MS Daily Brief-en

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The Maritime Security Forum is pleased to provide you with a product, in the form of a daily newsletter, through which we present the most relevant events and information on naval issues, especially those related to maritime security and other related areas. It aims to present a clear and concise assessment of the most recent and relevant news in this area, with references to sources of information. We hope that this newsletter will prove to be a useful resource for you, providing a comprehensive insight into the complicated context of the field for both specialists and anyone interested in the dynamics of events in the field of maritime security.

CIA’s TERRIFYING “Ghost Murmur” Weapon in Iran EXPLAINED

https://youtu.be/DkmHh6eZoZs?t=1

MS Daily brief-9 April 2026

READ ALSO THE ARTICLE FROM THE MARITIME SECURITY FORUM

IRANIAN ATTACKS IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ: BETWEEN THE USE OF FORCE, ARMED ATTACK AND GREY ZONE OPERATIONS AS A FORM OF ZAHHAKIAN LIMINAL MARITIME AGGRESSION

Contents

Breaking news: Trump FREEZES the war with Iran; Israel STRIKES hard against Hezbollah | TBN Israel 1

Putin’s last gambit: the Kremlin’s little mouse, Orban. 1

Developments in the Middle East – Maritime Security Forum.. 1

The Middle East ceasefire risks collapsing amid Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Iran’s blocking of oil tankers. 3

At least 254 dead after Israel struck Lebanon with a massive series of air strikes. 7

Trump news in brief: the story of two ceasefires, as the US and Iran cite different conditions 10

NATO chief says Trump is “clearly disappointed” by US allies’ refusal to join the war against Iran 12

In a war with no winners, Netanyahu appears to be the biggest loser 14

Developments in Ukraine – Maritime Security Forum.. 17

Briefing on the war in Ukraine: the Kremlin’s threat to countries regarding the transit of Ukrainian drones 19

Recent developments regarding the ceasefire between Iran and the US: Regional and economic implications and possible scenarios – Maritime Security Forum.. 21

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has only 7 main vessels, and Ukraine is attacking them one by one – Maritime Security Forum.. 23

Turkey blocks LNG through the Bosphorus: Romania and Bulgaria, the new corridor for Ukrainian gas – Euronaval.ro. 25

Cable-laying vessels: The silent infrastructure that keeps the global internet running – Euronaval.ro 30

Strategic Lessons from the War in Iran – US-Israel Military Coordination and Strategic Transformations in the Persian Gulf – Maritime Security Forum.. 34

Rules, Power and Uncertainty in the Governance of Maritime Space – Maritime Security Forum 37

Chinese Gravitational Technologies and Implications for Maritime Security – Maritime Security Forum 38

The Illusion of Peace: What is Happening in the Middle East – Maritime Security Forum.. 39

Attack on the Feodosia oil terminal and regional implications – Maritime Security Forum.. 41

For the first time, Russian officials are discussing the possibility of establishing a buffer zone in the Vinnytsia region of Ukraine, near Transnistria – Maritime Security Forum.. 41

Breaking news: Trump FREEZES the war with Iran; Israel STRIKES hard against Hezbollah | TBN Israel

https://youtu.be/8-Fw0GyQWZw?t=1

Putin’s last gambit: the Kremlin’s little mouse, Orban

https://youtu.be/_hzx8iEY1o4

Developments in the Middle East – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 24 hours, the focus of developments in the Middle East has been on the Persian Gulf region, where the security situation has deteriorated rapidly, with direct implications for the global energy system and maritime security architecture. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz has become critical, as Iran has intensified its control and coercive measures over maritime traffic, citing the continuation of Israeli military operations in the region as justification. In practical terms, this is not a formal, complete closure of the strait, but rather the establishment of a regime of operational uncertainty – characterised by selective inspections, asymmetric threats and high risk for commercial vessels – which produces effects comparable to a partial blockade.

This strategy reflects a sophisticated use of ‘sea denial’ instruments, in which control is exercised not through classic naval dominance, but by creating an environment of risk sufficient to deter or delay commercial flows. Consequently, international shipping operators have begun to recalibrate their routes and temporarily suspend transits, which has caused significant disruptions to global supply chains. Given that a substantial proportion of global exports of oil and liquefied natural gas transit through Hormuz, the immediate effect is increased volatility in energy markets and rising transport and insurance costs. In strategic terms, Iran is thus able to externalise the pressure of the conflict onto the global economy, without entering into an open naval confrontation with Western forces.

At the same time, the fragile diplomatic framework represented by the temporary ceasefire between the United States and Iran is rapidly unravelling. Differences of interpretation regarding the scope of the agreement – particularly in relation to Israel’s military actions in Lebanon – have led to a crisis of trust between the parties. Iran considers that attacks on its regional allies undermine the spirit of the ceasefire, whilst Israel and its supporters assert that operations in Lebanon do not fall within its scope. This normative ambiguity, combined with the intensification of maritime tensions, significantly reduces the likelihood of the agreement being maintained and increases the risk of a return to direct hostilities.

The spread of the conflict to the northern front is confirmed by the intensification of Israeli military operations in Lebanon, targeting the infrastructure and capabilities of the Hezbollah organisation. The scale of the air strikes and the high number of casualties indicate a deliberate escalation, which goes beyond the logic of isolated deterrent actions. Hezbollah’s response, in the form of rocket attacks on Israeli territory, confirms the entry into a phase of intensified mutual confrontation. This development has a direct impact on the situation in the Persian Gulf, as Iran uses maritime pressure as an instrument of indirect response, reinforcing the interconnected nature of the theatres of operations.

Against the backdrop of these developments, the conflict is taking on an increasingly pronounced multi-front structure, through the continued involvement of proxy actors, including groups in Yemen, which are maintaining pressure on maritime routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This geographical distribution of tensions reflects a coherent regional strategy of power projection, in which Iran avoids concentrating its forces in a single theatre and prefers to create multiple points of instability, complicating the coordinated response of its adversaries.

From a naval strategic perspective, these developments confirm that the maritime domain has become the primary vector for escalating the conflict. The control or disruption of a choke point such as the Strait of Hormuz generates systemic effects that far exceed the regional scope of the confrontation. In this context, naval superiority can no longer be assessed exclusively in traditional terms, but must be analysed through the prism of the ability to ensure freedom of navigation in an environment characterised by hybrid, asymmetric and distributed threats.

The implications for Europe are immediate and significant. The increased maritime risks in the Persian Gulf translate into pressure on energy markets, with direct effects on economic costs and security of supply. At the same time, the need to maintain a robust Western naval presence in this area may lead to the redeployment of strategic resources, indirectly affecting other theatres of interest, including NATO’s eastern flank.

In this context, the Black Sea acquires increased strategic relevance, not through a direct operational link with the Persian Gulf, but through its integration into an extended security continuum linking the Eastern Mediterranean to the Pontic region. For Romania, this development has a dual dimension. On the one hand, the instability in Hormuz increases the strategic value of the Black Sea’s energy resources and associated infrastructure, transforming them into assets of European importance. On the other hand, the redeployment of Western naval attention and capabilities towards the Middle East may create relative vulnerabilities in the Pontic region, particularly in the context of an already tense security environment.

From an operational perspective, the lessons learned from recent developments are relevant to the configuration of Romanian naval capabilities. The focus must shift towards integrated maritime surveillance systems, mine warfare capabilities, the protection of offshore energy infrastructure and the use of unmanned platforms. In an environment where threats are predominantly asymmetric and below the threshold of open conflict, rapid response capability and interoperability with allies become essential.

In conclusion, developments over the last 24 hours confirm that the Persian Gulf is the current epicentre of the crisis, and it is the maritime dimension of the conflict that is generating the most far-reaching systemic effects. The spread of hostilities to Lebanon and the continued pressure on global maritime routes indicate a clear trend towards the regionalisation of the conflict, with direct implications for Europe’s energy and maritime security. For Romania, these developments underscore the need to consolidate a naval strategy adapted to the new realities, in which the protection of critical infrastructure, economic resilience and allied integration become central elements of national security.

Maritime Security Forum

The ceasefire in the Middle East risks unravelling, against the backdrop of Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Iran’s blocking of oil tankers

The inclusion of Lebanon represents a significant difference in the interpretation of the ceasefire agreed on Tuesday at the last minute

Middle East crisis – live updates

Julian Borger, Andrew Roth and David Smith

Thursday 9 April 2026, 00:10 CEST

The fate of the two-week ceasefire in the conflict with Iran appeared to be in jeopardy on Wednesday, as both sides presented divergent versions of what had been agreed, Israel intensified its bombing campaign in Lebanon, and Iran halted the passage of oil tankers due to an alleged breach of the ceasefire by Israel.

Iran and Pakistan, which brokered the last-minute ceasefire, both claimed that the ceasefire also included Lebanon.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu disagreed, and Israeli forces launched the war’s heaviest attack to date on over 100 targets, killing at least 254 people. Donald Trump, after initially remaining silent, stated that Lebanon represented “a separate conflict” and was not part of the agreement.

The scale of Wednesday’s Israeli attacks was condemned as “horrific” by the UN’s top human rights official, Volker Turk.

“Such a massacre, just hours after a ceasefire was agreed with Iran, defies belief. It puts enormous pressure on a fragile peace, which civilians so desperately need,” he said.

In a strongly worded statement, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, claimed that Israel and the US had violated several clauses of the provisional ceasefire and condemned Israel’s aggressive bombardment of Lebanon, as well as the US demand that Iran should not have the right to enrich its own uranium.

“In such a situation, a bilateral ceasefire or negotiations are unreasonable,” the statement said.

Although the statement did not announce Iran’s rejection of the ceasefire, it did indicate that tensions were at their peak less than 24 hours after Trump had announced that a ceasefire agreement had been reached.

The Iranian news agency Fars reported that oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz had been stopped following Israel’s “breach of the ceasefire”.

Iran was due to reopen the strait during the two-week ceasefire, and the price of oil fell sharply below $100 a barrel in the hours following the announcement of the truce, prompting a rise in global stock markets.

The news brought no immediate relief to the hundreds of loaded oil tankers stranded in the Gulf due to the conflict, which were awaiting approval from insurers before setting sail and reported ongoing interference with their satellite navigation systems.

The White House described as “false” the reports by Iranian state media regarding the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and stated that Trump expects it to be reopened “immediately, swiftly and safely”, while the US expressed hope that the ceasefire would hold, even as it threatened to unravel.

Vice-President JD Vance said that, in his view, the differing opinions regarding Lebanon’s inclusion in the ceasefire agreement stemmed from a “legitimate misunderstanding”.

“I think the Iranians believed the ceasefire agreement included Lebanon, but it didn’t,” he said. “We never made that promise.”

Israel had offered to “hold back a little in Lebanon” to support US negotiations, he added, but would not include that area in the ceasefire agreement.

In Israel, opposition politicians, led by Yair Lapid, criticised Netanyahu for failing to secure the decisive victory he had promised in the war and for instead causing a “diplomatic disaster” that has eroded trust between Israel and the United States.

“We still have objectives to achieve – and we will achieve them either through an agreement or by resuming fighting,” Netanyahu said in a statement on Wednesday evening.

Maritime traffic has continued to flow slowly through the Strait of Hormuz, but at a much slower pace than before the war. It has been confirmed that five ships passed through the strait on Wednesday, four of which were Iranian and were heading towards the Persian Gulf from the east, whilst the fifth was Greek-owned.

AXSMarine, a global maritime software and monitoring company founded in France, stated that it is “unlikely that there will be a sudden influx of ships heading for the strait, given the conditions imposed by Iran, under which passage must be approved by its armed forces. “It is not the same as an open strait,” the company said.

The United Arab Emirates said its air defences had intercepted 17 ballistic missiles and 35 drones, apparently launched by Iran during the day following the announcement of the ceasefire. It was also reported that Iran had attacked a Saudi oil pipeline to the Red Sea a few hours after the ceasefire was announced.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed on Wednesday that it had struck several targets in the region with missiles and drones, including what the IRGC described as oil facilities belonging to US companies in Yanbu, the Saudi port on the Red Sea, and the pipeline terminal.

Trump presented a different version of the agreement in his social media posts on Wednesday morning compared to the one he had suggested when announcing the ceasefire on Tuesday evening.

In the first version, he referred to Iran’s 10-point proposal as a “viable basis for negotiation” and focused on an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

The statement came as a surprise in Washington, as Iran’s 10 points differ significantly from US objectives and include the right to enrich uranium, the complete lifting of sanctions, the payment of war reparations, and a plan granting Iran and Oman joint control over the strait.

Karoline Leavitt, Trump’s press secretary, said on Wednesday at a press conference: “The Iranians initially presented a 10-point plan that was fundamentally frivolous, unacceptable and was completely rejected. The idea that President Trump would ever accept an Iranian wish list as an agreement is completely absurd.”

On Wednesday morning, Trump suggested that the ceasefire was based on a completely different, 15-point proposal from the US, claiming that many of the points “had already been agreed”.

