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Why US Risk a $100M F-35 on a $70k Iranian Drone?
MS Daily brief-11 February 2026
- MS Daily Brief-en
- The multi-domain deadlock in the context of Romania and the Black Sea
- Integrated military cooperation for the protection of offshore energy platforms in the Black Sea
- NAVY ARSENAL – Explanatory Memorandum
- The Phantom Fleet and maritime security challenges
- China’s military leadership faces a serious problem
- The possibility of Romania initiating a project similar to Nordic-Baltic Eight
Contents
News from Ukraine | Wow! Ukraine has launched a major counterattack! Is this a good idea? 1
Norwegian defence chief says Russia could invade the country to protect its nuclear assets 1
EU moves closer to creating offshore centres for migrants and asylum seekers. 3
“Red alert” for Greece after air force officer accused of spying for China. 6
Iran’s secret fleet of old oil tankers is a ticking time bomb for marine life, experts say. 10
Bulgaria rocked by mysterious deaths of six people in the mountains. 17
The world’s major straits: Strategic maritime chokepoints in global trade. 19
The irregular war of cetaceans in Russia’s North Atlantic. 23
Conventional forces will never embrace irregular warfare. 27
About drones โ statistics. 30
The stop at the Ream naval base reflects the deepening ties between Cambodia and the US 35
Ukrainian Magura V5 marine drones receive a swarm of bait, ready to attack. 36
Ukrainian Magura V5 marine drones receive a swarm of lures, ready to attack. 38
How Artificial Intelligence could reshape four key competitions in the war of the future. 39
Europe’s first private hypersonic rocket reaches Mach 6. 43
Royal Navy showcases AI-accelerated targeting cycle. 44
Lockheed unveils Lamprey submarine drone carrier concept 45
US Navy deploys two nuclear attack submarines near Guam as tensions in the Indo-Pacific rise 46
French Navy launches offshore patrol vessel PH Trolley de Prรฉvaux to secure Atlantic approaches 47
US Air Force deploys A-10C Warthogs to protect Navy mine warfare operations in the Arabian Gulf 50
Taiwan to build 10 new light frigates for air defence and anti-submarine warfare. 52
Frankenburg to test anti-drone missile in Ukraine in 2026. 55
US intercepts Russian Shadow Fleet tanker Aquila II. 56
BREAKING NEWS: Iran FORTIFIES nuclear facility as US considers attack; IDF ELIMINATES terrorist leader | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine | Wow! Ukraine has launched a major counterattack! Is this a good idea?
Norwegian defence chief says Russia could invade the country to protect its nuclear assets
Exclusive: Eirik Kristoffersen, who served in Afghanistan, rejects Trump’s claim that NATO troops stayed out of the front line
Shaun Walker in Bergen
Tuesday, 10 February 2026, 20:07 CET
The Norwegian army chief has said Oslo cannot rule out the possibility of a future Russian invasion of the country, suggesting Moscow could act on Norway to protect its nuclear assets stationed in the far north.
“We do not rule out a land grab by Russia as part of its plan to protect its own nuclear capabilities, which are the only thing they have left and which effectively threaten the United States,” said General Eirik Kristoffersen, the Norwegian defence chief.
He acknowledged that Russia has no ambitions to conquer Norway, as it did in Ukraine or other territories of the former Soviet Union, but said that much of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is located on the Kola Peninsula, a short distance from the Norwegian border, including nuclear submarines, land-based missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft. These would be crucial if Russia were to enter into conflict with NATO elsewhere.
“We do not rule out this possibility, because Russia still has the option to do so to ensure that its nuclear capabilities, its retaliatory capabilities, are protected. This is the scenario we are considering in the far north,” he said.
In a wide-ranging interview with the Guardian newspaper, Kristoffersen harshly criticised Donald Trump’s recent comments about Greenland, as well as the US president’s “unacceptable” claims that allied countries did not serve on the front lines in Afghanistan while American troops bore the brunt of the fighting.
“What he said made no sense, and I know that all my American friends in Afghanistan know that,” said Kristoffersen, 56, a career officer who has participated in several missions in Afghanistan.
“We were definitely on the front lines. We did all the missions, from arresting Taliban leaders to training Afghans and doing surveillance. We lost 10 Norwegians. We lost friends there. So we all felt it didn’t make sense,” he said.
“At the same time, I felt that this is President Trump. I’ve never seen him in Afghanistan. He doesn’t know what he’s talking about when he says these things. A president shouldn’t say such things, but that didn’t really affect me. But my concern was for the Norwegian veterans, for the relatives of those we lost, for the soldiers we lost.”
Kristoffersen has been Norway’s chief of defence since 2020, responsible for the country’s armed forces as well as its intelligence service. It has been a period of intense change, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced a rethink of European security, with neighbouring Sweden and Finland joining Norway in the NATO alliance and the country strengthening its border areas with Russia in the far north.
Kristoffersen said that although Norway is mindful of the threat of a traditional Russian invasion, Russia’s current tactics are more diffuse. “If you prepare for the worst, nothing prevents you from being able to counter sabotage and more hybrid threats,” he said.
He added, however, that Norway and Russia still maintain some direct contact regarding search and rescue missions in the Barents Sea and that regular meetings take place at the border between representatives of the two armies.
He recommended setting up a direct military telephone line between the two capitals to provide a channel of communication that would prevent conflicts from escalating due to misunderstandings. He said that Russia’s actions in the far north have generally been less aggressive than those in the Baltic Sea.
“So far, what we have seen in terms of airspace violations in our area have been misunderstandings. Russia conducts a lot of [GPS] jamming operations, and we believe that the jamming also affects their aircraft,” he said.
“They haven’t said that, but we observe that when something like an airspace violation happens, it’s usually due to the pilots’ lack of experience. When we talk to the Russians, they respond in a very professional and predictable manner.”
Regarding Norway’s northern territory of Svalbard, which includes a Russian settlement and cannot be militarised under the terms of a 1920 treaty, Kristoffersen said that Russia “respects the treaty” and that Norway has no intention of militarising the area.
Moscow has accused Oslo of secretly militarising Svalbard, but Kristoffersen said this is just propaganda that Moscow does not really believe.
The northern Norwegian territory of Svalbard contains a Russian settlement. Photo: Anadolu/Getty Images
Regarding Trump’s claim that China and Russia have military plans in Greenland, Krisoffersen said it was “very strange” to hear such claims.
“We have a very good picture of what is happening in the Arctic from our intelligence service, and we don’t see anything like that in Greenland… we see Russia’s activity with its submarines and also its underwater programme in the traditional part of the Arctic… but it’s not about Greenland, it’s about reaching the Atlantic,” he said.
His comments came as French President Emmanuel Macron told a group of European newspapers that Europe was at a “Greenland moment” and urged countries to stand up to Trump.
Macron said that when there is “blatant aggression… we must not bow our heads or try to reach an agreement. We have tried this strategy for months and it does not work. But above all, it leads Europe, strategically, to an increase in its dependence.”
He said fears over Greenland were far from over. “There are threats and intimidation, and then suddenly Washington backs down. And we think it’s over. But don’t believe that for a second,” he said.
Asked whether Denmark and its allies would have any chance of repelling a US military takeover of Greenland if Trump went ahead with the plan, Kristoffersen replied: “They won’t, so it’s a hypothetical question.”
But he added a warning for Trump and the US military. “If Russia has learned anything from the war in Ukraine, I think it’s that it’s never a good idea to occupy a country. If the people don’t want it, it will cost you a lot of money and effort, and in the end, you will lose.
“The initial occupation is often very easy, but maintaining the occupation is very, very difficult. And I think all expansionist powers have experienced this.”
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/10/norway-defence-chief-russia-nuclear-assets
EU moves closer to creating offshore centres for migrants and asylum seekers
MEPs vote to allow people to be deported to places they have never been, while NGOs express fears over new list of “safe third countries”
Jennifer Rankin in Brussels
Tuesday, 10 February 2026, 17:38 CET
The EU has moved closer to creating offshore centres for migrants and asylum seekers after centre-right and far-right MEPs joined forces to push for tougher migration policies.
MEPs have voted for legislative changes that will give authorities more options for deporting asylum seekers, including sending people to countries they have never been to.
Under the new rules, which are expected to come into force in June, an asylum seeker can be deported to a country outside the EU, even if they have only passed through it, or to a place with which they have no connection, as long as a European government has signed an agreement with the host country.
The vote effectively supports Italy’s agreement with Albania and the Dutch government’s agreement with Uganda on the deportation of people whose asylum applications in the Netherlands have been rejected.
In a separate vote, MEPs also voted to create an EU list of ‘safe third countries’, meaning that people from these countries will be subject to accelerated procedures and find it more difficult to claim asylum.
The list includes all countries that are candidates for EU membership, including Georgia and Turkey, where the EU has expressed concern about the government’s crackdown on the opposition in 2025. The list of safe countries also includes Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco and Tunisia.
Human rights groups have raised concerns about the inclusion of Tunisia, where President Kaรฏs Saรฏed has taken repressive measures against civil society and opposition figures have been sentenced to up to 66 years in prison by politically controlled courts. Tunisian forces have also forced migrants to return to remote desert regions, where some have died of thirst.
A coalition of 39 NGOs said in a statement ahead of Tuesday’s vote that designating Tunisia as a safe country of origin deprived “Tunisian citizens of their right to an individual, fair and effective assessment of their asylum claims, while giving the Tunisian authorities a new blank cheque to continue systematic violations against migrants, civil society and civic space in general.”
Alessandro Ciriani, an Italian MEP who led the European Parliament’s work on the list of safe countries of origin, welcomed the result: “This is the beginning of a new phase: migration is no longer endured, but governed.”
He said: “For too long, political decisions on migration policy have been systematically called into question by divergent judicial interpretations, paralysing state action and fuelling administrative chaos.”
Ciriani is a member of Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party, which has clashed with Italian and European judges who ruled against the government’s agreements with Albania.
In 2024, an Italian court ruled that seven men from the Albanian centre would be transferred to Italy, disagreeing with Italy’s argument that it was a safe country of origin.
Italy argued that the men could be transferred to their “safe” countries of origin, Bangladesh and Egypt, but the judges said there was a lack of transparency in how safety had been assessed.
The EU has tightened its rules on refugees since more than 1.3 million people sought asylum during the 2015 migration crisis, but the trend has accelerated with the electoral gains of nationalist and far-right parties.
In search of “innovative solutions,” EU leaders approved the concept of offshore return centres in 2024 โ processing centres for people who have been denied asylum in the EU.
The right-wing Dutch government announced last September that it had reached an agreement with Uganda to allow the deportation of Africans who had been denied asylum in the Netherlands. The social-democratic government in Denmark had previously explored the possibility of processing asylum seekers in Rwanda, but never followed through with the project.
Last year, 155,100 people risked their lives travelling in unseaworthy boats across the Mediterranean Sea, and 1,953 died or disappeared, according to the UN refugee agency.
The death toll continued in the first weeks of 2026. It is feared that up to 380 people drowned after a boat from Tunisia was caught in a cyclone last month.
Supporters of the new measures argue that they undermine the business model of human traffickers.
“People who really need protection must receive it, but not necessarily in the European Union. Effective protection can also be provided in a safe third country, while individual assessment remains fully guaranteed,” said Assita Kanko, a Flemish nationalist politician.
The International Rescue Committee described the votes as deeply disappointing.
“The new ‘safe third country’ rules will likely force people to go to countries they have never set foot in โ places where they have no community, do not speak the language and face a very real risk of abuse and exploitation,” said Meron Ameha Knikman, senior advocacy adviser at the IRC.
The two laws were passed with strong support from the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and three nationalist and far-right groups.
The votes were the latest sign of a new dynamic in the European Parliament after a record number of nationalist and far-right MEPs were elected to the traditional Christian Democrats in 2024.
While critics accused the EPP of breaking the cordon sanitaire, the voting lists revealed a more complex picture. The centre-left was deeply divided, with significant minorities of socialist and centrist MEPs voting in favour of the new laws, while many centrists abstained.
“Warning sign” for Greece after air force officer accused of spying for China
Christos Flessas was detained in a case considered to be an exposure of Beijing’s strategy to infiltrate Western military and security services
Helena Smith in Athens
Tuesday, 10 February 2026, 20:04 CET
A Greek air force officer arrested on suspicion of spying for China has been remanded in custody pending trial after appearing before a military judge in a case seen as exposing Beijing’s determination to infiltrate Europe’s security and intelligence services.
Surrounded by armed escorts, a squadron commander identified as Colonel Christos Flessas left the court on Tuesday evening after testifying for more than eight hours.
The 54-year-old could face life imprisonment if found guilty of charges that include “passing strictly confidential military information” to China. He is said to have had access to sensitive military information, including developing armed forces technologies, and is believed to have been recruited by Beijing last year.
Greek media reported that he admitted to photographing and transmitting classified NATO documents using specialised encryption software provided by the Chinese secret services . He is alleged to have undergone training in China during an undeclared trip to that country, which, according to military sources, ultimately exposed him.
In a statement made by his lawyer after appearing in court, Flessas said: “Without my knowledge and without intention, I was involved in something that turned into a nightmare, dangerous and illegal. In my testimony, I did not try to justify myself or even defend myself… I ask to be punished with a fair sentence.”
The Greek authorities were reportedly informed by the CIA about the extent of the information leak, and in an extremely unusual statement after Flessas’ arrest on 5 February, the Greek general staff said there was “clear evidence of criminal offences under the military criminal code”.
Chinese agents are believed to have initially approached their target online before recruiting him at a NATO conference in an unidentified European country. Flessas reportedly said he was lured with promises of financial rewards in foreign currency and digital payments of between โฌ5,000 and โฌ15,000 for each transmission made. He told the military magistrate on Tuesday that the first contact with the agents who led him to his superior was established through LinkedIn.
Nicholas Eftimiades, a retired senior American intelligence officer with considerable experience in Chinese espionage operations, told the Guardian that the case was a wake-up call for the Greek government and military.
“[It is] significant because it shows China’s willingness and ability to penetrate the military communications infrastructure of Greece and other NATO members,” he said. “Nations spy on other armies to gain an advantage in war. Despite all the declarations of friendship and economic engagement, China continues to evolve as a threat to democracies around the world.”
Flessas was previously a NATO assessor in information systems and, at the time of his arrest, commanded a battalion in the Athenian suburb of Kavouri, specialising in telecommunications.
Eftimiades, whose book Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics was released last year, said that because Chinese citizens are required by law to support their country’s espionage efforts, the West is increasingly vulnerable to spies from Beijing.
Last week, four people, including two Chinese nationals, were arrested in France on suspicion of intercepting and collecting military information. In Germany last September, a former assistant to a member of parliament from the far-right Alternative fรผr Deutschland party was sentenced to nearly five years in prison for spying for China.
“China uses a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to conduct espionage worldwide,” said Eftimiades, who currently teaches national security at Penn State University. “[This] is different from the efforts of any Western government. The sheer volume of activity makes it impossible to counter… Western societies are open democracies. This makes them extremely vulnerable to China’s covert influence efforts.”
