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MS Daily brief-31 DECEMBER 2025
Contents
News from Ukraine | Russia’s economic disaster is already here and will worsen. 1
Russia claims to have moved a nuclear-capable missile system to Belarus. 1
Did Ukraine target Putin’s residence, or is Russia’s claim a ploy to influence Trump?. 4
Russia continues to import Michelin aircraft tires despite sanctions, records suggest 6
Power outage in Channel Tunnel disrupts thousands of travelers. 8
Israeli president’s office denies Trump’s claim that Netanyahu will be pardoned “soon”. 11
Trump news in brief: President’s renaming of Kennedy Center is a sour note for these artists 15
Estonian intelligence reveals Russia’s plans to disrupt Europe’s rearmament 17
India approves two more MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones to strengthen naval surveillance. 20
US Navy orders Leonardo UK BriteCloud anti-missile decoy for F-35 fighter jet self-protection. 24
Chinese Navy destroyer tests hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile at sea. 42
Thales to build AI mine warfare centers for the Royal Navy. 43
New Baltic study finds significant escalation of GNSS interference near Kaliningrad. 44
US Secretary of the Army briefed on British hybrid navy plans. 46
Russia attacks Odessa region port infrastructure again: grain ship damaged. 48
Peace plan for Ukraine “scares us to death,” officials say. 48
Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Shows Value Against Houthis. 52
Italy’s road to DDX destroyer tender begins now.. 53
Spain confirms order for 30 Turkish Hürjet training aircraft worth €2.6 billion. 55
Oil tankers from Azerbaijan and Turkey collided off the coast of Istanbul 56
BREAKING NEWS: Iran may be developing CHEMICAL weapons; Trump SUPPORTS ISRAEL in attacking Iran | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine | Russia’s economic disaster is already here and will worsen
Russia claims to have moved a nuclear-capable missile system to Belarus
The claim comes after the Kremlin accused Ukraine of attacking Vladimir Putin’s palace in Novgorod
Tuesday, December 30, 2025, 7:15 p.m. CET
Russia has said that its latest nuclear-capable missile system has been deployed in Belarus, a day after Moscow claimed that Ukraine had launched a large-scale drone attack on Vladimir Putin’s residence.
Footage released by Russia’s Defense Ministry showed the new Oreshnik missile crossing a snow-covered forest. Soldiers were seen camouflaging combat vehicles with green nets and flying a flag at an air base in eastern Belarus, near the border with Russia.
The video appeared to be part of an orchestrated attempt to intimidate Europe and prepare Russians for a further escalation of the already brutal war against Ukraine. If true, the deployment would symbolically reduce the time it takes for a Russian missile to strike an EU capital.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said that 10 Oreshnik systems will be stationed in his country. Putin announced that they will enter active service during a meeting with his generals on Monday, where he reaffirmed his intention to capture more Ukrainian territory, including the southern city of Zaporizhzhia.
Earlier, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that “retaliatory measures” would be taken against Kyiv and that targets were already prepared. This followed what he called an attack on Sunday evening involving 91 Ukrainian drones on the Russian president’s palace in the Novgorod region.
The Kremlin has not presented any evidence to support its allegations. Dmitry Peskov, Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, said on Tuesday that no evidence would be presented because all the missiles had been shot down. He said he could not comment on the lack of debris.
Residents in the area said they did not hear explosions or the sound of anti-aircraft fire, according to Russian independent media outlet Sota. No air raid alerts were issued, nor were any mobile phone videos showing smoke and flames, a typical feature of confirmed strikes, shared online.
On Tuesday, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said Russia had invented the story and urged other countries to ignore it. “Almost a day has passed, and Russia has still not provided any plausible evidence for its accusations. And it won’t. Because there is no evidence. No such attack took place,” he posted on X.
He did not criticize Donald Trump, who on Monday angrily backed Russia’s version and said Putin had told him about the attack in a phone call. “It’s one thing to be offensive because they are offensive. It’s another thing to attack their home. This is not the right time to do that,” the US president said.
Sybiha expressed his irritation with India, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates after they said they were concerned about the reports. “Such reactions to Russia’s manipulative and unfounded claims only play into Russian propaganda and encourage Moscow to commit even more atrocities and lies,” he noted.
Ukrainian commanders said Russian kamikaze drones regularly flew over the government palace used by Zelenskyy on their way to the capital. An officer, the head of territorial defense unit 112, said his team shot down two drones on Saturday over the state residence in Koncha-Zaspa, south of Kyiv.
“Whenever there are large-scale attacks, they fly into our area. They are always martyrs. We shoot them down quite often in this place,” the soldier told the Guardian. He shared a video showing an enemy drone flying at low altitude in the white winter sky.
Ukrainians want to continue focusing on diplomatic efforts to end the conflict, following Sunday’s two-hour meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump in Florida. The two leaders discussed a 20-point peace plan, under which the US would offer Kiev post-war security guarantees voted on by Congress.
No progress was made on the future of the Donbas region in the east, which Putin says should be ceded to Russia. Zelenskyy ruled out ceding any territory to Russia. He proposed a demilitarized zone, which could be confirmed by a referendum if Russia agrees to a ceasefire of at least 60 days.
Zelenskyy said that the Russians were spreading “fake news” because of the “quite successful conversation and meeting” he had with Trump over the weekend and the progress made in recent weeks by the US and Ukrainian delegations. Russia made accusations because it did not want “any positive results for anyone in this format,” he added.
The Ukrainian president is set to meet with European allies on January 6 in France at a conference hosted by Emmanuel Macron. Leaders will discuss Europe’s contribution to a peacekeeping operation. A subsequent meeting between European heads of state and Trump and his White House team is likely to take place in Washington.
Commentators have said that US security promises are meaningless if Trump is willing to accept everything the Russian president tells him. “If the monitoring of the potential ceasefire is carried out by the same people who now believe what Russia says, we will have big problems,” said Phillips O’Brien, professor of strategic studies at the University of St Andrews.
Update on the war in Ukraine: “Attack on global food security” as Russia strikes wheat ships and ports
The US has verified that the alleged attack on Putin’s residence is fake, says Zelenskyy; leaders of Ukraine’s allies will meet in France next week. What we know on day 1,407
Warren Murray and agents
Wednesday, December 31, 2025, 02:42 CET
- Russia launched waves of drones to attack the Black Sea ports of Pivdennyi and Chornomorsk, striking two civilian ships as they arrived to load wheat, the Ukrainian navy and government officials said. The Panamanian-flagged civilian ships Emmakris III and Captain Karam were hit, the navy said, adding that Tuesday’s attacks “threaten the lives of civilians and undermine global food security. Targeted attacks on civilian objects are a deliberate war crime.” Ukraine is a major agricultural producer and exporter. Oil storage tanks were also hit, said Oleksiy Kuleba, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, who added that both ports continue to operate.
- Russia’s continued and increasingly intense attacks on Ukraine are “an act of defiance” against the US plan to end the war in Ukraine, a French presidential source said on Tuesday. In addition, Moscow’s accusations of a Ukrainian drone attack on Vladimir Putin’s residence are not supported “by any solid evidence, including after cross-checking information with our partners,” the source said.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said: “Regarding the attack on [Putin’s residence in] Valdai, our team of negotiators contacted the American team, they analyzed the details, and we understand that this is false information. And, of course, our partners can always verify, thanks to their technical capabilities, that it is false.”
A Ukrainian drone attack damaged port infrastructure and a gas pipeline in the Russian Black Sea port of Tuapse, the regional administration said on Wednesday, adding that no casualties had been reported. Tuapse and its refinery are one of Russia’s main Black Sea outlets for oil products that Ukraine is targeting because they are exported to finance the war or used directly to fuel the Russian military. The port and refinery have been repeatedly hit by Ukrainian drone attacks.
Ukraine also launched drone attacks on Tuesday targeting Moscow, parts of western Russia, and annexed Crimea, injuring one person near the capital, Russian authorities said.
Zelenskyy said Ukraine would convene a meeting with the leaders of Kiev’s allies on Tuesday, January 6, in France, as diplomatic efforts to end the conflict intensified. The summit will be preceded by a meeting of their security advisers, planned for Saturday, January 3, in Ukraine.
Germany has accepted €10 million to drop its investigation into Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov for alleged violations of EU sanctions, prosecutors said on Tuesday. The agreement was reached on the basis of the “presumption of innocence,” prosecutors said. Usmanov is a close ally of Putin and the head of the International Fencing Federation. He was accused of using funds frozen under EU sanctions to pay for two properties in Germany that were to be monitored by a security company. In a separate investigation, prosecutors in Frankfurt charged Usmanov with money laundering. The case was settled in November after Usmanov paid €4 million.
Meanwhile, the US has lifted sanctions against Alexandra Buriko, former chief financial officer of Russian state-owned bank Sberbank, according to a post on the US Treasury Department website. Buriko was among the executives and directors who resigned from Sberbank, sanctioned by the West, shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Buriko went to court in December 2024 to request the lifting of sanctions, arguing that she had severed ties with Sberbank. It was known that she and the US government were in negotiations to resolve the case.
Did Ukraine target Putin’s residence, or is Russia’s claim a ploy to influence Trump?
Ukraine denied the claim and accused Russia of trying to undermine diplomatic progress – so who believes what?
Shaun Walker in Warsaw
Tuesday, December 30, 2025, 1:35 p.m. CET
Russia claims Ukraine attempted to strike Vladimir Putin’s residence in a massive drone attack on Monday. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Russian air defenses shot down 91 drones, calling the attack an act of “state terrorism.”
Ukraine denied the accusation, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Lavrov of spreading “typical Russian lies” to try to undermine diplomatic progress between Kiev and Washington, after a bilateral meeting with Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago, Florida, on Sunday.
Russia’s claim, like much of the geopolitics of 2025, seems to have been directed primarily at a single recipient, Trump, and he seems to have accepted it. “It’s one thing to be offensive because they are offensive. It’s another thing to attack their home. This is not the right time to do that,” Trump said Monday.
The accusation comes at a delicate diplomatic moment, with Trump insisting that the peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine is “95 percent complete.” Zelenskyy is desperately trying to keep the US president on his side, while Russia has convinced Trump that it is ready for negotiations, but seems unwilling to give up its maximalist war aims.
What evidence has Moscow provided?
Absolutely none, and on Tuesday Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that no evidence would be provided. “I don’t think there should be any evidence if there is a massive drone attack, which, thanks to the effective coordination of the air defense system, was shot down,” he told reporters in a telephone conversation.
Often, when a Ukrainian drone attack occurs, Russians living nearby post videos of explosions on social media, but there are no images of this alleged attack, and residents of nearby Valdai told independent Russian media that they did not hear any explosions on Monday.
Can Moscow be trusted?
In short, no. The Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense often make fantastic claims about the war in Ukraine. Moscow continues to insist that it never targets civilians in its drone and missile strikes on Ukraine, despite regular evidence to the contrary. Russian authorities have a long history of fictional stories about Ukraine, dating back to 2014, when Putin claimed that the Russian special forces who annexed Crimea were actually locals.
Does that mean the drone attack definitely did not happen?
It is difficult to say for sure. Ukraine certainly has a history of attacks inside Russia, including the assassination of military figures, drone attacks on oil refineries, and, most spectacularly, Operation Spiderweb, in which camouflaged drones launched from trucks destroyed numerous Russian strategic bombers inside Russia.
Certainly, Putin’s residence would be considered by Ukrainian planners as a legitimate and tempting target. However, it would be a strange choice to make this move at a key moment in negotiations with Trump, and the lack of corroborating evidence from eyewitnesses at the scene makes the claims seem less plausible.
If it is a false claim, what is the purpose?
There are several possibilities. Zelenskyy claimed that the accusation is a cover story to allow Moscow to strike government buildings in Kyiv, especially since Lavrov said that “retaliation targets” had already been selected. But as the last four years have shown, Moscow does not need cover stories to strike all kinds of targets in Ukraine.
A more likely scenario is that Putin, aware of the theory that Trump is often influenced by the last person he spoke to, was concerned about Zelenskyy’s personal visit to Mar-a-Lago and what might be achieved in the discussions. By accusing the Ukrainians of escalation, both publicly and on the phone with Trump, Putin may have hoped to once again change the calculations in the American president’s mind and postpone any decision that the Kremlin would consider too friendly toward Kyiv.
Did Trump believe it?
Early indications suggest that Trump believed the claim and was angered by Ukraine’s alleged actions.
When a reporter suggested that the claim might have been fabricated, Trump seemed to consider the possibility for the first time. “You’re saying maybe the attack didn’t happen? I think that’s possible too. But President Putin told me this morning that it did happen,” he said.
The CIA could probably provide Trump with a decent analysis of the veracity of the claim, but reports suggest that the president often ignores the conclusions of his own intelligence agencies.
Does anyone still believe the Russians’ claims?
In European capitals, the allegations were met with enormous skepticism, but elsewhere there are signs that the accusation has resonated. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrote on X in English and Russian that he was “deeply concerned” about the reports. “We urge all parties involved to remain focused on these efforts and avoid any actions that could undermine them,” he added.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha wrote on X on Tuesday: “We were disappointed and concerned to see statements from the United Arab Emirates, India, and Pakistan expressing concern about an attack that never happened.” He said that none of the three parties issued a statement when a Russian missile struck a Ukrainian government building in September.
Russia continues to import Michelin aircraft tires despite sanctions, records suggest
Exclusive: Sales through intermediary companies appear to continue despite Michelin’s attempts to halt trade
Daniel Boffey Chief Reporter
Tuesday, December 30, 2025, 5:00 p.m. CET
Russia has continued to use intermediary companies, including one apparently based in the UK, to import aviation tires manufactured by French firm Michelin, despite attempts to halt the trade, customs records suggest.
Despite sanctions imposed on the sale of tires to Russia, which is critically dependent on foreign suppliers, an analysis of the records indicates that a significant number continue to pass through.
The Guardian reported in September 2024 that $28 million worth of Michelin tires were delivered in 2023, despite the company halting all exports to Russia in March 2022 following the large-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The new data suggests that sales continued, albeit in reduced quantities, despite Michelin’s repeated attempts to stop trade by adapting its systems for monitoring the diversion of its products.
Between October 2024, after The Guardian report was published, and March 2025, Russia received 2,687 Michelin tires worth over $7 million (£5.2 million), according to records analyzed by Ukraine’s Economic Security Council.
Analysis of the entire year 2024 suggests that sales were facilitated by intermediaries, none of whom were Michelin customers. There is no suggestion of any wrongdoing on the part of Michelin, which has shut down all its commercial and industrial activities in Russia.
The shipments appear to have been sent by companies based in Turkey, Spain, Saudi Arabia, India, and an apparently British firm called General Trade Solutions (UK). There is no company registered under this name in the UK Companies Register.
The largest Russian importer of Michelin tires in 2024, Melaris LLC, was a supplier to the Russian military-industrial complex.
A Michelin spokesperson said the company “is committed to strictly complying with applicable economic and financial sanctions regarding Russia” and that it “has established dedicated internal processes and organization to ensure this compliance.”
The company stated that none of the Michelin tires apparently exported to Russia were intended for military use and that it had recently strengthened its compliance program by “implementing enhanced controls, in addition to existing measures, to further reduce the risk of diversion.”
The spokesperson added: “Adapting our compliance program to the risk of diversion has significantly reduced cases of circumvention, as your recent figures indicate.
“However, we remain vigilant regarding the quality of the data provided in such reports, as there is no guarantee that the tires mentioned are actually Michelin Group products, particularly due to the risk of counterfeiting and false declarations.
