IS ROMANIA PREPARED TO PROTECT ITS CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE? – Author Rear Admiral (rtr) PhD. Ion CUSTURĂ[1]
INTRODUCTION
Starting from the realities of recent serious international events, and I am referring here primarily to the hybrid warfare actions carried out by the Russian Federation in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and the Black Sea, culminating in the aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, a number of painful lessons have been identified that must lead to the adoption of urgent and effective measures to protect, ensure the resilience and sustainability of the country’s critical infrastructure in general and its critical maritime infrastructure in particular, in particular, which have become prime targets for aggressors in both hybrid actions and actual warfare.
Since the last decades of the last century and up to the present, the security of the normal functioning of nations and the global socio-economic system has been subject to various hybrid threats, of a physical and cybernetic nature, which have endangered the most sensitive components of their critical infrastructure, such as the facilities, systems and networks that ensure their normal functioning. The maritime domain is very important for critical sectors and industries such as communications, transport, energy production and transfer, trade, etc., and is also subject to the types of threats listed above due to the increasing interdependence and interconnectivity between nations worldwide, which gives critical maritime infrastructure geopolitical significance.
Critical maritime infrastructure can be understood in simple terms as the systems and means that are essential for the normal functioning of a society, economy and country from a maritime perspective. It is very important that Romanian policy makers recognise the importance and identify what Critical Maritime Infrastructure (CMI) means for the country, and prepare, adopt and implement as urgently and effectively as possible appropriate and adequately budgeted policies, strategies, legislative documents, plans and programmes so as to enable existing structures and institutions, or those that need to be set up specifically, to take effective measures to protect CII and ensure its resilience and sustainability.
DEFINITION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CI) AND CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE (CII)
Although there are common approaches to the content of critical infrastructure (CI)/critical maritime infrastructure (CMI), no common definition of the two concepts has yet been agreed upon. CI is considered to consist of systems that provide important functions for a country or region and that could affect the normal life of their community if these functions were interrupted or disrupted, covering almost every sector of activity, from a city’s drinking water and sewage network to the huge network of submarine communications cables crossing the Pacific Ocean.
The US has identified 16 critical infrastructure sectors[2]:
· Chemical: an integral component of the economy, businesses, warehouses, users (especially farmers), distributors and transporters of hazardous chemical/petrochemical materials, on which other sectors rely;
· Commercial facilities: provide a diverse range of locations that attract large crowds/masses of people for shopping, business, leisure/entertainment or communal living;
· Communications: is mainly a private sector, responsible for protecting its infrastructure and assets, with the Cybersecurity Infrastructure & Security Agency (CISA) supporting it in planning, anticipating and responding to sector disruptions; composed of communications networks (including submarine cables), internet service provider infrastructure and satellite systems;
· Disaster response materials and resources manufacturing companies: CISA identifies, assesses, prioritises, and protects industries of national importance to prevent and mitigate the impact of natural or man-made disasters;
· Dams: this sector provides critical water storage, retention and control services throughout the country, supplying water to many critical infrastructure sectors;
· Defence industry production bases: these consist of industrial complexes around the world that provide research and development for military weapons systems, subsystems, components and spare parts;
· Emergency services: infrastructure for police, fire and emergency management systems that maintain public safety and security, conduct life-saving operations, protect property and the environment, and assist communities affected by disasters;
· Energy: thermal power plants and electricity distribution networks, oil and natural gas facilities, oil and fuel pipelines and storage tanks, resources and means that maintain energy reserves at optimal levels and ensure the general health and well-being of the population;
· Financial services: banks, stock exchanges, payment systems and housing, financial institutions, from the largest global companies to community banks and credit institutions facing potential risks;
· Food and agriculture: farms, food processing facilities, food distribution networks and food safety systems, as well as food-related industries;
· Government services and facilities: federal, state, local and tribal government facilities and national security systems;
· Health and public health: hospitals, clinics and their supply chains for medical supplies and medicines, which rely on collaboration with all economic sectors to protect them from threats such as terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks and natural disasters;
· Information technology: data centres, critical infrastructure software and hardware systems, cyber security systems and internet infrastructure, which provide protection against increasingly important and complex cyber threats and vulnerabilities;
· Nuclear reactors, nuclear materials and waste: nuclear facilities, ranging from power reactors to medical isotopes used to treat patients, the US has an extensive civil nuclear infrastructure;
· Transportation system: ensures the rapid movement and transport of people and goods safely within the country and around the world, consisting of airports, seaports and river ports, railways, motorways, bridges and local public transport systems;
· Water and wastewater: water treatment plants, reservoirs, pumping stations and sewerage systems, which are vital to the stability and health of the nation.
