The light corvette, an immediate solution to regional challenges-Cam (rtr) Dr Constantin CIOROBEA[1]
“… we need to think more broadly about the environment in our neighbourhood. We need to take a fresh look at the Black Sea region. That is why I will present, together with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, the new EU Black Sea Strategy before the summer.“[2] -17 April 2025/Sofia – statement by European Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Marta Kos.
- Introduction
Through its actions over the past decade and by promoting geopolitical revisionism in the Black Sea, Russia has unilaterally changed the security architecture and dynamics in the region. In practical terms, the main objective is the intention to establish an uncontested regional hegemony, facilitating the projection of influence beyond its neighbourhood into the Western Balkans, the South Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, with the desire to become a global player again.
The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, culminating in the total invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, has turned the Black Sea into a sensitive strategic area, which has dramatically heightened regional risks, putting the riparian countries and Western alliances on alert. But in addition to direct aggression against the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, the Russian Federation is also waging hybrid warfare against EU member states and in the maritime environment, in the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Black Sea and the Black Sea. All these Russian aggressions have generated a series of painful lessons that must lead to the adoption of urgent and effective measures to protect and ensure the sustainability of critical infrastructure in general and critical maritime infrastructure in particular, which have become favourite targets for aggressors in both hybrid actions and warfare.
The maritime domain is very important for critical sectors and industries such as communications, transport, energy production and transfer, trade, etc. and is also subject to the types of threats listed above due to the increasing interdependencies and interconnectivity between nations worldwide. For its part, the Black Sea has, in recent decades, become an area of economic and strategic competition, due to its importance for the transport of energy resources and the considerable potential of its hydrocarbon reserves. In this context, Romania plays a key role, with access to important deposits of natural gas and oil, including in the Neptun Deep perimeter, considered one of the most promising discoveries in recent decades.
- Romania’s challenges in the Black Sea
The Black Sea is a complex geopolitical, economic and security interest not only for the littoral states, but also for major international players such as the United States, the European Union and China.
The invasion of Ukraine has generated a total shift in the fragile regional balance and demonstrated that changing borders by force remains a reality, especially when you have as a regional neighbour a country with unpredictable behaviour, such as Russia.
The US has put the Black Sea region on the Congressional agenda, calling for increased interdepartmental effort and within a year to develop a new Black Sea strategy “to enhance military assistance and coordination with NATO and the EU, deepen economic ties, strengthen democracy and economic security, and increase security assistance with Black Sea countries.”[3] And in December 2023, the US Congress passed the “Black Sea Security Act of 2023[4] /Black Sea Security Strategy”. The new US Trump administration has engendered a new approach to engagement in support of partners that emphasises national interests and direct negotiation on US commitments in the region. The importance of the region to the US, is now complemented by the signing of the agreement with Ukraine on rare minerals and other resources. The signing of this agreement will lead to an increase in US interest in the Black Sea region, probably continued support for Ukraine, but also an involvement in the security of the region through support for NATO member countries in the region. And these countries will be directly involved in ensuring freedom of navigation in the region, the security of shipping and critical infrastructure.
The EU, for its part, intends to respond to these urgent regional challenges, on strengthening regional security and reducing dependence on the US. Thus the European Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Marta Kos declared on 17 April 2025 in Sofia “ The European Union needs a broader view of the context in its neighbourhood and a new perspective on the Black Sea region, with a focus on security and the main regional challenges and opportunities”[5] .
Among the strategic premises promoted at EU level, it is worth noting the transformation of the Black Sea from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO, thus becoming a region of strategic interest for European security: “The Black Sea has transformed from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO and, together with the Baltic Sea, has become a key strategic region for European security in combating the threat from Russia”[6] . As the maritime space under EU responsibility is subject to all types of threats, including hybrid threats, response measures need to be developed. “Growing hybrid threats include cyber-attacks, sabotage, electronic interference in global navigation and satellite systems, disinformation campaigns and political and industrial espionage, and the weaponisation of migration. Sabotage activities in the Baltic and Black Seas are on the increase. Maritime activities, naval transport and critical undersea infrastructure are under threat. Europe’s freedom of action in air and space is also increasingly under threat. “[7]
These geostrategic evolutions, which have led to radical changes in the security environment, have found Romanian policy almost completely disconnected from what is happening beyond its borders, in the Black Sea region, an aspect unfortunately complemented by a lack of vision on how to solve the complex security problems in the region and in the maritime space.
