AMERICA’S MARITIME ACTION PLAN
Structured Summary of the Maritime Security Forum
The White House · February 2026
1. Context and General Framework
America’s Maritime Action Plan (MAP), published by the White House in February 2026, is the implementation plan for Executive Order (E.O.) 14269 — “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” — signed by President Donald J. Trump on April 9, 2025. The document is described as the most ambitious federal effort to revitalize the U.S. maritime sector since the adoption of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, having been developed under the coordination of the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), together with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in collaboration with the Departments of War (DOW), Commerce (DOC), Labor (DOL), Transportation (DOT), Homeland Security (DHS), and the United States Trade Representative (USTR).
The diagnosis presented in the introduction is a grim one and constitutes the fundamental justification for the plan. The United States’ naval industrial capacity has been systematically eroded for decades due to a lack of strategic focus, cumbersome government procurement procedures, and the absence of consistent support for the construction of commercial vessels in domestic shipyards. Added to this were reduced federal investments in the Maritime Industrial Base (MIB), insufficient private capital, excessive regulatory burdens, and rising production costs. The result is alarming: less than 1% of the world’s new commercial ships are built in the U.S., and the country has only 66 shipyards, of which only 8 are active in new construction, 11 have construction capacity, 22 have dry docks for repairs, and 25 specialize in out-of-water repairs. In contrast, strategic competitors—particularly China—have aggressively expanded their market share and produce ships at a fraction of U.S. costs.
The plan is structured as an integrated, “whole-of-government” strategy, organized around four operational pillars, complemented by two cross-cutting sections: one on deregulation efforts and one on legislative proposals. The document’s central philosophy is that no single measure — whether financial, regulatory, or procedural — can reverse the decline on its own; only coordinated and simultaneous action on all these fronts can restore American maritime dominance.
2. Pillar I – Rebuilding Shipbuilding Capacity and Capabilities
The first pillar constitutes the economic core of the plan and stems from the observation that rebuilding the U.S. naval industrial base is a prerequisite for any progress in the other areas. The stated objective is not only to increase the number of ships built in the U.S., but also to rebuild a resilient maritime industrial base capable of sustained production, rapid mobilization in crisis situations, and competitive performance on the international stage.
2.1 Increasing Domestic Shipbuilding Capacity
The document notes that the U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry for large ocean-going vessels is extremely limited: only 8 shipyards can build ships over 400 feet in length. Added to this are a shortage of skilled personnel, the annual federal procurement funding framework (which causes “stop-start” production cycles), the consolidation of the supplier base (with many critical components coming from a single source), cumbersome contracting procedures, and rising construction costs.
The proposed solutions form an integrated package of actions:
• Infrastructure transformation: investments in modernizing commercial shipyards by adding and upgrading dry docks, heavy-lift cranes, panel lines, and automated material handling systems; modernizing port utilities (shore power, high-capacity electrical distribution, broadband communications); improving rail connectivity and terminals.
• Leveraging existing authorities: utilizing and increasing funding for a wide range of instruments — Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III, Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS), Office of Strategic Capital, Title XI Federal Ship Financing Program, Capital Construction Fund (CCF), Construction Reserve Fund (CRF), Small Shipyard Grants. The mix of public and private capital and public-private partnerships (PPPs) are presented as key mechanisms for attracting institutional investors.
• Recapitalization of public shipyards: continuation of modernization projects at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard (Virginia), Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Maine), Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (Washington), Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (Hawaii), and the U.S. Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore, with priority given to capabilities for nuclear platforms and large surface ships.
• Channel mapping: designate the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and NOAA to assess the depths of navigation channels in major ports, inland rivers, and the Great Lakes, with a view to meeting modern transportation standards.
• Artificial intelligence and emerging technologies: using AI for requirements processing, supply chain analysis, contract language optimization, and compliance issue identification; utilizing additive manufacturing, augmented reality, and AI design tools; investing in capabilities for autonomous ships.
• Federal Shipbuilding Plan: developing a unified national plan, with frequent updates, to provide the industry with a clear picture of demand and to stimulate investment.
2.2 Incentives for Investment in U.S. Shipyards
To reverse the industry’s decline, the plan proposes a set of financial tools targeting both U.S. and allied investors. The primary vehicle is public-private partnerships, managed by state and local economic development organizations. The federal government provides supporting assistance through programs such as SelectUSA and the U.S. Investment Accelerator.