Each of these sectors is considered to be of great importance both in its own field of activity and for the sectors it could affect in the event of malfunctions, but in general, those sectors that ensure the continuation of critical state (government and business) activities and provide vital services are considered to be of vital importance. if compromised or not quickly restored, could endanger public health or national safety and economic security. Although they vary from country to country or region to region, the following sectors are generally considered vital: energy, water, transport and communications.
The maritime sector is of particular importance to a number of critical industries such as communications, transport, energy transfer, trade, etc., which may be subject to threats that impact the sustainable use and management of marine resources for economic growth, job creation and the general well-being of society. As a result, some important state and non-state actors are paying particular attention to critical maritime infrastructure (CMI) by setting up CMI monitoring and analysis structures and force packages to prevent and combat risks and threats to it. Thus, the Maritime Security Centre of Excellence (MARSEC COE) was established in Istanbul, Turkey, with Turkey as the framework nation and Romania and Greece as sponsor nations, becoming the 26th NATO centre of excellence on 8 June 2020. Furthermore, in response to the Russian Federation’s increasing hybrid actions in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, on 28 May 2024 NATO established within MARCOM/Norfolk, UK Centre for Critical Submarine Infrastructure Security, specifically “designed to protect the thousands of nautical miles of submarine oil and gas cables and pipelines that are vulnerable to attacks aimed at disrupting and breaking energy supply chains, global communications and international economic activity. The determination of NATO and the EU to strengthen the resilience of their states and launch a joint task force on critical infrastructure resilience (NATO-EU Task Force on Resilient Critical Infrastructure) are examples of collective efforts that can lead to increased protection of critical maritime infrastructure[3].
MARSEC COE has concluded that a generalised definition of Critical Maritime Infrastructure (CMI) should be understood as that part of a country’s critical infrastructure that comprises systems and assets that are essential for the functioning of society, the economy and a country from a maritime perspective and could include assets, facilities, systems, networks and essential processes that support the security, safety and stability of maritime operations[4].
ELEMENTS OF CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE (CMI)/ MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (MCI)
Of course, the definition of IMC/MCI is essentially a general approach, which can be better supported and explained by the specific parts that comprise it and which contribute to a better understanding and more intuitive explanation of it.
Based on the above definition and following a thorough analysis by MARSEC COE experts, it was found that IMC/MCI comprises the following elements[5]:
1. Mega-ports and mega-maritime terminals
2. Offshore platforms
3. Submarine/underwater internet/communications cables
4. Subsea oil fields
5. Offshore drilling and extraction platforms
6. Subsea oil and gas pipelines
7. Refineries
8. Oil, petroleum product and gas storage facilities
9. Power plants and high- and medium-voltage network nodes near ports and large coastal cities
10. Mandatory crossing points
11. Maritime communication lines
In my opinion, and after reviewing other works[6], I believe that the following elements should be added to the IMC/MCI components listed above:
12. Navigation channels with their locks, if not included in the mandatory crossing points
13. Submarine power cables
14. Offshore wind farms
15. Safe navigation and beaconing systems, as well as traffic control centres (VTSs – Vessel Traffic Systems/ VTIS – Vessel Traffic and Information Systems)
16. Shipyards at sea and on rivers
17. Military bases/ports on the coast/river and their depots
18. Road and railway bridges in coastal and river areas
19. Logistics bases of regional importance on the coast and rivers
20. Tanks/storage facilities for chemical substances and fertilisers (on the coast and at sea)
Taking into account all of the above, we can identify what could constitute elements of Romania’s critical maritime (and river) infrastructure:
1. The ports of Constanța, Mangalia, Midia, Galați, Brăila and Tulcea
2. Drilling and extraction platforms in the Romanian EEZ
3. Submarine pipelines and the oil terminal in Midia, and in the future the Neptun Deep-Tuzla pipeline
4. The Midia-Năvodari refinery
5. Oil and gas reservoirs/storage facilities in Constanța and ships for storing oil extracted from platforms (‘Buștenari’)
6. Tanks, storage facilities and vessels for the storage and transport of chemical substances and fertilisers in Romanian ports, on the coast and at sea
7. Entrance to the Sulina Canal, as a mandatory passage point from the Black Sea to the Danube
8. Maritime communication lines in the Black Sea, mainly Constanța-Bosphorus and Sulina-Bosphorus
9. The Danube-Black Sea, Sulina and Midia-Poarta Albă channels
10. Shipyards in Constanța, Mangalia, Midia, Tulcea, Brăila, Galați, Turnu-Severin and Orșova
11. Military ship bases, large units and their logistics bases and depots in the ports of Constanța, Mangalia, Tulcea, Brăila and Galați
