has just published, with Emilie Aubry, L’Atlas du Dessous des Cartes, le monde misé à nu at Tallandier.
The deployment of Mig 314 aircraft carrying Kinjal hypersonic missiles in Kaliningrad on 8 February 2022 reminded the world that Russia has a strategic foothold within NATO. A military stronghold during the Cold War, Kaliningrad is now seeing its defensive role strengthened as part of the “hybrid warfare” that Russia is currently waging against NATO. As the war (re)launched by Russia on 24 February 2022 drags on in Ukraine, questions are being asked about the disruptive role that the Russian enclave could play in the Baltic theatre.
If the Russian war in Ukraine were to spread, Russian forces based in Kaliningrad could intervene to provide advanced air defence for Russian territory and to disable infrastructure considered threatening by NATO, such as the missile defence base in Poland. Illustrated with a map of Kaliningrad.
In light of current events, we are republishing this article, originally published on 27 March 2022.
A strategic outpost
If Joseph Stalin had already requested the annexation of the northern part of East Prussia by the USSR in 1943, during the Tehran conference with the Allies, it was because he was aware of the strategic advantage represented by the ports of Königsberg and Pillau (now Baltiysk): they were ice-free all year round, unlike Leningrad and Kronstadt. The former German territory, covering an area of 15,000 km2, was then immediately transformed into a military zone renamed Kaliningrad in July 1946, like its capital Königsberg, in honour of Mikhail Kalinin, the president of the Supreme Soviet who had died a few weeks earlier. It was then closed to foreigners. The German populations remaining after the Soviet assault in 1945 were expelled in their entirety in the autumn of 1948.
The strategic objective assigned to Kaliningrad at that time was to control the new zone of Soviet domination in Central Europe, particularly Poland and the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), which had been forcibly integrated into the Soviet Empire during the war. With the Cold War (1947-1990), the Baltic Sea became a place of East/West rivalry, and Kaliningrad was transformed into a Soviet outpost. Taking on a defensive role against a possible attack by NATO forces, the entire territory was organised for this purpose. As part of the economic specialisation of the USSR, Kaliningrad prioritised the development of the military sectors, the military-industrial complex and shipbuilding. Even though the majority of Kaliningrad’s population remained ‘civilian’, their family and professional ties to the military contributed to the emergence of a military mentality throughout the region.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Kaliningrad remained the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet. However, the concentration of this significant military potential in this small territory raised concerns among the enclave’s immediate neighbours and those around the Baltic Sea. Russia’s definition in 1992 of a ‘near abroad’, an area of vital interests covering the former Soviet zone, complicated negotiations on the withdrawal of Russian-Soviet troops from Estonia and Latvia, especially as large Russian minorities lived there, representing 38% and 48% of the total population of these two states in 1991 [ 1 ] . There were fears that this Russian presence, particularly in the border regions, would serve as a vehicle for separatist aspirations and heighten tensions with Moscow.
The withdrawal of the Red Army, completed in 1993 for Lithuania and in the summer of 1994 for the other two Baltic states, had two consequences for the Kaliningrad region. On the one hand, the enclave took over all the bases lost in the region. On the other hand, it served as a reception area for armed forces withdrawing from the former Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe (East Germany, Poland and the Baltic states).
For Poland, the increased military presence in Kaliningrad is perceived as a threat, as it faces major difficulties in compensating for the loss of an integrated air defence system following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The number of Russian soldiers stationed in Kaliningrad is almost equivalent to that of the Polish army (220,000 men). Poland remains extremely suspicious of Russia and its “over-militarised” border, which is almost 200 kilometres long. For their part, the Baltic countries feel caught between Kaliningrad on one side and Belarus on the other, which has been militarily integrated into Russia since 1994.
In 1997, Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeev announced a unilateral reduction of ground and naval forces in Russia’s North-Western District, citing improved security in the region, and the Kaliningrad Military District was placed under the authority of the Leningrad District. [2] Military forces deployed in Kaliningrad increased to 30,000 by the end of the 1990s, reaching approximately 10,000 by 2002. [3] For Moscow, Kaliningrad’s role remains primarily defensive, but it also serves economic objectives, as set out in the Russian Federation’s Naval Doctrine until 2010, approved by President Vladimir Putin in July 2001. This doctrine emphasises economic and civil interests in the “global sea” and prioritises, well ahead of military missions, the development of port infrastructure and the modernisation of the merchant fleet, economic cooperation with the Baltic states and the assertion of maritime sovereignty. The heavy militarisation of the region is increasingly incompatible with the project to transform Kaliningrad into a “Hong Kong of the Baltic Sea “, the first stage of which involved the creation of the Yantar special economic zone in 1993. [ 4 ] .
