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Strait of Hormuz | Will 5,000 lb Bunker Buster Bombs End the Standoff?
MS Daily brief-19 March 2026
- MS Daily Brief-en
- The French nuclear deterrence initiative and European security: legal and strategic implications of a debate on Romania
- “The Stratified Conflict: Multidomain Warfare and Iran’s Strategic Dynamics in the Middle East”
- PHASES OF THE ATTACK ON IRAN AND MULTIDOMAIN WARFARE
- FOUR YEARS OF WAR IN UKRAINE
- Iran’s air defence system
- The need to reevaluate maritime doctrine following the introduction of maritime drones into the Romanian Navy
Contents
The US is sending something POWERFUL to the Strait of Hormuz… Iran’s worst NIGHTMARE! 1
News from Ukraine OMG! The situation is getting worse for the Russians. They are trapped! 1
Escalation of the conflict in the Middle East over the last 24 hours – Maritime Security Forum 1
Tehran warns Gulf energy facilities to evacuate after Iranian gas facilities were hit 2
Trump threatens to ‘destroy’ Iran’s entire South Pars gas field if Tehran attacks Qatar 3
War in the Middle East: why attacks on gas fields such as South Pars represent a major escalation 6
Britain says it is still in talks regarding the escorting of ships through the Strait of Hormuz 8
The US and Israel’s strategy of eliminating Iranian leaders could prove counterproductive 10
Israel faces fierce resistance from Hezbollah in its attempt to advance deeper into Lebanon 12
A Russian oil tanker is heading for Cuba amid the US-imposed economic blockade. 18
“Let him be tried”: a pro-Kremlin loyalist turns against Putin in a rare outburst 19
A damaged Russian tanker carrying natural gas has reached Libyan waters. 22
Ukraine war update: Ukraine strikes Russian air bases 800 km from the border 26
Russian oil tankers heading for Cuba – Maritime Security Forum.. 31
The strategic importance of Kharg Island – Maritime Security Forum.. 32
Italy plans to acquire a containerised naval mine-laying system.. 36
The final battle before a new world order? – Maritime Security Forum.. 38
How Ukraine ‘sank’ a NATO frigate and didn’t even realise what had happened. 42
The Navy is juggling aircraft carrier plans to stay afloat 45
The US is sending something POWERFUL to the Strait of Hormuz… Iran’s worst NIGHTMARE!
BREAKING NEWS: Israel BOMBS a major gas facility in Iran; a high-ranking mullah has been KILLED; Iran promises REVENGE | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine OMG! The situation is getting worse for the Russians. They are trapped!
Escalation of the conflict in the Middle East over the last 24 hours – Maritime Security Forum
Over the past 24 hours, the dynamics of the military strikes between Israel (with operational or complementary support from the United States) and Iran reveal an imperfect but strategically coherent symmetry: each side has targeted the other’s structural vulnerabilities, combining energy, military and urban targets in a pattern of controlled escalation, yet with systemic effects.
The Israeli strikes, indirectly supported by US capabilities, focused primarily on southern Iran, in the South Pars–Asaluyeh area, where the main natural gas extraction and processing complex is located. The attack targeted industrial facilities, pipelines and refineries, causing fires and operational shutdowns. The effect was immediate: reduced production, disruption to regional exports and the sending of a clear strategic signal – Iran’s economic vulnerability can be exploited militarily. This choice indicates a ‘deep economic strike’ doctrine, in which the objective is not only to degrade military capability, but also to erode the financial resources underpinning the war effort.
In parallel, Israel continued precision strikes on targets associated with the Iranian security apparatus, including key figures in the command structure. These actions were aimed at disrupting the decision-making mechanism and reducing the capacity to coordinate a response. At the same time, on the Lebanese front, strikes on Beirut and on infrastructure associated with Hezbollah sought to limit Iran’s ability to operate indirectly through non-state actors, thereby reducing pressure on Israel’s northern front.
The US component was particularly evident in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian ballistic capabilities and positions deemed a threat to maritime security were targeted. These strikes played a complementary role: they did not directly target economic infrastructure, but sought to limit Iran’s ability to escalate by blocking global energy routes.
Iran’s response was structured differently, but with a comparable strategic logic, aimed at maximising pressure on Israel and extending the conflict to regional energy infrastructure. In Israel, the main strikes were concentrated on the central region, including Tel Aviv and adjacent urban areas. The ballistic missiles launched struck residential buildings and civilian infrastructure, causing casualties and destruction. These attacks had not only a military dimension but also a psychological one, aimed at destabilising daily life and conveying a message of widespread vulnerability.
At the same time, Iran extended its retaliation to the Gulf states, in a move that transforms the bilateral conflict into a regional one. The strike on the Ras Laffan complex in Qatar was particularly significant, as it targeted one of the world’s most important liquefied natural gas hubs. The fires and production disruptions had immediate effects on energy markets, amplifying volatility and fears regarding security of supply. This action indicates a strategy of ‘energy retaliation’, whereby Iran responds to attacks on its own infrastructure by destabilising the entire regional energy system.
In the United Arab Emirates, strikes on facilities in the Abu Dhabi area pursued a similar objective: to extend the costs of the conflict beyond Israel and to send a warning to states perceived as its allies. Even where the damage was limited, the strategic effect was to increase the perceived risk and disrupt the normal functioning of the energy sector.
Saudi Arabia was drawn into this logic through attempts to strike oil infrastructure and explicit threats. Although many of these attacks were intercepted, they contributed to creating a climate of insecurity and to increasing operational and security costs for the regional energy industry.
A key element of Iran’s response is also its maritime and strategic dimension: through threats and potential actions in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran suggests its ability to disrupt global oil flows. Even in the absence of an actual blockade, the mere possibility of one generates immediate economic effects, demonstrating that Iran’s power lies not only in its direct military capability, but also in its geostrategic positioning.
By comparison, the strikes by the two sides reflect two distinct yet complementary strategic models of escalation. Israel (with US support) has primarily targeted Iran’s critical infrastructure and command centres, seeking to degrade the state’s ability to sustain the conflict in the long term. Iran, in turn, has combined strikes on Israel with the expansion of the conflict to regional energy infrastructure and third-party states, attempting to internationalise the costs and create global pressure.
The cumulative effect of these strikes is to transform the conflict into an interconnected system, in which there is no longer a clear separation between the fronts. Iran’s energy infrastructure, Israel’s urban centres and the energy hubs in the Gulf are simultaneously becoming targets and instruments of pressure. This interdependence amplifies the risk of escalation and means that every strike has consequences that extend far beyond the area in which it occurred, directly affecting the global energy and strategic balance.
Maritime Security Forum
Tehran warns Gulf energy facilities to evacuate after Iranian gas facilities were hit
By Reuters, 18 March 2026, 17:14 GMT+2, updated 12 hours ago
Smoke rises from Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura oil refinery following an alleged attack by Iranian drones, amid the conflict between the US, Israel and Iran, in Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, 2 March 2026.
DUBAI, 18 March (Reuters) – Iranian gas facilities in the Gulf were attacked on Wednesday, state media reported, prompting Tehran to declare that it would target a number of energy facilities in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar “in the coming hours”.
Oil prices rose on the news, with Brent crude futures climbing more than 6% to a session high of just under $110 a barrel.
The attacks on Iran’s energy industry in South Pars and Asaluyeh have raised concerns that Iran could also target the infrastructure of major global energy companies across the Gulf region, as well as alternative regional export routes, such as Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port on the Red Sea, prolonging a conflict that has already effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz.
A spokesperson for Qatar’s Foreign Ministry said Wednesday’s attack represented a “dangerous and irresponsible” escalation that endangered global energy security, whilst the United Arab Emirates emphasised the need to avoid targeting vital facilities. Qatar described it as an Israeli attack, without mentioning any role for the US.
The Israeli military did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Qatar has completely shut down its liquefied natural gas production due to the war, and any damage to the facilities could prolong the disruption beyond May, threatening to keep a fifth of the global LNG supply off the grid.
The Tasnim news agency said Wednesday’s attacks targeted petrochemical facilities in South Pars and added that the extent of the damage was not yet clear.
Gas flows from Iran to Iraq have been halted as Iran has redirected its gas to the domestic market, a senior Iraqi official told Reuters. Tehran supplies between a third and 40% of Iraq’s gas and electricity needs.
The attacks on South Pars make it even more likely that the war will continue into May, said Torbjorn Soltvedt, senior analyst for the Middle East at risk intelligence firm Verisk Maplecroft.
“The biggest concern will be the potential for attacks on Saudi Arabia’s east-west pipeline or export facilities on the Red Sea, which, along with Fujairah, offer the only significant alternative to the Strait of Hormuz,” added Soltvedt.
EVACUATION WARNINGS
The Iranian Revolutionary Guards have issued evacuation orders for the Samref refinery and the Jubail petrochemical complex in Saudi Arabia, the Al Hosn gas field in the United Arab Emirates and the Mesaieed petrochemical complex in Qatar, Mesaieed Holding Company and the Ras Laffan refinery, stating that these would be the targets of attacks, Iranian state media reported.
The LNG facilities in Ras Laffan were being evacuated, a source with knowledge of the matter told Reuters.
The notification to evacuate certain sites marks a clear escalation in rhetoric surrounding energy infrastructure, at a time when the global LNG market is already strained by disruptions, said Tom Purdie, senior LNG analyst at consultancy Energy Aspects.
Iran’s South Pars offshore gas field accounts for about a third of the world’s largest natural gas reserve. Iran shares the reserve with Qatar, a major exporter.
Most of the gas Tehran produces from South Pars is destined for domestic consumption. Iran’s gas production totalled 276 billion cubic metres in 2024, with 94% consumed within Iran, according to data from the Gas Exporting Countries Forum.
The US and Israeli war against Iran and Tehran’s attacks on its Gulf neighbours have disrupted oil and natural gas exports from the Middle East and forced production to halt.
Trump threatens to “destroy” Iran’s entire South Pars gas field if Tehran attacks Qatar
The US President claims that Israel will no longer attack South Pars – but threatens to destroy this “extremely important and valuable” site if Iran continues to attack gas facilities in Qatar
Thursday, 19 March 2026, 06:53 CET
Donald Trump has threatened to “massively blow up” the world’s largest gas field, after Israeli strikes on the Iranian site prompted Tehran to step up attacks on energy facilities across the Middle East.
Israel’s decision to target the South Pars gas field on Wednesday marked a major escalation of the war, heightening fears of significant disruptions to international energy supplies.
Iran retaliated swiftly with new attacks across the region, including on liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in Qatar – which infuriated the US president.
The US “knew nothing” about the Israeli attack on South Pars, Trump claimed on social media on Wednesday evening. The US media had earlier reported that the US was aware of the attack. The Wall Street Journal reported, citing anonymous US officials, that the president had approved it in an attempt to pressure Tehran into unblocking the Strait of Hormuz.
Authorities in Abu Dhabi said they had been forced to halt operations at the Habshan gas facility and the Bab field due to the Iranian attacks, which they called a “dangerous escalation” of the war.
Ras Laffan in Qatar, home to the world’s largest liquefied natural gas hub, has now suffered “extensive damage” following Iran’s attacks, state-owned giant QatarEnergy said. On Thursday morning, QatarEnergy reported “major fires” and significant damage to several LNG facilities within the hub. Qatar’s Ministry of the Interior later stated that all fires had been extinguished.
The attack on South Pars marked the first targeted strikes on Iranian fossil fuel production since the US and Israel sparked the conflict nearly three weeks ago.
Qatar, which shares the gas field with Iran, “was not involved in any way, shape or form in this attack, nor did it have any idea that it was going to take place,” Trump said, adding that Israel would not attack the gas field again unless Iran attacked Qatar’s gas facilities again.
Should Tehran choose to retaliate, Trump said: “The United States of America, with or without Israel’s help or consent, will completely destroy the South Pars gas field with a force and power that Iran has never seen or experienced before.”
Trump’s efforts to defuse attacks on energy infrastructure by threatening to destroy South Pars have failed to reassure global markets, as concerns over the economic impact of the conflict mount.
European oil and gas prices have surged, with Brent crude – the international benchmark for oil – rising by 3.9% to $111.51 per barrel. Major Asian stock markets came under pressure, with Japan’s Nikkei 225 index falling by 2.5%.
Saudi Arabia was also the target of Iranian ballistic missiles on Wednesday. Any trust in Tehran has been shattered, its foreign minister said. “This pressure from Iran will have a negative political and moral effect, and we certainly reserve the right to take military action if deemed necessary,” Prince Faisal bin Farhan said at a press conference.
A spokesperson for the Qatari Foreign Ministry described the Israeli attack on South Pars as “dangerous” and “irresponsible”, urging all parties not to target energy facilities. The United Arab Emirates’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs also described this action as a “dangerous escalation”, warning: “Attacking energy infrastructure poses a direct threat to global energy security.”
The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and gas tankers usually pass, remains effectively closed for the time being. Trump’s efforts to build a multinational naval force to reopen this key waterway have not yet borne fruit.
A fire broke out on a ship near the strait after it was struck by a projectile, the British agency Maritime Trade Operations said, citing a report on Wednesday evening. The ship was off the coast of the United Arab Emirates.
Emmanuel Macron, the French president, spoke with Trump and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar, following Wednesday’s attacks on gas facilities. Calling for a moratorium on attacks targeting civilian infrastructure, Macron said: “The civilian population and its essential needs, as well as the security of energy supplies, must be protected from military escalation.”
On another day marked by violence in the Middle East, the Palestinian Red Crescent said three Palestinian women had been killed in an Iranian rocket attack in the occupied West Bank, on Wednesday evening – Iran’s first deadly attack in the area and the first to kill Palestinians since the start of the war.