While Romania does not seem to be interested in regional security, some countries in the region, as well as international organisations interested in the Black Sea region, have drafted strategic documents to present their vision and interests regarding the design of the security model at regional level, namely in the maritime field.
Romania can no longer continue with this lack of vision in various areas and must initiate the development of strategic projects, focusing on increasing security, defence, economy, energy security and democratic resilience, deepening security cooperation between allies and regional partners, and one of the priorities is the need to define its own position on the regional security model. Otherwise, our country will continue to accept the security model promoted by Turkey and the Russian Federation based on the balance of power between the two countries, which has proved to be bankrupt.
The election of the new president and the elaboration of the country’s new national defence strategy is a favourable moment to define new directions of action necessary to implement and promote national interests and to ensure national security, and the Black Sea region and Romania’s Maritime Strategy can be an important area.
Regional security is also changing as NATO and the EU have recognised the importance of the Black Sea region for European stability and security. Also at the European level, the exploitation of Black Sea resources is in line with the objectives of the EU’s energy strategy, which encourages reducing dependence on Russia and increasing the use of domestic sources.
A major challenge in resource exploitation is environmental organisations opposing exploration and exploitation activities. And these actions must also be analysed in the context of geostrategic competition in the region. The Russian Federation, which plays a key role in the competition for resources in the Black Sea as the main supplier of natural gas to Europe, perceives any development of energy infrastructure in the region as a threat to its economic and geopolitical influence. This generates geopolitical tensions and requires additional security measures to favour Romania’s transformation into a regional energy hub. As Romania is playing an increasingly important role in realising energy security, cooperation in the field of maritime security is becoming more and more important to protect the offshore infrastructure from possible threats.
In addition to natural gas, the Black Sea is an important source of other mineral resources, including metalliferous sands and polymetallic sulphides. Although the extraction of these minerals is not yet profitable, the development of more efficient technologies could make the Black Sea an important source of raw materials for Romanian and European industries. These resources can strengthen Romania’s economic position, attracting strategic investments and contributing to the diversification of the EU’s energy supply, while also helping to reduce Romania’s dependence on imports of strategic metals, thus supporting the development of key industrial sectors.
- The light corvette, a solution to today’s security challenges
The change of the regional balance, the invasion of Ukraine, the de facto existence of an uncertain regional state “neither peace nor war“, the transformation of the Black Sea region, for the EU and NATO, from a secondary military theatre into a main military theatre, found Romania and the Romanian Navy under the influence of a lack of its own vision on the maritime environment, of a clear Black Sea policy and of a Maritime Strategy. But the Black Sea region has become, in the new post-M Munich 2025 context, a space where the interests of major powers and regional states intersect more intensely than ever before on the future of Euro-Atlantic security, in order to maintain stability and protect the interests of each regional actor.
Against this backdrop, the European Commission intends to present by this summer, 2025, its new Black Sea Strategy, conceived as a key policy framework for connecting the countries of the region and with a focus on security. Given the security situation in the region and the possibility of continued peace negotiations, military and maritime security issues will be an important chapter. The focus is likely to be on providing command and control, on shore and on board ship, for de-mining operations and ensuring freedom of navigation in the area of responsibility but also in Ukrainian waters, surveillance of the maritime space, the development of an EU, NATO mechanism for the protection of offshore and submarine infrastructure, the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania power cable, and logistical support for these missions.
The European Commission’s regional projects are particularly ambitious and Romania and Bulgaria, the only Black Sea littoral states on the EU’s borders, will have to support the EU’s endeavours in the region with capabilities. But the EU projects will be influenced by the provisions of the 1936 Montreaux Convention, because access for naval vessels from non-neighbouring states will be restricted for a long period, in a bid to reduce the escalation of tensions in the region.
So regardless of how the war launched by the Russian Federation is finalised, the two countries will be asked to take on a significant share of the regional security burden, especially in the maritime area of interest. This will entail a permanent naval presence in the area of responsibility, taking part in missions to ensure freedom of navigation and support de-mining actions to be carried out in the sea lanes of communication, and providing the necessary facilities for a maritime command post. It should also be borne in mind that these missions are of long duration and will require a particular commitment of forces and resources, especially from the naval forces of the two countries.