He insisted that there would be no uranium enrichment and that the US and Iran would work together to uncover Iran’s stockpile of 440 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which Trump called “nuclear dust”, enough fissile material for a dozen nuclear warheads.

Leavitt stated that a team of US negotiators led by Vance, as well as Trump’s envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, would travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, for talks set to begin this weekend. Negotiations with an Iranian delegation – expected to include Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi – will begin on Saturday.

Iran has published two different versions of its interpretation of the agreement. The Farsi version included acceptance of Iran’s right to enrich uranium. The English version did not include this.

Araghchi confirmed Trump’s claim that the Strait of Hormuz would be reopened during the two-week ceasefire, but said that ships would have to request safe passage in coordination with the Iranian armed forces.

The Iranian military closed the strait – a free waterway before the war – in retaliation for the US-Israeli attack on Iran on 28 February and is now charging oil tankers a fee of $2 million per vessel to pass through.

Tehran’s apparent interpretation of the ceasefire is that it will allow all ships to pass, but will maintain the fee, ultimately sharing the revenue with Oman, as co-custodian of the strait.

Pakistan expects to host talks on Friday to begin consolidating the ceasefire into a more lasting peace agreement, but by Wednesday the White House had not yet confirmed its participation. The differences to be bridged seemed as wide as ever, and certainly wider than at the last pre-war talks on 26 February in Geneva, where Omani mediators and British observers reported significant progress.

Pete Hegseth stated that the US would “eliminate” Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Photo: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

At the Pentagon, US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth suggested that if no agreement is reached on Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, US forces will “eliminate” it.

Any operation to extract or destroy the uranium, believed to be stored in canisters the size of scuba tanks and buried in deep shafts beneath mountains, would be lengthy, complicated and risky. Trump chose not to undertake such a mission during the five weeks of conflict, eventually stating that he did not care about the highly enriched uranium, as it could be monitored remotely via satellite.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, stated that US forces remain ready for a return to combat. “A ceasefire is a pause, and the joint force remains ready if ordered or requested,” Caine told reporters.

He claimed that the US air campaign in Iran had achieved its military objectives, striking over 13,000 targets and destroying approximately 90% of the Iranian navy and 95% of its naval mines.

Hegseth claimed that the US and Israel had “completely destroyed Iran’s industrial base” with a final wave of 800 air strikes on Tuesday night. He listed the Iranian leaders killed in the war, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and claimed that his son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, had been “wounded and disfigured”. The defence secretary claimed, without evidence, that Iran had “begged for this ceasefire”.

The government in Tehran presented the ceasefire in equally triumphant terms to its people. “America was forced to accept a ceasefire,” said Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior politician and foreign policy adviser to the Supreme Leader, according to state media. “In the new global power structure, Iran will play a role as the axis of the Islamic pole.”

Trump was irritated by the refusal of several Western allies to support his war against Iran. Leavitt told reporters that the president intended to discuss the possibility of the US leaving NATO when he meets the alliance’s secretary-general, Mark Rutte, on Wednesday.

Asked whether the president would raise the issue of withdrawing from NATO, Leavitt replied: “It is something the president has discussed and I believe it is something the president will discuss in a few hours with Secretary-General Rutte.”

After the meeting, Rutte told CNN that, in his view, some NATO member states had been put to the test and had failed during the war, but that “the vast majority of European nations have been helpful in terms of military bases, logistics and overflight rights”.

Congratulations on being one of the best

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/08/middle-east-ceasefire-doubt-israel-lebanon-iran-oil-tankers

At least 254 dead after Israel struck Lebanon with a massive series of air strikes

“The largest coordinated attack” against Hezbollah since the start of the war prompts warnings that Iran could withdraw from the ceasefire agreement

Middle East crisis – live updates

Dan Sabbagh in Jerusalem and William Christou in Beirut

Thursday, 9 April 2026, 01:52 CEST

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Israel has launched its biggest attack on Lebanon since the start of the war with Hezbollah, killing at least 254 people and injuring 837, an assault that has prompted Iranian officials to warn that Tehran could withdraw from the ceasefire agreed with the US overnight.

Fighter jets razed several buildings in central Beirut to the ground, filling the sky with smoke in what the Israeli defence minister called “a surprise attack” on the pro-Iranian group Hezbollah.

The Lebanese capital was littered with cars destroyed by explosions and the burning ruins of buildings that emergency crews were struggling to extinguish, whilst Israel bombed over 100 Hezbollah military targets in Lebanon.

The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office stated that the two-week ceasefire in the Middle East did not include Lebanon, contrary to a statement made by the Pakistani mediator – whilst Trump, after initially remaining silent, said that Lebanon was “a separate conflict” and was not part of the agreement.

Among the Israeli targets in Beirut hit by rockets on Wednesday was the Bechara El Khoury neighbourhood in the city centre. Photo: Anadolu/Getty

Hospitals in Lebanon issued urgent appeals for blood donations, whilst the Ministry of Health urged people to “clear the streets” so that ambulances could reach the injured.

People rushed home to check on their families. A man was filmed running towards a stricken building in the Chiyah neighbourhood, shouting: “There are people inside!” Images of children covered in rubble circulated on social media, as people tried to find their parents.

“I have a friend in this building – Mahmoud. I don’t know where he is. He’s not answering his phone. We have to stop this war, it’s getting ridiculous,” said Shaden Fakih, a 24-year-old gymnastics coach who was present when an Israeli strike brought down a building in the Barbour neighbourhood of central Beirut.

Iranian sources told the Iranian news agency Tasnim that the country is ready to withdraw from the ceasefire agreement if Israel “persists in violating the truce in Lebanon”, and the crisis was discussed by Iran’s foreign minister and his Pakistani counterpart.

Israel Katz, the Israeli defence minister, stated that the two theatres of operations – Iran and Lebanon – are separate and that the aim is to “change the reality in Lebanon and eliminate the threats to the residents of the north”.

The Israeli politician went on to issue a direct threat to the Hezbollah leader. “I have warned Naim Qassem that Hezbollah will pay a very heavy price for attacking Israel on behalf of Iran – and Naim Qassem’s turn will come,” he said.

The Israeli army’s Arabic-language spokesperson suggested that Israel would begin striking deeper into Beirut, having previously limited most of its attacks to the southern suburbs, where support for Hezbollah is widespread. The spokesman stated that Hezbollah was “repositioning” itself in the city’s mixed neighbourhoods and vowed to pursue Hezbollah fighters regardless of their location.

Shortly after this statement, Israel destroyed another building in the Tallet al-Khayet neighbourhood in western Beirut, which had not yet been hit in this war.

The suggestion that the attacks could strike anywhere in Beirut has terrified the city’s residents. “Where can I go? The whole of Lebanon is being hit. [Israel] is done with Iran and now they want to start on us,” said a resident present at the time of the attack on the Barbour neighbourhood, asking not to be identified.

The scale of Wednesday’s attacks was condemned as “horrific” by the UN’s top human rights official, Volker Türk. “Such a massacre, just hours after a ceasefire was agreed with Iran, defies imagination. It puts enormous pressure on a fragile peace, which civilians so desperately need,” he said.

The Red Cross said it was “outraged by the death and devastating destruction” in densely populated areas of Lebanon, adding that the country had once again been plunged into “panic and chaos”.

Trump said he was aware of the Israeli bombings and claimed that Lebanon “was not included in the agreement” because of Hezbollah. Asked whether the Israeli attacks were acceptable to him, the US president said it was “a separate conflict”.

An attack strikes the city of Tyre in Lebanon following the Israeli evacuation order

Until the wave of air strikes launched by Israel on Lebanon on Wednesday, Hezbollah had not announced any attacks against Israel since the ceasefire was declared – a first since the start of the war between it and Israel on 2 March.

Initially, Shehbaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, stated that Iran, the US and their allies “had agreed on an immediate ceasefire everywhere, including in Lebanon and elsewhere”, whilst announcing the ceasefire overnight.

The motorways leading south into Lebanon were congested with traffic at sunrise. Residents were trying to return to their homes, although Hezbollah had urged people not to return to certain villages as Israeli troops remained there.

Iran’s 10-point peace plan, accepted in principle by Trump as a basis for negotiations, called for an end to the war against “all components of the ‘axis of resistance’”, which, for Tehran, includes Hezbollah.

On Tuesday, there were signs that the broader diplomatic talks, mediated in Pakistan between the US and Iran, had concluded without Israel’s immediate involvement. Trump ph ly called Netanyahu to inform the Israeli leader of his decision shortly before making the announcement regarding the ceasefire.

The leader of the Israeli opposition, Yair Lapid, said that Netanyahu had failed politically and strategically. “There has never been such a political disaster in our entire history. Israel wasn’t even at the negotiating table when decisions were made regarding the very essence of our national security,” he posted this morning.

Later on Wednesday, Netanyahu stated that Israel remains prepared to confront Iran if necessary, as it still has “objectives to fulfil”, with the army asserting that it continues to pursue the goal of “disarming” Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The five-week war in Lebanon has brought the country to breaking point. Over 1.1 million people have been forcibly displaced, many of them forced to live on the streets. More than 1,530 people have been killed and 4,812 wounded as a result of Israeli air strikes, Lebanon’s Health Ministry said on Tuesday.

Several air raids on Israel took place in the early hours of the night, but ceased shortly before 3.30 am, approximately 40 minutes after the Pakistani Prime Minister’s announcement of a ceasefire. No further attacks have been reported since then.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/08/israel-operations-in-lebanon-to-continue-despite-trump-ceasefire-iran-pakistan-hezbollah

Trump news in brief: a tale of two ceasefires, as the US and Iran cite different terms

The US and Iran do not appear to agree on many aspects of their fragile two-week ceasefire – in brief, the main US political news from Wednesday, 8 April

The Middle East crisis – live updates

The Guardian team

Thursday 9 April 2026, 03:04 CEST

The two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran, brokered by Pakistan just hours after Donald Trump threatened to destroy civilisation, hangs by a thread – and, possibly, on a few key disagreements.

Washington and Tehran have presented markedly different versions of what was agreed, whilst the Trump administration and Iranian leaders each claim victory.

The terms of any lasting agreement remain openly contradictory. Trump posted on Wednesday morning that Iran would hand over its enriched uranium and that there would be ‘no more enrichment’ in the future. Iran’s 10-point counter-proposal, published by its own Supreme National Security Council, explicitly demands the right to enrichment.

Even the ceasefire itself is in dispute. Israel has stated that it does not cover Lebanon, where ground and air campaigns are at their highest level since the Israeli invasion of the north. Both Pakistan and Iran have asserted that a ceasefire would include Lebanon, even as Israel has intensified its bombing campaign in Lebanon, prompting Iran to halt the passage of oil tankers.

Hegseth claims that Iran “begged” for a ceasefire after the US and Tehran agreed on a two-week pause

After 40 days and 40 nights of war, Pete Hegseth, the US Secretary of Defence, spoke on Wednesday of divine providence, telling reporters that Iran’s weapons factories had been reduced to rubble, its army had been neutralised for years, and its supreme leader had been left wounded and disfigured, all for a temporary ceasefire.

_{Read the full article}

JD Vance claims the US is not interfering in the Hungarian elections

JD Vance has dismissed claims that the US is interfering in Hungarian politics, describing the accusations as “horribly ironic”, given that a series of polls suggest the opposition Tisza party could secure a working majority in the upcoming elections.

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NATO chief says Trump is ‘clearly disappointed’ by US allies’ refusal to join the war against Iran

Mark Rutte, NATO’s Secretary General, said that Donald Trump was “clearly disappointed” that US allies had refused to join the war against Iran, following a closed-door meeting held on Wednesday in Washington.

_{Read the full article}

Pam Bondi will not appear at the House hearing on the Epstein case, says the Department of Justice

Pam Bondi, the former US Attorney General, will not appear next week at the scheduled testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform to answer questions about how the Department of Justice handled the investigation into Jeffrey Epstein and the release of the Epstein files, the committee said.

_{Read the full article}

Democrats renew efforts to stop Trump’s war against Iran, amid growing calls to invoke the 25th Amendment

Democratic Party leaders have vowed to renew efforts to stop Trump’s war against Iran next week, following several days of escalating tactics that culminated in a temporary truce on Tuesday evening.

_{Read the full article}

US ignores evidence that Russia is helping Iran because it trusts Putin, says Zelenskyy

The US has ignored compelling evidence that Russia helped Iran attack American bases in the Middle East because it ‘trusts’ Vladimir Putin, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

_{Read the full article}

What else happened today:

The California Supreme Court on Wednesday ordered a county sheriff and gubernatorial candidate, who had seized over half a million ballots for the 2025 election, to suspend his investigation into allegations of electoral fraud whilst judges examine the legal challenge against it.

Several major US airlines have raised their baggage fees in recent days, blaming the ongoing volatility in oil markets caused by the US-Israel war in Iran, which has nearly doubled the price of jet fuel.

Lee Zeldin, the administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), delivered the keynote speech at a conference on Wednesday morning, hosted by a prominent think tank that denies climate change, which previously compared people concerned about the climate crisis to the Unabomber on billboards in 2012.

