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Romania’s F-16 jets scramble after Putin’s border strike
MS DAILY BRIEF – August 7 th, 2025
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Daily appearance Monday-Saturday 09 AM (GMT +2)
Some information is presented when possible from several sources
Contents
Trump may meet with Putin for talks on Ukraine war “as early as next week”. 1
Ukraine war update: Zelenskyy – don’t let Russia “fool us with details”. 3
The world awaits Trump’s next move as the deadline for a ceasefire in Russia approaches. 5
Attack on Zamzam refugee camp in Sudan reportedly kills over 1,500 civilians. 8
Israel issues forced eviction orders amid fears of total occupation of Gaza Strip. 10
Trump news in brief: President hails progress in Ukraine war, threatens India with severe tariffs 12
US research station staff evacuated from Antarctica in high-risk operation. 14
Maglev train researchers may have solved the “tunnel boom” shock wave problem.. 16
Drones are on deck: US Coast Guard prepares for fleet-wide UAS deployment 19
The world’s largest aircraft carrier visits France. 20
Lockheed advances development of in-flight missile guidance system.. 21
Spain favours European options over US-made F-35 fighter jets. 21
German-developed security AUVs to be integrated into AI-based digital platform.. 23
Russian and Chinese navies to conduct new joint patrols in Asia-Pacific. 23
OCS and a new era of regional cooperation. 24
Chile launches ambitious naval policy to build a fully domestic fleet by 2030. 28
French unmanned interceptor ship UHSI32 MkII validated for coastal attack missions. 29
US Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft steps up maritime surveillance to counter China in Indo-Pacific 31
TCG Orucreis frigate modernised to support Turkey’s national blue naval doctrine. 33
China deploys new Type 094 nuclear submarine to consolidate global sea dominance. 34
China commissions fourth Type 075 amphibious assault ship. 36
US plans to launch first interceptor satellite by 2028. 38
First Russian military forces and equipment arrive in Belarus to participate in Zapad-2025 39
Ukrainians blow up Mi-28 attack helicopter in Russia. 39
Foggy counter-response: A stronger approach to sub-threshold threats. 40
On limited nuclear use in the Western Pacific. 43
Breaking news: Tensions with Hezbollah EXPLODE; IDF prepares MASSIVE military operation against Hamas | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine | Ukraine has hacked a secret Russian submarine | Medvedev threatens again with nuclear weapons
Trump may meet with Putin for talks on the war in Ukraine “as early as next week”
The summit with the Russian leader would follow “significant progress” made by special envoy Steve Witkoff during his visit to Moscow
Shaun Walker in Kiev and Andrew Roth in Washington
Thursday, 7 August 2025, 02:51 CEST
Donald Trump could meet with Vladimir Putin as early as next week to discuss the war in Ukraine, White House officials said, although senior advisers warned that serious “obstacles” remain to a ceasefire.
On Wednesday evening, the US president told reporters at the White House, when asked when he would meet with the leaders of Ukraine and Russia: “There is a good chance that a meeting will take place very soon.” Trump said there had been no concrete progress leading to talks about a meeting, but that US officials had been working on it for “a long time.”
Trump gave no indication of where the meeting with Putin might take place. It would be the first summit between US and Russian leaders since Joe Biden and his counterpart met in Geneva in June 2021.
White House officials informed the American media about a meeting with Putin after US special envoy Steve Witkoff met with the Russian leader at the Kremlin on Wednesday. After the meeting, Trump said that “significant progress” had been made in talks to end the war in Ukraine.
Trump later told European leaders that he intends to meet with Putin in a bilateral meeting next week, followed by a meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the New York Times reported.
Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, said he did not want to exaggerate the progress made during the talks between Witkoff and Putin. “We hope that if things continue to progress, there will be an opportunity for the president to meet with both Vladimir Putin and President Zelensky, hopefully in the near future,” Rubio told reporters. “But obviously, a lot has to happen before that can happen.”
He said there were still many “obstacles” to peace, particularly regarding Russia’s territorial claims, and that there was no concrete proposal for a ceasefire. “What we have is a better understanding of the conditions under which Russia would be willing to end the war,” he said. The US should then compare this with “what the Ukrainians are willing to accept.”
Witkoff’s three-hour talks took place two days before the deadline set by the US president for Russia to reach a peace agreement in the war or face new sanctions.
“My special envoy, Steve Witkoff, just had a very productive meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Trump wrote on social media. “Important progress has been made! Afterwards, I briefed some of our European allies. Everyone agrees that this war must end, and we will work towards that in the days and weeks ahead.”
Trump did not provide further details on the content of the discussions, and some analysts will be cautious in interpreting these comments too much, given that Trump’s previous statements that Putin was ready to negotiate did not lead to significant progress. Putin has shown no signs that he is prepared to make concessions or that he is willing to change his main objectives in the war.
However, in recent days, there have been unconfirmed reports that the Kremlin may propose a halt to long-range missile attacks by both sides as an offer to Trump. It is not yet known whether this possibility was discussed during Wednesday’s talks at the Kremlin.
On Wednesday evening, Trump called Zelensky, who was returning to Kiev after a visit to the frontline areas in the north-east of the country.
“Our common position is very clear: the war must end and there must be a just end,” Zelenskyy wrote on social media afterwards. “European leaders also participated in the call and I am grateful to each of them for their support. We discussed what was said in Moscow. Ukraine must defend its independence. We all need a lasting and reliable peace. Russia must end the war it started.”
Trump had promised to impose secondary tariffs on countries importing Russian oil if no progress was made towards a peace agreement by Friday. On Wednesday, he issued an executive order imposing an additional 25% tax on Indian products, citing India’s continued imports of Russian oil .
India’s foreign ministry said it was “extremely regrettable that the US has chosen to impose additional tariffs on India for actions that other countries are taking in their national interest.”
A senior administration official said additional tariffs could be imposed on Friday. “The Russians are keen to continue working with the United States. Secondary sanctions are expected to be imposed on Friday,” the official said.
Witkoff arrived early Wednesday morning and was photographed walking through a park in central Moscow with Kirill Dmitriev, a Kremlin envoy who has played a key role in the negotiations so far. Russian agencies reported that he left Russia early Wednesday evening.
It was Witkoff’s fifth trip to Moscow as Trump’s chief negotiator with the Kremlin, but his first since Trump began taking a tougher stance toward Russia. Trump had previously shortened the 50-day deadline he had given Putin , saying he saw no desire on the part of the Kremlin to change its behaviour and describing recent attacks that killed civilians in Kiev as “disgusting”.
After Trump threatened new sanctions, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that harsh rhetoric could lead to direct conflict between Russia and the US. In response, Trump issued an order to reposition two nuclear submarines.
Trump and Kiev have called for a complete and unconditional ceasefire to allow negotiations to begin, but even a pause in long-range missile strikes could provide a welcome respite for both sides.
Ukraine has hit Russian energy and military infrastructure with long-range drones, forcing airports to close. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities continue almost every night .
On some nights, Russia sends up to 500 long-range kamikaze drones into Ukraine, and 72 people have been killed in Kiev alone since May.
Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, is expected to visit Kiev in the coming days, although no specific date has been set.
Update on the war in Ukraine: Zelenskyy – don’t let Russia “fool us with details”
Time is running out before secondary sanctions are imposed on Friday; most still trust Zelenskyy, but his popularity has declined after the failure of the fight against corruption. What we know on day 1,261
Warren Murray with Guardian journalists and news agencies
Thursday, 7 August 2025, 02:00 CEST
- Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia seems “more inclined towards a ceasefire” aft ‘s visit to Moscow on Wednesday, according to . “The pressure on them is working. But the main thing is not to get lost in the details – neither us nor the US,” the Ukrainian president said in his evening speech.
- Despite the commitment, sanctions against Russian oil “will still be imposed on Friday,” a senior Trump administration official said on Wednesday, according to Reuters. Separately, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said he did not want to exaggerate the progress made during the talks between Steve Witkoff and Putin. Many “obstacles” remain, particularly Russia’s territorial claims, and there is no concrete proposal for a ceasefire. There have been unconfirmed reports that the Kremlin may propose a halt to long-range missile attacks by both sides.
- Donald Trump could meet with Vladimir Putin as early as next week to discuss the war, White House officials said, although senior administration officials warned that serious “obstacles” remain to a ceasefire. Trump told reporters at the White House on Wednesday: “There is a very good chance that a meeting will take place very soon.” He gave no indication of where the meeting with Putin might take place. After the meeting with Putin, Trump wants a three-way meeting with the Russian leader and Zelenskyy, the New York Times and CNN reported, citing people familiar with the plan. The US president said “significant progress” had been made when Witkoff, a real estate agent, met with the Russian leader at the Kremlin on Wednesday. Meetings between Trump and Putin on Ukraine have been mentioned as a possibility in the past, but have not materialised.
- Trump has promised to introduce secondary tariffs on countries that import Russian oil if no progress is made towards a peace deal by Friday. On Wednesday, he issued an executive order imposing an additional 25% tariff on Indian products, citing India’s continued imports of Russian oil .
- Russian artillery strikes killed three people and wounded four on Wednesday in the southeastern Ukrainian city of Nikopol, the regional governor said. Serhiy Lysak, governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region, said two men and a woman had died. Nikopol is located on the northern bank of the Dnipro River, which is controlled by Ukraine. The RBK-Ukraine news outlet said the attack hit a car belonging to the state emergency services and that one of those killed was an emergency worker.
- A US Army soldier has been arrested for attempting to provide Russia with classified information about the American M1A2 Abrams main battle tank, the Department of Justice has said. Taylor Adam Lee, 22, of El Paso, Texas, is accused of attempting to “provide classified military information about the vulnerabilities of American tanks to a person he believed to be a Russian intelligence officer in exchange for Russian citizenship,” said Roman Rozhavsky, deputy director of the FBI’s counterintelligence division. Lee allegedly handed over an SD card containing documents and information to a person he believed to be a Russian agent.
- Most Ukrainians still trust Zelenskyy, but their number has fallen to 58% of the population after a failed attempt to limit the power of anti-corruption bodies led to protests, according to polls. The International Institute of Sociology in Kiev said on Wednesday that its poll, which began a day after the shock vote on 22 July, found that trust had fallen from a high of 74% in May and 67% in February-March, recorded over the previous 18 months. Zelenskyy said on Wednesday that he had visited troops near the front line in the Sumy region.
- Ukraine appointed a new head of its economic crime investigation unit on Wednesday. Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko said Oleksandr Tsyvinsky, a renowned anti-corruption detective, would head the economic security bureau. The director is chosen by a committee of international experts and then confirmed by the government. The government delayed his appointment for several weeks, citing family ties to Russia. Svyrydenko said Tsyvinsky had undergone a polygraph test as part of the appointment process. Marta Kos, the European commissioner for enlargement, welcomed the appointment as “a crucial reform strongly encouraged by the EU.”
The world is waiting for Trump’s next move as the deadline for a ceasefire in Russia approaches
The US president has been unusually reticent about plans to sanction Russia if it does not agree to end the war in Ukraine
Patrick Wintour Diplomatic Editor
Wednesday, 6 August 2025, 16:53 CEST
After concluding, following a six-month analysis, that Vladimir Putin is not a pragmatic authoritarian leader but an ideological nationalist who wants to reclaim what ” ly belongs to Russia,” the deadline set by Donald Trump for the Russian president to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine or face US sanctions on oil exports expires on Friday.
Trump’s next move – which some have claimed is a Russian ploy – to punish Putin could define his presidency.
It is a remarkable shift that experienced Trump observers such as Michael McFaul, former US ambassador to Russia, said they never expected. Just a few months ago, the debate focused on what other incentives Trump could offer Putin to end the fighting. His administration has not introduced any sanctions against Russia, compared to at least 16 sets of measures every six months since February 2022, according to a report presented this week to the Senate Banking Committee by Democratic leaders.
Trump initially gave Putin a 50-day deadline, which he then reduced by several weeks. “Secondary sanctions and tariffs against China, India and Brazil, which buy Russian oil, are the next obvious step in trying to stop the conflict,” US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker predicted on Tuesday.
But as the deadline approaches, scepticism persists about how far Trump will go. He sent his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, to Moscow for the fifth time for last-minute talks, and on Friday Trump acknowledged that he does not believe sanctions will have a significant impact because the Russians are “cunning characters and quite adept at avoiding sanctions.”
He also secured maximum political leeway by ensuring that the US Senate would not pass a bill before the summer recess that would have allowed him to impose 500% tariffs on exports from countries importing Russian oil, mainly India, China, Brazil and Turkey.
Trump argued that congressional legislation was unnecessary because he could act through executive orders, instead mentioning tariffs of 100% for economies importing Russian oil – a huge figure, even if lower than the 500% proposed by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham.
It is surprising that, in the run-up to Witkoff’s talks in Moscow, Trump, who is usually eager to flex his muscles before negotiations, offered only vague details about the sanctions that could be imposed on Russian energy importers, whether in the form of US sanctions against foreign refineries importing Russian oil or US tariffs on countries importing Russian oil.
Some of the warnings issued this week by Trump to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that he would raise tariffs on India because its government was not concerned “about the number of people killed in Ukraine by the Russian war machine” do not yet appear to be part of a broader strategy. Tensions appear to be just as high over Trump’s previous complaints about India’s trade practices and its purchases of cheap Russian oil. These are set to begin on 27 August.
Rachel Ziemba, a research associate at the Centre for a New American Century, said that if India is sanctioned but China – the largest buyer of Russian oil – is not, trade in Russian oil could become even more illegal. Some of Trump’s advisers, notably Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, warned China last week about raising tariffs on Russian energy purchases, but such threats are difficult to take seriously given Trump’s desire to conclude a trade agreement with China and the risks associated with a sudden disruption of trade between China and the US. In 2024, China accounted for 32% of Russian exports of oil and petroleum products.
McFaul told Foreign Policy magazine about a possible boomerang effect if widespread tariff increases turn into a full-blown trade war.
Trump has been hesitant about the impact of economic pressure on Putin. Many academics say that oil sanctions reshape economic relationships and change markets rather than producing changes in state behaviour.
Three years of sanctions against Russia have so far had, at best, a slow effect. Russia has recorded economic growth of 4% in 2023 and 2024, kept unemployment at an astonishing 2% and even reduced social inequality by supporting real wage growth, which has disproportionately benefited Russians at the bottom of the economic ladder, according to a recent report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank. The authors predicted that Russia’s economy could withstand the current level of sanctions for at least another three years.
But the report also highlighted Russia’s developing vulnerabilities. Interest rates are at 18%, inflation is persistent, and economic growth is stagnating. Russia has been forced to revise its budget for 2025 amid falling oil revenues, largely due to lower prices and discounts that importers such as India have been able to demand. As a result, government revenues from Russian oil and gas in May-June were 35% lower than in the same period in 2024, according to a July report by the Kiev School of Economics. Russia’s oil export revenues are estimated to fall by 16%, from $189 billion (£142 billion) in 2024 to $163 billion in 2025 and $151 billion in 2026.
The federal budget deficit reached 3.7 trillion roubles ($40.4 billion) in the first half of 2025, representing 97% of the annual target of 3.8 trillion roubles. This is more than five times higher than the deficit in the first half of 2024 and 57% higher than the largest deficit in the first six months of recent years (2023). Oil prices are unlikely to see a significant recovery, meaning that Russia will fall well short of its budget target, increasing its dependence on the National Wealth Fund (NWF) and domestic debt issuance.
The NWF’s liquid assets are also under pressure, with Russia set to draw heavily on these reserves by the end of the year. In a report published this week, Oxford Economics predicted that Russia “could enter recession”.
The overall reason is simple: the level of military spending, including the cost of voluntary recruitment, is distorting the economy. Economist Janis Kluge, who researches Russia at the SWP think tank in Berlin, estimates that Russia’s total military spending accounts for 8-10% of GDP, once all expenditure is included, including regional recruitment.
The pressure could increase. The latest EU sanctions package includes a ban on the purchase of petroleum products made from Russian crude oil starting in January next year. The package imposed sanctions on a major Indian refinery, Nayara Energy, for the first time, prompting Microsoft to suspend software services this week. Other refineries could be subject to sanctions – with the UK likely to follow suit – but the question then arises as to how the supply shortfall created by the loss of Russian oil can be covered.
Furthermore, if Trump joins the sanctions, the US and Europe will have to make a joint decision on the continued value of the oil price cap, a Biden-era tool designed to reduce Russia’s oil profits while keeping global oil prices low.
The cap was introduced in all G7 countries in December 2022 and works by withdrawing insurance from any shipping company that has not obtained a certificate attesting that it sells Russian oil at a price below $60 per barrel, but a host of problems have arisen.
In recent months, with the fall in oil prices, it has become clear that the $60 cap was set too high. The limit has also led to the emergence of a ghost fleet of tankers operating without official insurance and now sanctioned by the EU, the US and the UK. The UK and the EU have agreed to reduce the price cap from 2 September to $47.60 per barrel, but Trump is maintaining the US cap at $60 per barrel, a recipe for circumvention.
The only precondition is that Trump does not back down, McFaul said. “Making threats and not following through is one of the biggest mistakes you can make in diplomacy.” The former ambassador recalled George Shultz, the great US secretary of state during the Reagan era, who said, “Never point a gun at someone unless you are prepared to shoot.”
The attack on the Zamzam refugee camp in Sudan is believed to have killed over 1,500 civilians
The Guardian’s investigation finds that the number of victims of the April attack by the Rapid Support Forces is much higher than current estimates
Supported by
Thursday, 7 August 2025, 06:00 CEST
More than 1,500 civilians are believed to have been massacred during an attack on Sudan’s largest refugee camp in April, in what is believed to be the second worst war crime in the country’s catastrophic conflict.
A Guardian investigation into the 72-hour attack by paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on the Zamzam camp in North Darfur, the country’s largest camp for people displaced by war, has uncovered repeated accounts of mass executions and widespread abductions. Hundreds of civilians are still missing.
The scale of the likely casualties means that the RSF attack ranks second only to a similar ethnic massacre in West Darfur two years ago.
The war between the Arab-led RSF and the Sudanese army, which broke out in April 2023, has been characterised by repeated atrocities, forcing millions of people to flee their homes and causing the world’s largest humanitarian crisis .
To date, reports of the attack on Zamzam between 11 and 14 April indicate that up to 400 non-Arab civilians were killed during the three-day assault. The UN has stated that “hundreds” have died .