Map. Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave
Click on the thumbnail to enlarge the map of Kaliningrad. © Aurélie Boissière, Atlas of Europe, Autrement, 2021; courtesy of the publisher. View in PDF format
Boissière
Kaliningrad, a Russian lever against NATO expansion
However, in the early 2000s, the prospect of NATO and then the European Union expanding, particularly into the three Baltic states, confirmed a decline in Russian influence in the Baltic region. For Moscow, the accession of these former Soviet republics to the former enemy bloc damaged Russia’s prestige and power. It even sparked fears within the Russian army, due to their proximity to Russian territories considered strategic, that NATO would set up military bases there or even station nuclear weapons, not to mention the fear of seeing Kaliningrad surrounded by NATO member countries.
Moscow then played the “Kaliningrad card” [ 5 ]. In 1999, Kaliningrad thus became the site of the most important Russian military manoeuvre organised since the fall of the USSR, explicitly named “Zapad 99”, meaning “West 99”. The scenario for the exercises was based on a military attack on Kaliningrad by NATO, without the neighbouring states being informed.
The 2007 announcement that the Americans were installing elements of their missile defence shield in Central Europe, namely a detection radar in the Czech Republic and ten missile interceptors in Poland, then sparked Moscow’s anger. The Kremlin reacted immediately by declaring that these two countries could become targets of Russian armed forces [ 6 ]. President Putin then announced the deployment of new Russian Iskander missiles (SS26), a possible vector for nuclear warheads, in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, i.e. on the Polish border.
However, Moscow only carried out its threat to benefit from the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014. In Europe, Russia’s objectives are primarily geopolitical in nature, as they seek to reaffirm its central role in the continent’s affairs. Moscow thus seeks to influence both political and security governance and, consequently, to be recognised as having a right of oversight over its western neighbourhood. However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Russians feel that “Eastern Europeans have merely moved the Iron Curtain“ with the accession of the former Eastern Bloc countries to the European Union and, in particular, to NATO in 2004. Nevertheless, NATO, an enemy alliance during the Cold War, should, according to Russian decision-makers, have disappeared with the Warsaw Pact, which was dissolved in 1991.
The integration of the Baltic states in 2004 brought NATO to Russia’s borders, reviving a sense of encirclement that Russia has historically fought against, notably by establishing a glacis in both the Tsarist and Soviet eras. In August 2008, Russia responded with force to what it perceived as a threat to its borders in Georgia. This operation was ordered two months after NATO’s decision to formally accept Ukraine and Georgia into the accession process. Even though the implementation of the accession process had been postponed indefinitely, this expansion of the Atlantic Alliance was perceived by Moscow as a blockade of its southern border.
Starting in 2009, a struggle for influence began between Brussels and Moscow in the Baltic-Black Sea region. On the one hand, the European Union proposed an Eastern Partnership to the countries in this area; on the other hand, Russia offered them membership or association with the Eurasian Economic Union, a free trade area in the making. In 2013, Ukraine became the main stake in this rivalry. In this context of growing tensions, it was no longer a time for cooperation with the European Union on Kaliningrad, but rather for confrontation. Indeed, NATO deployed forces in the Baltic countries in response to an increasingly strong Russian presence in the Baltic Sea, followed by the deployment of Russian Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in October 2016.
The nuclearisation of Kaliningrad
According to Russian authorities, these nuclear-powered missiles are intended to replace the Tochka short-range tactical ballistic missiles (SS21 in NATO terminology). However, with twice the range (approximately 500 km), these new missiles are likely to threaten all neighbouring countries around the Baltic Sea. This deployment is complemented by the positioning in Kaliningrad of S-400 missiles, an air and missile defence system covering Lithuania and a large part of Poland and Latvia. Kaliningrad is also home to coastal batteries equipped with SSC 5 Bastion supersonic missiles with a range of 300 km and SSC 1 Sepal missiles with a range of 450 km. In total, the military personnel deployed in the enclave is estimated at 30,000 [9]. This deployment allows the territory of Kaliningrad to be protected according to an A2/AD (Anti Access/Area Denial) logic, with the aim of keeping NATO away from the Baltic Sea region.
