The Lepanto trap – what remains after the first naval battle?-Author Cam fl. (rtr) dr. Sorin LEARSCHI[1]
Introduction
The Battle of Lepanto, fought on October 7, 1571, represents a crucial moment in the maritime history of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. This naval confrontation took place in the Gulf of Lepanto, off the west coast of Greece, and was the result of an alliance of Christian states known as the Holy League, made up of the major maritime powers of the time, such as Spain, the Vatican, the Venetian Republic and the Cistercian Order.
The battle marked a turning point in the conflict between Christian and Muslim civilization, having significant impacts on the balance of power in the Mediterranean and reflecting the fears and aspirations of European society at the time. It would remain a symbol of resistance to Ottoman expansion, profoundly influencing European politics and culture in the 16th century and beyond.
During the course of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire was expanding rapidly in Europe, conquering vast territories and threatening the political stability of Christian countries. In this context, the resurgence of centralization of power and anti-Ottoman sentiment among European states led to the formation of the Holy League, which aimed to defend against Ottoman invasion. This alliance was the result of an unprecedented collaboration between states united in the face of a common threat.
The Battle of Lepanto, fought at a propitious moment, thus became not only a military confrontation but also a symbolic battle for the level of power of a Europe that wished to reassert its authority and influence in the face of Islamic expansion. This geopolitical situation set the stage for a momentous battle that would not only determine the fate of that day, but also alter the course of history for decades to come.
In academic studies, the term ‘Lepanto Trap’ refers to the strategic and military context of the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 and suggests a strategic trap in which Muslim fleets were crushed under the united forces of the European Christians. The significance of the term derives from the perspective that the battle was seen as an attempt to prevent Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean, together with the symbol of resistance and unity of nations that had banded together against a common threat.
Etymology of the term
The etymology of the term “Lepanto Trap” comes from the word “trap”, which suggests a situation in which a force or entity deceives or entraps its adversary by strategic techniques. It is combined with ‘Lepanto’, the name of the place where the battle took place, located in Naupaktos Bay on the Greek coast. This combination gives the connotation of a strategic trap, highlighting the complexity of the naval maneuvers and the tactical skill of the leaders of the time. By breaking free from these roots, the term captures not only the nature of the conflict but also its historical impact on the balance of power in the region.
“The ‘Lepanto Trap’, as a historiographical theme, has been extensively analyzed by various historians who have sought to highlight not only the significance of the 1571 battle, but also its long-term implications for subsequent geopolitical developments. It is generally recognized that the battle was not only a victory for the Christian coalition, but also marked the beginning of a period of stagnation for Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean, and contemporary scholarship contributes a marvelous diversity of perspectives, discussing not only the political effects, but also the cultural and sociological impact generated by the ‘Lepanto Trap’ in the European and Eastern space.
The relevance of the ‘Lepanto Trap’ manifests itself in the topicality of debates on national identities and global conflicts. Although the battle took place in the sixteenth century, its echoes are felt in contemporary international relations and it is often invoked. Moreover, the event continues to inspire the theme of the struggle for survival in new geopolitical and geostrategic conditions. This influence extends from academic studies to political discourses, providing a frame of reference for understanding contemporary societal trends and challenges.
The fleets of European nations, including in particular in the case of Romania, have focused too much on tactical capabilities for the initial phase of a conflict, neglecting the resilience and industrial capacity needed for a prolonged engagement. As a result, they fell into the ‘Lepanto trap’, which can lead to winning a battle but losing the war.
Experiences in the Red Sea and the Black Sea have demonstrated the susceptibility of protracted conflicts, necessitating rapid increases in shipbuilding to replace losses, repair of damaged ships (or even the recommissioning of recently decommissioned ships) and the ability to replenish their crews. Wider and more comprehensive standardization of ships, submarines, aircraft, weapons and sensors – along with related training – must be a priority for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but also a national priority.
The Ottoman Grand Vizier said: “I wish you knew the difference between your loss and ours. By wresting Cyprus from you, we deprived you of an arm; by defeating our fleet, you only shaved our beard. An arm when cut off cannot grow again; but a trimmed beard will grow so much the better for the razor.”