Media reports on Tuesday suggested that the Greek air force officer is cooperating fully with authorities. Well-informed sources said there are fears that other military officials may also be involved. One of them said the armed forces had made the case public as a warning.
“What we are seeing is unprecedented,” said Plamen Tonchev, an expert on Sino-Greek relations. “Greece is considered a relatively friendly country to China. This is the first time China has been so openly involved in an espionage case of this kind.”
Tonchev said the episode would “tarnish the image” of Beijing in a country where it gained control of a large part of the port of Piraeus a decade ago.
An estimated 24% of China’s imports to Europe are transported through container terminals in Piraeus, and Tonchev said this is a source of “great pride” for Beijing.
Iran asks the US not to allow Netanyahu to thwart nuclear negotiations before meeting with Trump
Tehran’s intervention comes as the Israeli prime minister heads to a hastily arranged meeting at the White House
Patrick Wintour Diplomatic Editor
Tuesday, 10 February 2026, 20:34 CET
Tehran has called on the US not to allow Israel to destroy the chance of reaching an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, amid speculation that Benjamin Netanyahu intends to use Wednesday’s hastily arranged meeting with Donald Trump at the White House to derail the negotiations.
Iran’s intervention came as the Israeli prime minister travelled to Washington to convince Trump not to negotiate an agreement with Tehran if it excludes limiting the country’s ballistic missile programme, renouncing support for proxy forces in the region and reducing human rights abuses in the country.
Netanyahu is deeply concerned that Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, are prepared to conclude an agreement limited to restricting Iran’s nuclear programme, which, in Israel’s view, would do nothing to reduce the long-term threat that Tehran poses to the region.
Before leaving for Washington, Netanyahu said he would “present to the president our approach to our principles in the negotiations.” He is expected to provide Trump with new information about Iran’s military capabilities, including new long-range ballistic missiles.
Netanyahu faces a delicate task in establishing his position, as he risks being perceived as provoking two of Trump’s most respected advisers by drawing up a series of demands that could force the US into a prolonged conflict with Iran.
He also risks upsetting Trump by creating divisions within the Republican Party, especially if he reminds the US president of his repeated and unfulfilled promises to come to the aid of Iranian protesters.
Netanyahu’s turbulent relationship with Trump is already entering another difficult period, as he continues to block his peace plan for Gaza, banning a Palestinian technocratic body from entering the Gaza Strip and effectively attempting to annex the West Bank.
Signalling that he knows he is on shaky ground, Netanyahu agreed to take US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee with him. Before leaving for Washington, Huckabee said there was “extraordinary alignment between the US and Israel on Iran” and that, as far as he knew, the two sides shared the same red lines.
Iran expressed its anger at Israel’s intervention. Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, the body that oversees Tehran’s negotiating strategy, said: “The Americans should think wisely and not allow him, through his attitude, to create the impression before his flight that he is going to the United States to set the framework for nuclear negotiations. They must remain vigilant about Israel’s destructive role.”
Larijani met with mediators between Washington and Tehran in Muscat to discuss the agenda for the upcoming negotiations.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said at the weekly press conference: “Our side in the negotiations is America. America must decide to act independently of the destructive pressures and influences that are harmful to the region.”
Israel’s alarm over a potential deal that undermines its ambitions for regime change in Tehran has grown since the US agreed to reopen indirect negotiations with Iran, which began on Friday in Oman.
The Iranian government also faces internal political challenges, with several reformist groups and academics issuing statements protesting against the suppression of dissent and, in particular, the arrest of Reformist Front leaders.
The Front issued a new statement expressing its shock and warning that the regime’s exclusionary approach and baseless accusations will exacerbate the political impasse and “strengthen the violent and belligerent factions that support Israel.” The Front called on Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to intervene urgently to secure the release of its leaders.
Even if the planned second round of negotiations is limited to Iran’s nuclear programme, as Tehran wishes, there is no guarantee of success, as Iran insists on retaining its right to enrich uranium as fuel for nuclear power plants, which the US allowed under the 2015 agreement, but which Trump seems to be ruling out.
Trump sent the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and three accompanying warships to the region, which are capable of striking a wide range of Iranian military and economic targets. The US has also strengthened the air defences of American bases in the region.
The head of Iran’s atomic energy authority said Tehran may be prepared to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium to a purity of 60%, a limited concession given that the 2015 agreement limited enrichment to a purity of 3.75%.
Iran’s secret fleet of old oil tankers is a ticking time bomb for marine life, experts say
Exclusive: Analysts say an oil spill catastrophe is coming that could be far worse than the Exxon Valdez disaster
Damian Carrington Environment Editor
Tuesday, 10 February 2026, 12:50 CET
Decrepit oil tankers in Iran’s secret fleet, which violate sanctions, are a “time bomb,” and it is only a matter of time before a catastrophic environmental disaster occurs, maritime intelligence analysts have warned.
Such an oil spill could be far worse than the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, which released 37,000 tonnes of crude oil into the sea, they said.
Pole Star Global assessed 29 Iranian ships that disappeared from radar after turning off their satellite identification systems following the US seizure of a Venezuelan tanker in December. Half of them were older than the recommended 20-year lifespan, analysts said, and because they operate in the shadows, they are believed to be poorly maintained and may not comply with international safety standards.
In recent years, more than 50 incidents involving tankers around the world have been reported, ranging from collisions to oil spills. Nine oil spills, from Thailand to Italy and Mexico, were attributed to ships in the Russian fleet between 2021 and 2024. However, the Iranian fleet has been little analysed.
The new analysis placed seven of the 29 ships in the “extreme risk” category, being over 25 years old, while three were over 30 years old. Five ships were both old and in the “very large crude carrier” class, capable of carrying around 300,000 tonnes of oil.
The hidden fleet’s tankers were typically uninsured, analysts said, meaning that the cost of cleaning up a spill would fall to the country where the disaster occurred. That cost could be between $860 million and $1.6 billion, according to a recent estimate.
The total fleet of tankers in the hidden fleet is estimated at several hundred ships, with some estimates suggesting that they account for 17% of the global tanker fleet. Russia has the largest hidden fleet, and two old Russian tankers caused a major spill in the Black Sea in December 2024 after one sank and the other ran aground.
Two Russian tankers sink in the Black Sea, causing a spill of 4,300 tonnes of oil โ video
Saleem Khan, head of data and analytics at Pole Star Global, said Iran’s unauthorised fleet has some of the oldest tankers in any fleet, with some far exceeding the safe lifespan for such vessels.
“It’s like a ticking time bomb,” he said, adding that it was “only a matter of time” before one of them sank and broke apart, or an explosion led to a major oil spill. “They carry oil, often under pressure, and there are a lot of machines on board that have to work perfectly so that problems such as fire or explosion don’t occur,” Khan said.
“The important thing is just the scale of the disaster it could cause โ it could be many times greater than that caused by the Exxon Valdez. But it’s a very, very profitable business for all involved. So they have a vested interest in keeping it going.”
Mark Spalding, president of the Ocean Foundation, said: “Iran’s ghost fleet poses a significant and growing threat to the environment. The question is not whether a major incident will occur, but when and which coastal communities and marine ecosystems will pay the price for a shipping system designed to avoid responsibility.
“We are deeply concerned that the environmental dimension of the ghost fleet’s operations has not received sufficient attention.”
The Iranian government did not respond to a request for comment.
Ghost fleet vessels use deceptive practices such as false flags, fake owners and blocked or falsified AIS satellite tracking to transport sanctioned goods. The trade in sanctioned oil is estimated to be worth many billions of dollars a year. French President Emmanuel Macron said in October that Russia’s ghost fleet trade was worth โฌ30 billion a year and was financing 30-40% of the war in Ukraine.
The United States has been most active against the ghost fleet tankers, seizing ships linked to Russia and Venezuela in recent months. France, Germany, Estonia and other countries have physically intercepted ghost fleet ships. The UK has not done so, despite the fact that the English Channel is a bottleneck for maritime transport, which is obliged to pass through national territorial waters.
However, the UK threatened to seize a tanker from the hidden fleet linked to Russia last week. In January, the US tracked the Russian-linked tanker Marinera from the Caribbean to the North Atlantic, seizing it between Scotland and Iceland with British assistance.
Pole Star Global’s analysis of Iran’s hidden fleet of tankers concluded: “The combination of the advanced age of the vessels, the lack of Western insurance and reduced maintenance standards under sanctions creates a high risk of catastrophic environmental damage.”
A single incident involving one of the larger tankers would, according to the report, result in toxic oil spills covering thousands of square kilometres, mass mortality of marine life, contamination of 500-1,000 miles or more of coastline, and a severe impact on human health and livelihoods.
The report recommends improving satellite monitoring systems for tracking ships and stricter port inspections, including refusing entry to ships that cannot demonstrate their safety. It also advocates sanctions against beneficial owners of high-risk ships. But Khan said: “There is certainly no coordinated international effort.”
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is responsible for setting the regulatory framework applied by member states. A spokesperson said: “Ships that do not comply with IMO safety and environmental regulations or operate without transparency endanger seafarers, the marine environment and global trade.”
The IMO’s Legal Committee is reviewing existing international maritime rules and agreements to see how they can be used more effectively to stop illegal activities and is developing clear guidance on how ships should be registered, focusing on better background checks, greater transparency and closer cooperation between countries to prevent false registrations and false flags.
A spokesperson for the British government said: “The United Kingdom is committed to disrupting and deterring vessels in the ghost fleet. We continue to take robust action, including requesting proof of insurance and penalising vessels suspected of being part of the ghost fleet transiting the English Channel. Since October 2024, the UK has challenged approximately 600 vessels suspected of being part of the ghost fleet using this system.”
“A step in the wrong direction”: Israel’s plans for the West Bank provoke negative reactions worldwide
The US, UK, EU and Arab countries condemn plans that, according to Israeli ministers, “will destroy the idea of a Palestinian state”
Julian Borger in Jerusalem
Wednesday, 11 February 2026, 02:59 CET
Israeli measures to tighten control over the West Bank have sparked global backlash, including a signal from Washington reaffirming the Trump administration’s opposition to the annexation of occupied territory.
Announcing the measures, which involve extending Israeli control to areas currently under Palestinian administration, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz said they were aimed at strengthening Israeli settlements in the West Bank and preventing the emergence of an independent sovereign Palestine.
The measures, adopted by the Israeli security cabinet, also facilitate the identification of landowners in the West Bank and the purchase of property in the territory by non-Arabs. It was initially unclear when the new rules would come into force, but they do not require additional approvals.
“We will continue to reject the idea of a Palestinian state,” Katz said in a joint statement with Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.
The EU called the measures “another step in the wrong direction” and said sanctions were “still on the table,” including the possible suspension of parts of the EU-Israel trade agreement.
A joint statement by a group of Arab and Islamic states, which will be key to Donald Trump’s hopes of implementing a peace plan in Gaza, said they “condemn in the strongest terms Israel’s illegal decisions and measures aimed at imposing illegal Israeli sovereignty.”
The signatories โ including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey โ said the new measures “will fuel violence, deepen the conflict and jeopardise regional stability and security.”
The United Kingdom said it “strongly condemns” the Israeli measures. “Any unilateral attempt to alter the geographical or demographic structure of Palestine is wholly unacceptable and would be incompatible with international law,” the UK said in a statement. “We call on Israel to immediately revoke these decisions.”
The Australian government, which is hosting a visit by Israeli President Isaac Herzog, also joined in the global condemnation. “Australia opposes the decision by Israel’s security cabinet to extend Israeli control over the West Bank. This decision will undermine stability and security,” the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said in a statement. “The Australian government has made clear that settlements are illegal under international law and represent a significant obstacle to peace. Changing the demographic composition of Palestine is unacceptable.
“The two-state solution remains the only viable path to long-term peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians.”
The outrage over Israel’s actions came on the eve of a planned meeting at the White House between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump on Wednesday. The administration made no official comment, but a White House official issued a statement to reporters expressing opposition.
“President Trump has made clear that he does not support Israel’s annexation of the West Bank,” the statement said. “A stable West Bank ensures Israel’s security and is consistent with this administration’s goal of achieving peace in the region.”
The new measures are sweeping and directly target authority and control over West Bank territory. They repeal a law dating back to Jordanian rule before 1967 that prohibited the sale of land to non-Arabs.
They also transfer authority over building permits in Hebron from the Palestinian-run municipality to the Israeli Civil Administration, the army’s occupation authority in the territory. The transfer could violate the 1997 Hebron Protocol, which divided the city into two sectors.
The Jewish settlement around Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem is also being transferred from Palestinian rule to direct Israeli control.
The Palestinian Authority’s control over designated parts of the West Bank has been severely weakened in recent decades due to lack of money, aggressive obstruction and Israeli settlement construction, as well as its own corruption. It issued a statement in its capital, Ramallah, warning that the new Israeli measures were aimed at “intensifying attempts to annex the occupied West Bank.”
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/10/israel-west-bank-plans-global-backlash
Trump news in brief: Why did the FBI raid the Georgia election office? Trump supporters who deny the election results asked them to do so
The unprecedented raid heightens concerns that the president will attempt to interfere in this year’s midterm elections โ important US political news from 10 February 2026 in brief
The Guardian team
Wednesday, 11 February 2026, 03:00 CET
When the Federal Bureau of Investigation raided the election office in Fulton County, Georgia, last month, the decision was based on debunked claims by election deniers and came after a complaint from a White House lawyer who tried to overturn the 2020 election, a sworn statement of the search warrant revealed on Tuesday shows.
The FBI investigation “stemmed” from a complaint filed by Kurt Olsen, a lawyer who sought to overturn the 2020 election and contacted Justice Department officials to urge them to file a motion with the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the election. Olsen began working at the White House last year to investigate alleged election fraud.
FBI witnesses in the investigation include a group of conservative activists who have been harassing state officials for years with allegations of wrongdoing in Fulton County. Many of their allegations have been investigated by state officials and debunked.
Other witnesses include two members of the Georgia state election commission, aligned with Trump, whom he publicly praised as “pitbulls” at a 2024 rally. The two members are Janice Johnston and Janelle King, who is married to Kelvin King, the current candidate for Georgia secretary of state.
The unprecedented raid raised concerns that Donald Trump would attempt to interfere in this year’s midterm elections. This concern intensified further when it was revealed that Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, was present at the raid in Fulton County. Gabbard is said to be conducting her own investigation, separate from that led by the Department of Justice.
Affidavit reveals that debunked claims by election deniers influenced FBI raid in Georgia
Trump lost Georgia in 2020 by nearly 12,000 votes, a result that has been confirmed twice. However, claims of wrongdoing were central to his efforts to keep alive the myth that the 2020 election was rigged.
Congressmen name six wealthy men ‘likely incriminated’ in Epstein files
Democratic Congressman Ro Khanna said on Tuesday that he and his Republican colleague Thomas Massie had forced the Justice Department to reveal the “hidden” names of six wealthy men they say are “likely incriminated” by their inclusion in the so-called Jeffrey Epstein files.
In a post on X, Khanna, from California, named the six as Salvatore Nuara, Zurab Mikeladze, Leonic Leonov, Nicola Caputo, Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem and Leslie Wexner.