“In addition, it is important to note that the aviation tire industry is unique, with standard compatibility of an aviation tire for all aircraft of the same model and a complex commercial chain involving multiple distributors and resellers.”
Roman Steblivskyi, policy expert at Ukraine’s Economic Security Council, said: “Russian aviation—both civil and military—remains dependent on Western aircraft tires due to their superior quality. Michelin should therefore take a more proactive approach to preventing the illicit re-export of its products to Russia via third countries.
Michelin’s due diligence frameworks refer to tracking the origin of certain minerals in the ‘human rights’ section; however, they do not address monitoring or preventing the supply of Michelin products to authoritarian states such as Russia.
“This gap raises questions about the alignment of the company’s due diligence standards with the current geopolitical environment and the risks associated with sanctions avoidance.”
The French Duty of Vigilance Law requires large French companies to develop and publish a plan to identify, prevent, and mitigate risks to human rights, health, safety, and the environment within their own operations, subsidiaries, and supply chains.
A Michelin spokesperson stated that risks related to export controls and sanctions are not something that French law requires them to address, but that “even though it is not explicitly mentioned in our latest due diligence plan, the Michelin Group has implemented and constantly reviewed and strengthened its export control and sanctions compliance policy, adapting its measures and controls to address diversion risks.”
Power failure in Channel Tunnel disrupts thousands of passengers
Engineers are still struggling to restore full rail service on Tuesday evening, while car passengers face seven-hour delays
Juliette Garside, Aneesa Ahmed, and Jane Clinton
Tuesday, December 30, 2025, 7:13 p.m. CET
A power failure in the Channel Tunnel disrupted thousands of travelers ahead of the New Year holidays, with all passenger and vehicle trains suspended for several hours as engineers rushed to repair the fault.
As Eurostar passenger departures to the continent were first delayed and then canceled, the concourses of London’s St Pancras International station filled with stranded travelers waiting for news. In Folkestone, Kent, queues of cars formed as drivers hoping to catch the shuttle faced delays of up to seven hours.
On Tuesday evening, engineers were still struggling to restore full service, with Channel Tunnel operator Getlink saying trains were running on only one of the tunnel’s two lines, in alternating directions.
The technical problem began on Monday evening, according to Getlink, with “an incident related to the power supply to trains.”
In statements on Tuesday morning, Eurostar indicated that the outage had caused a train operated by LeShuttle, which transports cars and freight vehicles through the tunnel, to break down. The company said the train was eventually removed from the tunnel.
At St Pancras, Jack Slater and his girlfriend had no choice but to cancel their New Year’s trip to Paris, a surprise they had been planning since the summer.
“We are advised to rebook for tomorrow, but all trains are already fully booked, so the only option would be to upgrade to first class, which means paying extra money,” he said.
Matt Orien had come from Seattle, USA, with his family, hoping to reach Paris after spending a few days in London. “It’s disappointing, but we have a friend who is helping us with the administrative formalities, so we hope to find a solution to get there,” he said. “We’re fine and we’ll find a way to entertain ourselves… We feel sorry for the people who are stuck on the train in the tunnel.”
Betty Ndukaeze, who was traveling with her family, was hoping to get to Paris for the celebrations. The trip started with a delay, with the 7:01 a.m. train leaving an hour late before stopping. After a long wait, they were sent back to St Pancras, she told the BBC.
“It was chaos from the moment we got here,” Ndukaeze said.
“They kept announcing that there was a problem with the train in front of us and said they were trying to fix it.
“We just came back here. The return journey from where we were stuck took only 20 minutes.”
On Tuesday afternoon, Eurostar announced that it would resume services to and from London around 6 p.m., but “strongly” recommended that passengers postpone their journeys. Live service updates showed that all departures to Paris on December 30 were canceled, except for two trains at 6:01 p.m. and 7:01 p.m. In the other direction, only the 6:12 p.m. and 7:12 p.m. trains were listed as scheduled to depart for London.
“As problems with the power supply in the Channel Tunnel persist, only one line is available for train traffic,” the operator said. “This means that delays and longer journey times than usual will continue this evening. We therefore continue to advise our customers to reschedule their journey for another day, if possible, with free exchanges available.
We also advise customers not to come to our stations if their trains have already been canceled.”
A photograph of a driver, distributed by the BBC, showed overhead electrical cables scattered across the tracks.
Eurostar, which transports passengers, and LeShuttle, which transports vehicles and is owned by Getlink, share the two lines of the tunnel, which normally run in only one direction.
Together, these services carry thousands of passengers a day during the Christmas period.
In an update sent at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, Getlink said that shuttle service “was resumed very gradually on one line shortly before 3 p.m. CET [2 p.m. in the UK]” and that trains were running “alternately in both directions, with significant delays.”
Additional shuttles will be added from Tuesday evening to Wednesday morning, and wait times will be adjusted throughout the day, the company said. Real-time shuttle updates warned passengers: “Approximately six hours delay from scheduled time, please check in as planned.”
In Folkestone, the shuttle’s terminus, drivers stuck in queues of cars waiting to board shared their frustration on social media. “We are about to board the 8:25 ferry, which is supposed to arrive at 3:05 p.m.!” wrote Spike on X, suggesting that some vehicles had been delayed by seven hours.
Kate from Woking said drivers in Folkestone were given meal vouchers, playing cards, and crisps. “The terminal staff did their best, but couldn’t promise much.”
Stephanie Roberts, from Ashford, was returning home after a two-week vacation in Le Touquet with her husband, Simon, and their 18-month-old French bulldog, Dempsey.
Cars stuck in traffic, waiting to board a LeShuttle service from Folkestone to Calais. Photo: Dean Pallant
“We started queuing in Calais at the Eurotunnel at 10:30 a.m. French time,” she said. “In the end, we waited more than five hours before we could board the train.
We had no food or water, but luckily we had brought a baguette with us, so we were able to eat that. I bought a small bottle of water from a vending machine for €3 for Dempsey. It’s not the price that’s the issue, it’s the principle.
Some British drivers with later trains said they had diverted to Dover to take the ferry.
The Port of Dover urged stranded drivers to consider switching to sea transport, saying that operators running between Dover and Calais had capacity for additional passengers.
The LNER railway company, which operates on the main line on the east coast, responded by offering passengers free transport home. It stated that “all customers who were forced to abandon their journey from London King’s Cross can return to their station of origin on the next available LNER service at no extra cost.”
LNER customers who choose to postpone their Eurostar journey to another day can use their existing LNER ticket to travel on the same day, the company added.
Rory Boland, editor of Which? Travel, said: “Those whose train has been canceled have the option to change their booking or request a refund or Eurostar e-voucher. In the event of delays, passengers are entitled to compensation.
“If you experience an overnight delay, you are entitled to hotel accommodation or reimbursement of the cost of accommodation.”
Eurostar has stated that customers can exchange their unused ticket for another date in the same travel class, receive a refund, or receive an electronic voucher valid for 12 months. Stranded passengers can also claim hotel accommodation worth up to £150 per room, along with £50 for taxi costs and £35 for food and drink expenses.
Israeli president’s office denies Trump’s claim that Netanyahu will be pardoned “soon”
Isaac Herzog’s spokesman says he has not spoken to Trump since the US president wrote to him urging him to halt the trial
Jason Burke in Jerusalem
Tuesday, December 30, 2025, 4:21 p.m. CET
The office of Israeli President Isaac Herzog has denied Donald Trump’s claim that Benjamin Netanyahu, who is on trial for corruption charges, will soon receive a pardon.
Shortly before meeting with the Israeli prime minister in Florida on Monday evening, Trump said that Herzog told him the pardon was “about to be granted.”
“How can you not do it?” Trump said. “He’s a war prime minister, a hero. How can you not give him a pardon?”
Trump added that he “spoke with [Herzog] and he told him that the pardon is about to be granted. It doesn’t get any better than that, does it?”
Netanyahu, the first sitting Israeli prime minister to be charged with a crime, denies the bribery, fraud, and breach of trust charges brought against him in 2019. His supporters have dismissed his trials as politically motivated.
At 76 years old, Netanyahu could be sent to prison if convicted, and a lengthy ban on holding public office would be part of any sentence. Given Netanyahu’s age, this would end his political career, Israeli analysts say.
Trump repeatedly raised the prospect of pardoning Netanyahu in social media posts and during a speech to Israel’s Knesset in October. A month later, the US president wrote an official letter to Herzog urging him to grant clemency and describing the case as “a politically motivated and unjustified prosecution.”
Asked on Monday about Trump’s remark, Herzog’s office said the Israeli president had not had any further conversations with Trump since receiving the letter in November.
“There has been no conversation between President Herzog and President Trump since the pardon request was submitted,” Herzog’s office said in a statement issued minutes after Trump’s comments.
Responding to the previous request, Herzog’s office said the Israeli president appreciates “Trump’s unwavering support for Israel, his immense contribution to the return of hostages, the transformation of the Middle East and Gaza, and the protection of Israel’s security,” but stressed that “any person seeking a pardon must submit a request in accordance with established procedures.”
Many in Israel were outraged by Trump’s intervention, saying it violated national sovereignty.
Herzog’s office said the Israeli president spoke with a representative of Trump at the time and was told that any decision would be made in accordance with established procedures.
Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, reportedly met with Herzog earlier this year to discuss canceling Netanyahu’s trial. Herzog gave a long speech explaining why this was not within his power, a Jerusalem Post columnist reported.
“The trials are proceeding at an extremely slow pace, but they are closing in on the defendant. Therefore, a pardon is necessary. Actually, not a pardon. To obtain a pardon, you have to admit guilt and resign. As far as Netanyahu is concerned, the trial must be canceled. At any cost,” wrote Ben Caspit.
Netanyahu himself submitted an official request for a pardon to Herzog on November 30, arguing that frequent court hearings are affecting his ability to govern and that clemency serves the national interest by helping to “calm spirits and promote broad reconciliation.”
The request by the former prime minister, who has held the position six times, has drawn fierce criticism from opponents, who say that pardoning him during his trial would be a flagrant violation of the rule of law.
Experts say that although presidential pardon powers can be exercised with some flexibility, they are intended to be used after a person has been convicted, and there is no precedent for overturning an ongoing trial, as Netanyahu and Trump are demanding.
Netanyahu and his wife, Sara, are accused in a case of accepting luxury goods worth over $260,000 (£198,000), such as cigars, jewelry, and champagne, from billionaires in exchange for political favors. He is also accused of attempting to negotiate more favorable media coverage from two Israeli media outlets in two other cases.
Tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over Yemen’s future reach a climax
Patrick WintourDiplomatic Editor
The dispute could lead to civil war in southern Yemen and the spread of conflict to neighboring countries
Tuesday, December 30, 2025, 6:19 p.m. CET
Tensions between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia over Yemen’s future and the imminent possibility of an independent state being declared in the south of the country have reached a climax, with Saudi Arabia effectively accusing the UAE of threatening its future security.
The dispute has the potential to trigger a civil war in southern Yemen and spread to other disputes, including in Sudan and the Horn of Africa, where the two countries often find themselves on opposite sides. Yemen could become just one of the theaters in which the two extremely wealthy Gulf states are fighting for political influence, control of sea routes, and commercial access.
The UAE has been involved in Yemen for years, thanks to its support for the separatist Transitional Council in the south.
Many observers, including diplomats in Riyadh, have assumed that the UAE—often seen as the junior partner, but more ideological partner—would back down and ask the STC to postpone or abandon its plan to declare independence and instead settle for negotiations for greater autonomy or more seats in Yemen’s coalition government body, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).
Saudi Arabia has always considered Yemen its territory, first attempting to defeat Iran-backed Houthi rebels in the north through a heavily criticized bombing campaign in 2015 and then, under international pressure, returning to diplomacy to try to reconcile the Houthis with the UN-recognized government in Aden.
However, in the last month, the United Arab Emirates has crossed many supposed red lines in Yemen, leading to Saudi bombing of vehicles docking at the Yemeni port of Mukalla. Riyadh has clearly stated that the vehicles were sent for use by the STC and came from an Emirati port.
Saudi Arabia stated: “The Kingdom emphasizes that any threat to its national security is a red line, and the Kingdom will not hesitate to take all necessary measures to confront and neutralize any such threat.”
Screenshot from a video showing smoke rising after an air strike by the Saudi-led coalition in the southern Yemeni port of Mukalla on Tuesday. Photo: Sabaa TV/Reuters
But the UAE has been quietly analyzing business opportunities in Yemen for years. Taking advantage of the sincere and popular desire to restore the independence that the south enjoyed before unification with the north in 1990, the UAE chose the STC as its vehicle.
It was a smart bet. The STC was finally recognized as a legitimate actor in 2019, when it was granted seats in the PLC.
After years of marginalization in UN peace efforts, STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi slowly gained Western recognition and was allowed to participate in events such as the UN General Assembly.
But the STC, fueled by longstanding cultural and economic grievances against the north, was never satisfied with federalist solutions and felt marginalized in the PLC anyway.
This month, the STC seized the opportunity, sending its forces into Hadramaut, the largest governorate in the south.
With its sudden expansion eastward, the STC controlled almost the entire territory of the former state of South Yemen, including the most productive oil fields.
After conquering Hadramaut, it was relatively easy to conquer al-Mahra, the easternmost governorate.
This came as a major shock to Saudi Arabia, which has since exerted diplomatic pressure on Abu Dhabi to demand the withdrawal of the STC.
In a fierce diplomatic battle, Riyadh has attempted to isolate the UAE and the STC, making it clear that even if the STC maintains its position, southern Yemen will never progress beyond the status of a microstate lacking international recognition.
So far, the UAE is not backing down. The withdrawal of the few remaining UAE counterterrorism forces from Yemen, announced on Tuesday, is meaningless, as the UAE’s support for the STC remains.
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, an Emirati political scientist, describes the UAE’s defense of the STC as almost a litmus test of the UAE’s character. He wrote on X: “The UAE does not disappoint or abandon its allies. It supports them generously and with abundant political and military resources. It does not leave them halfway to face their fate without support. It is clear in its policies and measures. It does not run away or avoid confrontation. It has a clear vision of its national and humanitarian responsibility and fulfills it with the utmost care.”
Similar patriotic statements are coming out of Riyadh. Farea al-Muslimi, a researcher on Yemen and the Persian Gulf at the Chatham House think tank, has no doubt about the seriousness of the situation.
“After years of indirect competition through local proxies, the dispute now appears to be moving toward a more direct confrontation, with Saudi Arabia publicly accusing the UAE of actions that threaten national security along its southern border,” he said.
The conflict reflects fundamental disagreements between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over Yemen’s future political structure and the balance of influence within it. In particular, the UAE—despite its greater geographical distance—has pursued a more interventionist and experimental approach on the ground.
“Tensions between the two countries have been building for years. These actions suggest that the situation is entering a particularly dangerous phase. This development also evokes worrying parallels with the 2017 Gulf crisis involving Qatar, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE coordinated a major diplomatic rift that destabilized regional relations for years.”
Muslimi added that the Houthis “will likely see the growing division between two of their main adversaries as a considerable advantage, watching as former coalition partners—who fought together and failed to defeat them—now turn against each other.”
Western governments, following Washington’s lead, have shown little desire to publicly criticize the United Arab Emirates in Sudan, and in Yemen their sympathy will be with Saudi Arabia and the maintenance of a unified state.
Trump news in brief: President’s renaming of Kennedy Center strikes a sour note for these artists
More and more musicians are pulling out of shows after Trump put his name on the building – the top US political news stories of December 30 in brief
The Guardian team
Wednesday, December 31, 2025, 2:00 a.m. CET
The list of musicians canceling concerts at the Kennedy Center, which Donald Trump tried to rename the “Trump-Kennedy Center” in Washington, D.C., continues to grow.