Specific recommendations include modernizing the Title XI program (expanding eligibility, reducing approval times, eliminating outdated requirements), creating an interagency Maritime Incentives Coalition, expanding the Capital Construction Fund program for shipyards (modeled after the successful program for shipowners, which currently manages $2.59 billion), and establishing a new grant program to strengthen shipyards of all sizes.
The most controversial proposal, which has generated widespread media attention, is the establishment of a universal fee for foreign-built ships entering U.S. ports. This would be an infrastructure or security fee, assessed based on imported tonnage. A tax of 1 cent per kilogram would generate approximately $66 billion over ten years, and a tax of 25 cents per kilogram could bring in nearly $1.5 trillion—funds that would go toward the new Maritime Security Trust Fund. The stated economic rationale is that foreign-built ships, which benefit from access to the U.S. market, must contribute to the long-term revitalization of U.S. maritime capabilities.
2.3 Maritime Prosperity Zones (MPZ)
Inspired by the 2017 Opportunity Zones, MPZs represent an innovative geographic-economic component of the plan. The Secretary of Commerce would be authorized to designate 100 zones, each with a 10-year term, in consultation with the Departments of the Treasury, Transportation, Homeland Security, OMB, and the Department of Defense.
Unlike traditional Opportunity Zones, MPZs will have expanded eligibility, including not only industrial entities but also components of the maritime supply chain, workforce development and educational institutions, as well as advanced manufacturing initiatives. The geographic distribution will be diversified beyond traditional coastal centers, encompassing river regions, the Great Lakes, Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories, along with the East and West coasts and the Gulf of Mexico.
2.4 Supply and Demand Issues
The document acknowledges that the government currently has a wide range of programs and agencies that, while useful, are not being utilized to their full potential. The recommendations aim to:
• Expanding federal funding and tax incentives by modernizing Title XI, CCF, CRF, accelerated depreciation, and introducing production-based refundable tax credits, which would send the strongest signals to manufacturers.
• Stimulating the growth of the U.S.-flagged fleet through restructured operating subsidies, multi-year participation agreements, guaranteed commitments for cargo transport, and a new procurement vehicle—the Strategic Commercial Fleet (SCF).
• Regulatory relief by simplifying reflagging procedures and equivalence reviews, strengthening the definition of “U.S.-built,” closing tax loopholes for repairs, and decoupling Clean Air Act requirements from the issuance of the EIAPP certificate.
• Strengthening resilience by expanding the Port Infrastructure Development Program (PIDP) and increasing the inspection capacity of the Coast Guard (USCG).
2.5 Leveraging international and industrial partnerships
The international component of Pillar I builds on the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) Framework. The USTR, in consultation with the DOS and DOC, is engaged in bilateral negotiations to secure reciprocal investment commitments. The document already claims a major success: President Trump is said to have secured “at least $150 billion in investments dedicated to the U.S. shipbuilding industry,” with the DOC tasked with mobilizing these funds.
The “Bridge Strategy” concept is presented as a practical tool: in multi-vessel procurement, the first units can be built at the foreign partner’s home shipyard, in parallel with direct investments in an American-owned or partnered shipyard, with production to be progressively “onshored.” The Title XI and Small Shipyard Grants programs, along with vocational training initiatives, are to be scaled up to make them more attractive to partners.
3. Pillar II – Reform of Education and Workforce Training
The second pillar addresses one of the most severe vulnerabilities identified in the plan: the chronic shortage of qualified seafarers and workers in the shipbuilding industry. The philosophy is that there can be no maritime revitalization without an adequate workforce, and the ability to man the fleet will only increase if training programs grow at a matching pace.
3.1 Expanding Seafarer Training and Education
To crew U.S.-flagged vessels, seafarers must hold a Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC) issued by the USCG. The current process involves high training costs and months of service at sea. The ongoing reduction of the U.S.-flagged large ocean-going fleet has diminished career opportunities, creating a vicious cycle.
Recommended actions include:
• Data-driven planning and reporting: developing a web-based system for the industry to report operational and financial impacts; creating a Mariner Mobilization Plan to address surge requirements during national emergencies.
• Modernization of credentialing and regulatory reform: modernizing the Merchant Credentialing Program (MCP); separating the processing of medical certificates from the issuance of MMCs; revising the Code of Federal Regulations to reduce duplicate examinations; aligning requirements for deck and engine departments; expanding acceptance of simulator training; shortening credentialing timelines.
• Mariner Incentive Program (MIP): a new program at MARAD that will include improvements to Student Incentive Payments (SIP), financial assistance for tuition at State Maritime Academies (SMA), and new mechanisms for recruiting and retaining mariners.
