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How the C-RAM Tracks and Destroys Targets in 4 Seconds
MS Daily brief- 24 September 2026
BREAKING NEWS: Explosions ROCK Iran; IRGC is militarising civilians; Saudi oil pipeline reopens | TBN Israel
News from Ukraine | Wonderful! Ukraine has driven the Russians out of a key territory | Brilliant!
Contents
News from Ukraine | Wonderful! Ukraine has driven the Russians out of a key territory | Fantastic! 1
Eight crew members of the USS Lincoln attempted suicide, the US Navy confirms. 11
Attack on a merchant vessel and infrastructure in the Odessa region – Maritime Security Forum 16
US Marines test the launch of an FPV drone from a boat in Okinawa – Maritime Security Forum 26
DAILY STRATEGIC BRIEFING: Ukraine – Black Sea – Middle East, 23 September 2026 – Maritime Security Forum
Over the past 24 hours, we have identified five developments of immediate strategic relevance.
Firstly: Russia has significantly intensified its attacks on Kyiv. On 23 September, Russian drones – including jet-powered variants – struck railway infrastructure, warehouses and petrol stations in the capital. AP reported at least two deaths and 41 injuries in the attacks on Kyiv, and in the early hours of 24 September, Russia also launched a ballistic missile strike on the capital, with local authorities reporting a further two deaths and several injuries. Russia pounds Kyiv with drone strikes as Zelenskiy addresses the UN | Reuters
Second: a possible formula for de-escalation between Ukraine and Russia emerges, but without an agreement. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated in New York that Ukraine is prepared for a maritime ceasefire and for halting attacks on energy infrastructure, provided Russia reciprocates. At the same time, he warned that, in the absence of such an agreement, Ukraine would continue its attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.
Third: The US and Iran are continuing diplomatic talks, but their positions remain far apart. Following the first round of indirect talks in recent months, an Iranian official told Reuters that there are major differences over the terms for ending the war. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated at the UN that Iran would not “surrender”, but called for diplomacy to continue. Iran, US still far apart in peace talks, Iranian official says; Pezeshkian vows no surrender | Reuters
Fourth: Hormuz remains the critical chokepoint of the global energy system. Only three commercial cargo ships passed through the strait on Tuesday, which is below the average for the last ten days. Meanwhile, reports in the Israeli press suggest that US negotiators have rejected Iran’s proposal regarding the reopening of the strait; this information comes from a Channel 12 report carried by the Times of Israel and should be treated as such, not as a confirmed official position from Washington. Shipping traffic via the Strait of Hormuz remains below the 10-day average, data shows | Reuters
Fifth: for Romania, security pressure in the Lower Danube and Black Sea regions remains high, even though we have not identified any new confirmed incursions into national airspace during the period under strict analysis. However, the incident at the Tulcea border the previous evening remains relevant to the operational assessment
1. UKRAINE – MASSIVE ATTACK ON KYIV
Kyiv, 23 September
Russia launched a large-scale drone attack on the Ukrainian capital. Reuters reports that railway infrastructure, warehouses and petrol stations were hit. One of the significant consequences was the disruption of internet services for approximately 100,000 households in Kyiv and the Kyiv region.
One technological aspect deserves special mention: the use of jet-powered Shahed drones.
Reuters reports that these variants operate at an altitude of approximately 4–7 km, have higher speeds and are much more difficult for Ukrainian mobile teams equipped with portable systems to intercept. Estimates cited by Reuters indicate an interception rate of around 60 per cent for the new variants, compared with levels of around 90 per cent for the conventional versions.
This development is of strategic importance. Jet-powered drones narrow the operational gap between attack UAVs and cruise missiles and force Ukraine to deploy more expensive air defence systems.
Kyiv, the early hours of 24 September
Before the news deadline, Russia launched a new attack, this time with ballistic missiles. Reuters reports at least two dead and six injured, according to local authorities, though the toll is still subject to change.
We therefore have a significant operational sequence:
drones → counter-drone measures → ballistic missiles.
We assess that this may also serve to progressively overwhelm Ukraine’s air defence systems.
2. THE DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION – POSSIBLE ENERGY AND MARITIME CEASEFIRE
In New York, Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine is prepared to accept both a ceasefire regarding energy infrastructure and a maritime ceasefire, provided Russia agrees to reciprocity.
This approach is significant for the Black Sea.
An effective maritime ceasefire could aim to reduce attacks on:
Ukrainian ports;
commercial vessels;
port infrastructure;
export corridors;
and possibly naval targets.
At the same time, Zelensky warned that if attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure continue, Russia could face a difficult winter as a result of Ukrainian strikes on its own energy sector.
However, as of 06:00, there is no confirmed Russian-Ukrainian agreement.
We therefore assess the situation as follows:
diplomatic proposal: confirmed;
conditional Ukrainian acceptance: confirmed;
Russian acceptance: not confirmed;
effective ceasefire: not yet in place.
3. ROMANIA – NATO – EASTERN FLANK
During the period under strict analysis, we have not identified any new confirmed incursion by a drone into Romanian airspace.
However, the incident that began on the evening of 22 September and was reported on 23 September must be taken into account: the Ministry of National Defence’s radars detected an aerial target moving over Ukrainian territory near the border, residents in the north of Tulcea County received a RO-Alert, and two Romanian F-16s were scrambled for monitoring. No incursions into national airspace were reported.
For Romania, however, the most significant development of the past 24 hours is the possibility of a Russian-Ukrainian maritime ceasefire.
Should this materialise, it would have a direct impact on Romania’s security environment by reducing the likelihood of incidents associated with attacks on Ukrainian ports in the north-western Black Sea.
4. THE BLACK SEA – THE DANUBE – MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE
We have not identified any new, confirmed major naval incident in the last 24 hours that would alter the operational situation in the Black Sea.
Instead, the diplomatic dimension has come to the fore precisely through the proposal for a maritime ceasefire.
For Romania, such an agreement would have implications in four areas: the security of Ukrainian Danube ports, commercial shipping, the risk posed by drones and munitions remnants, and the safety of the Romanian sector of the Black Sea.
However, until Russia agrees and verification mechanisms are in place, we do not regard the proposal as a change in the military situation.