12. Road and rail bridges over the Danube-Black Sea Canal and the Danube River
13. The Iron Gates 1 and 2 dams on the Danube
14. Safe navigation and beaconing systems, as well as traffic control centres in Constanța and Sulina.
CHALLENGES AND THREATS TO THE IMC/MCI
Given the complexity and diversity of the elements that make up the IMC/MCI, we can easily conclude that the challenges and threats they face are at least as complex and diverse.
Among the challenges and threats facing the ICM/MCI are those of a cybernetic nature, terrorism, hybrid actions and direct physical destruction, whether intentional or not, in times of peace or crisis, culminating in military actions targeting such objectives in the event of war.
As mentioned in the introduction, there have been many incidents and accidents related to critical maritime infrastructure, which have taken on a large scale, especially in the last decade and particularly since three years ago, when the Russian Federation launched its aggression against Ukraine and amplified its hybrid actions against neighbouring states, the EU and NATO. I will review just a few of these.
The sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines in September 2022, whose perpetrator has not yet been identified, is already well known and highly topical. A number of uncertainties surround the incident, which state and non-state actors are still trying to clarify and reach a final conclusion on the real perpetrator of the sabotage. The incidents in November 2024 that affected the submarine cables between Finland and Germany (Central European countries) and between Sweden and Lithuania are also noteworthy. Almost all state and non-state actors have assumed that these were ‘hybrid actions’ supported by Russia, which may seem very plausible in the context of Russia’s actions in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea in recent years, either directly or indirectly, through its ‘shadow fleet’ or ‘intermediaries’. However, it appears that one of the incidents was most likely due to an accident caused by bad weather and faulty handling of the anchor by the crew of a ship, with the authorities involved continuing their investigations. In 2008, between 23 January and 1 February, six fibre optic communication cables were severed in the Mediterranean Sea, near the entrance to the Suez Canal and in the Red Sea, blocking connections between Europe and the Middle East and the north coast of Africa for almost a week. Although the perpetrators were not identified, the fact that the incidents occurred within a week led to the idea that they were intentional.
Most of these incidents are accidental, with nearly 200 cables broken or interrupted annually worldwide due to fishing nets and other equipment or ship anchors.
Another major cause of damage to submarine cables and pipelines is earthquakes/submarine tectonic plate movements, submarine volcanic eruptions followed by tsunamis, or disasters caused by human activity, such as the Fukushima reactor explosion in Japan.
Other significant incidents related to IMC/CMI were those related to the blockage of important shipping lanes, and here I would refer to the blockage of the Suez Canal for six days in March 2021 due to totally unfavourable hydrometeorological conditions for the manoeuvre of the container ship ‘Ever Given’ This blockage led to an estimated market loss of USD 9.6 billion.
Remaining on the same subject, we cannot fail to mention the clearly intentional blockage of the Sulina Canal by the Ukrainian ship Rostock, loaded with metal profiles, on 2 September 1991 near the town of Partizani, which was left “tailing” from the perspective of the Romanian authorities. It was only ‘removed piece by piece’ from the canal in 2005, and a bypass canal was dug on the shore of the commune of Ilgani to allow navigation to resume quickly. We have not found details regarding the total damage suffered by the Romanian state, but this incident appears to have been motivated by the Ukrainians’ desire to open the Bâstroe Canal on the Chilia Branch for navigation in order to bypass the Sulina Branch and avoid canal fees.
If the incidents listed above occurred in peacetime, we can imagine that in wartime, critical maritime infrastructure elements become prime targets for military action, hit both with conventional weapons (aircraft bombs, land and naval artillery, missiles, torpedoes, drones, etc.) and by diversionary actions by special forces. These statements are supported by numerous examples from the three years of the war launched by Russia against Ukraine and even before its outbreak, when a multitude of hybrid actions were carried out, which continued and intensified during the aggression.