“They always gave us the hardest jobs”: how Maga billionaires relied on Mexican labour
When JD Vance gave a speech on the US economy late last year at a Uline factory in Allentown, Pennsylvania, he talked about the Trump administration’s key goals: removing “illegal aliens” from the country, rewarding companies that keep jobs in the US, and paying Americans good wages.
“We’re going to reward companies that build here in America and pay good wages to do so,” Vance said.
The location was not chosen at random. Uline, a privately held, billion-dollar office supply company, is owned by Liz and Richard Uihlein, two of the biggest donors to the Maga Republicans in the 2024 election.
But when it comes to immigration, Uline’s hiring practices in recent years offer an alternative view of how the US economy works in the real world.
Epstein arranged an intimate relationship for Tesla’s Kimbal Musk, emails show
Jeffrey Epstein arranged an intimate relationship between a woman in his network and Kimbal Musk, Elon Musk’s brother and a member of Tesla’s board of directors, according to emails in documents recently released by the Justice Department. The younger Musk and the woman had a relationship for about six months between 2012 and 2013, with Kimbal Musk describing it as “a romantic relationship.”
Local police are assisting ICE by using school surveillance cameras in the context of Trump’s restrictive immigration measures
US police departments are secretly using school surveillance cameras to support Donald Trump’s campaign against mass immigration, according to an investigation by 74.
Hundreds of thousands of audit logs over a one-month period show that police are searching the national database of automatic number plate readers, including from surveillance cameras in schools, for immigration-related investigations.
Mark Carney reminds Trump that Canada paid for the key border bridge that the US president says he will not open
The Canadian prime minister said he had a “positive” conversation with Donald Trump after the US leader threatened to block a key new bridge between the two countries, reminding the president that Canada paid for the construction and that the US owns part of the property.
Former Florida police chief claims Trump told him “everyone” knew what Epstein was doing in 2006
Donald Trump criticised Jeffrey Epstein about two decades ago, claiming that “everyone knew what he was doing,” a former Palm Beach police chief said.
Michael Reiter’s account of a conversation with Trump, contained in the 3 million pages of documents about Epstein released by the Justice Department, contrasts dramatically with the US president’s public statements. After Epstein’s arrest in July 2019, Trump said “I had no idea” when asked if he knew about his former friend’s abuse of teenage girls.
Trump administration removes LGBTQ+ Pride flag from Stonewall National Monument
The New York monument commemorates the June 1969 riots that followed a police raid on the Stonewall Inn, a popular gay bar in Greenwich Village, Manhattan. The six days of protests against the police action were a key moment in the start of the modern LGBTQ+ rights movement, and the site has since become a national symbol of LGBTQ+ pride. It is the latest move by the federal government to end diversity initiatives and sanitise the history shared in national parks.
What else happened today:
The acting director of ICE told a congressional committee on Tuesday that his agency is “an essential part of the overall security apparatus for the World Cup” and refused to commit to suspending operations near matches in this summer’s tournament.
Israel’s moves to tighten its grip on the West Bank have drawn global backlash, including a signal from Washington reaffirming the Trump administration’s opposition to annexing occupied territory.
In a surprise victory that could have implications for Democrats nationally, progressive activist Analilia Mejia was poised Tuesday to win a special primary election for a seat in the New Jersey House of Representatives after her main opponent conceded defeat.
Susan Collins, the Republican senator from Maine, who is one of the Democrats’ main targets in this year’s midterm elections, launched her campaign for a sixth term on Tuesday.
A new Republican bill proposes sweeping changes to U.S. toxic chemical laws that would eliminate protections for consumers, workers and the environment, warn public health advocates mobilising against the legislation.
US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick had lunch with Jeffrey Epstein on the disgraced financier’s private island, he said on Tuesday, as he faces mounting calls for his resignation from lawmakers on both sides of the political spectrum.
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/10/trump-administration-news-updates-today
Bulgaria rocked by mysterious deaths of six people in the mountains
The case is shrouded in feverish speculation, with prosecutors saying autopsies show two of the victims were “probably” murdered
Eden Maclachlan in Sofia
Tuesday, 10 February 2026, 18:13 CET
It has been dubbed Bulgaria’s “Twin Peaks”: a sinister saga involving the mysterious deaths of six people in the middle of the mountains that has gripped the Eastern European country.
Zahari Vaskov, director of the General Directorate of the National Police, said at a press conference on Monday that these deaths are “an unprecedented case in our country.”
Perhaps fitting for an investigation shrouded in sensational conspiracies, conflicting accounts and feverish speculation, Borislav Sarafov, the chief prosecutor, gave his own verdict. “Life has given us more shocking details here than in the TV series Twin Peaks,” he told local media, alluding to the 1990s American television series.
The case began in early February when three men aged 45, 49 and 51 were found dead in the burnt remains of a cabin near the Petrohan Pass, a mountain pass linking the province of Sofia to the northwestern province of Montana.
All three had gunshot wounds to the head, which forensic experts said were apparently self-inflicted, either from a short or close range. DNA traces detected on the firearms belonged only to the deceased men, they said.
Then, on Sunday, police discovered the bodies of three more people, two men aged 51 and 22 and a 15-year-old boy, in a caravan near the Okolchitsa peak, about 100 km north of the capital Sofia. The three had been sought by law enforcement because investigators suspected they were connected to the deaths in the Petrohan Pass.
Agence France-Presse reported that the prosecutor’s office said on Tuesday: “Based on the autopsy data for the three bodies [found later], it appears that there were probably two murders committed in succession and a suicide.”
According to the police, five of the deceased were members of the National Agency for the Control of Protected Areas, a non-governmental organisation dedicated to nature conservation, which used the hut in the Petrohan Pass as its headquarters and also hosted rural holiday camps for young people.
Some reports described its members as “forest rangers” who had been patrolling the area near the Serbian border for years and assisting the border police. Meanwhile, law enforcement officials said the men were involved in Tibetan Buddhism and quoted a relative of one of the members’ , who spoke of “exceptional psychological instability” within the group.
People close to the deceased said they must have been killed because they witnessed criminal activity in the Bulgarian-Serbian border area, where human trafficking and illegal logging are not uncommon.
Ralitsa Asenova, the mother of one of the victims found in the caravan, dismissed reports of tensions within the group. “It is obvious that they witnessed something. For me, this is a crime committed for professional reasons,” she said in an interview with Bulgarian television station Nova.
With details still scarce, the lack of official information has led to the spread of often unfounded speculation online and further undermined Bulgarians’ already low trust in their institutions and authorities. The country has no government and is heading for its eighth parliamentary election in five years.
Former President Rumen Radev described the case as “a political shock and a sign of the state of the country,” according to his press office. Radev, who resigned as head of state last month after nine years in office, offered his condolences to the families of the deceased and urged the authorities to resolve the case.
“I will not comment on this tragedy, which must be investigated by the competent authorities. The causes of these crimes must be clarified as soon as possible, because the public is waiting for answers,” he said.
In 2024, a survey showed that 70% of Bulgarians believed in conspiracy theories, while 37% were victims of disinformation โ to such an extent that the authors of the study, conducted by the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) and the Bulgarian-Romanian Digital Media Observatory, claimed that Bulgaria was in a “post-truth” situation.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/10/bulgaria-mysterious-deaths-mountains-petrohan-pass
The world’s major straits: Strategic maritime chokepoints in global trade
Sea straits function as critical nodes in the global transport network, facilitating international trade, energy flows and geopolitical connectivity.
The Strait of Malacca
Connecting the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, the Strait of Malacca is one of the world’s most critical maritime routes. It handles nearly 60% of global maritime traffic and approximately 25% of globally traded goods. Due to its narrow width and shallow depth, it is extremely vulnerable to congestion, piracy and navigation risks, making it a strategic concern for global supply chains.
The Straits of Singapore
Located between the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, the Singapore Strait serves as a vital continuation of traffic to Malacca. It is one of the busiest straits in the world, hosting dense ship movements within Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS). Its efficiency is essential for East-West trade and global container shipping operations.
Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz is an important geopolitical and energy chokepoint connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Approximately a quarter of the world’s oil consumption and a significant portion of LNG exports pass through this strait, making it strategically vital to global energy security.
Strait of Gibraltar
This strait connects the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea and separates Europe from Africa. It serves as a critical access point for maritime traffic entering Southern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East and is of both commercial and military strategic importance.
The Bosphorus Strait
The Bosphorus connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara and further to the Mediterranean Sea via the Dardanelles. As one of the narrowest international straits, it presents significant navigation challenges, particularly for tanker traffic. It is governed by the Montreux Convention, which regulates the transit of ships and naval passage.
The Bering Strait
Separating Asia from North America, the Bering Strait connects the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Although historically less trafficked, its strategic importance is increasing due to climate change, Arctic navigation, and emerging developments in the Northern Sea Route.
Bass Strait
Bass Strait separates Tasmania from mainland Australia and provides a direct sea route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It is known for its difficult weather conditions, which require advanced navigation planning and preparation for ships.
Strait of Magellan
Located in southern Chile, the Strait of Magellan connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and historically served as an alternative route before the Panama Canal. It remains important for regional navigation and for ships avoiding open ocean routes around Cape Horn.
These straits are indispensable for international maritime trade, energy transport and global economic stability.
Trump’s corridor in Armenia is leading Russia in the wrong direction, and we will be left with nothing โ Source RUSSIA
Konstantin Zatulin: This does not correspond to Russia’s interests in the region, nor to the interests of our ally Iran
In the photo: Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and US President Donald Trump (from left to right) (Photo: Zuma/TASS)
In Europe, Russia’s constructive attitude towards the US project in post-Soviet Transcaucasia โ Trump’s Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) โ was met with undisguised surprise by Trump. We are talking about the construction of railways, fibre-optic communication lines, as well as oil and gas pipelines on a section of approximately 40-42 kilometres through the territory of Armenia, which will ensure uninterrupted communication between Azerbaijan and Turkey.
According to agreements concluded between Washington and Yerevan last year, Armenia is transferring the administration and operation of the Trump Corridor to an American company.
This is not the first time Yerevan has relinquished Armenian territory, but until now Russia has reacted negatively to this. This time, everything looks different.
In January, Pashinyan asked Moscow to “urgently” restore the sections of the Armenian railway leading to the borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey โ for the implementation of TRIPP. This is because Armenia’s rail transport system is managed by South Caucasus Railway, a subsidiary of Russian Railways, on the basis of a concession until 2038.
At the same time, the Armenian leader did not hesitate to point out that no one is directly inviting Russia to participate in TRIPP.
A week and a half after Pashinyan’s “urgent request,” signals of response came from Moscow. They surprised European analysts. For example, the Hungarian newspaper Vilรกggazdasรกg wrote:
“The reaction of the Russian authorities was, to say the least, a surprise. It was unexpected.”
The point is that the Russian ambassador to Armenia, Sergey Kopirkin, said:
“Russia is closely monitoring developments surrounding the Armenian-American ‘Trump Road’ project. There is an opportunity to join this initiative, thanks to the very close cooperation in maintaining and developing the railway sector in the Republic of Armenia.”
And at a higher level, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova announced her willingness to consider joining this project after a thorough analysis of all the details.
Should Russia participate in some way in the Transcaucasian “Trump Route” and what surprised Europeans so much about Moscow’s willingness to discuss this topic? Konstantin Zatulin, deputy of the State Duma and director of the CIS Institute, answered these questions for Svobodnaya Pressa:
I am surprised that some people conclude that we have been invited to participate in the Trump Corridor. There has been no invitation to Russia, and the terms of the agreement between the United States and Armenia have already been published: we are talking about a company in which the qualified majority of shares will belong to the United States or its representatives, with the rest belonging to Armenia.
Full participation of third countries in this project is not envisaged.
Media news2
SP: What is the essence of Pashinyan’s proposals to Moscow?
– After such a situation, even in Armenia, people began to ask: where is Russia, because it is known that Russian Railways has a concession for the railways – Mr Pashinyan said that Russia could be involved in repairing sections adjacent to Turkey and Azerbaijan, which are in poor condition. But if Russia is not ready to carry out this work, then in this case it is possible to withdraw the concession from Russian Railways.
In this case, as always, the proposals are peppered with threats from the other side. But the proposal itself, in my opinion, is opportunistic.
Let us pretend to participate: without voting rights or a share of the profits from this project.
I am very sorry if the words of the official representative of the Foreign Ministry are understood in such a way that we agree. Because, in my opinion, this would be a mistake, another mistake in recent years when it comes to Russia’s policy in Transcaucasia. When we preferred to respond formally to such requests without analysing their essence. Whether it was the government of Azerbaijan or Armenia.
And we had an example when they used us in the dark and exposed us in an unpleasant light.
SP: What example are you referring to?
I am referring to the story of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Karabakh. It seems that it was intended to guarantee the status quo, but instead it became an extra for closing the Lachin corridor, then for conquering Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.
This inappropriate role was a joint creation of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships. Azerbaijan took measures that were not coordinated with us, and Armenia at that time claimed that what was happening in Karabakh did not concern it (and then accused Russia of betrayal โ “SP”).
And even the mandate of the peacekeeping contingent was not considered and approved. This, of course, does not fully excuse us. Because we had to understand: why were we in such a situation? We should have either acted or demonstratively left this territory. But we did neither, and as a result, we are now giving Mr Pashinyan the opportunity to say from all sides that we threw it away, abandoned it, and so on.
SP: But will the South Caucasus Railway repair the access roads to TRIPP in Armenia?
This is the implementation of a geopolitical project related to establishing direct contact between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This does not correspond to Russia’s interests in the region, nor to the interests of our ally Iran.
This is part of Turkey’s grand plans and is in the interests of the United States, which, thanks to the corridor, is entering the region and driving out our influence there. To respond to such plans with satisfaction or a desire to contribute to them is already a picture of a non-commissioned officer’s widow.
If we cannot prevent this, then at least let us not play the role of acolyte or extra. And let us see how things develop.
SP: Is Russia pursuing a more thoughtful policy in Transcaucasia than before?
– The policy is already changing, but with a long delay. I see the symptoms of change in the fact that we are trying to understand Azerbaijan’s true objectives more deeply. This is directly related to the shock caused by the deterioration of relations last year. There is an understanding that Azerbaijan is not only competing with us in the hydrocarbon sector, but is clearly building a competitive policy with Turkey not only in Transcaucasia, but is also trying to spread it to Central Asia.
This time, during his visit to Russia, the Speaker of the Armenian Parliament, Alen Simonyan, was criticised (for his Russophobic statements from the parliamentary rostrum in Yerevan โ SP). As a result, he had to avoid Moscow. But I think we will soon post recordings of what he said in Moscow and what he said in Yerevan for comparison. So there is no doubt about who we received here. His visit to us did not go very well. And this is a positive phenomenon.
But it seems to me that the time has not yet come for a comprehensive and deeper policy in the Caucasus, because we are now too busy with the NWO and are solving this problem for ourselves. When we solve it, the time will come to review our tactics and strategy not only in Transcaucasia, but also in other parts of the neighbouring country.