• Expansion of the Center of Excellence (COE): expanding support for registered apprenticeships, community colleges, and accelerated vocational programs to produce more certified seafarers.
• Military-to-Mariner (M2M): maximizing credit for military training and sea service when awarding MMC endorsements; extending tuition waivers to all members of the armed forces; providing career transition counseling for effective skills conversion.
• Training Flexibility: approving high-fidelity simulator training as a substitute for portions of required sea service; “test-out” options for demonstrated competency; accelerating certification through simulation.
3.2 Modernization of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA)
The USMMA campus in Kings Point, NY, suffers from a significant backlog of deferred maintenance, which affects the ability to train midshipmen. In April 2025, the USACE New York District and USMMA entered into a long-term agreement to revitalize and modernize the campus, with planning and design already advanced or completed.
The plan calls for: addressing urgent mission-critical maintenance issues; rehabilitating waterfront infrastructure (seawall, pier, dredging); demolishing and rebuilding some buildings and renovating others to modern standards; and expanding capacity to accommodate a 20% increase in student enrollment and a 30% increase in faculty positions.
3.3 Support for State Maritime Academies (SMA)
The six state maritime academies (California, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Texas) receive federal financial support through MARAD, in addition to funding from state governments. During the first Trump administration, the federal government funded the construction of five National Security Multi-Mission Vessels (NSMVs)—modern training ships that will serve the five non-Great Lakes academies.
The plan recommends a comprehensive review of support for the SMA—including Student Incentive Payments, direct financial support, fuel payments, training ship maintenance, and the NSMV program—to assess adequacy relative to the demand for seafarers.
3.4 Industry Needs – Training Capabilities
The document provides a detailed inventory of existing programs: USMMA, SMA, Center of Excellence for Domestic Maritime Workforce Training and Education (50 locations in 17 states and Guam), Small Shipyard Grant Program, Accelerated Training in Defense Manufacturing (a 16-week intensive program focused on welding, CNC, metrology, additive manufacturing), Additive Manufacturing COE, USN Talent Pipeline Program (with nearly 500 participating employers), MARAD U.S. Center for Maritime Innovation (USCMI), and Shipbuilding Workforce Development Incentive.
Key recommendations include: scaling up accelerated training models such as ATDM; geographic expansion of Additive Manufacturing Centers of Excellence (West Coast, Guam, Hawaii); strengthening registered apprenticeships; modernizing and expanding USMMA and SMA; favorable tax treatment of income earned by U.S. seafarers on U.S.-flagged vessels in international traffic (exclusion similar to that for citizens working abroad); promoting the DOL Industry-Driven Skills Training Fund; integrating shipbuilders with the USN Reserve to create a reserve force specialized in ship repair; federal guarantees for mortgage loans for shipbuilding workers, similar to those for veterans.
4. Pillar III – Protecting the maritime industrial base
The third pillar uses trade, federal procurement, and market signaling levers to align commercial incentives with national security. Effective trade policy, customs enforcement, coordination with allies, and federal procurement reform are expected to generate predictable demand for U.S.-built and U.S.-registered ships. The framework is E.O. 14275 — “Restoring Common Sense to Federal Procurement” — and the historic revision of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), announced in August 2025, described as the most significant reform of federal commercial procurement procedures in over four decades.
4.1 Strengthening preference requirements
Ships carry 41.5% of the value of U.S. global merchandise trade—approximately $2.1 trillion—but most are built abroad. The document proposes three measures:
• United States Maritime Preference Requirement (USMPR): a new requirement that, as ships are built in the U.S., will oblige economies with large volumes of exports to the U.S. to transport an increasing percentage of containerized goods destined for the U.S. on qualified American vessels.
• Expansion of Cargo Preference Requirements: increasing the quota (beyond the current 50%) for goods from U.S. civilian government agencies that must be transported on U.S.-flagged vessels.
• Anticipated reform of the three-year eligibility rule: immediate implementation of the reform scheduled for 2030, to accelerate fleet growth and expand the pool of seafarers available for mobilization.
4.2 Land Port Maintenance Tax
One of the notable tax proposals is the creation of a tax for land ports, equivalent to the Harbor Maintenance Tax for seaports. Goods entering through land ports would be subject to a modest tax of 0.125% of value. The funds collected will feed a new Land Port Maintenance Trust Fund (LPMTF), with a maximum of 10% allocated to administrative expenses. The rationale is to eliminate a tax loophole that encourages the rerouting of supply chains through Canada and Mexico, to the detriment of U.S. seaports.