However, a commission set up to investigate the number of victims has so far “counted” more than 1,500 dead in the attack, which took place on the eve of a conference organised by the British government in London aimed at bringing peace to Sudan.
Mohammed Sharif, a member of the committee from the former Zamzam administration, said the final number would be significantly higher, with many bodies still unaccounted for in the camp currently controlled by the RSF.
“Their bodies are lying in houses, in fields, on roads,” Sharif told The Guardian.
An atrocities expert with decades of experience in Darfur, who interviewed dozens of survivors from Zamzam, estimates that up to 2,000 people may have been killed.
On condition of anonymity, he added that the level of violence was shocking, even compared to the genocidal massacre of African ethnic groups in Darfur in the 2000s, committed by Arab militias that later became the RSF.
“All the testimonies of those who escaped indicate that they had family members who were killed. It’s something we’ve never seen before.”
Abdallah Abugarda, a member of the Darfur Diaspora Association in the United Kingdom, said that around 4,500 members of his organisation had a friend or relative killed in the attack.
At least 2,000 residents of Zamzam are still missing, he said.
“The massacre in Zamzam, which has been home to displaced people for over 20 years, is one of the most heinous crimes in recent world history. Yet there has been no global outcry,” Abugarda added.
Claire Nicolet, deputy head of the emergency department at the organisation Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) , said the attack targeted “one of the most vulnerable groups of people on earth.”
Those who survived, she said, faced “widespread looting, sexual violence and other attacks while on the road and appalling living conditions in transit sites for displaced people.”
A large number of women have been abducted and are still missing. Sharif said he knew of more than 20 women who had been taken to Nyala, an RSF stronghold 160 km from Zamzam.
Last month, the International Criminal Court said it had “reasonable grounds” to conclude that war crimes and crimes against humanity were being committed in Darfur.
In Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, it is believed that over 10,000 people – mainly Masalit and other non-Arab Sudanese – were killed by the RSF and allied militias over a two-month period beginning in mid-April 2023.
According to the UN, in November of the same year, an episode of fighting in a suburb of El Geneina caused the deaths of over 800 people.
The Sudanese army has also been accused of numerous war crimes, particularly the massacre of civilians in indiscriminate air raids.
Israel issues forced displacement orders amid fears of total occupation of the Gaza Strip
Israeli military leaders oppose Netanyahu’s plans amid growing diplomatic isolation
Wednesday, 6 August 2025, 16:36 CEST
The Israeli army has issued new orders for forced displacement in certain areas of Gaza City and Khan Younis amid fears that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is preparing to order the full occupation of Palestinian territory by the end of this week.
Israel’s security cabinet is set to meet on Thursday evening to approve plans for a major operation, despite serious concerns from senior military officers.
The order for Gaza — euphemistically described by the Israeli Defence Forces as an “evacuation” — is the latest in a series of dozens of similar announcements that have led to the displacement of most of Gaza’s population, many of them repeatedly.
The orders came as US President Donald Trump said that any decision on expanding Israeli control in Gaza was up to Israel. “As far as the rest is concerned, I can’t say anything. It’s very much up to Israel,” he told reporters on Tuesday.
Many people have returned to Gaza City relatively recently, after long periods of displacement, to find their homes destroyed by war and looted, in some cases even the doors and windows stolen.
While the Gaza health ministry reported that five more people had died of starvation in the coastal strip , which has been plunged into a devastating famine due to Israel’s total blockade of humanitarian aid earlier this year, Jordan reported that a humanitarian convoy of 30 trucks heading for Gaza was attacked by militant Jewish settlers at the entrance to Israel.
After the attack, the second in a few days, Jordan accused Israel of failing to take measures to prevent the attacks from recurring. “Serious intervention by Israel and a firm stance against those obstructing these convoys is necessary,” said Jordanian government spokesman Mohammad al-Momani.
Amid scenes of desperate suffering in Gaza, where vast areas have been turned into rubble fields by relentless Israeli attacks, the Gaza Strip’s civil defence agency reported that 20 people were killed when a truck carrying aid overturned on a crowd of people.
“Twenty people were killed and dozens wounded around midnight last night when a truck carrying aid overturned… while hundreds of civilians were waiting for aid,” said agency spokesman Mahmoud Bassal.
The incident took place near the Nuseirat refugee camp while the truck was travelling on an unsafe road that had previously been bombed by Israel, Bassal added.
Amid an acute aid crisis, trucks entering Gaza have been surrounded and looted by hungry Palestinians on numerous occasions, contributing to a widespread sense of chaos.
The new forced displacement order for Gaza City was issued after Israeli media reported Netanyahu’s apparent determination to continue the war after consultations with military chiefs on Tuesday and despite growing unease among serving and former Israeli security officials, including the head of the Israeli Defence Forces, Eyal Zamir.
According to reports, Zamir warned Netanyahu during a tense three-hour meeting on Tuesday that the plan could lock the army into the territory, amid concerns that the Israeli military is already overstretched. Zamir has not made any public statements on the matter.
Critics of the plan say that any attempt at total occupation — a demand made by the Israeli far right — would endanger the lives of Israeli hostages in Gaza, could take between one and two years to achieve, and would come at the price of increasing diplomatic isolation for the country, at a time when the international community is increasingly appalled by Israel’s actions.
Among those who spoke out against the plan on Wednesday was Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid. “I told Netanyahu that occupying Gaza is a very bad idea,” Lapid said after meeting with the Israeli prime minister. “You don’t make a move like this if the majority of the population is not on your side.”
Other critics include former leaders of Israel’s internal security service Shin Bet, the Mossad spy agency and the army, as well as former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In a video posted on social media this week, they claimed that far-right members of the government were holding Israel “hostage” by prolonging the conflict.
Netanyahu’s goals in Gaza are “a fantasy,” Yoram Cohen, former head of Shin Bet, said in the video.
Amid signs of division between Netanyahu and military commanders, Defence Minister Israel Katz said on Wednesday that the army’s chief of staff, Eyal Zamir, could “express his opinions,” but that the army would ultimately have to “execute” any government decision on Gaza.
Katz made the statement after Israeli media reported in recent days that Zamir opposed the government’s plan to fully occupy the Gaza Strip.
“It is the right and duty of the chief of staff to express his position in the appropriate forums, and once decisions are made by the political echelon, [the army] will execute them with determination and professionalism … until the objectives of the war are achieved,” Katz wrote.
“As the defence minister responsible for the [army] on behalf of the government, I must ensure that these decisions are implemented — and they will be,” he added.
The Gaza Health Ministry said at least 135 Palestinians, including 87 people seeking food, had been killed and 771 wounded in Israeli attacks in Gaza in the past 24 hours.
Agencies contributed to this report.
Trump news in brief: President hails progress in Ukraine war, threatens India with severe tariffs
Trump may meet with Putin next week to discuss the war in Ukraine, White House officials say – major US political news on 6 August 2025
The Guardian team
Thursday 7 August 2025, 03:11 CEST
US President Donald Trump could meet with Russian leader Vladimir Putin as early as next week to discuss the war in Ukraine, White House officials have said.
This development comes as senior administration officials warned that serious “obstacles” remain to achieving a ceasefire.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said he hoped the progress made would lead to a meeting between Putin and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the future, but that he did not want to exaggerate the progress made during the visit of US special envoy Steve Witkoff to Moscow.
“What we have is a better understanding of the conditions under which Russia would be willing to end the war,” he said.
The US should then compare this with “what the Ukrainians are willing to accept.”
Here is a summary of today’s important news:
Trump welcomes “progress” after meeting between Witkoff and Putin
Donald Trump said that “significant progress” had been made in talks on ending the war in Ukraine between his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and Vladimir Putin, which took place on Wednesday at the Kremlin. The three-hour talks took place two days before the deadline set by the US president for Russia to reach a peace agreement in the war or face new sanctions.
Trump threatens 50% tariffs on India
The White House is imposing an additional 25% tariff on imports from India, bringing total tariffs to 50%, in retaliation for the country’s purchase of oil from Russia, according to an executive order signed on Wednesday morning.
India has 21 days to respond to the potential tariffs before they take effect. The tariffs will be added to the 25% tariff imposed on India by Donald Trump last week as a “penalty” for the country’s trade relations with Russia.
Apple to invest $100 billion in US manufacturing, says Trump
Donald Trump celebrated on Wednesday Apple’s commitment to increase its investment in US manufacturing by another $100 billion over the next four years.
Apple’s plan to increase domestic investment comes as the company seeks to avoid tariffs threatened by Trump, which would increase costs for the tech giant as it relies on a complex international supply chain to manufacture its iPhones.
Trump plans to impose 100% tariffs on chips, but exempts companies “that manufacture in the US”
Donald Trump has said he will impose a 100% tariff on foreign computer chips, which is likely to increase the cost of electronics, cars, appliances and other goods considered essential to the digital age.
The impasse over the redistribution of electoral districts in Texas is worsening with bomb threats
Texas Democrats who left the state say they received a bomb threat at their hotel in Illinois amid a dispute with Republicans over efforts to block the adoption of a new electoral map.
Report reveals abuse of women and children in ICE centres
A new report has uncovered hundreds of cases of human rights abuses in US immigration detention centres. The alleged abuses include deaths in custody, physical and sexual abuse of detainees, denial of access to lawyers and the separation of children.
Border patrol agents ambush people at Home Depot in Los Angeles
The report was published on the same day that US border patrol agents carried out a raid outside a Home Depot store in Los Angeles on Wednesday, with officers jumping out of an unmarked rental truck and chasing and arresting more than a dozen people. The raid raised questions about the US government’s compliance with a federal court ruling.
Trump administration freezes $584 million in grants for “life-saving research” at UCLA
In an escalation of its attacks on higher education institutions, the Trump administration has suspended $584 million in federal funding for the University of California, Los Angeles — nearly double the amount originally planned, the university’s chancellor announced on Wednesday.
JD Vance’s team requested that the Ohio River’s water level be raised for a family boat trip
‘s team JD Vance has asked the military to take the unusual step of altering the flow of an Ohio lake to allow a family holiday boat trip, The Guardian has learned.
What else happened today:
- Republican Senator and Trump ally Marsha Blackburn has announced that will run for governor of Tennessee .
- Donald Trump is threatening to strip Washington, D.C., of its local autonomy and place it under direct federal control, following an alleged assault on a Doge employee .
- JD Vance was scheduled to host a meeting on Wednesday evening at his residence with a handful of senior Trump administration officials to discuss strategy for addressing the ongoing scandal surrounding convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein .
- Donald Trump is threatening to strip Washington of its local administrative powers and place the US capital under direct federal control, citing what he described as rampant juvenile crime.
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/07/president-trump-administration-news-updates-today
American research station staff evacuated from Antarctica in high-risk operation
Travel to Antarctica during the southern winter is restricted to emergencies, with crews having to navigate extreme conditions and land on frozen ground
Eva Corlett in Wellington
Wednesday, 6 August 2025, 07:38 CEST
The NewZealand Air Force evacuated three people from a US research base in Antarctica in a high-risk operation that required flying in extreme weather conditions and total darkness.
The air force said on Wednesday that the National Science Foundation had requested the medical evacuation of three of its personnel stationed at McMurdo Station, one of whom required urgent medical attention.
The crew of the C-130J Hercules aircraft took off on Tuesday afternoon and worked through the night to complete the mission, the Air Force said.
Between March and October, Antarctica is plunged into permanent night and can be affected by dangerous storms. Temperatures at McMurdo Station dropped to -24 °C on Tuesday.
New Zealand Air Force plane in Antarctica Photo: Al Denovan/New Zealand Air Force
Travel to the frozen continent during this period is limited to emergencies, with crews having to navigate in extreme conditions, with changeable weather and ice landings.
Mid-winter flights to Antarctica are one of the most difficult operations the air force undertakes, Commander Andy Scott said.
The American team had to clear the runway and ensure that the ice was “ready and suitable for landing” before the flight could leave New Zealand, Scott said.
“Although they determined it was safe, it remains an extremely challenging environment for night flying due to the extreme weather conditions, which are very changeable at this time of year and make accurate forecasting difficult,” he said.
“This, combined with the lack of available airfields for diversion once the aircraft has passed a certain point south, increases the risk, so these missions are not taken lightly.”
Once on the ice, the aircraft’s engines are kept running to keep them warm during refuelling, a process known as “hot refuelling”.
The Hercules aircraft flew to Antarctica with a doctor on board to care for patients during the flight. The aircraft landed back in Christchurch on Wednesday morning after a 19.5-hour round trip.
In a statement, the US embassy expressed its “deep gratitude” to the air force.
“This mission was not only difficult; it was one of the most technically demanding operations an aircrew can face,” said Melissa Sweeney, chargé d’affaires in New Zealand.
“It required absolute precision… It’s the kind of mission that tests every ounce of skill and courage,” Sweeney added.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/06/mcmurdo-station-antarctica-medical-evacuation
Maglev train researchers may have solved the “tunnel boom” shock wave problem
Sound dampers at tunnel entrances will be installed on China’s latest magnetic levitation train prototype
Andy Deng
Thursday, 7 August 2025, 06:00 CEST
Researchers hope they have solved the “tunnel boom” problem as they prepare to launch China’s latest magnetic levitation train prototype.
The latest version of the maglev train can reach speeds of 600 km/h (approximately 370 mph). However, train engineers have struggled with the problem of shock waves that occur when the train exits the tunnel.
When a high-speed train enters an enclosed space such as a tunnel, the air in front of it is compressed, like a piston. The resulting air pressure fluctuations merge as the train exits the tunnel, generating low-frequency shock waves. These are colloquially known as ‘tunnel booms’ – a similar, though different, phenomenon to the ‘sonic boom’ heard when aircraft exceed the speed of sound. Tunnel booms pose a serious challenge to operational safety, as shock waves can disturb people and animals nearby, as well as cause structural damage.
Now, however, researchers have discovered that installing innovative sound-insulating pads at the tunnel entrance can reduce shock waves by up to 96%. This promises improvements in operational safety, noise pollution and passenger comfort, as well as protecting animals in the vicinity of future lines.
This was already a well-documented problem for conventional high-speed trains, which travel at speeds of up to 350 km/h (217 mph), but it gets way worse for trains going even faster, because the shock wave gets stronger really fast and the critical length that causes a tunnel boom gets shorter really fast. For example, a train travelling at 600 km/h will produce a boom in a tunnel only 2 km (1.2 miles) long, whereas for conventional high-speed trains this only happens in tunnels 6 km or longer.
The porous structure of the new 100-metre-long buffers, combined with porous coatings on the tunnel body, allows the trapped air to escape before the train reaches the tunnel entrance, suppressing noise in the same way as a silencer mounted on a firearm.
Magnetic levitation refers to the use of magnetic force to suspend a train above a guideway or rail, sometimes at a height of only 10 mm, through electromagnetic or electrodynamic suspension. The train is then propelled using other electromagnets. While conventional high-speed trains are ultimately limited in speed due to increased wear on the wheels in contact with the rail, the separation of the rail from the train means that maglev trains rise above earthly problems such as friction.
Electromagnetic suspension (EMS) causes the train to cling to a single steel rail with a U-shaped underside. When the electromagnets connected to the train – positioned in a U-shape under the rail – are switched on, the train is levitated by an attractive force between the train and the rail. With electrodynamic suspension (EDS), the train is in a U-shaped guideway with superconducting coils embedded in the guideway and the train. When the power supply is turned on, magnetic poles are induced in the coils, resulting in a combination of repulsive and attractive forces that allow the train to levitate.
High-speed maglev trains debuted in 2004 in China, running between Pudong Airport and the outskirts of Shanghai at a speed of 460 km/h (286 mph), a speed record that still stands for rail vehicles in regular commercial service. Built using German “Transrapid” technology, this service is mainly aimed at foreign travellers, as locals prefer the much cheaper, albeit slower, metro.
However, the initial enthusiasm was quickly overshadowed, as the further development of China’s rail network focused exclusively on conventional high-speed trains. The national network is now the longest in the world, with a length of 48,000 km (30,000 miles), and more lines are under construction.
However, maglev trains are making a comeback under the auspices of state-owned manufacturer CRRC, which launched a new model in 2021. There is no mechanical noise, with passengers describing the quiet hum of the electromagnets and a smoother ride than on a conventional train.
Although no lines have been officially planned yet, it is expected that a future line will connect the capital, Beijing, with cosmopolitan Shanghai, reducing the journey time from 4.5 hours to 2.5 hours, roughly the duration of a domestic flight between the two cities.
In China, the cost of a high-speed train ticket is cheaper than that of a plane ticket (600 yuan compared to 1,200 yuan), unlike in many other countries. Flights emit on average seven times more CO2than high-speed trains over the same distance, which represents a huge potential for reducing carbon emissions.
China is not the only place where high-speed maglev trains are expected to appear over long distances. Japan is pinning its hopes on the Chuo Shinkansen, which will link its two major cities, Tokyo and Osaka, via Nagoya, crossing the centre of the country. The Tokaido Shinkansen, a conventional high-speed railway line, covers this distance in 2.5 hours, but it is hoped that the new maglev line, which will travel at 505 km/h (314 mph), will reduce the journey time to just 67 minutes. Initially, the line was scheduled to be partially operational in 2027, but inevitable delays have hampered the project and the new opening date is uncertain.
Russia is not giving up its naval ambitions in the Black Sea. The construction of a new landing ship in Kerch suggests long-term plans
Although some analysts have suggested that Russia has abandoned its maritime ambitions in the Black Sea after the losses suffered by its fleet in the region, the reality appears to be much more nuanced. According to military expert Ivan Kirishchevsky, the Kremlin has not “buried” its Black Sea Fleet, but has merely postponed certain objectives for an as yet unclear time frame.
For example, as early as 2023, Russia formally introduced a new 22380-type missile corvette into service and built a 22160-class patrol ship. Both ships are currently in the Baltic Sea, awaiting possible redeployment.
Meanwhile, two 22800-class Karakurt corvettes equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles have been transferred to the Caspian Sea — a region that, although not directly connected to the Black Sea, can be used to launch attacks on Ukrainian territory.
Until the recent fall of the Assad regime, Russia maintained a constant presence of the Black Sea Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, with a naval group consisting of a frigate, a corvette and two submarines — all capable of launching cruise missiles. For this reason, the Ukrainian Navy monitors not only ships in the Black Sea, but also those in the eastern Mediterranean.
Furthermore, at the Kerch shipyard in occupied Crimea, Russia is continuing the construction of a 23900-type landing ship, named “Ivan Rogov”. The ship will be 220 metres long and will be able to carry up to 15 helicopters. The estimated launch date is 2027, and the construction cost amounts to approximately 100 billion roubles.