Source: here
The irregular war of the cetaceans in Russia’s North Atlantic
Introduction
For seventy years, America and its allies have hunted steel hulls and listened to the beating of propellers in the North Atlantic. Today, this heartbeat belongs to something much older, much smarter and, according to the more feverish corners of Western intelligence, much more Russian. We are not talking about silent submarines or acoustic networks, but about orcas, the ocean’s ultimate predator, turned into a weapon by Moscow for a new era of Irregular Warfare. Since 2020, the Iberian orca subpopulation has carried out over 700 precision strikes on the rudders of ships, from Galicia to the Strait of Gibraltar. Yachts sink, autopilots die, and insurance actuaries panic.
The statement sounds like the plot of a B-movie produced in the final days of the Cold War. However, as military analysts grapple with hybrid and asymmetric conflicts, it is necessary to recognise that this programme, as it is called, is less a sign of fantasy and more a psychological operation in a biological package. The absurdity of the threat serves to mask the serious implications for naval security and deterrence.
A history of military programmes for marine mammals
To understand the current situation, we must acknowledge the strangely overlooked history of military programmes for marine mammals (MMPs). Since the Cold War, the Soviet Union and America have shown interest in marine mammals as instruments of national security. The earliest reported use of aquatic mammals in active military defence was during the Vietnam War. Five US Navy bottlenose dolphins were sent to Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, to defend American military vessels from enemy swimmers. While the US Navy trained dolphins to locate enemy divers and sea lions to detect mines, Moscow preferred the more robust physiologies of the Arctic. Despite a history of dolphin deployment, Russia has more recently focused largely on larger mammals.
(A US Navy sea lion attaches a recovery rope to test equipment. Image credit: US Navy)
Enter Hvaldimir. In 2019, a beluga whale with a camera harness appeared off the coast of Finnmark, in the northernmost part of Norway. First spotted in April near the island of Ingรธya, speculation about Hvaldimir’s purpose ranged from carrying weapons and conducting surface surveillance to locating underwater threats. The creature was clearly trained and had escaped (or been released), but it was also clearly more interested in socialising than national security. All reports referred to a friendly whale, happy to be around people. It turned out that belugas are perhaps too gentle, too sociable, and too corruptible by affection.
Three years later, in 2022, during the second invasion of Ukraine, Russia demonstrated that it had maintained its dolphin programmes, according to USNI. In February of that year, the Russian Navy placed two dolphin pens at the entrance to the port of Sevastopol, sheltered inside a sea wall. Most likely, the intention was to conduct counter-diver operations to prevent “Ukrainian special operations forces from infiltrating the port underwater to sabotage warships,” USNI reported.
(Image credit: Illustration by HI Sutton for USNI News)
Field reports from the Atlantic Orca Working Group (GTOA)
More recent irregular warfare activities in the Atlantic, however, involve a more formidable species: the Iberian subpopulation of killer whales. The orca logs kept by the Grupo de Trabajo Orca Atlรกntica (GTOA) read less like marine biology studies and more like after-action reports from an amphibious sabotage unit. As Reteuro reported based on GTOA logs:
“Most events involve sailing yachts under 15 metres, but commercial captains โ coastal vessels, trawlers, whale watching operators โ are now reporting close approaches, stern circling and hard blows that shake the vessel. In May 2024, a sailing vessel sank near the Strait of Gibraltar after repeated blows to the rudder, and smaller working boats off the coast of Galicia had their equipment damaged after sudden turns to protect their propellers. The animals seem to know where the controls are.”
(The moment seven orcas destroyed a yacht off the coast of Portugal. Image credit: Scuttlebutt Sailing News)
Translated into military targeting terms, the orcas’ actions could be described as follows:
- Tactics: Severe approach first, coordinated by minors under matriarchal supervision.
- Target selection: Vessels under 15 m are most vulnerable; larger vessels are merely inconvenienced.
- Weapon: Teeth on rudder pipes, sometimes zinc anodes that peel off.
- Duration of engagement: 6โ40 minutes, followed by deliberate disengagement.
- Geographical spread: Seasonal corridor from Rรญas Baixas to Moroccan waters, coincidentally overlapping NATO exercise areas and the new Baltic gas pipeline route.
In May 2024, a Polish yacht was sunk in the Strait of Gibraltar after repeated blows to the rudder. European authorities now issue “warning notices about interaction with orcas” and checklists, much as NATO once issued warnings about submarines. Oceanographic conditions that stimulate erratic behaviour in cetaceans are a possible cause, but the recommended ship procedures โ slow to extremely slow, engine neutral, crew forward โ read like a passive defensive posture adopted by a military formation.
Why orcas are perfect irregular warriors
In 2000, the BBC reported that “Dolphins trained to kill for the Soviet navy were sold to Iran… and other aquatic mammals were trained by Russian experts to attack enemy warships and frogmen.” Training cetaceans (usually dolphins) for military purposes is a long and complex process that requires a high degree of expertise, patience and positive reinforcement. It is a rigorous process that takes years to complete, involving a deep bond of trust between animals and trainers. But Putin’s more recent shift to orcas suggests a strategic change. Irregular warfare often focuses on destabilising an adversary through unconventional means, often below the threshold of open conflict. What could be more destabilising than a completely deniable, self-replicating aquatic predator? The doctrine of irregular warfare, in this regard, is based on a number of principles:
- Psychological impact: The possibility that an orca is on Moscow’s payroll costs NATO millions of dollars in preparation. Every dorsal fin becomes a potential periscope. A commander who observes an orca must consider the possibility that this six-tonne creature is a threat.
- Deniability: When a rudder is torn off, no one declares war on a whale. At worst, it is an “act of nature.” At best, it is a tragic accident at sea involving protected wildlife. Russia has likely turned the “grey area” between natural phenomena and state-sponsored attacks into a weapon.
- Zero overhead: No dry docks, no spare parts, no satellite link. It only requires a feeding programme and self-replicates without bureaucratic hassle.
- Scalability: Social learning is built in. A trained matriarch can pass on tactics to an entire group in a single season. The West calls this “cultural fashion.” The FSB calls it doctrine.
- Strategic geography: Iberian orcs patrol the exact junction where Atlantic ships channel into the Mediterranean โ close enough to European capitals to make the front page of newspapers, far enough from Russian bases to maintain plausible deniability.
NATO working groups, which actually exist, are debating responses. Attempts to mimic communications could involve “sonic signals for orcas” as deterrents (currently ineffective). Industries have been pressured to develop reinforced composite rudders (expensive). And finally, the possibility of deploying counter-whales, in particular the reactivation of the US Navy’s Cold War dolphin squadrons, in the hope that Flipper will still answer the call. There is also an unfortunate ethical aspect to this evolving form of Irregular Warfare: Russia has demonstrated a willingness to direct orcas as bait for target ships, often resulting in the death of the mammals.
(The rudder of a ship damaged by orcas in the Strait of Gibraltar is displayed in Barbate, southern Spain, in 2023. Image credit: Jorge Guerrero/AFP via Getty Images)
Conclusion
The North Atlantic appears crowded in a way not seen since 1986, a period that saw the highest operational tempo for both the American and Soviet navies since immediately after the Second World War. Today, captains of military, civilian and commercial ships chart their courses around “high interaction zones” just as they once avoided Soviet live-fire zones. The era of “irregular whaling” reminds observers that the most powerful weapons are often those that defy classification. Analysts must seriously prepare for a world in which national security is not threatened by advanced missile systems, but perhaps by synchronised, highly intelligent aquatic predators deployed with malicious intent. Most likely, it is a combination of all of the above.
When a black wing dries up the moonlight off Cape Finisterre, observers may ask the uncomfortable question: is this a hungry teenager looking to play, or is it something more sinister? In any case, the ship must be slowed down, the rudder centred, and the crew put on alert. The commissioner of the deep does not negotiate. As one Galician captain concluded: “They don’t hate us. They’re just doing their job.”
This is a work of speculative analysis. All citations about dolphins and beluga whales are based on facts and can be consulted by the reader. The only point of speculation (or narrative fiction) is whether Russia trained and used orcas for illegal warfare. The purpose of the article is to stimulate thought, not to serve as historical fact. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the US Government or the Department of War.
Source: here
Conventional forces will never embrace irregular warfare
Facts
- The Irregular Warfare (IW) Annex to the 2020 National Defence Strategy states: “The Department [of Defence/War] must institutionalise irregular warfare as a core competency for both conventional and special operations forces…”
- Department of Defence Instruction (DoDI) 3000.07 of 2025 on irregular warfare stipulates โ among numerous directives to the entire joint force โ that the military shall:
- Maintain a baseline level of military capabilities and personnel and track the ability and competence of the Military Services to meet CCMD [Combatant Command] requirements related to IW, in accordance with strategic guidance.
- Attract, develop, manage, engage, and retain a sufficient number of military personnel with expertise in the field of intra-property warfare.
- Provide development and career opportunities similar to those of fellow IW professionals.
- Manage military and civilian professionals in the field of international warfare to maintain long-term institutional knowledge in order to attract, stimulate and retain top experts in the field of international warfare.
- Include the ability to conduct IW in all military service force development and design products, in accordance with strategic guidance, common concepts, and prioritised CCMD requirements.
The author suggests that there is an additional fact: none of the above directives have been implemented as intended; moreover, they will not be implemented in the near future.
The siren call of irregular warfare
The siren call of irregular warfare (IW) has echoed through the corridors of American defence institutions for decades, growing louder with each asymmetric conflict. Doctrine, publications, and policy documents consistently assert that IW is not exclusively the domain of special operations forces (SOF), but a responsibility for every element of the War Department. However, despite these pleas and strategic imperatives, conventional military forces, by their very nature, remain resistant. The thesis of this article is that this resistance is not a failure of will, but an incompatibility, rooted in the identity, structure, and reward systems of conventional forces. America’s conventional military headquarters and units will never truly embrace irregular warfare as its proponents imagine, and to continue to believe that they will is a futile exercise. It should be noted โ very explicitly โ that the argument presented here is not that conventional forces should not embrace IW, but rather that they… will not accept it, for a variety of reasons. Furthermore, it is likely that conventional forces would accept the inner weapon if circumstances allowed, but they do not.
The appeal of integrating firearms into conventional forces is undeniable on paper. In an era dominated primarily by hybrid threats, proxy wars, and insurgencies rather than state-to-state conflicts, the ability to operate across the spectrum of conflict, from high-intensity combat to nuanced stability operations, seems a strategic imperative. It can be argued that if every soldier, sailor, airman, marine, guard, and coast guard possessed basic skills in security force assistance, civil affairs, psychological operations, and other related areas, the military would be more adaptable and effective in the complex environments that define modern conflicts. This vision, however, clashes head-on with the entrenched culture and operational paradigms of conventional forces.
America’s conventional military headquarters and units will never truly embrace irregular warfare as its proponents imagine, and to continue to believe that they will is a futile exercise.
Essentially, conventional military culture is defined by the pursuit of overwhelming kinetic advantage. Its identity is forged in preparation for interstate conflict: the decisive battle, the synchronised manoeuvre of tanks and artillery ( ), precision air strikes, and the projection of power by aircraft carrier battle groups. This culture values direct action, quantifiable destruction, and hierarchical command and control. Indicators of success are tied to tangible results, such as enemies killed in action, secured territory, and destroyed enemy infrastructure. None of this should change. The primary role of our military is to fight and win wars through large-scale combat operations.
Irregular warfare, on the other hand, thrives on ambiguity. It avoids kinetic solutions whenever possible, prioritising influence, legitimacy, and the art of population-centred engagement. Its indicators are superficial and often unquantifiable: shifts in public opinion, the strength of local governance, a population’s willingness to provide information. Adversaries are often indistinguishable from the civilian population, lines of conflict are blurred, and victory is a protracted, often generational endeavour. For a conventional force steeped in the culture of decisive kinetic action, this landscape is not just a different tactical problem; it is an existential challenge to its self-concept. It all comes down to using the right forces for the right mission. There are requirements for the selective use of kinetic options in irregular warfare. Conventional forces can use their capabilities selectively and effectively when they are part of an irregular warfare campaign plan, which the US does not have; however, such use is not the primary mission of conventional forces.
The ‘system’ is not built for irregular warfare
One of the most significant barriers to a joint force’s adoption of illegal warfare is the “specialisation trap.” When an elite dedicated forceโsuch as SOFโis explicitly created and celebrated for its expertise in irregular warfare, it inadvertently gives conventional forces implicit permission to offload that responsibility. The existence of Green Berets or Psychological Operations teams, for example, acts as a cultural pressure valve. ‘That’s their job’ becomes implicit for the conventional force commander. Why would a tank crew train in tribal engagement protocols when an SOF team is designed for that very mission? Why would an infantry platoon commander master the complexities of local influences when there is a dedicated Civil Affairs unit in the same camp that focuses exclusively on that issue? This division of labour, while seemingly efficient, actively undermines the widespread integration of illegal warfare skills.
Furthermore, the rewards system within conventional forces is fundamentally misaligned with the requirements of the joint military. Promotions, commendations, and career advancement are largely tied to performance on conventional metrics. A commander who excels at large-scale joint manoeuvres and scores high on training at the National Training Centre is likely to advance faster than one who spends years building relationships with local leaders or security forces in Country X, even though the latter may have greater strategic impact in a given theatre of operations. The “non-technical skills” of the joint militaryโstrategic patience, trust-building, and influence operationsโare often considered secondary, even peripheral, to the core competencies that define a successful conventional military career. These are rarely the attributes that earn a joint force commander a promotion.
Recognising this fundamental incompatibility is not an admission of defeat, but a step toward developing more realistic strategies, unless or until there is a paradigm shift in the joint force that goes beyond words on paper.
Training is another obstacle. Conventional forces operate on a training cycle for their primary mission: large-scale combat operations. This requires immense resources, time, and dedicated facilities. Integrating meaningful training for international weaponryโwhich often requires language skills, cultural immersion, geographic specialisation, and interpretation of complex political scenariosโis difficult to fit into an already busy training schedule. When a unit is preparing for a hypothetical near-peer conflict, the urgency of mastering tank artillery or air defence often outweighs the need to practise village stabilisation operations, even if the more likely deployment scenario involves the latter. The “tyranny of the urgent” in conventional joint forces training environments prioritises conventional forces over irregular forces . Note that there is no such clear line between the two (conventional and irregular); however, this is, unfortunately, a common perception and part of the problem presented here. This topic is a popular subject of debate and deserves its own discussion.
Bureaucratic inertia and resource allocation within large defence departments also hinder the integration of international warfare. Budgets, equipment procurement and force structure are optimised for conventional warfare. Developing and deploying specialised equipment for international warfare, establishing robust language and cultural training channels for the joint force, or modifying careers to reward expertise in international warfare requires a paradigm shift that clashes with deeply entrenched processes and vested interests. It is easier to procure a fighter jet or a tank than to redesign the cultural DNA of a land, air, or maritime manoeuvre unit. Although individual service members and units can demonstrate incredible adaptability and courage in international warfare environments, as seen in countless cases during the War on Terror, these are often reactive adaptations born of necessity rather than a proactive embrace of a new way of war. They conduct international warfare in spite of their conventional training and culture, not because of it.