A second jazz band has pulled out of a New Year’s Eve concert, announcing this just two days before the event was due to take place.
This week it was Cookers, described as a Grammy-nominated septet of legendary post-bop jazz musicians. The group did not give an explicit reason for its decision, but in a statement posted on its website said: “Jazz was born out of struggle and the relentless insistence on freedom: freedom of thought, expression, and the full human voice.”
The band’s decision to withdraw from the New Year’s Eve Jazz concert comes after the board of directors of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts voted earlier this month to rename the institution the Trump-Kennedy Center.
The decision sparked protests—and legal challenges—and the exterior of the Washington, D.C., arts center was quickly changed to Trump’s name. Shortly thereafter, drummer and vibraphonist Chuck Redd canceled a Christmas Eve concert.
Richard Grenell, the Kennedy Center’s president and a Trump appointee, threatened to sue Redd for $1 million in damages for what he called “a political stunt.”
Other shows are being canceled at the Kennedy Center after the name change to Trump.
The latest cancellation of a jazz concert comes after folk singer Kristy Lee announced that she had canceled a concert scheduled for next month at the center. Lee said on social media that “when American history starts to be treated as something you can ban, erase, rename, or rebrand for someone else’s ego, I can’t stand on that stage and sleep peacefully at night.”
Judge says Trump administration must continue funding consumer watchdog
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which, according to its supporters, protects American consumers from financial harm caused by banks, lenders, and powerful corporations, is at risk of collapse after Donald Trump promised to shut it down when he returned to power this year.
Judge suspends termination of temporary protected status for South Sudanese immigrants
US District Judge Angel Kelley in Boston has approved an emergency request from several South Sudanese citizens and an immigrant rights group to prevent the expiration of their temporary protected status, as scheduled, after January 5.
The ruling is a temporary victory for immigrant advocates and a setback for the Trump administration’s broader efforts to curtail the humanitarian program.
Israeli president’s office denies Trump’s claim about Netanyahu pardon
The office of Israeli President Isaac Herzog has denied Donald Trump’s claim that Benjamin Netanyahu, who is on trial for corruption charges, will soon receive a pardon.
Shortly before his meeting with the Israeli prime minister in Florida on Monday evening, Trump said that Herzog had told him that the pardon was “about to be granted.”
Iran urges Trump to defy Netanyahu on nuclear talks
Donald Trump should defy Benjamin Netanyahu and realize that resuming negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program is a better option and has a better chance of success due to stronger support in the region for a positive outcome, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says in an article published in The Guardian. He also suggests that Trump’s Republican base wants a deal and not more unnecessary wars.
Trump “not concerned” about China’s live-fire military exercise in Taiwan
Donald Trump said he is not concerned about China’s live-fire military exercises around Taiwan and that he has an excellent relationship with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who “hasn’t said anything to me about it.”
The US president’s comments came in the context of a major two-day surprise attack simulation launched by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Monday and Tuesday, which China called “Mission Justice 2025.”
What else we’re reading today:
- The man accused of placing homemade bombs outside the Democratic and Republican National Committee headquarters on the night before the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol appeared before a federal judge on Tuesday for a detention hearing.Read the full report: Washington DC homemade bomb suspect appears at detention hearing after alleged confession
Hosting Benjamin Netanyahu for the fifth time since returning to the White House 11 months ago, Donald Trump gave a performance on Monday that illustrated his usual disregard for foreign policy protocol.Read the full analysis: Trump shows his usual disregard for protocol, while Netanyahu looks on impassively Tatiana Schlossberg, granddaughter of the 35th US president, John F. Kennedy, died on Tuesday after revealing in November that she had been diagnosed with a rare form of leukemia. She was 35. Read the full report: Tatiana Schlossberg, JFK’s niece, dies after being diagnosed with rare form of leukemia Elon Musk said he would lead a “government efficiency department” (Doge) with “maximum transparency,” which will be responsible for saving $2 trillion in waste and exposing massive fraud. But with Musk out of the White House, Doge cutting only a small fraction of the promised waste, and dozens of lawsuits for violating privacy and transparency laws, much of what the agency has done remains a mystery. Read the full article: We still don’t really know what Elon Musk’s Doge did An American citizenship ceremony held in Boston earlier this year should have been marked by the joy of overcoming a verification process that lasted for years. Instead, participants from countries included on the travel ban list announced by Donald Trump last summer were excluded from participating, ending their American dream. Read the full report: Despair for future US citizens whose American dream was blocked by Trump
- While tens of thousands of New Yorkers will be in Times Square for the countdown to 2026, the city’s mayor-elect, Zohran Mamdani, has said he will be sworn in during a private underground ceremony at midnight in an abandoned subway station built during the golden age.Read the full report: Mamdani to be sworn in as New York mayor in abandoned subway station
Estonian intelligence reveals Russia’s plans to disrupt Europe’s rearmament
Currently, there are no signs that Russia intends to attack the Baltic states or NATO as a whole, but Moscow’s main goal remains to disrupt Europe’s rearmament.
This was stated by the Director General of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, Kaupo Rozin, writes GuildHall, referring to ERR.
Russia is trying to limit the strengthening of European defense by using “reassuring talk” about peace and spreading messages that military spending would take funds away from social programs. According to the head of intelligence, the Kremlin is seriously concerned about the pace of Europe’s strengthening, as in a few years Western countries could finally win this arms race.
Kaupo Rozin noted that Russia respects NATO and tries to avoid open conflicts. This was the result of the West’s adequate response to past incidents, such as the damage to underwater cables or airspace violations. Now, Russian planes over the Baltic Sea follow their routes with painful precision, and drone trajectories are changed to minimize the risk of accidental collisions, given the high level of military activity and the ongoing war in Ukraine.
The interview touched on the subject of hybrid attacks, but Rozin urged that the term be abandoned, considering it too mild. He is convinced that actions such as sabotage and cyberattacks should be called by their proper names and, in some cases, classified as state terrorism. They take place with the approval of the Russian leadership. At the same time, Moscow is trying to cover its tracks as much as possible, although this is not always successful, as recent operations in Poland and Romania have shown.
Estonian intelligence services are paying particular attention to Russia’s shadow fleet in the Baltic Sea. For Russia, maintaining the freedom of movement of these ships is a top priority, as oil exports are the main source of budget revenue. Rozin stressed that pressure on this fleet and maintaining sanctions in full are essential. Limiting access to financial markets and reducing energy revenues are gradually undermining the Russian military machine. Every dollar drop in oil prices deprives Russia of the huge funds it needs to continue the fight.
Regarding the internal situation in Russia, intelligence services note the gradual militarization of society. The return of veterans from the front is already affecting crime rates in the regions, and the large number of wounded is having a psychological impact on ordinary citizens. Rozin believes that military rhetoric is necessary for the ruling regime to maintain itself. Even if there is a ceasefire in Ukraine, the risks for the Baltic region could increase if Russia feels more confident and arrogant. The task for Estonia and the entire NATO alliance remains to develop their own defense capabilities so that Russia continues to respect the alliance’s borders in ten years’ time.
Source: here
The US Navy plans to purchase 12 SM-3 Block IIA anti-aircraft missiles for Aegis warships in fiscal year 2026
The Pentagon’s fiscal year 2026 procurement budget positions the US Navy’s Sea-Based Aegis Weapons System as a central pillar of the Missile Defense System. This measure underscores the growing urgency of countering ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats from near-peer competitors, while also strengthening allied and homeland defense.
The Department of Defense’s fiscal year 2026 acquisition budget, released in early 2025, presents the US Navy’s Sea-Based Aegis Weapons System as a decisiv e element of the US missile defense architecture, according to budget justification documents and Pentagon briefings. Officials describe Aegis as a battle-proven, forward-deployed shield operating aboard cruisers, destroyers, and Aegis Ashore sites, capable of defending both deployed forces and strategic territories against an expanding spectrum of missile threats.
A Standard Missile-3 Block IIA interceptor is launched from the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) during a test off the Pacific Missile Range Facility. (Image source: US DoD)
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense builds on the Navy’s long-standing Aegis weapon system, integrating high-power phased array radars, command and control software, and kinetic interceptors into a single combat system. Current BMD-capable ships rely primarily on the SPY-1D(V) radar, with the new Flight III destroyers introducing the SPY-6 radar for air defense, which offers significantly greater sensitivity, discrimination, and tracking capability against complex threat sets. These sensors transmit real-time data to the Aegis combat system, enabling simultaneous air and missile defense operations while maintaining the ability to detect interceptors across vast battle spaces.
At the heart of the modernization effort for fiscal year 2026 is the continued evolution of the Standard Missile-3 family, particularly the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. Developed jointly with Japan, Block IIA features a larger diameter booster and kill vehicle than previous variants, extending its engagement coverage against medium-range ballistic missiles. Traveling at speeds exceeding Mach 10 and relying on hit-to-kill kinetic energy rather than explosives, the interceptor is designed to destroy targets in the mid-course exo-atmospheric phase. Pentagon officials familiar with the program told Army Recognition that this capability remains unmatched in the naval domain and is essential for defending both forward-deployed forces and high-value assets such as Guam.
The mission profile presented in the fiscal year 2026 budget highlights the flexibility of Aegis BMD. The system is required to detect, track, and engage missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight, including terminal engagements in regional defense scenarios. Its sea-based deployment allows commanders to dynamically reposition sensors and interceptors, reducing gaps in coverage and adapting to changing threat axes, while Aegis Ashore installations provide continuous protection for key regions without relying on the host nation’s naval presence.
Funding details in the procurement budget reveal the scale of this effort. Discretionary resources in fiscal year 2026 support the acquisition of 12 SM-3 Block IIA interceptors and their integration into the Aegis Weapons System, along with the continued development of Aegis Baseline BMD 6.0 software, aligned with the Aegis Baseline 10.0.1 configuration. This software alignment is more than administrative. It enables improved sensor fusion, faster engagement times, and enhanced discrimination of decoys and countermeasures, all of which are essential when facing increasingly sophisticated ballistic and hypersonic threats.
The budget also highlights the expanding role of Aegis BMD beyond traditional ballistic missile defense. Program documentation explicitly mentions the system’s evolution to address cruise and hypersonic missile threats, leveraging modernized radars, improved trajectory management, and integration with common and allied sensors. Defense officials note that while the SM-3 remains focused on ballistic targets, Aegis provides the command and control backbone for layered defense, coordinating with SM-6 interceptors and other assets to counter threats at lower altitudes and maneuvers.
A major strategic driver for these investments is the Guam Defense Initiative. Funding for fiscal year 2026 advances Aegis enhancements tailored specifically to Guam’s layered defense architecture, integrating sea-based interceptors with land-based systems to protect the island from emerging ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic weapons. Within the Pentagon, Guam is increasingly seen as a stress test for integrated air and missile defense concepts that could later be applied to other forward-deployed regions.
Mandatory funding in the fiscal year 2026 plan marks the beginning of the development of the SM-3 Underlayer, intended to complement existing interceptors within the Guam Defense Architecture. This includes early work on an expeditionary variant of the SM-3 Block IIA equipped with next-generation engagement infrastructure, as well as investments to expand annual SM-3 Block IIA production capacity from 24 to 36 missiles. Industry sources told Army Recognition that this increase reflects growing concern about interceptor stockpile levels amid sustained demand for global deployment.
As missile threats become faster, longer-range, and more complex, Aegis Sea-Based Missile Defense is no longer viewed solely as a defensive layer, but as an active deterrent. By denying adversaries confidence in their ability to deliver effective strikes over long distances, the system shapes strategic calculations long before conflict begins. For Army Recognition readers, the fiscal year 2026 acquisition budget clearly shows that Aegis remains at the forefront of US efforts to adapt naval power to the realities of modern missile warfare.
Source: here
India approves two more MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones to strengthen naval surveillance
India has approved the lease of two additional MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones for the Indian Navy, thereby expanding its long-range maritime surveillance capability across the Indian Ocean region. This move strengthens persistent ISR coverage at a time when Chinese naval deployments are increasing near critical sea lanes.
India’s maritime surveillance network is poised for a significant expansion, as the Defense Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, has approved the lease of two additional MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones from the United States. As reported by the Times of India on December 29, 2025, the deal, valued at Rs 1,600 crore, aims to strengthen the Indian Navy’s persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities across the Indian Ocean region, particularly in the context of increased Chinese naval activity.
India has approved the lease of two additional MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones for the Indian Navy, extending long-range maritime surveillance in the Indian Ocean amid heightened regional naval activity (Image source: General Atomics)
The lease agreement comes as a follow-up to the previous introduction of two MQ-9Bs in 2020 under an emergency procurement, which have since flown over 12,000 hours in operational missions, according to official assessments. The new pair of drones will bring the total leased fleet to four, enabling round-the-clock aerial surveillance of strategic sea lanes, chokepoints, and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Operated from Rajali Naval Air Station in Tamil Nadu, the drones will remain under Indian control, while the contractor provides technical and maintenance support, reflecting a lease-operate model that has proven effective since its initial implementation.
The MQ-9B Sea Guardian is a maritime transport-optimized variant of General Atomics’ MQ-9 Reaper, with a maximum endurance of over 40 hours and a range exceeding 6,000 nautical miles. Designed for long-endurance, high-altitude ISR missions, the Sea Guardian is powered by a Honeywell TPE331-10 turboprop engine and can travel at speeds of over 310 km/h while maintaining operational ceilings of up to 40,000 feet. Its wide-area maritime surveillance suite includes synthetic aperture radar (SAR), inverse SAR, electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors, and Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers for maritime traffic tracking.
As highlighted in the Times of India report, the current lease agreement supports the Navy’s need for ISR coverage in areas of intense traffic and tension, such as the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and areas around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These are regions where Chinese submarines and surface ships have been detected operating more frequently in recent years, prompting a reassessment of India’s maritime situational awareness posture.
Technologically, the Sea Guardian represents a leap forward for India’s ISR capabilities. It is equipped with a maritime surface search radar, typically Leonardo’s Seaspray 7500E AESA or Raytheon’s SeaVue XMC, providing real-time detection, classification, and tracking of ships in varying weather and sea conditions. The EO/IR turret provides high-definition imagery and target acquisition capabilities for low-light and low-light environments, while satellite communications enable seamless control and real-time data relay from thousands of miles away.
Although current platforms are unarmed, the MQ-9B is structurally capable of carrying a full combat load in other configurations, including AGM-114 Hellfire and precision-guided bombs. India is expected to pursue the acquisition of up to 31 armed MQ-9B drones under a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program approved by the US government in 2023, a deal that would include 15 for the Navy and the rest split between the Army and Air Force. The current lease agreement is widely seen as a temporary measure as this long-term acquisition moves forward.
The lease model gives India an operational advantage without waiting for a complex procurement cycle to be completed. The platform has already demonstrated interoperability with Indian assets such as the Boeing P-8I Neptune and has been integrated into the Navy’s broader maritime ISR network. Real-time feeds from the MQ-9B have been used to monitor suspicious vessels, assist in naval exercises, and provide surveillance during HADR missions.
This development comes at a time when India is stepping up joint operational coordination with partners such as the US, Japan, and Australia under the Quad. The MQ-9B, with its persistent surveillance capabilities, plays a key role in these efforts, fueling combined maritime domain awareness architectures.
By moving forward with this lease agreement, New Delhi is signaling not only its intent to counterbalance the growing maritime assertiveness of adversaries, but also its strategic alignment with the United States in protecting critical Indo-Pacific sea lanes. The newly approved Sea Guardians are expected to enter operational deployment in early 2026, expanding India’s unmanned fleet at a time of increasing geopolitical flux in the maritime theater.