Among the hybrid actions that preceded and then increased in number and destructive results during the war, the following could be mentioned:
– the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 using the “little green men” method (military structures with weapons and military equipment and fighters in khaki uniforms without epaulettes or military insignia), then the reuse of the same method before the outbreak of hostilities in the regions targeted at the start of the aggression: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhia;
– the abusive establishment of vast areas for military exercises for ships using live artillery ammunition, missiles and torpedoes, which extended throughout the northern Black Sea area, practically to the limit of Ukraine’s territorial waters, disrupting, or rather blocking, all international maritime communication routes to and from Ukrainian ports in the north and north-west of the Black Sea; this raises a big question mark regarding the attitude that should have been taken by the hydrographic authority responsible for this area, given the obvious aggressive attitude of the Russian Federation;
– jamming and spoofing (generating false information to mislead) of GPS terminals for electronic navigation of ships and traffic coordination stations in port areas and traffic separation systems, as well as their satellite communications
– destruction of dams on the Dniester and Dnieper rivers and flooding of large areas to prevent or slow down ground operations (Ukrainian counteroffensive)
– destruction or damage to bridges and communication routes on major rivers and streams in the areas of operations (including the bridge over the Kerch Strait, an action by the Ukrainians, for which the Russians took special protective measures after the attack)
– destruction of power stations and important electrical network connection nodes near or within sea and river ports
– cyber attacks on communications and data centres that regulate or coordinate maritime activities or deal with the distribution of electricity or oil and gas flows.
Returning to the ICM/MCI and its elements in Romania, we can easily identify a number of risks and threats to these elements.
Firstly, consideration should be given to physical or cyber hybrid actions with destructive effects that could be carried out even in peacetime against Romanian maritime and river ports and navigable channels, which could cause them to be taken out of operation by:
· blocking entry/exit to/from ports and access routes to and from the Danube River with ships scuttled or sunk as a result of collisions or ‘technical failures’ whether intentional or not; destroying the locks of the Danube-Black Sea canal, which would cause unimaginable disasters by flooding large areas, not to mention the sudden rise in water levels in the port of Constanța and the devastating effects on ships in the port and related port infrastructure;
· blocking of shipping lanes (navigable channels and the Danube river) by destroying the railway and road bridges that cross them, as well as the accumulation dams at Iron Gates 1 and 2;
· explosions at oil, petroleum product and gas processing, storage and stockpiling facilities near ports, refineries, offshore platforms and offshore oil storage vessels, as well as at subsea and onshore pipelines near the coast used to transport these products;
· explosions (intentional or due to improper handling and storage) of hazardous chemicals and products with explosive potential (we cannot fail to mention here the disaster in Beirut on 5 August 2020, when 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate confiscated from a Georgian ship without legal transport documents and stored in unsafe conditions exploded, killing 106 people and injuring 5,000, destroying 80 buildings and 1,000 homes, and causing extensive damage to the port and surrounding area);08.2020, when 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, confiscated from a Georgian ship that did not have legal transport documents and stored in unsafe conditions, exploded, killing 100 people, injuring another 4,000, causing the disappearance of over 100 people and devastating several neighbourhoods in the city, with material damage estimated at USD 3-5 billion – the explosion was equivalent to a 3.3 magnitude earthquake on the Richter scale and appears to have been the result of an attack in retaliation for the seizure of the cargo)[7];
· Shipyards on the sea and rivers may be particular targets for hybrid actions aimed at disabling production and repair capabilities, affecting both the civilian and military sectors; extending to the military field, we could mention acts of sabotage and destruction of bases with military ships, large units and logistics bases and their warehouses in Romanian sea and river ports and near the coast or the Danube;
· the destruction of network nodes, power plants and even the electricity transmission infrastructure that supplies power to ports, shipyards, refineries and large cities in the coastal area;
· Cyber attacks on databases and communications infrastructure of IT systems dedicated to port and maritime activities, energy and water supply, and oil and gas pipeline flow, can be just as dangerous for IMC/MCI.
· Furthermore, disruption through jamming and spoofing of GPS terminals for electronic navigation of ships, traffic coordination centres and stations in port areas, traffic separation systems and their satellite communications.