Conclusion
The vision of a conventional force that fully embraces irregular warfare, in which every unit is equally adept at kinetic strikes and population engagement, remains elusive. The cultural, structural, and institutional forces at play within conventional formations create a durable barrier to such integration. Although doctrine will continue to advocate it, and individual successes will occasionally fuel hope, the reality is that conventional forces will always gravitate back toward their fundamental identity. Recognising this fundamental incompatibility is not an admission of defeat, but a step towards developing more realistic strategies, unless or until there is a paradigm shift within the joint force that goes beyond the limits of words on paper.
Source: here
About drones – statistics
What are drones?
Drones, or UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), are aircraft without a human pilot on board.
They can be controlled remotely or fly autonomously.
Initially, drones were developed to surveil the battlefield and gather intelligence.
Their role expanded after 2001, particularly in counter-terrorism operations.
The global market for military drones is projected to exceed $58 billion by 2030.
- In comparison, the fighter jet market is expected to reach $59 billion in the same year, while the tank market will grow to $7 billion.
Drones offer advantages over manned aircraft. They are smaller, cheaper and easier to deploy.
Furthermore, UAVs can fly longer periods without refuelling.
They are more effective at surveillance and allow for more precise strikes than missiles or artillery.
Drones also offer political advantages:
- Since no soldiers are put in danger, governments face less domestic pressure when authorising operations.
Drone warfare: a brief history
Drones were first used in large-scale operations during the Vietnam War, when the United States employed them for high-risk surveillance missions.
In the 1980s, Israel expanded the capabilities of drones by integrating them into electronic warfare and battlefield operations.
By the 1990s, drones had become a routine part of American military strategy, providing real-time intelligence in operations such as the Gulf War.
The first lethal drone strike took place in 2001, and drone-led counterterrorism expanded in the following decades.
Between 2009 and 2021, the US Air Force carried out over 14,000 drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia and Libya.
Over the years, the strikes have eliminated high-value targets, including Iranian General Qasem Soleimani (2020), as well as commanders of terrorist groups.
- US drone strikes resulted in approximately 8,858 to 16,901 deaths between 2010 and 2020, including militants and civilians.
In Ukraine, drones are being used on an unprecedented scale.
Both Russia and Ukraine deploy thousands of UAVs every month.
Most are low-cost commercial drones adapted for military use.
- Drones provide low-cost air strike capability, allowing small units to carry out complex missions.
A simple first-person view (FPV) drone is cheaper than an iPhone, costing only $300.
FPV drones are remotely piloted and transmit live video directly to a headset worn by the operator. This gives the pilot a first-person perspective, as if they were inside the drone itself.
The immersive control allows for precise low-altitude flights, making these drones ideal for “suicide” attacks or for launching munitions directly at enemy targets.
By May 2025, Russia had reportedly lost over 3,000 tanks, many of them to low-cost drone attacks.
Ground drones are increasingly being used for logistics, mine clearance and combat support.
Similarly, naval drones have emerged as tools for reconnaissance and attacks on ships and port infrastructure.
Drones are now used in all types of warfare:
- Offensive: striking vehicles, fortifications, and personnel
- Defensive: exploring terrain, guiding artillery fire or hunting other drones.
What we are seeing is the rise of drone-centric warfare, with cheaper and more accurate capabilities and less direct human involvement.
Most recently, Russia has made a breakthrough in military drone technology by introducing fibre optic-controlled drones.
- Fibre optic drones are usually FPVs that fly with a very long fibre optic cable attached to them. This allows the drone to be immune to any form of signal jamming equipment. This contributed to Russia’s successes on the battlefield in 2024 and early 2025.
The United States
Drones are integrated into every layer of American military strategy.
The United States has used drones extensively in:
- Targeted killing operations
- Surveillance and intelligence gathering
- Protection, surveillance of troops and supply lines
Iran
Iran has made drones a key part of its asymmetric strategy, using them to counterbalance the superior air power of its rivals and expand its regional influence.
Why has Iran turned to drones?
In recent years, Iran has rapidly increased its production of drones.
Estimates suggest it can produce around 150 drones per month.
Iran’s conventional military faces significant structural and geopolitical limitations:
- International sanctions have reduced its access to advanced aircraft technology and components.
- Technological inferiority: Iran’s air force lags behind regional rivals such as Israel and Saudi Arabia.
- Regional encirclement: Surrounded by American bases and hostile neighbours, Iran faces constant pressure.
To overcome these constraints, Iran has strategically invested in a domestic drone industry, which is:
- Cost-effective
- Capable of long-range strikes
- Can be deployed by proxy groups
Iran’s drone fleet is one of the most battle-tested in the world.
Notably, Iranian Shahed drones have been widely used by Russian forces in Ukraine.
Israel
Israel began using UAVs in the early 1980s, and drone operations have since become part of its national defence doctrine.
Israel uses drones on multiple fronts for both surveillance and precision strikes.
- In Gaza, drones are used for targeted killings, battlefield surveillance, and coordinating attacks against Hamas.
- Along the northern border, drones monitor Hezbollah activity in Lebanon and Syria.
- During recent escalations in the West Bank, drones have been used for crowd monitoring, reconnaissance and, increasingly, attack missions.
Israel has also begun integrating loitering munitions and AI-assisted targeting into its drone fleet, shortening reaction times between detection and engagement.
Israel is one of the world’s leading drone exporters, with platforms sold to more than 50 countries.
For Israel, drone exports are also an essential part of its defence diplomacy:
Drone sales also lead to training, joint exercises and information-sharing agreements, strengthening Israel’s partnerships.
Turkey
Turkey has become one of the most influential drone powers of the 21st century.
Drones now form a central pillar of Turkish military doctrine and foreign policy.
Turkey’s drone programme was born out of both necessity and ambition:
A need for effective tools in counterinsurgency campaigns against Kurdish groups and in border security operations
- A strategic ambition to achieve greater autonomy in defence and position itself as a global defence exporter
To achieve this, Turkey has supported a domestic drone industry led by companies such as Baykar.
Turkish UAVs have been used in multiple conflicts globally, including by Ukraine, Azerbaijan and even Turkey itself.
Turkey has become one of the world’s leading drone exporters.
The Bayraktar TB2 has been exported to over 30 countries, including Ukraine, Poland, and Pakistan.
Turkish drones are particularly attractive to middle powers and developing countries due to their low cost and minimal export restrictions compared to American or Israeli systems.
Exports also enhance Turkey’s defence partnerships.
Non-state actors and drones
The rapid expansion and falling cost of UAVs have enabled non-state actors to use and arm drones:
Hezbollah
Hezbollah has been developing its drone programme with Iranian support since the early 2000s.
Iran has provided Hezbollah with UAV platforms, expanding the group’s influence and creating pressure on Israel.
- Extends Iran’s strategic reach without deploying its own forces
- Allows Hezbollah to attack Israel with less risk to itself
Israeli defence officials now treat Hezbollah’s drone programme as a serious threat due to its potential to overwhelm air defences by launching multiple drones simultaneously.
Houthis
The Houthis have become some of the most active non-state users of drones.
They operate a fleet of drones modelled on Iranian designs.
Since 2018, Saudi Arabia has reported hundreds of drone attacks launched by Houthi forces against airports, military bases, and oil infrastructure.
- Notably, in 2019, the group launched a coordinated drone attack on an oil facility, disrupting the extraction of 5.7 million barrels per day of Saudi oil, nearly 6% of global supply.
Since the start of the war in Gaza, the Houthis have expanded their operations beyond Saudi Arabia.
They have launched long-range drones towards Israel, citing solidarity with the Palestinians.
The rebel group has also targeted commercial ships crossing the Red Sea, threatening global maritime trade routes.
Mexican cartels
Between 2020 and 2022, Mexican security forces recorded over 100 incidents involving drones operated by cartels.
Cartels use drones for several reasons:
- Monitoring police positions and roadblocks
- Remote attacks
- Ambush and intimidation of police forces or local communities
- Smuggling narcotics across borders
Drone attacks have become a common threat posed by cartels, both to law enforcement and rival groups.
The platforms used by Mexican cartels are usually commercial quadcopters, which can be modified to carry explosives or drugs.
Such drones cost a few thousand dollars and can be purchased online.
Source: here
Stopover at Ream Naval Base reflects deepening ties between Cambodia and the US
A stopover by the US Navy ship USS Cincinnati at Cambodia’s refurbished Ream naval base in January 2026 reaffirmed the defence relationship between Phnom Penh and Washington, with both nations calling for information exchanges that include frequent visits and the resumption of the Angkor Sentinel bilateral military exercise.
The American warship’s five-day stay at the Sokhemra facility demonstrated the growing relationship. The port expansion, completed in April 2025 and largely funded by China, raised concerns that the project would give Phnom Penh’s partner, Beijing, its own naval facility in the Gulf of Thailand. Cambodian leaders have reiterated that the facility will be open to all nations.
The United States Navy’s littoral combat ship USS Cincinnati makes a port call at the Ream naval base in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, in January 2026. KYODO/REUTERS
“Throughout the process, our Cambodian friends have assured us that Ream will be a sovereign port,” said Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command. Paparo, who arrived aboard the USS Cincinnati, called the port call at Cambodia’s invitation “an expression of good faith in our partnership for the future.”
The visit included talks between the nations’ military leaders aboard the American warship anchored off the east coast and a meeting at the Peace Palace in Phnom Penh, where Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet spoke with Paparo about the two countries’ “excellent military cooperation.”
Manet pledged to peacefully resolve disputes with neighbouring Thailand, where international efforts are needed to address recent border clashes. He thanked US President Donald Trump for promoting a ceasefire at the end of 2025.
Manet and Paparo spoke about the mutual respect between the countries and their relationship based on 76 years of friendship. Manet called the visit of the USS Cincinnati a “tangible result” of improved bilateral relations and expressed his confidence that they would continue to develop.
Paparo also held talks in Phnom Penh with Cambodian Defence Minister General Tea Seiha on strengthening cooperation between the nations’ forces.
Cambodia and the US agreed to resume the annual Angkor Sentinel exercise, last held in 2017. Officials said the exercises, which focused on peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, could take place in late 2026 or early 2027.
The renovation of the Ream naval base includes a 300-metre pier, a dry dock and a ship launch/recovery ramp, The Diplomat magazine reported.
The visit of the USS Cincinnati and its crew of about 100 marked the first American stop at the modernised facility and the first deployment of the US Navy in Cambodia since the USS Savannah stopped in Sihanoukville in December 2024.
Source: here
Ukrainian Magura V5 marine drones receive a swarm of decoys, ready to attack
Ukrainian engineers have taken their marine drone game to a whole new level, turning the Magura V5 into a formidable force multiplier. The latest update? A swarm of decoy drones accompanying the Magura V5, overloading Russian defence systems and clearing the way for the main attack drones to strike their targets.
Magura V5: Stealth and Precision
The Magura V5, or Autonomous Maritime Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus V5, is designed to strike enemy ships and coastal targets. Its low profile and minimal radar signatures make it a discreet predator, difficult to detect by enemy radar. The drone can navigate autonomously to its target, avoiding obstacles and laying mines along the way. As it approaches its prey, the Magura V5 unleashes its maximum speed, striking the target with devastating force.
Decoy Swarm: Overwhelming Defences
To further increase its effectiveness, the Magura V5 now operates alongside a swarm of decoy drones. These decoys saturate enemy defence systems, creating confusion and allowing the main attack drones to pass undetected. This innovative tactic significantly increases the chances of a successful attack.
Air-to-surface missile: Taking down helicopters
In a recent development, the Magura V5 has been modified to carry R-73 air-to-air missiles. This breakthrough allows the maritime drone to not only destroy ships, but also engage enemy aircraft.
In a recent operation, this modified Magura V5 shot down two Russian helicopters and severely damaged a third. “We didn’t hide from the air force as usual,” says a commander from Group 13, “but sought out encounters with the enemy. A helicopter is a fast target. Once it appears in our field of vision, we only have a few minutes to take up a favourable firing position. We calculated everything, and the missile hit the target on the first launch.”
The R-73 missile has been upgraded with a new guidance system capable of operating at a wider angle. The upgraded missile has a range of up to 40 km and a payload of approximately 8 kg.
Sea Drones: A Game Changer
Last year, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, Andriy Yusov, revealed that marine drones had caused $500 million in losses to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Magura V5 proved to be an extremely effective weapon in striking Russian ships in the Black Sea.
Sea Baby, another Ukrainian marine drone, has also demonstrated its ability to surprise the Russians. Last December, the Ukrainian Security Service released footage of an operation in the Kerch Strait, where Sea Baby drones engaged Russian forces with heavy machine guns. These new versions of Sea Baby are equipped with large-calibre machine guns with automatic ballistic guidance and target acquisition programmes.
The Magura V5 and Sea Baby sea drones have revolutionised naval warfare, demonstrating the power of unmanned technology. With their ability to operate autonomously, carry a variety of weapons and overwhelm enemy defences, these drones are a force to be reckoned with.
Source: here
Ukrainian Magura V5 marine drones receive a swarm of decoys, ready to attack
Ukrainian engineers have taken their marine drone game to a whole new level, turning the Magura V5 into a formidable force multiplier. The latest update? A swarm of decoy drones accompanying the Magura V5, overloading Russian defence systems and clearing the way for the main attack drones to strike their targets.
Magura V5: Stealth and Precision
The Magura V5, or Autonomous Maritime Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus V5, is designed to strike enemy ships and coastal targets. Its low profile and minimal radar signatures make it a discreet predator, difficult to detect by enemy radar. The drone can navigate autonomously to its target, avoiding obstacles and laying mines along the way. As it approaches its prey, the Magura V5 unleashes its maximum speed, striking the target with devastating force.
Decoy Swarm: Overwhelming Defences
To further increase its effectiveness, the Magura V5 now operates alongside a swarm of decoy drones. These decoys saturate enemy defence systems, creating confusion and allowing the main attack drones to pass undetected. This innovative tactic significantly increases the chances of a successful attack.
Air-to-surface missile: Taking down helicopters
In a recent development, the Magura V5 has been modified to carry R-73 air-to-air missiles. This breakthrough allows the maritime drone to not only destroy ships, but also engage enemy aircraft.
In a recent operation, this modified Magura V5 shot down two Russian helicopters and severely damaged a third. “We didn’t hide from the air force as usual,” says a commander from Group 13, “but sought out encounters with the enemy. A helicopter is a fast target. Once it appears in our field of vision, we only have a few minutes to take up a favourable firing position. We calculated everything, and the missile hit the target on the first launch.”
The R-73 missile has been upgraded with a new guidance system capable of operating at a wider angle. The upgraded missile has a range of up to 40 km and a payload of approximately 8 kg.
Sea Drones: A Game Changer
Last year, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, Andriy Yusov, revealed that marine drones had caused $500 million in losses to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Magura V5 proved to be an extremely effective weapon in striking Russian ships in the Black Sea.
Sea Baby, another Ukrainian marine drone, has also demonstrated its ability to surprise the Russians. Last December, the Ukrainian Security Service released footage of an operation in the Kerch Strait, where Sea Baby drones engaged Russian forces with heavy machine guns. These new versions of Sea Baby are equipped with large-calibre machine guns with automatic ballistic guidance and target acquisition programmes.