Source: here
Dutch Navy frigate HNLMS Evertsen conducts live-fire air defense exercises against swarm drone threats
The Royal Netherlands Navy has completed a three-day live-fire air and surface defense exercise with HNLMS Evertsen off the coast of Wales, becoming the first NATO ally to participate in the Sharpshooter exercise. This milestone highlights the increasing integration of allies as navies adapt to the growing threat of unmanned systems and complex, multidirectional attacks.
According to information released by QinetiQ and the Royal Netherlands Navy on December 19, 2025, the Dutch air defense frigate HNLMS Evertsen successfully completed an advanced live-fire exercise at the UK Ministry of Defense’s Aberporth test range. Spanning three days, the event placed the frigate and its crew in a highly realistic operational scenario designed to replicate modern air and surface threats, including unmanned aerial systems and coordinated attack profiles, which are increasingly common in contemporary conflicts.
HNLMS Evertsen is a De Zeven Provinciën-class air defense frigate with a displacement of approximately 6,000 tons and is specifically designed to protect high-value naval assets against saturation attacks (Image source: QinetiQ)
Operating approximately 20 miles off the coast of Wales, HNLMS Evertsen faced simulated coordinated swarm attacks involving both air and surface threats. QinetiQ deployed Banshee Whirlwind aerial drone targets, capable of replicating high-speed, low-signature unmanned aerial systems, alongside the Hammerhead unmanned surface vehicle, designed to simulate fast and aggressive surface attackers. These real threats were integrated with synthetic injections representing cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and hostile aircraft, creating a congested combat space designed to stress the ship’s combat system from early detection to final engagement.
HNLMS Evertsen is a De Zeven Provinciën-class air defense frigate with a displacement of approximately 6,000 tons and specifically designed to protect high-value naval assets against saturation attacks. Central to its performance during Sharpshooter was its advanced sensor and combat management architecture, built around the SMART-L long-range air surveillance radar and the APAR active phased array radar. This combination of sensors allows the ship to simultaneously detect, track, and classify multiple air threats, including small drones and high-altitude ballistic targets, providing the situational awareness necessary in complex swarm scenarios.
During the exercise, Evertsen successfully tracked and neutralized five air targets and engaged two Hammerhead unmanned surface vehicles, both of which were hit and sunk. Dutch Navy officials confirmed that the engagements tested the ship’s comprehensive layered defense concept, combining radar indication, command and control decision-making, and coordinated weapon use. The frigate’s armament, which includes the Mk 41 vertical launch system capable of firing SM-2 and ESSM missiles, a 127 mm main gun, and close-in weapon systems, was exercised in accordance with realistic rules of engagement designed to reflect combat conditions in contested waters.
The threat scenario was developed by Inzpire, a tactical training specialist owned by QinetiQ, with a focus on defending critical maritime infrastructure and allied task forces. Real and synthetic threats were deliberately combined to overwhelm sensor operators and command teams, forcing rapid prioritization and engagement decisions. Sources familiar with the exercise noted that the sustained pace over several days was a key objective of the training, reflecting the endurance requirements expected during extended naval operations , where unmanned threats can be launched repeatedly at low cost by adversaries.
Commander Marcel Keveling of the Royal Netherlands Navy emphasized that the immersive nature of the exercise brings concrete operational value. He stated that firing live weapons at realistic targets while maintaining a high state of readiness over several days provided lessons that will directly influence future deployments. He also stressed that this training is essential because modern naval warfare increasingly involves asymmetric threats, in which drones and unmanned surface vessels can challenge even highly capable air defense ships.
On behalf of the United Kingdom, QinetiQ emphasized the strategic importance of Sharpshooter as a multinational training platform. Will Blamey, UK Defense Director General at QinetiQ, noted that interoperability between allied navies is becoming critical as threat systems evolve more rapidly and become more networked. He emphasized that combining live and synthetic environments allows teams to train decision-making under pressure, sharing tactics and operational perspectives across national borders.
QinetiQ’s role as a cornerstone of British military testing and evaluation was central to the exercise. Under a Long-Term Partnership Agreement with the UK Ministry of Defense, the company operates 16 locations nationwide, supporting complex training in land, sea, and air domains. The Sharpshooter exercise is part of a broader effort to validate NATO air and missile defense concepts against emerging threats observed in recent conflicts, particularly the widespread use of drone swarms to probe and saturate defense systems.
The Dutch Navy’s participation follows a series of recent Sharpshooter and related exercises involving the Royal Navy and allied forces. In early 2025, HMS Dauntless countered drone swarms prior to its deployment with the UK Carrier Strike Group. QinetiQ also supported the Med Strike exercise in the Mediterranean Sea and the large-scale Formidable Shield exercise off the coast of Scotland, where 11 allied nations collectively responded to threats ranging from unmanned systems to ballistic and supersonic missiles.
For the Royal Netherlands Navy, the successful performance of HNLMS Evertsen during the Sharpshooter exercise reinforces the operational relevance of the De Zeven Provinciën class design in today’s threat environment. As unmanned systems proliferate and adversaries increasingly rely on saturation tactics, the ability of advanced air defense frigates to integrate allied sensors, weapons, and networks will remain a cornerstone of NATO maritime security.
Source: here
US Navy orders Leonardo UK BriteCloud anti-missile decoy for F-35 fighter jet self-protection.
The US Navy has officially awarded Leonardo UK a sole-source contract to equip the F-35 Lightning II with the BriteCloud Active Expendable Decoy, designated AN ALQ 260(V). The decision strengthens the survivability of Navy fighter jets against increasingly capable radio-guided missiles and confirms negotiations that have been ongoing for more than a year.
The US Naval Air Systems Command confirmed on December 23, 2025, that Leonardo UK had been awarded a sole-source contract to supply BriteCloud Active Expendable Decoy for integration into the Navy’s F-35 Lightning II fleet. Designated by the US military as AN ALQ 260(V), the system is intended to counter advanced radio frequency guided missile threats and marks a significant milestone following extensive discussions between the Navy and industry throughout 2024 and 2025, according to defense officials familiar with the program.
The introduction of an active decoy adds a critical outer layer to the F-35’s defensive system, extending survivability once stealth advantages begin to erode (Image source: US DoD)
The contract was revealed through an official US Government procurement notice dated December 23, 2025, covering the purchase of an undisclosed number of Active Expendable Decoys, along with initial spare impulse cartridges, test equipment, and dedicated support resources needed to sustain fleet operations. Structured as a base year with up to one optional year, the agreement does not publicly disclose its total value or quantities. However, defense officials familiar with the Navy’s internal planning told Army Recognition that previous projections indicated a possible need for up to 6,000 decoys, a scale compatible with the sustained operations of the F-35C air wing and F-35 expeditionary deployments.
NAVAIR justified the sole-source nature of the award by citing over 14 years of joint research, development, integration, and testing conducted with Leonardo UK, in close cooperation with the UK Ministry of Defense. The contract notice states that awarding the program to any alternative supplier would result in an unacceptable delay of approximately eight years. Navy experts have assessed that a new entrant would need at least four years to achieve the necessary level of technical maturity, an additional three years to complete safe separation, software validation, and effectiveness testing on the F-35, and another year to establish manufacturing readiness for initial low-rate production. In the context of accelerating missile proliferation and evolving electronic countermeasures, NAVAIR concluded that Leonardo UK is the only responsible source capable of meeting operational deadlines without disrupting fleet deployment schedules.
Operationally, the decision reflects a clear recognition of a long-recognized limitation in the F-35’s self-protection architecture. The F-35 combines a low-observable shape, internal weapons carriage, and advanced sensor fusion powered by its AN/APG-81 AESA radar and Distributed Aperture System, all managed through a highly automated mission system designed to reduce pilot workload. However, although the aircraft is equipped with the BAE Systems ASQ-239 electronic warfare system, capable of threat detection, geolocation, and electronic attack, it does not use conventional chaff packages. Its defensive concept relies heavily on onboard electronic attacks and a limited inventory of ALE-70 fiber optic towed decoys, which can limit range during repeated engagements in dense threat environments.
The introduction of an active sacrificial decoy adds a critical outer layer to the F-35’s defensive system, extending survivability once stealth advantages begin to erode. In a high-level conflict scenario, where the aircraft may be exposed to multiple engagement zones during a deep strike, enemy air defense suppression, or carrier-based power projection missions, the availability of BriteCloud provides an additional means to break missile lock and maintain the aircraft’s low observable profile without relying solely on continuous onboard jamming.
The selected system aligns with the BriteCloud 218 variant, a compact version of Leonardo’s original 55 mm BriteCloud projectile. Measuring 2 inches by 1 inch by 8 inches, BriteCloud 218 is designed to be compatible with standard US-manufactured countermeasure dispensers, such as the AN-ALE-47, allowing for rapid field deployment without major aircraft modifications. The decoy meets the Navy’s requirements for full mission programmability under US government control, has demonstrated radio frequency countermeasure effectiveness at Technology Readiness Level 9 and Production Readiness Level 9, confirming proven performance under relevant operational conditions and established low-rate production capability.
The US Air National Guard’s Foreign Comparative Testing program played a key role in validating the technology for US service. Following successful tests on F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft in 2022, the Guard issued a formal recommendation for engagement, confirming both the effectiveness of the decoy against representative threats and its minimal integration burden. Navy officials told Army Recognition that these results provided a high degree of confidence that the system could be transitioned to the F-35 with limited software updates and no structural modifications, preserving the aircraft’s characteristic handling characteristics.
Technically, BriteCloud is a second-generation, disposable active decoy. Unlike traditional towed decoys, which remain physically connected to the aircraft via a cable to receive power and data, BriteCloud is a fully autonomous, battery-powered jammer installed in the same manner as a conventional flare or chaff cartridge. Once ejected, it quickly creates spatial separation from the host aircraft, presenting itself as a more attractive target for incoming missiles. Its onboard processor analyzes incoming radar signals, cross-references them with a preloaded threat library, and generates a highly realistic false target by manipulating Doppler, range, and velocity parameters.
Leonardo engineers emphasize that the decoy’s ability to simultaneously provide pull-off action and speed is essential against modern missiles equipped with advanced electronic countermeasures, including home-on-jamming seekers designed to exploit traditional jamming emissions. By simulating a signature that approaches or exceeds that of the aircraft, BriteCloud lures the missile completely away, ensuring that both the interceptor and its fragmentation pattern miss the protected platform.
The production timelines outlined in the contract notice indicate that initial deliveries could begin as early as four months after contract award and no later than ten months, with all decoys delivered within twelve months of the first delivery for each contract period. Annual procurement volumes are estimated to range between 3,000 and 6,000 units, supported by spare parts, repairs, and on-site field service representatives. Although the F-35 has already completed integration and testing, leading to a formal implementation decision, a separate decision on integration on the F-A-18E-F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler fleets is anticipated around 2027.
Strategically, the award highlights the US Navy’s recognition that stealth alone is no longer sufficient against proliferating high-frequency radars and networked missile systems. By combining low observability, sensor fusion, advanced onboard electronic warfare, towed decoys, and now active sacrificial decoys, the F-35 is being shaped into a much more resilient multi-domain attack platform for high-level conflicts. For Leonardo UK, the contract firmly establishes BriteCloud as a central element of Western airborne self-protection at a time when electronic warfare is returning as a decisive factor in modern air combat.
Source: here
China’s strategic disguise revealed: PLARF disguises DF series ICBM launcher as a Zoomlion crane to avoid satellite surveillance
Open-source imagery from late December 2025 shows that the PLARF has disguised its Dongfeng series ICBM launcher as a Zoomlion crane, thereby complicating enemy ISR, suppressing the decision-making cycle, and bolstering the credibility of China’s second-stage nuclear counterattack in the Indo-Pacific.
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(ASIA DEFENSE SECURITY) — In an era where satellites constantly monitor the movement of strategic military assets, algorithm-based pattern recognition operates nonstop, and intelligence platforms operate around the clock, China has quietly manifested a form of strategic disguise when the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) disguises its Dongfeng (DF) series portable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launcher as a civilian construction crane. It was issued by Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science and Technology, a move that fundamentally complicates the adversary’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities while bolstering the credibility of Beijing’s second-stage nuclear counterattack capabilities.
This camouflage strategy first came to light through open-source imagery and analysis in late December 2025, which showed DF series ICBM Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) encased in a removable yellow shell, complete with Zoomlion-style branding and a crane-like silhouette, a method that allowed these nuclear weapon delivery systems to disappear into China’s vast public logistics ecosystem while exploiting the visual saturation of heavy construction equipment throughout the country.
This approach is a long-established doctrinal logic in China’s strategic culture, as a defense analysis states that such a move “aims to conceal the movement and parking locations of missile launchers, thus complicating the visual recognition and surveillance of China’s mobile strategic forces,” a statement that sums up how elements of deception, mobility, and ambiguity are deliberately incorporated into PLARF operational grammar.
The implications go beyond simple masking, as these tactics challenge long-held assumptions about the visibility of nuclear forces, the stability of early warning, and arms control verification in Asia, while highlighting how China is adapting its nuclear deterrence capabilities to survive and operate under the most intrusive surveillance conditions it has ever experienced in the history of strategic weapons.
By absorbing strategic nuclear assets into the visual and logistical fabric of the Chinese public economy, Beijing has effectively weaponized normality itself, turning everyday industrial movements into shields against sensitive targets and compressing the decision-making cycle on the other side into an atmosphere of profound uncertainty.
This approach exploits a critical weakness in modern ISR architectures, where machine learning-based pattern recognition systems still rely on visual indicators of probability, commercial datasets, and contextual assumptions that can be deliberately “poisoned” by mimicking state-backed public platforms.
Strategically, this TEL, disguised as a crane, reinforces China’s guarantee of a second-stage counterattack not by simply increasing numbers, but by raising the operational and political costs of preventive action to a level that risks triggering miscalculation and catastrophic escalation.
Taken together, these camouflage tactics signal the maturity of China’s nuclear deterrence philosophy, which increasingly prioritizes viability through ambiguity and systemic friction over transparency, thereby reshaping the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific, characterized by constant surveillance but with declining certainty.
The Dongfeng missile family and the logic of mobility
The Dongfeng missile family, whose name means “East Wind,” forms the backbone of China’s land-based nuclear deterrence and represents the most resilient pillar of the country’s evolving nuclear triad, with modern road-mobile systems designed specifically to undermine adversaries’ confidence in the success of preemptive strikes.
At the heart of this force is the DF-41, China’s most advanced intercontinental ballistic missile, with an estimated range of over 12,000 kilometers, placing the continental United States and much of Europe within range, while also allowing for long-range launches within China, beyond the reach of sea or air attacks.
The strategic importance of the DF-41 is further enhanced by its multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), with estimates suggesting it can carry up to 10 nuclear warheads, each with an explosive power measured in hundreds of kilotons, thus allowing a single launcher to threaten multiple hardened targets or destroy missile defense systems through saturation.
Mounted on a large multi-axle launcher, the DF-41 can move quickly on a road network, deploy from an unprepared location, and transition from movement to launch readiness in a matter of minutes, a feature that turns geographic depth and civilian infrastructure into an active component of deterrence.
Complementing the DF-41 is the DF-31 family, including the DF-31A and DF-31AG variants, which offer a range of approximately 8,000 to 11,000 kilometers and retain the same basic survivability features, such as solid-fuel propulsion, road mobility, and rapid launch capabilities.
These systems are operated by dispersed PLARF brigades, which typically house between six and 12 launchers each, supported by a network of underground tunnels, hardened covers, and pre-cased launch sites, forming what analysts often describe as a “shell game” of strategic missiles.