5. UAV–UAV – UNMANNED NAVAL WARFARE
In the last 24 hours, we have not identified any new publicly confirmed UUV–UUV confrontation.
We are, however, maintaining this separate category because the recent precedent in the Black Sea indicates the emergence of a new function for naval drones: not only attacking conventional ships, but also intercepting and destroying other USVs.
We continue to monitor three indicators: the emergence of new USVs armed with remote-controlled stations, video-confirmed USV–USV interceptions, and the development of escort/counter-USV tactics for ports and ships.
6. USA – IRAN: NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE, BUT MAJOR DIFFERENCES REMAIN
This is one of the key developments of the day.
Reuters reports that the US and Iran remain a long way from reaching an agreement on ending the war, following indirect negotiations held in New York. An Iranian official stated, however, that the diplomatic process must continue
In his speech at the UN, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian adopted a two-pronged stance: Iran will not yield to American pressure, but remains open to negotiations.
Here, a very clear distinction must be drawn between rhetoric and diplomatic dynamics.
Rhetoric: extremely harsh.
Diplomacy: ongoing.
Agreement: a long way off.
Negotiation channel: operational.
This combination marginally reduces the likelihood of an immediate, uncontrolled escalation, without, however, reducing the overall level of risk.
US attacks → Iran
For the period 23 September, 06:00 – 24 September, 06:00, we have not identified any new confirmed US military strikes on Iranian territory in the main sources consulted.
Iran → US attacks
During the same period, we have not identified any new confirmed Iranian strikes on US bases or forces.
7. THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ – TRAFFIC REMAINS EXTREMELY LOW
The situation has not returned to normal.
Shipping data analysed by Reuters shows that only three commercial cargo ships passed through the strait on Tuesday, compared with four the previous day, a figure below the average for the last ten days.
This confirms that diplomatic talks have not yet led to a return to normal operations.
Meanwhile, the Israeli press reported, citing Channel 12, that US negotiators had rejected the Iranian offer to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and had contested the idea that Tehran could impose conditions on free navigation through the strait. There is no direct official confirmation from Washington in the report in question, which is why we are treating the information as media coverage of the negotiations, rather than an officially established diplomatic fact.
Iran is demanding, amongst other things, the lifting of the port blockade, the easing of sanctions, the release of frozen assets and the establishment of a safe shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz, agreed in conjunction with Oman.
8. NAVAL INCIDENT IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ
One further development is worth noting: the Indian and Omani authorities have reported the death of an Indian sailor in an attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. Indian sailor killed in attack on vessel in Strait of Hormuz — Indian, Omani authorities | The Times of Israel
Responsibility for the attack is not established in the source consulted.
We therefore do not attribute the attack to Iran or any other actor in the absence of credible confirmation.
The incident is, however, significant as it demonstrates that the risk to commercial crews remains real, not merely theoretical.
9. IRAN – NEIGHBOURING STATES – THE EU
The President of the European Council, António Costa, spoke with Pezeshkian and made three demands of Iran: the resumption of cooperation with the IAEA, an end to attacks against neighbouring states, and the full restoration of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.
This European intervention is significant because it seeks to link three issues that have until now often been negotiated separately:
nuclear – regional security – freedom of navigation.
From a strategic perspective, this integration could become one of the diplomatic approaches towards a possible broader agreement.
10. YEMEN – HOUTHIS – SAUDI ARABIA
We do not identify, within the period under strict analysis, any confirmed major territorial change that would alter yesterday’s assessment.
However, the overall situation remains extremely serious.
Houthi forces have advanced in recent weeks to positions that could affect the security of Bab el-Mandeb, and the conflict has already led to massive population displacements. Reuters previously reported over 100,000 people displaced in the current phase of the fighting
The strategic element remains unchanged:
control of the coastline + the capability to launch drone/missile attacks + proximity to Bab el-Mandeb = the ability to exert pressure on global maritime transport.
11. BAB EL-MANDEB – THE SECOND CRITICAL CHOKEPOINT
We continue to assess Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb together, not separately.
Hormuz controls energy access from the Persian Gulf.
Bab el-Mandeb controls the link between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and thus the route to the Suez Canal.
A simultaneous disruption would affect oil, LNG, container shipping, marine insurance costs and Europe–Asia supply chains.
In the last 24 hours, we have not identified any closure of Bab el-Mandeb.
12. GAZA
Khan Younis, 23 September
An Israeli air strike on a vehicle in the west of Khan Younis killed two Palestinians and injured two others, according to local medical staff.
The Israeli army confirmed the attack and stated that the target was a militant. Subsequently, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that one of those killed, Mohammad Abu Elwan, was a senior Hamas financial official.
Let us summarise, therefore:
confirmed fact: Israel carried out the attack;
medical report: two dead, two injured;
Israeli assessment: one of those killed was a Hamas official;
independent confirmation of his role: we have found none in the sources consulted.
On the humanitarian front, reconstruction remains at a standstill, and over 2,000 buildings are considered at risk of collapse, according to Gaza officials quoted by Reuters
13. WEST BANK
During the period under review, the Palestinian press reported the arrest by Israeli forces of a colonel from the Palestinian Authority’s Preventive Security Service. The Times of Israel explicitly presented the information as originating from Palestinian reports.
We do not regard this isolated incident as a strategic shift in the situation, but we include it because the relationship between Israeli forces and the Palestinian Authority’s security structures is an important indicator of institutional stability in the West Bank.
14. ISRAEL – HEZBOLLAH – LEBANON
During the period under review, we have not identified any new and confirmed major military escalation on the Israel–Hezbollah front.
This is in itself significant following the incidents and attacks of the preceding weeks.
However, the structural problem remains unresolved: the planned withdrawal of UNIFIL, control of southern Lebanon, the disarmament of Hezbollah and the continued Israeli military presence continue to create the conditions for a resumption of hostilities. Reuters recently reported that UNIFIL is preparing for the transition ahead of its withdrawal, whilst the process of disarming Hezbollah remains at a standstill.
15. SYRIA
We have not identified any military developments in the last 24 hours on a scale comparable to those in Ukraine, Iran or Yemen.