Meanwhile, the European Union has urged Israel to “cease its operations” in Lebanon, a country that French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot is due to visit on Thursday.
Lebanon was drawn into the crisis earlier this month when Hezbollah fighters fired rockets into Israel. Israel retaliated with strikes that have killed at least 968 people, according to Lebanese authorities, and displaced over a million.
It has been more than a week since Trump first suggested that the war might end “very soon”. With no end in sight, some companies are bracing for at least another month of severe disruption.
Hong Kong-based airline Cathay Pacific suspended flights to and from Dubai and Riyadh on Thursday until the end of April, a move it attributed to the “evolving situation in the Middle East”.
The war in the Middle East: why attacks on gas fields such as South Pars represent a major escalation
This was the first attack on a fossil fuel energy production facility. But why is it significant and who does it affect?
Wednesday, 18 March 2026, 20:22 CET
The attacks launched by both sides on so-called upstream gas production facilities in recent days represent a significant escalation of the war in the Middle East, with potentially long-term consequences.
These attacks marked the first time that facilities associated with fossil fuel energy production have been targeted in the conflict, rather than sites more generally associated with the oil and gas industry.
What has been targeted in recent days?
On Tuesday, a successful Iranian drone attack led to the suspension of operations at the Shah gas field in Abu Dhabi. The site can produce 1.28 billion standard cubic feet of gas per day and supplies approximately 20% of the United Arab Emirates’ gas supply and 5% of the granulated sulphur used globally in phosphate fertilisers.
On Wednesday, an Iranian production facility for the South Pars gas field, which Iran shares with Qatar across the Gulf, was struck. The field is the largest in the world and represents Iran’s most important domestic energy source, as the country sometimes struggles to produce sufficient electricity.
The attack, which prompted Tehran to threaten further retaliation against energy infrastructure, was widely reported in the Israeli press as having been carried out by Israel with US approval, although neither country immediately claimed responsibility.
The US and Israel had previously refrained from targeting Iran’s energy production facilities in the Gulf, in an attempt to avoid Iranian retaliation against the oil and gas industries of its neighbours.
Why are these attacks significant?
The attacks are significant because they signal a potential escalation of the conflict, with long-term consequences for the global economy. Whilst a cessation of hostilities could lead to the resumption of suspended gas and oil supplies within a few months, experts estimate that any significant damage to production itself could have an impact lasting for years.
Warning of the impact of possible further escalations, Saul Kavonic, an analyst at MST Financial, told the Financial Times: “Something that would take a few million barrels out of production would have a greater impact, as it means there is no way to replenish stocks even after the war ends.” A strike on a liquefied natural gas facility would be the worst-case scenario, he added, as repairs could take several years.
Oil prices soared following the attack on South Pars, amid fears that the disruption to global energy supplies would worsen. This disruption raises the political stakes for Donald Trump in the run-up to the US mid-term elections. Diesel prices in the US have already exceeded $5 a gallon for the first time since the 2022 surge in inflation, which eroded support for his predecessor, Joe Biden.
How have countries in the region reacted?
Following the attack on South Pars, Iran listed a number of major oil and gas facilities in the region belonging to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, stating that they were now “direct and legitimate targets” and should be evacuated immediately. A few hours later, loud explosions were heard in Riyadh.
Qatar, a close US ally hosting the largest US airbase in the region, blamed Israel for the attack, without mentioning any US involvement. A spokesperson for the Qatari Foreign Ministry described the incident as a “dangerous and irresponsible” escalation that jeopardises global energy security.
The United Arab Emirates stated that the attack on South Pars posed a threat to global energy supplies and to the security and stability of the region.
A liquefied natural gas production facility in Qatar. Photo: Reuters
Can’t it simply be repaired?
One lesson learnt from the 2003 invasion of Iraq was that it took much longer than expected to repair the damaged energy production infrastructure. The Bush administration had promised that reconstruction would be funded by oil revenues, but although contractors were able to access Iraqi facilities and $2 billion was spent on oil projects, it took more than two years for production to return to pre-war levels.
Attempts to repair Ukraine’s energy infrastructure damaged by Russia have highlighted problems related to bottlenecks in the supply of equipment.
What role does energy production in the Gulf play, beyond revenue?
Energy production in the Gulf has long had social, political and diplomatic significance that far exceeds its economic returns. Social contracts with citizens living under often repressive monarchies are based on the sharing of energy wealth, and this is essential for living standards and for the states’ ability to attract foreign workers.
Energy is also an integral part of how countries in the region interact with one another. The brief détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which barely survived Israel’s attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities last year, was a priority for Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Mohammed bin Salman, as part of his efforts to diversify the Saudi economy. He considered tensions with Iran to be a waste of resources. On the Iranian side, the easing of tensions was driven by an economy that was slowly collapsing under US sanctions.
Historically closer to Iran due to a shared interest in the South Pars gas field, Qatar has clearly expressed its concern over the attack. The field has at times served as a diplomatic bridge not only between Doha and Tehran, but also on a broader scale.
The UK says it is still in discussions regarding the escorting of ships through the Strait of Hormuz
Officials say military planners are working with US Central Command, but the situation remains too dangerous for anything to happen soon
Dan Sabbagh Defence and Security Editor
Wednesday, 18 March 2026, 19:52 CET
The UK has stated that it remains engaged in discussions with the US and European allies regarding the escorting of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, but the situation remains too dangerous for this to happen any time soon.
Iran is still considered a threat and is believed to possess a wide range of weapons – from cruise missiles to maritime drones – despite 19 days of US-led bombing of its navy and coastal targets.
A British defence official said that Tehran has “a very effective command and dispersion system”, meaning it could continue to attack even if many of its military and political leaders were killed.
Its mountainous coastline makes it difficult to track missiles and drones. The defence official added: “The threat level is so high that I don’t see many nations willing to send their warships into the midst of this threat at the moment.”
Iran has, in effect, closed the strait through periodic attacks on oil tankers and other vessels. Around a fifth of global crude oil traffic passed through the strait before the war, and a dramatic drop in exports has contributed to prices rising above $100 a barrel.
Donald Trump has criticised the UK and other NATO members for failing to provide warships to help patrol this strategic waterway. On Tuesday, on Truth Social, he stated that the United States “no longer needs or wants the assistance of NATO countries”.
However, the UK has stated that discussions on this matter are continuing at a military level and that additional British planners have been sent to work with US Central Command (Centcom), which leads the US military effort against Iran.
It is unclear what contribution the UK would make to a potential maritime escort operation, although the Royal Navy could, in theory, redirect HMS Dragon, a destroyer currently heading for Cyprus, to the Arabian Sea. No other warships are immediately available.
On Wednesday, Defence Secretary John Healey discussed the Strait of Hormuz in a telephone conversation with the defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy and Poland. France has previously stated that it would be willing to send warships to the strait, but only once the ‘most intense’ phase of the conflict has ended.
Al Carns, a UK Minister of State for Defence, said that the last escort operation in the Gulf, which began in 1987 during the final phase of the Iran-Iraq War, required 30 warships. “This is just one example of the resources required. So, it is a major undertaking,” he said at a briefing.
He emphasised that “this must be a multinational solution”, arguing that the UK has no option but to work with the US, however difficult that may be. “But I would say this: there is one thing worse than working with allies, and that is working without them,” he said.
The US Navy has not yet indicated that it is prepared to engage in an escort operation, preferring to focus on the ongoing bombing campaign, although officials have suggested this could change next month. The Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group is operating off the coast of Oman.
Overnight, Centcom stated that it had used 5,000-pound ‘bunker buster’ bombs on what it called ‘fortified Iranian missile bases along the coast of Iran, near the Strait of Hormuz’, as part of a broader effort to eliminate the threat posed by anti-ship cruise missiles.
Kevin Rowlands, a naval expert at the Royal United Services Institute think-tank, said that although Iran’s capacity to cause damage had been steadily reduced, the danger to shipping remained.
“It is almost impossible to reduce the risk to zero, and we can expect ships to face a residual level of threat for some time,” said Rowlands, adding that the strait’s narrow width of 20 nautical miles “effectively creates a death zone” in which the warning time for an attack may be as little as a few seconds.
The US and Israel’s strategy to eliminate Iranian leaders could prove counterproductive
Peter Beaumont, Senior International Correspondent
Attempts to ‘decapitate’ the state could strengthen resistance rather than destabilise the regime
- Middle East crisis – live updates
- Fighting intensifies between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
Wednesday, 18 March 2026, 19:27 CET
Israel’s decision to authorise its military to eliminate any high-ranking Iranian official on its assassination list has raised significant new questions about the so-called decapitation strategy and what it is intended to achieve.
In private, Israeli officials have informed their American counterparts that, in the event of an uprising, the Iranian opposition would be “slaughtered”. This appears to contradict Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategy of pursuing regime change by targeting high-ranking figures within Iran’s political and security apparatus.
However, even before the outbreak of a full-scale war, Iranian experts and analysts – as well as some former Israeli officials – were sceptical about the possibility that the Iranian clerical regime could be overthrown through such attacks.
To date, the targeted attacks have killed, among others, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, security chief Ali Larijani and intelligence minister Esmail Khatib.
At the heart of the matter lies the structure and resilience of the Iranian regime – and how both the regime and the Iranian public respond to such attacks.
Before the US and Israel launched their attacks three weeks ago, experts had assessed that the regime was stagnating in the face of protests and that some form of change seemed inevitable. That dynamic has now shifted.
“This is not a personalised regime,” said Sanam Vakil, an Iran expert at Chatham House. “There are institutional layers beneath every individual, and I suspect the response to decapitation strikes would simply be [promotion] from within – although that risks bringing unknown and untested individuals to the fore. Given Israel’s success rate, you can imagine that there are probably lower-ranking individuals who are not so keen to move up the system into dangerous work.”
So far, Vakil does not consider Israel’s decapitation strategy to have been successful. “At the moment, it seems to be buying time, and I’m not sure what the US is trying to achieve, but there is the potential for the system to be revived to renew a regime that was becoming a spent force, in which those who advance have seen their mentors, bosses and family members killed.
“It is not an approach that produces Jeffersonian democrats, but fierce resistance fighters. It generates even more resistance,” she said.
Israel’s history of assassinations does not indicate particular success. Over the years, Israel has killed numerous high-ranking leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah, including the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, in 2004, and the secretary-general of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. However, although Israeli campaigns have weakened these groups, both have recovered.
Jon B Alterman, of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, is another sceptic, citing the example of Hamas, which he said “as a political movement has absorbed its martyrs and lives on to fight on”.
He wrote in a recent post: “Unfortunately, significant improvement through decapitation is unlikely. Every situation is unique and each involves an element of chance. However, the track record of achieving ambitious political objectives – which the United States has – through limited military efforts is poor.”
Although he cited the killing of Osama bin Laden as an example of how a non-state group can be significantly weakened by removing a leader, Alterman said that the Israeli attempt to decapitate a state is “unprecedented”.
“One of the common myths within the US government after 9/11 and before the invasion of Iraq was that you simply had to eliminate the ‘dirty dozen’ [among the regime’s top figures] in Iraq,” he told The Guardian. “I thought it was a bad idea then and I think it’s a bad idea now. One issue that hasn’t received enough attention is that, if you eliminate the people who have credibility with the bad guys, there’s no one left with influence to stop the bad guys.
“It also seems that the regime’s resilience is underestimated. It may be possible to create internal divisions, but I know of no evidence that there are moderate democrats waiting in the wings.”
For Alterman, the most likely outcome of the decapitation strategy “is an internally unstable Iran”, which is more likely to commit acts of violence beyond its borders, whether through cyber warfare, proxies or terrorism.
The situation is complicated by the fact that a successful popular uprising is not necessarily the most likely outcome of a destabilised regime.
In a January essay for the American journal Foreign Affairs, Afshon Ostovar, a Middle East expert at the Naval Postgraduate School, predicted that any coup would most likely come from within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the country’s most powerful actor, and would aim to preserve existing institutions—a potential dynamic that still holds.
Steven Simon, a security expert at Dartmouth College and former member of the US National Security Council, wrote in War on the Rocks: “The scenario that deserves more attention than it receives is not the collapse of Iran, but the persistence of Iran; wounded, vindictive and impossible to govern through the instruments that won the war.”
Vakil said: “There is also something perverse about this. What Israel and the US are pursuing, and what makes me feel so uncomfortable, is the fact that there is no will, no choice and no justice for Iranians in this process.”
Israel is facing fierce resistance from Hezbollah as it attempts to advance deeper into Lebanon
The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) are engaged in intense fighting with militants in at least three key areas, as part of the battle for control of border towns
William Christou in Tyre and Lorenzo Tondo in Jerusalem
Wednesday, 18 March 2026, 16:25 CET
Israel and Hezbollah are engaged in intense ground clashes in at least three strategic areas in southern Lebanon, as Israel continues its ground invasion of its neighbour, according to a Lebanese security source and residents of the affected towns.
Much of the fighting has centred around the strategic hilltop town of Khiam, with the Israeli Defence Forces conducting an air and artillery campaign against Hezbollah fighters barricaded in the town. Fighting intensified there after days of clashes, with a Hezbollah spokesperson acknowledging that “intense clashes” had taken place on the town’s eastern and northern outskirts.
As fighting continued in Khiam, Israeli troops attempted to penetrate the border towns in the central and western sectors of southern Lebanon. A resident of the border village of Aita al-Chaab said that fighting between Israeli soldiers and Hezbollah fighters was intense in that area.