China’s emphasis on mobility is no coincidence, but rather reflects Cold War lessons about the vulnerability of fixed silos, as well as contemporary assessments that precision-guided conventional strike systems, hypersonic weapons, and cyber ISR have eroded the viability of static nuclear forces.
Western estimates now put China’s operational stockpile of nuclear warheads at over 350, with projections that could reach 1,000 by 2030, a trajectory that makes the survivability of each launcher not just a tactical issue, but a key pillar of strategic stability.
Public disguise as a strategic weapon
The decision to disguise the DF series TEL as a Zoomlion construction crane reflects the planned exploitation of China’s vast and dense industrial environment, where heavy machinery routinely travels on highways, industrial areas, and suburbs without attracting the attention of the public or automated surveillance systems.
Zoomlion, based in Changsha, Hunan province, is one of the world’s largest construction equipment manufacturers, producing a wide range of all-terrain cranes and heavy vehicles that visually resemble DF series missile launchers in terms of scale, number of axles, and structural mass.
One of the company’s main products, the ZAT24000H all-terrain crane, uses a nine-axle chassis and is capable of lifting up to 2,400 tons, dimensions nearly equal to the proportions of large ICBM TELs and providing a reasonable civilian analogue for such vehicles on public roads.
The camouflage observed on the DF series launchers consists of a removable yellow casing designed to mimic the upper structure of the crane, complete with a forged operator’s cab, ballast forms, warning signs, and industrial logos that transform a nuclear delivery system into what appears to be routine construction equipment.
A subtle but revealing detail is the color scheme, as pure Zoomlion cranes are usually painted green or blue, while these camouflaged TELs are displayed in bright industrial yellow, an option that analysts believe is optimized not for human observers, but to fool satellite image recognition algorithms trained using global datasets that associate construction equipment with yellow.
From a top-down or distant perspective, particularly via electro-optical satellites or synthetic aperture radars conducting wide-area searches, these camouflaged launchers blend in with the noise of civilian logistics, dramatically increasing the analytical time and effort required to identify them as military assets.
At close range, this deception is much less convincing, as the dark green military chassis, reinforced structural elements, and absence of a real crane articulation point become apparent, but this limitation underscores the real purpose of the tactic, which is to defeat rapid detection rather than withstand detailed inspection.
It is important to note that these hosts can be quickly removed, allowing the TEL to transition from covert transit mode to launch configuration without significant delays, ensuring that concealment does not affect response or readiness.
Kren Zoomlion
Exposure to these covert tactics does not come from staged information leaks, but rather from the growing power of open-source intelligence, when images and videos distributed on Chinese social media platforms in late 2025 caught the attention of independent analysts who detected inconsistencies with known public crane models.
High-resolution images reveal vehicles with an extraordinarily reinforced chassis, atypical axle spacing, and proportions corresponding to known DF-series TELs, rather than commercial construction equipment, prompting a detailed side-by-side comparison with certified rocket launcher configurations.
Satellite imagery further confirms this finding, showing similar vehicles covered with yellow camouflage inside the PLARF base and along known missile transit routes, including forested and semi-rural areas where additional camouflage nets enhance protection against optical and infrared sensors.
In one notable sequence, a launcher disguised as a crane is seen parked near a wooded area, its yellow host partially protected by foliage, demonstrating how public camouflage can be combined with a natural terrain mask to create a multi-domain deception cover.
Video footage circulating online shows this convoy of vehicles traveling on public roads, complete with warning signs and escort patterns compatible with heavy industrial transport, thus reinforcing the image of routine public activities rather than strategic troop movements.
Previous precedents show that this is not an isolated innovation, as similar camouflage has been used on armored vehicles since 2020, signaling a deliberate and evolving doctrine rather than an experimental anomaly.
These developments illustrate how China is systematically refining its deception techniques, integrating lessons from global surveillance trends and adapting them to the increasingly transparent reality of the battlefield.
Strategic Impact on Regional Deterrence and Stability
By absorbing its most sensitive nuclear assets into civilian traffic patterns, China significantly complicates the adversary’s targeting calculus, as the task of distinguishing between missile launchers and cranes in real time becomes a matter of probability rather than certainty.
In crisis scenarios, such as the Taiwan standoff, these camouflaged TELs have the potential to survive an initial wave of conventional or nuclear attacks, preserving China’s ability to execute counter-launches and thus bolstering the credibility of its first-use doctrine by guaranteeing a second-strike capability.
From the perspective of the United States and its allies, this tactic undermines confidence in ISR dominance, as even sophisticated satellite constellations and artificial intelligence-based analytics may have difficulty distinguishing genuine civilian assets from large-scale covert strategic weapons.
The risk of miscalculation also increases when the adversary is forced to assume the worst-case scenario, which can lead to over-targeting or planning a larger attack, increasing the risk of escalation during conflict.
Regional actors, including Japan, India, and South Korea, must now consider China’s more opaque nuclear posture, where the viability of launchers is enhanced not only by geography and fortification, but also by deliberate fusion with public life.
In terms of arms control and confidence-building efforts, such concealment poses serious challenges, as the verification regime has traditionally relied on observable differences between military and civilian systems, differences that are now deliberately obscured by this approach.
A senior international defense researcher once characterized China’s strategic culture as one that prioritizes surprise and concealment, noting that “China’s emphasis on deception and surprise is rooted in its strategic culture, where concealing capabilities until the moment of determination is the key to victory,” a perspective that aligns closely with the observed use of crane camouflage.
The military-civilian coalition and the economy of disguise
The use of Zoomlion-style camouflage is a clear example of China’s military-civilian coalition strategy, in which civilian industry, technology, and infrastructure are used to increase military efficiency without obvious militarization.
Zoomlion’s scale provides a particularly effective backdrop for such scams, with the company reporting revenues of approximately 45.5 billion yuan, equivalent to approximately $6.4 billion or RM30.1 billion, a figure that underscores the prevalence of its equipment in China’s industrial landscape.
In such an environment, the presence of large, multi-axle yellow vehicles does not attract attention, allowing military movements to be concealed not through secrecy, but through statistical normality.
However, this combination carries its own risks, as the concealment of civilian and military identities has the potential, in a war situation, to expand the range of assets considered legitimate targets, thereby endangering actual civilian equipment and infrastructure.
Critics argue that such practices erode long-standing norms designed to protect public commerce, while proponents point out that in an era of rigorous surveillance, survival requires creative adaptation.
From a technological standpoint, the integration of civilian design cues into military platforms also accelerates innovation, as seen in the new TEL concept that includes an electric powertrain, advanced suspension system, and improved off-road mobility inspired by heavy commercial vehicle engineering.
Source: here
The Chinese Navy’s CCA and UCAV reveal the clearest picture yet and signal the beginning of a new era of maritime warfare with drones
High-resolution images from Shanghai show how China is accelerating the integration of combat drones on ships to reshape the maritime balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
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(ASIA DEFENSE SECURITY) — The emergence of the clearest and closest images yet of China’s Cooperative Combat Aircraft (CCA) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) mock-ups marks a crucial strategic turning point in the evolution of maritime air power, with the visual evidence providing a remarkable window into how Beijing is structurally and systematically building a future battlefield that will be dominated by autonomous systems, the concept of distributed destruction, and carrier-based drone warfare, all designed to reshape the military balance of power across the Indo-Pacific.
The high-resolution images, filmed at the Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard in Shanghai and which spread rapidly on various Chinese social media platforms before going global, show several drone skeletons with stealth capabilities stationed in the dock area, within striking distance of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) newest amphibious assault ship, the Type 076 Sichuan.
It sends a clear signal that China has moved from the conceptual experiment phase to the testing phase of deck-based unmanned combat operations.
“This is the closest and clearest image yet of this new Sea CCA and UCAV model,” according to one analytical observation, while another statement described the development as “another surprise… New images have been released of CCA and UCAV mock-ups to be tested aboard the Type 076,” a series of statements that collectively argue that China’s unmanned maritime flight program has now moved from speculative assessment to openly observable reality.
The images reveal at least six different models of the CCA category, in addition to what appears to be a variant of the Wing Loong that has been evaluated, with the arrangement, orientation, and physical position very close to the flight deck infrastructure, strongly suggesting that these platforms are ready for integration on a ship clearly designed as a hybrid aircraft carrier for drones. instead of conventional amphibious assault ships.
Taken together, these photos are not just a routine snapshot of shipbuilding industry activities, but rather serve as a strategic signal that China is accelerating its efforts to achieve unmanned maritime dominance, at a time when tensions in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the rest of the Western Pacific region remain structurally unresolved and increasingly fraught with military elements.
China’s decision to allow such images to circulate — whether through controlled leaks or strategically calculated tolerances — also reflects a growing level of confidence in the country’s unmanned maritime flight roadmap, with visibility being used as a strategic communication tool aimed at regional competitors and external powers in the region.
The physical proximity of this model to the Type 076 Sichuan signifies not only technical readiness but also organizational maturity within the PLAN, where ship design, aircraft development, and operational doctrine formation are now developing in parallel and integrated fashion rather than in stages and in isolation.
By openly coordinating a CCA and UCAV with a visible profile alongside an amphibious aircraft carrier equipped with fixed-wing flight capabilities, Beijing is sending a clear signal about the doctrinal conflict between maritime control, sea denial, and expeditionary attack, which effectively compresses the traditional boundary between aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious landing forces.
This doctrinal conflict suggests that future PLAN operations will increasingly rely on unmanned systems to produce constant presence, sensor dominance, and attack depth, deliberately reducing the political and operational risks associated with losing pilots in high-intensity conflict scenarios or gray zone operations.
From a strategic deterrence perspective, these images serve as a subtle but powerful reminder that China’s naval modernization is no longer limited to hull numbers or missile stocks, but has decisively stepped into the realm of networked autonomy and mass-deployable maritime air power.
Ultimately, the clarity of these images underscores a profound reality now haunting the Indo-Pacific security order, namely that the era of experimental maritime drones is coming to an end, and a new era of unmanned aircraft carrier warfare — designed, built, and deployed en masse by China — has already begun.
From experimental UAVs to networked combat assets: the evolution of China’s maritime drone doctrine
China’s rapid rise in the development of unmanned aerial systems reflects a long-term doctrinal shift dating back to the early 2000s, when the People’s Liberation Army identified autonomous platforms as a critical asymmetric tool to offset the technological and quantitative advantages of Western air and maritime power operating in the Pacific theater.
China’s early UAV program focused primarily on reconnaissance and target acquisition missions, but the country’s continued investment, combined with a broad industrial ecosystem and a culture of iterative prototyping, has produced a generation of combat drones optimized for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare, precision strikes, and collaborative operations with manned aircraft.
The public appearance of the GJ-11 UCAV “Sharp Sword” at the 2019 military parade marked a major turning point, revealing that China had mastered stealth formations, land-based weapon carriage, and low-profile exhaust integration — capabilities previously monopolized by a few of the world’s major aerospace powers.
By 2024, satellite images showing a GJ-11-like mock-up near the Type 076 construction site offer early indications that Beijing intends to expand its stealth UCAV operations beyond land-based airports into the maritime domain, in line with the PLA’s overall effort toward what it calls “rotational” warfare.
The CCA concept currently under development resembles, but does not fully replicate, the West’s “loyal wingman” program, emphasizing quantity, affordability, and modularity, with Chinese designs that would be optimized for subsonic operations, internal precision-guided munitions carriage, and mission flexibility rather than exotic high-profile performance.
Observable design cues from the latest mock-up — including lambda wings, kite-shaped canard planes, dorsal engine intake, and slanted tail surface — show a clear preference for reducing radar cross-section and managing infrared signatures, signaling that these platforms are designed to survive and operate in contested air defense environments.
Unconfirmed but widely assessed payload options include China’s precision-guided munitions, such as the FT-8 series, small-diameter glide weapons, and electronic attack packages, allowing UAVs to serve as attack multipliers, decoys, or sensor nodes in the broader network-centric architecture of destruction.
The strategic logic behind this approach is clear, as unmanned platforms allow China to rapidly increase its combat mass at a fraction of the cost of manned aircraft, with estimates suggesting that advanced UCAVs can be produced at a cost well below $10 million per unit, equivalent to approximately RM47 million, compared to over $80 million (approximately 375 million RM) for modern 4+ generation fighter jets.
Type 076 “Sichuan”
Type 076 Sichuan: China’s hybrid drone aircraft carrier and the rewriting of amphibious warfare
At the operational core of this wave of unmanned flight is the Type 076 Sichuan, a platform weighing approximately 44,000 tons that fundamentally redefines the role of amphibious assault ships by including fixed-wing flight capabilities previously associated only with aircraft carriers.
Launched in August 2024 and commissioned in November 2025, the Type 076 is equipped with an electromagnetic launch system as well as landing arresting gear, allowing for the launch and recovery of fixed-wing drones alongside helicopters and, potentially, manned tiltrotor aircraft.
Recent images of sling test vehicles, deck markings, and drone mock-ups placed on the flight deck confirm that Sichuan was configured from the outset as a drone-centric flight platform, not as a secondary aviation asset.
The ship’s spacious flight deck, super-island structure, and interior mission space appear to be optimized for unmanned operations, including command and control nodes, data fusion centers, and maintenance facilities tailored for high rates of drone mission generation.
This configuration allows the PLAN to overcome long-standing constraints in maritime transport capabilities and aircraft carrier availability by deploying a platform capable of supporting air operations in scenarios ranging from the Taiwan crisis and forced patrols in the South China Sea to power projection in the Indian Ocean.
With a displacement weight nearly equal to that of the US Navy’s America-class assault ships, the Type 076 effectively bridges the gap between China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers and the country’s amphibious forces, while also providing flexible tools for gray zone operations that reduce the risk of escalation but maintain a constant presence.
By integrating drone flights into the amphibious hull, Beijing has gained the ability to project air power without risking high-value aircraft carriers, thus preserving its flattop assets for high-intensity conflicts while using unmanned platforms for daily strategic stress.
Anatomical mock-up: Design philosophy, navalization, and the role of operations
This mock-up now on display reveals a family of unmanned platforms, not a single design, signaling a modular approach in which different aircraft structures fulfill specific roles in carrier-based ecosystems.
The main CCA mock-up appears to have a medium-sized fuselage, rearward-swept lambda wings, and two outward-swept tail fins, with a shape ratio suggesting a mission focused on endurance versus high-speed interception.
The outline visible under the protective cover shows reinforced landing gear, as well as the possible integration of arresting hooks, confirming that these platforms are designed for catapult takeoff and arresting landing, not just ground takeoff.
A larger, tailless design has also been identified, closely resembling the GJ-21 naval UCAV variant, with a stealth design optimized for deep-penetration maritime strikes, high-value ISR, and electronic warfare missions.
The presence of what appears to be an evaluated variant of the Wing Loong suggests that China is also exploring the operation of a long-range medium-altitude drone from the Type 076 to provide continuous surveillance, target marking, and communications relay functions in disputed maritime space.
Advanced autonomy is believed to be at the heart of this design, with artificial intelligence enabling formation flying, dynamic task distribution, and real-time coordination with human assets such as the J-20 stealth fighter and KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft.
In the context of operations, these drones can serve as forward sensors, weapon carriers, or sacrificial decoys, overwhelming enemy defenses and allowing manned aircraft to launch attacks from a distance with less risk.
China’s emphasis on large-scale production means that, unlike Western programs that are limited by costs and procurement cycles, these maritime UCAVs could be deployed in large numbers, defeating adversaries’ defenses through mass advantage rather than individual platform superiority.
Indo-Pacific strategic implications and the future of maritime air power
The integration of UCAVs and UCAVs aboard the Type 076 has profound implications for regional security, particularly in the South China Sea, where China’s maritime claims overlap with some ASEAN countries.