The family of a man who was killed at Florida State University last year plans to sue ChatGPT and its parent organisation, OpenAI, for allegedly telling the suspected perpetrator of the shooting how to carry out the mass attack.

Two teenagers, alleged supporters of Islamic State, accused of attempting to detonate explosive devices during a protest outside the home of New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani, openly discussed how many people they could kill, with one remarking: “I want to sow terror, bro”, according to an indictment unsealed on Tuesday.

Jasveen Sangha, who pleaded guilty last year to selling a lethal dose of ketamine to actor Matthew Perry, was sentenced on Wednesday to 15 years in prison. Known as the “Ketamine Queen”, Sangha was the fifth defendant to accept a plea deal and admit her guilt in the case, receiving the harshest sentence.

,,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/08/trump-news-at-a-glance-latest-updates-today

NATO chief says Trump is “clearly disappointed” by US allies’ refusal to join the war against Iran

Mark Rutte praises the “very frank” discussions, but refuses to say whether the president raised the possibility of a withdrawal from the alliance

Lauren Gambino and news agencies

Thursday, 9 April 2026, 02:53 CEST

Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General, said that Donald Trump was “clearly disappointed” that US allies had refused to join the war against Iran, following a closed-door meeting held on Wednesday in Washington.

Speaking to CNN after the private meeting with the US president, Rutte declined to say directly whether Trump had mentioned the threat of withdrawing from the military alliance over the war with Iran, but described the exchange as a “very frank, very open” discussion between “two good friends”.

The meeting between Trump and Rutte took place at a delicate moment, less than a day after the US and Iran agreed on a two-week ceasefire, which includes the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. The fragile agreement was reached after Trump threatened to target Iran’s civilian infrastructure, warning that “an entire civilisation will perish” if Tehran did not allow safe passage through the strait by the Tuesday evening deadline set by the president.

Ahead of the meeting, Trump had stepped up his criticism of the 77-year-old alliance, calling it a “paper tiger” and suggesting that the US might consider leaving it, after NATO member states ignored his call for military assistance to help reopen the critical waterway – the closure of which had caused a sharp rise in global oil prices.

“He made it clear to me what he thinks about what has happened over the last two weeks,” Rutte said in an interview with CNN, refusing to answer specific questions about whether Trump had expressed a desire to leave NATO. “It’s a nuanced picture.”

Although Rutte and Trump have had a relatively cordial relationship in the past, the visit did little to mitigate the president’s contempt for transatlantic military allies who did not support Washington during the war with Iran.

In a post on Truth Social after the meeting, Trump wrote: “NATO WASN’T THERE WHEN WE NEEDED IT, AND IT WON’T BE THERE IF WE NEED IT AGAIN. REMEMBER GREENLAND, THAT BIG, POORLY MANAGED CHUNK OF ICE!!!” Trump stated earlier this week that his latest frustrations with the alliance “began” with its opposition to his desired takeover of Greenland.

On Wednesday morning, White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt acknowledged that Trump had discussed leaving NATO. “I think it’s a topic the president will discuss in a few hours with Secretary-General Rutte,” Leavitt said.

Trump is a long-standing critic of NATO and, during his first term, suggested he had the authority to leave the alliance on his own. However, Congress passed a law in 2023 preventing any US president from withdrawing from NATO without its approval.

The essence of the commitment undertaken by NATO’s 32 member countries is a mutual defence pact in which an attack on one is considered an attack on all. The only time it has been invoked was in 2001, to support the United States following the 9/11 attacks.

Despite this, Trump complained during his election campaign against Iran that NATO had shown it would not stand by the US.

Ahead of the meeting, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell issued a statement in support of the alliance, saying: “In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, NATO allies sent their young soldiers to fight and die alongside American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.” McConnell, who sits on a committee overseeing defence spending, urged President Trump to be “clear and consistent” and said it was not in America’s interest to “spend more time fostering resentment towards allies who share our interests than deterring adversaries who threaten us”.

It is unclear whether the Trump administration would challenge the law prohibiting a president from withdrawing from NATO. When the law was passed, it was supported by Trump’s current Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, who was then a senator from Florida.

Rubio met separately with Rutte on Wednesday morning at the State Department. In a statement, the State Department said that Rubio and Rutte discussed the war with Iran, as well as US efforts to negotiate an end to the war between Russia and Ukraine and “intensifying coordination and burden-sharing with NATO allies”.

The alliance has been shaken over the past year, as Trump has scaled back US military support for Ukraine in the war against Russia and threatened to take Greenland from Denmark.

But Trump’s pressure on NATO intensified after the war with Iran began in late February. The president insisted that securing the Strait of Hormuz is not the US’s job, but the responsibility of the countries that depend on the flow of oil passing through it.

“Go to the strait and simply occupy it,” Trump said last week.

Trump also became furious when NATO allies Spain and France banned or restricted the use of their airspace or joint military facilities by the US in the war with Iran. These and other nations have agreed, however, to help through an international coalition to open the Strait of Hormuz once the conflict ends.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who has been a particular source of frustration for Trump, is due to travel to the Gulf to support the ceasefire. Britain has been working on a post-conflict security plan for the strait.

The Associated Press contributed to this article

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/08/nato-mark-rutte-trump-iran-war

In a war with no winners, Netanyahu appears to be the biggest loser

Peter Beaumont, Senior International Correspondent

As Iran and the US reach a fragile truce, Israel’s conflict has proved a failure and, according to opponents, “a political disaster”

Middle East crisis – live updates

Wednesday 8 April 2026, 16:48 CEST

In a war where there were no winners, Israel’s prime minister appears to be the biggest loser, having concluded a fragile and vague ceasefire with Iran.

After years of Benjamin Netanyahu’s threats against Iran, after his actions at the UN General Assembly, after the dubious dossiers endlessly waved under the nose of the world’s press, and after the diplomatic pressure exerted on successive US presidents to accept a war against Iran, Israel’s conflict has proved to be a failure.

The verdict of the US intelligence community, according to which Israeli predictions of regime change and revolution in Iran were ‘ridiculous’, has proved to be correct. The Israeli estimate that the war would last, at best, a few days, and at worst, a few weeks, was lamentably far from reality.

Even two days ago, according to Israeli broadcaster Channel 12, Netanyahu was pressing Donald Trump not to accept a ceasefire. For a day, the US president issued genocidal warnings to Tehran, then relented, according to sources, leaving Israel on the sidelines in his deliberations.

“There has never been a political disaster like this in our entire history. Israel wasn’t even close to the negotiating table when decisions were made regarding the very essence of our national security,” wrote Israel’s main opposition leader, Yair Lapid, on X.

“The army has done everything asked of it, and the public has shown remarkable resilience, but Netanyahu has failed politically, failed strategically, and has not achieved any of the objectives he himself set. It will take us years to repair the political and strategic damage that Netanyahu has caused due to his arrogance, negligence and lack of strategic planning.”

“Netanyahu has failed politically, failed strategically and has not achieved any of the objectives he himself set,” said Yair Lapid (left). Photo: Jack Guez/AFP/Getty Images

The leader of the left-wing Democrats party, Yair Golan, also described the ceasefire as a “strategic failure” on Netanyahu’s part.

“He promised a historic victory and security for generations, and in practice, we have achieved one of the worst strategic failures Israel has ever known,” Golan said on X. “It is a total failure that jeopardises Israel’s security for years to come.”

The reality is that Netanyahu staked everything on his war, and through his failure to secure the fall of the theocratic regime, the seizure of Tehran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, or a significant weakening of the state, Israel’s global standing – already severely tarnished by his actions in Gaza, where he has been accused of committing genocide – has been damaged.

From a security perspective, despite Trump’s claims, the power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has been consolidated, as Tehran – at least for the moment – has achieved its primary objective of simply surviving a month-long attack by two of the world’s greatest military powers.

The attacks have left behind a regime that is wounded but still intact, with significant military resources, which will likely pursue rapid rearmament whilst seeking opportunities for retaliation.

Netanyahu’s insistence on continuing the attacks in southern Lebanon also appears arrogant, given that Israel’s stated intention to create a new security zone puts its forces in direct conflict on the ground with Hezbollah fighters, who have historically proven adept at fighting on their own territory.

Viewed in this context, Israel’s massive, horrific and unannounced air strikes on Lebanon appear to be a punitive act of displacement, after having been thwarted in Iran.

The consequences in terms of public opinion and diplomacy are likely to be even more severe for Netanyahu and Israel. In America, in particular, a political consensus dating back to the 1960s is visibly crumbling. Israel’s role in pushing Trump towards war in Iran has been attacked by both progressives and the far-right wing of the MAGA movement, whilst support for Israel, in general, is at historic lows even amongst Jewish voters.

Then there are the domestic repercussions for Netanyahu in an election year in Israel. Far from transforming Israel’s security situation, he will emerge from the war without having achieved any of the key objectives he promised.

Despite Netanyahu’s well-documented cynicism in hyping up his typically short-lived achievements, it will be obvious to Israelis that, far from having eliminated what he has long described as an ‘existential’ threat to Israel, conditions remain largely unchanged.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may have died, but his hardline son has succeeded him. Rather than closing the chapter on Iran’s nuclear programme, Tehran’s 10-point plan – which Trump has described as a viable basis for negotiations – appears to include acceptance of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, although Trump has denied that this would form part of the deal.

At least for the moment, the terms of the talks between the US and Iran point to something closer to the framework of Barack Obama’s international nuclear deal – which Netanyahu strove so hard to sabotage and from which Trump withdrew – than to a new reality.

For some, such as Haaretz’s military affairs correspondent Amos Harel, the failure was foreshadowed in Netanyahu’s war plans. “Many of the weaknesses shared by the current US administration and the Israeli system led by Netanyahu have come to light: a tendency to gamble on unfounded hopes, superficial and unfinished plans, ignoring experts, or aggressively using pressure to force them to align their views with the wishes of the political leadership,” said Harel.

It will also be clear to the Israelis that the conflict that unfolded over the past month was a unique opportunity to conduct a campaign on this scale, with the full support of the US. Other flare-ups may occur, but the chance of such sustained hostilities recurring seems remote.

Trump opposed the most dangerous escalation, including the issue of deploying ground troops, which is extremely unpopular among American voters, partly due to the extreme costs and the highly damaging effects on the global economy.

It has not escaped some people’s notice that, having secured his much-desired war – and seen it fail – Netanyahu has little chance of being given a second chance with US support.

Given that this has been a recurring political theme for the Israeli Prime Minister for years, one might ask: what is the point of it now?

“This is already the fourth time in a row – in Gaza, once in Lebanon and twice in Iran – that his boasts of total victory and the elimination of existential threats have turned out to be empty promises,” Harel wrote.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/08/war-with-no-winners-netanyahu-israel-iran-us-ceasefire

Developments in Ukraine – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 24 hours, the war in Ukraine has unfolded without any major operational breakthrough, but with a clear combination of Russian air pressure, continued attrition on the ground, intensified Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, and the continuation of the diplomatic deadlock. The overall picture is that of a conflict which has not ‘thawed’ in the sense of a decisive offensive, but which is deepening through a logic of mutual attrition, with an increasingly pronounced focus on infrastructure, logistics and the ability of both sides to absorb successive shocks.

The most visible immediate development was the continuation of the Russian campaign of drone attacks on critical Ukrainian infrastructure. On the night of 8–9 April, Russian drones damaged an electrical substation in the Odessa region, and the company DTEK stated that one of its facilities had been hit, after the region had been attacked “almost non-stop”. During the same period, Ukrainian authorities reported strikes in Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Sloviansk, Kherson and Sumy. This pattern confirms that Russia continues to combine pressure on energy and port infrastructure with attacks spread across multiple fronts, in order to force Ukraine to fragment its air defences and intervention resources.

The significance of the strike on the Odessa region goes beyond purely tactical considerations. Odessa remains the key hub for Ukrainian maritime exports to the Black Sea, and the attack on its energy and related infrastructure aims not only to cause local damage but also to undermine the Ukrainian state’s logistical resilience. In the same vein, on 8 April, Reuters also reported a drone attack on the Danube port of Izmail, Ukraine’s largest port on the Danube, where port infrastructure and a civilian vessel were damaged. In terms of Russian strategy, sustained pressure is being exerted on Ukraine’s alternative export corridors, including those along the Danube, which has direct relevance for Ukrainian economic security and Romania’s neighbouring region.

In humanitarian and operational terms, recent days have confirmed the persistence of a pattern of strikes on civilian areas close to the front line. Reuters previously reported, but still within the analytical timeframe relevant to the interpretation of the last 24 hours, that Russian attacks in the south-east killed civilians on buses in the Dnipropetrovsk region and caused deaths in Kherson, where Ukrainian officials and human rights organisations accuse the systematic use of FPV drones against civilians. This pattern is significant not only morally and legally, but also militarily: it indicates that Russia is attempting to transform the area near the front line into a zone of permanent insecurity, preventing the logistical and social normalisation of the territory under Ukrainian control.