4.3 Efficiency of Government Procurement
The current strategy for federal ship procurement is described as fragmented, overly complex, and frequently duplicative across agencies, leading to delays, increased costs, and underutilized industrial capacity. The recommendations form a package of reforms:
• Multi-year and multi-vessel procurement: single contracts spanning multiple years and covering multiple vessels to reduce unit costs, stabilize the industrial base, and ensure production continuity.
• Contractual efficiency: drastically reducing the number of contractual deliverables; eliminating or limiting change orders to justified situations (increasing production cadence, reducing costs, resolving capability or safety issues); incentive payments for meeting or beating deadlines.
• Vessel Construction Manager (VCM) Model: agencies enter into contracts with a commercial owner-operator who manages the construction of a new vessel and negotiates the commercial construction contract with a U.S. shipyard. The model is recommended for the maximum extent practicable in the procurement of auxiliary platforms.
• Other Transaction Authorities and off-the-shelf commercial products: elimination of mandatory waiting periods, same-day evaluation, negotiation of all terms; use of off-the-shelf commercial products with lifecycle support agreements.
• Improved requirements definitions: early interagency collaboration among technical parties, operators, and procurement professionals; a design-bid-build approach to validate projects prior to contracting; elimination of redundant federal reviews; coordination through the Government Shipbuilding Council.
• Commercial standards and designs: review all ship programs to identify opportunities to adopt proven commercial standards, reducing costs and delivery times.
• Emerging technologies: AI, digital twins, additive manufacturing, integrated autonomous systems for research and surveillance; modern standards for emissions, safety systems, IT security, and capabilities for Arctic construction and ice classes.
4.4 Actions regarding the China investigation (Section 301)
One of the plan’s components with the most direct international implications. In 2024, the USTR initiated a Section 301 investigation into China’s actions, policies, and practices targeting the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance. The public report, released on January 16, 2025, determined that these actions are unreasonable and burden U.S. trade, making them actionable.
On April 17, 2025, the USTR announced responsive measures. On June 6, 2025, a public comment period was launched regarding amendments to Annexes III (service fee for operators of foreign-built vehicle transport vessels) and IV (restrictions on certain maritime transport services). On October 10, 2025, additional amendments were announced. Then, on October 30, 2025, the U.S. and China reached an economic and trade agreement that includes China’s commitment to remove its retaliatory measures and sanctions imposed on certain shipping entities. The U.S. suspended the implementation of the countermeasures for a period of one year, effective November 10, 2025. The document specifies that the U.S. will continue its historic cooperation with the Republic of Korea and Japan to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding industry.
5. – National Security, Economic Security, and Industrial Resilience Pillar IV
The fourth pillar translates maritime policy into a strategic advantage by linking industrial capacity, fleet readiness, and strategic posture. Its components cover: strengthening MIB supply chains; expanding the U.S.-flagged fleet in international traffic; establishing the Maritime Security Trust Fund; promoting robotic and autonomous systems; the strategy for Arctic maritime security; and recapitalizing the Inactive Reserve Fleet.
5.1 MIB Security and Resilience
The document uses historical data to highlight the fundamental role of the MIB: during World War II, the U.S. produced thousands of military and commercial ships, training hundreds of thousands of sailors, which enabled the Allied victory; by 1946, over 70% of oceanic transport was under the American flag. Today, the MIB can no longer sustain a protracted conflict or growing maritime trade.
The recommended actions focus on:
• Domestic capacity for critical components: developing domestic production of large marine engines, gearboxes, propeller shafts, propellers, forgings and castings, high-strength steels, and advanced electronics; reducing dependence on single sources; investing in the processing of strategic raw materials and critical minerals.
• Innovation and industrial modernization: AI, additive manufacturing, robotics and automation, Industry 4.0 analytics, modern non-destructive testing techniques, cold spray repair; fast-track certification for mature manufacturing technologies; R&D for modular and robotic techniques.
• Supply chain resilience: intentional diversification to reduce the impact of disruptions; a requirement for OEMs to outsource to other domestic shipyards once their own capacity is exceeded.
• Clear economic security metrics: defining an explicit requirement—number, size, and types of ships needed for the continuous flow of goods during a crisis; measuring the ROI of MIB programs against this benchmark.
5.2 Strategic Commercial Fleet (SCF)
The creation of the SCF represents one of the plan’s structural innovations. This fleet, composed of U.S.-built ships engaged in international trade, would provide the depth and redundancy necessary to support global military logistics and the continuous flow of goods to the U.S. economy. SCF ships would receive financial support for both construction and operation, leveling the playing field between the U.S. and subsidized foreign competition. The SCF would complement the Maritime Security Program and the Tanker Security Program, both of which would be funded at authorized levels.