Carrier-based drone operations will allow Beijing to maintain continuous air coverage of disputed areas, conduct surveillance and intimidation missions, and support amphibious operations without exposing pilots to risk.
In a Taiwan crisis scenario, these platforms could provide early-stage ISR support, electronic warfare, and strikes, thereby facilitating blockade or invasion operations while complicating defense planning for Taipei and its partners.
For the United States and its allies, China’s push toward unmanned maritime flight challenges long-held assumptions about aircraft carrier vulnerability and mission generation rates, forcing a reassessment of air defense, anti-UAS, and electronic warfare strategies.
Regional actors such as Japan, Australia, and India are likely to accelerate their autonomous programs and deepen security cooperation in response, potentially triggering a new phase of technological competition centered on autonomy, networking, and resilience.
In the long term, China’s ability to deploy large-scale, affordable drones from aircraft carriers has the potential to erode the qualitative advantages traditionally held by advanced navies, shifting the balance of competition toward parties capable of integrating mass, intelligence, and autonomy into a single coherent operating system.
The emergence of these images marks not only a technological achievement, but also a strategic turning point that underscores that maritime drone warfare is now moving from an experimental phase to an operational reality, with implications that will resonate in the Indo-Pacific security architecture for decades to come.
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AYYILDIZ 2025: Turkey and Pakistan’s elite maritime commands strengthen cooperation in special maritime operations amid Indo-Mediterranean tensions
This high-intensity special operations exercise reflects the strategic unification of Ankara and Islamabad in the face of hybrid maritime threats from the Arabian Sea to the eastern Mediterranean.
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(ASIA DEFENSE SECURITY) — In the cold winter air of Istanbul, as the Bosphorus Strait narrows into a natural strategic chokepoint connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, elite naval commandos from Turkey and Pakistan concluded a 12-day high-intensity joint exercise called AYYILDIZ 2025.
It was an event that went beyond bilateral exercises and became a planned demonstration of operational consolidation, strategic signaling, and deepening maritime security alignment between the two major Muslim powers operating at the end of the Indo-Mediterranean security spectrum.
The AYYILDIZ 2025 exercise brought together Turkey’s elite Su Altı Taarruz (SAT) command and the Pakistani Navy’s Special Services Group (SSGN).
Held between December 15 and 26, 2025, at the Turkish Navy’s Special Operations Command (SAT) Base in Istanbul, the exercise brought together Turkey’s elite Su Altı Taarruz (SAT) command and the Pakistani Navy’s Special Services Group (SSGN).
It brings together two of the world’s most secretive and experienced maritime special operations forces in a training program designed to improve joint operability, hone joint mission execution, and refine joint operations doctrine to address high-risk and complex maritime situations.
As the vector of regional maritime threats continues to evolve — from piracy and gray zone operations in the Arabian Sea, to maritime warfare, energy infrastructure disputes, and maritime terrorism in the eastern Mediterranean—the conclusion of AYYILDIZ 2025 highlights how special operations forces are increasingly positioned as the first line of response in contested coastal and blue-water environments, where conventional maritime power is increasingly inadequate.
The exercise also took place in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical context, with Turkey facing intensifying energy disputes and maritime competition in the eastern Mediterranean, while Pakistan simultaneously faces ongoing maritime threats from non-state actors, submarine proliferation, and strategic competition along the Arabian Sea coast, thus positioning AYYILDIZ 2025 as more than just a tactical exercise, but as a strategic rehearsal for future combined maritime security operations.
By integrating elite operators, platforms, and planning cells from both navies into a unified operational ecosystem, AYYILDIZ 2025 sends a clear message that Ankara and Islamabad are actively investing in a long-term military partnership based on high trust, capable of generating real operational impact across multiple maritime theaters.
Combining realism, secrecy, and operational pressure, the exercise demonstrates how two geographically separate but strategically aligned navies coordinate their special operational capabilities to address hybrid threats that increasingly blur the line between peace and conflict at sea.
AYYILDIZ 2025: Objectives, operational design, and evolution of the main bilateral special operations framework
AYYILDIZ, which means “Crescent and Star” in Turkish — a symbolic reference to the national emblem shared by Turkey and Pakistan — has grown since its inception in the late 1990s to become one of the most enduring and operationally relevant bilateral special forces training series outside the NATO framework.
The 2025 edition marks the significant maturation of this exercise, building on decades of accumulated operational experience while integrating lessons from contemporary maritime conflict areas, including the Black Sea, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean.
Hosted at Turkey’s SAT Command Base, the exercise leveraged state-of-the-art maritime training infrastructure, including simulated ship environments, “Ship-in-a-Box” container-based attack facilities, live-fire ranges for targets, and an integrated air-sea infiltration corridor designed to mimic the real operational pressures encountered in maritime deterrence and counterterrorism missions.designed to mimic the real operational pressures encountered in maritime deterrence and counterterrorism missions.
The core objectives of AYYILDIZ 2025 are intentionally formulated to enhance SAT-SSGN interoperability, refine common planning and execution procedures, exchange best tactical practices in the field of maritime special operations, and verify command and control compatibility in mission scenarios based on strict time constraints and intelligence.
Participants took part in a series of high-intensity activities, including live-fire exercises, sniper operations, visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) missions, helicopter infiltration using fast-rope techniques on moving ships, underwater combat diver operations, as well as integrated maritime counterterrorism scenarios involving multiple infiltration vectors.
Each training module is designed to test not only the individual skills of the operator, but also unit cohesion, communication discipline, and rapid decision-making in low-threat situations, which is a key feature of modern maritime security operations.
A defining feature of AYYILDIZ 2025 is the deliberate integration of the Turkish-Pakistani joint strike force, a methodological approach that requires operators to operate beyond their respective national doctrines while relying on NATO-influenced tactics, uniform weapons handling procedures, and universal special operations principles.
The highlight of the exercise was a high-profile demonstration of coordinated VBSS operations involving surface ships, rotary-wing aircraft, and high-speed infiltration boats, thus validating the ability of SAT and SSGN units to operate seamlessly in air, surface, and underwater domains in complex maritime combat spaces.
Although no official allocation figures have been disclosed, defense analysts estimate that 12 days of high-profile bilateral special operations exercises on this scale — involving live fire, aviation resources, specialized maritime platforms, and elite personnel — conservatively exceed $6 to $8 million, equivalent to approximately RM 28 million to RM 37 million, thus underscoring the strategic value that both governments place on this partnership.
The AYYILDIZ 2025 exercise brought together Turkey’s elite Su Altı Taarruz (SAT) command and the Pakistan Navy’s Special Services Group (SSGN).
Designed for the elite: The strategic profile of Turkey’s SAT Command and the Pakistani Navy’s SSGN
At the heart of AYYILDIZ 2025 operations are two elite special maritime units, whose reputations have been built through decades of secrecy, high-intensity training channels with high dropout rates, and operational missions in some of the world’s most dangerous security environments.
Su Altı Taarruz (SAT) Türkiye, established in 1963 and often compared to the US Navy SEALs, represents the Turkish Navy’s primary offensive special maritime operations capabilities, specializing in underwater demolition, reconnaissance, direct action, counterterrorism, and covert maritime missions.
Operating under a doctrine shaped by Cold War maritime confrontations and refined through post-Cold War regional conflicts, SAT commandos are trained to conduct high-precision operations in the Aegean Sea, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and beyond, i.e., in environments characterized by dense sensor coverage, contested coastlines, and complex political sensitivities.
SAT operators undergo some of the most difficult selection and training regimes among NATO allied forces, including HALO/HAHO parachuting, advanced combat diving, close combat, sniper operations, and maritime deterrence, resulting in a single force optimized for high-risk missions where political denial and operational accuracy are critical.
Complementing the SAT is Su Altı Savunma (SAS), responsible for underwater defensive operations such as mine resistance and port protection, together forming a comprehensive ecosystem of special maritime operations with offensive and defensive capabilities.
On the Pakistani side, the Navy’s Special Services Group (SSGN), established in 1966 after the 1965 India-Pakistan War, serves as the Pakistan Navy’s primary unconventional warfare force, with mandates covering covert infiltration, VBSS operations, maritime counterterrorism, and strategic reconnaissance.
Headquartered at PNS Iqbal, Karachi, and reporting to the Naval Strategic Forces Command, the SSGN traces its institutional origins to the US Navy SEAL training methodology, while integrating local operational training from conflict theaters in South Asia and West Asia.
SSGN training channels are known for their exceptional rigor, with dropout rates reported to exceed 80%, reflecting an emphasis on physical endurance, psychological resilience, and absolute operational discipline.
In terms of operations, the SSGN has accumulated extensive combat experience, from port defense and counterinsurgency operations during the 1971 conflict to counterterrorism missions against al-Qaeda-linked elements, as well as the defense of critical maritime infrastructure such as PNS Mehran and PNS Zulfiquar.
Often referred to as the “Iqbal Teams,” the SSGN reflects Pakistan’s strategic need to secure its maritime approach, protect maritime communication routes, and counter hybrid threats from state and non-state actors in the Arabian Sea.
The pairing of SAT and SSGN at AYYILDIZ 2025 is not just a symbolic collaboration, but the unification of two cultures of special maritime operations that are battle-tested and shaped by different but complementary strategic needs.
The AYYILDIZ 2025 exercise brought together Turkey’s elite Su Altı Taarruz (SAT) command and the Pakistan Navy’s Special Services Group (SSGN).
The Strategic Foundation: Turkey–Pakistan Defense Relations and the Maritime Dimension of the Seven-Decade Partnership
AYYILDIZ 2025 is best understood as a tactical manifestation of the much deeper strategic relationship between Turkey and Pakistan, a defense partnership that dates back to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1947 and is reinforced by shared geopolitical interests, ideological compatibility, and increasingly concentrated security challenges.
Formalized by the 1954 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and strengthened during the Cold War through frameworks such as CENTO, this bilateral relationship has evolved into a multidimensional defense partnership encompassing cooperation at sea, in the air, on land, and in the defense industry.
Naval cooperation has long been a pillar of this relationship, beginning with the Turgutreis series of exercises in the 1960s and progressively advancing to increasingly complex anti-submarine warfare exercises, maritime deterrence, and special operations.
A major milestone in recent years is Turkey’s $1.5 billion MILGEM corvette program for Pakistan — equivalent to approximately RM7.0 billion — which remains the largest defense export in Turkey’s history and a benchmark example of cooperation in the defense industry, technology transfer, and joint shipbuilding.
The program, which involves the construction of four MILGEM-class corvettes, two built in Istanbul and two in Karachi, has significantly enhanced the Pakistani Navy’s surface warfare and network-based operations capabilities, while also integrating Turkey’s naval design philosophy into the future architecture of the Pakistani fleet.
Flight and training cooperation also strengthens this partnership, with Pakistan providing training support for Turkish F-16 pilots and both sides exploring collaboration on TAI’s TF Kaan Türkiye next-generation fighter program.
Recent multinational exercises such as Doğu Akdeniz-2025 and Pakistan’s participation in the AMANs exercise in the Arabian Sea illustrate how Ankara and Islamabad are increasingly operating within overlapping multilateral security frameworks, thereby increasing the strategic weight of their bilateral alignment.
The awarding of Turkey’s Legion of Merit to the Chief of the Pakistani Navy, Admiral Naveed Ashraf, in August 2025, also underscores the political and institutional depth of this relationship, reflecting the continued commitment of the highest levels to defense cooperation.
In this context, AYYILDIZ 2025 does not appear as an isolated event, but as a critical node in a long-term strategic architecture designed to coordinate Turkey-Pakistan maritime power projection, crisis response, and special operational capabilities in an interconnected theater.
Strategic implications and future direction of SAT–SSGN collaboration
The strategic implications of AYYILDIZ 2025 extend beyond bilateral military exercises, positioning these exercises as a significant contributor to regional maritime stability along the arc stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea.
For Turkey, deepening special operations cooperation with Pakistan extends its strategic reach into the Indian Ocean region, counterbalancing diplomatic isolation in parts of the Mediterranean and bolstering Ankara’s role as a security provider beyond its immediate geography.
For Pakistan, continued engagement with Turkey’s special operations forces complements its military modernization efforts, improves interoperability with NATO-like standards, and strengthens its ability to counter hybrid maritime threats.
At the systemic level, increased SAT–SSGN interoperability contributes to the security of global maritime communication routes, energy transit routes, and critical maritime chokepoints that are increasingly threatened by piracy, terrorism, and state-sponsored gray zone activities.
As hybrid warfare evolves to include unmanned systems, cyber maritime sabotage, and information operations, exercises such as AYYILDIZ provide a flexible platform for adapting special operations doctrines to new threat vectors.
Looking ahead, the next edition of AYYILDIZ is expected to include unmanned surface and underwater systems, cyber-maritime integration, and expanded multinational participation, thereby enhancing the strategic relevance of this exercise.
As one defense official pointed out, such exercises are essential to ensure “effective and rapid coordination” in joint operations, while the Pakistani Navy has consistently insisted that its goal is “to build synergies, strengthen military ties, and improve interoperability between Special Operations Forces.”
In an era defined by superpower competition, disputed seas, and ongoing hybrid threats, AYYILDIZ 2025 is clear evidence that Turkey and Pakistan are not only practicing together but actively forming a common maritime security architecture based on trust, capability, and operational readiness.
The crescent moon and stars, united under the winter sky of Istanbul, now cast a longer strategic shadow over the world’s most contentious waters.
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Chinese Navy destroyer tests hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile at sea
YJ-20 launched from a Type-55 guided missile destroyer. PLA image
China’s surface combatants are set to receive a new anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability following final tests of the YJ-20 from a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) destroyer.
The launch of the new hypersonic missile took place aboard the Type 055 destroyer CS Wuxi (104). Chinese state media claimed that the YJ-20 successfully hit a maritime target at an unspecified distance.
When operational, the PLAN’s growing fleet of guided missile destroyers will have access to a long-range, difficult-to-intercept sea-attack missile that can keep US and Washington’s allies’ naval forces in the Indo-Pacific at bay.
Officially unveiled at China’s 2025 military parade, the YJ-20 was one of several missile systems dedicated to long-range precision strike and anti-ship missions presented by Beijing. A Janes report previously noted that the hypersonic design indicated a ble capacity to be carried in the vertical launch system (VLS) cells of PLAN surface combatants.
“With these characteristics, the YJ-20 will be a cornerstone of China’s A2/AD doctrine, due to its ability to penetrate layered defenses and deliver kinetic energy at hypersonic speeds, making it exceptionally difficult to intercept with current missile defense systems,” the Janes report stated.
Equipped with 112 vertical launch cells, the 10,000-ton Type 055 class is among the most capable guided missile destroyers built in the Pacific. China plans to commission a total of 16 units into PLAN service. Its domestically designed VLS system can support cold- and hot-launched munitions, including HHQ-9 surface-to-air missiles and YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles, and has been used on the Type 055 and Type 052D destroyer classes.
Ben Lewis, founder of PLATracker, an organization dedicated to monitoring Chinese military activity and development, told USNI News that the YJ-20 demonstrated “the significant progress Beijing has made in developing and deploying advanced capabilities designed to threaten US forces.”
“The YJ-20 is a remarkable capability because of its ability to maneuver on reentry. This makes defending against it much more complicated,” Lewis said. “It has a range of between 1,500 and 2,000 km, which, combined with its deployment from surface ships, will give the PLAN the ability to strike deep into the Pacific.”
However, Lewis also pointed out that the complex support and surveillance systems required to effectively operate these hypersonics at extended ranges “remain untested in real combat scenarios.”