The Paris meeting of the heads of state and government of the “Coalition of the willing” on security in Ukraine on 27 March 2025 identified several aspects presented at the end of the Paris meeting, by the interim president Mr Ilie Bolojan, who underlined Romania’s role in this coalition, a role that also corresponds to our national interests in the region “Romania will participate in this working group and, through the infrastructure it has, radars, drones, aerial police, as well as cooperation with Turkey and Bulgaria on demining, we will work together so that this agreement is respected, because a safe area in the Black Sea, which guarantees navigation for all ships, is good for trade and development in this area”[8] .
But the situation for the naval forces of the two countries is not optimistic, as both have old ships that will be stretched to the limit during long and operationally intense missions.
Bulgaria is operationalising a multirole patrol vessel of the MMPV/Multi-Purpose Modular Multirole Patrol Vessel type, with the designation Hrabri,[9] built in the MTG Dolphin shipyard in Varna. The vessel is expected to be handed over to the Bulgarian Naval Forces at the end of 2025, after completion of the necessary tests, so it will be operational most likely in summer 2026. Also in December 2024, the second patrol vessel, Smeli, was launched in the water, with delivery scheduled for 2026. The design of the patrol vessels, which are actually a kind of corvette, was developed for Bulgaria based on the OPV-90 patrol vessel of the German company Lürssen Defence.
As regards the Romanian Naval Forces, the last coherent programme for equipping the Romanian Navy with warships was represented by the purchase, in 1990 and 1991, of the three missile-carrying ships “ZBORUL”, “PESCĂRUȘUL” and “LĂSTUNUL”.
There was an unsuccessful attempt to equip four corvettes, the programme was triggered in 2016, restarted in 2019, and in 2023 the project was withdrawn, so today, after nine years of projects, the naval forces have virtually no modern capabilities in place to support EU security projects in the region.
But in addition to EU projects in the region, the Black Sea basin has become inhospitable, with maritime blockades, drifting mines, attacks on civilian or critical maritime infrastructure, jamming of ships’ GPS signals and diversion of trade routes threatening to further disrupt the region. Practically at sea, we can consider that we have a situation of “neither peace nor war“, and Romania must react firmly to these challenges and the Romanian Naval Forces will play an increasingly important role.
Resource exploitation in the Black Sea is not without geopolitical challenges. The Russian Federation strengthened its military presence in the region after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, using the Black Sea as a strategic platform for its regional influence. Control over energy resources is thus becoming a factor of tension, and Romania needs to develop the necessary capabilities to protect them in long-term missions.
The competition for access to offshore mineral resources is taking place in a complex geopolitical context characterised by economic and strategic rivalries. In this new security framework, Romania must understand that membership of the Euro-Atlantic structures is not an absolute guarantee, and the development of national defence forces is an increasingly necessary requirement.
In addition to the urgency of EU requirements for regional security capabilities, of those necessary for the projection of national interests in the Black Sea region, in the design of naval capabilities, Romania must also take into account EU initiatives in the development of these capabilities, such as the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) programme.
The programme is a collaborative concept aimed at developing new corvette-class ships capable of performing a wide range of future missions[10] . The initiative involves EU naval forces and project members, with five countries (Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Norway, Italy, France, Spain and Greece) formally joining the EPC project, while Romania, Ireland and Portugal participate as observers. The programme is being developed by a consortium of the European shipyards Navantia (Spain), Fincantieri (Italy) and Naval Group (France), together with the joint venture Naviris (France/Italy) and Hydrus (Greece) and other beneficiaries from Greece, Denmark and Norway .[11]
The programme is now in its second four-year phase (2025-2029) and aims to complete the critical design review and production of two prototypes: a Long Range Mission (LRM) and a Full Combat Mission (FCM). These prototypes will form the basic models for future national corvette fleets, enhancing commonality, interoperability and standardisation within the naval forces of EU Member States. The vessels will be modular, interoperable and capable of a wide range of missions adapted to the specific needs of each fleet. These missions include maritime surveillance with a high degree of autonomy and operations to enforce law or promote sovereignty in areas of responsibility.
Given the EU requirements, the emergencies mentioned at regional or national level, as well as the perspective projects in the naval field at European level, Romania does not have many options to ensure in the short term the necessary capabilities for the maritime environment and especially cannot afford to wait another 5-8 years and realise that nothing has been acquired.