A source in the Lebanese security services stated that the village was one of many border towns that had become the scene of intense fighting, as Israel attempted to infiltrate southern Lebanon via various points along the shared border. There, they encountered resistance from Hezbollah members.
Fighting broke out as Israel concentrated its troops along the border, bringing in four brigades and tank columns in preparation for a large-scale ground invasion of southern Lebanon. The Israeli army stated that it had launched a “limited ground operation”, whilst the political leadership discussed expanding the campaign.
The war was triggered when Hezbollah fired rockets into Israel on 2 March. Israel swiftly launched a military operation against Lebanon with the aim of completely eliminating Hezbollah. Hezbollah portrayed the war as one of survival for Lebanon, claiming it was defending the country from almost daily Israeli air strikes since the November 2024 ceasefire between the two sides. Outside Hezbollah’s base of support, the move to drag Lebanon into a war was deeply unpopular.
The latest hostilities are a clash between Israel’s air power and Hezbollah’s guerrilla fighters. Experts have said that ground fighting in Lebanon is now concentrated on strategic axes, particularly Khiam, which could determine Hezbollah’s ability to repel the Israeli invasion.
“Khiam lies on a high plateau overlooking the Hula Valley and along key routes leading westwards towards the Israeli border,” said Ahmad Beydoun, a researcher at TU Delft specialising in open-source investigations of armed conflicts.
Israel says it aims to create a buffer zone between Hezbollah’s operations in Lebanon and the border, to keep towns in northern Israel out of the line of fire. Photo: Jalaa Marey/AFP/Getty Images
Israeli control of the hilltop would cut off Hezbollah’s supply lines to its fighters in southern Lebanon. “Control of Khiam separates the central and eastern sectors south of the Litani [River], cutting off the link to the Bekaa Valley,” said Beydoun.
The Israeli army targeted civilian infrastructure in southern Lebanon to further disrupt supply lines, striking bridges crossing the Litani and main roads leading south. It also struck medical centres and emergency personnel, attacks intended to worsen living conditions in southern Lebanon, human rights groups said.
The question of how Hezbollah managed to maintain its presence south of the Litani, despite the Lebanese army’s disarmament efforts over more than a year, as well as almost daily attacks on fighters and weapons depots by Israel, remains unanswered. Despite intense pressure, Hezbollah managed to put up strong resistance right on the front lines in southern Lebanon, using a combination of anti-tank guided munitions, drones and artillery.
For the inhabitants of southern Lebanon, the issue of disarmament seemed to be one debated only within think tanks. On the ground, Hezbollah was still present, but remained in the background. Many of the villagers were themselves members of the group. Now that Israel has invaded, many of them have taken up arms.
“Hezbollah is now fighting on the ground. Every town in the south has at least a few hundred fighters armed with anti-tank missiles. It will not be an easy task for Israel,” said Imad Salameh, the mayor of Khiam. He added that support for Hezbollah was widespread in the south and that weapons depots were scattered throughout the region.
Whilst Hezbollah was clashing with Israel in Khiam, the IDF was advancing to the border. The source within the Lebanese security services stated that Israel was using the hilltops it had occupied on its side of the border to shell the Lebanese side, whilst soldiers attempted to encircle the fighters.
The Moment building in central Beirut collapses following an Israeli attack – video
Israel was also creating ‘safe zones’ along the Lebanese border, where residents could remain as long as they provided their own security to prevent Hezbollah from infiltrating the village. A resident of Kafr Shouba, whose house was just a few metres from the border, said that on Monday evening, Israeli forces raided his home and three other houses. He was pushed up against a wall by IDF soldiers whilst they searched his home for weapons. When they left, they took a resident with them for questioning, he said.
The immediate objective of the Israeli campaign, according to former IDF officers, was to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon that would push Hezbollah away from the border. Although the official objectives remain vague, military activity suggests a two-pronged approach: the occupation of territory south of the Litani River, coupled with the creation of a surveillance-dominated zone to the north of it.
“The buffer zone is intended to ensure that Israeli communities in the north are out of the direct line of fire of anti-tank missiles and guided anti-tank missiles … to push the physical line from which they can fire further north,” said Miri Eisin, a former senior officer in the IDF’s combat intelligence corps and a senior researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.
If Israel manages to push Hezbollah back from the Litani, it would then focus on the group’s presence north of the river. The armed group launches most of its rockets and drones towards Israel from north of the river, whilst its members on the southern bank concentrate their efforts on fighting Israeli soldiers.
Israeli military experts have warned that the idea of a buffer zone in southern Lebanon would require a long-term occupation, which could, in turn, revive popular support for Hezbollah. Currently, the group is isolated domestically and under pressure after dragging Lebanon into another war with Israel.
“What is unfolding now is a new occupation of parts of southern Lebanon,” said Prof. Yagil Levy, director of the Open University Institute for the Study of Civil-Military Relations in Israel. “But this time, [Israel] is occupying the territory and removing the population, thereby ensuring itself complete freedom of action and reducing the risk of guerrilla operations emerging from the villages.”
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/18/fighting-intensifies-israel-hezbollah-southern-lebanon
Israel strikes Iran’s South Pars gas field hours after its forces killed the intelligence minister
The death of Esmail Khatib, the third high-ranking Iranian official killed in the last 24 hours, has been confirmed, whilst Israel is also launching intense air strikes on Lebanon
- Middle East crisis – live updates
- Analysis: why the attacks on gas fields represent a major escalation
Lorenzo Tondo in Jerusalem and William Christou in Beirut
Wednesday, 18 March 2026, 20:25 CET
Israel struck Iran’s giant South Pars gas field on Wednesday, marking a major escalation of the war, just hours after Israeli forces killed the regime’s intelligence minister and launched some of the most intense air strikes on Beirut in decades.
The attack on the Pars site in the Persian Gulf, which Iran shares with Qatar and which constitutes the world’s largest natural gas field, prompted Tehran to warn neighbouring states that their energy infrastructure could be the target of attacks “within hours” and triggered furious reactions from Qatar and other nations in the region.
Located off the coast of the southern province of Bushehr, the field holds an estimated 1,800 billion cubic feet (51 billion cubic metres) of gas in situ, accounting for approximately 70% of Iran’s domestic supply and a large proportion of Qatar’s exports.
Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Majed al-Ansari, described the attack on the gas field – an extension of Qatar’s North Field – as a “dangerous and irresponsible move”.
The Gulf state’s energy company subsequently stated that the Iranian attacks had caused “extensive damage” to its gas hub in Ras Laffan.
Qatar’s Foreign Ministry condemned what it called a “brutal attack by Iran”, stating that the attack represented a “direct threat to its national security”. In a significant escalation, Iran’s military and security attachés were ordered to leave Qatar within 24 hours.
Abu Dhabi stated that it had suspended operations at its Habshan gas facility following a separate missile attack by Iran.
As the war intensifies, new evidence raises questions about the purpose of the joint US-Israel attack on Iran. A day after Joe Kent, director of the US National Counterterrorism Centre, resigned in protest, the director of US national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, told Congress that Iran had made no attempt to rebuild its uranium enrichment programme since it was destroyed in the attacks of June 2025.
“As a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme was destroyed. Since then, there have been no efforts to rebuild that capability,” Gabbard stated in her testimony before the Senate.
Israel’s attack on South Pars was coordinated and approved by the Trump administration, the US news site Axios reported, citing two senior Israeli officials. The report notes that a US defence official confirmed this claim.
The attack on Iran’s gas infrastructure hub marks a significant escalation in US and Israeli military operations. Until now, both countries had largely avoided targeting Iran’s oil and gas sector in an effort to limit global price shocks, but oil rose towards $110 (83 pounds) a barrel on Wednesday, as mounting threats to energy infrastructure in the Gulf and the ongoing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz sparked fears of further supply disruptions.
In a statement released on Wednesday by the semi-official Iranian news agency Tasnim, Iranian authorities claimed that five facilities in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar “will be the target of attacks in the coming hours”.
The US-Israel war against Iran is now in its third week, with at least 2,000 deaths reported and no clear end in sight. The Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed, and US allies have resisted Donald Trump’s calls to help reopen this vital shipping route, through which roughly a fifth of the global supply of oil and liquefied natural gas normally passes.
In a post on his social media platform Truth Social on Wednesday, the US president appeared to suggest that the US could ‘finish off’ Iran and then leave the responsibility for securing the strait to the allied countries that depend on it, a familiar allusion to his long-standing complaints about burden-sharing.
“I wonder what would happen if we ‘finished off’ what remains of the Iranian terrorist state and let the countries that use it – not us – be responsible for the so-called ‘strait’?” Trump said. “That would get some of our ‘allies’ who aren’t stepping up to the plate moving, and fast!!!”
The attack on the South Pars gas field came as Iran confirmed the death of intelligence minister Esmail Khatib, after Israel claimed to have killed him in a night-time strike, making him the third high-ranking Iranian figure to be assassinated in 24 hours.
Khatib’s death follows those of Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, and Gholamreza Soleimani, commander of the Basij militia.
Khatib was appointed Iran’s intelligence minister in August 2021 by then-President Ebrahim Raisi. A cleric with deep roots in the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus, his career included posts within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the judiciary, and in 2022 he was sanctioned by the US Treasury for alleged cyber operations targeting Washington and its allies.
The Israeli military stated that the intelligence ministry headed by Khatib was “the main intelligence organisation of the Iranian terrorist regime, which also played a key role in supporting the regime’s repression and terrorist activities”.
His assassination removes yet another pivotal figure from the core of Iran’s political and security establishment at a time of acute crisis, following the deaths of Larijani – a pillar of the system and the highest-ranking figure killed since Ali Khamenei – and Soleimani, alongside other high-ranking paramilitary figures.
Taken together, the three assassinations suggest that Israel possesses detailed intelligence on the movements of the Iranian leadership within Tehran and is capable of acting on it, using its near-total control of Iranian airspace, alongside the US, to strike with apparent precision.
Israeli warplanes struck central Beirut in the early hours of Wednesday, destroying apartment blocks in the Zuqaq al-Blat neighbourhood. Photo: Khalil Ashawi/Reuters
In Lebanon, Israel struck central Beirut, destroying apartment blocks in some of the most intense air strikes on the city in decades. It also bombed two bridges over the Litani River, marking an expansion of attacks against civilian infrastructure in the south of the country. A spokesperson for the Israeli army said it had blown up the bridges to prevent Hezbollah from transporting fighters to southern Lebanon, where the organisation is engaged in intense clashes with Israeli soldiers.
The destruction of the two bridges, one of which led to the major city of Tyre and the other was just south of the town of Nabatieh, has further isolated the area south of the Litani from the rest of the country. In recent days, Israel has bombed two other bridges over the Litani, petrol stations and main roads in the region, whilst issuing a general evacuation order for the area 40 kilometres north of the border between Israel and Lebanon.
A vehicle belonging to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrols Tyre after the Israeli army issued an evacuation order for the southern coastal city and surrounding areas. Photo: Kawnat Haju/AFP/Getty Images
Israel’s announcement that it would soon bomb the bridges triggered a new exodus of Tyre’s residents. Cars packed with families and mattresses tied to their roofs headed north, whilst civil defence personnel directed people towards the city’s last remaining bridge, the other having already been struck by Israel. The Lebanese army withdrew from its checkpoints on the bridges ahead of the attacks, fearing it might be caught in the blast.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah continued to announce rocket launches towards Israel and claimed it was putting up staunch resistance against the Israeli army advancing into southern Lebanon. People injured in the Israeli attacks arrived in waves at hospitals throughout the day. At least 968 people, including 116 children, have been killed and over 2,432 injured as a result of Israeli attacks during the last 16 days of fighting, the Lebanese Ministry of Health said.
Despite intense attacks by Israel and the US on its missile infrastructure, Iran appears to retain the capability to launch targeted strikes. The Israeli medical service reported that two people, a couple in their 70s, were killed in Ramat Gan, east of Tel Aviv.
According to Israeli officials, the couple were killed by Iranian cluster munitions, which Tehran has been firing at Israel since the start of the war.
In a separate attack, at least four Palestinian women were killed when an Iranian rocket struck near Hebron in the West Bank on Wednesday evening, the Red Crescent said.
Even when intercepted by Israel’s air defence systems, such weapons can remain extremely dangerous: their submunitions scatter in the air and can fall over urban areas, detonating on impact or remaining unexploded, posing a lethal risk long after interception.
A Russian oil tanker is heading for Cuba amid the US-imposed economic blockade
According to shipping data, the vessel carrying 730,000 barrels of crude oil is due to arrive in Cuba on 23 March, after Donald Trump said he hoped to have “the honour of conquering” the country
The Guardian team and news agencies
Thursday 19 March 2026, 02:55 CET
Hundreds of thousands of barrels of Russian oil are heading for Cuba, according to maritime tracking data, as the communist island suffers power cuts amid the US-imposed economic blockade and Donald Trump threatens to take it over.
Sanctioned Russian oil The Anatoly Kolodkin loaded 730,000 barrels of crude oil at the Russian port of Primorsk on 8 March, and by 16:00 GMT on Wednesday was in the Eastern Atlantic, heading for Cuba, maritime analysis firm Kpler said.
Its data showed that the Russian-flagged vessel, owned by the Russian state shipping company Sovcomflot, was due to unload at the Matanzas oil terminal in the north of the island around 23 March.
Trump said on Monday that he expected to have “the honour of conquering Cuba”, claiming he could do “whatever he wants” in the context of US negotiations with Havana regarding the country’s future.
The US has sought to step up pressure on Cuba, its long-standing foe, since it detained Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January. Since then, Trump has halted Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba and threatened to impose tariffs on any country selling oil to Cuba, stating that, as a result of his actions, Cuba “will receive neither oil nor money”.