The YJ-20 joins China’s expanding fleet of area denial weapons, which in recent years has grown to include an increasing number of maneuverable hypersonic missiles. ASBMs such as the DF-21D and DF-26 are touted by the Chinese military as “aircraft carrier killers” and “Guam killers.”
This year’s Pentagon report on China’s military power officially revealed the existence of a first-class intercontinental ASBM, the DF-27. The US Department of Defense claims that the missile could strike maritime targets up to 8,000 miles away.
Source: here
Thales to build AI mine warfare centers for the Royal Navy
Thales has secured a contract to design and deliver a new generation of Autonomous Remote Command Centers for the Royal Navy, a move intended to accelerate the transition away from manned minehunters and integrate artificial intelligence into the heart of future mine countermeasures.
Awarded by Defence Equipment and Support, the initial £10 million phase is structured to reach approximately £100 million as capabilities mature, forming part of the government’s transition to a hybrid navy.
The program aims to reorganize how the UK identifies and neutralizes sea mines by coordinating unmanned assets from compact, containerized control hubs housed on ships, bases, or land-based facilities. Thales positions this capability as the centerpiece of a systemic approach in which unmanned surface vessels, autonomous underwater vehicles, and sensor suites are integrated through a common operational picture, rather than separate platforms and software seams. Operators are expected to control and monitor multiple assets across domains from a single suite, rather than fragmented consoles.
At the heart of the system is the M-Cube mission management suite, already used by several allied navies. It underpins planning, tasking, and assessment for both autonomous and conventional mine clearance. The Royal Navy configuration pairs M-Cube with Mi-Map, an AI-enabled analytics tool designed to compress workloads by filtering and classifying data from underwater sensors at speed. Mi-Map uses machine learning to refine automatic target recognition through repeated operational use, with Thales arguing that it processes sensor inputs at a scale beyond human capability.
This AI stack is supported by cortAIx, Thales’ internal accelerator, which draws on approximately 800 specialists in critical systems, cyber, and advanced sensors AI. The group says cortAIx is designed to shorten the path between research, prototyping, and deployment capability by integrating iterative updates, rather than waiting for multi-year refresh cycles. This reflects the Department of Defense’s use of spiral acquisition for core field functions at the outset, then adding functionality and integrations as technology and feedback dictate.
The hardware is initially delivered as twin modular containers, with options to expand from shipboard installations to larger operational centers. Thales highlights the ability to remove personnel from the point of threat: isolated hubs allow missions to continue with sailors physically evacuated from mined waters, maintaining a naval presence without exposing crews to explosive hazards. The company says this directly addresses the increased risk to maritime infrastructure and chokepoints, which have become increasingly contested as state and non-state actors target seabed infrastructure and shipping lanes.
Paul Armstrong, General Manager for Underwater Systems at Thales UK, said: Thales is honored to continue its central role in providing mine countermeasure capability to the Royal Navy, building on our proven heritage. This new generation of autonomous command centers is part of a flexible suite of autonomous C2, from containerized solutions to shipboard operations centers or large land-based operations centers. By collaborating across the supply chain, we are committed to supporting the UK with world-class technology and promoting growth and high-value skilled jobs within our UK operations.
Luke Pollard, Minister for Defense Readiness and Industry, presented the agreement as both a capability and economic decision. By adopting autonomous maritime technology, the Royal Navy is pioneering innovation to help keep our sailors safe at sea. This is supported by a UK defense industry that delivers world-class capabilities that exemplify how defense acts as an engine for growth.
The broader threat environment cited by the Ministry of Defense includes Russian activity around underwater infrastructure, increased proximity operations in the North Atlantic, and the need to keep vital trade routes open under pressure. The isolated hubs are described as a tool for preserving freedom of navigation without relying on older vessels, which are becoming increasingly expensive to maintain and own.
Thales says the work will support over 200 skilled roles at locations in Somerset and Plymouth, in addition to the supply chain of British companies involved in autonomy, sensors, secure communications, and containerized systems.
Source: here
New Baltic study finds significant escalation of GNSS interference near Kaliningrad
A new technical study has recorded a significant escalation of GNSS interference in the southern Baltic Sea, with measurements on ships indicating a shift from simple jamming to coordinated spoofing-jamming activity near the Kaliningrad maritime border.
The follow-up research, shared with UK Defence Journal by GPSPatron, expands on a land-based monitoring project we reported on last year. The previous phase, conducted with Gdynia Maritime University, documented persistent multi-constellation jamming from a fixed sensor on shore. This latest six-month campaign placed a GP-Probe TGE2 system aboard a research vessel operating out of Port Gdańsk between June and October 2025, capturing interference exactly as it affects moving ships.
The results suggest a significant shift in the electronic warfare environment. According to the report, the most powerful events now combine false GPS signals with simultaneous jamming of GLONASS, Galileo, and BeiDou. The authors argue that this forces reliance on falsified GPS inputs while denying access to satellite-independent distances. They recorded 83.5% GNSS availability during the worst period and over four days of spoofing during June and July, including nearly 30 continuous hours in a 48-hour window.
Spectral analysis indicates multiple transmitters, not a single system. Four distinct signatures were identified: a spoofing transmitter, two chirp jammers in different bands, and an analog broadband jammer covering the entire L1 band. The report states that the near-simultaneous activation of these components implies a coordinated centralized network, while the different spectral fingerprints suggest multiple locations.
The technical profile has also changed. The previous study highlighted clean, wideband jamming consistent with modern systems. The new dataset shows simpler chirp jamming at higher power, combined with spoofing and older RF hardware with frequency instability. This combination, the authors say, indicates an environment where old, high-power systems and new spoofing tools are being used together.
The intensity of interference increases sharply offshore. Signals that appear weak in Gdańsk become significantly stronger in open waters, increasing by up to 15 dB as the ship approaches waters oriented toward Kaliningrad. This spatial gradient underpins the paper’s conclusion that maritime operators bear the brunt of the disruption, with fewer detectable effects on land-based infrastructure.
Stefan Majinovic of GPSPatron told us that the results provide a “rare, data-driven perspective” on an evolving threat landscape and that the company is making the raw data available for further analysis. The full report, including spectrograms and methodology, is available on the GPSPatron website.
Source: here
US Secretary of the Army briefed on British hybrid navy plans
The Royal Navy presented its plans for a “hybrid navy” and expanded use of unmanned systems during a visit by US Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll to Portsmouth.
Driscoll, who oversees modernization and resource allocation for approximately one million US Army military personnel and 250,000 civilians, met with First Sea Lord General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, and senior Royal Navy leaders. Discussions focused on how the UK intends to adapt its force structure, integrate autonomous platforms, and remain “ready for war,” as outlined in the Strategic Defense Review.
The visit included a tour of the experimental ship Patrick Blackett, where the Navy demonstrated equipment and systems currently being tested. This included Malloy T-150 quadcopters used to resupply ships and hard-to-reach locations, Puma remotely piloted surveillance aircraft, and scale models of unmanned platforms such as the XV Excalibur submarine and the Proteus rotary-wing drone.
Malloy aircraft were recently used operationally in the Indo-Pacific, transferring supplies between HMS Dauntless and HMS Prince of Wales during the 2025 aircraft carrier strike group deployment.
Royal Marines and 700X Naval Air Squadron personnel also briefed the US delegation on the frontline use of small unmanned systems and how they are shaping tactical concepts.
Jenkins said: “It is an honor to welcome the US Secretary of the Army to the Navy headquarters and show how the Royal Navy is driving innovation and adopting agile practices to evolve into a modern hybrid force. The Royal Navy is proud to stand shoulder to shoulder with our American partners in leading the revolutionary initiatives that are shaping the future of the US Army.”
Source: here
Attack on Ukrainian Black Sea ports: Russia targets critical infrastructure and damages civilian ship in Odessa
On Tuesday, Russia launched an attack on infrastructure in the Odessa region, damaging a civilian ship and facilities in the Black Sea ports of Pivdenni and Chornomorsk, according to statements by Deputy Prime Minister Oleksi Kuleba.
Kuleba reported that a civilian ship flying the Panamanian flag and loaded with grain was damaged, while storage tanks were also hit. One person was injured, he added on Telegram. “This is yet another targeted attack by Russia on civilian port infrastructure. The enemy is trying to disrupt logistics and complicate maritime transport,” Kuleba said. Despite the attack, both ports remained operational, he added.
The Odessa region is home to Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, which are essential to Ukraine’s foreign trade and economy, especially during the war. Ukraine is a major global producer and exporter of agricultural products. In the nearly four years of conflict, the role of the ports of Odessa, Pivdenni, and Chornomorsk has grown significantly as other Ukrainian ports have been destroyed or occupied by Russian forces.
Recently, maritime tensions between Ukraine and Russia have escalated. Both countries have carried out attacks on naval and commercial targets in the Black Sea and beyond. Ukraine is increasingly using maritime drones to attack ships connected to Russia’s unofficial fleet, which transports Moscow’s sanctioned oil.
Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its attacks on the city of Odessa and its infrastructure. Vladimir Putin is increasingly talking about his goal of “liberating Novorossiya,” which would allow him to gain control of the Danube railway station, blocking Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea.
Source: here
Russia has again attacked the port infrastructure of the Odessa region: a grain ship has been damaged
Russia has again attacked the port infrastructure of the Odessa region. A civilian grain ship flying the Panamanian flag was damaged.
According to CTS, this was announced by the Deputy Prime Minister for Reconstruction – Minister of Community and Territorial Development, Oleksiy Kuleba.
As a result of the enemy attack, damage was recorded to facilities in the ports of Pivdenny and Chornomorsk.
According to preliminary information, one person was injured. Rescuers are working on site – the elimination of the consequences continues.
Oil storage tanks at one of the industrial enterprises were damaged. A civilian grain ship flying the Panamanian flag, which was in the port, was also damaged.
“This is another targeted attack by Russia on civilian port infrastructure. The enemy is trying to disrupt logistics and complicate navigation. Despite the shelling, seaports continue to operate in accordance with security requirements,” the official said.
Source: here
Peace plan for Ukraine “scares us to death,” officials say
KIEV, Ukraine — A maximum of 800,000. That is how many soldiers the Ukrainian army would be allowed to have under the current 20-point peace framework — a 20% reduction from the approximately one million currently armed, but a significant increase from the 600,000 initially proposed.
This higher number was a concession won by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after weeks of resistance. But it is still a ceiling for a force built up over nearly four years of war with Western weapons, Western training, and Western intelligence.
Russia faces no equivalent limit.
Nearly four years ago, Moscow expected Kyiv to fall in three days. Instead, Ukraine buried its dead in mass graves from Bucha to Izium, watched Mariupol’s defenders disappear into Russian filtration camps, counted the tens of thousands of children, according to the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, who were taken across the border — and kept fighting.
Zelenskyy said that more than 45,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed and 390,000 wounded in a February interview with Piers Morgan — about 1 in 20 of the country’s fighting-age men, according to The Economist.
The army that paid for every kilometer in bodies is now being asked to shrink, cede the ground it still holds, and accept guarantees that even its allies cannot explain.
It is one of many sticking points that have plagued negotiators since November — dismissed as naive by the Ukrainians and treated as a baseline demand by Moscow. The figure of 800,000 should be the compromise.
But the current frameworks offer little in terms of stifling Russian hostilities, retired Lt. Gen. James Mattis, former commander of U.S. Army Europe and one of NATO’s most experienced voices on the alliance’s eastern flank, told Military Times.
“Who benefits from this?” he told Military Times. “Russia.”
The framework, handed to Moscow on December 24, proposes a demilitarized zone along a line that Russia did not capture on the battlefield, according to The Washington Post. It offers “Article 5-like” security guarantees, Hodges noted, which even US officials have struggled to explain.
It also calls on Ukraine to hold the line against an adversary whose response to the current peace talks, according to Zelenskyy, came in the form of nearly 500 drones and 40 missiles over Kyiv last weekend, an attack that killed two people and left a third of the capital without power, according to Reuters. The wartime leader arrived at Mar-a-Lago the next day.
“Russian representatives are engaged in lengthy discussions,” Zelensky wrote on Saturday, “but in reality, the Kinzhalii and Shahed [drones] speak for themselves.”
The pattern continued on Monday, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that Ukraine had attacked Putin’s residence in Novgorod with 91 drones overnight — an accusation that Zelensky called a lie and “an attempt to undermine peace negotiations,” according to Reuters.
In response, Lavrov said Moscow would “review” its negotiating position and that targets for retaliatory strikes had already been selected.
The security architecture also remains in flux. US President Donald Trump offered Ukraine a 15-year security guarantee as part of a plan revised earlier that day — a commitment that Zelenskyy quickly called “powerful,” but which he extended to 30 or 50 years, citing the nearly 15 years since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
But the offer requires ratification by the US Congress and approval by the European Parliament, according to NPR — a procedural hurdle that could leave the guarantees undefined in practice.
Russia’s military has failed to crumble
The army that Moscow expected to collapse in 72 hours is now one of the most tested fighting forces in the world.
Nearly a million Ukrainians are now armed, trained on NATO weapons systems, integrated into Western intelligence-sharing networks, and hardened by nearly four years of high-intensity conventional warfare.
They have absorbed more lessons on the battlefield about drone tactics, electronic countermeasures, and decentralized command than any NATO army has learned in recent decades — and they have done so under fire. This is the force that the 20-point framework would limit to 20% less than its current size.
Hodges, who spent years planning for a possible Russian conflict from his headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany, sees the cap as an operational straitjacket.
“What Ukraine is being asked to do is politically and morally unacceptable,” he told Military Times.
Force limits aren’t just about the number of personnel, he explained. They restrict rotation cycles, training flow, and the ability to mobilize the capacity Ukraine would need if the ceasefire were to break down.
An army capped at 800,000 cannot regenerate as a warfighting force needs to — not while maintaining a 600-mile front and defending cities from nightly drone bombardments, while Russia builds toward a 2026 recruitment goal of 409,000 soldiers, said military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov in a year-end interview with Suspilne.
The latest on the US-led peace talks in Ukraine — and how leaks, deadlines, and changes in plans are already reshaping battlefield planning.
Ukraine’s booming drone industry is part of the equation, already surpassing the alliance it defends. Kyiv now claims a production capacity of four million first-person view drones annually — more than all NATO countries combined, according to Bloomberg — 96% of which are built domestically, according to Defense Minister Rustem Umerov.
The asymmetry was evident in September, when at least 19 Russian drones entered NATO airspace over Poland. Dutch F-35s and Polish F-16s were scrambled — supported by an Italian early warning aircraft, a Belgian tanker, and German Patriot batteries — to successfully shoot down only four of the 19, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.
Ian Kelly, former US ambassador to Georgia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, sees a clear pattern.
“You don’t accidentally send 20 missiles into Poland,” he told Military Times. “And it wasn’t the first time.”
The incident prompted Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to declare that Europe is already caught up in a “new type of war,” according to The Guardian.
Although the revised 20-point version increased the troop limit, it did not change the architecture. The army that has more experience fighting modern Russia than any other NATO army would still be locked into a force structure designed by Moscow — while the North Atlantic alliance watches as its most capable forward buffer is decimated by the enemy it was built to stop.
A pause that favors Moscow
An unenforced DMZ looks exactly like a new front line, according to Hodges. And the security guarantees that are now being promoted do not explain who responds when Russia tests them — which is why many Ukrainian and NATO planners, like him, see the current proposals as a freeze, not an end.
The retired lieutenant general pointed to Dayton. That agreement froze the lines in Bosnia, with US and NATO troops authorized to enforce peace through lethal action. Twenty-five years later, that framework still holds.