First of all, it must be understood that the region is characterised by an uncertain state of “neither peace nor war“, and the mentality regarding the development of the Romanian Naval Forces must be changed, which was marked by a misperception specific to the post-NATO accession period, characterised by a minimalist, defensive approach, which promoted the concept that membership in the North Atlantic alliance automatically equals guaranteed security of the national maritime space. This model of almost exclusive dependence on NATO has inevitably led to chronic underfunding of the Romanian naval component, stagnation of modernisation programmes and neglect of the building of its own naval deterrence and projection capabilities.
The evolution of the security situation in the wider Black Sea region in the period 2022-2025, generated by the Russian-Ukrainian war, has shown that the security of a state in the face of a direct military threat cannot depend exclusively on allied solidarity, but on its own level of preparedness, capabilities adapted to new forms of conflict and the existence of a credible naval force.
Thus, first and foremost, the programme of modernising the vessels in the fleet must be continued, supplemented by the acquisition of new vessels. And in this new paradigm, the acquisition in the first phase of 2-4 Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), equipped to the level of corvettes (light corvettes), may represent a solution. The patrol vessel concept allows for a variable outfitting and configuration, adaptable to various missions, ranging from patrolling and surveillance, search and rescue operations, anti-smuggling, rapid intervention on offshore economic targets or low intensity military actions. Compared to large platforms (frigates or corvettes), these vessels have low acquisition costs, low operating costs and low maintenance costs, providing the capabilities needed to conduct long combat actions in a less hostile environment.
It should also be taken into account that some NATO and EU states are tending to integrate patrol vessels as an element of their naval development strategies, and in the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) programme one of the prototypes is considering this concept.
Such vessels have several advantages: they provide a high degree of adaptability, can carry out a wide variety of missions, have the facilities to operate a helicopter and UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) and launch a RHIB (rigid-hull inflatable boat), or surface drones.
It also includes the “Fitted For But Not With (FFBNW)” concept. This aspect describes a construction project that provides the opportunity to include some weapon systems in the project, but that system is not installed or is only partially installed during construction, with installation being completed later as required. The concept may be to leave sufficient space to provide for future upgrades, or to install a particular weapon system but without the purchase of ammunition.
In this context, the light corvette concept allows for the installation of the latest-generation US Naval Strike Missile (NSM) anti-ship missiles, which are in the process of being procured, and of anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems adapted to operational requirements.
Another important aspect is the very good price and short delivery time when such vessels are in production. Also the fact that such ships are being manned by naval forces makes it easier to reduce the crew training time, which can be estimated to be at least four months, in parallel with the finalisation of the ship.
Thus, during the meeting of the Supreme Council for National Defence of 28 March 2025, it was presented that Romania, as a state bordering the Black Sea, is following with the utmost attention all the discussions related to the armistice, its monitoring and ensuring the safety of navigation in the area. Also “In this security context, the members of the Council, at today’s meeting, analysed and approved the provision of the Romanian Naval Forces with a new light corvette capable of carrying out a multitude of missions in the shortest possible time, with a view to the Ministry of National Defence taking the necessary steps to carry out the purchase. The fitting out of such a vessel will have a significant impact on the existing fleet, being part of the modernisation and equipping programmes in various stages of implementation. The Romanian Army will continue to focus its strategic efforts on strengthening national and allied defence capabilities in order to deter and effectively combat all types of classical, asymmetric, hybrid and other threats.”[12]
Regarding the sale of a Hisar-class OPV, indirect references to Romania were made in Turkey. However, there has been no confirmation from official sources about the export to Romania.[13]
As for the continuation of the naval forces’ equipping programme, in parallel with the modernisation of the existing ships and the acquisition of Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), the process of building four corvettes by a domestic yard using the facilities offered by the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) programme may be initiated.
- Conclusions
Irrespective of how the war started by the Russian Federation with its attack on Ukraine will be finalised, regional security, i.e. the security of the Black Sea, will be complicated. The region’s security architecture will be redefined and Romania must step up its efforts to be a security provider, to promote its own interests in the region and to support EU and NATO projects. In this context, Romania must initiate a process to draw up a Maritime Strategy, a comprehensive plan that includes maritime, military, economic and energy security, the response to hybrid threats, protracted conflicts and strategic competition in the Black Sea.