According to experts quoted by focus.ua, these efforts show that Russia is pursuing a coherent maritime strategy in the region, even if it currently appears to be “on hold”. This strategy is articulated not only in relation to Ukraine, but also to Moscow’s relations with NATO, Turkey and the Montreux Convention regime, as well as with the states in the Black Sea basin.
Russia’s naval ambitions ultimately reflect the broader objectives of its foreign policy: to consolidate its status as a global power and shape a new international balance of power.
Source: here
Drones are on deck: US Coast Guard prepares for fleet-wide UAS deployment
The US Coast Guard has completed full operational testing of Shield AI’s V-BAT unmanned aircraft system (UAS) aboard its USCGC Midgett and Stone vessels.
Credit: US Coast Guard
This move comes in preparation for the future installation of V-BAT UAS capability across the entire national fleet of security vessels and, eventually, other classes of US Coast Guard vessels.
The US Coast Guard is in the midst of a transition to the advanced V-BAT vertical take-off and landing system. This capability addresses a critical operational need for persistent aerial surveillance capabilities to support a wide range of missions.
The Coast Guard awarded a contract for unmanned aircraft systems to Shield AI in June 2024. The V-BAT can perform vertical takeoffs and landings, which requires a smaller footprint than other UAS previously used by the Coast Guard.
In addition, the service intends to explore the use of V-BAT on other classes of ships with smaller flight decks and ships without flight decks.
The Coast Guard’s Research and Development Centre has served as the independent test agent (ITA), with overall responsibility for managing the operational testing process for the maritime UAS capability on host ships. The ITA coordinates operational testing events to evaluate the operational performance of the system, directs all data collection efforts, and determines whether mission requirements have been met.
The operational testing event used the cutters in a fully mission-capable state to support flight operations during the deployment period.
The comprehensive assessment verified the system’s ability to meet identified key performance parameters and evaluated operational effectiveness in assisting the national security vessel in fulfilling its missions during routine operations. The testing also evaluated operational suitability. It was noted that no critical operational issues were identified.
Source: here
The world’s largest aircraft carrier visits France
The world’s largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), arrived in Marseille, France, for a scheduled port visit alongside the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81).
According to reports, the ships arrived in France on 4 August 2025. Both ships are part of the Carrier Strike Group Twelve, which is on a scheduled deployment in the US Sixth Fleet’s area of operations to support the combat effectiveness of US Naval Forces Europe-Africa.
“The visit of the USS Gerald R. Ford to Marseille is a symbol of the Franco-American alliance,” said Charles Kushner, US Ambassador to the French Republic.
“This ship embodies American excellence in the defence industry — it is the newest and most adaptable aircraft carrier in the US fleet, as well as the largest aircraft carrier in the world.”
While in port, the crews and personnel aboard both ships will participate in tours of Marseille, Paris and Monaco, as well as a reception aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford.
The Gerald R. Ford, Carrier Air Wing Eight and Destroyer Squadron Two, USS Bainbridge and USS Mahan, conducted multi-domain operations in the Atlantic before transiting the Strait of Gibraltar with the Spanish frigate ESPS Canarias and the Italian ship ITS Spartaco Schergat. They took part in Neptune 25-2 before arriving in Marseille.
Construction of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) began on 11 August 2005, with Northrop Grumman performing a ceremonial steel cutting for a 15-tonne plate intended for the aircraft carrier’s side hull. The keel was officially laid on 13 November 2009.
The aircraft carrier was delivered to the US Navy on 31 May 2017 and was commissioned by President Donald Trump during a ceremony on 22 July 2017. Its first deployment was completed in 2024.
Source: here
Lockheed advances development of in-flight missile guidance system
Lockheed Martin is advancing the development of a flight missile data link designed to support real-time targeting of dynamic threats.
The Remote Interceptor Guidance System – 360 (RIG-360) is designed to use data from multiple sensors to provide 360-degree updates during flight.
With the successful assembly of the first diode array, the RIG-360 engineering, manufacturing and development (EMD) programme has entered its second phase.
The array assembly is one of three critical subsystems in the RIG-360 EMD programme, acting as a communications hub to send, receive and translate radio frequency data for target tracking.
“The RIG-360 is a revolutionary capability,” said Stu Chaffey, director of Advanced Integrated Air and Missile Defence Programmes at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control.
“The capabilities of the RIG-360 will enable soldiers to use the best weapon available within the Integrated System Fire Control(IBCS) to eliminate incoming threats.”
Remote interceptor guidance
Originally developed for the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile, RIG-360 allows IBCS to directly update the missile, rather than relying on radar, for improved targeting accuracy.
It has also been tested with the multiple guided missile launch system for improved strikes against moving targets such as ships and mobile missile launchers.
The software-defined X-band system features a ground antenna that transmits guidance data to an onboard antenna.
The RIG-360 initiative aims to promote IBCS objectives by facilitating interoperability between various sensors and optimal weapon systems.
Source: here
Spain favours European options over US-made F-35 fighter jets
The Ministry of Defence announced on Wednesday that Spain has decided not to purchase US-made F-35 fighter jets and will instead opt for European-made variants, confirming a report in the newspaper El País.
The decision comes after tensions between Madrid and Washington over Spain’s refusal to increase defence spending to 5% of economic output, as demanded by US President Donald Trump.
El País reported on Wednesday morning, citing anonymous government sources, that the left-wing government of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez had abandoned plans to buy F-35 aircraft and would explore European alternatives.
The government has allocated €6.25 billion ($7.25 billion) in its 2023 budget for the purchase of new fighter jets. British defence publication Janes reported that Spain is considering the purchase of up to 50 F-35s, the newspaper reported.
However, the government’s plan to spend most of the additional €10.5 billion on defence announced for this year excludes the purchase of F-35 aircraft, it added.
The aircraft are manufactured by US aerospace giant Lockheed Martin.
A statement from the Ministry of Defence said that Spain’s option involves European-made Eurofighter aircraft and fighter jets manufactured under the European Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project, whose main industrial partners are Dassault Aviation and Airbus.
Sanchez announced earlier this year plans to increase defence spending to meet NATO’s target of 2.0% of economic output by 2024.
But he later refused to increase long-term spending to 5.0%, prompting Trump to threaten Spain with additional tariffs.
Source: here
Italy to give final green light to flagship Sicily bridge project
The proposed bridge over the Strait of Messina Webuild
The Italian government was set to give final approval on Wednesday to a multi-billion euro project to build a bridge linking Sicily to the mainland, paving the way for work to begin after decades of debate.
The construction of the 3.6-kilometre (2.2-mile) bridge, designed to be one of the longest in the world, has been discussed since the late 1960s to help develop Italy’s impoverished south.
Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government has made it a priority and allocated 13.5 billion euros ($15.6 billion) over the next 10 years for the bridge and surrounding facilities.
The Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning and Sustainable Development (CIPESS) is due to meet at 12:30 p.m. (10:30 GMT).
Matteo Salvini, leader of the ruling League party and Minister of Infrastructure, has announced that he will hold a press conference later, before travelling to the bridge construction site.
The Strait of Messina Bridge project was awarded to the Eurolink consortium following an international tender. The consortium is led by Webuild, Italy’s largest construction company, which also includes the Spanish group Sacyr and the Japanese group IHI.
According to the Strait of Messina Company, which is overseeing the project, the government commission’s approval would allow preliminary work to begin, including archaeological and geological studies. Land expropriations will also be authorised.
Last week, Salvini told reporters that validation by the national court of accounts would be necessary before the CIPESS resolution could take effect. A source close to the situation said this could take several weeks.
The bridge has attracted vehement criticism from those who question the wisdom of building it in an earthquake zone and those who say it would be a waste of money and harmful to the landscape, amid fears that the Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta criminal gangs in the area could infiltrate the works to make huge profits.
Some groups of citizens are campaigning against the bridge, calling it unnecessary, and environmental associations filed a complaint with the European Union this week, pointing out serious risks of environmental damage.
However, the bridge also enjoys strong support from those who believe that a fast rail and road link, as an alternative to the current ferry crossing, would provide a much-needed boost to Sicily and the rest of southern Italy’s poorer regions.
Webuild has active construction projects around the world, including the NEOM megaproject in Saudi Arabia. Sacyr participated in the expansion of the Panama Canal, and IHI was involved in the Akashi suspension bridge in Japan and the Osman Gazi suspension bridge in Turkey.
Webuild has estimated that this construction could create over 100,000 jobs. According to the Strait of Messina Company, the bridge will be completed in 2032.
Two years ago, Webuild appointed Gianni De Gennaro, former head of the Italian police and undersecretary of state for intelligence and security services, as president of Eurolink.
Source: here
Security AUVs developed in Germany will be integrated into an AI-based digital platform
German defence technology company Euroatlas and systems supplier Rheinmetall have formed a partnership to integrate Euroatlas’ advanced autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) into Rheinmetall’s modular, artificial intelligence-based digital platform, designed to unify and manage multi-domain defence systems.
This integration will support specific use cases in coastal defence, where the digital platform will act as the backbone of Rheinmetall’s system-of-systems infrastructure for maritime operations.
Each 6.5-metre AUV has an integrated sensor suite consisting of 17 sensors, continuously collecting data from each when the AUV is deployed for underwater operations such as monitoring the integrity of submarine cables.
Euroatlas said the technology will enable long-endurance and high-resilience missions based on an integrated modular artificial intelligence software package developed in partnership with EvoLogics.
Under the partnership, Rheinmetall will support the integration of the AUV system into its global coastal defence architecture and it will be integrated into Rheinmetall’s coastal protection infrastructure projects, which include sensors, C2 systems and support networks.
In addition, Rheinmetall will act as a liaison with the relevant national defence authorities.
The partners will collaborate on the development of specialised variants of the AUV, tailored to specific mission requirements, including future capabilities, to align with Rheinmetall’s coastal protection ecosystem.
Source: here
Russian and Chinese navies to conduct new joint patrols in Asia-Pacific
Chinese sailors welcomed by residents of Vladivostok for Maritime Cooperation – 2025 Chinese Navy
Russian and Chinese military ships will conduct joint patrols in the Asia-Pacific region, following recent exercises in the Sea of Japan, Russian news agency Interfax reported on Wednesday.
“Crews from the Russian Navy and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy will form a new working group to carry out joint patrol missions in the Asia-Pacific region,” Interfax said, citing a statement from the Russian Pacific Fleet press service.
The two navies held joint exercises in the Sea of Japan from 1 to 5 August, which included artillery firing, anti-submarine and air defence drills, and improving joint search and rescue operations at sea.
In the final phase of the exercises, the Russian heavy anti-submarine ship Admiral Tributs and the corvette Gromky, together with the Chinese destroyers Shaoxing and Urumqi, conducted live-fire training exercises, and the crews practised searching for and neutralising a mock enemy submarine, Interfax reported.
The Pacific Fleet previously stated that the exercises were defensive in nature and were not directed against other countries.
Russia and China, which signed a “no limits” strategic partnership shortly before Russia entered the war in Ukraine in 2022, conduct regular exercises to practise coordination between their armed forces and send a deterrent signal to adversaries.
Source: here
The SCO and a new era of regional cooperation
Against the backdrop of global geopolitical changes, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has become an essential platform for regionalism in Eurasia.
The SCO and a new Eurasian regionalism
Against the backdrop of global geopolitical changes, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has become an essential platform for regionalism in Eurasia. Founded in 2001, the SCO is today the largest regional organisation in the world in terms of geographical coverage and population, covering 80% of Eurasia and nearly 40% of the world’s population. Its members include the major powers China, Russia, India and Pakistan, along with four Central Asian states and, more recently, Iran and (pending) Belarus, a scope that gives the SCO significant influence on the world stage. In fact, over the past two decades, the SCO has transformed itself “from a regional organisation into a force with global influence.” Collectively, the SCO states account for about a quarter of global GDP and control about 20% of the world’s oil reserves and 44% of natural gas after Iran’s accession. Such figures underscore the SCO’s potential to shape economic and security agendas beyond its region.
It is important to note that the SCO is not a traditional military alliance, but a political, economic and security cooperation bloc, often described as guided by the “Shanghai Spirit” of mutual trust and mutual benefit. This ethos reflects a constructivist approach: the idea that common norms and identities can be built through dialogue and institutions. The founding principles of the SCO emphasise “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilisations and the pursuit of common development,” values that have become the cornerstone of its dynamic growth. Unlike alliances created on the basis of immediate strategic interests, SCO regionalism is rooted in the gradual building of trust and normative convergence among members. It provides a multilateral forum in which countries as diverse as Russia and Pakistan or China and India can engage on the basis of agreed rules of engagement, defusing bilateral tensions within a framework of cooperation.
The “Shanghai spirit” and constructivism
The SCO’s success is largely due to its common normative framework, a point well explained by constructivist theory in international relations. This highlights how states’ interests and identities are shaped by ideas, norms and interaction. In the case of the SCO, the “Shanghai Spirit” has promoted a sense of community and a common purpose among very diverse members. This spirit involves respect for each member’s sovereignty and development path, avoiding interference in internal affairs and zero-sum rivalry. Instead of viewing security in narrow terms, SCO members emphasise cooperative security, combating common threats such as terrorism or drug trafficking together, rather than against each other. Over time, regular SCO summits, ministerial meetings and joint exercises have built a regional identity centred on stability, development and mutual respect. The result is a unique diplomatic culture: Beijing often refers to SCO countries as a “family” bound by trust and non-aggression.
Indeed, the SCO ostentatiously positions itself as “standing on the right side of history, fairness and justice,” implicitly contrasting its inclusive and multipolar approach with the bloc confrontation of the Cold War era. At a time when a few powers insist on decoupling and exclusive alliances, the SCO’s normative message is one of “dialogue over discord” and “diversity over hegemony”. This is a classic constructivist dynamic: shared values and discourse gradually reshape members’ expectations of each other.
Security cooperation: a fundamental pillar of stability
Security cooperation is at the heart of the SCO’s mandate and is an area where Pakistan contributes and gains considerably. The organisation was originally conceived in the early 2000s to combat the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism, and this remains a central objective. The SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), based in Tashkent, facilitates information exchange and joint operations between the security agencies of member states. Through RATS and regular joint “Peace Mission” exercises, the SCO has developed impressive counter- rrorism capabilities. For Pakistan, which has long struggled with militant insurgencies, such cooperation is invaluable.
The SCO provides an ideal platform for regional powers to formulate a collective approach to stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan, as Afghanistan’s immediate neighbour, has used SCO forums to emphasise peace and inclusiveness in Kabul. At a recent meeting of the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers in Tianjin (July 2025), the Pakistani delegation stressed the need for a “terrorism-free Afghanistan” and called for the establishment of an inclusive government in Kabul representing all ethnic groups. This contributes to preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups and gains political support from China and Russia in the call for stability and humanitarian aid for the Afghan people.
Pakistan’s role and opportunities within the SCO
Despite domestic economic difficulties in recent years, Pakistan has embraced the SCO as a vehicle to revitalise its economy and expand its diplomatic horizons. As a South Asian nation historically isolated from Central Asia, Pakistan sees itself as a “bridge between South Asia and Central Asia,” a role that the SCO can firmly consolidate. Geographically, Pakistan provides the SCO with a vital link to the Indian Ocean, and in return, the SCO offers Pakistan access to vast Eurasian markets and energy resources. In terms of trade and investment, the prospects are significant. The SCO region includes some of the world’s fastest-growing economies and largest energy producers, from China to Kazakhstan. By engaging these partners, Pakistan aims to unlock new export markets and secure much-needed foreign investment.
Crucially, the SCO’s focus on connectivity meshes with ongoing initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Most SCO countries participate in the BRI, meaning there is synergy between SCO plans and projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan has been the lead partner in the CPEC, a $60 billion infrastructure programme that includes roads, ports and power plants and links Pakistan to western China. Through SCO forums, Pakistan can advocate for regional infrastructure – for example, rail links from Central Asia to Pakistani ports or energy pipelines connecting gas-rich states to consumers in South Asia. Greater connectivity aligns with Pakistan’s goal of becoming a regional trade corridor.
From a diplomatic perspective, Pakistan’s role in the SCO also sends a message. It signals a diversification of Pakistan’s foreign policy, a shift towards the “Global South” coalition of emerging powers, reducing excessive dependence on Western frameworks. The consensus-based decision-making process within the SCO (where every member’s voice counts) allows Pakistan to express its views on international issues alongside giants such as China and Russia. In particular, Pakistan has used SCO platforms to gain understanding (if not direct support) for its position on controversial issues such as Kashmir or disputes with India, framing them in terms of regional stability. Although the SCO does not directly mediate bilateral disputes, the atmosphere of mutual respect can help temper rhetoric. For Pakistan, every SCO interaction that projects it as a responsible regional actor is a boost to its international image. It reinforces Pakistan’s narrative that it is committed to countering terrorism, strengthening peace and multilateral cooperation, countering past Western criticism and highlighting its contributions to regional peace.
Conclusion: Embracing a cooperative future
As an international cooperation bloc, the SCO represents a new model of regionalism, one that Pakistan has wholeheartedly embraced to broaden its strategic and economic horizons. Through the SCO, Pakistan is engaging in a broader geopolitical landscape that favours multipolarity, regional connectivity and common security. The SCO’s constructivist foundations, the “Shanghai spirit” and its normative position have helped foster a sense of shared destiny among member states. This bodes well for a country like Pakistan, which benefits from an environment where major powers prioritise consensus-building over rivalry. In practical terms, Pakistan’s active involvement in SCO initiatives has already paid dividends: cooperation in counter and terrorism has made the region safer, economic integration is opening new avenues for trade and investment, and diplomatic engagements (such as the visit of the army chief to China) provide vital support for Pakistan’s stability and growth. The SCO, as Chinese President Xi Jinping has noted, “is on the right side of history” by upholding fairness, justice and the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation, which resonate strongly with Pakistan’s aspirations for peace and development.