But the current proposals for peace in Ukraine offer no equivalent.
“We had Minsk-1 and Minsk-2,” Hodges said. “You had a ceasefire, you had observers, and the Russians looked the other way. It never rose to the level of it.
“If there is going to be a demilitarized zone or separation zone, as we had after the Dayton Peace Accords, there will have to be Europeans and Canadians there with real capability — with the authority to respond immediately when Russia violates it.”
Who, Hodges wondered, would then fly reconnaissance over the buffer zone? Who responds when Russia probes the line — under what authority and within what time frame? And with the line of contact changing daily even now, which positions on which day get blocked?
“If you don’t have someone there who is a credible deterrent, the Russians won’t respect it,” he added. “And I don’t think any serious person believes they will.”
Even if the skies become quiet, the mission does not — a temporary halt to the war does not mean Ukraine can retreat. The front line still needs to be monitored; Air defenses must continue to cover cities and forward positions; ammunition must continue to flow; medevac chains must remain operational; rotation cycles must be maintained.
A senior European diplomat, granted anonymity by Military Times to discuss sensitive negotiations, said that even with a ceasefire and DMZ, the security needs of China and Europe will not subside. Russia will continue to probe.
“The only reason it’s still called hybrid warfare is because we decided to call it hybrid,” he said.
The pattern is already clear: drones have already penetrated NATO airspace. Sabotage plots and cyberattacks have been uncovered across the continent, and US investigations of Russia stop short of triggering Article 5.
“When does it cross the line?” he added. “When do we have a Sarajevo moment?”
Security guarantees should close these resource and security gaps while preventing a return to war — but they don’t, the diplomat said. And everyone at the negotiating table knows it.
“Does anyone really believe that this administration would respond to a Russian drone attack on Ukraine as it would a Russian drone attack on New York or Washington?” Hodges asked, referring to the “platinum” guarantees that US officials proposed earlier this month.
“Of course not.”
Who pays to hold the line
Even if the guarantees hold, the math doesn’t add up: Russia can afford to prolong its invasion — Ukraine cannot.
World Bank data puts Russia’s GDP in 2024 at $2.17 trillion; Ukraine’s is $190.7 billion — an 11-to-1 ratio.
Ukraine bears the heaviest military burden in the world, over a third of its annual GDP, according to a SIPRI analysis. But Russia can afford to keep its war machine running in the long term: Moscow spent about 7.2% of its GDP on defense in 2025 — that’s 15.5 trillion rubles, roughly Ukraine’s entire annual economic output.
This imbalance shapes everything that follows, including how long Russia can sustain the war and how much external money Ukraine needs just to stay in the fight.
If sanctions are relaxed under any agreement, Russia’s defense industrial base will recover in a timeframe that Ukraine cannot match. Money is already a battle — the EU has spent months trying to unfreeze Russia’s frozen assets, with Belgium demanding additional guarantees that have stalled the process, complicating the EU’s efforts to turn frozen wealth into large-scale support for Ukraine, according to Politico.
The only thing that changes Putin’s math is that the war is too costly to continue.
“That’s how this war ends, when Russia can’t pay for what it’s doing,” Hodges said. “And we’re not going to get there by killing another half a million Russians. Putin doesn’t care about that.”
In his view, that means doing what European leaders have put off for three years: unfreezing the money in Belgium and sending it to Kyiv, imposing real sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft, and going after secondary buyers — Turkey, India, and China — that are keeping Russia’s oil revenues flowing.
Kelly explained that the only “consistent message” from Washington was “that there is no more ‘free lunch,’ no more big billion-dollar packages.”
Thus, European allies hold both the deterrence mission and the law of support, without the experienced partner around whom they built their most recent defense posture.
If the US slows down funding for Ukraine or European defense spending enough, or continues to avoid sanctions against Russia, the burden falls back on Europe — allies who must then support Ukraine and deter Russia at the same time, with a weaker forward buffer than they had before any agreement was signed.
“The Europeans have failed,” Hodges said, “which is why Putin calls European leaders ‘pigs’ — because he is pretty sure the Europeans won’t do what is necessary.”
If the West wants a peace plan that will hold, he added, it must do what the current frameworks do not allow: enforce violations in real time, keep Ukraine armed and funded, and make the war financially unbearable for Moscow.
“What we have done so far has not worked,” the diplomat acknowledged. “So how do we increase our support in a way that influences Moscow’s calculations?”
No one has answered that question yet. What they have is a framework that limits Ukraine’s military, leaves enforcement undefined, and asks allies to bear a burden they haven’t built the capacity to carry. It’s less a peace plan and more a stress test, officials say, and from Europe’s perspective, it’s failing.
“We all see where this is going,” the diplomat said. “And it scares us to death.”
Source: here
Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Proves Its Worth Against Houthis
Once heavily criticized, the Littoral Combat Ship is proving its worth against Houthi threats, displaying unexpected combat effectiveness in a challenging maritime environment.
Warrior talks with Air Force general about Sentinel ICBM
by Kris Osborn, Warrior
The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship was perhaps the most criticized surface platform in naval history, as the ship received strong, high-level criticism in its early days and was later ridiculed and partially replaced for not being survivable enough.
Years ago, former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel reduced the planned size of the fleet by about 1⁄3 largely due to a chorus of concern that the ship simply wasn’t “survivable” enough to support the type of “blue water” maritime warfare challenges envisioned by the Navy facing high-power threats. This was the reason the Pentagon and the Navy launched the FFG Frigate program, described as a specific effort to design a more “survivable” type of LCS designed with space armor, longer-range weapons, over-the-horizon missiles, and a larger, more heavily reinforced hull.
LCS Too Weak
A few years ago, the Navy took its hesitation about the LCS so seriously that former Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro told the House Appropriations Committee that a large number of LCS ships must be retired because they simply cannot withstand an increasingly advanced Chinese threat in the Pacific.
“The problem we face with the eight we intend to decommission is the problems with the new ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) modules on these ships. The ships were designed to deal with a different threat, and it will be a challenge for these ships to contribute to the fight at the forefront,” Del Toro told Congress in 2022.
Del Toro’s comments were quite significant because they directly address the Navy’s overall conceptual and strategic shift from counterterrorism, counterpiracy, and Visit Board Search and Seizure missions to massive preparations for high-power warfare against advanced adversaries in the open seas. Key elements of this mission and threat-based readiness changes have been advocated since 2015, when the Navy revved up its concept of “distributed lethality.” This effort was designed to massively strengthen the entire surface fleet for high-power warfare on the open ocean. Ships such as the LCS have received new generations of weapons, drones, and anti-submarine technology as part of a fleet-wide strategic initiative to make the surface fleet much more lethal and capable of contributing key relevance to high-power warfare.
LCS to Frigate
Not long after the launch of the FFG(X) program, Navy weapons developers sought to plan the ship as more than just a more powerful version of the LCS, but rather a more heavily armed ship capable of being relevant in large-scale “open water” maritime warfare. There is still a great need for the naval frigate, especially given the problems associated with the Constellation-class frigates.
However, the grim reaper may have arrived too early for the LCS, at least to some extent, as the ship has not only become more lethal and survivable, but also designed to meet certain key requirements for surveillance, countermeasures, manned crew, and coastal or near-coastal reconnaissance, patrol, drone operations, and mine clearance. In terms of coastal surveillance, the LCS has had the ability to reach critical, high-risk waters that are impossible for deeper ships to operate in. This can bring the ability to find and destroy mines, access ports inaccessible to mail ships, launch drones, and conduct littoral reconnaissance closer to the enemy coast.
The LCS has also been able to launch and recover drones and helicopters while still launching anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, and countermine mission packages or technology suites specifically designed to integrate with ship-based command and control. The LCS mission packages have also shown promise, as they integrate otherwise disparate systems in a networked and coordinated manner for submarine hunting, coastal enemy engagement, and littoral reconnaissance.
LCS Against the Houthis
The controversial and much-criticized LCS appears to have proven its ability to add substantial tactical and maritime warfare support to ongoing warfighting operations in the Middle East, which is, of course, relevant to the Navy’s ongoing thinking regarding plans for its LCS fleet.
An interesting essay by the US Navy describing the homecoming of the USS Indianapolis, a free-class variant of the LCS, describes how the ship performed critical diplomatic, logistical, and navigation functions during the US Navy’s fight against the Houthis in the 5th Fleet’s area of responsibility in the Middle East.
As the workhorse of the Arabian Gulf, Indy performed the low-level missions necessary to maintain good diplomatic relations in the Middle East, which allowed standard missile launchers to reposition themselves to deal with bad actors in the Red Sea. I think it’s pretty special that we were able to provide the commander of the Fifth Fleet with more tools and options to help keep trade flowing freely through a contested waterway,” Cmdr. Matthew Arndt, commander of the USS Indianapolis, said in a Navy essay.
Source: here
Italy’s road to DDX destroyer tender begins now
Italy has set in motion the process for two next-generation DDX/DDG destroyers — an investment meant to refresh the Navy’s top air escort layer as Mediterranean threats continue to evolve.
In the last few hours, Italy has officially set in motion the procurement mechanisms for two new-generation destroyers — labeled DDG in official language and widely known as DDX — by publishing a prior information notice in the EU Official Journal. The notice indicates February 18, 2026, as the date when the actual procedure is expected to begin, with a total budget of approximately €2.7 billion (excluding VAT).
This is not just another shipbuilding line. By signaling a negotiated procedure conducted through OCCAR and already presenting Orizzonte Sistemi Navali (OSN) as the inevitable industrial equivalent, the Ministry of Defense is effectively locking in the governance, industrial architecture, and strategic intent of Italy’s next “flagship” surface combatants.
The notification matters because it turns years of studies into a timetable. OSN itself is pursuing the program through a contract dated December 15, 2021, focused on risk reduction and design definition for a “new generation destroyer (DDG),” divided into a feasibility phase and a project definition phase. Today’s step is the bridge from the conceptual design to a procurement that — crucially — already includes lifetime support and technological evolution throughout the ships’ lifetime, not just during construction.
Industrial continuity is the other key signal. Documentation presented in open sources describes the DDX as an evolution based on the FREMM EVO, with OSN highlighted as the holder of the relevant industrial and intellectual property rights that justify a negotiated path without a traditional open tender. In practice, Rome appears to be prioritizing program and integration risk over competition—an approach that may make sense when the goal is to deploy a complex combat system on a tight operational schedule.
Strategically, the program reinforces a simple reality: Italy wants to maintain a top-tier escort layer for carrier and amphibious groups and a credible area air defense capability for national and NATO missions in a Mediterranean that has become increasingly “missile-shaped” and saturated with drones. The DPP 2025–2027 framework discussed in Italian defense reports also points to a broader trajectory: the first two units are intended to replace the Durand de la Penne/Mimbelli, with additional ships planned later to replace the Doria-class destroyers.
Source: here
Spain confirms order for 30 Turkish Hürjet training aircraft worth €2.6 billion
In October 2020, Airbus announced its intention to develop a new training aircraft, called the AFJT [from Airbus Future Jet Trainer], to replace the F-5M Tigers used by the Ejército del Aire y del Espacio for the operational transition of its future fighter pilots. But despite promises of economic benefits, this project did not come to fruition, as the Spanish Ministry of Defense preferred another solution.
In fact, four years later, it signed a memorandum of understanding with the Turkish Secretariat of Defense Industries to develop an “advanced training system” based on the Hürjet training aircraft, then under development at Turkish Aerospace Industries [TAI].
Then, at the 2025 edition of the IDEF 25 arms fair, held in Istanbul last July, Airbus entered into a partnership with TAI to deliver thirty Hürjets to the Ejército del Aire y del Espacio before the end of this decade. This came after it took over the leadership of a consortium of Spanish companies [ITP Aero, INRA, Senet, etc.] responsible for developing an “integrated combat training system” [ITS-C]. All that remained was to wait for the contracts to be notified. That has just happened.
On December 29, the Spanish Directorate General for Armament and Materials confirmed the order for thirty Hürjet aircraft, awarding a €2.6 billion contract to Airbus Defence and Space, appointed as national project coordinator, and TAI.
Incidentally, with the exception of drones, this is the first time that a NATO and European Union member country has purchased a military aircraft designed in Turkey.
In detail, this contract includes the purchase of the Hürjets, their modernization to Spanish standards, the creation of an aircraft conversion center in Spain, the renovation of the training center of the Fighter School at the Talavera la Real air base, and the provision of an “integrated set of operation and maintenance services.”
This program will take place in two phases. The Hürjets will first be delivered in their original configuration between 2028 and 2029. These aircraft will then be modified by Airbus according to the requirements expressed by the Ejército del Aire y del Espacio. These aircraft will join the Talavera la Real base between 2031 and 2035.
“This ambitious program aims to create a state-of-the-art combat training system in Spain that meets the immediate needs of the air and space forces. It will also stimulate domestic industry participation, return on investment, and the development of capabilities, while ensuring Spain’s sovereignty throughout the process,” commented Jean-Brice Dumont, Head of the Air Power Division at Airbus Defence and Space.
As a reminder, the Ejército del Aire y del Espacio uses the Pilatus PC-21 to train its student pilots, as does its French counterpart. But unlike the latter, it has not abandoned the “jet” for their operational transition.
Source: here
Oil tankers from Azerbaijan and Turkey collided off the coast of Istanbul
Due to strong winds at anchor, the anchor chain of the Kalbajar oil tanker became entangled in the propeller of the nearby Alatepe.
Off the coast of Istanbul, two oil tankers collided due to strong winds. According to the Turkish Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, the ships were flying the flags of Azerbaijan and Turkey – Kalbajar and Alatepe, writes ЦТСCTS.
It is specified that the incident occurred at anchor. A rescue team and a Kurtarma-9 tugboat were immediately sent to the scene.
There were no deaths or injuries as a result of the accident.
Representatives of the Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company (ASCO, part of AZCON Holding) reported that due to strong winds at anchorage, the anchor chain of the Kalbajar oil tanker became entangled in the propellers of a nearby ship.
The relevant authorities were immediately informed of the incident.
“In accordance with current maritime safety protocols, port inspection specialists promptly arrived at the scene of the incident to assess the situation. Currently, service employees are performing appropriate technical work on both ships, and measures are underway to safely separate the vessels. At the time of the accident, there was no cargo on the ship,” the shipping company said.
Source: here
Since the beginning of 2025, there have been 90 combined strikes against Ukraine’s port infrastructure
In 2025, the intensity of strikes on port infrastructure has increased significantly. Thus, since the beginning of 2025, 90 combined strikes have been recorded. For comparison, this is twice as many as in the same period last year.
According to the CTS, nearly 800 air raid sirens have been sounded in the Odessa region alone since the beginning of the year, and their total duration exceeds 30 days, or more than a month.
With this in mind, the government, together with the Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority and with the support of partners, continues to expand the network of mobile shelters in all ports of the Odessa and Mykolaiv regions. More than 50 mobile facilities have already been installed to protect the population.
The number of stationary shelters is also growing—today there are over 30 in seaports.
According to Oleksiy Kuleba, Deputy Prime Minister for the Reconstruction of Ukraine – Minister of Communities and Territorial Development, it is important that port operators and private companies that have equipped dozens of their own protective structures join this activity.
Separately, according to him, the government is also working to strengthen the protection of the ports themselves. For security reasons, the details are not disclosed, he says, but systematic work is being carried out with the Armed Forces, in cooperation with other services and international partners.
Despite the enemy’s terror and daily bombings, the ports are functioning and logistics are being ensured at sea.
Every day, hundreds of port workers, power engineers, and specialists ensure the functioning of the logistics infrastructure and the stability of maritime export routes and continuously process goods.
Source: here