This deployment contributes to causing panic in neighbouring countries in the region and increasing feelings of insecurity and regional instability. This feeling is further reinforced by the Russian military exercise Zapad-2017, which, according to Russian authorities, is mobilising 12,700 soldiers (according to NATO, nearly 40,000) to test A2/AD military capabilities, including through a naval blockade. These manoeuvres demonstrate Russia’s determination to strengthen its military potential on its western flank, made possible by Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
In this context, Kaliningrad is once again at the centre of regional tensions in the Baltic region. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea (2014), the Baltic states fear that Moscow will launch a destabilisation strategy against them, similar to that in Ukraine, based on the manipulation of their Russian-speaking minorities, before invading them from the Kaliningrad enclave. A series of war scenarios simulating a Russian invasion of the Baltic states, carried out by researchers at the Rand Corporation [ 10 ], have shown that Riga or Tallinn could be surrounded by Russian forces in less than 60 hours.
Kaliningrad, a strategic tool in hybrid warfare?
During Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term (2012-2018) and the emergence of new ambitions on the international stage, Russia has made limited use of its military force, with the notable exception of Syria, favouring hybrid warfare tools such as propaganda and information warfare, cyberspace, for the purposes of sabotage and destabilisation. This notion of ‘hybrid warfare’, popularised in the mid-2000s by two officers of the Marine Corps – General James Mattis and Colonel Frank Hoffman – describes a type of warfare that combines conventional and unconventional warfare, regular and irregular warfare, and in particular information warfare and cyber warfare. In practice, a threat can be considered hybrid when it involves several different dimensions and types of warfare [11]. In this context, the sanctification of Kaliningrad through its increased militarisation and on appears to be a means of exerting pressure on its European neighbours and partners and, more generally, on the West, particularly through the Euro-Atlantic bodies of the European Union and NATO.
The remilitarisation of the Kaliningrad region is accompanied by a modernisation of the military apparatus throughout Russia [ 12 ] . Since his re-election in 2008, President Putin has sought to restore the credibility of Russian military power on the international stage. This has involved a significant budgetary effort, which has enabled the massive re-equipment of the armed forces, the modernisation of the nuclear arsenal, a profound restructuring of conventional forces and the professionalisation of personnel. In terms of maritime doctrine, the 2015 doctrine makes preventing NATO’s eastward expansion an absolute priority. Kaliningrad has once again become not only the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet, but also a significant component of Russia’s missile defence. Approximately 10,000 troops are deployed in three fully equipped combat brigades: an elite marine brigade and two motorised brigades. In times of peace and crisis, the enclave serves as an outpost for surveillance and intelligence gathering. It contributes to the security of maritime routes, gas pipelines and submarine cables, while also acting as a platform for strategic deterrence, coercion and isolation, thanks to the deployment of various types of drones and missiles since 2016.
Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the remilitarised enclave of Kaliningrad has become a strategic pawn in Moscow’s hybrid war with NATO countries. This increases the sense of vulnerability of neighbouring countries facing a new unfavourable balance of power and encourages the escalation of tensions through information warfare and propaganda. President Putin himself is said to have suggested that Russia could deploy troops within two days, if it so wished, not only in Kiev, but also in Warsaw and the Baltic states. Furthermore, since the Zapad-2017 exercises, the Suwalki Gap, a 65 km long strip of land forming the border between Poland and Lithuania and thus the link between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO, has been perceived by the Alliance as particularly vulnerable [ 15 ] . Therefore, both the Balts and the Poles consider Russia to be the main threat to regional security.
In 2022, the Russian enclave once again became a military outpost, an essential element of Russian security and military strategy in the Baltic region and against NATO. The war in Ukraine could turn it into a destabilising force at the heart of NATO.
The deployment of Kinjal missiles in early February 2022, one of Russia’s six new strategic weapons, has therefore heightened concerns among residents of the Baltic Sea region and NATO headquarters. Their range of 2,400 km allows them to reach all Western European capitals except Madrid and Lisbon, while the Iskander missiles have a range of only 500 km. For Moscow, this tactical deployment is a response to the strengthening of NATO troops in the Baltic countries and Poland and signals the army’s anti-ship strike capabilities, two weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
Therefore, if the conflict were to escalate, the armed forces based in Kaliningrad could intervene to provide advanced air defence for Russian territory and disable infrastructure considered threatening to NATO, such as the missile defence base in Poland. In addition, they could prevent NATO member countries from accessing the Baltic Sea. According to some sources, Kaliningrad even hosts groups of hackers capable of waging information warfare or jamming communications or sabotaging networks.
Although the end of the Cold War led to the belief that Kaliningrad would become a prosperous territory, a “Hong Kong” of the Baltic Sea, benefiting at the beginning of the 21st century from the dynamics of the European Union’s eastward expansion, it is clear that the Russian enclave has once again become a military outpost, an essential element of Russian security and military strategy in the Baltic Sea and in its relationship with NATO . The war in Ukraine could transform this area into a destabilising force at the heart of NATO.
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