On the ground, the last 24 hours do not indicate a collapse of the Ukrainian defence, nor a real reduction in Russian pressure. The most reliable assessment available for this period remains that presented by Reuters on 6 April and reiterated in statements by Oleksandr Syrskyi: Ukraine claims to have recaptured around 480 km² in the south-east and east since the end of January, including towns in the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, but Russia is continuing its spring offensive, regrouping its forces and seeking further territorial gains, including the creation of a ‘buffer zone’ in Dnipropetrovsk. Thus, the current picture is not one of a swift Russian operational victory, but of persistent pressure along a very long front, combined with Ukrainian attempts to destabilise certain axes of the offensive.

The most significant operational focus remains around Pokrovsk. Reuters reports that Ukrainian attacks and counter-attacks from the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions are complicating Russian plans, but, at the same time, Russian troops continue to press north of Pokrovsk, a key logistics hub for the Donbas. This combination suggests that the front line is not static, yet neither side has gained a decisive advantage in the last 24 hours; rather, it confirms that Pokrovsk remains one of the focal points of the Russian campaign, and Ukraine’s ability to sustain it logistically is critical to maintaining the operational balance in the east.

As for the broader assessment of the front, Volodymyr Zelenskyy had stated a few days earlier that the situation was the best for Ukraine in the last ten months and that the Russian offensive planned for March had been thwarted. Although such an assessment must be treated with caution, it is partly supported by the slowdown in the pace of the Russian advance observed by Reuters and by the fact that, despite the intensity of the fighting, there is currently no sign of a large-scale breakthrough threat. Nevertheless, the very sources cited by Reuters indicate that fighting remains very intense, with the Ukrainian General Staff recently reporting hundreds of clashes in a single 24-hour period, and the Russian concentration in areas such as Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole suggests that Moscow has not abandoned its objective of gradually wearing down the Ukrainian defences.

A key development over the last 24 hours is the Ukrainian campaign against Russian energy infrastructure. Reuters reported on 8 April that Ukraine has stepped up its strikes on Russian refineries, ports and oil terminals in recent weeks, following the stalling of peace talks. Notable targets include the NORSI refinery, which suspended operations following a drone attack, facilities at Ust-Luga, as well as oil and transhipment infrastructure in Novorossiysk, Sheskharis and Primorsk. Even though some exports have continued, the strategic effect of this campaign is clear: Ukraine is seeking to increase the economic cost of the war for Russia, put pressure on energy logistics and force Moscow to redeploy air defences deeper into its territory.

This move is highly significant as it confirms a shift in the focus of the war: in the absence of a Ukrainian capacity to rapidly mount a large-scale ground offensive, long-range strikes against Russian energy, exports and logistics hubs are becoming instruments of strategic compensation. Reuters explicitly notes that this campaign has accelerated following the breakdown of negotiations, meaning that military and diplomatic dynamics are now directly linked: the less the talks yield, the more central the infrastructure becomes as a battlefield.

At the same time, Ukraine is seeking to respond technologically to the wave of Russian drones. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence announced on 8 April that drone interceptors had shot down over 33,000 enemy UAVs in March – double the figure for February – and emphasised that jet-powered Shahed drones represent the new major challenge. Even if this figure comes from an official Ukrainian source and must be viewed accordingly, it is nonetheless analytically relevant: it shows that Ukrainian air defence is increasingly adapting through relatively inexpensive and scalable solutions, not just through high-value conventional systems. This suggests that the war is entering an even deeper phase of technological and industrial competition in the field of drones.

Regarding losses and the intensity of the conflict, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence published an estimate on 9 April stating that Russia had lost 1,040 troops, 64 artillery systems and 2,238 operational-tactical UAVs the previous day. Like any official war report, these figures cannot be independently verified in real time and should be treated with caution, but they are useful as an indicator that Kyiv continues to describe the fighting as extremely intense, with a particular focus on the destruction of Russian drones and artillery.

Diplomatically, the last 24 hours have brought no real progress, but have resulted in shifts in rhetoric. The Kremlin stated on 8 April that it welcomes the US-Iranian ceasefire and hopes that Washington will be able to resume trilateral talks on Ukraine, indirectly confirming that the Ukrainian issue had been pushed into the background by the escalation in the Middle East. In response, Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire if Russia “responds in kind”, reiterating the idea that a ceasefire could pave the way for further agreements. However, the underlying positions remain irreconcilable: Russia insists on the surrender of the rest of Donbas, whilst Ukraine refuses to cede territories that Russia does not even fully control. Consequently, diplomatic space exists only in rhetoric; in substance, the deadlock persists.

Furthermore, the AP reported that Zelenskyy proposed an Easter truce in strikes on energy infrastructure, yet even this proposal was made against a backdrop of pronounced scepticism and continued attacks. This matters because it shows that tactical de-escalation initiatives have not disappeared, but neither do they alter the underlying logic of the conflict: each side wants first and foremost an operational advantage or a favourable diplomatic formula, not merely a temporary ceasefire.

Strategically, the conclusion for the last 24 hours is as follows: Russia continues to rely on the systematic attrition of Ukraine through air strikes, constant pressure on the front line and strikes on the energy network and port logistics; Ukraine is responding with elastic defence, local counterattacks and the expansion of its campaign of deep strikes against Russian energy infrastructure. We do not see a collapse of either side, but rather the consolidation of a form of high-intensity, deeply industrialised warfare, in which drones, energy, ports and logistics are almost as important as the traditional lines of contact.

If we restrict our analysis strictly to what has changed in the last 24 hours, the key points are as follows: Russian pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure has continued, including in Odessa; the front line remains fiercely contested, particularly around Pokrovsk and on the south-eastern axes; Ukraine has maintained its campaign to strike at Russian energy infrastructure; and diplomacy has remained deadlocked, despite the resumption of talk of a ceasefire. In other words, the latest day did not change the course of the war, but it very clearly confirmed its current nature: a multi-domain war of attrition, in which the battle for energy, mobility and industrial resilience is just as important as the battle for territory.

Maritime Security Forum

Briefing on the war in Ukraine: the Kremlin’s threat to countries regarding the transit of Ukrainian drones

Warning following attacks on Russian oil ports in the Baltic region – yet Russia has repeatedly sent its own drones through NATO and European Union airspace. What we know on day 1,506

Warren Murray with Guardian editors and agencies

Thursday, 9 April 2026, 03:52 CEST

Russia – which has repeatedly violated the airspace of European countries with its military drones – has threatened the Baltic states if they allow Ukraine to do the same. Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, spoke following Ukrainian drone attacks on the Russian Baltic Sea ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga, which disrupted Russia’s oil exports. “If third countries have made or are making their territory available for enemy drones to fly over, they must fully understand – and we are sure they do, as it has been explained to them – the risks to which they are exposing themselves.”
The US has ignored compelling evidence that Russia helped Iran target American bases in the Middle East because it “trusts” Vladimir Putin, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Luke Harding writes that, in an interview with Alastair Campbell on the podcast The Rest is Politics, Zelenskyy said he had tried to draw the White House’s attention to this issue, but “the problem is that they trust Putin. And that’s a shame.” Zelenskyy claimed that Donald Trump’s negotiators had failed to “truly understand the details of what Russia wants”. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner had “spent too much time” with Putin and his senior officials. The two travelled to Moscow five times last year, but have not yet visited Kyiv.

Russian drones damaged an electrical substation in the Odessa region of southern Ukraine on Wednesday, Ukrainian officials said. The governor of the south-eastern Zaporizhzhia region, Ivan Fedorov, said that a night-time attack with Russian glide bombs killed a man in a village outside the region’s main city, also called Zaporizhzhia. Two women were injured. The governor of the neighbouring Dnipropetrovsk region, Oleksandr Ganzha, said that Russian drones and artillery had attacked a number of towns nearly 40 times during the day. At least three people were injured.
Officials also reported casualties following drone strikes in Sloviansk, near the front line in the eastern Donetsk region, as well as in the southern Kherson region and the Sumy region, on the border with Russia. Debris from a downed drone in the Krasnodar Krai region of southern Russia killed a man, the region’s governor said on Thursday.
Ukrainian drones blew up an oil terminal in Feodosia, in Russian-occupied Crimea, the commander of Ukraine’s drone forces announced on Wednesday. Robert “Magyar” Brovdi also listed attacks on a Buk-M3 missile system and a Zoopark counter-artillery radar in the Zaporizhzhia region, as well as on a Tor missile system in the Donetsk region, within the Zaporizhzhia region.
Ukraine’s antitrust commission has rejected a $760 million bid for a stake in Fire Point, Ukraine’s leading drone and missile manufacturer, by a defence conglomerate based in the United Arab Emirates, the agency told Reuters on Wednesday. The commission stated that the application from the UAE-based Edge Group did not meet the necessary criteria. Fire Point manufactures many of the long-range drones that Ukraine uses to attack Russia, as well as the Flamingo cruise missile.
France will increase its stockpile of explosive drones by up to 400% by 2030, according to a draft bill presented on Wednesday. The draft bill on military spending was presented after France’s top commanders stated that the country must be prepared for a conflict with Russia in the coming years and that NATO should adapt to produce more weapons more quickly. Under the bill, an additional €8.5 billion will be allocated to boost ammunition stocks between now and 2030.

Stocks of Scalp cruise missiles will increase by 85%, torpedoes by 230%, and surface-to-air missiles by 30%.The French government is also taking steps to double penalties for vessels that fly no flag or refuse to comply, in a move apparently targeting Russia’s ‘ghost fleet’. Ships in the oil smuggling fleet frequently change their flag, a practice known as ‘flag-hopping’, or sail under invalid flags. France will impose penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of €300,000. Hungary’s Foreign Minister, Peter Szijjarto, offered to send Russia’s Sergei Lavrov a document regarding Ukraine’s accession to the EU, according to recordings leaked on Wednesday. The audio clips published by a consortium of investigative news agencies, including VSquare.org, were the latest in a series of leaked conversations. Reuters said it could not independently verify the authenticity of the audio recordings, but Szijjarto had previously criticised the alleged interception of his telephone conversations without denying the veracity of the recordings.

“I’ll send it to you. It’s no problem,” Szijjarto reportedly said in a conversation, after Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, stated that Moscow wanted a document on the role of minority languages in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations. The Reuters report noted that it was unclear what document was being referred to and whether it was available in the public domain. Reuters also mentioned that the Hungarian government had been contacted for comment.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/09/ukraine-war-briefing-kremlin-threat-to-countries-over-ukrainian-drone-transit

Recent developments regarding the ceasefire between Iran and the US: Regional and economic implications and possible scenarios – Maritime Security Forum

Analysis of statements, reactions and perspectives on the Iran-US conflict and the impact on the Strait of Hormuz and global markets

The context of the ceasefire and the regulation of transit through the Strait of Hormuz

Iran and Oman intend to levy transit fees on ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz during the two-week ceasefire, according to the Tasnim news agency. The funds collected will be directed towards reconstruction, and Iran has requested up to $2 million per ship, although payment has not been clearly confirmed. Since the start of the war, the strait has been effectively blocked, with only 5% of normal maritime traffic passing through the area, whilst some countries, such as Pakistan and India, have negotiated guaranteed passage.

Oman’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked to comment but did not provide an official position. This regulation of transit and the levying of fees could set a precedent for future regional conflicts or negotiations.

Official statements and positions: Iran, the US and China

The White House considers the two-week ceasefire “a victory for the United States”, and Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt highlighted the US military’s role in achieving military objectives and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump claimed “a total and complete victory”, but did not clarify whether he would take action should Iran breach the agreement, maintaining ambiguity over possible retaliation.

Trump suggested that China had played a role in pushing Iran towards negotiations, and Beijing confirmed that it had “worked to help secure a ceasefire and an end to the conflict”, reiterating its support for dialogue and peace. This highlights the multifaceted diplomatic engagement and China’s role as an international mediator.

Iranian reactions and statements: The 10-point plan and the perception of victory

Iranian officials have issued statements in Farsi and English, presenting the ceasefire as a major achievement. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated: “If attacks on Iran cease, the army will halt defensive operations and coordinate safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.” Negotiations between Iran and the US are proceeding on the basis of proposals from both sides, and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council has stated that “almost all the objectives of the war have been achieved”, presenting the agreement as a victory and warning that a state of alert will be maintained. These statements reflect Tehran’s determination to secure firm guarantees and maintain a position of strength in the negotiation process.

Regulation of transit through the Strait of Hormuz
Cessation of attacks
Withdrawal of US forces
Compensation for Iran
Lifting of sanctions
UN resolution to guarantee the final agreement

According to Iranian statements, the US has accepted, in principle, Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment, which represents an important step towards a lasting agreement. “We are prepared to make concessions, but only if all points of our plan are respected and international guarantees are provided,” Araghchi emphasised. The next steps in the negotiation process include the formation of joint committees and monitoring the implementation of the agreement, and Iran remains on high alert until concrete results are achieved.