That is why now is one of those moments when a regional security construction can be initiated, even if it will require special costs. For the success of the initiative, the efforts of all those who can support such a project must be united, starting with NATO, which has initiated a series of actions, then the EU, which has also declared its open interest in this region through its new Black Sea strategy. Romania must act to deter Russia and promote the presence of the EU and NATO in the region. This multidimensional approach to the Black Sea security project may attract partner and candidate countries, but it may also induce Turkey to collaborate at regional level. In the absence of strategic documents for different areas, Romania may become a hostage to the interests of large economic or state actors.
The mineral resources in the Black Sea play an essential role in Romania’s strategic positioning on the geopolitical map of Europe. The exploitation of offshore deposits, particularly in the Neptun Deep perimeter, has economic, energy and security implications that influence both Romania’s bilateral relations with the major powers and its status in the European Union and NATO.
In addition to the economic impact, the exploration and exploitation of marine resources has major strategic implications. The presence of international companies and the growing interest of major powers in the region emphasise the importance of the Black Sea as an area of geopolitical competition. In this context, Romania needs to align its energy policies and security strategy with international realities, maintaining a balance between economic development and national security.
These radical changes in the regional security architecture, the EU’s growing involvement in the region and the development of offshore economic projects have caught Romania without the necessary defence, hybrid threat countering, protection and surveillance capabilities. Thus, the Romanian Naval Forces (FNR) are faced with the need to rapidly adapt their own capabilities, and the modernisation of the ships in their complement and the acquisition of light corvette platforms are emerging as an urgent and unavoidable strategic priority, especially as the acquisition of multirole corvettes has been delayed for an inordinately long time.
Equipping Romania with light corvette platforms gives it time to integrate the European Corvette/EPC programme supported by the European Defence Agency (€60 million from the European Defence Fund in the form of grants). This programme will generate two ship prototypes by 2029, representing a common platform that can be customised according to Member States’ requirements.
In terms of sensors and armaments, each participating country can configure them as it wishes as long as it is large enough to accommodate a reasonable range of armaments. The project provides the possibility of installing an 8-cell or 16-cell vertical launcher. The Vard shipyards (Brăila, Tulcea) that Fincantieri owns in Romania, as well as other shipyards that may join the programme, can benefit from this project.
In view of the provisions of the 1936 Montreaux Convention on the access of military vessels of non-coastal states, Romania’s direct involvement in regional security will be increasingly important, as the non-Black Sea states will not send vessels to the region for a long period of time, in order to reduce the escalation of tensions in the region. And the requirements to ensure freedom of navigation for their own harbours but also for the transport of grain, and now after the signing of the US agreement with Ukraine on rare minerals and other resources, minerals and other goods from Ukrainian ports, will be increasingly emphasised.
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[1] Cam (rtr) dr. CIOROBEA Constantin, CLUBUL AMIRALILOR / Maritime Security Forum, cciorobea@yahoo.com
[2] https://presamil.ro/o-noua-strategie-europeana-pentru-marea-neagra/
[3] “Romney, Shaheen Unveil Bipartisan Bill to Establish U.S. Strategy Toward Black Sea Region,” Senator Mitt Romney, July 12, 2022, https://www.romney.senate.gov/romney-shaheen-unveil-bipartisan-bill-to-establish-u-s-strategy-toward-black-sea-region/
[4] https://www.romney.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/black_sea_security_bill_2023.pdf
[5] https://presamil.ro/o-noua-strategie-europeana-pentru-marea-neagra/
[6] European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2025 on the White Paper on the future of European defence/ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0034_RO.html
[7] White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030/ https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc0-3867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for % 20European%20defence%20%E2%E2%80%93%20Readiness%20202030.pdf
[8] https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/declaratii-de-presa-sustinute-de-presedintele-interimar-al-romaniei-ilie-bolojan-dupa-participarea-la-reuniunea-sefilor-de-stat-si-de-guvern-ai-coalition-of-the-willing-privind-securitatea-in-ucraina
[9] https://newsweek.ro/international/bulgaria-ne-o-ia-inainte-acord-cu-germania-pentru-a-echipa-nave-cu-sisteme-avansate-de-razboi
[10] https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/european-patrol-corvette-epc-europe/?cf-view
[11] https://defence-industry.eu/european-multi-mission-patrol-corvette-project-secures-additional-eu-funding/
[12] https://csat.presidency.ro/ro/comuni/sedinta-consiliului-suprem-de-aparare-a-tarii1743168241
[13] https://turdef.com/article/romania-might-buy-a-hisar-class-offshore-patrol-vessel