Another tanker, the Sea Horse, flying the Hong Kong flag, loaded nearly 200,000 barrels of diesel at the end of January off the coast of Cyprus from another tanker, according to Kpler data.
It left the Mediterranean on 13 February and has since sailed west across the Atlantic, slowing down between late February and early March and following an erratic course, the tracking system indicated. On Wednesday at 16:30 GMT, it was in the north-west Caribbean, approximately 1,500 km (932 miles) from the Cuban coast.
The Russian-flagged vessel Anatoly Kolodkin is on the list of sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom.
Cuba has not imported oil since 9 January, when Mexico delivered a shipment in the days following Maduro’s dismissal. Mexico has been under pressure from Trump to halt these deliveries.
With Agence France-Presse
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/19/cuba-us-economic-blockade-trump-russian-oil-tanker
“Let him be tried”: a pro-Kremlin loyalist turns against Putin in a rare outburst
Ilya Remeslo posts a message on Telegram titled “Five reasons why I have stopped supporting Vladimir Putin” for his 90,000 followers
Wednesday, 18 March 2026, 14:39 CET
For years, Ilya Remeslo was a trusted Kremlin operative, tracking regime critics and denigrating independent journalists, bloggers and opposition politicians.
Then, the 42-year-old lawyer suddenly turned against the most powerful man in the country. On Tuesday evening, Remeslo posted a manifesto to his 90,000 followers on Telegram, entitled: ‘Five reasons why I have stopped supporting Vladimir Putin’.
Ilya Remeslo. Photo: Telegram
In it, he accused the “illegitimate” Russian president of waging a “failed war” in Ukraine, which has claimed millions of victims and destroyed the economy, and argued that Putin’s more than two decades in power illustrate how “absolute power corrupts”, urging him to step down.
The post sent shockwaves through the Russian online sphere, fuelling confusion over how such a loyalist could change his position so abruptly – and whether this change was sincere.
Reiterating his earlier remark, he told The Guardian on Wednesday from his flat in St Petersburg: “Vladimir Putin should resign and be tried as a war criminal. His personalised and corrupt system is doomed to collapse, as we are now seeing with the war in Ukraine and elsewhere.
“The army is not advancing in Ukraine, and the war is going nowhere. The losses are massive. We are fighting for tiny territories that, in the end, will bring Russia nothing.”
He went on to criticise Putin’s authoritarian regime, the state of the economy and Moscow’s recent efforts to block internet access. “This man [Putin] has destroyed everything he has laid his hands on. The country is literally falling apart,” said Remeslo.
Although members of Russia’s pro-war community, known as “Z-bloggers”, have sometimes criticised the country’s military leadership, very few have openly challenged Putin or the broader rationale behind the invasion.
Remeslo’s sweeping tirade therefore marked a rare breach of long-standing taboos, said Ivan Philippov, a researcher on the pro-war movement. “It is truly unprecedented,” he said. “I am struggling to make sense of it.”
Remeslo, a former member of Russia’s Public Chamber, a Kremlin-controlled advisory body, has long been known as a regime supporter who has used his legal expertise to target and denounce critics of the authorities in court and online. Much of his work has focused on campaigns directed against the former opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, appearing in courtrooms across the country to testify against him.
Remeslo’s U-turn sparked immediate speculation. Some initially suggested that his account might have been hacked – a theory quickly dismissed after Remeslo posted a video repeating his claims. Others argued that it could be a form of political “black magic” by the Kremlin – a staged provocation to identify those who might support him.
Remeslo might have suffered a “nervous breakdown”, said Philippov.
Remeslo maintained that “none of this is staged. I am simply telling the truth” and denied that he had been directed by anyone, saying: “People really overestimate the current administration. They would not come up with such a plan.”
Asked why he had chosen to speak out now, Remeslo said the decision had taken shape gradually, until he felt he could no longer remain silent. “Putin is no longer ‘one of us’. He is a person whose interests are completely alien to both Russia and me personally. I have come to the conclusion that it is both possible and necessary to criticise him, because otherwise none of this will stop and nothing good will come of it,” he said, adding that many other members of the community “felt the same way”.
Remeslo said he had received desperate calls all morning from contacts in the security services, urging him to take down his posts, which, according to him, suggested the system was in a state of panic.
The Russian opposition appeared baffled on Wednesday. Leonid Volkov, a close ally of Navalny and one of Remeslo’s long-standing targets, said he initially suspected the episode had been staged, but later changed his mind, stating that the remark went far beyond anything the Kremlin could have sanctioned or orchestrated.
“He wrote and said things that simply cannot be said. People are jailed for far less… This opens a very dangerous Pandora’s box. It crosses every red line,” Volkov said.
However, “it is hard to believe that this was an act of personal courage or initiative,” he added.
Remeslo’s outburst comes at a politically sensitive time for Moscow, which has recently faced rare criticism even from its most loyal supporters, due to widespread mobile internet outages and disruptions to the Telegram service. Recent polls also suggest growing war fatigue, with a record number of Russians saying they would prefer it to end as economic pressures mount.
However, Western intelligence assessments and experts generally consider Putin’s power system to be resilient, characterised by elite cohesion and strict control over society.
Remeslo said he was under no illusion that he might face prosecution for his remarks. The Russian authorities have previously dealt ruthlessly with internal challenges, even among prominent nationalists. They handed down a long prison sentence to Igor Girkin, a prominent former separatist commander and outspoken critic of Putin, and eliminated his allies. It is also believed that Moscow was behind the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the mercenary leader who launched a short-lived revolt against the authorities and subsequently died when his plane crashed in unclear circumstances.
“I am prepared for any trial against me,” Remeslo said. “The time has come to somehow break this vicious circle and speak out. I bear a certain responsibility as someone who, for a long time, supported this regime and helped it survive.”
A damaged Russian tanker carrying natural gas has reached Libyan waters
There are fears of an environmental disaster, as the vessel continues to drift after being struck, presumably by a drone attack
Angela Giuffrida in Rome
Wednesday, 18 March 2026, 19:51 CET
A badly damaged Russian tanker carrying liquefied natural gas, which had been adrift in the Mediterranean for two weeks, raising fears of an environmental disaster, has reached Libyan waters, the Italian civil protection agency said on Wednesday.
The Arctic Metagaz was part of a Russian ‘ghost fleet’ used to circumvent sanctions imposed on the country’s oil and gas following the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The vessel was struck in an alleged drone attack near Maltese waters earlier this month, causing a huge hole. The crew is believed to have been rescued between Malta and Libya.
Earlier this week, the tanker was adrift between Malta and the Sicilian island of Lampedusa, prompting the governments of Italy, France, Malta, Spain, Greece and Cyprus to send a joint letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, warning that the vessel posed an “imminent and serious risk of a major environmental disaster”.
A spokesperson for the Italian civil protection agency, which has been monitoring the situation, told The Guardian that the ship is now in Libyan territorial waters and is therefore the responsibility of the authorities in that North African country.
On Wednesday, Libya issued a navigation advisory to all vessels operating in the area – where sea and weather conditions are currently unfavourable – urging them to exercise the utmost caution, according to reports in the Italian press.
A spokesperson for Italy’s civil protection agency stated that, although no leaks have been detected, the fundamental risk lies in “the dispersal into the sea of the hydrocarbons on board”.
He said: “There are approximately 90 tonnes of crude oil or diesel on board, so we are more certain of this risk. The other danger relates to the gas the tanker was carrying. We are less certain about the quantity, but a gas leak could occur.”
The Russian Foreign Ministry acknowledged that the Arctic Metagaz, which was carrying LNG from the Arctic port of Murmansk, was adrift in the Mediterranean Sea and stated that Moscow’s involvement in resolving the situation depended on “specific circumstances”.
The Russian Ministry of Transport claimed that the vessel had been attacked by Ukrainian naval drones launched from the Libyan coast.
Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister, will face pressure at the EU summit over his veto on the loan for Ukraine
The Hungarian Prime Minister shows no sign of backing down, whilst Volodymyr Zelenskyy urges the EU to resolve the dispute
Jennifer Rankin in Brussels
Thursday, 19 March 2026, 06.00 CET
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán will face pressure from other EU leaders to stop blocking a vital €90bn loan for Ukraine, amid a political dispute over an oil pipeline.
Ahead of Thursday’s EU summit, Orbán, who faces elections next month, has shown no sign of dropping his veto on the loan. He has said he will not allow it to go ahead until the Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline, which supplies Hungary with Russian oil via Ukraine, is repaired.
“If there is no oil, there is no money,” Orbán said in a video message on Tuesday, posted after the publication of a letter from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in which he stated that “every possible effort” to repair the Druzhba pipeline was underway.
Orbán said he had made it clear to the President of the European Council, António Costa, that Hungary’s position remained unchanged. “If President Zelenskyy wants to receive money from Brussels, then he must reopen the ‘Friendship’ [Druzhba] oil pipeline,” he said.
Zelenskyy said on Wednesday that he hoped EU leaders would honour their promise to lend Ukraine €90 billion for urgent military supplies and general budgetary support. “We are truly counting on the countries and the EU to find ways to resolve this issue,” he said during a visit to Madrid.
Zelenskyy told EU leaders earlier this week that Ukraine was “making every possible effort to repair the damage and restore the operation” of the pipeline, which Kyiv claims was damaged by a Russian air strike.
Hungary and Slovakia are the only two EU countries benefiting from Druzhba, having secured a temporary exemption from the EU ban on Russian oil imports, introduced following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Hungary’s last-minute blocking of the €90 billion loan infuriated other EU leaders, as Orbán had agreed to the funding deal last December on the condition that Budapest would not be required to participate.
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic had pledged not to block the decision by the 24 EU member states to take out the loan. The loan offer was a hard-won Plan B deal, after an initial proposal to use Russian assets as the basis for the loan was rejected by Belgium and several other countries.
EU diplomats insisted there was no alternative to what Hungary had already agreed to. “A deal is a deal,” said a senior EU diplomat. “So, no Plan B, no Plan C, no Plan D. This [€90bn loan] is what has to happen.”
A second senior diplomat said: “We cannot talk about a Plan B, because if we talk about a Plan B, we are giving in to blackmail.”
Criticism of the Hungarian government was becoming increasingly open, the person said. “The fact that the €90 billion loan is blocked after Prime Minister Orbán explicitly approved it alongside his colleagues marks a turning point, and this criticism is now being voiced in a way we have never heard or seen before.”
An EU official said that Costa, who will chair the EU summit, had a long telephone conversation with Orbán on Tuesday morning. “The message was very clear: ‘I expect you to honour the commitments you made within the European Council and for this decision on the €90 billion loan to be respected’,” the official said, quoting Costa.
Whilst some diplomats have expressed scepticism that Orbán would back down before the elections, a draft of the post-summit communiqué, which has been leaked to the press, states that EU leaders are looking forward to “the first instalment [of the €90 billion loan] by early April”.
Hungary, alongside Slovakia, is also blocking the 20th round of EU sanctions against Russia, which were due to be adopted last month to mark the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion.
A pro-government poster reading “Let’s not let Zelenskyy have the last laugh” hangs above supporters of opposition candidate Péter Magyar during a march in Budapest. Photo: János Kummer/Getty Images
In the Hungarian elections on 12 April, Orbán faces his most serious political challenge in the 16 years he has been in power. Polls show his main rival, Péter Magyar, has a lead of up to 20 points, whilst Orbán is trying to capitalise on the dispute with Ukraine.
The European Commission announced on Tuesday that EU funds and technical assistance would be made available to restore the flow of Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia. Although the measure aims to overturn the Hungarian veto, the offer has drawn criticism at a time when the bloc has committed to phasing out Russian oil imports by the end of 2027.
“We are preparing to repair a pipeline that Russia itself bombed – to resume the flow of Russian oil that we claim to be phasing out – for Hungary, which is blocking €90 billion for Ukraine that we are funding – without Hungary,” wrote Rihards Kols, a Latvian nationalist conservative MEP, who described the policy as “delusional”.
Thursday’s summit in Brussels is supposed to be dedicated to revitalising Europe’s declining competitiveness vis-à-vis the US and China. It is likely that this agenda will be overshadowed by the dispute with Hungary and the war in the Middle East.
Regarding the Middle East, EU leaders are expected to call for “de-escalation and maximum restraint” and to condemn “Iran’s indiscriminate military attacks in the region”. The European Council will state that it is “deeply concerned by the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon”. Although the statement also condemns Hezbollah, there is no direct reference to the US or Israel regarding their role in triggering the war with Iran.
On Wednesday, alongside Zelenskyy, the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, stated that the war in the Middle East would not diminish his government’s support for Ukraine.
“We cannot deny that the crisis in the Middle East is dominating the discussions, and for this very reason, I want to tell the Ukrainian government that nothing and no one will make us forget what is happening in Ukraine,” said Sánchez.
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/19/hungary-orban-ukraine-loan-veto-eu-summit-europe
War in Ukraine update: Ukraine strikes Russian air bases 800 km from the border
Kyiv strikes Russian factories that manufacture and repair military transport aircraft; a former Kremlin supporter suddenly calls on Vladimir Putin to step down. What we know on day 1,485
The Guardian team and news agencies
Thursday 19 March 2026, 02:10 CET
The Ukrainian military has struck two Russian factories that manufacture and repair military transport and cargo aircraft in the Ulyanovsk and Novgorod regions, the Ukrainian General Staff said on Wednesday. It stated in a press release that the attack on the Aviastar factory, part of Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation’s Ulyanovsk-based , took place on 16 March. The factory produces Ilyushin-76MD-90A military transport aircraft and Ilyushin-78M-90A refuelling aircraft, and maintains ‘Ruslan’ cargo aircraft; it is located approximately 800 km (around 500 miles) from the border with Ukraine. The Ukrainian military stated that hangars and parking areas had been hit, and some of the aircraft had been damaged.