International reactions and economic impact

Prior to the recent ceasefire between Iran and the US, tensions in the region had reached alarming levels, culminating in the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz – a strategic chokepoint through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil passes. This conflict caused major concern among investors and affected global markets, as any disruption to transit through Hormuz can have direct consequences on energy prices and international economic stability. The announcement of the ceasefire sparked a wave of optimism: Japan’s Nikkei index rose by 3.2%, and Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index advanced by 2.7% the day after the official announcement. At the same time, the price of Brent crude fell by over 8%, reaching $68 per barrel, having previously exceeded $74 per barrel due to tensions. Economic analyst Li Wei stated: “The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz reduces the risk of a global energy crisis, but political uncertainty remains high.” Similarly, British expert Sarah Johnson warns that “without a lasting agreement, markets could quickly return to volatility, and investors must monitor developments in the region.”

In response to Iranian claims of victory, President Trump dismissed these statements, labelling them “fraud”. He chose instead to quote only a short version of the Iranian foreign minister’s statement, which did not claim victory but confirmed that maritime transit through the Strait of Hormuz would be safe for at least two weeks. This approach reflects the US administration’s scepticism regarding the stability of the agreement and its reluctance to acknowledge Tehran’s diplomatic successes.

Possible developments and scenarios

Full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz: If the ceasefire holds and negotiations progress, maritime traffic could return to normal, with a positive impact on energy markets and the global economy.
The sustainability of the agreement: If US-Iran dialogue leads to a final peace agreement and the lifting of sanctions, the region could experience long-term stability. However, Iranian warnings and the US’s ambiguous stance indicate the risk of a resumption of hostilities.
The involvement of China and other regional actors: China’s diplomatic role could be strengthened, and Oman could become a strategic negotiating hub.
Impact on reconstruction and transit fees: The collection of transit fees could become a financing tool for reconstruction, but also a source of tension between coastal states and shipping operators.
Risk of escalation: If any of the parties interprets the agreement differently or if regional interests are threatened, there is a possibility of the conflict reigniting, with serious consequences for global energy security.

Conclusion

The ceasefire between Iran and the US brings hope of a diplomatic solution and the resumption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, but uncertainties remain. China’s involvement, market reactions and official positions show that ‘peace does not come when you wait for it, but when you build it’, and the future depends on negotiations, compromises and the vigilance of all actors involved.

Maritime Security Forum

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has only seven main vessels, and Ukraine is attacking them one by one – Maritime Security Forum

Striking more frequently with more powerful drones, Ukraine is determined to destroy the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

The “Admiral Makarov” in 2020. Photo courtesy of the Russian Ministry of Defence.

Only seven missile-armed warships remain in Russia’s once-powerful Black Sea Fleet
Ukrainian drone forces are escalating their attacks on these surviving ships in their port in southern Russia
The most recent raid, on 6 April, reportedly damaged a missile frigate

Following numerous Ukrainian attacks, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been reduced to just seven ships. Ukraine has reported that its drones recently struck the frigate Admiral Makarov in the port of Novorossiysk. This action is part of a campaign targeting Russia’s remaining ships in the Black Sea and reduces Moscow’s ability to use Kalibr missiles for attacks on Ukrainian cities. The USF claimed that the Unmanned Systems Centre had ‘struck’ the ship, which was armed with surface-to-air missiles and Kalibrs.

Warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet have been destroyed or damaged by Ukraine. Infographic by Euromaidan Press, based on Torger78 on X

Admiral Makarov, its sister frigate Admiral Essen, three Buyan-class corvettes and potentially just two upgraded Kilo-class submarines – all seven currently sheltering in Novorossiysk – routinely fire 2,300 kg Kalibrs at Ukrainian cities.

Thermal imagery from FP-1 and FP-2 drones shows the attack on Admiral Makarov and the frigate launching a surface-to-air missile, but does not clearly show any impact. Ambiguity is common: following the explosion near the Kolpino submarine in December, evidence of damage was unclear, with only the ship’s prolonged delay serving as an indication. It may take some time before clear evidence emerges as to whether or not the Admiral Makarov was damaged by the FP-1/2.

VIDEO: https://twitter.com/i/status/2041100980494708878

Weak drones

The Ukrainians have made several attempts to strike the Admiral Makarov, which took over the role following the sinking of the cruiser Moskva in 2022. The raid involving dozens of drones in March did not cause major damage. Ukrainian drones have a long range but carry a small payload of explosives, which limits the destruction caused. Missiles such as the Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG are effective, but rare. The FP-1 has a long range (1,400 km) but a small warhead (60 kg), whilst the FP-2, with a 100 kg warhead, has a range of only 200 km. Fire Point is working on new variants, with fuel tanks in the wings, to accommodate larger warheads.

The upgraded FP-1 will have a 100 kg warhead, according to Denys Shtilierman of Fire Point. This is sufficient to damage a steel-hulled vessel. It is not known whether the drones used on Monday against the Admiral Makarov carried larger warheads. Ukraine is increasingly attacking the Black Sea Fleet with ever more powerful drones. If they failed to hit the Admiral Makarov on Monday, they will likely try again soon until the ship is taken out of action.

Maritime Security Forum

Turkey Blocks LNG Through the Bosphorus: Romania and Bulgaria, the New Corridor for Ukrainian Gas – Euronaval.ro

“Trans Canada Keystone Oil Pipeline” by shannonpatrick17 is licensed under CC BY 2.0

Turkey has decided to reject Ukraine’s proposal to transport liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the Bosphorus Strait, citing the unacceptable safety risks that LNG tankers would pose in a waterway that narrows to 700 metres and passes through the heart of a city of 16 million inhabitants. Instead, Ankara is proposing an alternative that places Romania and Bulgaria at the centre of the energy architecture of the war in Ukraine: a gas corridor via onshore pipelines, supplied from Turkish FSRU (Floating Storage and Regasification Unit) terminals in the Aegean Sea. The implications for Romania are immediate, concrete and far-reaching.

I. Why Turkey Said NO: The Physics and Geopolitics of the Bosphorus Strait

Turkey’s decision comes as no surprise to anyone familiar with the specifics of navigation through the Bosphorus. The strait is 31 kilometres long, but narrows to 700 metres at critical points and requires course changes of 70 to 80 degrees – extreme technical conditions for any large vessel, let alone an LNG tanker, which transports liquefied natural gas at -162 degrees Celsius and presents a risk profile entirely different from that of an oil tanker or an LPG carrier.

“We cannot allow this. An explosion would cause unimaginable damage.” – senior Turkish official, quoted by Middle East Eye, 7 April 2026

The technical distinction between LPG and LNG is crucial and often overlooked in public debate. The IGF Code on the Safety of Ships Carrying LNG and Alternative Fuels precisely defines the operational standards and associated risks. An LPG tanker can transit the Bosphorus – and does so regularly. An LNG tanker is a different category: the volume of vapour resulting from a major incident would create a flammable cloud of proportions incomparable to any previous accident recorded in the strait. Turkish officials have cited not only the risk of an accident, but also the strategic precedent: allowing LNG through the Bosphorus would open the door to Russian LNG as well, a prospect that Ankara cannot politically manage in the current context.

An incident that added urgency to the discussion: a Turkish oil tanker was struck by a naval drone (USV – Unmanned Surface Vehicle) in the Black Sea, 15 nautical miles from the entrance to the Bosphorus, last month. The maritime security of oil tankers in active conflict zones is a reality that operators in the Black Sea face on a daily basis. Sending LNG vessels into the same maritime space, through the same urban chokepoint, would have represented a huge operational and political risk.

II. Ukraine’s Proposal: Context and Strategic Rationale

Before the war, Ukraine met almost all its gas needs from domestic production. Russian attacks have destroyed around 50% of this capacity, according to the governor of the Ukrainian central bank. In this context, Kyiv is urgently seeking alternative sources. The solution proposed by Naftogaz involves the construction of an FSRU (Floating Storage and Regasification Unit) in the Black Sea, supplied with LNG imported from the US or other sources – but this solution requires explicit permission for LNG vessels to transit the Bosphorus Strait.

“We discussed practical steps for implementing joint gas infrastructure projects, as well as opportunities for the joint development of gas fields. Cooperation with Turkey provides us with energy and logistical security.” – Volodymyr Zelenskyy, following his meeting with Erdogan, Istanbul, 4 April 2026

Ukraine is already importing US LNG via terminals in Poland and the Baltic states and purchasing LNG via Greece. The Revithoussa LNG terminal in Greece and its role in Eastern Europe’s energy security have become a critical hub in this equation. In March 2026, Ukraine stepped up imports and began stockpiling gas for the coming winter – a sign that pressure on the supply infrastructure will increase, not decrease, in the coming months.

III. The Turkish Proposal: FSRU in the Aegean and the Route through Bulgaria-Romania

The counterproposal put forward by the Turkish Minister of Energy, Alparslan Bayraktar, is more sophisticated than it appears at first glance. Turkey already has operational FSRU facilities in the Aegean Sea – units capable of receiving large-capacity LNG carriers without requiring transit through the Bosphorus, regasifying the cargo and injecting the gas into the onshore pipeline network. The fleet of FSRU vessels and their role in European energy security has grown dramatically since 2022, when Europe urgently sought alternatives to Russian gas.

“Here are our FSRU facilities – you can bring the gas and the energy. We’ll source it for you or we’ll buy it together. We can make joint purchases, regasify the LNG, feed it into the system and send it to Ukraine.” – Alparslan Bayraktar, Turkey’s Minister of Energy, Bloomberg interview

The route proposed by Ankara is: imported LNG (US, Qatar, other sources) unloaded at Turkish FSRUs in the Aegean Sea -> regasification -> injection into the Turkish onshore pipeline network -> transit through Bulgaria and Romania -> delivery to Ukraine. This solution completely bypasses the Bosphorus for LNG vessels and utilises existing trunk pipeline infrastructure, with one major constraint: the Bulgaria-Turkey interconnection capacity is currently only 3.5 billion cubic metres per year – a significant constraint that would require substantial investment to overcome.

“FSRU Independence in the port of Klaipėda, Lithuania” by AB Klaipėdos Nafta is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0

Route Comparison: The Ukrainian Proposal vs. The Turkish Alternative

Criterion	Ukrainian Route (LNG via the Bosphorus)	Turkish Route (Aegean FSRU + Pipeline)
Bosphorus Transit	YES – LNG tankers	NO – only pipeline gas
Safety risk	Very high (potentially catastrophic explosion)	Low (land-based infrastructure)
Speed of implementation	Rapid (FSRU in the Black Sea)	Medium (requires onshore investment)
Key constraint	Turkey’s refusal	Capacity 3.5 bcm/year (Bulgaria-Turkey bottleneck)
Role of Romania	Minor transit (FSRU terminal in the Ukrainian Black Sea)	CRITICAL – mandatory corridor via main pipelines
Geopolitical risks	Precedent: Russian LNG via the Bosphorus	Dependence on the RO-BG-UA trilateral agreement

Samuel Bailey (sam.bailus@gmail.com), CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

IV. Romania at the Centre of the Equation: From Transit to Regional Energy Hub

The Turkish proposal transforms Romania from a peripheral player in the Ukrainian energy crisis into an essential corridor. If the Aegean FSRU – Bulgaria – Romania – Ukraine pipeline scheme becomes operational, Romania is no longer merely a consumer managing its own energy security, but a critical infrastructure for supplying gas to a country at war.

This is not a new position for Romania. The role of Romania and Poland as key hubs for Ukrainian grain exports has already demonstrated that the country can function as a logistics hub for strategic Ukrainian flows. Gas via onshore infrastructure adds an energy dimension to this role – with greater technical and political complexity, but also with higher stakes.

The pressure point identified by Bayraktar is the Bulgaria-Romania interconnector: 3.5 billion cubic metres per year, current capacity. Eastern Europe receives gas via Greece – the alternative route through Revithoussa shows that this regional diversification architecture is already under construction – but capacities are still insufficient to absorb the volumes required in the event of a full Romania-Bulgaria-Ukraine agreement. Doubling the capacity of the Bulgaria-Turkey interconnector and a possible extension to the Ukrainian border would require investments in the hundreds of millions of euros and at least 2–3 years of construction.

V. The maritime dimension: FSRUs, LNG carriers and the Black Sea

Any of the routes discussed involves a significant maritime component, even if the Bosphorus is excluded from the equation. The Turkish FSRUs in the Aegean Sea must be supplied by LNG carriers coming from the Atlantic or the Persian Gulf – the global fleet of LNG carriers and the outlook for 2035 is already under pressure, with $48 billion in investments exposed to the risk of overcapacity, as well as the risk of a sudden shift in demand.

The Qatar crisis – Iran’s attack on Qatar’s LNG infrastructure, which affected 17% of global capacity – has sharply reduced the availability of LNG on the spot market and increased competition for long-term contracts. Against this backdrop, Ukraine and Turkey are negotiating joint purchases of US LNG – a strategy to reduce costs by aggregating demand, but also to diversify suppliers politically.