However, we are keeping Syria under observation due to the instability of military depots, the presence of external actors and its interdependence with the Lebanese front. Earlier this week, a further explosion at a Syrian army ammunition depot in Aleppo province was the fourth of its kind in September.
16. ENERGY – IMPORTANT MARKET SIGNAL
The price of oil rose by nearly 4 per cent on Wednesday, following a volatile trading session, against a backdrop of uncertainty surrounding US–Iran negotiations and Pezeshkian’s statement that Iran would not surrender.
The market is thus sending a clear signal: investors do not yet consider the negotiations sufficient to eliminate the geopolitical premium associated with the Strait of Hormuz.
For Europe, the risk is not limited to the price of oil. The following must also be monitored:
the cost of LNG;
maritime transport;
insurance premiums;
refined petroleum products;
any simultaneous disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.
17. WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN THE NEXT 24–72 HOURS
Kyiv is becoming the key European indicator. It remains to be seen whether this morning’s ballistic missile attack marks the end of the campaign that began yesterday or the start of a new wave.
The Ukraine–Russia energy and maritime ceasefire is the second indicator. Any official response from Moscow to Zelensky’s offer may have a direct impact on the Black Sea and, by extension, on Romania’s security.
Hormuz remains the key global indicator. It is not statements, but the actual number of ships passing through the strait that will show whether a genuine de-escalation is taking place
US–Iran: we are monitoring whether mediators will resume negotiations during the UN General Assembly and whether differences regarding the blockade, sanctions, Iranian assets and navigation can be bridged.
Romania: we are monitoring separately any Russian air activity in the Odessa–Chilia–Ismail area, any RO-Alert in Tulcea, the deployment of air policing aircraft, drone debris and maritime incidents.
Final assessment
Over the past 24 hours, the European centre of gravity has temporarily shifted to Kyiv. The succession of drone attacks, including reactive variants, followed by the ballistic missile strike in the early hours of 24 September, indicates that Russia retains the capacity to exert simultaneous pressure on the Ukrainian population, infrastructure and air defence
There is, however, a diplomatic development that we must monitor very closely: the possibility of combining an energy ceasefire with a maritime one. For Romania, the maritime component is even more important than it appears at first glance, as it could reduce military pressure on the north-western Black Sea, Ukrainian ports and the Danube Delta. For the time being, however, there is a Ukrainian proposal, not an agreement.
In the Middle East, we do not regard the US–Iran negotiations as a successful de-escalation. They represent a channel for de-escalation. The distinction is crucial. Positions remain far apart, the Strait of Hormuz is operating at a fraction of its normal traffic levels, and commercial vessels continue to face the physical risk of conflict.
We therefore identify two possible turning points for the next 24–72 hours: a Russian response to the energy/maritime ceasefire proposal and the transformation of the US–Iran negotiations into a verifiable arrangement concerning the Strait of Hormuz. If neither of these avenues progresses, the strategic picture will remain characterised by very high risk along two simultaneous axes: Ukraine–the Black Sea and Iran–Hormuz–Bab el-Mandeb.
Maritime Security Forum
Iran’s President criticises the ‘aggressor’ Trump in a speech at the UN, but expresses his willingness to engage in dialogue
Masoud Pezeshkian states that Tehran is ready for dialogue and diplomacy, “but without the language of force”
Patrick Wintour in New York
Wednesday 23 September 2026, 18:44 CEST
Iran’s President, Masoud Pezeshkian, has turned the tables on Donald Trump, describing the US as the true aggressor and terrorist in the Middle East, whilst insisting that Iran has always demonstrated its commitment to the negotiating table.
In a defiant speech delivered to the UN General Assembly in New York – his first since the US and Israel launched an all-out war against Iran – Pezeshkian repeatedly vowed that Tehran would never bow to the US.
However, he balanced this defiant stance with a willingness to engage in dialogue, stating: “President Trump and those who seek to intimidate us must understand that we are prepared for dialogue, diplomacy and negotiations, but without resorting to the language of force.”
On Tuesday, the US President had declared before the UN that he was considering the possibility of ‘annihilating’ Iran, but went on to welcome the resumption of talks between negotiators from Tehran and Washington.
A surprise three-hour meeting between Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, and the US Special Envoy, Steve Witkoff, which took place on the sidelines of the General Assembly on the same day, was deemed constructive by both sides. It was the first meeting of its kind since June, but it did not prevent the US delegation from leaving the chamber at the start of Pezeshkian’s speech.
US delegation leaves the chamber during the Iranian president’s speech at the UN General Assembly
The Iranian president did not go into detail about the discussions, but gave the impression that he was focusing on securing the support of Iran’s Arab neighbours for Tehran’s proposals regarding the future of the Strait of Hormuz, the vital waterway that has been intermittently blocked since the start of the war, causing a sharp rise in global energy prices.
He made it clear that Iran cannot tolerate the strait being used to transport weapons that could then be turned against it, a statement suggesting that the Islamic Republic will demand the right to inspect ships transiting the strait in future. Iran’s objective, he said, is to live independently.
Pezeshkian accused Washington of “terrorism” for the assassination of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, at the start of the war. He showed photographs of the late leader and of the more than 150 schoolchildren killed in the early days of the conflict, before insisting that Tehran had never started a war.
“We were merely defending ourselves. We are not terrorists,” he said. “Our innocent people have been the target of cowardly attacks and acts of aggression imposed on our country.”
He asserted that Iran has the right to pursue a peaceful civilian nuclear programme and that it has no intention of building nuclear weapons.
He has repeatedly argued that the solution to regional security lies in reaching an agreement within the region itself, rather than with external parties such as the US. Iran does not view its neighbours as rivals in matters of security, he said, but as partners in the field of security. “In today’s world, those who are unable to defend themselves will be trampled underfoot,” he added.
Since the start of the war, Iran has repeatedly attacked US allies in the region.
Donald Trump claims he could “annihilate Iran” if no agreement is reached – video
Insisting that Iran is the true victim of terrorism, Pezeshkian questioned why “Israel kills, whilst Iran is subject to sanctions”. He added: “They kill, we are sanctioned. Iran has not sought special treatment, but has wanted equal rights.”