The attack on Aircraft Maintenance Plant No. 123 in the town of Staraya Russa, in the Novgorod region, took place a day later, the General Staff said. It specified that the facility provided a full cycle of repairs and modernisation for heavy transport aircraft, including the Ilyushin-76, Ilyushin-78 and L-410. “Striking such targets directly reduces the enemy’s ability to repair and maintain combat-ready aircraft,” Ukrainian drone forces stated on X.
Ilya Remeslo, a long-standing trusted pro-Kremlin operator, has suddenly turned against Russian President Vladimir Putin. On Tuesday, Remeslo posted a manifesto to his 90,000 followers on Telegram, entitled: “Five reasons why I have stopped supporting Vladimir Putin”. In it, reports Pyotr Sauer, Remeslo accused the “illegitimate” president of waging a “failed war” in Ukraine, which has caused millions of casualties and destroyed the economy. He called on Putin to step down.
Spanish police said they had arrested three people on the holiday island of Mallorca for allegedly helping a Russian citizen evade EU sanctions imposed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The man and the two women are accused of acting as frontmen to manage luxury properties, bank accounts and vehicles, with the aim of protecting the assets from seizure, police said on Wednesday. The authorities have not disclosed the Russian citizen’s name, but the Spanish media have identified him as Nikolai Kolesov, a businessman linked to the military sector and considered close to Putin. Kolesov heads a major supplier of helicopters to the Russian army.
Tens of thousands of Moldovans have been left without water after a Russian attack on a hydroelectric power station in Ukraine led to oil pollution of a major river that flows through both countries. Moldova’s President, Maia Sandu, blamed Russia for the pollution of the Dniester River following an attack on the Novodnistrovsk hydroelectric power station in Ukraine on 7 March, stating that it “threatens Moldova’s water supply”. The Ukrainian plant is located approximately 15 km (9 miles) upstream from Moldova’s northern border with Ukraine and supplies water to around 80% of Moldova’s population, which numbers approximately 2.5 million.
British officials are preparing for a possible legal action against Roman Abramovich, after he failed to meet the deadline for releasing the £2.4 billion he received from the sale of Chelsea FC. The Russian billionaire failed to hand over the money by the 17 March deadline, amid a dispute over how the funds would ultimately be used. Government officials have said they will now take steps to prepare for a potential legal case, so that the money can be spent on humanitarian purposes in Ukraine. They have written to Abramovich’s lawyers to warn them of this, writes Kiran Stacey. Abramovich’s spokespeople were contacted for comment. Nikolai Patrushev, an adviser to Putin, said that Russia regards the attack on a Russian LNG tanker in the Mediterranean as “an act of international terrorism”, Russian state media reported. Russian officials claimed that the Arctic Metagaz, which was carrying LNG from the Arctic port of Murmansk, was attacked by Ukrainian naval drones and said the weapons were launched from the Libyan coast. The vessel barely made it into Libyan waters, writes Angela Giuffrida. The Russian Ministry of Defence said on Wednesday that its forces had captured the village of Oleksandrivka in Ukraine’s Donetsk region.Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Wednesday that Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever’s call for normalisation of relations with Moscow showed that there was still some sense in certain parts of Europe. De Wever’s comments run counter to the EU’s official policies of maintaining a hard line against Moscow over the invasion of Ukraine and phasing out the use of Russian fossil fuels . De Wever’s comments have been criticised by various European leaders. A senior NATO military officer has called on the alliance to extend the Cold War-era fuel pipeline network by hundreds of kilometres eastwards, to ensure sufficient supplies for NATO troops in the event of a future conflict with Russia. The 10,000 km (6,215 mile) pipeline network, buried 80 centimetres (31 inches) underground, was built during the Cold War. The pipeline network currently spans 12 countries, but ends in western Germany, where it serves military bases, such as the US Ramstein Air Base, as well as major civilian hubs, such as Germany’s largest airport in Frankfurt.
Trump news in brief: the president’s war against Iran is costing the US budget billions of dollars
The US spent $11.3 billion on bombs in the first six days of the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran – the top US political news stories from 18 March 2026, in brief
The Guardian team
Thursday 19 March 2026, 02:00 CET
Part of Donald Trump’s pitch to voters was that, if he became president again, he would cut government spending and not send American troops to war. He may have campaigned on promises, but he is governing by dropping billions of dollars’ worth of bombs on Iran.
In the six days following the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran on 28 February, $11.3 billion was spent on bombs funded by American taxpayers that struck the country and caused hundreds of deaths, the Pentagon told lawmakers. This figure does not reflect the total cost of the conflict, such as the deployment of forces, and will now be much higher given the ongoing nature of the war.
The cost of the first week of the war with Iran would be more than enough to fully fund the Environmental Protection Agency this year ($8.8 billion), the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention ($9.2 billion) or the National Cancer Institute ($7.4 billion). The $11.3 billion also exceeds the total amount allocated this year to fund federal scientific research through the National Science Foundation.
“This merely highlights a worrying prioritisation of militarism at the expense of the health and wellbeing of the American public,” said Adam Gaffney, a professor at Harvard Medical School who has studied the impact of the administration’s policies on health.
US spending in the first week of the war with Iran raises serious questions about priorities
The US spent $11.3 billion in the first week of the military attack on Iran alone. This massive expenditure dwarfs the annual budgets of many public health and scientific agencies that the Trump administration has sought to cut, raising serious questions about the country’s priorities.
Tulsi Gabbard tells Senate committee that US strikes on Iran are a strategic success
Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence who in 2019 was selling T-shirts bearing the slogan ‘No War with Iran’, told the Senate Intelligence Committee on Wednesday that US strikes on Iran were a strategic success.
Kash Patel admits under oath that the FBI buys Americans’ location data
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has begun purchasing Americans’ location data, FBI Director Kash Patel stated under oath on Wednesday during the Senate Intelligence Committee’s hearing on global threats.
Markwayne Mullin adopts a more conciliatory tone but defends Trump’s policies at Senate hearing
Markwayne Mullin defended his ability to lead the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and expressed regret for comments he made regarding an American citizen killed by immigration agents during his confirmation hearing on Wednesday, which began on an unusually confrontational note, when a fellow Republican senator accused him of encouraging violence.
Nancy Mace draws the White House’s ire over independent rescue efforts in the Middle East
White House officials have become increasingly frustrated with Republican Representative Nancy Mace, accusing her of complicating efforts to evacuate Americans stranded in the Middle East by attempting to carry out her own rescue missions, according to people familiar with the matter.
Fed keeps interest rates unchanged amid rising oil prices and inflation fears fuelled by the war in Iran
Fed officials faced a number of issues to consider at this week’s meeting: soaring oil and gas prices, volatile inflation that remains above the Fed’s 2% target, and a weakening labour market that unexpectedly recorded 92,000 job losses last month.
What else happened today:
The number of premature deaths caused by the Covid-19 pandemic was far higher than the official US figure, according to a new study highlighting dramatic disparities in unrecorded deaths.
A fire on board the USS Gerald R Ford, which injured sailors and destroyed 100 berths, is the latest incident to affect the world’s largest aircraft carrier, which is on a marathon deployment and which some claim has undermined crew morale.
The confirmation hearing for Markwayne Mullin, Donald Trump’s nominee to replace Kristi Noem as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has left officials and disaster management experts concerned about what his tenure would mean for the future of America’s leading disaster response agency.
US lawmakers, trade union leaders and several community organisations have expressed shock and disgust after several women went public with allegations of sexual misconduct and abuse by the late trade union leader César Chávez.
Instagram will stop encrypting private messages between users from May, after facing years of criticism from law enforcement and child protection groups over this feature.
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/18/trump-news-latest-updates-today
US aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford: Current situation and operations – Maritime Security Forum
The US aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford, deployed in operations against Iran, is set to dock temporarily in a port following a fire on board. US officials confirmed this on Tuesday, the 18th day of the war with Tehran.
The Gerald R. Ford, the world’s newest and largest aircraft carrier, is currently in the Red Sea. It is scheduled to dock temporarily in Souda Bay on the island of Crete, according to official statements.
US Navy photograph taken by Class I Mass Communications Specialist Joshua J. Wahl
Details of the incident on board
The fire broke out in the ship’s main laundry area, and nearly 200 sailors were treated for smoke inhalation. It took hours to bring the fire under control, and it affected approximately 100 berths. One service member was evacuated from the ship due to injuries.
Officials did not specify how long the Ford would remain in Crete.
The New York Times first reported the extent of the damage to the ship, but the Pentagon did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
The Ford’s involvement in military operations
The aircraft carrier had been deployed for nine months, taking part in operations against Venezuela in the Caribbean before arriving in the Middle East. This duration raised questions regarding the morale of the sailors and the ship’s readiness.
Since the start of operations against Iran on 28 February, the United States has carried out strikes on over 7,000 targets.
The Ford carries over 5,000 sailors and has more than 75 military aircraft, including F-18 Super Hornet fighter jets. Its sophisticated radar enables air traffic and navigation control.
Support ships and capabilities
Support ships include the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser Normandy and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers: Thomas Hudner, Ramage, Carney and Roosevelt. These ships are equipped with surface-to-air, surface-to-surface and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
Maritime Security Forum
Russian oil tankers heading for Cuba – Maritime Security Forum
Russian oil tankers are heading for Cuba, reports Bloomberg, citing data from Kpler Ltd. It is currently known that two ships are heading for Liberty Island.
According to the agency, the tanker “Anatoli Kolodkin” has left the Russian port of Primorsk and is heading for the port of Matanzas, Cuba. The vessel is carrying 730,000 barrels of Russian crude oil from the Urals. According to preliminary information, the vessel is expected to arrive in Cuba by the end of this month. A second tanker, the “Calul de Mare”, is also en route to Liberty Island with a cargo of oil on board, but there is virtually no information available about this vessel.
The question also arises as to whether the Russian tanker will be able to bypass the US naval blockade imposed around the island specifically to prevent oil from reaching it. Due to the embargo, Cuba is virtually out of fuel, and the island is facing an energy crisis. On Monday, 16 March, Cuba suffered a total power cut.
The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement declaring its willingness to offer assistance to Cuba, including energy supplies. The Kremlin confirmed that it is in constant contact with the Cuban leadership.
For his part, Trump said he would do as he pleased with Cuba, but that its turn would come after he had “negotiated with Iran”.
Maritime Security Forum
The US and intervention in the Strait of Hormuz. The use of bunker-busting bombs and the military context – Maritime Security Forum
The US dropped bunker-busting bombs on the coast of Hormuz
Although there have been calls and open threats, the United States has not received support from its most loyal European allies, forcing Donald Trump to manage the tense situation in the Middle East on his own.
The failure of Operation Epic Fury, despite the intense bombing of the capital and the elimination of Iran’s top leaders, has prompted Washington to resort to dropping 2,250 kg bunker-busting bombs on the cliffs along the coast of Hormuz. Columnist Malte Humpert offers a detailed analysis of this situation in his article published on gCaptain.
The motivation and targets of the operation
According to official information, these bombs, designed to destroy underground fortifications, were used against “threats emanating from the coast” that endanger maritime trade routes. US military officials have confirmed that the US military attacked Iranian coastal missile launchers near the Strait of Hormuz. These targeting and systems, regarded by intelligence services as a direct threat to international maritime transport, have caused major disruptions to traffic on this strategically important waterway.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) issued a statement highlighting the “repeated successful use of 5,000-pound (approximately 2,268 kg) high-penetration munitions” against heavily fortified Iranian missile sites located along the Iranian coast.
The impact on maritime traffic and strategic implications
The operation reflects a clear shift towards a direct approach to maritime threats. Although the intensity of attacks has recently decreased, commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains virtually at a standstill. The number of ships passing through the strait has fallen sharply, from 130–140 per day to a negligible level, and insurance premiums for war risks and security concerns continue to deter shipowners.
These targeted attacks suggest the US’s intention to weaken Iran’s maritime capabilities and create the conditions for the restoration of this important global energy corridor. Washington must act alone, as its allies have not become involved in the conflict with Iran.
The limitations of the bombings and the prospects for the operation
The effectiveness of the bombing of the rocky and sandy area on the Iranian coast of the Strait of Hormuz raises serious questions. The use of a few lighter bombs over a wide area is unlikely to yield the desired results, requiring further efforts to reconnoitre the terrain and the use of heavier weapons. Furthermore, aerial bombs are ineffective against drones used to attack ships.
Overall, the operation appears to be an attempt driven by the need to take action, as otherwise the war with Iran could take a turn unfavourable to the United States.
Maritime Security Forum
The strategic importance of Kharg Island – Maritime Security Forum
Kharg Island is a vital hub for Iran’s economy and energy infrastructure, handling between 90 and 95 per cent of the country’s crude oil exports. The terminals on the island process approximately 950 million barrels of crude oil annually, and the maximum daily capacity can reach up to 7 million barrels. Furthermore, the island’s storage facilities can hold up to 30 million barrels, underscoring the island’s crucial role in the export of energy resources.
China is the main buyer of Iranian oil, and the geographical position of Kharg Island, just 25 kilometres from the coast and part of Bushehr Province, provides access to deep waters that allow supertankers to dock. This is essential for Iran, as most of its coastline is shallow. To support operations and defence, the island has a settlement, an airport and military infrastructure, which has recently been targeted by US attacks.