5.3 Maritime Security Trust Fund (MSTF)
The MSTF would provide a dedicated and mandatory funding stream for programs that strengthen the U.S. maritime industry and merchant marine. By capturing identified revenues (particularly the universal tax on foreign-built ships), the MSTF would ensure substantial, long-term investments in shipbuilding, fleet expansion, and the maritime workforce. Authorized expenditures would cover programs identified as useful for promoting, growing, and strengthening the domestic maritime sector.
5.4 Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS)
The document places RAS at the center of military maritime evolution. They are cheaper to produce and more “expendable” than manned surface combatants or submarines, capable of filling the “Low” component of the High -Low mix. RAS can perform combat, resupply, and ISR missions, can operate autonomously or via remote control, and can be networked over long distances.
Their industrial advantage lies in the decentralization of production: they can be assembled modularly, allowing a wide range of commercial shipyards and inland facilities to produce modules or perform final assembly—thereby expanding competition and capacity while reducing costs.
Recommendations include: designating areas within the Exclusive Economic Zone (including the Great Lakes) for the easy and safe testing of maritime robotic technologies;
standardizing RAS hull designs to reduce “MIL-SPEC creep” and enable scalable production; aligning USCG missions toward modular and less complex platforms when appropriate, to reserve high-end cutters for critical missions.
5.5 Strategy for Arctic Waters
Arctic waters offer significant opportunities—trade routes, scientific research, resources—but also major risks. Melting ice and technological innovations are opening up access, but strategic competitors are intensifying their military and economic presence.
The Arctic Strategy includes a comprehensive set of actions:
• Strengthening Presence: expanding USCG icebreaking capabilities; USCG and DOW training; engagement with allies to share the burden of defending the region.
• Situational awareness: information-sharing networks; new-generation unmanned aerial, surface, underwater, and space systems; technologies to reduce ships’ electronic signatures.
• Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT): improving GNSS performance in the Arctic where satellite geometry is suboptimal; leveraging pilot programs derived from E.O. 13905.
• Communications: improvements to satellite communications; strengthening terrestrial HF radio infrastructure.
• Defense infrastructure: modernizing infrastructure in Alaska and Greenland; investing in the USCG icebreaker fleet.
• Response to excessive maritime claims and freedom of navigation: objecting to unilateral actions that threaten rights, freedoms, and legitimate uses of the seas; routine exercises and transits in accordance with international law.
• Sustainable fishing: data and research on fish stocks; cooperation to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.
• Seabed activities: research, mapping, and exploitation of critical minerals; partnerships with allies; a more robust domestic supply chain.
• Energy security: modernization of Alaska’s port energy infrastructure; protection of the Alaska LNG project.
5.6 Inactive Reserve Fleet
The Inactive Reserve Fleet includes military ships retained by the USN and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) administered by MARAD. A subset of the NDRF—the Ready Reserve Force (RRF)—is maintained at a high state of readiness for activation within 5 days, with each ship carrying fuel for 7 days of navigation and lubricants for 45 days.
The challenges are complex: the geographical dispersion of the ships, the advanced age of the vessels, the difficulty in procuring spare parts, maintenance costs, and the recruitment of qualified civilian sailors. Recommendations include: improving the interagency budgeting process with accurate forecasts; revitalizing the Government Shipbuilding Council; recapitalizing the RRF through the VCM program, in parallel with the continued acquisition of second-hand ships. The USN and U.S. Transportation Command must prioritize finalizing design requirements to ensure rapid access to assured maritime transport capacity.
6. Deregulation Measures
The chapter on deregulation reflects a core philosophy of the administration: the U.S. maritime regulatory framework is perceived as rigid, outdated, and economically disadvantageous, placing U.S.-flagged operators at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign competitors. The initiative is carried out under the auspices of E.O. 14192 — “Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation.” The USCG completed 19 deregulation actions in FY 2025, and MARAD eliminated several outdated provisions from the CFR.
The recommendations are organized into three areas:
6.1 Elimination of redundant, outdated, or unduly burdensome regulations
Actions include: assessing and reducing duplicate data collection requirements; eliminating duplicate inspections and certifications when authorized agents or classification societies already ensure compliance; reducing obligations under Marine Equipment Regulations II; eliminating outdated requirements from the NVIC (Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular) — specific examples: NVIC No. 8-00 for container construction, foam fire-extinguishing systems, safety provisions for LNG bunkering, NVIC No. 10-97 for cargo security, NVIC No. 11-91 for jack-up drilling units; elimination of inspections of non-proprietary barges on the Great Lakes; reduction of requirements for small overnight passenger vessels; raising the threshold for major marine property damage from $500,000 to $2,000,000; adjustment of the EPA’s EIAPP requirements.