Going forward, Pakistan’s role within the SCO is likely to continue to grow. With China currently holding the SCO presidency and promoting new initiatives, Islamabad has an opportunity to co-drive agendas in areas such as sustainable development, cultural exchange and, potentially, new financial mechanisms among member states. Essentially, the SCO offers Pakistan an alternative diplomatic platform outside the traditional Western-dominated arenas, one where its voice is heard by neighbours and partners who share many of its concerns. This opportunity is invaluable at a time when Pakistan is seeking to redefine its narrative globally. By remaining true to the SCO’s cooperative ethos and avoiding zero-sum calculations, Pakistan can contribute to shaping a more secure and interconnected region. In turn, the solidarity and support offered by other SCO members, represented by China’s “ironclad” camaraderie, will continue to bolster Pakistan’s journey towards stability and prosperity. In a world torn apart by rival blocs and uncertainties, the SCO’s unique regionalism and the constructive engagement it promotes could offer a ray of hope, and Pakistan is ready to be one of its main beneficiaries and supporters on the international stage.
Source: here
Fujian aircraft carrier nears commissioning date as China demonstrates catapult launch capability
China continues to advance its naval transformation at a steady pace, as evidenced by the recent broadcast of an official documentary approved by the Central Military Commission and aired on CCTV. The series revealed new information about the development of the Fujian aircraft carrier, China’s first equipped with catapult launch systems, and also highlighted progress in the country’s amphibious warship construction programme. The images, backed up by testimonies from military personnel and technical experts involved in the tests, confirm that Fujian is now in its final phase before entering operational service.
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Fujian (Type 003), with hull number 18, is China’s third aircraft carrier and the first designed entirely in-house (Image source: Chinese Ministry of Defence)
Fujian (Type 003), with hull number 18, is China’s third aircraft carrier and the first designed entirely in-house. Built at the Jiangnan Shipyard, it was launched in June 2022 and began sea trials in May 2024. With a length of 316 metres, a width of 76 metres and an estimated full displacement of between 80,000 and 85,000 tonnes, it is comparable in size to the former American Kitty Hawk class. The Fujian is also the first Chinese aircraft carrier to use electromagnetic catapults (CATOBAR), a launch- y system previously used only on board the American ship USS Gerald R. Ford. The ship is equipped with three electromagnetic catapults, a sloped flight deck for arrested landings and a large internal hangar. The air wing is expected to consist of more than 50 aircraft, including at least 40 fixed-wing platforms and 12 helicopters. Among the planned aircraft are the J-15T multi-role fighter, the J-15D electronic warfare variant, the J-35 stealth aircraft and the KJ-600 early warning aircraft. Propulsion is provided by steam turbines powered by diesel generators. The ship does not use nuclear propulsion. Although specific details about the defensive systems have not been confirmed, it is likely equipped with close-in weapon systems (CIWS), short-range surface-to-air missiles and electronic warfare suites on board the ship.
In one episode, the documentary shows, for the first time, footage of aircraft on the aircraft carrier performing catapult-assisted takeoffs. The scenes are accompanied by reactions from the crew and engineers, marking what they describe as a significant moment in the development process. According to those interviewed, the transition from simulated catapult launches to real launches is a critical transition, as real maritime conditions place additional physical and psychological demands on pilots that simulations cannot fully replicate.
Commander Tian Wei, from the Fujian aviation department, notes in the documentary that teams are working to ensure a smooth transition between ski jumping and catapult launch operations. The goal is to streamline the conversion process and bring the new systems to combat readiness as quickly as possible. With multiple sea trials conducted over the course of more than a year, Fujian has helped improve coordination between engineers, shipbuilders and crew, strengthening procedural familiarity. This level of readiness is expected to enable immediate combat readiness upon commissioning, a new approach in China’s naval doctrine. The integration of delivery and operational transfer is positioned as the standard for the future.
This capability is part of a broader strategy to build what Chinese authorities call a “five-piece set” of carrier-based air assets. These consist of a stealth fighter jet, a catapult-launched multi-role fighter jet, a fixed-wing early warning aircraft, an electronic warfare platform and an anti-submarine warfare helicopter. Fujian is expected to be the first Chinese aircraft carrier to launch all five components in operational configuration. According to military analyst Zhang Junshe, this configuration is nearing completion. In the future, carrier-based aircraft such as the J-15T and J-35 are expected to operate interchangeably on ski-jump aircraft carriers such as the Liaoning and Shandong, as well as on catapult-equipped platforms such as the Fujian. This level of cross-platform compatibility is considered essential for coordinated operations with multiple aircraft carriers.
At the same time, CCTV confirmed the official appearance of the Hubei, the fourth ship in the Type 075 amphibious assault class. Recently seen operating alongside the Hainan in the South China Sea, the Hubei reflects the continued growth of China’s amphibious capabilities. Type 075 ships feature a full-length flight deck that allows for simultaneous take-offs and landings of multiple helicopters. Their landing decks can carry air-cushioned landing craft, armoured vehicles and tanks. From Hainan to Guangxi, then Anhui and now Hubei, the Chinese Navy has progressively expanded its amphibious fleet. Zhang Junshe notes that these ships are well suited to serve as command platforms for an amphibious task force, capable of integrating with destroyers, frigates and replenishment ships to conduct over-the-horizon landing operations and long-range force projection missions.
These developments underscore China’s expanding naval projection capabilities. With an aircraft carrier such as the Fujian, equipped with advanced technologies, and an increasingly capable amphibious fleet, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is building the tools necessary for sustained operations in distant maritime theatres. This trajectory, supported by continuous industrial and technological progress, allows China to operate further from its coast and protect its overseas interests with greater operational autonomy.
Source: here
Chile launches ambitious naval policy to build a fully domestic fleet by 2030
Chile has taken an essential step in its maritime industrial strategy. On Monday, 4 August 2025, the board of directors of the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO) approved the creation of the Shipbuilding Committee. This body is part of the implementation of the National Shipbuilding Policy, a strategic initiative launched by President Gabriel Boric in January and in force since July. Funded through the Sustainable Productive Development Programme, the committee will be responsible for stimulating technological growth and activating the industrial value chains necessary to establish a national shipbuilding base. The ultimate goal is to ensure that all surface vessels required by the Chilean Navy are built domestically.
Almirante Riveros (FFG-18) is one of two Karel Doorman-class frigates transferred to the Chilean Navy from the Royal Netherlands Navy (Image source: Wikimedia)
The policy addresses multiple objectives. Strategically, it aims to strengthen Chile’s military autonomy by facilitating national shipbuilding capacity, thereby reducing dependence on foreign suppliers and strengthening technological sovereignty. It is also designed to provide resilience in the face of international crises, while giving the Chilean Navy greater control over the maintenance and evolution of its fleet. From an industrial perspective, the plan is to consolidate a complete production chain, from shipyards to the manufacture of on-board systems and components, through close collaboration between the state, private companies, research institutions and trade unions.
From an economic point of view, the project aims to structure a sector capable of generating skilled jobs, revitalising the southern regions of the country and diversifying the national economy beyond its dependence on raw materials. At the regional level, Chile could position itself as an exporter of components or ships to other Latin American navies, thereby strengthening its diplomatic and technological presence in the Southern Cone. Through this policy, the government aims to articulate a long-term industrial vision based on innovation, national security and competitiveness.
The meeting that formalised the creation of the committee was chaired by Economy Minister Nicolás Grau and included the participation of Foreign Minister Alberto van Klaveren, Social Development Minister Javiera Toro, Undersecretary of State for the Budget Heidi Berner, Undersecretary of State for Agriculture Alan Espinoza, Undersecretary of State for Science Cristián Cuevas, Corfo Executive Vice President José Miguel Benavente, and Minister of National Defence Adriana Delpiano. The broad representation reflects the cross-sectoral nature of the policy adopted.
The main objective of the new committee is to promote effective coordination between the public and private sectors by aligning government programmes aimed at supporting Chile’s shipbuilding industry. This includes identifying policies and initiatives focused on technological development, industrial innovation and the creation of local added value. The committee is also tasked with promoting collaboration platforms that bring together private companies, research centres and the state to implement strategic projects. Particular attention will be paid to the national and regional visibility of the shipbuilding sector and its integration into broader development policies.
The Shipbuilding Committee will be headed by a Board of Directors responsible for promoting public policies to support the sector. The Board will include representatives from the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Economy, the Chilean Navy and Corfo, and will be chaired by an independent figure appointed jointly by the Ministries of Economy and Defence. A Strategic Advisory Council with a technical role will support the committee, guiding its direction. This advisory body will include key stakeholders such as shipyards and Navy workshops (Asmar), the Southern Chile Shipping Association (Armasur), the National Association of Metallurgical Industries (Asimet), the National Fishing Society (Sonapesca), the National Shipowners’ Association (ANA), private shipyards, the Asmar trade unions and academic institutions.
The current Chilean Navy is centred around eight second-hand frigates acquired from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands: three British Type 23 ships (Chilean Type 23 class) and five Dutch Karel Doorman-class ships (Jacob van Heemskerck class). The navy also operates two Scorpène-class submarines, two Thomson-class submarines (based on the Agosta design) and a Galvarino-class multi-role logistics support ship. Amphibious capabilities are provided in part by a Foudre-class landing platform dock acquired from France. The navy also maintains a fleet of offshore and coastal patrol vessels, which are essential for monitoring Chile’s extensive maritime areas, including Patagonia and the surrounding island territories.
Source: here
French unmanned interceptor ship UHSI32 MkII validated for coastal attack missions
According to information published by CMN Naval at the end of July 2025, a new live maritime demonstration of the UHSI32 MkII high-speed unmanned interceptor vessel took place off the French coast. This essential test event, which aimed to validate the operational maturity of the platform, was carried out in the presence of senior French Navy officials, along with representatives of MTG Marinetechnik GmbH and German Naval Yards, a subsidiary of CMN Naval and co-developer of the unmanned platform. The UHSI32 MkII is designed and built by Constructions Mécaniques de Normandie (CMN), a French shipbuilder with a long tradition, with advanced navigation and autonomous mission systems provided by German specialist Anschuetz GmbH.
The French UHSI32 MkII is a 32-metre unmanned interceptor vessel with artificial intelligence navigation, modular payloads and speeds of over 45 knots (Image source: CMN).
During the demonstration, the UHSI32 MkII performed a series of advanced mission scenarios representative of real-world naval operations. These included autonomous coastal navigation in variable sea conditions with full real-time obstacle detection and avoidance, followed by a remotely controlled interception and shadowing manoeuvre of a simulated surface threat ( ). The vessel was fully piloted and mission managed from a land-based command and control centre equipped with a secure digital interface, allowing operators to oversee navigation, sensor fusion and payload activation. The test ended with a rapid run at over 40 knots to demonstrate agility, propulsion responsiveness and fuel efficiency under operational load, confirming the vessel’s ability to maintain persistent high-speed operations in littoral environments.
The UHSI32 MkII is a fully unmanned derivative of the combat-proven HSI32 MkII interceptor, redesigned to operate autonomously or by remote control. The vessel measures 32 metres in length, with a lightweight hull constructed from advanced composite materials that significantly reduce radar signature and improve hydrodynamic performance. It is powered by two high-power diesel engines coupled with water jet propulsion, reaching maximum speeds of over 45 knots. The platform integrates Anschuetz’s latest generation autonomous control suite, which includes artificial intelligence-assisted navigation, autonomous obstacle recognition, dynamic route planning and machine learning algorithms to adapt to changing maritime environments. The onboard mission system allows for the integration of a wide range of sensors, including electro-optical/infrared turrets, surface search radars, AIS interceptors and optional remotely operated weapon stations. Its modular deck allows the integration of mission-specific payloads, such as boarding assistance systems, electronic warfare kits or vertical take-off drone launchers.
The operational differences between the unmanned UHSI32 MkII and its manned predecessor, the HSI32 MkII, mainly focus on crew risk reduction, mission endurance and deployment flexibility. Although both have the same agile, high-speed airframe design and modular payload capability, the unmanned variant is equipped with advanced autonomous navigation and remote control systems, enabling it to perform missions without personnel on board. This eliminates the physiological limitations of human crews, allowing the UHSI32 MkII to operate continuously for long periods of time, including in high-risk or restricted access environments where manned vessels would face significant threats. In addition, the absence of life support systems, accommodation spaces and manual control interfaces allows for a more optimised internal configuration, increasing payload and endurance. Tactically, the unmanned version can be deployed as a forward sensor, decoy or interdiction asset, with reduced political and operational consequences in disputed waters, providing a more flexible and scalable tool for modern naval force projection.
From a tactical and operational perspective, the UHSI32 MkII provides naval forces with the ability to extend their maritime presence and surveillance without exposing crews to high-risk environments. It can be deployed as an advanced sensor node in maritime surveillance networks or as an autonomous interceptor for critical infrastructure protection, choke point security and anti-smuggling operations. Due to its high speed performance and low acoustic and radar signatures, the platform is particularly suited to green water and littoral areas, where traditional patrol vessels face greater vulnerability. In addition, the UHSI32 MkII can operate in manned/unmanned team concepts, serving as an escort or scout for larger surface combatants, thereby multiplying fleet effectiveness and increasing the operational tempo. Its ability to conduct persistent surveillance missions over extended periods with a low logistical footprint also offers advantages in terms of force optimisation and budget efficiency.
The emergence and accelerated development of unmanned maritime vessels is deeply rooted in the changing landscape of today’s maritime threats. Growing regional tensions in strategic corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz, the South China Sea, the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean have highlighted the need for constant maritime awareness, rapid response capabilities and reduced personnel exposure in volatile areas. At the same time, near-peer adversaries are implementing increasingly sophisticated A2/AD strategies that complicate the safe operation of manned assets near contested coastlines. As a result, NATO and allied navies are prioritising unmanned maritime systems that offer stealth, flexibility and persistent presence at minimal risk. In this broader context, platforms such as the UHSI32 MkII are no longer experimental, but are rapidly becoming integral components of modern fleet architecture, providing scalable and interoperable solutions for maritime security operations , asymmetric threat response and digital battlefield integration.
With this successful live demonstration, CMN Naval underscores its leadership in unmanned naval systems and signals its readiness to offer an export-ready operational capability to allied and partner navies around the world. The UHSI32 MkII is not only a technological leap forward in autonomous surface warfare, but also embodies the shift in naval doctrine towards distributed, unmanned and AI-based fleet operations designed to meet the challenges of the contested maritime environments of the future.
Source: here
US Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft step up maritime surveillance to counter China in Indo-Pacific
According to information published by the US Department of Defence and official sources on 4 August 2025, the Boeing-manufactured P-8A Poseidon continues to strengthen its role as the US Navy’s most capable maritime patrol and reconnaissance platform. Given the escalating military tensions in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the South China Sea, the Philippine Sea and the Taiwan Strait, the aircraft has become an essential tool for force projection, early warning and submarine warfare preparedness in disputed waters.
A US Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft lands after a surveillance mission in the Indo-Pacific region (Image source: DVIDS)
The P-8A Poseidon is a military derivative of the Boeing 737-800ERX commercial aircraft, structurally reinforced for low-altitude operations and maritime attack roles. Powered by two CFM56-7B27A turbofan engines, each providing 27,300 pounds of thrust, the Poseidon has a maximum speed of 490 knots and an unrefuelled range of over 1,200 nautical miles, with four hours on station. The fuselage integrates a fully digital flight deck and a suite of advanced mission systems centred around the AN/APY-10 multimode radar, enabling high-resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging and reverse SAR for ship classification. Its sensor package also includes electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) turrets, electronic support measures (ESM), magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) systems and over 120 internally stored sound beacons. The onboard acoustic processor system can analyse submarine signatures in real time and signal Mk 54 torpedo engagements, while external hardpoints support AGM-84D Harpoon Block II missiles and depth charges.
The Indo-Pacific region has seen an increase in close air encounters and aggressive interceptions between Chinese and American forces. A recent reported border incident involving a P-8A patrol flight over international airspace near Taiwan highlights the persistent dangers faced by US surveillance aircraft. These encounters highlight Beijing’s increasing efforts to challenge the freedom of navigation and air operations of its allies, while the Pentagon maintains that all patrol flights are conducted legally and within globally recognised limits. US officials continue to advocate for robust deconfliction mechanisms to prevent escalation in the , especially as routine patrols increasingly intersect with hostile standoff behaviours.
At the strategic level, the deployment of P-8A Poseidon missiles in the Indo-Pacific reflects the United States’ commitment to integrated deterrence in a region increasingly characterised by military competition with China. The US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) considers persistent maritime domain awareness and submarine surveillance vital to maintaining the rules-based international order, ensuring the security of key allies such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and deterring Chinese naval expansion beyond the first island chain. With Beijing accelerating the modernisation of its naval and submarine forces, including the expansion of Type 093 and 094 platforms, the ability to detect, track and respond to underwater threats is no longer a regional concern but a global imperative. The presence of the Poseidon missile strengthens multilateral security frameworks such as AUKUS and the Quad, supporting interoperability in joint maritime operations and maintaining a credible forward presence for the US in a theatre of operations that could shape the future of global power dynamics.
With an operational ceiling of 41,000 feet (approximately 12,400 m), anti-ice systems for wings and robust maritime weather performance, the P-8A is designed for long-endurance missions in complex operational environments. It supports real-time data fusion through its secure Link-16 and satellite communications systems, ensuring seamless integration with carrier strike groups, destroyers and allied ISR assets. The Poseidon’s multi-threat engagement capability, combined with its rapid re-tasking capability, positions it as a key asset in enforcing the US strategic posture, deterring submarine incursions and protecting maritime trade routes essential to both regional stability and global commerce.
The increased frequency of P-8A deployments to key forward bases in Japan, Guam, and Australia reflects Washington’s priority to maintain submarine dominance and ensure persistent surveillance of contested littoral areas. As the geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific continues to change, the P-8A Poseidon is at the forefront of modern naval operations, providing unmatched coverage, precise targeting support and critical deterrence against emerging submarine threats.
Source: here
TCG Orucreis frigate modernised to support Turkey’s national blue naval doctrine
According to information published by Türkiye Today on 4 August 2025, the TCG Oruçreis (F-245) of the Turkish Navy’s Barbaros class officially rejoined the fleet following the completion of an extensive mid-life modernisation project, which elevates the ship to the status of the most advanced combat platform currently in Turkish service. This transformation, carried out under the ADVENT Combat Management System (CMS) Programme, led by HAVELSAN in close cooperation with the Turkish Naval Forces Command, supports Turkey’s maritime strategy, known as the “Blue Homeland” doctrine. The strategic goal is to ensure deterrence and power projection in disputed maritime areas in the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Sea regions.