The Magura V5 and Sea Baby sea drones have revolutionised naval warfare, demonstrating the power of unmanned technology. With their ability to operate autonomously, carry a variety of weapons and overwhelm enemy defences, these drones are a force to be reckoned with.
Source: here
How Artificial Intelligence Could Reshape Four Key Competitions in Future Warfare
How will advances in artificial intelligence (AI) shape the future of warfare? There is a growing belief among policymakers and analysts that AI will transform the future of warfare, but researchers are still in the early stages of understanding how AI will actually change combat.
In this report, the authors provide a conceptual framework and preliminary assessment to help establish the terms of a more systematic debate about the military implications of AI. The authors use the framework to assess how AI could influence four “core” competitions in military affairs: (1) quantity versus quality, (2) hiding versus finding, (3) centralised versus decentralised command and control (C2), and (4) cyber offensive versus cyber defence. Their conclusions suggest that the US military may need to change important aspects of how it traditionally operates in order to exploit the potential of AI.
Key conclusions
Quantity could gain a significant advantage over quality
- The relative cost-effectiveness of quantity could improve as AI-enabled unmanned systems become cheaper and more capable. The combination of “precise mass” and “affordable mass” could give a new generation of affordable, expendable unmanned systems an increasing cost advantage over exceptional platforms and weapons for some applications, although exceptional systems will continue to play important roles.
More sophisticated concealment could help offset advances in detection, but this will require new approaches and investments in deception.
- AI will improve detection by rapidly fusing and analysing intelligence from proliferated sensors. But armies can develop countermeasures to keep the stealth competition contested, including using AI to orchestrate sophisticated deception campaigns.
Mission command โ a hybrid between centralised and decentralised C2 models โ will remain desirable
- AI does not change the reasons why mission command has advantages over more centralised or decentralised C2 paradigms, which rely on having the right information in the right places to make timely, sensitive decisions. Access to information, not just cognitive capacity, acts as a limiting factor in the transition to alternative approaches to C2.
Cyber defences will benefit from AI in ways that could make combat networks more resilient to cyber attacks in the long term
- AI could help address the challenges of scale, speed, and efficiency that currently limit cyber defence and give cyber offence a structural advantage. However, cyber attackers will always retain some ability to penetrate networks, especially with the help of AI.
Recommendations
- The United States should invest more in research and experimentation for new capabilities that enable greater use of mass and deception. Examples include exploring runway-independent unmanned aircraft for air combat missions and new AI tools for deception to counter AI-enabled detection by adversaries. Opportunities to capitalise on the trends identified in this report are available today, even though AI technology is still maturing.
- The United States must allocate scarce resources assuming it will face sophisticated and adaptable adversaries. There may be temptations to use AI to double down on existing approaches, hoping that the United States will have an unassailable advantage as the first mover in AI, allowing it to operate in ways that defy the trends noted in this report. Instead, the United States should allocate scarce resources to approaches that offer sustainable long-term advantages.
- The United States needs a plan to manage the transition to an AI-based force. Important questions remain about the details of implementing AI; for example, what exactly might a new balance between exceptional capabilities and robotic mass look like in the US force structure, how might the United States distribute AI tools to units in a thoughtful way that balances speed with the need for trust and reliability, and how can the United States train both human personnel and AI tools in ways that reinforce strengths and compensate for weaknesses?
Source: here
Venezuela after Maduro: Questions and answers with RAND experts
Comment
3 February 2026
A female militiaman holding a Venezuelan flag in Caracas, 23 January 2026
Photo by Javier Campos/NurPhoto via Reuters
Today marks one month since the dramatic US operation in Venezuela that captured Nicolรกs Maduro, the country’s president, and brought him to New York to face federal drug trafficking charges.
Although many details about the operation are now clearer than they were immediately after the events, it remains uncertain how the sudden change in Venezuela could influence long-term political, economic, and institutional dynamicsโboth within the country and across the region.
To better understand this uncertainty and identify trends to watch in the future, we asked three RAND experts to discuss why Venezuela remains essential to Latin America, how regional actors are responding to changes in Caracas, the nature of the US-Venezuela relationship, and more.
Why is Venezuela’s political trajectory so important to Latin America?
TAHINA MONTOYA: Because the crisis extends beyond Venezuela’s borders. The prolonged authoritarian regime has imposed severe costs on Venezuelans, including rising living expenses and widespread human rights abuses, while driving large-scale migration and facilitating the emergence of criminal and armed actors. At the same time, Venezuela has become a case study for how the United States, hemispheric partners, and adversaries respond, with critical implications for regional norms, security cooperation, and broader hemispheric security.
MARIE JONES: Venezuela has become the most closely watched case of democratic erosion in Latin America, followed by an uncertain political reconfiguration. Its trajectory matters not only because of its size, resources, and population, but also because it shapes regional expectations about the possibility of regaining democratic governance in deeply captured states. Venezuela’s experience influences norms around executive power, electoral integrity, and the role of security forces in politics. Materially, its instability has triggered the largest displacement crisis in the region’s modern history, putting pressure on neighbouring governments and regional institutions.
KELLY PIAZZA: Venezuela’s fate resonates throughout the region. Once one of Latin America’s most prosperous democracies, its return to authoritarianism and economic collapse have affected neighbouring states through mass migration, humanitarian challenges and shifts in regional alliances โ developments that have strained social systems and reshaped domestic politics across the region. Moreover, Venezuela has long functioned as a key supporter and partner of other authoritarian regimes in the region, particularly Cuba. The ongoing political turmoil and economic deterioration with ly influence the stability and resources of its allies, while also serving as a cautionary tale about how comparable regimes may experience pressure or disintegration under similar conditions. More broadly, Venezuela’s experience informs wider regional debates about governance, democracy, nationalisation, and relations within the hemisphere.
Venezuela has become the most closely watched case of democratic erosion in Latin America, followed by an uncertain political reconfiguration.
What are the most plausible scenarios for Venezuela in the next one to three years?
MONTOYA: Whatever follows for Venezuela will require a deliberate, phased strategy and sustained cooperation to avoid further instability and enable lasting change. Although a political transition remains possible, recent rhetoric from interim President Delcy Rodrรญguez suggests that this path remains fragile. Any credible path forward must include the voices of Venezuelans most affected by the crisis. Their perspectives are essential to restoring governance, addressing security challenges, and achieving sustainable outcomes.
JONES: Several scenarios seem plausible in the short term. One is a form of managed authoritarian continuity, in which political power is redistributed within existing elite networks, without significant democratisation. Another is a partial political openingโsuch as limited electoral reforms or negotiated power sharingโthat falls short of a full democratic transition. A more ambitious scenario would involve a negotiated political reconfiguration leading to competitive elections and institutional rebuilding.
PIAZZA: Recent events illustrate that “decapitating the regime does not mean changing the regime.” Although Nicolรกs Maduro has been replaced by Delcy Rodrรญguez, most of the ruling structure remains intact. As a result, little has changed on the ground. The same security forces patrol the streets, fear continues to silence dissent, and state media spreads its familiar propaganda.
Although Venezuela could eventually move toward a democratic transitionโeither organically or through a negotiated arrangement in which Chavista leaders accept elections under domestic and international pressureโthe most plausible short-term scenario remains the persistence of a deeply entrenched authoritarian system marked by continued instability.
How have Latin American countries reacted over the past month? How do you see them adapting to changes in Venezuela going forward?
MONTOYA Latin American governments have fallen into four categories as the crisis in Venezuela has unfolded. The first group consists of states that support Maduro’s removal as a blow to authoritarianism and criminal networks (e.g., Argentina). The second group condemns this measure as a violation of sovereignty and international law (e.g., Colombia). A third group remains cautious, prioritising stability, border security and the risk of spillover (e.g., Panama). And a fourth group reflects mixed or internally divided positions (e.g., Chile). These divergent responses are likely to persist, making credible solutions for Venezuela essential, as developments could either mitigate or exacerbate instability in the hemisphere.
But what about Cuba? Does Maduro’s removal bring the island’s regime and fragile economy closer to collapse, as many observers have speculated?
JONES: Any sustained disruption to Cuba’s economic and energy lifeline from Venezuela increases pressure on an already fragile Cuban economy. However, collapse is not inevitable. Havana has demonstrated resilience before, particularly during the “Special Period” after the collapse of the Soviet Union, adapting to external shocks through rationing, diversification of partners and internal controls. The more immediate effect is an increase in economic stress and political risk, rather than the sudden collapse of the regime. Much depends on how Venezuela’s energy and foreign policy orientations evolve.
PIAZZA allies and partners have undoubtedly been essential in sustaining the Cuban regime. Venezuela’s reduced oil supplies have put significant pressure on Havana, exacerbating power outages, living conditions and adding pressure overall. The regime’s resilience depends in part on how other nations respond to US efforts to isolate and pressure Cuba. However, there are solid reasons to believe that it will persist as it has for decades: the government remains virtually “coup-proof,” with no unified or institutionalised opposition, and benefits from both robust mechanisms of repression and a capable intelligence network.
MONTOYA Cuba has long relied on Venezuela’s energy and economic support. With this support drastically reduced, shortages of basic necessities are likely to generate internal instability. Given that Cuba is only 90 miles from the United States, instability on the island has direct security implications, especially as the ongoing crisis in Haiti is already destabilising the Caribbean.
The most plausible short-term scenario in Venezuela remains the persistence of a deeply entrenched authoritarian system marked by continued instability.
How could different political outcomes in Venezuela affect regional migration patterns?
MONTOYA: Different political outcomes in Venezuela will shape migration in ways that directly affect security and stability across the hemisphere. A poorly planned or executed transition is likely to fuel displacement, increasing pressure on neighbouring countries. By contrast, a coherent and gradual transition could restore confidence and reduce outward migration, especially if basic needs and security concerns are addressed. For this reason, integrating the perspectives of Venezuelans most affected by the crisis is essential to reducing migratory pressures and preventing further instability.
JONES: If Venezuela experiences even modest stabilisation through improved governance, economic management or security, then outward migration could slow. Large-scale return migration is unlikely in the short term. Instead, prolonged uncertainty or institutional collapse would sustain or renew migration flows, particularly to Colombia, Brazil, Peru, and the Caribbean. Over time, the challenge for the region is shifting from emergency response to long-term integration ( PDF); millions of Venezuelans have already established lasting economic and social ties outside their country.
PIAZZA If Venezuela’s dictatorship were to consolidate further or if the country were to slide into deeper chaos, migration would likely intensify as people flee increasingly deteriorating conditions, with fewer targeting the United States than in the past due to the current restrictive US immigration climate. In contrast, a democratic transition marked by greater stability and economic recovery would likely slow outward migration and encourage more Venezuelans to stay or even return home. (Approximately 8 million have left in recent years.)
Source: here
Europe’s first private hypersonic rocket reaches Mach 6
Hypersonica, an Anglo-German defence start-up developing what it describes as a sovereign European hypersonic strike capability, has conducted its first successful hypersonic test flight in Norway, reaching speeds in excess of Mach 6 and covering over 300 kilometres.
The company said the flight took place at Andรธya Space on 10 February and marked the first time a privately funded European defence company had conducted a hypersonic missile test at this level of performance. Hypersonica said all systems performed as expected throughout the vehicle’s ascent and descent through the atmosphere.
According to the company, the prototype accelerated to speeds exceeding Mach 6, which it said equates to over 7,400 kilometres per hour. It added that the system’s performance had been validated down to the subcomponent level under hypersonic flight conditions, providing data sets that will inform future design and analysis work.
Hypersonica co-founders, CEO Dr Philipp Kerth and CTO Dr Marc Ewenz, said the test represents a major step towards the firm’s ambition to develop a European hypersonic strike capability by 2029.
“Hypersonica has reached a major milestone on our path to developing Europe’s first sovereign hypersonic strike capability by 2029,” they said in a statement. “Our test flight provided invaluable data sets that will inform the design and development of future high-speed strike systems and improve our ability to analyse adversaries’ weapon profiles.”
They added that the company’s rapid development cycle was designed to challenge assumptions about the time and cost required to build advanced strike systems.
“As a privately funded start-up, our speed from design to launch in just 9 months should recalibrate expectations about the cost and time required to develop this crucial capability,” they said.
Hypersonica said its development plan involves successive test flights designed to develop capabilities in stages, including flight control at hypersonic speeds, manoeuvrability and, ultimately, full mission requirements. It described its architecture as modular, allowing for upgrades and shorter development cycles compared to conventional approaches.
The company claimed that its approach could reduce costs by more than 80% compared to traditional programmes and said it would support Europe’s ability to meet NATO-aligned deadlines and the UK’s hypersonic framework targeting 2030.
“This is a proud moment for European defence innovation,” the founders said, adding that the company had continued this work with a focus on responsible development.
Hypersonica, founded in December 2023 by former Oxford University researchers, is based near Munich and operates a wholly owned subsidiary in London.
Source: here
Royal Navy showcases AI-accelerated targeting cycle
The Royal Navy is pursuing a series of initiatives aimed at leveraging artificial intelligence to improve decision-making speed and targeting efficiency, the Ministry of Defence said in a written parliamentary response.
In a response published on 9 February, Defence Minister Luke Pollard said the work was being carried out “in parallel with the development of the Maritime Fighting Web”, a broad effort aimed at improving how the Royal Navy links sensors, commanders and effectors across its fleet and wider defence networks.
“Alongside the development of the Maritime Fighting Web, several Royal Navy initiatives are underway to leverage artificial intelligence to improve the decision-making cycle,” Pollard said.
He added that the Royal Navy is taking steps to establish a dedicated targeting organisation designed to represent the maritime element of the UK’s Joint Force, suggesting a trend toward more formalised and centralised targeting structures as defence increasingly focuses on multi-domain operations.
“These include establishing a Royal Navy targeting organisation to represent the maritime component of the Joint Force; conducting exercises and training with NATO allies, partners and other services; and collaborating with the Defence Artificial Intelligence Cell on emerging technologies,” he said.
Pollard directly linked the work to the war in Ukraine, where the rapid integration of drones, electronic warfare, targeting intelligence and real-time data sharing has become a defining feature of battlefield effectiveness. “These efforts incorporate lessons learned from the ongo y conflict in Ukraine and address current operational risks facing the Royal Navy,” he said.
Source: here
Lockheed unveils Lamprey submarine drone carrier concept
Lockheed Martin has unveiled a new autonomous underwater vehicle that it says could provide the US Navy and allied forces with a flexible platform for surveillance, seabed operations and weapons delivery, including the ability to deploy unmanned aerial systems.
The company announced the “Lamprey” Multi-Mission Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (MMAUV) on 9 February, describing it as a plug-and-play system designed for covert access and denial missions at sea in contested maritime environments. Lockheed said the vehicle can be transported to the theatre of operations by attaching it to a host surface vessel or submarine, without requiring modifications to the host platform.
The company claims that Lamprey can arrive with fully charged batteries and recharge during the mission using onboard “hydrogenators,” allowing for longer-range operations without returning to a support vessel. Lockheed said the design is intended to support secure access missions such as intelligence gathering and persistent surveillance, as well as maritime denial activities including electronic disruption, diversionary manoeuvres and kinetic attacks.