6.2 Streamlining Compliance Processes
Recommendations include: simplifying risk assessments for recurring operations (e.g., LNG bunkering); improving the efficiency of NEPA reviews through new procedures developed by the USACE in coordination with the Council on Environmental Quality; renewing Nationwide Permit Program permits before their March 2026 expiration; prioritizing permit applications for port infrastructure projects in accordance with E.O. 14154, 14156, 14261, and 14269; achieving a 100% utilization rate for the CBP Vessel Entry and Clearance System;
updating CBP reporting requirements; ensuring forms and systems comply with new USCG rules; expanding the use of electronic navigation tools; permitting underwater inspections in lieu of dry docking when safe (update to NVIC No. 01-89); revising 33 CFR Part 72 for modern transmission of marine information products; implementing or updating traffic separation schemes.
6.3 Clarification of Regulations and Policies
Key Directions: clarifying the definition of “Waters of the U.S.” under the Clean Water Act, in light of the March 2025 joint EPA-Army memorandum implementing the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA; clarifying the eligibility of foreign-built vessels for inspection and certification under the Maritime Security Program; standardizing public guidance and field personnel training across USACE districts and USCG sectors.
6.4 Regulatory Updates for Autonomous Vessels
The document acknowledges that the current regulatory framework was designed exclusively for manned vessels, creating significant gaps for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS). The identified gaps include: a lack of clear definitions of autonomy levels; the absence of standards for manning, remote operations, and human factors (operator qualifications, control center design, fatigue prevention); missing procedures for verifying AI-based navigation decisions; inadequate communication standards; safety and emergency response rules that assume the presence of a crew; unclear inspection, certification, and approval pathways; insufficient cybersecurity standards; lack of standards for sensor resilience and multi-sensor fusion; ambiguities regarding liability, insurance, and legal responsibility; fragmentation of interagency coordination and port infrastructure.
7. Implementation of Legislative Proposals
Achieving the MAP’s objectives requires legislative support. Two comprehensive bills have already been introduced in the 119th Congress: the Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security Act of 2025 (SHIPS Act) and the Building Ships in America Act of 2025.
In addition, the Trump administration is preparing its own package of legislative proposals, which will be submitted to Congress following the release of the Presidential Budget Request for FY 2027. These proposals will aim to:
• Enforce tariffs at U.S. borders and prevent the circumvention of certain tariffs through imports via land ports.
• Creating the Maritime Security Trust Fund as a consistent source of funding.
• Programs to stimulate private investment in commercial shipbuilding, commercial shipyards, and repair facilities.
• Establishing Maritime Prosperity Zones, modeled after Opportunity Zones, to attract investment from domestic investors and allies.
• Establishing national maritime scholarships and opportunities for students to study abroad, as well as bringing in maritime experts from allied countries.
• Ensuring an adequate gross tonnage of U.S.-flagged commercial vessels available for use in crisis situations, through incentives to grow the U.S.-flagged fleet and U.S. shipbuilding for international trade.
8. Conclusions and Strategic Implications
The document’s conclusion places the plan within a historical context: maritime power has always been the cornerstone of American global leadership, both through naval strength and through the ability to transport goods across the oceans and secure sea lanes. Dominance in shipbuilding and shipping, combined with the navy, propelled the U.S. to great power status and proved decisive in Allied victories in both World Wars.
The erosion of maritime capabilities in recent decades is characterized as a strategic vulnerability of the first order, resulting in a weakened U.S. economy. Executive Order 14269 has been described as the first critical step, and the current plan as the comprehensive implementation tool. The central philosophy is that such complex and interconnected objectives cannot be achieved through piecemeal actions: financial incentives do not produce results without procurement reform; increased ship production has no impact without an increase in the skilled workforce; any domestic effort can be undermined by uncoordinated trade policies.
The four pillars form a unified strategy—rebuilding shipbuilding capacity, reforming education and workforce training, protecting the maritime industrial base, and supporting national security and industrial resilience—supplemented by regulatory actions and legislative proposals. According to the document, the plan’s implementation should restore the U.S.’s position as a global maritime power, strengthening national security and ensuring economic prosperity.