Pezeshkian’s speech was praised domestically, but the hardline secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, refused to describe the discussions with the Americans as negotiations. He stated: “Mr Araghchi [Iran’s foreign minister] has set out Iran’s conditions, and until these are met, the Strait of Hormuz will not be opened and no negotiations will take place.”
He warned Iran’s neighbouring countries that are enforcing a US-imposed ban on Iranian travel: “If you side with the United States, we will not stand idly by.” He warned that, should Iranian flights be banned through regional cooperation with Washington, “their airports will no longer have any flights either”.
Pezeshkian’s attendance at the high-profile UN diplomatic event in the heart of Manhattan had been called into question, as it was unclear whether the US would grant a visa. Ultimately, Washington granted permission, but refused visas to several members of Pezeshkian’s delegation.
In Tehran, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Esmail Baghaei, confirmed that discussions had taken place between the two sides, but did not appear to confirm any change in Iran’s negotiating position.
He stated: “The interaction that took place with the American side was conducted through Qatari mediation. The aim of this interaction was to convey Iran’s conditions, including an end to the war in all its dimensions, an end to US aggressive actions, the naval blockade and the economic war, the release of Iranian assets, and so on.”
Aware of potential negative domestic reactions, he added that Iran’s conditions had been conveyed.
Iran has set out seven preconditions before returning to negotiations, and in a new development over the past 48 hours, has stated that the Strait of Hormuz could be reopened within seven days if these conditions were met.
It is likely that the US and the Gulf states will be forced to accept a shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz that requires commercial vessels to follow a route situated mainly in Iranian waters and under Iranian control, rather than under Omani control.
The fact that the negotiations lasted three hours suggests that some progress has been made. The US is under pressure to reduce oil prices and increase the availability of refined oil ahead of the mid-term elections in November. The latest published figures suggest that the number of identifiable oil tankers passing through the strait is fewer than five a day.
The bottleneck in the strait is exacerbated by uncertainty over the control exercised by the Houthis – the Iranian-backed Yemeni paramilitary groups – over a second strategic energy transport chokepoint, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.
There are no signs that Trump wishes to reignite a full-scale war with Iran or, indeed, with the Houthis, given that Republicans are striving to steer the domestic political agenda away from a highly unpopular conflict which Americans believe they are losing.
Iran is under increasingly intense pressure from sanctions, and the US naval blockade makes it almost impossible to export oil, depriving the country of much-needed foreign currency. On Wednesday, Iranian civilian aircraft faced a potential global flight ban due to the threat of secondary sanctions from the US against any entity linked to the Iranian civilian fleet.
Iranian officials have been negotiating frantically with neighbouring countries in an attempt to maintain an air bridge, but it appears that Oman and Iraq have been forced to close their airspace to Iranian civilian aircraft.
Milei threatens at the UN that Argentina will “take matters into its own hands” regarding the Falkland Islands
The Argentine president accuses the United Nations of being full of “parasites” in a bellicose speech delivered at the General Assembly
Daniel Boffey, Chief Reporter
Wednesday 23 September 2026, 20:50 CEST
Javier Milei has condemned the UN, warning that Argentina will “take matters into its own hands” in its dispute with the UK over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.
In a scathing speech delivered at the General Assembly in New York, the Argentine president criticised the UN for its ineffectiveness regarding the long-standing tensions over the British overseas territory in the South Atlantic, known in Argentina as the Malvinas.
“An organisation that set out to defend the territorial sovereignty of its members has decided to turn a blind eye to the situation in the Malvinas,” said Milei, referring to the UN, adding that Argentina is prepared to act unilaterally in relation to recent oil exploration operations near the territory.
The President criticised the Sea Lion project, a major offshore oil development project located in the North Basin of the Falkland Islands, describing the exploitation of the territory’s resources as an “illegal act”.
The President told the General Assembly that Argentina “will not stand idly by whilst others exploit resources under illegal foreign occupation”.
“Argentina will not sit idly by waiting for the UN and the international community to fulfil their own mandate,” he said. “We will take matters into our own hands.”
Argentina has accused the United Kingdom of violating a 1976 UN resolution ordering both parties to refrain from unilateral actions on the islands. Milei’s government this month initiated sanctions proceedings against more than 60 companies and individuals linked to the oil drilling project.
The Falkland Islands Government had approved the development and production plans for this project, which is a joint venture between an energy company based in Israel and an oil and gas exploration company listed on the London Stock Exchange.
The UN officially recognises neither British nor Argentine sovereignty and maintains that the status of the archipelago remains a disputed issue to be resolved through bilateral negotiations. The organisation has repeatedly called on both governments to find a peaceful solution to the dispute, which escalated into a conflict in 1982 following an invasion by Argentine forces.
The conflict, which lasted 74 days, ended with the surrender of the Argentine forces. It claimed the lives of 649 Argentine servicemen, 255 British servicemen and three Falkland Islanders.
“For us, the Malvinas Islands are a national cause,” Milei told the General Assembly. The UN, he said, is a “useless organisation whose sole purpose is to support a gang of slightly arrogant parasites who pass themselves off as well-meaning bureaucrats”.
“That is why the Falkland Islands are not just a matter between Argentina and the United Kingdom,” he said. “They also raise a question about this organisation’s ability to enforce its own resolutions.”
In 2013, a referendum was held in the Falkland Islands on the political status of the archipelago. With a turnout of 92 per cent, 99.8 per cent voted to remain a British territory, with just three votes against.
Milei told UN delegates that the principle of self-determination should not apply in the case of the Falkland Islands, as “the population was settled by the occupying power on a territory whose sovereignty is disputed”. “We call on the United Kingdom to resume negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute, as required by international law,” he said.
Last month, Donald Trump stated that he was reassessing the US’s neutral stance on the Falkland Islands. The issue was discussed this week during the first meeting between Trump and the UK’s Prime Minister, Andy Burnham.
“The clear position is: we will stand firm in the face of any threats,” said Burnham. “We will defend the right of the Falkland Islanders to self-determination and to remain British. I simply wanted the President to hear directly from me that this is Britain’s clear position, and he understood very well what I told him.”