The modernised TCG Orucreis features a new radar, ADVENT CMS, EW upgrades and improved missile systems (Image source: Aselsan)
Ordered in 1997, TCG Oruçreis belongs to the MEKO 200TN Track II-A variant of the Barbaros-class frigates. With a length of 118 metres, a width of 14.8 metres and a full load displacement of approximately 3,380 tonnes, the ship is powered by a combined diesel or gas propulsion system (CODOG) consisting of two General Electric LM2500 gas turbines and two MTU diesel engines. This configuration allows for a maximum speed of 32 knots and a range of over 4,000 nautical miles at cruising speed. As part of the modernisation, the ship’s old electronic and mechanical systems have been replaced or extensively overhauled to improve longevity, automation and survivability, extending its operational relevance into the 2040s.
At the heart of this transformation is ADVENT CMS, a locally developed, network-centric command and control solution that now governs over 30 subsystems on board. With over 700 applications and six million lines of source code, the system enables joint engagement capabilities, tactical decision support and seamless integration with national and NATO data link architectures, including Link-11, Link-16 and Link-22. It supports real-time communication between platforms, autonomous training scenarios without disrupting ship systems, and dynamic threat assessment modules. These features substantially improve situational awareness, command coordination and reaction speed in high-intensity maritime combat.
The upgrade also includes a comprehensive sensor and weapon upgrade. TCG Oruçreis is now equipped with an advanced suite of offensive and defensive systems, including the locally produced ATMACA anti-ship cruise missile system and traditional Harpoon missiles for redundancy. The ship’s vertical launch system has been upgraded to the Mk 41 standard, enabling it to deploy four-wheel Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) for medium-range air defence. The main naval gun has been replaced with a 127 mm/54 calibre system, complemented by two remotely controlled, STOP-stabilised 25 mm weapon stations and a Phalanx Mk 15 close-in weapon system (CIWS) for close-range protection against air and missile threats.
Improvements to fire control and targeting are built around the AKREP multimode radar system, supported by integrated search radars, national friend or foe identification (IFF) capability and electro-optical systems. TCG Oruçreis now also has improved anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, with upgraded sonar systems and the integration of the HIZIR torpedo countermeasure suite. The ship’s electronic warfare capability is managed by the AREAS-2NC system, providing detection, classification and countermeasure capabilities against a wide range of electromagnetic threats. The ship also benefits from advanced infrared search and track (IRST) and electro-optical sensors, enabling passive surveillance and targeting in electronically contested environments.
After months of shore-based and sea trials in Turkish waters throughout 2024, including live-fire exercises and full-spectrum combat simulations, the ship has successfully completed all acceptance activities. The frigate’s performance was validated during NATO’s largest annual maritime exercise, Dynamic Mariner/Flotex-25, which took place in March 2025 in the Gulf of Cadiz, off the coast of Spain. TCG Oruçreis demonstrated full interoperability with allied task forces, serving as a command platform for multi-domain operations and gaining recognition for its new combat capabilities.
This modernisation effort should be viewed in the broader geopolitical context of Turkey’s evolving maritime doctrine. Over the past decade, Ankara has become increasingly assertive in defending its perceived maritime rights and interests, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. Given ongoing disputes over exclusive economic zones, access to hydrocarbon reserves and territorial waters, Turkey has prioritised the creation of a capable and independent navy capable of sustained operations far from its shores. The “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) concept underpins this ambition, calling for permanent maritime vigilance, strategic depth and technological autonomy. By modernising its legacy frigates with domestically produced systems, Turkey is not only increasing its operational resilience but also reducing its dependence on foreign suppliers, particularly in the context of changing global defence export dynamics and restrictions on access to technology.
Furthermore, Turkey’s investment in digital combat systems and multi-role surface platforms underscores its intention to transition from a coastal defence force to a regional blue-water navy. TCG Oruçreis is now a key asset in this transformation, a highly networked surface combatant capable of conducting maritime control, area denial, force escort and intelligence missions across the Turkish Navy’s vast area of responsibility. The modernised frigate will likely serve as the lead ship in fleet formations and as a command and control node during expeditionary deployments.
In conclusion, the successful modernisation of the TCG Oruçreis signals a significant leap in Turkey’s naval warfare capabilities and reflects the country’s broader ambition to become a decisive regional maritime power. As Turkey’s defence industries continue to mature and deliver sovereign naval technologies, the modernisation of the Oruçreis serves as a benchmark for future programmes aimed at modernising the entire surface fleet, while promoting the production of the national defence industry. The ship’s entry into active service marks a fundamental achievement in the Turkish Navy’s strategic roadmap towards 2030 and beyond.
Source: here
China deploys new Type 094 nuclear submarine to strengthen global maritime dominance
According to information published by Chinese Central Television on 1 August 2025, the Chinese state media broadcast a rare recording of a ballistic missile-launching nuclear submarine taking off on a long-range patrol from an undisclosed naval facility. The broadcast showed the submarine in motion and included a symbolic statement from one of the crew members, who pledged to launch nuclear missiles “without hesitation” if ordered to do so. The vessel is believed to be a Type 094 Jin-class submarine, one of six in China’s strategic submarine fleet and a central component of the country’s maritime nuclear deterrent force, armed with JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The Type 094 Jin class is China’s first nuclear submarine equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles, forming a key part of its maritime nuclear deterrent system. (Image source: OE Data Integration Network)
This state-approved press release marks the first known instance in which China has publicly acknowledged the active deployment of a Type 094 SSBN. Although Chinese authorities have withheld the submarine’s hull number, mission profile, and exact amount of ammunition, the vessel is believed to have departed from Longpo Naval Base, a fortified underground facility on Hainan Island that supports China’s nuclear submarine force. The timing and content of the footage appear to be carefully orchestrated to reinforce strategic signalling, both to regional rivals and to the international community at large, amid growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain.
According to the US Department of Defence and several open-source intelligence assessments, the Type 094 Jin-class submarines represent China’s first credible means of maritime nuclear deterrence. These submarines are currently transitioning to the use of JL-3 intercontinental ballistic missiles, significantly extending their operational range. From their patrol areas in the South China Sea or the Western Pacific, Type 094 units equipped with JL-3 missiles could place the entire continental United States within range. At the same time, development of the next generation of Type 096 submarines is progressing, with entry into service estimated at the end of the decade. China is also investing heavily in new nuclear-powered attack submarines, particularly the future Type 095 class and the advanced conventional Type 041 class, designed to improve underwater warfare capabilities and fleet escort functions.
From a technical perspective, the Type 094 submarine is a second-generation Chinese SSBN designed to bridge the gap between traditional platforms and more advanced strategic deterrent systems currently under development. The submarine has an estimated submerged displacement of approximately 11,000 to 12,000 tonnes and measures approximately 135 metres in length. Powered by a pressurised water nuclear reactor, the vessel can remain submerged for long periods of time, allowing for extended deterrence patrols without surfacing. Its maximum submerged speed is estimated at 20 to 24 knots, with a maximum operating depth of over 300 metres. The Type 094 is equipped with twelve vertical launch silos for JL-2 missiles, which have an estimated range of between 7,200 and 8,000 kilometres and can carry a single 1-megaton nuclear warhead or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), depending on the configuration.
In terms of defensive and tactical systems, the Type 094 submarine is equipped with six 533 mm torpedo launchers, capable of launching heavy torpedoes and naval mines. The submarine is also believed to be equipped with basic to moderately advanced electronic warfare systems, acoustic countermeasures and decoy dispensers to avoid detection or attack by enemy forces. However, Western analysts generally rate the Type 094 submarine as acoustically inferior to American and Russian SSBNs, particularly those of the US Navy’s Ohio class or Russia’s Borei class. Significant noise levels make the submarine easier to detect in open ocean environments, although recent upgrades suggest incremental improvements in sonar damping and hull design.
Compared to other major submarine powers, such as the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, China’s ballistic missile submarine force remains less mature but is advancing rapidly. The US Navy leads with its fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, renowned for their stealth, endurance and global strike capability, which will soon be replaced by the new Columbia class. Russia maintains a deterrent with its Borei-class submarines, armed with advanced SLBMs and benefiting from decades of experience in submarine warfare. France and the United Kingdom operate fewer but highly sophisticated SSBNs, of the Triomphant and Vanguard classes respectively, with proven second-strike capabilities and integrated NATO interoperability. China’s Type 094, although a significant milestone, still lags behind in terms of acoustic stealth and missile range. However, with the future integration of the Type 096 and JL-3 missiles, China is closing the gap and moving from a minimal deterrence posture to a more assertive maritime nuclear force with greater survivability.
The public announcement of the deployment of a nuclear submarine comes at a time of escalating strategic competition between China and the United States, particularly in the maritime domain. Friction over Taiwan, the expansion of US defence cooperation with regional allies such as Japan, the Philippines and Australia, and recent military exercises in the South China Sea have sharply heightened tensions. The announcement could also serve as a strategic counterweight to the US Navy’s advanced deployments and submarine operations under AUKUS. By presenting a second-strike platform under official media guidance, Beijing aims to reinforce its message of nuclear deterrence, assert its regional claims, and discourage potential adversaries from interfering in what it considers to be its core national interests.
This deliberate public disclosure underscores a new level of confidence in China’s rapidly developing second-strike nuclear capability. It reflects a shift in strategic posture, in which China is no longer content to rely solely on ambiguity, but is prepared to use clear messages to strengthen deterrence, demonstrate credibility, and assert its growing role as a global nuclear power. The deployment and publication of the Type 094 patrols mark a turning point in China’s strategic communication, potentially influencing future regional naval dynamics and deterrence calculations.
Source: here
China has commissioned its fourth Type 075 amphibious assault ship
Chinese multi-purpose amphibious assault ship Hubei (#34), Type 075. August 2025, China. Photo credit: globaltimes.cn
China has officially commissioned the fourth Type 075 amphibious assault ship into its navy.
The new ship has been named Hubei and has the hull number 34.
This was announced in a report by Chinese state television dedicated to the anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army.
The Hubei was launched on 14 December 2023 at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding (Group) Co., Ltd. shipyard in Shanghai.
After launch, the ship underwent sea trials and docking tests throughout 2024.
Chinese amphibious assault ship Hubei (No. 34) of the Type 075 class. August 2025, China. Photo credit: globaltimes.cn
It is likely that Hubei joined the fleet before the official announcement, as it has already participated in joint exercises with other Chinese Navy ships.
China has previously ordered three submarines of this type: Hainan (in 2021), Guangxi and Anhui (both in 2022).
Project 075 is an important component of China’s efforts to build an ocean-going fleet with strong amphibious capabilities.
These ships have an estimated gross displacement of approximately 35-40 thousand tonnes, a length of over 230 metres and a width of 36 metres.
Chinese amphibious assault ship Hubei (No. 34) of the Type 075. August 2025, China. Photo credit: globaltimes.cn
Type 075 amphibious assault ships can land marines, transport military equipment and helicopters, enabling long-range landing operations.
Despite its impressive performance, the Type 075 is inferior in size to Project 076, an even larger amphibious assault ship nicknamed Sichuan, which was launched on 27 December 2024.
The Type 076 Sichuan multi-purpose amphibious assault ship. China, December 2024. Photo credit: Chinese state television
The development of the amphibious assault ship fleet demonstrates China’s strategic ambitions in the region and its desire to expand the expeditionary capabilities of its Navy and a possible landing in Taiwan.
Source: here
The US plans to launch its first interceptor satellite by 2028
Illustration of missile threat surveillance satellites. Photo credit: L3Harris Technologies
Lockheed Martin plans to test a space interceptor demonstrator capable of engaging highly manoeuvrable hypersonic missiles within the next three years.
Amanda Pound, director of advanced programme development, said this, according to DefenseOne.
During a press conference at the company’s headquarters in Gunstville, the company representative said that her office is currently reviewing various interceptor concepts, from lasers to satellites that transform into projectiles and manoeuvre towards targets.
“The goal is to have an in-orbit demonstration of a space interceptor by 2028,” she said. “We have the capability to do this. We are ready to provide support.”
The missile interception satellite will be a key element of the future Golden Dome continental missile defence system, which will provide protection against advanced threats to the United States.
Lockheed Martin highlighted the important role of other, less ambitious components of this system, in particular early warning satellites for missile launches, which should detect them in the thermal imaging spectrum.
The company spoke about the creation of a new “prototyping centre” to test new concepts for a space-based missile defence system. It will test not only its own technologies, but also those of partners and smaller companies.
The new facility has been implemented based on the Lighthouse Innovation Centre. The company says work is already underway – testing technologies that should protect both from the ground and from space against current and future threats.
Recently, CNN sources reported that the Pentagon has scheduled the first test of the Golden Dome missile defence system for the end of 2028, during the US presidential election period.
One of the sources within the defence department said that the Missile Defence Agency (MDA) intends to name this test FTI-X. The abbreviation stands for Flight Test Integrated, a test of an integrated flight system in which Golden Dome sensors and weapons will work together in a single system to intercept targets.
Space Force General Michael Gutlein, appointed by Trump in May to lead the Golden Dome project, said the ambitious goal is technologically realistic but also presents other risks:
“I think the real technical challenge will be building the space interceptor. The technology exists, I believe. I think we’ve proven every element of the physics, that we can make it work. What we haven’t proven is, first, can we do this economically, and second, can we do this at scale? Can we build enough satellites to combat the threat? Can we expand the industrial base quickly enough to build those satellites?”
According to another source, the 2028 test could be just the “first phase” of the programme. For now, the project is moving forward quickly, relying on existing systems to demonstrate that the concept of a global missile defence shield is worthy of additional funding.
Source: here
The first Russian military forces and equipment have arrived in Belarus to participate in Zapad-2025
The first echelon of Russian troops and equipment has arrived in Belarus to participate in the Zapad 2025 joint strategic military exercises.
These manoeuvres represent the main stage of this year’s joint training of the two countries’ military personnel. The training will take place in September.
Belarusian and Russian military personnel are currently in the final stages of preparation.
The Belarusian side has stated that during the Zapad 2025 exercise, it intends to practise new forms and means of using ground forces, based on an analysis of recent modern military conflicts.
Such strategic military manoeuvres are held regularly, every two years, alternately on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and Russia.
Their official objectives are usually to practise joint defensive and offensive actions, improve the interaction of the armed forces and test the army’s readiness for various scenarios.
However, these exercises always raise concerns among neighbouring countries due to possible unexpected actions or incidents.
Such fears are not unfounded, as Belarus has become a launching pad for Russian invasion forces against northern Ukraine, including Kiev.
At the end of May, Belarusian Defence Minister Viktor Khrenin said that the main training part of this year’s exercises would be moved deeper into Belarus to “reduce tensions.”
He added that this move “also demonstrates a willingness to engage in dialogue” with neighbouring countries. The minister also said that these Russian-Belarusian military exercises “are not directed against anyone.”
In response to Zapad 2025, Poland will conduct the strategic exercises Żelazny Obrońca in September, in which some NATO countries will participate.
Source: here
Ukrainians blow up Mi-28 attack helicopter in Russia
A Ukrainian guerrilla group placed explosive devices under a Russian Mi-28 attack helicopter at a military base in the Tver region of Russia.
The guerrillaPeople’s Resistance of Ukraine movement published images of the operation.
To destroy the Russian helicopter, the guerrillas entered the territory of the 344th Centre for Combat Use and Retraining of Military Aviation Personnel, located near the town of Torzhok in the Tver region.
They planted two small explosive devices under the landing gear of the Mi-28 helicopter, which was parked in an open area near the runway.
VIDEO 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=106&v=geIcS2MJOqA&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fmilitarnyi.com%2F&source_ve_path=Mjg2NjY
The explosion of the Russian helicopter was not captured on video. The authors of the post mentioned that the Russian army concealed the fact of the intrusion into the territory of the military unit and the commission of acts of sabotage.
Instead, the guerrillas cite local residents’ publications reporting the sounds of explosions and smoke from the airbase area on 31 May this year as evidence of the successful completion of the operation.
Source: here
Mapping the Cosmos
Operational astrography for the new space age
As scientific, commercial and geopolitical activities accelerate beyond areas close to Earth, existing boundaries of outer space are proving inadequate; they are often highly technical, inconsistently applied and inaccessible to many decision-makers. In this report, the authors draw on existing geographical and cartographic precedents to propose four distinct astrographic regions – the surface environment, near space, the celestial neighbourhood and deep space – each based on sustainable physical thresholds or established conventions. Designed to be accessible, sustainable and generalisable, the framework aims to support discussions among a wide range of space professionals. The authors also highlight opportunities for further improving this framework, including the incorporation of multi-body gravitational boundaries, four-dimensional mapping, and the tion of additional regions and spatial characteristics as space activities continue to evolve.
Key findings
- Despite advances in mapping the Earth, the Moon and even nearby planets, the field of space mapping lacks agreed terms and definitions for representing and describing the empty space between celestial bodies.
- Existing spatial representations have tended to originate from academia and therefore prioritise accuracy and detail at the expense of accessibility, affecting their usefulness for decision-makers and space operators.
- The authors provide an innovative framework for delimiting astrographic regions for any given gravitational system, following three guiding principles: ensuring a framework that is accessible to decision-makers and space planners of all types, sustainable in the long term, and generalisable across different gravitational systems.
- As interest in cislunar space grows, the clear definition and consistent representation of this region provided in this report will be useful in supporting coordination, safety, and future space development.
- Minimum orbit spheres (minors), mass concentrations (mascons), Lagrange zones, reference frames, and Hill spheres are valuable features that future researchers can use to define analogous regions in other gravitational systems.
- The authors anticipate that future work will refine these definitions and include additional concepts not covered in this report.
Source: here
Fogging: A stronger approach to sub-threshold threats
The issue of “hybrid” or “sub-threshold” warfare (defined as hostile state activity that falls below the threshold of conventional armed conflict) has attracted considerable attention in recent years in the context of the struggle between free and open nations and their authoritarian adversaries. While the hybrid challenge posed by nations such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Iran is well recognised, this paper examines the main sub-threshold threat to the United Kingdom (UK) – from Russia.
As one of the leading European powers within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and a staunch ally of Ukraine, the UK is under particularly acute hybrid attack from Russia. Even before the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the UK had suffered some of the most blatant and damaging attacks from Russian sub-threshold operations, not least the deployment of the nerve agent Novichok in Salisbury in 2018.
Much of the debate on how to address Russian hybrid threats has been fundamentally defensive in nature, focused on the UK’s resilience against Russian sub-threshold operations such as sabotage, cyber attacks, assassinations, information operations and so on. This is exemplified by the recent report of the Select Committee on Defence, ‘Defence in the Grey Zone’, which, while offering coherent recommendations, was almost entirely absent on the more proactive aspects of deterring hybrid threats.