The possibility of a US intervention and the effects on the oil market
The United States possesses sufficient forces and resources to attempt to seize control of Kharg Island, having significant experience to draw upon, such as the 1983 landing at the airfield in Grenada and the 2001 landing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. However, these examples cannot be directly compared with the situation in Iran. If Kharg Island were to be occupied by US forces, the escalation of tensions would trigger a global surge in oil prices, affecting China as well, which would be forced to respond.
The risks and difficulties of a military operation on Kharg Island
An assault on Kharg Island and the ensuing clashes would inevitably lead to casualties among US troops. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian forces, particularly the IRGC and the Basij militia, resorted to extreme tactics, demonstrating a high willingness to die as martyrs. These factors must be taken into account by the Pentagon when planning such an operation, as capturing the island will not be an easy task. Landing troops from helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft at the airfield and holding the position until the main forces arrive would be only the first step in a complex process.
The strategic limitations of control over the island
Kharg lies a short distance from the Iranian coast, which significantly complicates any US plan for occupation. If Iran refuses to yield to pressure regarding the oil infrastructure, their MLRS systems could destroy everything on the island, leaving only ruins behind. Even if this were painful for Iran, the island could be recaptured and subsequently rebuilt. The US will not be able to maintain control of the island in the long term and will withdraw under various pretexts.
A relevant precedent is the situation of Serpent Island in the Black Sea, where temporary control held no strategic value for Russia as long as southern Bessarabia was held by Ukraine. Similarly, the occupation of Kharg Island without control over key positions in mainland Iran is meaningless. However, the context of the operation is different, and a conflict of this kind would be one for which the Americans are ill-prepared.
Maritime Security Forum
The War in the Middle East and its Consequences for the Former Soviet Space – Maritime Security Forum
For decades, the Middle East has been one of the most tense regions in the world. Any escalation of the conflict in this area has a rapid impact on the global economy and international security. For the former Soviet states, this impact is felt directly, given their geographical proximity and the existence of close historical and economic ties with the countries of the Middle East. This is relevant both for Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as for Russia and Belarus, which have stepped up their cooperation with Iran, which was attacked by Israel and the United States on 28 February.
The chain of events and the impact on the energy economy
The events triggered in the Middle East at the end of February have generated a chain of effects globally, ranging from a sharp rise in energy prices to heightened global instability. For the economies of the countries and associations in the former Soviet space, this means entering a period of challenges, given Iran’s role as a key partner. The Eurasian Economic Union, for example, has an interim free trade agreement with Iran, due to come into force in May 2025.
The development of trade and infrastructure projects
Trade between Iran and the EAEU countries has grown steadily in recent years. In 2024, Iranian exports to the EAEU exceeded $2 billion, an increase of approximately 20% compared to the previous year. Projections indicate that trade could reach $18–20 billion over the next five to seven years. At the same time, transport infrastructure is being developed, such as the North-South International Transport Corridor, which connects Russia and northern Europe with India and the Gulf states, reducing delivery times between Europe and South Asia and diversifying trade routes.
The impact of the crisis on the countries involved
Recent events in the Middle East have created a marked sense of uncertainty regarding the future of the countries involved in international trade. For the former Soviet states, the scale of the consequences will depend on the duration of the conflict, the extent of other regional states’ involvement, the impact on major transport routes, and developments in global oil and gas markets. Each state will feel the effects according to its specific economic circumstances and its relations with Iran and the Middle East. For example, Kazakhstan has experienced significant economic fluctuations in the past, when falling oil prices against a backdrop of regional tensions led to a reduction in budget revenues of over 15% in 2015. Armenia, where approximately one-third of foreign trade depends on Iran, has faced major difficulties in accessing essential goods, and inflation on basic foodstuffs exceeded 8% following the crises of 2019 and 2022. Turkmenistan, for which Iran is the second-largest trading partner, has felt the direct impact of rising living costs, with food and fuel prices increasing by over 20% during periods of regional instability. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with over 30% of their exports to South Asia transiting through Iranian ports, faced significant logistical and trade bottlenecks when transport routes were affected by conflicts, leading to delays and financial losses for the agricultural and industrial sectors.These concrete examples demonstrate that the impact of a new conflict can be profound and vary from state to state, depending on the economic structure and the level of dependence on Iran and the region. The former Soviet states should diversify their trade partnerships to reduce vulnerability to such crises, because, as an old Romanian proverb says, ‘you shouldn’t put all your eggs in one basket’.
Armenia: Economic dependence and strategic vulnerability
The economic and political ties between Armenia and Iran are particularly significant, with Armenia serving as a strategic partner for Tehran in the South Caucasus. Around 30% of Armenia’s foreign trade is conducted via Iran, and energy cooperation is exemplified by the gas-for-power project, under which Iran supplies over 500 million cubic metres of natural gas annually, and Armenia supplies electricity in return. A concrete example of collaboration is the Armenia-Iran electricity interconnector, recently expanded to increase transmission capacity to over 400 MW, thereby facilitating the stability of the region’s power grids. On the commercial front, the ‘North-South’ motorway project enables the transport of goods between Iran, Armenia and Georgia, stimulating logistics flows and the diversification of export routes.
In the current geopolitical context, Armenia plays a pivotal role in the South Caucasus, often caught between the interests of Russia, Iran and Western states. The escalation of the conflict in the Middle East affects not only trade and logistics but also the regional balance: the weakening of Tehran’s influence complicates Yerevan’s position, particularly following the 2020 conflict with Azerbaijan, which led to the loss of strategic territories and a reduction in Armenia’s access to international markets. Thus, any disruption in relations with Iran amplifies Armenia’s economic and strategic vulnerability, affecting energy security and the ability to keep open transport corridors vital for foreign trade.
Georgia and Azerbaijan: Economic and security challenges
Georgia, which shares no direct border with Iran, has a low level of bilateral trade but plays a vital role as a transport hub between the Black Sea, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Instability in the region and rising maritime transport costs could affect Georgian ports and transit routes, as well as infrastructure projects. Azerbaijan has complex relations with Iran, marked by political tensions, but may benefit from rising energy prices, with heightened risks in the areas of security, migration and logistics. Avoiding direct involvement in the conflict with Iran is essential for the country’s stability.
Central Asia: Opportunities and risks
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have developed trade and transport links with Iran, and an escalation of the conflict could undermine the achievements of recent years. Rising energy prices may bring additional revenue to exporters, but instability and logistical complications may offset these benefits. Kazakhstan, for example, is developing transport routes via the Caspian Sea and Iran, including the North-South Corridor, but the project is threatened by the current crisis, with reports already of suspensions in grain shipments to Iran. At the same time, high oil prices could bring additional revenue to the state budget.
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: Dependence on routes and goods
In Kyrgyzstan, trade with Iran is limited, but the crisis in the Middle East may have significant effects on migrants and trade routes. Due to regional instability and transport restrictions imposed by the conflict, many migrants are being forced to return home, and access to South Asian markets via Iranian ports is becoming difficult or even impossible. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan depend on certain goods imported from Iran, such as chemicals, construction materials and industrial equipment, and a significant proportion of Uzbekistan’s exports and imports pass through Iranian ports. For example, approximately 30% of Uzbekistan’s exports to South Asia, including agricultural and textile products, use these routes. In the absence of significant oil and gas reserves, a prolonged conflict could severely affect the economies of these two countries, limiting both the flow of goods and employment opportunities for the population.
Turkmenistan: Impact on prices and the population
Turkmenistan is among the beneficiaries of rising oil and gas prices, but the negative consequences of the crisis may outweigh the potential benefits. The current crisis, driven by international sanctions and instability in the global energy market, has affected both Turkmenistan’s exports and imports. Iran is Turkmenistan’s second-largest trading partner after Russia, and a large proportion of industrial goods and foodstuffs come from Iran. The sharp rise in prices has had a direct impact on people’s daily lives: the cost of basic foodstuffs, fuel and services has risen substantially, leading to a decline in purchasing power, difficulties in accessing essential goods and heightened social tensions. Furthermore, regional instability and trade restrictions have created uncertainty regarding jobs and economic prospects, directly affecting the standard of living of Turkmen citizens.
Belarus and Russia: Trade relations and logistical vulnerabilities
Belarus has limited trade links with Iran, but attaches great importance to cooperation, viewing Tehran as a market for industrial products and a regional logistics hub. Transport disruptions and rising costs could reduce the competitiveness of Belarusian goods. Shipments to Belarus often pass through parallel routes involving the Middle East, and a prolonged conflict would lead to higher prices for imported goods and the emergence of security issues.
For Russia, the crisis in the Middle East is also two-sided, particularly given that Russia occupies a central position in relations between the entire former Soviet space and Tehran. In recent years, economic and political ties between the countries have strengthened significantly. Trade has risen to $4.8 billion, an increase of approximately 16% compared to the previous year, and Iran is rightly considered one of the largest markets for Russian agricultural products. In 2025, the countries even signed a long-term strategic partnership agreement, valid for 20 years, which provides for extensive economic and military-technical cooperation. Furthermore, Russia is actively using the Iranian route to develop the North-South international transport corridor.
Russia finds itself in a unique position regarding the consequences of the conflict. On the one hand, escalating tensions in the Middle East could complicate the implementation of joint projects and disrupt transport routes. On the other hand, rising global oil prices could generate additional revenue for the Russian budget and might even influence relations with EU countries, which are currently facing a serious energy crisis.
At the same time, long-term instability in the region remains a serious risk for Russia. This concerns not only transport logistics but also security. The situation surrounding Iran could escalate across the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, posing a threat to Russia as well. This refers primarily to the rise of extremist and radical religious movements, which will attempt to extend their influence into Russian regions, with all the consequences that this entails.
Thus, events in the Middle East have far-reaching implications for the entire former Soviet space. In the short term, some countries will benefit economically from rising oil and gas prices. However, in the long term, a protracted conflict poses significantly greater risks, as it could lead to rising inflation, increased transport costs, a decline in international trade and, most importantly, a marked deterioration in security across the whole of Eurasia.
Maritime Security Forum
Italy intends to acquire a containerised naval mine-laying system
New multi-purpose coastal vessels (MTC_MTF) under construction at the T. Mariotti shipyard. Note the containerised modules at the stern. Photo by Luca Peruzzi. (Scale model on display at Sea Future 2025).
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The Directorate for Naval Armaments (NAVARM) of the Italian Ministry of Defence has issued a preliminary market consultation notice for the procurement of a containerised naval mine-laying system for munitions in service (including those for training).
The mine-laying system is intended to be installed on board all the latest Italian Navy vessels, equipped to accommodate containerised systems on the aft deck. These include:
- the new CNG-C mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs),
- the new multi-purpose coastal vessels (MTC/MTF),
- the second-hand offshore support vessel (OSV),
- the Olterra special operations and diving vessel – the submarine rescue vessel (SDO-SuRS),
- the Quirinale, the main hydro-oceanographic platform,
- future multi-purpose vessels for underwater surveillance (UPSDS).
The acquisition will enable the Italian Navy to acquire mine-laying capability for the new naval platforms currently under construction or in the process of being acquired.
“The system will raise current safety standards during the storage and transport of these weapons from ammunition depots to ships,” according to the document, and will also improve the standardisation of mine deployment from various naval platforms.
The new mine-laying system will consist of two ISO20 standard containerised modules:
- one for the transport and mine launcher, in accordance with NATO military standards MIL-STD-810F and MIL-STD-461F, amongst others, and certified as CSC, DNV 2.7-1, Class 1 explosive transport in accordance with European ADR/IMDG international regulations, suitable for launching MP-80, Manta, Murena and Asteria naval mines, as well as for transport as a mine storage/depot module, “capable of facilitating all operations constituting the standard operational flow for the deployment of naval mines”, the document states;
- a so-called “storage/depot” with a naval mine storage capacity of at least 12 MP-80/Murena/Asteria-type mines or 24 Manta-type mines, and a combination thereof.
The system will also need to include a support system for the planning, execution and evaluation of naval mine-laying operations (the so-called Planning and Evaluation system – “P&E”). The latter must include a digital cartographic representation of the areas to be mined and the planned laying positions, the calculation of the actual laying position, the deviation from the planned point, the display and countdown of the laying time for each individual mine relative to the planned position, the recording of relevant data from the laying operations, and the export of laying data in AML (Augmented Military Layer – STANAG 7170) and NATO ADatP-3/APP-11 formats.
The system must be capable of being secured on deck using twist-lock systems, whilst all arrangements necessary for the proper functioning of the system (i.e. power supply) must be provided by the aforementioned naval vessels. In particular, the containers must be positioned in the keel direction in the aft section of the vessels to allow for the easy release of the mines. In the case of the new MCMV CNG-C vessels, the mine-laying system will consist solely of the launch module.
According to the document, the system will ensure adequate redundancy, reliability and maintenance, a ten-year maintenance plan (to be carried out by MMI personnel) and a five-year period of logistical support and assistance for the in-service management of the system.
The supplier will be required to provide training courses for operators and maintenance personnel, both on board and ashore, whilst acceptance of the system will be subject to sea trials as part of a so-called OPEX (Operational Experimentation) campaign.
Naval mines presented by Rheinmetall (RWM Italia) during Indo Pacific 2022 in Sydney: Murena on the left and Asteria on the right.
The responding industry must demonstrate that it holds an agreement with the mine design authority, RWM Italia, based in Ghedi, near Brescia, for the design/configuration of fire programme loading systems (MP-80/Murena/Asteria) or installation systems (Manta), as well as holding a licence for use or the ability to obtain such a licence. In this regard, the economic operator must declare its willingness, should NAVARM request it, to carry out suitability tests at its own expense, intended to confirm the declared capabilities, as per the document. The estimated value of the supply/service is indicated as €8 million (VAT not applicable), with an estimated contract duration of 730 calendar days, requiring a declaration of compliance with the REACH Regulation, amongst other obligations. Interested industries must respond to the notice within 21 days of publication.