From an analytical perspective, the MAP presents both new elements and continuities. Structural innovations include Maritime Prosperity Zones, the Strategic Commercial Fleet, the Maritime Security Trust Fund, the Land Port Maintenance Tax, and the universal tax on foreign-built ships—instruments that, if implemented, will reshape the U.S. maritime economy. At the same time, many of the measures represent enhancements or reforms of existing programs (Title XI, Capital Construction Fund, Small Shipyard Grants, MARAD training programs).
The document’s limitations must also be acknowledged. The plan, by its nature, outlines a strategic architecture but does not impose concrete obligations on the industry nor does it amend specific regulations on its own. Many of the measures depend on congressional approval—in particular, the universal tax on foreign-built ships, the MSTF, the MPZ, and the SCF require enabling legislation. Practical implementation will depend on the FY 2026 and FY 2027 budgets, the progress of discussions with allies (especially South Korea and Japan, key partners in shipbuilding), the status of the October 2025 U.S.-China agreement, and the actual capacity of the U.S. industry to absorb the promised massive investments.
For international actors—companies, allied governments, and trading partners — MAP signals a clear shift toward a neo-mercantilist maritime policy, with an emphasis on domestic content requirements, flag preferences, tariffs on foreign-built ships, and reciprocal investments. For actors seeking to position themselves favorably in the U.S. market, anticipating the MPZ framework, participation in the “Bridge Strategy,” and partnerships with U.S. shipyards will become essential strategic pathways. For strategic competitors, the document is a clear declaration of intent to challenge global dominance in shipbuilding and maritime transport, seeking to rebalance a market perceived as distorted in China’s favor.
Overall, America’s Maritime Action Plan represents the most comprehensive federal effort to revitalize the U.S. maritime sector in the last nine decades. Its success will depend on the institutional capacity to simultaneously coordinate financial, regulatory, educational, and diplomatic reforms over a timeframe long enough to rebuild an industry whose decline is due to decades of strategic neglect.
Possible Implications for Romania
Romania should not view America’s Maritime Action Plan as a strictly American sectoral policy, but rather as a signal of a strategic realignment of the Western maritime economy, with indirect effects on the Black Sea, the European shipbuilding industry, NATO logistics chains, and critical infrastructure policies. The U.S. plan is based on the idea that the decline in shipbuilding, the national-flag merchant fleet, and maritime industrial capacity represents a national security vulnerability, not just an economic problem. For Romania, this paradigm shift is significant because, after 2022, the Black Sea has become a space where military security, energy exports, grain transport, the protection of undersea infrastructure, and the resilience of NATO’s eastern flank intersect. Therefore, any U.S. strategy for rebuilding maritime power must also be viewed as a potential framework for repositioning Romania within the Euro-Atlantic maritime architecture.
The first major implication concerns Romania’s shipbuilding and repair industry. Romania still possesses significant industrial assets in Constanța, Mangalia, Galați, Brăila, Tulcea, and other centers with a naval tradition; however, these capabilities have often been managed in a fragmented manner, without a coherent national strategy for integration into Euro-Atlantic value chains. MAP emphasizes the reconstruction of the maritime industrial base, the modernization of shipyards, and investments in dry docks, heavy cranes, panel lines, automation, additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems. Romania could use this model to reevaluate its own shipyards not merely as commercial entities, but as strategic infrastructure. In a favorable scenario, Romanian shipyards could become suppliers, subcontractors, or industrial partners in Western programs for repair, maintenance, conversion, modular construction, or the production of components for auxiliary vessels, autonomous platforms, or port infrastructure. In an unfavorable scenario, if Romania fails to act strategically, U.S. revitalization and the reorientation of investments toward shipyards in the U.S., South Korea, Japan, or more proactive European states could further marginalize Romanian capabilities.
The second implication concerns the Port of Constanța. MAP treats port infrastructure as part of economic security, not merely as a commercial facility. The emphasis on modernizing channels, rail connectivity, terminals, shore power, broadband communications, and logistical resilience is directly relevant to Romania. Constanța can become a key hub for NATO’s eastern flank, for Ukraine’s reconstruction, for grain corridors, for military mobility, and for European supply chains. However, this opportunity requires accelerated investment in dredging, specialized terminals, digitalization, cybersecurity, rail access, Danube connections, and crisis response capabilities. If the U.S. is rebuilding its own maritime strategy around resilience, Romania should adopt a similar approach: Constanța can no longer be viewed merely as a commercial port, but as critical Euro-Atlantic infrastructure.