Eight crew members of the USS Lincoln have attempted suicide, the US Navy confirms
Hung Cao, Acting Secretary of the US Navy, responded to questions from US Senator Kirsten Gillibrand in a letter
Robert Mackey and Uwa Ede-Osifo
Thursday 24 September 2026, 02:53 CEST
Eight members of the US Navy personnel, assigned to the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group, have attempted suicide since the start of their long-term mission as part of the US war against Iran, Hung Cao, the acting Secretary of the US Navy, revealed on Tuesday, in a letter to US Senator Kirsten Gillibrand.
“Since the start of the Lincoln’s mission, there have been a total of eight suicide attempts within the strike group,” wrote Cao, responding on behalf of US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth to Senator Gillibrand’s question regarding the quality of life on board the fleet. “This figure includes the crew of the USS Lincoln and sailors from the carrier’s air wing, personnel from the strike group and destroyer squadron, the escort destroyers and all embarked air wings.”
CNN first reported on Cao’s reply to Gillibrand.
The crew of the “Lincoln”, who had spent 286 days at sea, disembarked on 1 September at a tourist resort in Thailand. The crew’s mission had been scheduled to end in May, but it was extended due to the ongoing war.
In August, two military newspapers reported on the deteriorating mental health of the sailors, including multiple attempts to jump overboard. The reports sparked outrage among Democrats, who called for an investigation into conditions on board.
In March, a sailor’s attempt to jump overboard was prevented by his colleagues, according to Cao. In August, a sailor did in fact jump overboard. The individual was rescued and received medical treatment before being “transferred from the ship for further care”, Cao wrote.
MS Now also reported in August alarming allegations regarding the presence of mould in the ship’s showers and dwindling supplies of food and soap, amongst other essential items.
The number of main course options was temporarily reduced from two to one, Cao wrote in his letter, a measure “implemented to optimise endurance and ensure sustained presence on duty”. He stated that four nutritionally balanced meals were served daily.
He acknowledged some delays in restocking the crew’s supplies.
As details of the low morale amongst the crew of the USS Lincoln began to emerge, Hegseth played down the media coverage, claiming that the media had “completely distorted” the situation. “We ensure that every ship, every crew, every captain has everything we can provide at all times,” he told reporters in August.
“What Trump and Secretary Hegseth dismissed as ‘fake news’ turned out to be serious and deteriorating conditions for members of our armed forces,” Gillibrand said in a statement on Wednesday to *The Guardian*. “Our troops and their families make immense sacrifices every day, yet the President has dismissed them with blatant disrespect. The fact that this administration can find unlimited funds from taxpayers’ money for bombs, ballrooms and billionaires, but cannot look after our service members, is completely unacceptable.”
“The Navy and the Secretary of the Navy are deeply committed to the health, wellbeing and morale of sailors,” a US Navy official told *The Guardian* on Wednesday.
Here is the full text of Cao’s response to Gillibrand’s questions:
Download the original document
In the US, you can call or text the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline on 988, or chat online at 988lifeline.org. In the UK and Ireland, Samaritans can be contacted on the freephone number 116 123. In Australia, the Lifeline crisis support service is 13 11 14. Other international helplines can be found at befrienders.org
,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/sep/23/uss-lincoln-suicide-attempts
The Black Sea, between military risk and economic pressure: Ukraine’s ports, exports and insurance – Maritime Security Forum
The escalation of attacks on commercial vessels, terminals and logistics infrastructure has transformed the Black Sea into a region where military risk translates directly into economic costs. For Ukraine, the issue is not only the ability of ports to operate, but also the willingness of shipowners, access to insurance, the continuity of agricultural funding and the competitiveness of goods on foreign markets. The effects, however, extend beyond the Ukrainian economy: Russian exports are also affected, and volatility in grain and energy transport may influence international prices.
A wider risk zone
In September 2026, the London marine insurance market extended its reporting requirements for war risks to the entire Black Sea. The territorial waters of the non-conflicting littoral states — Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia — are subject to a different regime, but this distinction does not eliminate the operational risks associated with transiting the basin. For shipowners, the consequence is a more rigorous assessment of each voyage, prior notification, separate cover for war risks and additional premiums.
These costs can run into hundreds of thousands of dollars per voyage and are passed on in freight rates, the price of goods and exporters’ margins. More importantly, insurance alone does not solve the problem: if shipowners consider the probability of an attack too high, available capacity falls even when ports remain technically open.
Ports are operating, but commercial access remains fragile
Satellite imagery and industry reports indicate that ships continue to enter ports in the Odessa area sporadically. Consequently, the situation cannot be described as a total blockade. This distinction is important: the infrastructure may remain partially operational, whilst commercial traffic is reduced by the perceived risk, delays and the lack of insurance at an acceptable cost.
Reuters reported on 16 September that Ukraine was considering extending insurance arrangements for ships carrying foodstuffs. According to the agricultural organisations cited, approximately 90 per cent of Ukraine’s exported goods traditionally passed through Black Sea ports, and recent disruptions have reduced agricultural exports by around 60 per cent. Kyiv already has a state compensation scheme and the Unity Facility, developed with Marsh McLennan and underwriters from Lloyd’s, but the scale of the escalation requires additional capital and credible guarantees.
Exports: the key issue is market access
Ukraine continues to have a significant agricultural base. International sector sources forecast a substantial harvest of cereals and oilseeds for 2026. However, a good harvest does not automatically generate income: without safe and reliable transport, goods pile up in warehouses, domestic prices fall, and farmers lose the liquidity they need for the next growing season.
This contradiction — high international prices, but depressed local prices in areas cut off from logistics — shows that the main effect of the war is market fragmentation. The economic cost stems not only from the physical destruction of terminals, but also from the inability to convert production into exports and revenue.
Alternative routes reduce dependence, but do not fully replace maritime transport
The European Union’s solidarity corridors, the Danube ports and rail links through the Republic of Moldova and Romania offer Ukraine options for continuity. However, these have lower capacity, higher costs and their own vulnerabilities. Low water levels on the Danube may limit the loading of barges, border infrastructure causes delays, and the transfer between different railway gauges remains an obstacle.
The Port of Constanța thus takes on added importance, both as a transhipment point and as a key element of regional resilience. For Romania, this development brings logistical opportunities, but also puts pressure on infrastructure, necessitates more extensive security measures, and exposes the country to incidents near its maritime and Danube borders.