The Port of Constanța is not explicitly mentioned in the Turkish proposal – the route under discussion is via onshore pipelines, not through maritime terminals. However, the storage and interconnection infrastructure in the Constanța-Cernavodă area is of indirect relevance: in the event of an acute energy crisis, an FSRU terminal in Constanța could complement the onshore route or substitute part of the capacity. The security of maritime energy terminals and their strategic importance remains an all the more pressing priority given that the Black Sea is now an active theatre of operations, where naval drones can target any critical infrastructure.

VI. The Montreux Convention: The Cornerstone of the Entire Discussion

Any analysis of transit through the Bosphorus must begin with the 1936 Montreux Convention and its application in the Ukrainian crisis. The Convention grants Turkey full control over transit through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. During the war, Turkey blocked the transit of military vessels – but commercial vessels, including tankers, continued to sail. The refusal of LNG is not a decision based on Montreux (which does not explicitly prohibit LNG), but a sovereign decision of security and political expediency.

Turkey is skilfully utilising the tools made available to it by the Montreux Convention. The refusal of LNG is, simultaneously, a legitimate security decision, a political signal to Russia (whose LNG vessels would also be affected by a transit precedent) and an economic positioning move: Ankara is consolidating its role as a regional energy hub, not merely a transit corridor. The more gas that passes through Turkish facilities – FSRUs, TurkStream, interconnections – the greater Turkey’s bargaining power within the Euro-Asian energy architecture.

This logic overlaps with the discussions between Turkey and Hungary regarding the security of TurkStream – another sign that Ankara is methodically building its position as an indispensable energy intermediary, regardless of the political direction of the war and the associated risks

Romania is facing a rare window of opportunity: a major regional power (Turkey) is explicitly proposing a central role for Romanian infrastructure in an energy security project of historic significance. This window will not remain open indefinitely.

Urgent trilateral negotiations between Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey: Launching a formal framework for negotiations to double the capacity of the Bulgaria-Turkey interconnector and extend the network towards Ukraine. Every month of delay risks losing relevance to alternative routes (via Greece, via Poland).
Inventory of existing onshore capacities: Romania must urgently assess what additional transit capacity it can offer without major investment and which sections require funding. European funds (TEN-E Regulation, Connecting Europe Facility) are available for energy interconnection projects of common interest.
Assessing the feasibility of an FSRU in Constanța: In the medium term, an FSRU terminal in the Port of Constanța – enabling the direct import of LNG into the Black Sea without transit through the Bosphorus, via smaller-capacity vessels – would transform Romania from a transit corridor into a regional energy hub. Maritime security risks must be assessed in parallel.
Accelerating Neptun Deep: Romanian offshore gas production remains the country’s strongest energy security tool. A producer with a gas surplus has a completely different negotiating role compared to a mere transit corridor.
Securing onshore infrastructure against hybrid risks: The pipelines crossing Romania and Bulgaria are critical infrastructure in the full sense of the term. Their physical and cyber protection, in the context of active warfare at the border, can no longer be treated as a routine technical matter.

Conclusion: The narrow Bosphorus has opened up a wide path for Romania

The Bosphorus’s 700-metre width at its narrowest point has, paradoxically, created an opportunity of historic significance for Romania. Turkey’s refusal to allow LNG tankers to sail through Istanbul is not the closing of a door – it is the opening of a land corridor through the heart of Eastern Europe, with Romania at its centre. The question is not whether Romania will become a regional energy hub, but whether it has the institutional, diplomatic and technical capacity to transform this geographical position into real negotiating power.

Ukraine’s energy crisis, combined with Turkey’s refusal, the global LNG crisis and geopolitical pressures in the Black Sea, is creating a convergence of factors that Romania is unlikely to see again any time soon. To miss this window of opportunity – through bureaucratic inertia, a lack of vision or the failure of trilateral negotiations – would mean ceding a strategic role to alternative routes that bypass the country entirely.

The Bosphorus, too narrow for LNG, could become, for Romania, wide enough to pass through to a leading energy position in Europe.

Source: here

Cable-laying vessels: The silent infrastructure that keeps the global internet running – Euronaval.ro

“lodbrog_crane_holding_trf_webres” by OceanNetworks Canada is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Ninety-nine per cent of global digital traffic — financial transactions, military communications, streaming, cloud data, private messages — is not transmitted via satellite, but through some 550 submarine cables that criss-cross the ocean floors of the world. The vessels that lay, repair and maintain them are among the most specialised and strategically valuable in the global commercial fleet. A niche industry, dominated by a few players, at the intersection of technology, national security and geopolitical power.

I. What Is a Cable Lay Vessel and Why Does It Matter

A submarine cable-laying vessel (CLV) is a highly specialised naval platform designed for the installation, maintenance and repair of fibre-optic and power cables in the underwater environment. The process is by no means simple: the cable is unwound from the vessel via a controlled tensioning system, guided by an ROV ( ), and laid with millimetre precision on the ocean floor, at depths that can exceed 8,000 metres.

The global fleet of CLVs comprises around 60–70 active vessels, with a massive concentration in the hands of four or five companies that dominate both construction and operation. Unlike bulk carriers or oil tankers, a modern CLV costs between 200 and 500 million dollars and takes years to build. State-of-the-art navigation equipment, dynamic positioning (DP) systems and cable management infrastructure make the CLV one of the most complex naval platforms in existence.

The strategic importance of these vessels far exceeds their commercial value. Without functioning submarine cables, the global internet would collapse within hours. International financial systems would grind to a halt. Military communications would be severely disrupted. This reality has transformed cable-laying vessels from neutral technical instruments into national security assets of the highest sensitivity.

II. Market Map: Who Controls Submarine Cable Laying

The global submarine cable market — valued at approximately $3.5–4 billion annually in the telecommunications segment, with accelerated growth due to offshore power cable projects — is dominated by an oligopoly comprising four major players, originating in the US, Europe and Asia. The breakdown below reflects market share estimates based on contracts awarded between 2019 and 2024:

Company	Estimated market share	Origin	Main specialisation
SubCom (Cerberus Capital)	~28%	USA 🇺🇸	Submarine telecommunications, repeater systems
Alcatel Submarine Networks (Nokia)	~24%	France 🇫🇷	Telecommunications, integrated end-to-end systems
NEC (Network & Systems)	~16%	Japan 🇯🇵	Telecommunications, Asia-Pacific market
HMN Technologies*	~13%	China 🇨🇳	Telecommunications, projects for emerging markets
Prysmian Group	~10%	Italy 🇮🇹	Offshore power cables, HVDC
Others (Jan De Nul, GlobalMarine etc.)	~9%	Miscellaneous	Repairs, regional projects, wind energy

* HMN Technologies, formerly Huawei Marine Networks, sold in 2019 to a Chinese consortium under pressure from the US. The company remains excluded from projects funded by Western governments.

Concentration is extreme. The top three players — SubCom, ASN and NEC — together control around 68% of the global market. This oligopolistic structure reflects both the huge barriers to entry (capital, technology, expertise) and the political dimension of the industry: the ability to lay and repair submarine cables is treated by the major powers as a strategic advantage that cannot be left to the free market.

The explosive growth in demand for broadband — driven by hyperscalers such as Google, Meta, Microsoft and Amazon, which are building their own submarine cable networks — has transformed the industry. Over the past five years, these companies have commissioned or co-financed more than half of the new cable capacity installed globally. At the same time, the energy transition is boosting demand for CLVs specialising in offshore power cables, which are needed to connect wind farms to onshore grids—a category in which Prysmian and Nexans hold dominant positions.

III. Why 99% of Global Data Travels Along the Ocean Floor

cable data by Greg Mahlknecht, map by OpenStreetMap contributors, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

A complete and up-to-date map can be found at https://www.submarinecablemap.com/.

The assumption that satellites handle global communications is a widespread misconception. Communications satellites are essential for remote areas, mobility and redundancy, but they cannot compete with submarine cables in terms of capacity, latency and cost per bit transmitted. A single modern fibre-optic cable can carry over 350 terabits per second simultaneously — the equivalent of hundreds of millions of simultaneous telephone calls.

Ship-based GPS and AIS systems, banking networks, SWIFT transactions, diplomatic and military communications, and SCADA systems for critical infrastructure — all ultimately rely on submarine cables for international routing. Even satellite communications services, including Starlink, use ground stations connected via submarine cables to major internet networks.

The importance becomes even clearer when analysing the geographical distribution. Certain cable landing points — chokepoints of the global internet — concentrate huge volumes of traffic. The Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, Gibraltar and the Eastern Mediterranean are not only energy arteries but also critical nodes of the undersea digital infrastructure, where any disruption — accidental or deliberate — generates immediate global consequences.

IV. The Geopolitical Dimension: Cables as Weapons and Targets

The explosion of the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022, an event for which a Russian vessel was photographed in the area, demonstrated that strategic underwater infrastructure can be attacked at asymmetrically low cost to the aggressor and with huge economic and political consequences for the target. The same reasoning applies directly to submarine telecommunications cables.

Between November and December 2024, the Baltic Sea saw three separate incidents of submarine cable cuts within a few weeks of one another — the Estlink 2 cable (Finland–Estonia), the C-Lion1 cable (Germany–Finland) and a cable in the Gotland area. The Finnish, Swedish and German authorities detained a Chinese-flagged vessel — the Yi Peng 3 — suspected of deliberately anchoring above the cable routes. These incidents marked a major turning point: for the first time, NATO states explicitly treated the sabotage of submarine cables as an act of hybrid warfare.

Russia maintains a fleet of vessels with documented reconnaissance capabilities and the potential to sabotage underwater infrastructure. The Russian radio-electronic reconnaissance vessel that arrived in Cuba illustrates the operational model: civilian platforms tasked with gathering intelligence on underwater infrastructure. The GUGI (General Directorate for Deep-Sea Research) fleet of the Russian Navy operates submarines and surface vessels specially designed for operations at great depths — including along transatlantic cable routes.

The Chinese dimension is equally worrying. The exclusion of HMN Technologies from Western projects follows a well-established pattern: Washington has exerted systematic pressure on allies to block the company’s participation in geopolitically sensitive projects, citing the risk of data interception or controlled sabotage. The US CABLE Act (Countering Adversarial Subsea Acquisition and Lending Act), adopted in 2024, institutionalises this approach, prohibiting federal funding for projects involving entities from countries deemed adversaries.

The Taiwan Strait poses a particular risk: 14 submarine cables connect Taiwan to global networks, and China has already demonstrated that it is capable and willing to disrupt submarine communications in disputed areas. Each incident fuels concerns regarding global energy and digital security in an increasingly fractured geopolitical context.

V. The Battle for the Cable-Laying Fleet: Who Commands, Who Builds

While the cable-laying market is an oligopoly, the fleet itself is now becoming a subject of state-level industrial policy. The US does not possess significant national capacity for building CLVs — SubCom operates vessels partly built in European and Asian shipyards. The US Tanker Security Programme — through which the US Navy ensures access to strategic commercial vessels in the event of conflict — has no explicit equivalent for CLVs, although discussions have progressed in recent years.

Europe is in a relatively advantageous position: French companies (ASN/Nokia), Italian firms (Prysmian, Nexans) and groups such as Jan De Nul (Belgium) or Global Marine (UK) provide a solid regional capacity. France, with Alcatel Submarine Networks and the prospect of operationalising the next-generation nuclear aircraft carrier that will project its naval power, explicitly treats underwater infrastructure capability as an element of national digital sovereignty.

Japan, through NEC and government programmes for the security of submarine cables in the Pacific region, has invested significantly in the protection of critical underwater infrastructure. This approach follows the same pattern as Japan’s discoveries of rare earths on the ocean floor: Tokyo treats the deep underwater environment as a strategic space, not as neutral seabed.

VI. System Vulnerabilities: What Could Happen and What It Costs

Repairing a broken submarine cable involves locating the fault with sub-kilometre precision, mobilising a repair CLV (a fleet even rarer than that used for laying), navigating to the location (sometimes in remote areas or in severe weather conditions) and the actual operation of lifting, welding and re-laying. The process takes from a few days to several weeks and costs between $1 million and $3 million per operation.

There are currently around 20–25 vessels specialising in submarine cable repairs globally — a dramatically insufficient number in the event of a coordinated attack or a crisis involving multiple simultaneous breaks. Simulations by NATO and the Centre of Excellence for Strategic Communications in Riga have demonstrated that a coordinated attack on 5–6 landing points or critical routes could partially isolate Europe from global digital networks for periods of days or weeks.

The physical security of the cables is also not fully addressed. Unlike gas pipelines, which are monitored by pressure sensors and SCADA systems, submarine cables operate under conditions of vulnerability similar to those of critical energy terminals — reduced visibility, minimal physical protection on deep-water segments, and critical dependence on the availability of a small number of specialised vessels for emergency repairs.

VII. The International Response: From Statements to Real Capabilities

In 2023, NATO established the Underwater Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (UISC), based in Northwood (UK), as a direct response to the incidents in the Baltic Sea. The centre’s mandate includes monitoring suspicious naval activity near critical underwater infrastructure and coordinating the allied response. This is an important step — but actual operational capabilities remain limited.