This is not to say that defensive measures are not vital; they are. Strengthening the nation’s ability to withstand multifaceted hybrid attacks is essential.
However, it is not enough to be resilient to attacks. If the United Kingdom considers itself to be in a strategic confrontation with Russia, as the National Security Strategy states(NSS) of June 2025 , then taking a passive role and simply repelling blows is not sufficient deterrence. The UK should regain the initiative and take the fight against Russia to the sub-threshold arena.
This does not mean that defensive measures are not vital; they are. Strengthening the nation’s ability to withstand multifaceted hybrid attacks is essential. The fact that the failure of a single substation led to the closure of the UK’s main airport is indicative of the weak resilience of critical British national infrastructure, while Module 1 of the Covid-19 Inquiry highlights the failures of the state’s response to major civil emergencies. The 2025 Resilience Action Plan goes some way towards addressing these shortcomings, but more should be done. Significant investment should be made in strengthening the UK’s resilience, perhaps most importantly in public understanding of risk and in sharing information on how to act and respond to crises.
However, a passive approach will not deter further attacks. Russia will continue to explore vulnerabilities as long as it believes there will be little serious pushback. This cannot continue. Aggressors are deterred by active resistance, not passivity. The NSS appears to recognise this in writing – mentioning the requirement to move out of a ‘defensive posture’ and adopt a ‘campaign approach’ – but again offers little detail beyond defensive and monitoring measures. This suggests that Her Majesty’s Government (HM) is not yet fully prepared to adopt the more proactive approach required for effective deterrence.
The first step in such an approach would be the rapid identification and recognition of incidents as hybrid attacks. This should then be followed by swift attribution and condemnation. Where the balance of probability from initial information suggests that the cause of a problem is malicious state activity, this should be signalled publicly, swiftly and decisively, both domestically and internationally. Much of the strategic advantage of hybrid attacks stems from their ‘plausible deniability’. This advantage must be denied; through the declassification and public release of selected information, if necessary.
Identification and attribution should then be followed by retaliation – the counter-strike. The adversary should be punished for the attack on the UK at the sub-threshold level and made aware of the clear red lines that the UK will not allow them to cross. If Russia carries out a hybrid attack on the United Kingdom, it should be followed swiftly by a British – or NATO – hybrid counterattack on Russian interests.
In most cases, the United Kingdom will not want to adopt the same tactics as its adversaries. Russia, in particular, engages in activities that are often nihilistic, unethical and extremely dangerous to civilians, in violation of international humanitarian law. The UK would not want, for example, to carry out cyber attacks on Russian electricity networks that power hospitals, both because of the potential harm to civilians and because of how easily it would feed Russian narratives of “by the way” and “Western hypocrisy”.
Long periods of deliberation – followed by toothless official condemnations weeks or months later – cannot continue to be the modus operandi. The emphasis should be on decisive and tangible action – it is not enough to simply track Russian hybrid activities and label them as such.
However, both the Strategic Defence Review and the NSS call for the UK to achieve an “asymmetric advantage”. Indeed, asymmetry in a sub-threshold struggle is preferable, particularly where the UK can use its expertise in finance, maritime, cyber and special operations.
For example, a Russian cyber attack on the United Kingdom could be countered by the Royal Navy by rapidly detaining a known Russian vessel from the nation’s “shadow fleet” or by working with an ally to disrupt Russian intermediaries and illicit financial flows abroad through well-targeted sanctions and law enforcement action. This should then be made public to demonstrate to both domestic populations and the adversary that the UK is prepared to respond.
As suggested by the NSS, enabling this type of response will likely require legislative and policy changes to allow for swift, flexible and decisive action by the UK Government. Long periods of deliberation – followed by toothless official condemnations weeks or months later – cannot continue to be the modus operandi. The emphasis should be on decisive and tangible actions – it is not enough simply to track Russian hybrid activities and name them as such.
Of course, the United Kingdom conducts hybrid activities through multiple means against adversaries, in secret. However, in the author’s experience, the appetite for risk in much of the UK Government for conducting even the most basic sub-threshold offensive activities against state threats is extremely low, to the point of impotence. While understandable, fear of escalation cannot be allowed to prevent British responses to very direct and blatant hybrid attacks. A well-established framework should be established and understood to allow for decisive responses while managing concerns about escalation.
In addition, the importance of public attribution and openly acknowledged retaliation should be emphasised. The strategic message about hybrid activity is often as important as the activity itself. While the sensitivity of some operations is recognised, keeping all such activities in the shadows does not support the desired narrative that the United Kingdom is a capable and willing actor to respond to adversaries.
Finally, the UK should be proactive in countering hybrid threats abroad and support allies and partners in their competition below the threshold. The UK’s adversaries, particularly Russia, actively promote their narratives and cause instability in many regions of the world, including South-East Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia. In these scenarios, although coercive power resources such as special forces operations, advanced military deployments and economic sanctions have their place, soft power tools are most useful in the long term to counter adverse influence and hybrid threats. Massive investment in good governance programmes, free and open journalism, and British soft power through the BBC World Service, the British Council and cultural exports will be key tools for countering adverse hybrid activities and strengthening the UK’s global influence.
One of the key principles of the British military in defensive operations is to ‘keep the offensive spirit’. The UK government should adopt this attitude towards sub-threshold operations. Competitiveness and strategic advantage will not be achieved through defensive measures alone. Proactive and proportionate, but stronger responses are needed if the UK and its allies and partners are to effectively challenge and deter adversaries at the sub-threshold level.
Matthew Palmer is a former British Army officer, Sir John Moore Associate Fellow at the Geostrategy Council and Richmond Fellow at the Royal Naval War College. He also writes in a personal capacity for Cracking Defence. His views are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Ministry of Defence or the British Government.
This article is part of the Strategic Advantage Cell.
Source: here
On the limited use of nuclear weapons in the Western Pacific
Introduction
Would China or the United States use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan? If so, what would this look like in practice? This paper examines this grim prospect. It takes the form of a series of questions designed to highlight the key factors that could influence the limited use of nuclear weapons in a war in the Western Pacific.
Firm answers to these questions are not always forthcoming. Precise calculations regarding decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons – on both the Chinese and American sides – are impossible to determine definitively before the actual moment when such weapons might be used. Rather, the intention of this paper is to provide the reader with insight into the issues that come into play when debating the use of nuclear weapons in a high-stakes situation in Taiwan. The aim is less to provide difficult answers and more to provide a basis for further discussion.
Examining the use of nuclear weapons in the Western Pacific should obviously not be confused with advocating it. But avoiding the use of nuclear weapons in practice may depend, in part, on a better prior understanding of the circumstances in which it might come into play. At the very least, realistic examinations of the use of nuclear weapons in the Western Pacific can raise awareness of the risks of escalation in any conflict over Taiwan.
First use
A note before continuing: the document allows either China or the United States to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. (1)Although China has officially maintained a “no first use” (NFU) policy since it first tested an atomic bomb in 1964, the validity of this promise has always been a source of debate. China’s transition from a minimal deterrent in the 20th century to much more robust nuclear capabilities today has led to additional questions about the veracity of its NFU commitment. (2) It is assumed here that the existence of an NFU doctrine in itself would not prevent first use by China. For its part, the United States has never renounced first use.
Question 1: Would a war over Taiwan remain limited?
The first question to be asked about the use of nuclear weapons in the Western Pacific does not necessarily concern nuclear weapons themselves. Rather, it concerns the nature of any conflict over Taiwan. Namely, would it be a total war or a limited war?
A limited (conventional) war is one in which states do not apply all elements of national power to the conflict, nor do they risk their existence (or at least that of the ruling regime). It differs from a total war in that it is not an existential clash: even if a state loses a limited war, it will continue to exist as before and suffer less than the kind of catastrophic defeat experienced, for example, by the Axis powers in the Second World War.
Writing on this subject almost 70 years ago, the then academic Henry Kissinger offered a useful summary of limited war, describing it as follows:
it was fought for specific political objectives which, by their very existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force used and the goals to be achieved. This reflects an attempt to affect the will of the adversary, not to crush it, to make the conditions to be imposed appear more attractive than continued resistance, to aim at specific objectives rather than complete annihilation. (3)
He further adds that “limited war is essentially a political act.” (4) That is, each side must tacitly agree to keep the conflict limited and to apply its military forces accordingly.
The United States, the Soviet Union, and China all chose this path in the Korean War, limiting the fighting to the peninsula rather than extending the conflict to their respective countries. For example, General Douglas MacArthur wanted to bomb Chinese bridges over the Yalu River, but was ultimately denied permission by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Truman, who feared escalating the conflict into an all-out war with the communist bloc. (5)
If we consider a more recent case, however brutal and destructive the war in Ukraine has been, it is still not a total war. Russia has not used its nuclear weapons, nor has it deliberately attacked NATO territory, even though the alliance has provided essential supplies to Ukraine. For its part, Ukraine has faced some limitations on the use of Western weapons against targets on Russian territory and has sometimes hesitated to fully mobilise its entire population for the fight. (6)The refusal of the United States and other NATO countries to directly engage their own military forces was another important factor in keeping the war in Ukraine limited.
Would a conflict in Taiwan therefore be a limited war (i.e. a “maritime Ukraine”) or something closer to a total war? Although it may seem obvious, one essential factor is worth emphasising: whether there will be a direct, large-scale clash between American and Chinese military forces. If China launches an invasion attempt, will the US intervene against this effort with its own air and naval forces? Alternatively, will China launch a pre-emptive strike against US military assets in the Western Pacific with its missile forces to prevent intervention? (7) Each party’s will have a decision to make regarding the other party’s open involvement in a conventional conflict.
Even if Chinese and American forces engage in direct combat, a war could still remain limited. The Korean and Ukrainian examples illustrate that intense and destructive conflicts can be fought without reaching total war. In a Taiwan scenario, certain actions considered escalatory could be off-limits. For example, the US could avoid direct attacks on the Chinese mainland, or China could avoid targeting American bases on the territory of regional allies such as Japan and the Philippines. But once Chinese and American forces start spilling each other’s blood, the ability to maintain tacit limits on the scale of a conflict — the mutual political act identified by Kissinger — will become increasingly difficult.
Several analysts have warned that a US-China fight over Taiwan would not be a short, intense battle, but rather a long and difficult one. 8The longer such a war lasts, the greater the existential stakes could be for both Beijing and Washington. It is true that neither China nor the United States would cease to exist as a state if they lost (barring the mass deployment of nuclear energy), but there may be other factors that would cause the leadership of the US and China to view a potential loss through an existential lens.
From the US perspective, a decisive defeat, coupled with the loss of a substantial part of its air and naval forces, could threaten the dominant position it has played in Pacific security for 80 years. (9) This diminution of status — possibly accompanied by a deterioration in regional alliance relationships — could rise to the level of an existential threat in the mind of an American president. (10)
From the perspective of the Chinese leadership, the consequences of defeat could be even more severe. It is difficult to imagine any Chinese leader who would fail in an attempt to invade Taiwan and survive politically. And simply being removed from power might be the best possible outcome. His physical safety — and that of his immediate family — could be at risk. (11) A Chinese leader could therefore face a personal, existential threat in the event of defeat, in addition to a national one.
For both sides, the weight of the loss would increase with each loss. China and the United States could suffer losses in a fight with Taiwan on a scale not seen since the Korean War — and they would do so in a relatively short period of time. No one knows how leaders in Beijing and Washington would react to such a level of carnage. Perhaps mass casualties would sober minds and induce a truce, but it is equally likely (if not more so) that they would lead to escalation, as each side fights to “count” its losses and ultimately achieve victory.
As the stakes become more existential, the pressure on the tacit cooperation needed to keep the war limited will become greater. The prospects for a transition to total war will increase, and with them the risk that the use of nuclear weapons could be considered by either side as a viable option — even if it was not before the conflict began.
Question 2: Is limited nuclear use compatible with limited war?
If either China or the United States opts for direct military confrontation, this would open the door to the use of nuclear weapons as the war progresses. But once nuclear weapons are used, can further nuclear use be controlled? In other words, does any use of nuclear weapons amount to total war, or can nuclear weapons be used while maintaining a limited conflict?
Obviously, there is limited practical experience to draw on when considering these questions. The only use of nuclear weapons in wartime in history – the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki – ended the war in which they were used. Significantly, Japan did not have its own nuclear weapons. There was never any danger of counterattacks against American cities or forces.
The precepts of the Cold War era offer some guidance on the feasibility of limited nuclear war, but the picture is mixed at best. As historian Francis Gavin’s study illustrates, one of the most important examples of planning for the controlled use of nuclear weapons—the Kennedy administration’s flexible response policy—appears to have been less a viable strategy than a useful piece of political rhetoric. (12) As Gavin notes, there were few substantial changes in the nation’s classified nuclear manual – the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP – between the Kennedy administration and the previous Eisenhower administration, which was based on the obvious policy of “massive retaliation.” (13)
It appears that little attention was paid to the limited use of nuclear energy — at least among the planning staff of the time — while decision-makers seemed genuinely agnostic about the ability to control the use of nuclear energy. (14) As President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defence, Robert S. McNamara, later testified before Congress in 1966, “It is not yet clear how a nuclear war could be conducted in a theatre of operations without assuming a very serious risk of escalation into a general nuclear war.” (15) In essence, one of the principal architects of the flexible response publicly contradicted an often-assumed aspect of that policy: that nuclear war could be reliably fought in a limited manner.
And previous supporters of limited nuclear war lost interest in the idea, especially as the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear arsenal to match that of the United States. (16)This section provides a very brief overview of early Cold War thinking on limited nuclear war, using mainly the positions of Kissinger and Brodie as representative examples. However, it is by no means complete, and a more comprehensive discussion of the subject should include, at a minimum, the works of BH Liddel Hart, Morton Halperin, Robert Osgood, Thomas Schelling, and Albert Wohlstetter. For a more in-depth overview of the thinking of this era on limited nuclear use, see Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Limited War and the Advent of Nuclear Weapons” and Andrew L. Ross, “The Origins of Limited Nuclear War Theory,” in On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century, eds. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014) 3–48, Kindle edition. See also Freedman and Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 121–154, Kindle edition. After initially arguing for the feasibility of controlled nuclear warfare in an earlier book, Kissinger later seemed to backtrack in a second text:
Even with the best intentions on both sides, a nuclear war will be more difficult to limit than a conventional one. Since no country has had experience in the tactical use of nuclear weapons, the possibility of miscalculation is considerable… The pace of operations could outrun the possibilities of negotiation. Both sides would be operating in the dark, with no precedents to guide them and with an inevitably inadequate understanding of their adversary’s aims, if not their own. The line between conventional and nuclear weapons is more familiar and therefore easier to maintain — assuming the will to do so — than any distinction within the nuclear weapons spectrum. (17 years)
It is true that there were Cold War strategists who made strong arguments in favour of the opposite effect, perhaps most eloquently Bernard Brodie. He believed that the use of nuclear weapons could be controlled if applied correctly. His main argument was that by denying themselves the option of using tactical weapons at the outset of a conflict (i.e. not as a last resort after conventional efforts had failed), the United States was unnecessarily tying its hands and probably undermining the deterrent effect of war in general. (18 years)
At first glance, supporters of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States to defend Taiwan today would probably find common ground with Brodie. However, Brodie tested his argument about tactical use in the context of crises where the adversary either a) had only an incipient nuclear capability (China at the time), or b) had a more robust nuclear capability, but was fighting the United States over an issue that was not considered an existential threat to the adversary (the Soviets and the status of Berlin). (19) Under these conditions, there was a greater prospect of managing escalation and avoiding a general nuclear war, in his view. (20)
None of these conditions would be present in a contemporary conflict over Taiwan. Most importantly, China has a mature nuclear force and is substantially increasing its arsenal, as we will discuss. Second, Taiwan’s status appears to be a vital—even existential—issue for China in a way that Berlin never was for Moscow (at least as Brodie described it). (21 years old) With these two important criteria removed, Brodie’s arguments for tactical use lose their validity in the face of the contemporary situation in the Western Pacific.
***
To move from the historical to the theoretical, consider the overall impact of the use of a nuclear weapon by one of the parties involved in a conflict. Such action is likely to bring everyone involved to their senses. One side will use a nuclear weapon, perhaps against a distinct military target, and both sides will then take a step back, realising that further use of nuclear weapons could easily follow and, with it, a much greater catastrophe.
Here, however, there is the same problem identified earlier with regard to mass casualties in a conventional conflict: the initial use of nuclear weapons could lead to a cessation of hostilities if decision-makers become sufficiently concerned about the carnage they are witnessing and the risks of further use of nuclear weapons. However, the use of nuclear weapons could also lead to a ‘double down’ – a desire to pursue victory to justify the losses suffered, including those now suffered in a nuclear attack.
Furthermore, if the initiating state was desperate enough to use nuclear weapons once in an attempt to change the course of the conflict, why would it not be willing to carry out additional attacks? The only reason not to do so is either a) if its adversary surrenders, or b) if its adversary responds with its own nuclear attack. Even in the latter case, the initiator could use nuclear weapons again if the fear of defeat is great enough.
As indicated, the initial use of nuclear weapons presents the target of the attack with its own dilemma: does it simply accept the attack and possibly seek peace, or does it respond with its own use of nuclear weapons, partly to demonstrate that nuclear weapons cannot be used without retaliation? The slope quickly becomes slippery, especially if one or both sides involved in the war truly believe that defeat is an unacceptable outcome.
This discussion raises another philosophical question: is existential defeat by nuclear means worse than existential defeat by conventional means? Asked here, in the quiet of peacetime, the answer may seem obvious — that defeat in a nuclear war is almost certain to be worse than defeat in a conventional war. But in the midst of the intensity of a major direct conflict between great powers — perhaps a protracted one, with tens of thousands of lives already lost on both sides — the answer could become more confusing, and restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons could become more malleable in the minds of decision-makers.
The next set of questions examines more concrete aspects of each side’s nuclear weapons. A useful starting point for this discussion is to examine the composition of the US and Chinese arsenals.
Question 3: How do the nuclear arsenals of China and the US compare?