The impact is not one-sided
The analysis must avoid giving the impression that Ukraine alone is bearing the costs of the escalation. Ukrainian attacks on Russian infrastructure in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have, in turn, reduced or slowed down grain and energy flows. CSIS noted in September that the reciprocal attacks had simultaneously affected the major ports of both states, including the Novorossiysk area, which is crucial for a significant proportion of Russian grain exports.
This reciprocity does not imply complete symmetry in terms of damage or responsibility, but indicates that the commercial risk has spread across the entire basin. The insurance and transport markets react to the likelihood of incidents, not to the political arguments of the parties involved.
Implications for food security
The Black Sea is a major artery for grain, fertilisers and energy. UNCTAD emphasises that the disruption to exports from Ukraine and Russia particularly affects import-dependent developing countries. The experience of the Black Sea Grain Initiative has shown that a predictable shipping framework can stabilise flows and ease pressure on prices. In the absence of a similar mechanism, markets remain sensitive to every military incident, insurers’ decisions and capacity constraints.
Conclusions
1. There is no complete blockade, but rather a severe deterioration in trade access. Ships can continue to operate on an ad hoc basis, but costs, risk and reduced availability among shipowners limit volumes and predictability.
2. Insurance has become a strategic tool. War risks and underwriting capacity can effectively close a route even if it remains physically open. Public-private schemes can mitigate the problem, but cannot indefinitely compensate for a deterioration in security.
3. For Ukraine, the logistical bottleneck threatens the entire agricultural cycle. Lower revenues, insufficient storage space and difficult access to credit may affect future sowing and production, not just current exports.
4. Routes via the Danube, Romania and the Republic of Moldova are essential, but complementary. They increase resilience and bargaining power, without fully replicating the efficiency and capacity of deep-water seaports.
5. The risk is both regional and global. Escalation affects Ukrainian and Russian trade flows, transport costs and the food security of importing nations. Lasting stabilisation would require verifiable protection of civilian shipping, a reduction in attacks on commercial infrastructure, and a credible international monitoring and assurance mechanism.
International sources consulted
- Reuters / Insurance Journal, 16 September 2026 — ship insurance and the impact on Ukrainian agricultural exports.
- Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 11 September 2026 — attacks on ports and implications for food security.
- UN Trade and Development — the role of Black Sea transport in food market stability.
- U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2 July 2026 — the transport of Ukrainian grain and the competitiveness of logistics routes.
- Reuters / Baird Maritime, 18 September 2026 — expansion of the risk zone for marine insurance.
Maritime Security Forum
Sanctions, straits and the risks associated with the Russian shadow fleet – Maritime Security Forum
The escalation of hostilities in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov in the summer of 2026 reduced commercial traffic to some Russian and Ukrainian ports and heightened third-country states’ interest in the security of navigation. In this context, Turkey plays a central role: Ankara administers the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, controls access between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and enforces a set of technical regulations, fees and maritime services with significant economic and political implications.
This analysis examines the relationship between the legal regime governing the straits, revenue generated from ship transit, the application of sanctions and the activities of the Russian ‘shadow fleet’. The assessment distinguishes between verifiable facts, debatable legal interpretations and public policy implications.
1. The Montreux Convention and Turkey’s regulatory scope
The 1936 Montreux Convention remains the primary framework for navigation through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It guarantees, in peacetime, freedom of passage for commercial vessels and permits the levying of fees for health services, maritime signalling and rescue operations. Pilotage and towing are presented in the text of the convention as optional services.
Over time, changes in the size and characteristics of ships, increased traffic and environmental risks have led Turkey to adopt additional rules. The restrictions introduced in 1994 for oil tankers, the stricter conditions applied to large vessels since 2018 and the advance notification requirements were justified on the grounds of navigational safety. In practice, the priority given to ships using pilots and the obligations imposed on certain categories sometimes turn formally optional services into costs that are difficult to avoid.
This development highlights a tension between the letter of a treaty drafted for the technical conditions of the 1930s and the contemporary need to manage a congested maritime corridor. It does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the convention has been breached, but it does justify a transparent examination of the proportionality of the measures and their non-discriminatory application.
2. The increase in fees and the transit economy
From October 2022, Turkey significantly increased the reference value used to calculate the fees provided for in the Convention. Further adjustments took place in 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026. The cumulative effect was an increase in the cost of a crossing and in the public revenue generated by transit through the straits.
In addition to the general fees, shipowners incur pilotage costs and, for certain vessels, towage costs. The final amount depends on tonnage, vessel type, duration of the operation, the time at which the service is provided and the number of crossings. Oil tankers and gas carriers are subject to additional costs, as their risk profile is higher.
From an economic perspective, the system has three effects. Firstly, it generates significant revenue for Turkish institutions and operators. Secondly, it increases the logistical cost of exports from the Black Sea basin. Thirdly, it provides the Turkish authorities with an indirect means of influencing traffic flows through rules governing order, scheduling and priority.
3. Pilotage, towing and institutional structure
Turkey’s General Directorate for Coastal Safety administers pilotage services in the straits and sets the relevant tariffs. Traffic monitoring is supported by the Turkish Vessel Traffic Service, through communication centres and surveillance systems. Requests must be submitted prior to entering the straits, which allows for the verification of the vessel’s characteristics, cargo and documentation.
Pilotage in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles operates as a public monopoly. Towing is mainly carried out by state-owned services, but may also involve authorised private operators. Outside the straits, similar services are contracted out to private companies for specific port regions.
This structure provides Turkey with access to detailed information on vessels and counterparties. Consequently, the issue is not merely commercial, but also one of compliance: the availability of prior data enables the verification of sanctions, insurance and beneficial ownership before services are provided.
4. The Russian ‘shadow’ fleet and the enforcement of sanctions
The Russian ‘shadow fleet’ consists, in a broad sense, of vessels used to maintain hydrocarbon exports in the face of Western restrictions, often through opaque ownership structures, frequent changes of flag, unconventional insurance arrangements and multiple intermediaries. Not all vessels with commercial links to Russia are subject to sanctions, and their legal status must be verified on a case-by-case basis.