As mentioned above, while in peacetime hybrid actions against IMC/MCI can cause major damage and disruption to economic and social activities in the maritime and related sectors, in wartime the widespread use of air, naval and submarine weapons and the massive use of drones against critical maritime infrastructure which have become prime military targets, could completely paralyse activity in this area.
Eloquent examples can be found in the military actions of the Russian Federation during the three years of aggression against Ukraine, when seaports and river ports, energy infrastructure, dams, war production facilities, military bases and their depots in ports and on the coast were priority targets of the Russian army.
In principle, in times of peace or in the early stages of crisis situations and in the event of disasters/natural disasters or disasters caused by human error, those responsible for the protection of CII/CII are the economic operators that operate critical infrastructure elements and must take appropriate measures to protect them, and if they are unable to cope with the situation, they must request the support of state or non-state entities that have forces and means specific to protection actions in the area where the respective elements are located (including cyber security), such as the Navy, Coast Guard or Air Force, which can operate in maritime/riverine and adjacent areas with surface vessels, submarines, autonomous or deep-sea divers, drones/USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles), UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) or UUWVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles), integrated surveillance and naval, air and submarine situation analysis systems/centres, etc. During crisis situations and at war, it is clear that IMC/MCI objectives become targets for enemy military action and will therefore be priorities for protection, mainly through actions by the Romanian Naval Forces (FNR) in close cooperation/collaboration with other specialised forces of the national defence system.
Although we have a war on our border, our naval forces have been deprived of combat ships and modern means to deal with new types of threats to national security and critical infrastructure in general, but also to critical maritime infrastructure, and are currently only able to react to a limited extent to protect them in the event of real action by potential adversaries.
Moreover, the critical maritime infrastructure in the FNR’s area of responsibility is crucial for supporting and defending the southern flank of NATO and the EU, rising to the level of strategic importance, especially given that the extraction of methane gas and its transport through the Neptun Deep-Tuzla pipeline, intended to compensate to a large extent for the cessation of EU gas imports from the Russian Federation and to contribute decisively to ensuring Romania’s energy independence, will soon be completed.
Given the complexity and high technological level of the means used in actions against the IMC/MCI, it is necessary to equip the Romanian Naval Forces and other forces that can contribute to the protection of critical maritime infrastructure with modern, state-of-the-art ships and combat means, and be able to carry out combat missions at sea against surface ships, submarines, cruise/hypersonic missiles, aircraft (fixed-wing or helicopters), torpedoes, aerial, naval and submarine drones, as well as mines.
CONCLUSION
There are states and international organisations, the most relevant for us being the US, France, the UK, Germany, the Baltic and Nordic states, NATO and the EU, which, understanding the importance of critical infrastructure and the need to protect it, have developed important policies, strategies, laws, documents and action plans for Critical Infrastructure in general and Critical Maritime Infrastructure in particular. Searching the legislative and CSAT websites for laws or regulations related to our country’s critical infrastructure, we did not find any document addressing this highly topical issue, especially given that for three years we have been engaged in a full-scale war on our borders and have even seen Russian drones or their debris entering Romanian territory, as well as sea mines drifting in our territorial waters, the contiguous zone and the Exclusive Economic Zone. It is possible that all documents related to Romania’s critical infrastructure are contained in secret documents that are not accessible to the general public, but why have other states, NATO and the EU addressed this issue publicly without publishing truly secret data and activities whose disclosure would endanger the IMC/MCI?
The only visible reactions from the Romanian state were to alert the population, send aircraft from the air police service to the area to detect, recognise and monitor their trajectory, and set up commissions (sometimes led by the Minister of Defence) and teams to investigate the site where they fell. A series of effective measures were taken at sea involving SMFN forces and resources (combat and auxiliary vessels, helicopters, EOD divers and radio-electronic surveillance and observation equipment) with a special operational effort to monitor and provide early warning of maritime hazards, in particular drifting sea mines, which ensured safe navigation on maritime communication lines in the SMFN’s area of responsibility.
Are these measures alone sufficient to protect Romania’s critical infrastructure in general and its critical maritime infrastructure in particular? I believe that they are not, and I would like to point out that the main documents issued by the EU[8] and NATO[9] in this regard are not comprehensive and cannot replace the documents that must be adopted at national level by each country, with the two organisations emphasising the particular importance of specific measures taken at national level in this area in the context of close, efficient and complementary cooperation between their members.