Overall, the US nuclear arsenal is larger and more diverse than China’s, but Beijing is likely to close this gap in the coming years. For now, however, the United States still maintains a numerical advantage in terms of active nuclear weapons, with approximately 1,770 deployed nuclear warheads, compared to approximately 600 for China. (22)
The United States operates a nuclear triad, meaning it has the means to launch nuclear weapons from sea-based forces (submarines), land-based forces (intercontinental ballistic missiles or ICBMs) and air-based forces (bombers). All three elements of the triad are undergoing major modernisation, with the acquisition of the new Sentinel ICBM, the Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and the B-21 stealth bomber, the latter having both a conventional and a nuclear mission. The bomber should become operational in the next few years, while the first Sentinel and Columbia units are scheduled to enter service in the early part of the next decade, although each programme has encountered technical delays. (23 years)
China also operates a nuclear triad, although the three “legs” are not all equally well established. For example, China has only recently added an air component with the launch of an air-launched ballistic missile armed with nuclear weapons that can be launched from its H-6 bombers . (24)At sea, China has a small force of six SSBNs, but there are important questions about their overall quality, including their levels of acoustic damping. (25)Perhaps to compensate for this weakness, China is developing a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the JL-3, which could allow its SSBNs to attack parts of the continental United States from seas adjacent to the Chinese mainland, eliminating the need for riskier long-range patrols in the Pacific. 26
Most of China’s nuclear forces — about 80% — are deployed on land-based missiles. (27) Moreover, this percentage will only increase in the coming years as China undertakes a major expansion of its ICBM force and, with it, increases its total number of intercontinental warheads. China has already built 300 new silos and has begun to deploy ICBMS in some of them. (28) It also appears to be increasing the number of missiles capable of carrying MIRVs or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (i.e. more than one warhead per ICBM). (29) Together, these measures could help China field 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, according to the latest estimate from the Department of Defence (DoD). (30)
Even without these additions, China already maintains a capable land-based force anchored by mobile solid-fuel road-mobile missiles, such as the DF-31A and DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each of which can cover significant portions of the continental United States. (31) Their mobility makes this group of missiles particularly difficult to counter.
Question 4: Why is China expanding its nuclear arsenal?
The expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal is a significant development in itself, but even more so when considered in light of a potential clash with the United States in the Western Pacific. How much connection is there between the build-up of Chinese forces and contingency planning for Taiwan?
One school of thought suggests that there may be no immediate correlation. Rather, China’s consolidation is seen as “status-driven.” That is, China sees itself as a great power — a power equal to the United States and a power equal (or greater) than Russia. As such, it is natural for China to have a nuclear arsenal commensurate with these two powers. (32)
In a way, the status argument follows the reasoning behind China’s initial acquisition of nuclear weapons, as explored by researchers such as Jeffrey Lewis. He argued that China’s nuclear development in the 1960s was an extension of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, an effort to expand Chinese scientific and technological capabilities to match those of other major states. (33)Notably, China progressed rapidly from simple fission models to the development and testing of fusion models—thermonuclear weapons—in part because of the prestige that this level of capability conferred. (34) However, after achieving thermonuclear detonation, China refrained from pursuing the massive number of nuclear weapons developed by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. By the end of that conflict, the total number of Chinese nuclear missiles capable of striking the continental United States could be counted on one hand. (35 years)
At that time, China’s “status” seemed to be satisfied – at least in the view of Mao and his immediate successors – by the technological achievement represented by nuclear weapons, regardless of the large number of systems deployed. Beijing may now consider that quantity matters as much as quality when comparing itself to other major nuclear powers.
A second explanation for China’s rise is more directly related to Taiwan. This could be described as the anti-coercion argument. Here, the work of political scientist Matthew Kroenig is useful. In a comprehensive study of historical crises involving nuclear powers, Kroenig found that the state with a decisive numerical advantage in nuclear weapons was usually the winner in a given crisis. Nuclear superiority allowed the numerically dominant state to coerce the other side into accepting the desired outcome. (36)
From this perspective, China is explicitly pursuing nuclear development to ensure approximate numerical parity with the United States and thus protect itself against coercion in any crisis between the two countries, with Taiwan being an obvious concern. Just five years ago, the ratio of Chinese to US operational nuclear weapons was approximately 1:6 in favour of the US. (37) In recent years, China has improved this ratio to approximately 1:3 and could reach a ratio of approximately 2:3 by the end of the decade if current Defence Department projections are correct. Previous Defence Department estimates have suggested that the Chinese inventory could grow to 1,500 operational warheads by 2035, bringing it to near parity with the US arsenal by the middle of the next decade. (38)
To some extent, the exact reason for China’s nuclear weapons development may matter less than the reality of the capabilities they provide Beijing. Whether motivated by issues related to great power status or because it understands the coercive mathematics explained in Kroenig’s work, the result is the same: China has a vastly expanded nuclear inventory, the size of which would significantly complicate the United States’ response to any crisis involving Taiwan.
This discussion also highlights the interactive nature of nuclear force sizing among major powers. Whether the explanation is based on prestige or anti-coercion, it rests on the fact that China views its nuclear capabilities in contrast to those of the United States (and possibly Russia as well). It is important to recognise that great powers assess their military capabilities – perhaps especially their nuclear arsenals – in relation to one another.
Question 5: What tactical nuclear weapons do China and the United States possess?
Both the Chinese and American nuclear arsenals are currently dominated by strategic systems. China does not appear to possess tactical weapons, while the United States’ tactical options are limited.
As background, tactical weapons are designed to achieve a specific localised impact, often linked to conditions on the battlefield. 39 Strategic systems, on the other hand, are designed to have much broader effects, such as deterrence, ending war or, in extreme cases, retaliation for strategic nuclear use by an adversary.
Given their different purposes, tactical and strategic weapons have contrasting levels of explosive power. Tactical weapons have much lower power, in some cases up to one kiloton or less. A universally accepted upper limit for the power of tactical weapons is elusive, with 20 kilotons or 50 kilotons sometimes suggested as informal ceilings for considering a weapon to be ‘tactical’. The general idea is that the power of strategic systems is much greater than that of tactical weapons, with some strategic warheads in the arsenals of major nuclear powers exceeding 400 kilotons and even one megaton. (40) (Note: One kiloton is equal to the explosive power of 1,000 tonnes of TNT; one megaton is equal to 1,000 kilotons.)
However, these categories can be somewhat vague and depend on context. (41) For example, the ‘Little Boy’ bomb detonated over Hiroshima had an explosive power of 15 kilotons, which by contemporary standards would label it a tactical weapon. (42) But it contributed to strategic effects in terms of the final outcome of the war. The bomb also killed at least 70,000 Japanese in its initial explosion. (43) This illustrates another important point: even tactical weapons can cause significant loss of life if detonated in densely populated areas.
China’s lack of tactical options is probably not surprising, given China’s limited nuclear arsenal during the Cold War, an era when tactical weapons were probably at the height of their prominence. Both the Soviet Union and the United States used thousands of such weapons, and each had its own doctrine and theories for the use of tactical weapons as combat elements. (44) After the end of the Cold War, the United States significantly reduced its stockpiles of tactical weapons and withdrew almost all of them from active deployment under President George H.W. Bush. (45 years)
Today, the United States has only three types of operational tactical nuclear weapons. The first of these is the B61 gravity bomb. The term “gravity bomb” simply suggests that this is a free-fall weapon: the launch aircraft must fly over the target and drop the B61 bomb like an old-fashioned World War II bomber. There are different variants of the B61 bomb; those currently in service are ‘dial-a-yield’ bombs. (46) This means that these weapons can be programmed to produce varying levels of explosive power, possibly up to 150 kilotons, down to less than one kiloton, or various yields in between. (47) Therefore, B61 missiles can be operated either tactically or strategically.
The land-based version of the Air Force’s F-35 (variant A) has been certified by the Department of Energy (DOE) to carry the B61, and the stealth characteristics of this fighter aircraft could help it perform its nuclear delivery mission better than its non-stealth predecessors, such as the F-16 or F-15. (48)The B61 could also be launched from a long-range bomber such as the B-2 stealth bomber or its replacement, the B-21. (49)However, although it is an important advantage, stealth is not an absolute guarantee of survival. This highlights the main disadvantage of the B61: the requirement to fly directly over the target – as opposed to firing a long-range weapon – exposes the launch aircraft to a greater degree of threat from enemy air defences.
The United States’ second main tactical option is the W76-2 warhead. This is derived from a thermonuclear warhead (W76-1) carried by the Navy’s Trident ballistic missile, launched from submarines. (50) In the case of the W76-1, a small nuclear fission explosion triggers a larger fusion reaction, producing a thermonuclear detonation. In the case of the W76-2, only the initial fission trigger is retained, producing a much lower yield for the nuclear warhead, estimated by open sources at eight kilotons. (51)
The W76-2 tactical warhead is also delivered by the Trident SLBM, a strategic delivery vehicle. (52) It has been suggested that its launch could confuse China (or even Russia) regarding the payload of a missile launched from an American SSBN: does Trident carry a single tactical warhead or its usual payload, consisting of several strategic warheads? Could such a launch scare an adversary into launching its own strategic warheads before the W76-2 reaches its target? This discussion again enters the realm of the hypothetical, but “launch ambiguity” is still a concern that is at least worth mentioning with regard to the W76-2. (53)
In theory, the United States has a third tactical option, another warhead with a rapid command function, the W80, carried by the US Air Force’s AGM-86 cruise missile, launched from the air. (54) However, this is an ageing duo, with both the missile and the nuclear warhead nearing the end of their service life. Designed in the 1970s, the AGM-86 missile has no stealth features and flies at subsonic speeds; its ability to survive contemporary Chinese air defences is highly questionable. (55 years old) The Department of Energy is working on a modernisation of the W80 model, called the W80-4, which can be launched by the Air Force’s next-generation stealth cruise missile. (56) However, this missile-warhead combination will not be available until 2030 at the earliest. 57
Congress also continues to fund the development of a fourth tactical option, a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) for the Navy’s attack submarine fleet. (58) However, a senior Navy official has suggested that achieving the proposed goal for initial operational capability — by 2034 — could be challenging. (59)
Question 6: How would tactical nuclear weapons affect a conflict in Taiwan?
For at least the next five years, the only two viable tactical options for the US will likely be the B61 gravity bomb and the Trident launch of the W76-2 nuclear warhead. Meanwhile, China still has no tactical nuclear weapons. This leads to a surprising question: is this a good thing or a bad thing when considering a conflict in Taiwan?
One line of argument holds that tactical weapons can serve as a pause in total war, including general nuclear war. They have the gravity of nuclear use but generally have much more limited physical effects, especially if used against military targets as opposed to population centres. Therefore, tactical use could facilitate the adversary’s withdrawal, as opposed to if more powerful nuclear weapons had been directed against it. Alternatively, tactical weapons could provide more moderate options for responding to an adversary’s initial use of nuclear weapons — a way to signal determination against the use of nuclear weapons without resorting to larger strategic weapons.
Viewed from this perspective, tactical weapons provide a necessary intermediate step on the escalation ladder, one that both sides can descend before the widespread use of more powerful nuclear or weapons comes into play. Returning to Kissinger’s original formulation, tactical weapons offer the prospect of extending the tacit political cooperation necessary for limited nuclear war.
But there are problems with this argument. Precisely because they are less destructive than strategic systems, tactical weapons could facilitate crossing the nuclear threshold. Once these weapons are introduced into a conflict, however, there is simply no guarantee that subsequent nuclear use will remain tactical. In this sense, do tactical weapons ultimately make strategic use more likely by introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict in the first place?
This is the central dilemma of tactical weapons: whatever merits they may have in theory for controlling nuclear war, they substantially lower the nuclear threshold without promising any subsequent use. Needless to say, there are no binding rules: because one side starts with a five-kiloton bomb, the other side is under no obligation to respond in kind. An adversary could immediately escalate to strategic use if it sees an advantage in doing so. Indeed, this could be the case if the United States were to use a tactical weapon in the Western Pacific, as China currently has only strategic systems with which to respond.
Two further assumptions can be made about how tactical options might affect decisions about engagement in the Western Pacific. The first is that the United States might be more willing to initiate the use of nuclear weapons because it has tactical options, while China does not. Indeed, there is heated debate within the US think tank community about the United States’ intention to use tactical weapons to defend Taiwan early in a conflict with China. (60) To be clear, this is not an official US position, but its consideration in public policy illustrates how the existence of tactical options can lead to more forward-looking positions on nuclear use.
The second assumption is that China would be less inclined to instigate the use of nuclear weapons because it lacks tactical options. However, some caveats are necessary. One of the assumptions underlying this paper is that the use of nuclear weapons is most likely in a conflict when one side is seeking to avoid existential defeat. As noted, in China’s case, the risk could be not only to national status but also to the physical survival of a leader if an attempt to invade Taiwan fails. Any leader desperate enough to use nuclear weapons in these circumstances might not get bogged down in the details of kiloton production.
Therefore, the possession of tactical weapons could make the use of nuclear weapons more attractive, but the lack of such weapons does not, by any means, preclude their use. This discussion also highlights the fact that a Chinese leader may ultimately have a more compelling reason to use nuclear weapons, while an American leader may currently have better options (or at least more diverse choices) for the effective use of nuclear weapons.
A key factor to watch is whether China will continue to develop its own tactical weapons at some point. 61 Both the Department of Defence and independent experts have argued that this is likely, if not inevitable. 62 The timelines for developing such a capability are uncertain. A specially designed, low-yield weapon could require new designs and, eventually, nuclear tests to confirm its effectiveness. (63) Analysts at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist have speculated about a more direct option: China could “disable” the secondary physics package in one of its thermonuclear weapons, reverting to the lower yield of its fission trigger. (64) (This would be similar to what the United States did when it created the W76-2 tactical weapon from the original W76-1 thermonuclear warhead, as discussed above.)
A decision by China to pursue tactical options would likely signal an important shift in thinking about the usability of nuclear weapons. (65) Once available, tactical options could encourage Chinese defence planners to consider their practical applications more carefully, in the same way that some American strategists are now publicly discussing tactical use in a conflict over Taiwan.
This highlights another problematic aspect of tactical weapons: they move the nuclear threshold from one of strategic desperation (i.e., avoiding existential defeat un t the start of a war) to the realm of operational utility (i.e., achieving specific effects on the battlefield at the start of a conflict). For this reason, the risk of nuclear use would seem to increase exponentially if both sides have tactical options in a future conflict between China and the United States in the Western Pacific. That said, it is important to emphasise that China has not yet taken substantial steps to develop tactical nuclear weapons, at least as far as can be seen from public sources.
This raises another difficult question: does the US possession of tactical options – and the development of new ones – encourage China to seek its own low-yield options? We recall the interactive nature of nuclear planning between major powers, as mentioned above. This is a point worth considering if the US would prefer not to see Chinese tactical capabilities. One confusing aspect, however, is that US nuclear planning is itself influenced by Russian capabilities. Russia’s large inventory of tactical warheads is a separate factor driving US interest in this class of weapon. (66)
One conclusion concerns operational effectiveness. For nearly 25 years, thinking about the use of tactical nuclear weapons within the US defence planning community has largely lagged behind President Bush’s decision to withdraw most US tactical weapons from the field in 1991. (67) Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent concerns about NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic states have revived discussions about the usefulness of tactical nuclear weapons. A series of war games conducted by RAND that examined tactical use in a Baltic scenario played a central role in these debates. (68)
One exercise was revealing: the team playing NATO used low-yield weapons against Russian forces in Latvia. Russia’s response was to attack several NATO air bases behind the front lines with 50-kiloton warheads, targeting a significant portion of the alliance’s air resources, including its stealth fighter jets. In short, after the alliance opened the door to nuclear use on the battlefield, Russia used its own follow-up attack to much greater effect. (69) This raises another essential consideration in a contingency situation involving Taiwan: which side would gain more operational benefits once the nuclear threshold is crossed?
Question 7: Would China or the United States benefit more from a limited number of nuclear engagements?
Given its history with tactical nuclear weapons during the Cold War and its current monopoly on such systems (at least within the US-China dynamic), it is tempting to suggest that the United States is better positioned to use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan. China has a much less developed public body of work on nuclear warfare, certainly compared to the United States. (70) However, one important factor mitigates this: geography. The United States has only a finite number of places where it can use nuclear weapons in a war with China – namely, against Chinese ground forces fighting in Taiwan, against Chinese naval forces at sea, and against military installations on Chinese territory.
The obvious consideration here is the potential collateral damage to Taiwan’s population and infrastructure if the United States were to direct tactical strikes against a Chinese invasion force once it had reached the shore. The main island of Taiwan is approximately 14,000 square miles – not necessarily small, but not massive either. However, it supports a population of nearly 24 million, giving it a population density of approximately 1,700 people per square mile. (71) There may be very limited places where the United States could use a tactical nuclear weapon with good military effect and avoid approaching Taiwan’s population centres. Also, how would a tactical attack affect local Taiwanese military units opposing the Chinese invasion force? (72)
Given the challenges of using nuclear weapons even on Taiwan, some American analysts have suggested that the Chinese invasion fleet at sea is targeted by tactical strikes. (73)However, to a surprising extent, the destructive power of nuclear weapons dissipates over water, resulting in a limited area where an explosion is lethal to a ship. (74) Writing in the midst of the Cold War, a US Navy weapons effects specialist was candid about the usefulness of nuclear weapons at sea:
Survival in the face of a nuclear weapon is probably better than many naval officers have been led to believe. In the general scenario that could be proposed for the next war at sea, nuclear weapons will most likely be directed against special forces or, at least, against main ships. Ships within approximately 1,000 metres of a modest explosion of about 10 kilotons will not survive. However, a one-megaton airburst can be fully survived at a distance of up to 5,000 metres. (75)
The tactical weapons in today’s American arsenal have much less power than the megaton explosion referred to. In the case of more modest 10-kiloton detonations (comparable to the estimated eight-kiloton yield of the W76-2 warhead), the effective lethal radius is just over half a mile (i.e., 1,000 metres). As long as an opposing naval force – such as a Chinese invasion fleet – remains reasonably dispersed, it becomes difficult to eliminate multiple ships with a single tactical strike. (76)Instead, the use of nuclear weapons could sink a single ship at a time or, at best, a handful of ships. In other words, nuclear weapons can be used to destroy ships, but they are not very effective in doing so.
To compensate, some American strategists have suggested that the Chinese navy could be targeted at the end of its journey, when it would be gathering in tight formation either to dock in Taiwanese ports or to deploy amphibious forces against the beaches. 77, However this raises further questions. In his seminal study of Taiwan invasion scenarios, Ian Easton identified 14 potential beaches where China could move forces ashore. (78) Would each of these areas require a tactical attack from the open sea? Would repeated attacks be necessary in each area? One can imagine scenarios in which the tactical use of US forces is not really limited, but amounts to at least a dozen or more attacks.