The passage of a sanctioned vessel through straits raises two distinct issues. The first concerns the right of transit provided for by the Montreux Convention. The second concerns the provision and payment for related services, such as pilotage and towage, particularly when transactions are denominated in US dollars or involve entities subject to jurisdictions that apply sanctions.
The Convention may limit Turkey’s ability to arbitrarily deny commercial passage, but it does not automatically resolve the issue of ancillary services and financial compliance. A sound legal assessment requires details of the specific vessel, the beneficial owner, the flag, the insurer, the cargo, the currency of payment and the entities processing the transaction.
One area of vulnerability is insurance. Turkish regulations require information on marine liability cover, whilst many vessels in the shadow fleet do not use established P&I clubs. Accepting a policy issued by a provider of uncertain financial standing transfers part of the risk of an accident to the coastal states and to public funds.
5. Trade priorities and mutual dependencies
Traffic regulations may give priority to vessels supplying Turkish refineries, gas terminals or power stations, as well as those heading for shipyards in Turkey. This mechanism reflects legitimate interests in energy security and economic continuity, but may create incentives to deepen trade relations with operators who are difficult to verify.
The relationship is one of interdependence. Russia relies on access through the straits for part of its maritime exports, whilst Turkey gains revenue, energy and business for its maritime ‘ ’ sector. This interdependence reduces the likelihood of radical measures, but increases the importance of clear compliance and transparency procedures.
6. The Kerch Strait: fees, control and legitimacy
In the Kerch Strait, the legal situation is different. Following the occupation of Crimea in 2014, Russian-controlled bodies took over the collection of fees that had previously been the responsibility of the Ukrainian authorities. Subsequently, administration was reorganised through Russian federal institutions, and pilotage and the use of the Kerch–Enikale Canal continued to generate revenue.
From the perspective of Ukraine and those states that do not recognise the annexation of Crimea, the legitimacy of these fees is disputed. Furthermore, reported maritime accidents and shortcomings in the coordination of pilotage call into question the link between the revenue collected and the actual quality of navigational safety.
From an analytical perspective, three dimensions must be distinguished: the right to administer and levy navigation charges, operators’ compliance with sanctions, and the technical standards applied to vessels. Confusing these may lead to overly general legal conclusions.
7. Implications
For Turkey. The administration of the straits strengthens its strategic position and generates revenue, but exposes it to criticism regarding the selective application of rules and insufficient control over vessels with opaque ownership or insurance. A major incident could result in environmental, reputational and budgetary costs far exceeding the revenue generated from services.
For the European Union and its partners. The effectiveness of sanctions depends not only on the designation of vessels, but also on the monitoring of port services, insurance, payments and intermediaries. Technical cooperation with Turkey may be more effective than general calls for transit restrictions, which may conflict with the Montreux Convention.
For maritime safety. Old vessels, inadequate maintenance and uncertain insurance increase the likelihood that an accident could become a regional issue. Sharing data on inspections, beneficial ownership and financial cover would reduce the risk without automatically turning technical control into a political tool.
For regional trade. Rising tariffs and delays affect all trade flows, not just Russian exports. Costs may be passed on to energy, grain and transport prices, whilst uncertainty may divert traffic to more expensive routes.
For the legal regime of the Black Sea. Practices developed since 2022 show that historic treaties can be adapted administratively without formal renegotiation. This flexibility is useful for security, but requires transparency to avoid the perception of arbitrary application.
Conclusions
1. The Turkish Straits represent simultaneously a legal corridor, an economic instrument and a strategic lever. The Montreux Convention guarantees commercial transit, but the manner in which the technical rules are applied influences the cost and pace of navigation.
2. The issue of sanctions cannot be reduced to the mere passage of a vessel. Checks must cover ownership, insurance, payments, service providers and the destination of the cargo.
3. Pilotage and towage generate both revenue and liabilities. The institutions that receive data and payments also have the means to identify technical and compliance risks.
4. The shadow fleet poses a collective risk. Opacity regarding ownership and the uncertain quality of insurance may shift the consequences of an accident onto riparian states, regardless of their political stance.
5. The Kerch Strait regime requires separate analysis. The dispute over sovereignty, the legality of tolls and safety standards is not equivalent to Turkey’s administration of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.
6. An effective response should be risk- and data-driven. Priorities include vetting ships and insurers, ensuring transparency regarding beneficial owners, coordinating sanctions, and establishing regional contingency plans in the event of an accident.
Maritime Security Forum
Attack on a merchant vessel and infrastructure in the Odessa region – Maritime Security Forum
An attack on the night of 23 September 2026 targeted a merchant ship in the Black Sea and infrastructure targets in the Odessa region. According to information provided by the Ukrainian authorities and reported by Ukrinform, the ship’s captain died, the crew were evacuated, and a fire broke out on board, which was subsequently extinguished.
1. The maritime incident
The State Enterprise ‘Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority’ announced that a cargo ship had been struck in the Black Sea during the night. The attack caused a fire on board. Naval forces evacuated the crew, and subsequent intervention enabled the fire to be extinguished.
According to the same report, the ship’s captain, a Ukrainian national, died. The information available in the initial report does not specify the extent of the damage, the nature of the cargo, the ship’s exact position or the effects of the incident on its seaworthiness.
2. Discrepancies requiring clarification
The reports cited contain a discrepancy regarding the ship’s flag: one passage mentions Antigua and Barbuda, whilst another mentions Tanzania. Furthermore, the latest report indicates that three crew members were injured, a detail not included in the summary provided earlier. Until a definitive confirmation is issued by the maritime authorities, these details must be treated as unconfirmed information.
The discrepancies may stem from successive updates, inaccurate translations or the confusion of two separate incidents. They do not alter the gravity of the incident, but are important for establishing the vessel’s identity, the jurisdiction of its flag state, investigative responsibilities and any potential compensation.
3. Attacks on infrastructure in the Odessa region
Meanwhile, the head of the Odessa regional military administration, Oleg Kiper, stated that port and civilian targets had been struck. According to him, the attacks twice targeted storage facilities for medicines, everyday goods and food. It took several hours to extinguish the fires.