“The modern battlefield demands platforms that can hide, adapt and dominate,” said Paul Lemmo, vice president and general manager of Sensors, Effectors & Mission Systems at Lockheed Martin.
Lockheed also said that the vehicle includes an open architecture payload compartment, allowing it to be configured for different mission sets. The company suggested that this could include payloads ranging from anti-submarine torpedoes to UAV launchers, indicating that the system could potentially act as an underwater “carrier” for deploying other effects or platforms.
“LampreyMMAUV was funded internally, allowing us to iterate at lightning speed and deliver a truly multi-mission weapon to the Navy that detects, disrupts, decoy and engages on its own,” Lemmo added.
Lockheed described Lamprey as capable of delivering both kinetic and non-kinetic effects, collecting multi-intelligence data, supporting targeting, and deploying equipment on the seabed. The company said the platform is designed to provide a persistent autonomous presence while reducing dependence on traditional manned underwater platforms.
Source: here
The US Navy is deploying two nuclear attack submarines near Guam as tensions in the Indo-Pacific rise
Two US Navy Los Angeles-class fast attack submarines surfaced together off Guam in a rare, tightly controlled formation exercise supported by naval aviation. The event highlights how forward-deployed underwater forces are training for coordination and rapid response in an Indo-Pacific region with increasingly shorter warning times.
Two US Navy Los Angeles-class fast attack submarines, USS Asheville (SSN 758) and USS Annapolis (SSN 760), surfaced together off Guam on 17 December 2025 for a strictly controlled photo exercise with an MH-60S Sea Hawk from Maritime Helicopter Squadron 25. According to information released by the Commander of Submarine Squadron 15 on 9 February 2026, the event took place in the Indo-Pacific under conditions that emphasise coordination and safety, not stealth. The image is more than a public affairs moment. It captures a deliberately unusual posture for platforms built to remain unseen and offers a window into how the US Navy is using Guam-based underwater forces to signal readiness in a region where warning times are shrinking.
The Asheville and Annapolis are late-production “688-enhanced” submarines, a variant designed to be quieter than earlier Los Angeles-class submarines while also featuring improved sensors and combat systems. In basic physical terms, the class is designed around speed and endurance: approximately 6,900 tons submerged, about 360 feet long, capable of exceeding 25 knots, with published diving depths in the category of over 800 feet. These figures translate into tactical freedom of manoeuvre, particularly in the vast operational areas of the Western Pacific, where rapid repositioning can decide whether a contact becomes a kill or fades into acoustic congestion.
Their relevance to attack is based on payload: Los Angeles-class attack submarines are equipped with 12 vertical launch tubes for Tomahawk cruise missiles, adding a salvo option that does not consume storage in the torpedo room. Beyond the VLS, the boats retain the ability to launch additional weapons through torpedo tubes, allowing commanders to combine land-attack missiles, heavy torpedoes, and mines depending on the mission. In a contingency situation, this flexibility matters because it allows an SSN to swing from intelligence gathering to sea denial to precision strike without the visible logistical tail that follows surface combatants.
The US Navy has Tomahawk Block IV and Block V variants as long-range, all-weather subsonic weapons with a range of 900 nautical miles, guided by a combination of inertial navigation, terrain contour matching, digital scene matching and GPS. Block IV introduced two-way satellite communications for in-flight re-targeting and the ability to remain on the move, while the Block V upgrade adds navigation and communications enhancements and is structured to include future variants, including a Maritime Strike Tomahawk seeker kit and the Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System. From a tactical perspective, this means that an SSN based in Guam can keep land targets at risk across multiple arcs, while the fleet has a family of Tomahawks that are constantly migrating to more dynamic targeting and more difficult sets.
For underwater combat, the decisive weapon remains the Mk 48 ADCAP heavyweight torpedo. Designed to defeat fast, deep-diving nuclear submarines and high-performance surface ships, it can be wire-guided for mid-course control and then home in with active and passive acoustics in the terminal phase, allowing for reattacks if a target evades the first attempt. The point is not the published figures for speed and range, which are necessarily conservative in open sources, but the tactical effect: a submarine commander can operate with a weapon built to penetrate modern countermeasures and yet deliver a catastrophic detonation profile under the keel against surface combatants.
So why organise a “joint” event around two submarines and a helicopter? Because high-level underwater warfare is never purely underwater. An MH-60S does not hunt submarines like an MH-60R, but it is a practical enabler for safe and coordinated surface operations: communications relay, immediate search and rescue coverage, medical evacuation readiness, and airborne surveillance during close-in manoeuvres. Helicopter squadrons based in Guam maintain a continuous SAR and medical evacuation posture in the 7th Fleet area, making them natural aviation partners when submarines conduct controlled manoeuvres near the island’s busy shipping lanes.
Is it common to see two attack submarines side by side? Operationally, no. Submarines survive by separation, stealth and ambiguity, and even close navigation in close formation involves collision risk and radiates intent. When it does happen, it usually occurs in permissive waters, on the surface, and for a reason that goes beyond the doctrinal instinct to disappear: navigation training, coordinated transits, safety demonstrations, or deliberate signalling. Underwater, multiple submarines can operate together, but they do so in a distributed, not overlapping, manner, using deconfliction measures that preserve acoustic advantage and reduce mutual interference.
The strategic context is Guam itself: US Navy messages have consistently presented Naval Base Guam and Polaris Point as an advanced underwater outpost. Submarine Squadron 15 is described as operating at the spearhead, with an advanced posture in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The island’s value lies in its geography: it is close enough to matter, far enough away to support operations and allow for faster rearmament and repair than a transpacific voyage back to the continental United States. The forward deployment is where submarines refuel, repair and reload in the event of conflict, and the force based there includes several Los Angeles-class submarines alongside newer Virginia-class submarines.
The message is that the US can operate in coordinated packages that combine underwater attack platforms with aviation support and strict procedural discipline. Operationally, it suggests a depth of wave growth: not a single submarine on station, but multiple hulls available from a forward node. Strategically, it is deterrence through controlled visibility, reminding adversaries that even old “688-enhanced” boats can deliver modern Tomahawk effects and credible denial at sea, while remaining among the most difficult targets in the inventory once they submerge again. In a region defined by missile salvos, long-range sensors and contested logistics, the Navy is using rare transparency on the surface to make a simple point: the underwater force is already ahead, already armed and already training as a team.
Source: here
French Navy launches offshore patrol vessel PH Trolley de Prรฉvaux to secure Atlantic approaches
The French Navy has confirmed the launch of the Trolley de Prรฉvaux, the first offshore patrol vessel in the Patrouilleurs Hauturiers class, at Concarneau in February 2026.
On 6 February 2026, the French Navy confirmed the launch of the offshore patrol vessel Trolley de Prรฉvaux in Concarneau, as France begins to replace its ageing patrol vessels operating from metropolitan bases. The vessel, launched on 5 February at the Piriou shipyard, is the first of seven Patrouilleurs Hauturiers class offshore patrol vessels and has entered the outfitting phase at sea after initial construction work began in May 2024.
The Prรฉvaux trolley is now entering the outfitting phase at sea in Concarneau ahead of port and sea trials planned for 2026, with delivery expected in 2027 or 2028, depending on the results of the trials, before its allocation to the Brest naval base. (Image source: French Navy)
The ship was launched on 5 February 2026 at the Piriou shipyard, approximately twenty months after construction began in May 2024 and after the first block was laid on 3 September 2024. The launch was carried out using the port’s boat lift, after a short delay caused by weather conditions, with the hull already painted and partially equipped on shore. Trolley de Prรฉvaux is the first of seven PH-class patrol vessels ordered in November 2023 under the authority of the Directorate General of Armament, with the Naval Group responsible for the design, combat system and construction shared between Piriou, CMN and Socarenam.
The ship’s name honours Jacques Trolley de Prรฉvaux, a French naval officer and resistance figure born in 1888, who served in the French Navy from the early 20th century until World War II. During the First World War, he was active in naval aviation and lighter-than-air aircraft operations, and in the interwar period he held a wide range of command and staff positions, including missions abroad. During World War II, he joined the French Resistance, operating under the pseudonym Vox within intelligence networks that provided information on German naval and military activities, particularly in the Mediterranean. Arrested by the Gestapo in March 1944, he was executed with his wife Lotka in August 1944 and was posthumously promoted to rear admiral and decorated with the title of Compagnon de la Libรฉration, making his name a symbol of both naval service and resistance against the occupation.
The Patrouilleurs Hauturiers (PH) programme involves a total of ten vessels intended to replace several categories of old patrol vessels operating from metropolitan France. Seven offshore patrol vessels form the first batch ordered at the end of 2023, while three additional units are planned in a later phase to complete the fleet entry by 2035. Industrial responsibilities are distributed across three shipyards, with Piriou building two vessels in Concarneau, CMN building two in Cherbourg, and Socarenam building three at sites such as Calais, Saint-Malo and Boulogne-sur-Mer, within a common construction framework coordinated with the Naval Group. The programme aims to maintain patrol coverage across the Atlantic, the ChannelโNorth Sea and France’s Mediterranean approaches, while addressing the reduction in the number of patrol vessels available, expected in the second half of the 2020s as older vessels are withdrawn from service.
The PH Trolley de Prรฉvaux is 92 metres long, 14.2 metres wide and has a draught of approximately 3.6 metres, for a full load displacement of nearly 2,400 tonnes. Propulsion is based on a diesel-electric architecture rated at 2 x 3,850 kW, using two fixed-pitch propellers driven by electric motors powered by converters from diesel generators, supplemented by two bow thrusters for increased manoeuvrability. The ship is designed for a maximum speed of 21 knots, with autonomy prioritised over speed compared to previous French patrol classes. The operational range is stated as 6,000 nautical miles at 12 knots, and the endurance at sea is stated as up to 30 days without resupply, to support extended offshore patrols and sustained presence missions at distances from home ports.
The sensor and combat system configuration centres on the SETIS-C combat management system, which integrates a Thales NS54 4D AESA multifunction X-band radar, a Friend or Foe identification system and a hull-mounted BlueWatcher sonar. Navigation sensors include multiple navigation radars and an optronic system, with provision for electronic warfare equipment as part of the surveillance and self-protection suite. The inclusion of an active hull-mounted sonar differentiates the class from previous patrol vessels and supports underwater surveillance tasks, including maritime boarding and submarine security missions. This sonar capability builds on experience gained in previous installations in the French fleet and expands the roles of patrol vessels into areas previously covered by higher-level combat ships.
The class’s armament consists of a forward-mounted 40 mm rapid-fire naval gun, a remotely operated SIMBAD-RC launcher firing Mistral Mk3 missiles for short-range air defence, and a mix of 12.7 mm and 7.62 mm machine guns for close protection. The RapidFire naval system uses 40 CTC telescopic ammunition, with an optronic fire control system, a rate of fire of approximately 200 rounds per minute, and an effective range of approximately 4,000 metres. The SIMBAD-RC launcher carries two ready-to-fire missiles with a declared engagement range of 8 km and is also designed to counter rapid surface threats. The overall weapon layout is designed to deal with asymmetric threats, localised air defence and self-protection during patrol missions, rather than high-intensity naval combat.
Aviation and boat handling facilities are essential to the ship’s mission profile, with a hangar and flight deck capable of operating an Airbus H160M Guรฉpard helicopter and unmanned aerial systems such as the VSR700 or Aliaca. The flight deck is sized to accommodate helicopters up to the 11-tonne class, including the NH90, while the hangar supports lighter helicopters of around 6 tonnes. Boat facilities include two dedicated bays for semi-rigid boats of up to approximately 8.5 metres, suitable for EDO NG fast boats and future ETRACO NG boats, as well as additional rigid-hull inflatable boats, depending on the configuration. These resources enable boarding, maritime interception and special operations support, extending the ship’s range beyond its own sensors. Accommodation is provided for a total of 84 personnel, including a core crew of 54 sailors and 30 additional places for embarked teams or mission-specific detachments.
The operational roles assigned to the Patrouilleurs Hauturiers (whose name literally means offshore patrol vessels in English) include maritime surveillance, protection of French waters and approaches, support for state actions at sea, escort missions, interception, evacuation support and protection of national interests. For ships based in Brest, missions also include contributing to the security of ballistic missile submarine operations by maritime surveillance and underwater monitoring. The class is also intended for deployments beyond metropolitan waters, with references to operations in Northern Europe, West Africa and other regions where a sustained patrol presence is required. A service life of approximately 35 years is mentioned for the class, along with a target availability of up to 300 days per year, reflecting an emphasis on operational persistence.
The programme is closely linked to the retirement of older patrol assets, including the A69 avisos reclassified as patrol vessels in 2009 and the public service patrol vessels (PSPs) Flamant, Cormoran and Pluvier commissioned in 1997. Several A69-derived vessels have already left service, with the rest expected to be retired between 2025 and 2027 due to age, maintenance burden and parts availability, without being reallocated prior to retirement. During the transition period before all seven new ships enter service between 2027 and 2030, the French Navy anticipates reduced patrol capacity, with interim mitigation measures based on other surface combatants. In this context, the delivery sequence of the Patrouilleurs Hauturiers is intended to progressively restore French offshore patrol capability.
After launch, the PH Trolley de Prรฉvaux will continue with outfitting, systems integration and testing, with 2026 identified as a year focused on crew training, system activation and initial sea trials. The crew has already been trained, and acceptance processes are planned prior to entry into active service, which is currently expected in 2027 or 2028. Parallel construction continues on other ships in the class, including D’Estienne d’Orves at Cherbourg and Jeanne Bohec at Calais, with other units scheduled at Concarneau and Cherbourg by the end of the decade. The names of the ten planned ships honour figures from the French Resistance during the Second World War, including Trolley de Prรฉvaux, D’Estienne d’Orves, Jeanne Bohec, Premier maรฎtre Nonen, Jacqueline Carsignol, Commandant Ducuing, Quartier-maรฎtre Anquetil, Andrรฉe Borrell, รmilienne Moreau and รle de Sein, marking the first time in modern French naval practice that multiple combat ships bear women’s names alongside a commune name.
Source: here
US Air Force deploys A-10C Warthogs to protect Navy mine warfare operations in the Arabian Gulf
US Air Force A-10C aircraft conducted armed surveillance for the USS Santa Barbara during a US Central Command mine countermeasures exercise in the Arabian Gulf. This pairing highlights how the Pentagon is combining traditional firepower with unmanned naval systems to keep sea lanes open near the Strait of Hormuz.
The sight of US Air Force A-10C Thunderbolt II aircraft flying protective profiles alongside the USS Santa Barbara (LCS 32) during a US Central Command training event in the Arabian Gulf is more than just a photo opportunity. It is a clear operational signal that mine countermeasure forces operating in one of the world’s most restricted and politically charged waterways will be protected by dedicated and persistent firepower. In the tight geometry of the Gulf, where small boats, drones, and coastal weapon systems can compress warning times into minutes, pairing a littoral combat ship mine hunter with an aircraft built to sit low, see the fight, and strike quickly is a deliberate choice, not nostalgia. For both US 5th Fleet planners and regional observers, the implication is clear: if the Gulf becomes hostile, the forces tasked with keeping the sea lanes open will not remain exposed.