The European Union has included the security of submarine cables within the legislative framework of the CER (Critical Entities Resilience) Directive and NIS2, imposing higher resilience standards on critical infrastructure operators. The EuroAfrica Connect, EllaLink and MEDUSA cable projects — partly funded by European funds — aim to diversify routes and reduce dependence on vulnerable sections. France’s naval ambitions and efforts to build an autonomous European maritime capability are part of the same drive to reduce strategic vulnerabilities.

For Romania and NATO’s eastern flank, the issue is concrete and immediate. The Black Sea remains an area of major strategic importance, with underwater infrastructure — including telecommunications cables and pipelines — whose integrity is directly linked to regional security. The ability to monitor and protect this infrastructure is a national security priority, not a niche technical issue.

Conclusion: Whoever controls the ocean floor controls the global flow of data

Cable-laying vessels are arguably the most strategic naval platforms of the digital age — less spectacular than aircraft carriers, but essential to the functioning of the global economy and security. The oligopoly that operates them reflects national security interests, not just market dynamics. And recent incidents in the Baltic Sea have transformed the subject from academic theory into an operational priority for NATO.

The question is no longer whether submarine cables can be attacked — but whether the international community has the real capabilities to protect and repair them quickly enough to limit the consequences of a coordinated attack. The honest answer, at this point, is no. And the cable-laying industry — too small, too concentrated, too underfunded at a strategic level — lies at the heart of this critical capability shortfall.

Source: here

Strategic Lessons from the War in Iran – US-Israel Military Coordination and Strategic Transformations in the Persian Gulf – Maritime Security Forum

Analysis of recent developments and strategic implications

The US-Israeli war against Iran has demonstrated unprecedented coordination between the two armies and a series of new strategic developments in the Persian Gulf region.

Context and Strategic Premises

In recent years, the security strategies of states in the Persian Gulf region have been marked by an unprecedented intensification of collaboration between the United States and Israel, which has evolved from simple joint exercises and intelligence-sharing to a new form of operational integration, far deeper than traditional cooperation. This transformation reflects not only the need to respond to regional threats, but also the desire to build a common front capable of managing complex challenges such as missile, drone and cyber attacks, as well as the destabilisation caused by non-state actors or rival states such as Iran.

Although many countries in the region periodically publish national or military strategies, the true strategic direction and effectiveness of these documents are revealed only in the concrete manner in which power is applied and in the way decisions regarding military coordination, logistics, technological interoperability and rapid crisis response are put into practice. In the context of the current war, now more than five weeks into its outbreak, we can observe a detailed analysis of the major transformations in the region: from the shift in paradigms regarding the decapitation of a sovereign state’s leadership, to the expansion of strategic depth beyond geographical borders, and right through to US-Israel military integration, which redefines the terms of the alliance and offers a model for other conflict zones.

Even if the final outcomes are not yet clearly defined, developments in recent weeks demonstrate that regional security no longer depends solely on military force, but also on the capacity for rapid adaptation, technological innovation and the strengthening of alliances. In this new era of warfare, power is no longer measured solely by the number of troops or equipment, but by the efficiency of defence networks, the interoperability of systems, and the ability to anticipate and neutralise threats before they materialise. Thus, the Persian Gulf is becoming a strategic laboratory, and the lessons learnt here will resonate far beyond regional borders, influencing how global security is built in the coming decades.

1. Decapitation – the new opening move

The war did not begin with a gradual escalation, but with a swift and decisive strike at the apex of the Iranian power pyramid. The use of decapitation as an opening tactic, targeting the leadership of a sovereign state, marks a paradigm shift in modern conflicts. This approach was not merely a military act, but a demonstration of strategic force intended to send a clear message to both Iran and the international community: the rules of the game have changed, and traditional escalation thresholds no longer apply. Unlike past attempts, such as the assassination of Fidel Castro or the killing of Osama bin Laden, the action in this conflict was open, well-organised and targeted an entire echelon of leaders, signalling a new strategic logic. The fact that the attack was orchestrated publicly, with the direct involvement of top military structures and benefited from advanced technological support, reflects both confidence in the ability to manage the consequences and the determination to set a precedent in terms of responding to strategic threats.

The target was the leadership of a sovereign state, not non-state actors. This highlights the maturing and radicalisation of the logic of conflict, as until now decapitation had been reserved for the leaders of terrorist groups or non-state actors, not heads of state or government. Consequently, the red line was deliberately crossed, with potentially destabilising effects on international norms.
The decapitation took place at the start of the conflict, not at the end. This allowed the initiators to seize the strategic initiative, rapidly disrupt the adversary’s ability to react, and induce a state of shock among both the leadership and the population. In effect, the war began with a decisive action, not a slow attrition, which completely altered the dynamics and pace of the confrontation.
It targeted a group of leaders, not just one person. The aim was to eliminate not only the central figure, but an entire decision-making system, in order to create a power vacuum and amplify the disorganisation. This collective approach suggests a strategy to swiftly block any attempt at continuity or regrouping of the leadership, thereby reducing the chances of a coordinated response.
The action was declared publicly, not carried out covertly. The transparency of the action served to send a clear warning and to deter other states from following the same path. At the same time, the publicity generated a major psychological effect, both domestically (to mobilise its own citizens) and internationally (to intimidate adversaries and their potential allies).

This tactic redefines the onset of war, transforming it into a tool for shaping the logic of the conflict. The erosion of the informal taboo against attacking the leadership of a sovereign state may set a dangerous precedent, thereby normalising such actions and paving the way for a cycle of mutual decapitation between states. Furthermore, this approach may lead to an uncontrolled escalation of conflicts, where each side attempts to deal a decisive blow to the opponent’s leadership, at the risk of completely destabilising the international order. The rapid loss of leadership can transform a state into a vulnerable entity, lacking coordination and the capacity to react. Consequently, the normalisation of decapitation as an opening tactic not only changes the rules of war but calls into question the very stability of the international system, risking to open up negative prospects for future symmetric conflicts.

2. Strategic Depth – Beyond Geography

Traditionally, strategic depth was linked to territory and geography, but the current war demonstrates that this concept extends beyond borders. Israel, although geographically limited, has managed to absorb massive attacks thanks to a multi-layered defence architecture and early warning capabilities. Strategic depth thus becomes systemic, based on alliances and technological integration, not merely on the ground.

3. From Cooperation to US-Israel Military Integration

Military cooperation between the US and Israel has evolved from sporadic coordination to operational and structural integration, becoming a central pillar of the region’s security architecture. We are no longer talking merely about a traditional partnership, but about a level of cohesion involving joint planning, synchronised execution and the sharing of strategic resources. American and Israeli officers not only collaborate in command centres, but also jointly develop response scenarios and engage in defence simulations targeting complex threats, including cyber and asymmetric threats. This ongoing interaction has led to the development of integrated protocols for crisis management, reconnaissance operations and the protection of critical infrastructure, demonstrating that the boundaries between the two armies are becoming increasingly permeable. Strategic alignment is not limited to information sharing or joint exercises, but translates into real interoperability, with mutual access to advanced technological platforms, communications networks and missile defence systems. Thus, military integration is not merely a force multiplier, but becomes a fundamental part of regional power, marking a break from previous models, when the relationship was often kept discreet to avoid political tensions and international reactions. Currently, this transparency and openness reflect mutual trust, but also the determination to build a resilient alliance, capable of responding rapidly and effectively to any challenge.

Furthermore, military cooperation is complemented by a parallel diplomatic approach, which strengthens the alliance on multiple fronts. Even under the pressure of conflict and regional uncertainty, channels of negotiation remain open, facilitating continuous dialogue and the exchange of strategic perspectives. Diplomats and military personnel work together to calibrate responses to challenges, avoiding uncontrolled escalation and maintaining a balance between firmness and openness to compromise. This strategy, in which force and dialogue coexist, is a distinctive feature of the US-Israel relationship, ensuring a united front on both the military and diplomatic fronts. Through this duality, the alliance adapts to new geopolitical realities, demonstrating that flexibility in negotiations is just as important and strengthens defence.

4. Strategic Ambiguity – An Outdated Strategy in the Gulf

Gulf states, such as Qatar, have long relied on maintaining relations with rival camps to maximise their flexibility. This balancing strategy, known as ‘strategic ambiguity’, was long considered an asset, allowing these states to negotiate with opposing powers, attract investment and avoid direct involvement in regional conflicts. However, recent attacks on energy infrastructure, such as those on Saudi refineries or gas terminals, have demonstrated that this strategic ambiguity no longer provides protection, but exposes them to risks from both sides. States are becoming vulnerable targets, without the assurance of a real shield from any alliance and without the possibility of a rapid and coordinated response. The pressure to align with emerging blocs is growing ever more intense, against a backdrop of regional polarisation and global rivalries, and strategies based on balance are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain in an environment dominated by power and constraints. In practice, a new geopolitical landscape is taking shape, in which ‘sitting in the middle’ is no longer a safe option, but a position of maximum risk. In this context, the Gulf states are forced to reassess their foreign policies and opt for clear alliances, sacrificing some of the autonomy they once enjoyed. Flexibility thus becomes a luxury increasingly difficult to maintain, and ambiguity shifts from an advantage to a vulnerability.

Conclusions

The US-Israeli war against Iran represents not merely a turning point, but a genuine rupture in the regional security architecture, with repercussions extending beyond the traditional geographical and military framework. The unprecedented coordination between the two armies, manifested through operational integration and joint planning, demonstrates that alliances are no longer mere force multipliers, but structural elements of power. This level of cooperation involves not only information sharing and joint exercises, but also genuine interoperability, mutual access to state-of-the-art technologies, and synchronisation in crisis management. Strategic depth is being redefined, shifting from territorial defence to a systemic approach based on networks of alliances and technological integration, which enables small states to absorb major shocks and remain relevant on the regional stage. Strategic ambiguity, which was once a refuge and a source of flexibility for small Gulf states, is now proving to be a major vulnerability: in the face of polarisation and the pressure to choose sides, the ‘middle ground’ is no longer a safe option, but a position exposed to risks from both directions. The current context reflects the synergy and advantage of solid alliances, but with the caveat that excessive dependence on a single partner can limit a state’s freedom of action and capacity to adapt. In a world where the balance is shifting, transparent cooperation becomes both a shield and a weapon, whilst the lack of clear alliances turns vulnerability into a certainty.

In the long term, these developments will fundamentally reshape not only military strategies, but also perceptions of the independence, sovereignty and security of states in the region. A new regional order is taking shape, characterised by deep collaboration, transparency and operational integration, in which states are forced to abandon ambiguity and opt for firm alliances. This transformation will redefine both how conflicts are managed and how peace is negotiated, and diplomatic flexibility becomes a rare luxury, reserved only for those with the capacity to build robust partnerships. Only by striking a balance between firmness and dialogue can states hope to preserve their autonomy and successfully navigate the geopolitical challenges of the future.

Maritime Security Forum

Rules, Power and Uncertainty in the Governance of the Maritime Domain – Maritime Security Forum

UNCLOS, global actors and the challenges of the contemporary maritime order

1. The Return to the Rule of Force at Sea

A maritime landscape is increasingly taking shape in which force tends to prevail over rules. It is as if we are returning to the days when whoever fired the first cannon dictated the order at sea, and the maritime space ceased to be governed by law, transforming into a arena of brute force. In this context, UNCLOS (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) remains the primary framework designed to maintain order – establishing the limits of sovereignty, freedom of navigation, rights over resources and dispute resolution procedures. The central idea of the Convention is as clear as day: the sea must be a space where rights are determined by law, not by force or historical myths.

2. China and the Ambiguity of Compliance with Maritime Regulations

Although China is a party to UNCLOS, its approach to maritime rules raises questions. Beijing appears to respect the Convention only when it serves its interests, and when the rules contradict its claims, it disregards them without hesitation. The most telling example is China’s actions in the South China Sea, where its exaggerated claims were rejected by international arbitration (the Philippines v. China case), yet Beijing does not recognise the ruling, consolidating its control through infrastructure and force. This conduct undermines the fundamental principle of UNCLOS: maritime rights must be established by law, not imposed through pressure or mythology.

3. Russia: Open Force as an Instrument of Maritime Remodelling

Russia, although a signatory to UNCLOS, acts even more directly, using force to redraw the maritime space. The occupation of Crimea, attempts to alter maritime rights in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, attacks on ports and threats to civilian transport are actions that amount to a forced rewriting of the maritime order. Russia operates formally within the international legal framework, but resorts to war to undermine its foundations – a strategy reminiscent of the Romanian saying ‘you make the law and you break it too.’

4. Iran and Political Manoeuvring in the Absence of UNCLOS

Iran represents a special case, but one that is equally problematic. Although it has signed UNCLOS, it has not ratified the Convention, which gives it greater freedom of action. Thus, Tehran is transforming the Strait of Hormuz from a global trade route into a tool for exerting pressure and geopolitical influence, using its strategic position t e global energy and trade flows.