Winston Churchill emphasized the need to think about naval warfare at the strategic level in his speech in the House of Commons in March 1912, saying:
… In peacetime we measure the relative naval construction of two navies by percentages…. Battles are not decided by ratios or percentages. They give clear and absolute results, and the strength of the contending fleets should be measured, and is measured, not as in peacetime by comparison, but by subtraction. It must be expected that in a fleet battle between equally good and equally efficient navies, enormous damage will be inflicted upon each other. Many ships on both sides will be sunk or blown up. Many others will suffer injuries that will take months to repair… Furthermore, with a mutual destruction of newer ships, older ships will rapidly increase in value. When the Ace is removed, the King is the best card and so on… All this has to be taken into account in judging the standards of new construction that are appropriate to our needs.
Churchill is right: peace and war require different ways of thinking. Different logic applies. If free and open nations continue to think of future naval wars in terms of peacetime, they will fall into the “Lepanto trap”. They will overestimate the value of tactical successes and underestimate the strategic value of industrial capability and thorough preparation. Of course, naval forces tend to focus on their core mission – the preparation and conduct of military operations at sea – and strategic issues are best addressed at the political and industrial level, but it would be a grave mistake to create a growing division between operational, industrial and training issues.
“The modern ‘Lepanto trap’ would be interpreted as an excessive focus on tactical outcomes without a real plan for results, both in terms of shipyard capabilities and human resource management. Therefore, naval strategy should pay equal attention to combat capabilities as well as force generation and renewal when assessing overall naval power.
Countries in the Euro-Atlantic Alliance tend to focus too much on the former at the expense of the latter, perhaps because of the limited importance of traditional naval platforms.
The case of Romania is even more expressive. The deindustrialization of the shipyards, the loss of specially trained personnel, the influence of total dependence on external suppliers, have been underestimated in terms of their direct impact during naval battles.
In the current Indo-Pacific context, the long-term US and Chinese trends in naval shipbuilding and training capabilities seem to be in total conflict. At the end of World War II, the United States had 11 naval shipyards and 64 civilian shipyards. That number dropped sharply at the end of the Cold War due to the growth of the Asian shipbuilding industry and the post-Yom Kippur economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. Today, only four operational US shipyards remain, plus 22 civilian shipyards that contribute in various ways to the construction, maintenance, repair and operation of the US Navy. In addition, not all of these four aging shipyards can contribute to the repair of key units: aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). For submarines, this has a direct impact on the SSN AUKUS program, which faces the dilemma of whether to continue building Virginia-class SSNs for the US Navy or prioritize SSN AUKUS to strengthen the US alliance in the Indo-Pacific. Dry-dock size and capacity, a skilled labor force, and modern infrastructure are major hurdles that must be overcome for the United States to launch the naval renaissance it needs to compete strategically at sea. In contrast, the growing shipbuilding capacity of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) offers Beijing a long-term strategic advantage, with a tonnage capacity equivalent to the entire Royal Navy or the French Navy within two to three years.
In the case of Romania, even if there are plenty of shipyards – both on the Black Sea and on the Danube River – their capacities are not at a satisfactory military technological level to carry out extensive repairs to extensive damage to naval equipment and in particular modern weaponry.
As NATO fleets shrink in numbers and Chinese capabilities continue to grow, this timeframe will inevitably shorten.
According to an unpublished U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) presentation for 2024, China has 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States. This means that Beijing has an overwhelming advantage when naval strategy is analyzed in terms of the entire military industry.
In Western Europe, the situation is more or less the same: the number of large shipyards is shrinking. In addition, many of the existing shipyards have a dual purpose, military and commercial, and have to cope with conflicting order backlogs. For example, the same dry dock at the Atlantic shipyard in Saint Nazaire is used not only for the construction and maintenance of LHDs and auxiliary oil replenishment (AOR) tankers, but also for the construction of giant cruise liners and LNG carriers.
Nearly all European countries face the same problem and there are deep-rooted structural constraints on potential naval rearmament policies: While NATO and the European Union (EU) support armament investment to strengthen Europe’s defense posture and to deter and counter hybrid or symmetric threats, deficiencies in the naval industrial base will have a significant impact on the future of European naval power.
Rebuilding an adequate naval industrial base will take years and considerable funds will be needed to make it competitive. However, strengthening partnerships with countries with strong shipbuilding industries could be a potential solution.