US Air Force A-10C Warthog aircraft conduct armed surveillance for the USS Santa Barbara (LCS 32) during a mine countermeasures exercise in the Arabian Gulf, highlighting a common strategy that combines LCS-based unmanned mine hunting with persistent close air support to deter threats from fast boats, drones and mines near the Strait of Hormuz (image source: U.S. DoW).
Army Recognition reviewed the CENTCOM photo set, and the A-10’s visible equipment is revealing. The aircraft is carrying 500 lb Joint Direct Attack munitions, a LITENING targeting pod and a seven-barrel 2.75-inch rocket pod, assessed as loaded with Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II laser-guided rockets, plus a prominent 600-gallon centreline fuel tank for extended time on station. This combination is less about heavy armour today and more about sustained armed surveillance: the A-10 can identify, track and pursue fast, small maritime contacts, staying aloft long enough to shape the escalation, not just react to it.
At the heart of this deterrent posture is the GAU-8/A 30mm cannon, still one of the most specialised weapons in the US service. Air Force data attributes a rate of fire of 3,900 rounds per minute to the cannon, while General Dynamics documentation highlights the combat mix that makes the weapon tactically flexible: PGU-13/B Explosive Incendiary for fragmentation and incendiary effects against soft targets and PGU-14/B Piercing Armouring Incendiary for penetration and post-armour destructive effects. In the context of maritime security issues, this translates into rapid and discriminating explosions against small boats, engines and exposed weapon mounts, without penalising the depth of the magazine by relying exclusively on rockets.
The deeper story is how a close air support platform from the Cold War era has been gradually remodelled for the cheap threat and crowded reality of today’s battlefield. The A-10C standard emerged from the Precision Engagement upgrade path, which brought digital weapons management, modern cockpit displays, electronic countermeasures, and full delivery of smart weapons, including JDAM and advanced targeting pods. This modernisation is what allows the aircraft in the CENTCOM photos to function less like a classic weapons truck and more like a networked attack node, generating precision weapons and missiles from its own sensors. For mine escort missions, this matters because the first shots may need to be precise, politically controlled, and fired on compressed timelines.
The missile pod is particularly important in 2026. APKWS II has become a preferred option for engaging low-cost air threats in the US Central Command area because it offers precision at a fraction of the price and with a much higher transport density th ‘s traditional air-to-air missiles. In a Gulf emergency, the same logic applies to surface ships in swarm: a single A-10 can carry enough guided missiles to conduct multiple independent engagements and still preserve JDAMs for higher-value or time-sensitive targets. The growing relevance of the A-10 against drones tightens the protective bubble around slow, mission-focused ships such as minesweepers.
The presence of the USS Santa Barbara is not symbolic: with the disappearance of Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships from the region, the US Navy is relying on the Independence LCS variant, configured with the Countermeasure Mission Package to hunt, neutralise and clear mines, keeping sailors at a greater distance from the danger zone. The package is described as an integrated suite that pushes sensors and neutralisation tools outboard via the MCM unmanned surface vehicle and an MH-60S helicopter, enabling detection sequences for engagement against coastal mines. As stated by Navy senior leadership at the start of operational capability, the new equipment is designed to keep sailors away from danger, but only if the mother ship is protected while operating.
The mine hunting chain is built around layered detection. The system combines forward-looking and side-looking sonar with digital gap-filling capability, while electro-optical identification provides confirmation when contacts require discrimination. Industry programme material emphasises that the system is designed to identify and classify bottom and moored mines, feeding a kill chain that may include helicopter-delivered neutralisers. This makes the Santa Barbara an operational game changer for the joint force, but it also makes the ship a priority target for any adversary hoping to block maritime traffic by mining choke points and then hunting the hunters.
Strategically, it is about denying Iran and its proxies a familiar crisis lever: pressure from mining and fast boats in and around the Strait of Hormuz. The exercise is directly linked to persistent concerns about mine warfare in the Gulf and the danger posed by fast attack craft, increasingly associated with unmanned surface vessels. The next step for the A-10 is connectivity. Selected aircraft are now being used with Link 16, closing a long-standing interoperability gap and allowing Warthogs to share a real-time tactical picture with ships, airborne command and control platforms, and coalition assets. In practical terms, this is how an ageing aircraft becomes a credible escort in modern, sensor-saturated combat: see first, distribute quickly, fire often, and stay overhead until the mine hunters finish the job.
Source: here
Taiwan to build 10 new light frigates for air defence and anti-submarine warfare
Taiwan plans to build ten new light frigates, optimised for air defence and anti-submarine warfare, with entry into service planned between 2028 and 2040.
As reported by USNI News on 6 February 2026, Taiwan plans to build ten new light frigates optimised for air defence and anti-submarine warfare as part of a long-term shipbuilding programme. The 2,500-tonne class is intended to replace ageing surface combatants and support sustained patrol, escort and surveillance missions in the Taiwan Strait and adjacent waters between 2028 and 2040.
The ten subsequent frigates are based on a prototype that began with two initial ships, one for each configuration, with construction beginning in 2023 for the air defence variant and in 2024 for the anti-submarine variant. (Image source: Taiwan Ministry of Defence)
Specifically, Taiwan plans to build ten new light frigates dedicated to air defence and anti-submarine warfare missions, with commissioning scheduled between 2028 and 2040. The programme focuses on a new class of 2,500-tonne light frigates and is a central element of Taiwan’s long-term naval renewal effort. Funding priorities show that anti-aircraft and anti-submarine projects account for $7.8 billion of a $9.9 billion allocation covering six major shipbuilding initiatives overseen by the Ministry of National Defence. The light frigates are intended to support ongoing patrol, escort and deterrence missions in the Taiwan Strait and nearby waters, replacing ageing ships facing increasing operational pressure.
The ten ships are divided equally between two configurations, with five optimised for air defence and five focused on anti-submarine warfare. They follow the construction of two prototype frigates, one of each configuration, with the air defence prototype beginning construction in November 2023 and the anti-submarine prototype in January 2024. Delivery of these two initial ships is scheduled for the end of October 2026, after which the authorities will decide on the large-scale production of the remaining ten units. In parallel with the frigate programme, the Taiwanese fleet’s planning framework also includes a submarine rescue vessel, a rapid combat support vessel, two rescue vessels and a 10,600-tonne amphibious assault vessel, indicating a broader effort to rebalance surface combat, logistics and support capabilities.
Taiwan’s light frigates are based on an international design developed by Gibbs & Cox and adapted to Taiwan’s operational requirements. The anti-aircraft variant has a hull length of 96 metres, a beam of 21 metres and a draught of 3.3 metres, while the anti-submarine variant adopts a longer hull of 116 metres, with the same beam and draught to support sonar systems and quieter operations. Early design targets focused on a displacement of 2,500 tonnes, but internal reviews increased the size to nearly 3,000 tonnes and the length to 120 metres to ensure sufficient internal volume for sensors, weapons and future upgrades. The final configuration visually resembles a scaled-down version of the American Constellation-class frigate.
The light frigate programme is a direct response to the retirement of Cold War-era Knox-class frigates and the continued reliance on older American and French designs, including Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, La Fayette-class frigates, and Kidd-class destroyers. These ships are frequently tasked with intercepting and monitoring Chinese naval units operating near Taiwan’s maritime areas, creating sustained pressure on availability and maintenance cycles. The new light frigates are intended to absorb a significant portion of these routine missions while providing improved air defence coverage and dedicated anti-submarine capabilities. At the same time, questions arise in planning circles about balancing the survivability and speed of larger frigates with the lower costs and greater agility of the missile corvettes already in service.
Missile corvettes play a parallel role in Taiwan’s naval posture, with the smaller ships carrying domestically produced subsonic and supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. The Tuo-chiang class is publicly associated with a tactic centred on launching missile salvos and retreating at high speed, earning it the label of “aircraft carrier killer” in local narratives. This context frames part of the debate surrounding light frigates, particularly whether larger, slower-accelerating hulls can realistically operate in close proximity to the more numerous and modern surface combatants of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (it should be noted, however, that the Battle of Samar on 25 October 1944 demonstrated that such a scenario could be successful). The Taiwanese light frigate programme is therefore part of a broader discussion about the mix of forces, weighing endurance, sensor range and command functions against reduced speed and signatures.
Close-range defence and patrol functions are addressed by integrating the XTR-102A2 remote weapon system, with two 20 mm tubes, chosen in place of the previously considered remote-operated 30 mm guns. Developed by the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, the XTR-102 family combines optoelectronic targeting with remote operation and includes the single-barrel XTR-101 and twin-barrel XTR-102 variants. The ship-mounted XTR-102A2 uses twin 20 mm T-75 cannons with a firing rate of between 400 and 1,200 rounds per minute and a maximum effective range of 2,000 metres, optimised for engaging drones, fast boats and other small surface or air threats. The same system is already deployed on several Taiwanese naval and coast guard vessels, supporting uniformity and continuity of training.
The origins of the light frigate programme stem from delays in the Zhenhai Project, which initially sought to use a new generation frigate of approximately 4,500 tonnes. Budget continuity was maintained while the concept shifted to a smaller hull, using a rotating array radar instead of a fixed four-face array system. An earlier concept, presented in 2018, envisaged a 1,400-tonne ship with a length of 85 metres, powered by two diesel engines, capable of 30 knots and offering a range of 2,200 nautical miles at 12 knots, with armament including a 76 mm gun, anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles and anti-submarine torpedoes. Subsequent planning milestones in 2022 aligned the programme towards a 2,500-tonne light frigate, citing the increasing presence of Type 053H3, Type 054A and Type 056A vessels as a determining factor in the revised requirements and confirming that ten subsequent vessels would complement the two prototypes.
Industrial execution assigns combat system integration to the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, while hull construction was opened to domestic competition and awarded to Jong Shyn Shipbuilding Company in May 2023, with the contract taking effect on 12 May. The two prototypes are funded by a total budget of NT$20 billion, including NT$4.6 billion for the anti-aircraft defence ship and NT$4.45 billion for the anti-submarine ship, with additional allocations covering missiles, radars and combat management integration. Construction milestones include steel cutting in late 2023 and early 2024, structural assembly ceremonies in November 2024 at the Xingao shipyard in Kaohsiung City, and planned delivery by October 2026. Once operational, the ten additional light frigates are expected to become the backbone of Taiwan’s surface fleet by 2040, supporting patrol, escort and deterrence missions while ensuring continuity as older ships are decommissioned.
Source: here
The enemy continues to use the relatives of captured Ukrainian defenders as a tool to achieve its military objectives.
The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported this.
The latest manipulation by the invaders involves attempts to bypass Starlink by blocking Starlink terminals, which they used to ensure communication in their units.
Finding themselves in a difficult situation due to the loss of communication, the aggressor began to put pressure on the families of prisoners of war. Russian special services are using blackmail and threats, demanding that Ukrainians officially register new Starlink terminals in their names.
The consequences of registering Starlink for the enemy
If a registered terminal is used to extinguish a fire or control attack drones, this will be a direct reason to bring a person to criminal responsibility under Ukrainian law.
The Coordination Headquarters emphasises that for the invaders, Ukrainians are just a “disposable resource”.
The enemy is not interested in the fate of those who give in to blackmail, and the fact of registering equipment for the invader’s use will remain permanently in digital records as evidence of complicity.
If citizens receive offers, requests or threats related to the registration of Starlink terminals, they are urged to contact law enforcement agencies immediately.
Source: here
Frankenburg to test anti-drone missile in Ukraine in 2026
Estonian company Frankenburg plans to test its new Mark 1 anti-drone missile in Ukraine between April and June 2026.
A company representative told Militarnyi at the World Defence Show 2026 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that development is progressing at full speed.
“We are developing the system as quickly as possible and hope to conduct tests in Ukraine soon. My goal is to be ready for a demonstration in the second quarter. I don’t want to launch the product too early while it is still being refined,” the representative said.
Frankenburg says the system is designed to be the world’s first affordable anti-drone weapon, using the “fire and forget” principle.
Frankenburg system specifications
The main component is the Mark 1 short-range interceptor missile, which can engage targets at ranges of up to 2 kilometres and altitudes of approximately 1.5 kilometres.
The missile is equipped with a modern electro-optical seeker and a closed-circuit guidance system. Targets are destroyed using a glass fragmentation warhead weighing approximately 500 grams. Instead of traditional metal fragments, the warhead uses glass fragments as damaging elements.
Propulsion is provided by a composite solid-fuel rocket motor, which allows the interceptor to quickly enter its attack trajectory.
A Frankenburg representative emphasised that the system was designed to counter unmanned aerial vehicles up to Class 3, with priority targets such as Shahed-type drones and other slow-moving aerial threats, such as loitering munitions.
At the exhibition, the company presented a test launcher that had already been tested in Latvia last December. The final version of the system will have four missiles for each launcher. A fully operational system can integrate up to four stationary launchers, providing 16 missiles ready for launch.
The system is built on the principle of open architecture, allowing the launchers to integrate with the customer’s existing ground target sensors, including radars and electro-optical sensors.
Launcher for the Mark 1 missile from Frankenburg. 9 February 2026. Photo credit: Militarnyi
In the future, the system is planned to be installed on other platforms, including even maritime drones. In addition to the ground version, an air-to-air version is being developed in cooperation with a major defence company. This version will use a rail-mounted launcher for two missiles, mounted under the aircraft’s wing.
The company’s initial production capacity is based in Latvia, but it also plans to implement a “field foundry” concept. This modular production unit allows for the rapid implementation of missile manufacturing directly in the country where they are used.
Source: here
US intercepts Russian Shadow Fleet tanker Aquila II
The US military intercepted the tanker Aquila II in the Indian Ocean for violating sanctions.
The Pentagon said in a statement that the landing took place “without incident”.
The tanker, the Pentagon explained, was operating in violation of the quarantine for sanctioned ships imposed by US President Donald Trump.
The Department of Defence said the ship was tracked from the Caribbean to the Indian Ocean, after which an operation was carried out to intercept it.
“No other country on planet Earth has the ability to impose its will on any territory. On land, in the air or at sea, our Armed Forces will find you and bring you to justice. You will run out of fuel long before you outrun us,” the statement said.
The Pentagon added that it would deprive illegal actors and their intermediaries of the ability to challenge US authority in the global maritime sphere.
The Aquila II tanker
The Aquila II appears in the database of the War and Sanctions portal, created by the Ukrainian Defence Intelligence Service, as a ship involved in the transport of sanctioned crude oil from Russia and Venezuela.
The ship belongs to the category of crude oil tankers with a tonnage of 159,073 tonnes.
Aquila II in the Ukrainian Defence Information database
Aquila II is considered part of the so-called “shadow fleet” associated with SUNNE CO LIMITED, which the US added to its sanctions list on 10 January 2025.
On the same day, the US also imposed sanctions on the ship itself. Subsequently, restrictions were also imposed by the UK, the EU, Canada, Switzerland and Ukraine.
Employees on the Aquila II oil tanker. 9 February 2026. Photo credit: Pentagon
In July 2025, the ship’s official flag was unknown, although it was actually flying the Panamanian flag.
On 7 January, the US military conducted an operation to intercept the tanker Marinera, formerly known as Bella-1 and now flying the Russian flag.
Source: here