Source: here
The final battle before a new world order? – Maritime Security Forum
The Strait of Hormuz is a relevant example of the interaction between geopolitics and geostrategy, highlighting the importance of geographical position in international relations. This strait, situated between Iran and Oman, connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean and is one of the world’s most important maritime routes. A large proportion of the oil exports of countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates pass through it.
From a geopolitical perspective, control or influence over this strait offers a major advantage to states in the region, particularly Iran, which can use this position to exert pressure on the international community. Major powers, such as the United States and China, have a direct interest in maintaining security and freedom of navigation in the area, as their economies depend on a constant flow of energy resources.
From a geostrategic perspective, blocking the strait could be achieved through military means, such as sea mines or attacks on commercial vessels, which would trigger a major international crisis. Such action would lead to a rise in oil prices, disruption to global trade and an escalation of political tensions.
In conclusion, the Strait of Hormuz is a key strategic point where geography influences global politics, and the decisions of international actors can have far-reaching economic and military consequences.
On 28 February 2026, US and Israeli air strikes on Iranian facilities triggered a conflict that significantly disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, blocking around 20% of global oil transport. Iran effectively closed the strait to ‘enemy’ vessels, and the price of Brent crude rose rapidly. The International Energy Agency released strategic reserves.
The crisis is not merely an energy one, but is testing the global standing of the United States. Ray Dalio emphasised that losing control of the Strait of Hormuz would be tantamount to losing influence, similar to the Suez Crisis of 1956 for the British.
Hormuz represents the only major export route for Gulf oil, given the region’s geology. The blockade is more than just military – it relates to the physical structure of the area and the limitations of alternatives (insufficient pipelines). Historically, the situation is reminiscent of the Suez Crisis, but unlike in 1956, there is no third power capable of mediating effectively.
On 17 March 2026, the flow of oil tankers was at 10–30% of normal levels, with Iran selectively controlling access. The US responded militarily, but costs are rising, sparking internal debate. Although President Trump has requested international naval support, responses from key states have been cautious; many prefer to avoid direct military involvement, suggesting a decline in America’s role as a global leader.
Five scenarios for the future: an Axios analysis
The current complex situation has led to numerous predictions. On 10 March 2026, Axios presented five possible scenarios:
Scenario 1: A negotiated agreement and the halting of Iran’s nuclear programme
Iran agrees to give up its nuclear arsenal and sign a comprehensive deal, receiving economic benefits in exchange for ending hostilities. According to the Brookings Institution, this is the most likely scenario in the short term, as neither Trump nor his supporters want a protracted conflict with the US, involving heavy losses. Before 28 February, mediators in Oman indicated that Iran was willing to give up its stockpile of enriched uranium, suggesting that a solution was close.
Scenario 2: ‘The Venezuela Model’
Trump is attempting to bring about regime change in Iran through a mixed strategy — military, financial and diplomatic — aiming to install a leader open to relations with the West. Brookings highlights that this plan would involve ground troops, which does not fit with Trump’s preferences or the available military resources.
Scenario 3: Protracted War of Attrition
Iran opts to prolong the conflict, hoping to exhaust American political patience and provoke domestic pressure due to the costs and casualties. Experiences in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq show that the American public’s tolerance for long conflicts is limited.
Scenario 4: Regional escalation
The conflict involves other regional groups such as Hezbollah, Iraqi Shias and movements in Yemen, with implications for Ukraine and East Asia. Dalio warns that the US cannot manage multiple major conflicts simultaneously without risking a significant reduction in its financial and military capabilities.
Scenario 5: Withdrawal after declaring victory
The Trump administration proclaims success, withdraws its troops and leaves the Iranian regime weakened but still in place. Financial markets were anticipating a rapid withdrawal, and any signal to that effect influenced the price of oil.
The Great Cycle and the changing world order
Ray Dalio offers a broader perspective, placing the conflict within a structural context described in his book *Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order*. He identifies five major forces that dictate the evolution of empires: long-term debt, domestic politics, global geopolitics, technological innovation and natural phenomena.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis is not an isolated incident; it reflects the convergence of these factors and indicates that the US is in an advanced phase of the imperial cycle — with high debt, marked polarisation and difficulties in maintaining alliances. The crisis with Iran can be viewed as a ‘final battle’, similar to the Suez Crisis of 1956, which will demonstrate whether American power remains dominant or whether we are witnessing a shift in influence.
Since the conflict began, the dollar has risen by around 2%, confirming its status as a safe haven, but analysts say this rise is due to both the oil shock and investors repositioning themselves.
The geopolitics of allies and the reconfiguration of the global partnership
US allies, such as Germany, South Korea and Japan, have been reluctant to send ships to the Strait of Hormuz, suggesting that Trump is seeking to reorganise the American presence and redraw global influence along regional lines. Tensions within NATO, the withdrawal of funding for Ukraine and dialogue with Russia and China appear to indicate a strategic recalibration.
This episode is forcing major energy consumers (China, India, Japan, the EU) to reassess their dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, with these states’ reactions being reflected in legislative changes and naval strategies. These decisions will have an impact on energy security infrastructure, regardless of the outcome of the conflict.
Certainties, interpretations and speculation
It is essential to distinguish between confirmed facts, probabilities and hypotheses:
Confirmed data (17 March 2026):
- Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen to 10–30% of normal levels;
- The price of Brent crude has exceeded $100 per barrel, peaking at $119.50 on 9 March 2026;
- No major ally has publicly committed to a naval escort;
- The US and Iran are refusing to negotiate a ceasefire;
- The IEA has released 108.6 million barrels from strategic reserves.
Plausible interpretations:
The blockage at Hormuz can be compared to the Suez moment for American hegemony; the allies’ reluctance could reflect a profound shift in the partnership with the US; Trump is aiming for a strategic withdrawal.
Speculation:
A potential US failure could lead to the dollar being abandoned as a reserve currency, whilst a victory would cement US hegemony for a new generation.
When geology meets history
The Strait of Hormuz represents the intersection of geological processes (the Arabia–Eurasia collision, the formation of the Persian Gulf) and a century of global energy dependence. There are no comparable maritime alternatives, overland pipelines are insufficient, and building new routes entails huge costs and a long timeframe.
Dalio argues that the stakes of the conflict are systemic: how it ends will send a message about the real power of the US and the architecture of the international order. However, the analogy with Suez has its limits — in 1956 there were successor(s) ready to take on the role of global hegemon; in 2026 there is no clear candidate, and China is approaching the situation with strategic patience.
This combination of difficulties for the dominant power, the lack of an obvious successor, alliances in the process of change, and geological vulnerability underscores the current instability. Hormuz is becoming the uncertain transition between the old and the new order, with unclear rules, high costs, and long-term influence on the world.
Maritime Security Forum
The risk of mines in the Strait of Hormuz: considerations, foreseeable implications and future approaches – Maritime Security Forum
From 10 March 2026, against the backdrop of the war with Iran, a new and most insidious threat has emerged: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz with Iranian mines. The war, launched to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, risks turning into a ‘Tank War 2.0’ with far-reaching global consequences.
Key questions regarding the impact of the mine blockade
The main question is: How will the mining of the strait affect the course of operations, as well as regional and global security and stability?
To outline answers, the following aspects must be analysed:
- How real is the threat of mines in the Strait of Hormuz?
- Iran’s naval mine warfare: capabilities, design and the ‘Russian footprint’.
- US mine-countermeasure capabilities and their deployment: What has happened?
1. The reality and significance of the mine threat in the Strait of Hormuz
The United States has faced such threats before: in the conflicts in the Persian Gulf at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, three main-class warships (a guided-missile cruiser, a helicopter carrier and a guided-missile frigate) were destroyed by mines. The last explosion occurred on an Iranian mine in 1988, during the Tanker War. In retaliation, the US destroyed five Iranian ships and damaged other oil platforms and warships. This experience demonstrates both the costs and the gravity of such conflicts.
Currently, following the start of US and Israeli strikes, Iran has banned all ships from passing through the straits, with the exception of those flying the Chinese flag or transporting Iranian oil to China.
There are no reliable answers regarding the coverage of events and the information received. The author’s analysis of the video published by US Central Command shows that, of the 16 ships struck, only four were capable of laying sea mines (a corvette, a submarine, a landing craft with a crane, and a floating platform boat). The rest – missile and patrol boats – had neither the equipment nor the space for laying mines.
The situation is deteriorating: the media are reporting strikes on at least three civilian vessels that attempted to cross the strait.
Preliminary conclusions: There is no clear confirmation of actual mine-laying, nor any visual signs or relevant reports, and so far no ship has been blown up by mines.
However, experience from conflicts in the Persian and Oman Gulfs, as well as Iran’s track record in mine-blockade operations, confirms the plausibility of a mine-laying scenario in the Strait of Hormuz.
The mere emergence of information regarding the mine threat provokes immediate reactions in the military and security spheres, leading to assessments and preparations for countermeasures.
An urgent issue is the assessment of the parties’ anti-mine capabilities and the likely nature of their actions, even in the absence of sufficient information.
2. Iran’s capabilities in naval mine warfare: design and the ‘Russian footprint’
Recent reports on Iran’s mine capabilities are limited, which is understandable: the actual presence of naval mines and the means of deployment is never made public. Estimates of 2,000–6,000 mines and the capacity of small boats to lay 2–3 mines are plausible. CIA documents from 1984 indicate an annual production of 200 mines, and calculations over 30 years yield the ‘magic number’ of 6,000 mines – although this cannot be officially confirmed.
Iranian forces use Soviet YAM anchor mines, obsolete North Korean anchor mines (500 kg of explosive), as well as non-contact bottom mines (magnetic, electromagnetic, acoustic), composite, non-magnetic and self-propelled mines, produced in China and other countries. The incident involving the explosion of the US cruiser Princeton in an Iraqi minefield containing Italian MN3 Manta mines illustrates the complexity of the arms market and the diversity of sources.
Assessing the mining capability of Iranian vessels (2–3 mines) requires an analysis of the composition of the Iranian Navy and the IRGC:
- Iranian Navy: four naval districts (three for the Persian/Oman Gulf), 106 warships (17 submarines, 5 frigates/corvettes, 23 landing craft, 61 patrol boats), anti-ship missile systems and naval aviation.
- IRGC Navy: four commands, three naval zones, 139 vessels (3 UAV carriers, 5 corvettes, 5 landing craft, 56 missile boats, 70 patrol boats, 2–3 thousand small amphibious assault craft).
It is likely that all submarines, frigates, corvettes, some landing ships and some patrol boats are capable of carrying mines. The number of mines laid by small boats varies between 2 and 4, similar to the capability of Ukrainian armoured boats.
Analysis of reports and videos shows that, in the first weeks of the war, the US Navy destroyed Iran’s and the IRGC’s newest combat vessels, including large submarines, frigates, corvettes and combat craft. This suggests a significant reduction in the total mine-laying capacity of naval vessels, estimated at 800–1,200 units.
The presence of modern unmanned naval vehicles (surface/submerged) is likely, indirectly confirmed by the attack on a civilian vessel by an unmanned vehicle in March 2026. Experience from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict at sea (2022–2025) indicates the possibility of using drones for mining.
Planning and implementation of the mine-laying operation
Assessing Iran’s actions and capabilities involves retrospectively reconstructing the elements of the naval mine barrier plan. With no strategic surprise for the US, Iran had to anticipate the start of hostilities with a margin of error of no more than 1–2 days, depending on the occupation of combat zones by US forces.
The purpose of the mine-blockade operation depends on the strategic objectives of the Iranian armed forces. Mining the strait was considered a last resort in the event of external intervention, a threat to the territory, or an attempt at regime change. The minefield could only weaken Iran, primarily through delays in oil exports.
As a rule, the threat of mining was used to deter the enemy, which is what Iran did in the early days of the conflict. As American objectives became clearer and Iran’s capacity for resistance diminished, conditions were created for the full implementation of the plan to mine the strait.
A key question is whether Iran managed to preserve its mine stocks and carriers, dispersing them and preparing them for covert action. Analysis of US actions suggests that some minelaying vessels were damaged, but if Iranian vessels were at sea, they were likely carrying out missions to lay minefields. Thanks to its intelligence superiority, the US was able to locate and strike these vessels effectively.
In conclusion, the risky actions of Iranian vessels at sea were motivated by the need to create a system of active (offensive) and defensive naval minefields. In addition to blocking maritime routes, the Iranians were likely planning defensive anti-landing barriers and active minefields along the probable routes of the US Navy in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf.
The second part of the article will include an analysis of the military-geographical conditions of the Strait of Hormuz, US mine countermeasure capabilities, and the prospects for mine warfare in the strait.
Explosions involving US warships and vessels in the Persian Gulf
In the context of naval confrontations in the Persian Gulf, there are several notable incidents that highlight the impact of sea mines on warships and oil tankers.
The USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) incident – 14 April 1988
During the Iran-Iraq War, the US Navy’s Oliver Perry-class guided-missile frigate, USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), was blown up by an Iranian mine in the Persian Gulf. The ship sustained significant damage, but the crew managed to salvage it through effective interventions. Repairs to the ship took 13 months and cost approximately 90 million US dollars. In response to this incident, the US Navy launched Operation Praying Mantis on 18 April 1988, destroying five Iranian ships and boats (including a frigate, a missile boat and three small boats), damaging another frigate and destroying units on two oil platforms.