Northeast Asia, particularly South Korea and Japan, is very important to the United States given the potential for direct conflict in the Indo-Pacific. These countries have top-notch shipbuilding facilities with dry docks capable of accommodating the largest ships in the U.S. Navy’s order of battle and therefore have the capability to deal with the consequences of naval warfare. South Korean shipyards are particularly important to the US military. This is because their industrial capacity and the high skill levels of their workforce can provide effective MRO (maintenance, repair and operations) capabilities.
The ability to rapidly accelerate the construction of new ships to compensate for losses and to replenish crews in a short time is essential for a prolonged naval operation.
In the light of recent experience in the Red Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, not only short conflicts should be envisaged. An example can be given by the potentially dangerous situation in the Mediterranean Sea, where Western fleets have the great advantage of strategically located and efficient shipyards compared to the (temporary) Russian Fleet, now without the Tartus Naval Base. The real lack of specialized technical support is a big problem for these forces, thus imposing the acceptance of a low technical status, as well as excessive wear and tear of ships, complemented by the need to transfer ships from the North Sea and the Baltic Sea only through the waters of Western European countries.
The Black Sea, with the blockade of the Turkish Straits through the application of the provisions of the Montreaux Convention of 1936, is in a special situation. Russia has construction and repair capacities, but is blocked in the Black Sea area, is financially limited, blocked by the application of international embargo measures, but benefits from the isolation of the Caspian Sea and the connection with the Sea of Azov and the North Sea, but only for ships of smaller tonnage.
Romania has two construction and repair yards in the Black Sea (with limited capacity for military assets) and another one in Midia for hull and superstructure repair/maintenance. Several facilities are available on the Danube for the construction and repair of military vessels, but the most efficient ones do not belong to the Romanian state and must also take into account the restrictions generated by the river’s flow (fishing restrictions) or ice regimes. The existence of a maritime area of the Danube between Sulina and Brăila is an advantage, but the proximity of a hostile force from the north is a disadvantage.
The problem of embarked personnel to supplement the combat forces at sea or on the river is relatively easy to solve, as Romania has a large number of civilian seagoing personnel with internationally recognized and certified technical skills. What remains to be resolved is specific training in the operation of weapons and military systems, as well as tactical training for these personnel. Here a solution must be found for the regular training of reserve personnel.
Another problem is the lack of a national commercial fleet that can be used to meet military and civilian transportation needs in the national interest. Solving this problem must be an objective of the utmost importance, as it is one of the defining elements of Romania’s maritime power. At the international level, we have a secondary effect of globalization, namely that the number of qualified seafarers from Euro-Atlantic countries is decreasing.
Given the creation of a strategic reserve of seafarers who could serve on military vessels in case of need, the question of the number of seafarers currently available immediately arises. The French Parliament’s 2023 report on the “Strategic Fleet” highlights the great difficulty in training reservists, as very few crews are currently composed solely of French nationals. Romania is in a special case. The vast majority of Romanian sailors work in international crews, but at the same time there is the advantage of the current use of English, which provides the necessary adaptability and learning capacity to operate the Western equipment on board Romanian naval vessels.
Both industrial capacity and the ability to build and maintain adequate stocks are essential for future naval warfare. Given the geopolitical realities, the dynamics of Euro-Atlantic de-industrialization and the economic specialization in the service sector constitute a significant disadvantage in this respect.
The obvious solution is, of course, to invest in both the military industrial base and the civilian industrial base and to maintain training capabilities for both purposes.
However, given the political, economic and social context in which developed countries are developing, the obvious solution does not seem realistic. Maritime strategy needs to address the problem as a whole.
The fleets of free and open countries have relied on technology to solve the problem wrongly and have assumed that they can accomplish the same number of missions with fewer, more capable platforms. This hypothetical conclusion might have worked in the days when Euro-Atlantic countries had a significant naval advantage over their rivals, but those days are over.
High-tech mobile naval forces have fallen into the “Lepanto trap”. Now we need to think about naval strategy in a more integrated way, linking military, industrial, education and training capabilities. Churchill was right. New ships built to compensate for losses will not reach the same level. Ships repaired will never have the same capabilities as those in service.
Rather than defending obsolete platforms, we should argue that in times of military crisis, after the initial shock, it may be necessary to strike a new balance between sophistication and mass production. Standardization of ships, submarines, aircraft, weapons, sensors and associated training should be a priority for NATO.
MARITIME SECURITY FORUM
[1] Director of the Maritime Security Forum/ Club of Admirals