5. The Role of Non-Participating States: the US and Turkey

An important aspect concerns states that have not ratified UNCLOS but largely act in accordance with its principles. The US, although not an official party to the Convention, consistently supports freedom of navigation and adheres to the rules, but its formal absence creates a vulnerability: a global leader that has not joined the main treaty. Turkey finds itself in a similar situation, particularly in the sensitive areas of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. These states do not directly undermine the system, nor do they contribute to its consolidation, leaving the maritime order in a state of uncertainty and constant flux.

6. The Transformation of Maritime Confrontation: Modern Technology and Tactics

Technological changes have redefined the way maritime confrontations are conducted. Imposing fleets are no longer needed to cause significant damage. Drones, missiles, unmanned platforms and attacks on ports and critical infrastructure allow for the maintenance of a constant threat, blocking access to maritime infrastructure without formally conquering the territory. These new realities call for adapted rules, as chaos on the world’s oceans benefits no one.

Conclusions and Outlook

Faced with a tense transition towards an updated international system of maritime law, it is becoming clear that what is at stake is not just order at sea, but global stability itself. UNCLOS remains the fundamental benchmark, but continuous adaptation, cooperation and political will are needed to preserve the sea as a space governed by rules, not by force. “Where there is law, there is no bargaining,” says an old Romanian proverb – but reality shows that bargaining still persists, and the future depends on states’ ability to establish and uphold clear rules, to innovate and to adapt the maritime order to the challenges of contemporary technology and geopolitics.

Only through active engagement, dialogue and reform can we hope that the sea will remain a space of cooperation and law, not an arena of brute force and uncertainty. Ultimately, the balance between firmness and openness will determine whether the maritime order survives or is swallowed up by the waves of new conflicts.

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Chinese gravitational technologies and implications for maritime security – Maritime Security Forum

Recent developments, regional incidents and strategic conclusions

1. Technological progress: the Chinese gravitational detector

Last month, Chinese researchers announced the development of a gravitational detector with world-leading precision. This advancement significantly enhances the technology’s potential for military applications, opening up new prospects for the surveillance and control of sensitive maritime areas.

The instrument uses a superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID), capable of detecting objects by identifying minute variations in gravity. This approach overcomes the limitations of traditional methods (sonar, magnetic anomaly detection, radar), as gravity cannot be masked or shielded, thereby enhancing efficiency in detecting underwater targets, such as nuclear submarines on patrol.

The research team highlights the instrument’s usefulness both in the scientific field and for identifying underground resources. At the same time, this innovation brings China closer to the capability of detecting nuclear submarines, a development that could fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region.

2. Performance and international comparison

The report by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) highlights the instrument’s ability to reduce measurement noise in gravitational gradient measurements to a level close to that of large-scale gravitational wave detectors, such as the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) in the US, which uses mirrors placed 4 km apart. In contrast, the Chinese instrument is the size of a desk, making it far more practical for mobile or military applications.

3. The Lombok Strait incident: context and implications

On 6 April, an Indonesian fisherman discovered a torpedo-like underwater object bearing the logo of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) near the Lombok Strait – a strategic route monitored by the US and Australia. This area is crucial for the transit of ships and submarines between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The object, approximately 3.7 metres long and 0.7 metres in diameter, was identified by local authorities as likely being an observation or underwater research device. Although it posed no immediate threats (such as explosives or radioactive materials), investigations are continuing to determine whether the data collected has military or strategic value.

CSIC, one of China’s largest naval conglomerates, develops submarines, naval vessels and underwater monitoring equipment. The discovery of such a device in a sensitive area raises questions about China’s intentions and the possible implications for regional security, particularly in the context of tensions in South-East Asia and Australia’s plans to operate nuclear submarines in the region.

4. Regional reactions and precedents

This incident is not an isolated one: in the past, Indonesia and the Philippines have reported the discovery of unmanned underwater vehicles suspected of being of Chinese origin. Although Indonesia is not a direct rival of China in the South China Sea, relations have become strained, particularly after Chinese vessels entered Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone, prompting diplomatic protests.

These events highlight the strategic risk posed by the presence of autonomous underwater vehicles, which, even if declared to be for research purposes, can provide China with essential data for military operations, surveillance and strategic planning.

5. Conclusions and Outlook

The transformation of underwater warfare: Chinese technological progress, combined with the use of autonomous vehicles and gravitational detectors, is changing the rules of the game in the field of maritime security. Submarines, previously considered invisible, are becoming increasingly easier to detect.
Regional vulnerabilities: Discoveries in the Lombok Strait and other sensitive areas demonstrate that coastal states must strengthen their monitoring capabilities and collaborate to protect their sovereignty and strategic interests.
The need for new rules: Technological advances often outpace the current legal framework (UNCLOS), necessitating an update to international law to prevent the escalation of tensions and ensure global maritime stability.
Cooperation and transparency: In a world where technology is becoming increasingly sophisticated, only through dialogue, transparency and strong partnerships can a balance be maintained between security, development and compliance with international law.

In conclusion, recent developments in gravitational technologies and incidents involving autonomous underwater vehicles illustrate a new phase in the global competition for control of maritime spaces. “Not everything that flies is edible,” says an old Romanian proverb, but in the current context, any underwater object can have major implications for regional security and sovereignty.

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The Illusion of Peace: What is Happening in the Middle East – Maritime Security Forum

Recent developments in the Middle East give the impression of a temporary lull. In reality, this appears to be more of a tactical pause than a genuine de-escalation. Amidst the information noise, what matters most are actions—not rhetoric. A tactical pause, not stabilisation.

Reports of a ‘ceasefire’ between the United States and Iran should be viewed as a short-term de-escalation.

Such pauses are usually used for:

• regrouping forces

• resupplying logistics and provisions

• reassessing losses and adjusting strategy

The activity of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) suggests preparation and repositioning, rather than withdrawal.

Military dimension: Concentration of forces Indicators of continued escalation include:

• the movement of aircraft carrier strike groups

• the redeployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford

• the deployment of strategic aviation, including the B-52 Stratofortress

These actions indicate a build-up of capability, not the end of the conflict. Proxy conflicts continue.

At the same time, indirect confrontations remain active:

• Hezbollah in Lebanon

• Other regional actors aligned with Iran. Israel continues operations against these groups, indicating that there is no comprehensive ceasefire across the region. The energy factor and global impact.

A key element is control over the Strait of Hormuz—a critical artery for the global oil supply. Any stabilisation or escalation here directly affects:

• global energy prices

• the economic stability of exporters, including Russia

• energy security in Europe and Asia Negotiations as a tool for buying time Potential negotiations, including those involving third parties such as Pakistan, are likely to serve to:

• reducing immediate tensions

• buying time for strategic decisions At the same time, the parties’ core positions remain fundamentally incompatible.

Conclusion: The current situation is not a path to peace, but rather a phase of regrouping ahead of future decisions.

Key trends:

• Military presence in the region is increasing

• Proxy conflicts persist

• Energy dynamics remain central

• Diplomacy is being used tactically, not strategically.

In the coming weeks, the key question will be whether this lull leads to a further escalation or gives way to a more lasting stabilisation. For the time being, the indicators point to the former.

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Attack on the Feodosia oil terminal and regional implications – Maritime Security Forum

Detailed, structured analysis and conclusions on recent developments

Details of the incident in Feodosia

On the night of 8 April, the JSC oil terminal in Feodosia, a temporarily occupied territory, was the target of an attack that caused a major fire. According to eyewitnesses, two tanks, one large and one smaller, were engulfed in flames, visible from several kilometres away. Although locals reported explosions and a fire at the oil depot, local authorities have not officially confirmed the incident. This information was reported by RBC-Ukraine, citing Telegram Astra.

Regional context: Strikes on Russian Federation oil terminals

On 7 April, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine announced that following the strike on the ‘Sheskaris’ oil terminal in the Krasnodar Krai, several pieces of infrastructure essential for the transport and transhipment of oil had been damaged.
That same night, Ukrainian forces carried out a further strike on the oil terminal in the port of Ust-Luga, located on the shores of the Baltic Sea. OSINT analysts confirmed the attack, and the Russians reported drones over the Leningrad region.

Key implications and trends

Military presence in the region is increasing: Attacks on strategic infrastructure are intensifying tensions and military mobilisation.
Persistence of proxy conflicts: Indirect actions continue, impacting critical infrastructure.
Energy dynamics remain central: Strikes on oil terminals highlight the role of energy resources in the conflict.
Diplomacy is used tactically, not strategically: Actions appear to serve temporary objectives, with no clear direction towards a long-term resolution.

Conclusions

The attack on the oil terminal in Feodosia, combined with the recent strikes on terminals in the Russian Federation, reflects an escalation of the conflict in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea regions. These actions target energy infrastructure and underscore the fact that the region is currently undergoing a phase of regrouping and intensifying tensions, not a path towards peace. In the coming weeks, the decisive question will be whether this lull leads to a new escalation or evolves towards a more lasting stabilisation. For now, the indicators point to an intensification of the conflict, and the proverbial saying “There is no calm without a storm” seems to fit the current context perfectly.

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For the first time, Russian officials are discussing the possibility of establishing a buffer zone in the Vinnytsia region of Ukraine, near Transnistria – Maritime Security Forum

Background and details on Russia’s plans

Pavlo Palisa, deputy head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, stated on Wednesday, 8 April, in an interview with RBC-Ukraine, that Russia is considering for the first time the creation of a buffer zone in the Vinnytsia region, on the border with unrecognised Transnistria. This intention is part of a series of broader plans aimed at destabilising Ukraine’s border regions and extending the conflict towards the south of the country.

Palisa noted that Russia frequently revises its timelines and operational objectives, but this year it will focus on the Donbas, expanding its efforts if circumstances permit, particularly along the Oleksandrivsk axis and the Zaporizhzhia sector.

Russian plans and regional implications

Buffer zones in the Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv and, recently, Vinnytsia regions – bringing the conflict close to the Moldovan border and, indirectly, to the Romanian border.
Attempts to capture Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, with long-term intentions regarding Mykolaiv and Odesa, which could seriously affect the region’s energy and logistics corridor.

The Deputy Head of the Presidential Office stressed that there is no need to panic, as Russia does not have sufficient forces to implement all these plans simultaneously.

The situation in Transnistria: the Russian military presence

Russian troops have remained in Transnistria since 1992, following the conflict of that period.

Officially, they are presented as “peacekeepers” and guards of ammunition depots, but Moldova considers their presence illegal.

The Ukrainian Ambassador to Moldova estimates that the “Russian Operational Group of Forces” numbers over 1,000 troops, most of whom are local residents holding Russian passports, which limits personnel rotation and reduces operational mobility.

These forces are primarily a tool of political influence, and Moldova has this year presented a plan for the reintegration of Transnistria, the first since 2003.

Implications for Moldova

Increased security risks: The creation of a buffer zone in Vinnytsia brings the conflict to Moldova’s border, amplifying territorial vulnerability and the risk of internal destabilisation. Moldova could face additional political and military pressure, particularly in the context of Transnistria’s reintegration.
Threat to sovereignty: The presence of Russian troops in Transnistria becomes a source of tension. Any military movement near the border could be used as a pretext for ‘protection’ or intervention, undermining efforts at reintegration and the maintenance of stability.
Russian political influence: A buffer zone could facilitate the expansion of Russian influence in Moldova, including through the manipulation of minorities and the local political context.

Implications for Romania

Proximity to the conflict: A buffer zone on Moldova’s border, and by extension Romania’s, increases the risk of conflict spillover and regional destabilisation, with potential implications for national security and communities in the border area.
Pressure on energy infrastructure: Russia’s plans to target the southern corridor (Odessa, Mykolaiv) directly affect the energy and logistics routes crossing Romania. “No calm without a storm” becomes relevant, as any escalation may affect the transit of resources.
Strategic role in the EU and NATO: Romania will need to strengthen its position as a border state, stepping up cooperation with Moldova and Ukraine and preparing responses to crisis scenarios.

Implications for the European Union

Regional stability: A buffer zone on the EU’s borders (through Moldova and Romania) amplifies security risks and pressure on European neighbourhood policies. The EU will need to respond promptly to any escalation.
Energy crisis: Attacks on oil infrastructure and plans to seize ports could destabilise energy flows to the EU, increasing dependence on alternatives and exacerbating vulnerabilities.
Diplomacy and solidarity: The EU will need to step up dialogue and support for Moldova and Romania, both in terms of security and the economy, to prevent long-term destabilisation.

Conclusion

Russia’s plans to create buffer zones and extend the conflict into southern Ukraine, with a focus on Vinnytsia and Transnistria, represent an escalation with major cross-border implications. Moldova is becoming a critical point in this equation, Romania finds itself in the position of guardian of the EU and NATO’s eastern border, and the European Union must manage security and energy risks in the region. “No calm without a storm” – the Romanian proverb – fits the context perfectly, warning that any apparent lull may precede new waves of instability.

Maritime Security Forum

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