The third implication concerns security in the Black Sea. MAP emphasizes national security, industrial resilience, strategic fleet, autonomous systems, maritime surveillance, and crisis response capability. For Romania, these priorities align with the need to strengthen maritime surveillance, protect trade routes, counter sea mines, defend offshore energy infrastructure, and monitor Russian activities. In this context, Romania should aim not only to acquire conventional military ships but also to integrate naval drones, underwater sensors, autonomous patrol systems, secure communications, and maritime domain awareness solutions. MAP confirms that the future of maritime power will not depend exclusively on large, expensive, and difficult-to-produce platforms, but also on distributed, modular, and autonomous systems. This lesson is highly relevant for a country bordering the Black Sea, where the constraints of the Montreux Convention, Russia’s proximity, and the enclosed nature of the basin necessitate agile, interoperable, and hard-to-neutralize solutions.
The fourth implication concerns Romania’s economic relationship with the United States. MAP contains a clear orientation toward flag preferences, domestic content, taxes on foreign-built ships, and incentives for American production. This direction may reduce foreign shipbuilders’ direct access to the American market, including that of European builders. For Romania, the risk is that ships or components produced in Romanian shipyards will become less competitive if they fall under the scope of tariffs or restrictive requirements. However, there is also an opportunity: if the U.S. seeks allied partners for “Bridge Strategy”-type initiatives, Romania could position itself as a provider of complementary industrial capacity, particularly for repairs, conversions, modules, auxiliary equipment, training, or regional maintenance. This would, however, require active economic diplomacy, not simply waiting.
The fifth implication concerns the Danube and inland corridors. MAP focuses not only on maritime coasts but also on river infrastructure, the Great Lakes, and inland routes. For Romania, this idea is essential, as the Danube can function as a strategic extension of the Black Sea. In the context of the war in Ukraine, Romania’s Danube ports have gained major logistical importance. Romania should link its maritime policy to its Danube policy: Galați, Brăila, Tulcea, Sulina, Giurgiu, and the Rhine–Danube corridor can become components of an integrated strategy for military mobility, trade, agricultural exports, regional reconstruction, and energy security. A mature Romanian interpretation of the MAP should include the Danube within the same strategic framework in which the U.S. includes ports, canals, and inland infrastructure.
The sixth implication concerns professional training. The U.S. plan emphasizes the shortage of sailors, technicians, welders, engineers, additive manufacturing specialists, autonomous system operators, and shipyard personnel. Romania faces a similar problem: an aging workforce, professional migration, a shortage of technical trades, and the reduced appeal of maritime careers. MAP should inspire a Romanian reform of maritime education by strengthening cooperation between universities, technical high schools, shipyards, the Naval Forces, the Romanian Naval Authority, and international partners. Romania could propose joint programs with American institutions to train specialists in maritime security, naval engineering, port logistics, autonomous technologies, maritime law, and critical infrastructure protection.
The seventh implication concerns European strategic autonomy and complementarity with NATO. MAP has a distinctly national and neo-mercantilist logic, but for Romania the key question is how this American orientation can be harmonized with European Union policies on the defense industry, green transport, port security, TEN-T, the Connecting Europe Facility, and the Black Sea strategy. Romania should avoid a passive approach, in which it waits for external initiatives, and instead build its own position: integrating the Port of Constanța into NATO logistics chains, developing a strategic shipbuilding policy, attracting American and European investment in shipyards, utilizing EU funds for infrastructure, and promoting the Black Sea as a priority area for Western maritime security.
The eighth implication concerns international law and the regulation of navigation. MAP addresses freedom of navigation, countering excessive maritime claims, the security of strategic waters, and the protection of legitimate maritime interests. For Romania, these issues are directly relevant in the Black Sea, where freedom of navigation, maritime delimitation, the security of offshore infrastructure, the protection of submarine cables and energy pipelines, as well as the regime of straits are matters of national interest. Romania can use this convergence to develop legal and diplomatic expertise in the law of the sea, maritime security, the protection of critical infrastructure, and state responsibility for hybrid actions in the maritime domain.
In conclusion, the main implication for Romania is that the MAP confirms the sea’s return to the center of power politics. For Romania, this means that the Black Sea, the Port of Constanța, the Danube, shipyards, maritime education, and the Naval Forces can no longer be treated separately. They must be integrated into a coherent national maritime strategy, connected to NATO, the EU, and the strategic partnership with the U.S. Romania has a window of opportunity: it can become a relevant regional maritime actor, a provider of logistical and industrial resilience on the eastern flank, or it can remain merely a peripheral beneficiary of decisions made by others. The MAP does not automatically offer advantages to Romania, but it creates the context in which a strategically active Romania could transform its geographical position into an industrial, diplomatic, and security advantage.
MARITIME SECURITY FORUM