CONCLUSIONS
From the above, we can draw the following conclusions:
1. Romania is only to a limited extent prepared to protect its critical infrastructure, including its critical maritime infrastructure.
2. It is absolutely necessary for Romanian policy makers to understand the importance of critical infrastructure and the need to protect it, and to develop important policies, strategies, laws, documents and action plans to protect Critical Infrastructure in general and Critical Maritime Infrastructure in particular, taking into account their importance in ensuring the economic and social life of the country.
3. Dedicated structures must be created and interconnected to ensure the surveillance, analysis and countering of various hybrid threats, both physical and cyber, that may endanger the most sensitive components of critical infrastructure/critical maritime infrastructure, such as the facilities, systems and networks that ensure their normal functioning.
4. Appropriate equipping of these structures with modern means that can ensure the effective action of those established to intervene to protect and ensure the resilience and sustainability of CII/CMI, such as equipping them with modern ships and combat means, of the Romanian Naval Forces and other forces that can contribute to the protection of critical maritime infrastructure, in order to also carry out combat missions at sea against surface ships, submarines, cruise/hypersonic missiles, aviation (fixed-wing or helicopters), torpedoes, aerial drones, naval and submarine vessels, as well as mines.
5. Among the measures of paramount importance in ensuring the safety and resilience of critical maritime infrastructure are early warning/situational awareness and risk analysis in the creation and development of an early warning system dedicated to the protection of CIM/MCI, which would enable the structures responsible for its protection/defence to counter hostile actions in a timely and effective manner.
6. Of particular importance is the preparation of the population, the economy and the Romanian state’s forces for action in the event of hybrid/armed attacks or disasters resulting from natural disasters or undesirable human actions.
Bibliography
1. US Cyber Security & Infrastructure Security Agency,
https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors, accessed on 03.02.2025
2. ‘NATO officially launches new Maritime Centre for Critical Infrastructure Protection’ Article by the Public Affairs Office at MARCOM, https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2024/nato-officially-launches-new-nmcscui, accessed on 04.02.2025
3. Diren DOĞAN, Cdr. (TÜR N), Deniz ÇETİKLİ (MARSEC COE), ‘Maritime Critical Infrastructure protection (MCIP) in a changing security environment’, pp. 5-7
4. Ibid., p. 14
5. Njall FRIDBERTSSON, General Report- ”Protecting Critical Maritime Infrastructure- the role of technology”, rev.2, NATO, 07 October 2023 https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2023-critical-maritime-infrastructure-report-fridbertsson-032-stc, accessed on 05.02.2025; “WHAT IS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?”, https://www.ibMareacom/think/topics/critical-infrastructure, accessed on 05.02.2025
6. Uta Steinwehr, ‘What happened in Lebanon?’, article, https://www.dw.com/ro/ce-s-a-%C3%AEnt%C3%A2mplat-%C3%AEn-liban/a-54464910, accessed on 04.02.2025
7. EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf, accessed on 03 February 2025
8. ‘NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’,
[1] Maritime Security Forum
[2] US Cyber Security & Infrastructure Security Agency,
https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors, accessed on 03.02.2025
[3] ‘NATO officially launches new Maritime Centre for Critical Infrastructure Protection’ Article by the Public Affairs Office at MARCOM, https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2024/nato-officially-launches-new-nmcscui, accessed on 04.02.2025
[4] Diren DOĞAN, Cdr. (TÜR N), Deniz ÇETİKLİ (MARSEC COE), “Maritime Critical Infrastructure protection (MCIP) in a changing security environment”, pp. 5-7
[5] Ibid., p. 14
[6] Njall FRIDBERTSSON, General Report- ”Protecting Critical Maritime Infrastructure- the role of technology”, rev.2, NATO, 7 October 2023 https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2023-critical-maritime-infrastructure-report-fridbertsson-032-stc, accessed on 05.02.2025; “WHAT IS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?”, https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/critical-infrastructure, accessed on 05.02.2025
[7] Uta Steinwehr, ‘What happened in Lebanon?’, article, https://www.dw.com/ro/ce-s-a-%C3%AEnt%C3%A2mplat-%C3%AEn-liban/a-54464910, accessed on 04.02.2025
[8] EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf, accessed on 03
February 2025
[9] ‘NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’,