The Bridgeton Incident – 24 July 1987
The supertanker Bridgeton, with a displacement of over 400,000 tonnes, was crossing the Persian Gulf in a convoy protected by US warships when it struck an Iranian mine near Farsi Island. The explosion caused a 43-square-metre hole in the tanker’s hull, but the vessel continued on to port. Following the incident, signs of Iranian mining of the Gulf were found, but it was determined that this did not endanger the convoy.
The USS Princeton (CG-59) incident – 18 February 1991
On 18 February 1991, the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton (CG-59) was blown up near Faylaka Island by two Italian-made Manta-class (MN103 Manta) bottom mines. The ship sustained considerable damage and required repairs that took several months, costing approximately 24 million US dollars.
Maritime Security Forum
How Ukraine ‘sank’ a NATO frigate and didn’t even realise what had happened
During exercises in Portugal, the Ukrainian military ‘sank’ a frigate belonging to a NATO country, and the crew didn’t even realise what had happened, how it happened, or why they were unable to do anything about it.
It turned out that, during the 2025 REPMUS/Dynamic Messenger international exercise in Portugal, the Ukrainian military, which was also taking part in the exercises, conditionally sank a frigate belonging to an unnamed NATO country using unmanned boats. In addition to UAVs, various ships and aircraft took part in the exercises, writes DEFENSE EXPRESS.
During the exercises, the forces were divided into two sides, blue and red. It is known that the red side included units from the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Ukraine and other unnamed countries.
The Ukrainian army brought several unmanned Magura V7 drones, armed with an explosive payload and a machine gun. To hit the target, it was sufficient to aim and obtain a photograph or video footage, after which it was considered destroyed.
It can be assumed that, in the case of the Magura V7 equipped with an explosive payload, it had to fly close to a simulated enemy vessel. The same applies in reverse: it was sufficient to aim at the BEC and take a photograph or video footage for it to be considered destroyed.
Thus, during one of the exercise stages, the Ukrainian army carried out a simulated attack on the frigate on the blue side. As a result of the attack, the frigate sustained numerous simulated hits, which would have caused it to sink in a real battle. However, even after the attack had ended, the ship’s crew did not realise that it had already taken place.
And five minutes after the frigate was due to go down, the blue group asked in a joint chat: “So are you attacking us now or not?” The Ukrainian military concluded that the problem lay not in the availability of weapons to repel the BECs’ attack, but in detecting them, because, as we have already established, the crew did not even realise they had already been attacked.
From Defense Express, we add that, indeed, NATO frigates are heavily armed, particularly with automatic cannons and machine guns. Had the unmanned boats been detected, it is unlikely they would have been able to get so close to carry out an attack, and most likely, they would all have been destroyed.
For target detection, the frigates are equipped with a comprehensive array of sensors, including various radar stations, sonars, cameras, etc. However, Ukrainian naval drones are made of radar-transparent material, which makes them extremely difficult to detect using radar.
Furthermore, they are small in size and have a low profile, which makes it very difficult to detect them using sonar or cameras. They can simply hide amongst the waves and go unnoticed.
Consequently, one of the main tools for combating unmanned boats should be the means of detecting them. For example, a greater number of cameras equipped with artificial intelligence for identification, aerial drones or specialised radars are being developed to detect these targets.
It appears that, according to the results of the four-week REPMUS/Dynamic Messenger 2025 exercises, the red team led by the Ukrainian army emerged victorious.
Source: here
The energy crisis in Iran and global efforts to reduce fossil fuel consumption – Maritime Security Forum
The war in Iran has triggered a major energy shock, prompting decision-makers across the globe to rethink strategies to reduce dependence on oil and gas imports. Proposed solutions include expanding nuclear energy and developing renewable sources, increasing strategic reserves and domestic production, as well as diversifying external supply sources.
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, following the US and Israeli attack on 28 February, marked the third international energy shock of the decade, forcing governments to reassess the risks associated with dependence on the free flow of oil. This event fuelled the view that the fossil fuel era must be drawing to a close, against a backdrop of opposition to efforts to combat climate change.
Geoffrey Pyatt, former Under-Secretary of State for Energy Resources and current Managing Director at McLarty Associates, emphasised that the issue of energy security has never been as acute as it is today. Markets used to regard Gulf resources as guaranteed, but this perception has changed radically.
Europe, one of the largest energy consumers, has recently introduced financial guarantees for nuclear energy, following decades of nuclear power plant closures. Major energy importers are seeking to diversify their suppliers to minimise risks.
Global and regional reactions
China, the world’s largest consumer of Iranian oil, has accelerated its transition to renewable energy and expanded its emergency reserves, according to a department within the state planning body. Wang Jin, a senior researcher at the Beijing Club for International Dialogue, said that governments globally would reconsider supply chains and pay more attention to nuclear and clean energy.
In the short term, major consumer nations have opted for a coordinated release of emergency stocks at record levels, accompanied by calls for consumers to conserve energy.
Supply disruption and the impact on markets
The blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery for fossil fuels from the Middle East, has affected around 20% of the world’s supply of oil and liquefied natural gas. The International Energy Agency has described this situation as the most severe disruption in the history of global energy supplies, with crude oil prices exceeding $100 per barrel.
The current energy crisis follows Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which led Europe to cut Russian imports, and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, which caused a sharp drop in demand for fossil fuels, followed by a rapid rebound.
Both shocks have contributed to rising global inflation.
Asian dependence and regional reactions
Asia, which relies heavily on oil and LNG imports from the Middle East, has been hardest hit by both rising prices and supply disruptions. Refineries in Singapore and Malaysia have cut production, whilst petrochemical firms in Japan and Taiwan have reduced supplies to customers.
These difficulties have revitalised support for nuclear energy in certain regions. In Taiwan, officials are considering restarting the last nuclear power station, whilst Japan is discussing the restart of reactors shut down following the Fukushima disaster. Meanwhile, China, the largest buyer of Iranian oil, has reduced processing at its refineries and banned fuel exports to prevent domestic shortages.
China has been relatively insulated from the crisis thanks to its abundant emergency oil reserves and high electrification rate, with over half of new vehicle sales being electric and the grid powered by more than 50% renewable sources.
In the US, electric vehicles account for less than 10% of the market, and renewable energy covers around a quarter of electricity generation.
Officials in Japan, Taiwan, Bangladesh and Pakistan intend to diversify their import sources and purchase LNG on the spot market, reducing their reliance on long-term contracts from the Middle East.
Europe and strategic missteps
The cost of the European Union’s fossil fuel imports has risen by €6 billion since the outbreak of the conflict, amplifying pressure on energy prices. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has stated that dependence on costly and volatile imports puts Europe at a structural disadvantage and has proposed a programme for investment guarantees in innovative nuclear technologies.
The reduction in the share of nuclear energy in the European energy mix over the last 25 years has been deemed a strategic mistake, with nuclear production falling to 15% of the EU total, down from a third in 1990.
To protect citizens and businesses from rising costs, the EU is drafting changes to the carbon market and state aid measures, such as subsidies and tax breaks.
Russian advantages and new dependencies
The United States, the world’s largest producer of oil and gas, is less exposed to domestic shortages but is focused on tempering global prices against the backdrop of the war. Inflation is a key vulnerability for the Trump administration ahead of the elections.
The Trump administration has eased sanctions against Russia to allow additional purchases of Russian oil, marking a partial reversal of the previous strategy of reducing Moscow’s revenues.
The Iran crisis could lead to a reconsideration of Western sanctions on Russian LNG, as the EU and Asia lose supply sources. LNG now accounts for 45% of the EU’s gas imports, up from 20% in 2021.
The EU aims for its green energy plans to reduce exposure to disruptions such as those triggered by the war in Iran, but risks creating a new dependence on China, for both hardware and software.
Bart Groothuis, a Member of the European Parliament, has warned that, although Europe will no longer be subject to Vladimir Putin’s whims or instability in the Middle East, creating new dependencies on China could generate new problems in the energy infrastructure.
Maritime Security Forum
The Navy is juggling aircraft carrier plans to stay afloat
One aircraft carrier was already worn out before catching fire, another has had its service life extended for a second time, whilst the delivery of a third is delayed.
A perfect storm involving three US Navy aircraft carriers highlights the pressure on the fleet against the backdrop of an ongoing war in the Middle East and tensions in Asia. One of the carriers was damaged by a fire, another has just had its service life extended for a second time, and a third has had its delivery postponed until 2027. Although a Navy official told The War Zone that there is no link between the fire and the service life extension, taken together these events highlight just how difficult it is to build, operate and maintain these huge and costly nuclear-powered ships, especially when their deployments or service lives are pushed beyond their anticipated deadlines.
On 12 March, a fire broke out in the laundry area of the USS Gerald R. Ford whilst the ship was in the Middle East, injuring two sailors. Although officials initially said the damage was minor, the ship is now heading to Souda Bay in Crete for repairs, according to USNI, taking it out of the conflict with Iran. On Monday, The New York Times reported that the fire took more than 30 hours to extinguish and left over 600 sailors “sitting on the floors and tables”.
The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford was damaged by a fire in its laundry area. (Photo by Seaman’s Apprentice Nathan Sears) (Photo by Seaman’s Apprentice Nathan Sears)
It is unclear how long the repairs to the Ford will take, but only one aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln, remains as the conflict drags on into its 18th day with no immediate end in sight.
The fire was the latest in a series of problems for the Ford during a deployment that has lasted 10 months, extended twice, and which would have set a post-Vietnam War record by mid-April had it not been sent out of the theatre of operations. The previous record, of 294 days, was set by the USS Abraham Lincoln in 2020. However, a military official told the Times that the Pentagon acknowledges the Ford is reaching the limits of its deployment duration. He added that the USS George H.W. Bush is preparing to be deployed to the Middle East and will likely replace the Ford. CENTCOM declined to comment when we sought further details.
The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) crosses the Atlantic Ocean , 15 February 2026. (US Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Mitchell Mason) Petty Officer 2nd Class Mitchell Mason
As previously reported, the USS Ford experienced sewage issues before being deployed to the Middle East from the Caribbean, and the latter played a key role in the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro. Just prior to this, Admiral Daryl Caudle, the head of naval operations, was so concerned in January about the condition of the ship and its crew, and the scheduled repairs, that he said he would “reject” any order to extend the deployment.
Typical aircraft carrier missions last around six to eight months, a period intended to ensure that ships can maintain their readiness and crews do not become fatigued. When this does not happen, it creates a cascade of problems affecting not only the ships and crews, but also the facilities that have scheduled repairs and have lined up workers to carry them out.
The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, the last aircraft carrier to undertake an extended mission, has seen its planned maintenance extended by six months and is still ongoing, due to the additional pressure of having been away from its home port for so long. The Navy’s budget for the 2026 financial year shows that work on the ship should have been completed last July, but it remains unfinished. The lack of availability is reverberating throughout the rest of the fleet. This limits the options commanders have when planning or preparing for emergencies and throws the aircraft carrier’s overall availability plan out of balance.
The Ford was already set to require an extended refit before the fire, and now this could be prolonged even further. You can read much more about the problems created by the delayed maintenance of aircraft carriers through extended deployments in our in-depth analysis here.
Meanwhile, the USS Nimitz, the Navy’s oldest operational aircraft carrier, has had its service life extended for a second time.
“The service life of the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) has been further extended to March 2027,” the Navy said in a statement. “Consequently, the US Navy plans to decommission the ship in 2027.”
On 13 March, the Navy signed a $95.7 million contract with Huntington Ingalls Inc. “for advance planning and long-term procurement of materials to prepare for and facilitate the decommissioning and refuelling of the USS Nimitz (CVN 68). The work will be carried out in Newport News, Virginia, and is expected to be completed by March 2027.”
News of the extension emerged after the aircraft carrier left Naval Base Kitsap in Bremerton, Washington, on 7 March, heading for Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, as part of a scheduled homeport change prior to decommissioning, according to Breaking Defense, which was the first to report the change in the Nimitz’s plans. Originally, the Nimitz was scheduled to be decommissioned in April 2025, but this has been extended to May 2026.
The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) crosses Puget Sound during the ship’s final departure from Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton, Washington, on 7 March 2026. (US Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist Seaman Kimberli Ibarra Ruiz) Seaman Kimberli Ibarra Ruiz
It is unclear whether the Nimitz will be deployed before being permanently decommissioned, but it no longer has an assigned air wing.
However, the decision to keep the ship in service until 2027 coincides with the postponement of the delivery of the future USS John F. Kennedy, the second Ford-class aircraft carrier
The Kennedy’s delivery date “has been moved from July 2025 to March 2027 (preliminary acceptance to follow) to support the completion of Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) certification and the continuation of Advanced Weapons”, a Navy official told us in December.
Federal law requires the Navy to maintain at least 11 aircraft carriers in the fleet. We have asked the Navy whether there is a link between the Nimitz and Kennedy extensions and the delay in the Kennedy’s delivery, and we will update this story with any relevant information provided.
The Navy announced that the Kennedy completed Builder’s Sea Trials (BST) at Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS), a division of HII, in Newport News, Virginia, on 4 February. BSTs provide an opportunity to test the ship’s systems and components at sea for the first time and make any necessary adjustments prior to further sea trials.
The future USS John F. Kennedy has undergone the builder’s sea trials. (Photo by: Ricky Thompson/HII) ASHLEY COWAN
The current status of the Ford, Nimitz and Kennedy-class ships highlights the Jenga-like nature of trying to meet commanders’ needs whilst maintaining the condition of the ships and crews and complying with federal law. All of this, of course, is in flux. Given that America is in a new war with an uncertain future, there could be further upheavals in the Navy’s plans for its aircraft carrier fleet.
Source: here