Viewed in isolation, the United States’ third option for the use of nuclear weapons is the most advantageous: attacks against military installations on the Chinese mainland. The list of possible targets is almost endless, including air bases, ports, missile sites, radar sites, and assembly areas for invasion troops. The purely military logic of attacking such facilities cannot be denied, nor can the fact that nuclear weapons could strike these targets with devastating efficiency. The key issue, of course, is that such attacks would not take place in a vacuum. Nuclear strikes on Chinese territory – even to achieve tactical or operational effects – could have immediate strategic consequences.
Unlike the US position, China has a wider range of potential targets across the Pacific. These would include the use of nuclear weapons against US ships, US forces on the territory of regional allies, US territories such as Guam, non-contiguous states (Hawaii and Alaska) and installations on the West Coast or, possibly, the entire continental United States. As with American attacks against the Chinese mainland, some or all of these targets could trigger a strategic response. But viewed solely through the narrow lens of military utility, the use of nuclear weapons would appear to have at least three potential advantages for China.
First, it would allow China to devastate important US logistics hubs in the First Island Chain. Just as the US would look at the Chinese coast and see numerous targets, so would China in surveying US military bases in Japan and the Philippines, including airfields, ports, ammunition depots, radar installations, and a range of other critical facilities. China already possesses ample means to attack these facilities with conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles. (79) However, nuclear use could achieve results with greater economy and permanence than damage caused by conventional attacks, which could be repaired more quickly.
Second, the use of nuclear weapons could enhance and simplify China’s ability to attack the Second Island Chain. Here too, China already has the means to target US military installations in the Second Island Chain, particularly those in Guam, with conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles. (80) However, maintaining pressure on US military installations on Guam – more than 1,800 miles from the Chinese coast – could be difficult and extremely resource-intensive with conventional weapons. (81) Asingle nuclear weapon could paralyse US operations in Guam with a single strike.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, nuclear weapons could extend China’s reach against US bases and logistics in the Central and East Pacific. Most of China’s conventional missile options are limited by range to targets in the First and Second Island Chains. (82)Meanwhile, China’s navy, while large and powerful, lacks the logistical capabilities and base network necessary to conduct large-scale operations across the Pacific. (83) Therefore, US military installations in Alaska, Hawaii, and on the West Coast are much less threatened by Chinese conventional attacks than US installations in the Western Pacific.
Admittedly, this is not an absolute sanctuary. China has nuclear-powered submarines that could eventually attempt clandestine cruise missile attacks outside the Western Pacific. 84 China is also developing a conventionally armed medium-range ballistic missile, the DF-27, which could threaten Alaska and Hawaii. (85) However, relatively speaking, US bases in the Central and Eastern Pacific do not face the same level of threat as those in the Western Pacific. The use of nuclear weapons could change this situation.
This discussion of the possible uses of nuclear weapons is far from exhaustive. 86 At the very least, however, nuclear weapons would allow each side to attack targets in the Western Pacific more economically and with far greater force than conventional options allow. However, in the case of China, the addition of nuclear weapons would add sets of targets that are available to limited conventional means of attack, namely American bases in the Central and Eastern Pacific rear. This does not mean that nuclear use would bring greater benefits to China, but it is a warning that the answer is not clear.
As noted, the previous discussion omits the issue of escalation and retaliation to focus on military utility. Moving from the theoretical to the real world, the response of the party attacked with a nuclear weapon should obviously be taken into account in the equation. The nature of this response could impact the net value of any nuclear attacks if the initiating party were to receive a more devastating blow in response. This brings the discussion back to the question of whether nuclear use can be controlled once initiated, a question that depends on mutual understanding of each side’s red lines.
Question 8: Do China and the United States understand each other’s nuclear red lines?
As mentioned earlier, at the heart of limited war is the notion of tacit cooperation: each side must avoid actions that it believes could push its adversary into total war. To maintain this cooperation, a clear understanding of what an adversary considers unacceptable—not just undesirable or painful, but truly intolerable—is necessary. In simple terms, these are “red lines,” the limits of pain or intrusion that one side to a conflict cannot accept.
Because of the power of nuclear weapons, establishing and understanding red lines for limited use would be extremely difficult. (87) How can one determine in advance what nuclear use an adversary might accept – or at least consider sufficiently acceptable that it would respond only with its own limited nuclear attack? Is “acceptable nuclear use” even a viable concept, or is it, on the contrary, the ultimate oxymoron?
An additional complication is the lack of transparency regarding the views on the use of nuclear weapons among the Chinese leadership. This is a kind of ‘black box’, even though it would be an essential variable in assessing the ability to keep a nuclear war in the Western Pacific limited.
For example, would the Chinese leadership really be more tolerant of nuclear attacks against amphibious forces at sea, as opposed to attacks against bases on Chinese territory? Even if such an option could avoid direct use against the Chinese homeland, attacks against amphibious forces at sea could still kill tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers and confront a Chinese leader with the prospect of an existential defeat. Consider that in the 1980s, the Reagan administration essentially claimed that the Soviets could not use nuclear weapons against American carrier battle groups without expecting retaliation of the same kind on land (i.e., a nuclear war started at sea would not remain at sea). (88)Alternatively, if we move away from scenarios of use at sea, is there any potential use of nuclear weapons against Chinese territory that would not provoke a nuclear response?
To provide some perspective on possible Chinese reactions, some American expert groups have staged war games simulating the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan. 89 Similar games have probably been conducted within the US government. However important these exercises are, they ultimately require American players to take the place of Chinese decision-makers. (90)Even the most perceptive sinologist can only guess at China’s intentions and reactions. The result is simply an impression of possible Chinese red lines, rather than clearly established limits against which US actions can be weighed. Modelling Chinese responses is not useless, but ultimately it is still conjecture. (91)
On the US side, there may also be a lack of clarity regarding its nuclear red lines. As noted, China has a number of potential targets in the Pacific in terms of the types of US territories it could attack. It is tempting to impose an artificial hierarchy on them in relation to the US response: for example, an attack on the island of Guam might not be as provocative as an attack on Hawaii, which in itself might be considered a lesser violation than the use of nuclear weapons against Los Angeles or another city on the West Coast. But this is another assumption, one that may not hold true in practice. Would an American leader necessarily be more tolerant of a nuclear attack on Guam, an American territory, than on a non-contiguous American state or a mainland city? There is no fixed answer here, and the precise answer may be idiosyncratic to a particular president.
Under the American system, the potential response to certain types of nuclear engagement could change from one administration to another. Depending on a president’s personal views, this could include a response in kind to any nuclear engagement against American personnel or territory, regardless of location (e.g., Guam could matter just as much as Los Angeles, after all). The general point to emphasise is that if American citizens cannot reliably predict how their own government might respond to certain types of nuclear use, this requires much of the Chinese leadership to have perfect clarity on the subject. When it comes to nuclear red lines, Beijing will be guessing as much as Washington.
It is therefore difficult to be optimistic about maintaining limited use of nuclear weapons in a war over Taiwan. Controlled nuclear use seems to require certainty about the response — that limited use of a nuclear weapon will not precipitate a strategic response from an adversary. Red lines could provide this certainty if they are clearly understood and respected. If they are not understood or observed, then it becomes difficult to reliably predict the outcomes. Without certainty about the response, any nuclear use against another nuclear power becomes an endless gamble.
Before concluding this discussion of the use of nuclear weapons in the Western Pacific, two other practical factors must be weighed: the potential impact of active missile defence and the reactions of the United States’ allies in the Pacific. These are examined in the last two questions.
Question 9: How would missile defence affect the use of nuclear weapons?
After years of debate about their combat capabilities, active missile defence appears to have performed well in long-term use in Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, in mitigating Iranian ballistic missile attacks against Israel. (92) How useful would US active systems such as Patriot, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system and the Navy’s standard Aegis radar/missile combination be in defending against nuclear missiles? The United States is also investing heavily in a ground-based missile defence system for Guam. (93)
Collectively, active defence could provide important protection for US forces and bases against a nuclear attack in the Western Pacific. But at least three caveats must be added to this assertion. First, even the best active defences are not foolproof, an essential consideration if the incoming payload is nuclear. Second, the volume of missile launches observed in Ukraine and Israel could pale in comparison to that of a full-scale war with China. (94)It would be wrong to automatically assume exactly the same performance of US active defence under conditions of substantially higher enemy fire rates.
Finally, defence systems in the American theatre of operations will probably be most effective at the start of a conflict over Taiwan, when American stockpiles of interceptors are at their highest. Few analysts expect China to lead with a nuclear strike. Instead, Chinese nuclear use is most likely later in a war, when the US stockpile of interceptors will be at its lowest. This could lead to the US managing its active defence to protect certain locations, leaving others inevitably exposed. For example, civilian population centres could be favoured over military installations as interceptor stocks are depleted. There is at least some prospect that the US could completely exhaust its stockpile of interceptors if a war with China were to continue long enough. (95)
In a limited nuclear attack, China could also use a missile with a longer range and higher speed – a missile for which the defence systems in the theatre of operations were not designed. For example, China could use an ICBM to attack a relatively close target such as Guam. Russia has already hinted at this tactic with its use of the experimental Oreshnik missile in Ukraine. (96) The idea is that, although active US defence could complicate Chinese calculations about how to use nuclear weapons, it is unlikely to prevent their use altogether.
A final but important point concerns strategic defence. China has no means of defending its homeland against long-range attacks by American intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The United States, for its part, has a capability against ICBMs – the ground-based midcourse defence (GMD) system – but there are important questions about its effectiveness. (97)
Broadly speaking, defeating a ballistic missile becomes proportionally more difficult as its range and speed increase. The successes seen against short- and medium-range missiles in Ukraine and Israel may not translate into threats with much longer ranges, such as ICBMs, which travel at much higher speeds.
The GMD system also consists of only 44 interceptors deployed at two bases in Alaska and California. 98 In addition, it would not be surprising if the intention were to launch at least two and possibly even four interceptors at a given target to ensure the best possible chance of destroying it. Depending on how they are allocated, rough calculations suggest that the GMD is capable of handling between 11 and 22 warheads, assuming that the system operates as intended – for which there is no guarantee. (99) This level of protection would be of marginal value if a war over Taiwan escalated into a large-scale strategic exchange between China and the United States.
Could GMD be useful against limited Chinese nuclear strikes in the Central or Eastern Pacific? Possibly, but given that the system has a mixed track record under controlled test conditions and, of course, has never been tested against a real-world threat, it would seem dangerous to rely on GMD. There are also broader questions that can be asked about decoys and other means that China could use to deliberately spoof the system. At best, GMD could represent a haphazard, last-ditch effort to stop a limited, long-range nuclear attack. This should not be confused with a proven and reliable means of countering Chinese nuclear use.
In short, one can rightly boast of the impressive technological achievement of US theatre-level defence, but still maintain perspective on their potential role in a Pacific conflict. Their past performance does not guarantee similar performance under the intense conditions of a large-scale war with China. And when applied to countering nuclear use, there is a real risk of miscalculation, particularly against long-range missiles. Ultimately, there will be critical concerns about ammunition stocks as the war continues and interceptors are rapidly consumed.
Question 10: How would US allies in the Pacific react to the use of nuclear weapons?
Access to bases on the territory of its Asian allies would be essential to enable US military operations if it chose to fight directly against China over Taiwan. 100 In particular, the facilities in Japan and the Philippines would likely be essential, as they frame Taiwan within the First Island Chain. Australia could also potentially provide useful strategic depth if US and allied military facilities in the First and Second Island Chains were severely degraded. (101) The US also has important military facilities in South Korea, although that country’s willingness to make them available for a possible intervention in Taiwan is more doubtful. (102)
Indeed, it is not certain that any of the four main US allies in the Pacific – or even some of them – would openly support the United States in a war against Taiwan, at least one in which they themselves were not first attacked by China. (103) The use of nuclear weapons – or even the prospect of their use – could further weaken this fragile support.
Assessing the regional response to the use of nuclear weapons is complicated by the fragmented nature of the US alliance system in the Pacific. For better or worse, the North Atlantic Alliance has kept nuclear issues at the forefront of European defence planning for decades after the end of the Cold War. Within NATO, the Nuclear Planning Group provides an institutional mechanism for discussing US (and British) nuclear capabilities and planning in relation to alliance defence. (104) The US can collectively commit all its European allies to nuclear issues.
The dynamics of US alliances in the Pacific are fundamentally different, as these relationships are based on separate bilateral agreements, not on a multilateral structure with a permanent organisation for discussing nuclear issues. There is also much less history of consultation to build on; there has never been an Asian equivalent of NATO’s Cold War dual-key arrangements regarding the potential US nuclear use in the Pacific theatre. (105) Asia is therefore rather a ‘blank page’ when it comes to allies’ perspectives on the use of nuclear weapons.
For the sake of discussion, however, it is possible to identify two general responses. 106 The first is that a particular ally summarily withdraws its support for the United States. That is, if either China or the United States initiates the use of nuclear weapons, the ally blocks additional access to its territory for American forces and withdraws any of its own military units from combat. Such a response could be another factor that might prevent the United States from initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons if, for example, it meant losing access to vital bases in Japan or the Philippines. At the very least, the reaction of allies and the concomitant impact on the US logistics network should be carefully weighed against the operational value of any nuclear strikes.
In this regard, China could consider ways to calibrate its own nuclear use (or threat of use) to force a US ally to withdraw from the fight, undermining US logistics. The danger for Beijing is that nuclear use or threats could have the opposite effect — pushing an ally closer to Washington rather than creating a rift between them. China is not averse to exaggeration.
This leads to the second possible reaction to the use of nuclear weapons: the US ally stays in the fight, accepting the risks involved. At that point, the ally might look at the ongoing struggle between China and the United States and realise that it too has an existential interest in the outcome of the conflict. A decisive defeat of the United States would deprive the ally of its long-standing protector and leave it facing a victorious and possibly vengeful China. If Washington were to consider using nuclear weapons for fear of losing decisively, an ally might share that concern and support the use of nuclear weapons.
There is no certainty here. Pacific allies could serve as a constraint on US nuclear use, possibly working to keep a war over Taiwan limited. But there are also scenarios in which their own security concerns encourage the use of nuclear weapons. Whether China has already targeted an ally’s territory with conventional force, the level of losses suffered by an ally’s military and civilian population, and which side (China or the US) crosses the nuclear threshold first are all factors that could shape an ally’s response.
Summary
Discussing the possible use of nuclear weapons in the Western Pacific is not an easy conversation, but it is a necessary one, perhaps as important as any other in international security today. Understanding the nuclear danger in a war over Taiwan does not automatically eliminate it, but it is nevertheless the first step toward protecting against the worst possible outcome. Therefore, responses, rebuttals, and other reactions to the ideas and questions outlined above are encouraged. In addition, the following four related thoughts are offered for further consideration.
First, it is tempting to dismiss American strategists who propose the use of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict as reactionary or reckless. But it can also be argued that these analysts are actually taking a clear-eyed view of a potential war in the Western Pacific. Just four or five years ago, it was still novel to discuss in public debate a conflict over Taiwan’s nuclear future. The fact that the prospect is now accepted as almost a necessity is not entirely a negative development. It reflects a recognition of how brutal a conventional fight could be for both sides and how this could cause either China or the United States to consider the use of nuclear weapons.
This is not to advocate the use of nuclear weapons in any way. It is simply an observation that it is, unfortunately, correct (even essential) to include this possibility in any reasonable discussion of a war over Taiwan. But if the notion of nuclear use is introduced, it is also incumbent on those participating in the discussion to examine all the consequences of such action. Where could limited nuclear use lead? This question must also be asked in connection with the critical question of whether the United States should commit its forces to defend Taiwan in the first place.
Second, the essential incubator for a nuclear war in the Western Pacific remains a conventional one. Each side must carefully consider this reality before choosing to commit the other side’s military forces. Washington will face an important decision, as noted, but Beijing will also bear a unique responsibility in this regard. Writing from a US perspective, it is tempting to see US choices and actions as the only variable in the nuclear use equation. However, unless there is an attempted invasion, there is no real prospect of a conventional war between China and the United States and no subsequent danger of limited nuclear use or worse.
An even greater escalation would be if China opted for a conventional attack without warning against US bases in the Western Pacific, concurrent with action against Taiwan. This could push the United States into a war, whether it wants to or not — and with greatly reduced conventional forces to fight it. The nuclear risk in the Western Pacific is a shared danger, and it is China’s responsibility to mitigate it as much as it is the United States’.
The United States, for its part, may have unique responsibilities when it comes to nuclear planning. This leads to a third point: US policy statements and arms programmes do not exist in a vacuum. What is said and discussed publicly—in addition to the nuclear weapons that are in possession and under development—can influence how China responds in terms of the size and structure of its own nuclear forces. China’s current increase in nuclear power is likely a product of this silent dynamic. Given the critical issue of tactical weapons—and China’s abstention from using these capabilities to date—it is worth asking whether there are ways to mitigate any incentive for China to match low-yield US capabilities. There may not be, but given the immense consequences of China’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, it is a question that deserves serious consideration by the United States.
Finally, the reader will have noticed that no strict definition of limited nuclear use has ever been offered in this text. That is because there is none. The best approximation is that “limited use” simply means not a full-scale nuclear war. Beyond that, there are no firm parameters regarding the number of warheads, yields, or target selection that definitively constitute limited use. The concept exists largely in the eye of the beholder. Indeed, at the moment of action, limited use will simply be whatever the initiating nuclear power hopes its adversary believes it to be.
By its very nature, limited nuclear use depends on the interaction between the highly subjective perceptions of two very different actors. The challenge in attempting to regulate such activity is quickly apparent. The most striking thing about this paper is the persistence of ambiguity and uncertainty: so many questions that cannot be answered. There are too many unpredictable variables to model accurately in advance how limited nuclear use might manifest itself in practice in the Western Pacific.
Perhaps the most important question of all remains: if limited nuclear use cannot be reliably controlled, should it be risked in the first place? Neither China nor the United States would launch a limited attack believing that it would trigger a large-scale nuclear war. But under the unprecedented emotional and psychological pressure of the first bilateral nuclear war in history, how will leaders be able to judge the consequences of a first use? Moreover, if the tacit cooperation necessary to keep a conventional war limited has already broken down, what prospects are there for the mutual restraint necessary to moderate a nuclear exchange? These are only hypothetical questions for now, but they could be tested in practice in the coming years.
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