The available information does not provide a full assessment of the damage, nor does it specify whether port operations have been suspended. Consequently, the incident indicates disruption and an increased operational risk, but does not in itself allow the conclusion that the region’s ports have become inoperable.
4. Operational context
An attack on a commercial vessel must be analysed separately from attacks on military targets. Civilian vessels are operated by companies, crews and insurers from different jurisdictions, and an incident can have international consequences even when it occurs near a theatre of war.
For commercial operators, the risk is not determined solely by the probability of a direct hit. Alerts, temporary route closures, additional inspections, rescue difficulties, port congestion and uncertainty regarding cargo can prolong voyages and increase costs.
5. Implications
For the safety of navigation. The death of a ship’s captain demonstrates that the risk to commercial crews is direct, not merely financial. Shipowners may review procedures for entering port, lay days, routes and the thresholds at which they suspend a voyage.
For marine insurance. The incident may lead to a reassessment of premiums for war risks, coverage limits and the conditions imposed prior to entering Ukrainian waters. Uncertainty regarding the flag and the circumstances of the attack may delay the determination of liability and the settlement of claims.
For Ukrainian ports. Even if the infrastructure remains operational, repeated attacks may reduce vessel availability and slow down loading, unloading and storage. The economic impact may materialise even before a complete physical disruption, through higher costs and lower volumes.
For supply chains. Strikes on warehouses containing medicines, food and everyday goods may affect regional distribution and increase pressure on alternative capacities. The extent of the impact, however, depends on the volume destroyed, the duration of the disruption and the availability of reserve stocks.
For flag states and coastal states. The incident may require cooperation between Ukraine, the flag state, the operator, the insurer and regional maritime authorities. Rapid clarification of the vessel’s identity and the coordinates of the attack is essential for a credible investigation.
For regional security. Attacks on commercial shipping increase the risk of the conflict spreading indirectly, as ships, crews and cargo may have links to states not involved in the hostilities. This highlights the need for maritime notification and intervention mechanisms.
Conclusions
1. The incident represents a significant escalation for commercial shipping. The fact that there was a casualty amongst the crew shows that the threat extends beyond material damage to ships and infrastructure.
2. The information must be verified before any legal conclusions can be drawn. Discrepancies regarding the ship’s flag and inconsistent reports on casualties necessitate confirmation of the vessel’s identity and the sequence of events.
3. The physical operation of ports does not equate to normal commercial access. Increased risk may reduce traffic and insurance capacity even if facilities continue to operate.
4. The effects may ripple through the economy. Transport, storage, insurance and security costs may affect exporters, importers and the final price of goods.
5. Protecting civilian shipping requires international coordination. The rapid exchange of information, warning procedures, incident verification and rescue capabilities are essential for minimising casualties and trade disruptions.
Source cited in the original article: Ukrinform, based on statements from the Ukrainian authorities.
Maritime Security Forum
Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is falling amid attacks on commercial vessels – Maritime Security Forum
Preliminary monitoring data indicates a severe reduction in visible commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. According to Reuters, citing Kpler, only two cargo ships passed through the strait on Monday with their AIS transponders active, compared with ten the previous day. This development coincides with two separate attacks on an oil tanker and a liquefied petroleum gas carrier.
1. A sharp decline, but one that is difficult to measure precisely
Kpler’s data shows that a Panamanian-flagged Supramax vessel, loaded with mineral raw materials, and a Liberian-flagged bulk carrier passed through the strait. However, the figure of two crossings only reflects traffic identified via the Automatic Identification System. al vessels that switched off their transponders, transmitted incomplete data or were tracked by other means are not included.
Prior to the conflict that broke out on 28 February 2026, Reuters estimated that approximately 125 large commercial vessels crossed the strait daily. A direct comparison with the two observed transits suggests an extreme contraction in visible traffic, but does not prove that only two vessels actually crossed.
Available sources also point to differences between monitoring systems. The Joint Maritime Information Centre noted that commercial providers were reporting low numbers of transits, whilst US data on assisted navigation indicated higher volumes. This discrepancy may reflect differing methodologies, the protection of operational data, and the limited use of AIS in high-risk areas.
2. The attacks on the LR Stephanie and the Al Maryah
According to Marisks Intelligence and maritime reports, the LR Stephanie, an oil tanker flying the Isle of Man flag, was struck by an unidentified projectile whilst entering the strait. Two crew members sustained minor injuries. The vessel, managed by Universal Tanker Corp., continued its journey under its own power.
The day before, the liquefied petroleum gas carrier Al Maryah, flying the Liberian flag and managed by ADNOC Logistics and Services, was struck whilst exiting the strait. This vessel was also able to continue without being towed.
Responsibility for the two incidents had not been established at the time of reporting. Marisks noted that neither vessel appeared on publicly known Iranian lists of vessels deemed non-compliant. The absence of a confirmed claim calls for caution in attributing the attacks.
3. The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz
The Strait connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea and is, at its narrowest point, approximately 21 nautical miles wide. The International Energy Agency estimates that by 2025, nearly 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day will pass through this corridor, accounting for approximately a quarter of global maritime oil trade.
Hormuz is also vital for liquefied natural gas. According to the IEA, around 19 per cent of global LNG trade passed through the strait in 2025, mainly comprising exports from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. This concentration explains the markets’ swift reaction to any incident, even if traffic is not completely disrupted.
Alternatives are limited. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pipelines that can bypass the strait, but the IEA estimates the available spare capacity at around 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day. This can mitigate a disruption, but cannot fully replace the volumes normally transported by sea.
4. A trade restriction, not necessarily a physical closure
A reduction in traffic may occur without a formal blockade. Shipowners may delay entry, anchor in safer areas, wait for an escort or temporarily avoid the route. Insurers may impose additional premiums, notification conditions and coverage limits, whilst cargo owners may request that shipments be rerouted.
The fact that the vessels that were struck continued their journey suggests that the damage to their propulsion systems was limited. However, the signal sent to the market is broader: the probability of an attack on a commercial vessel has become high enough to affect decisions across the entire sector.
5. Implications
For the oil market. A prolonged reduction in transit volumes may delay deliveries from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Iran. Even without any physical loss of production, delays may constrain available supply in the short term and amplify price volatility.
For the gas market. Qatar’s and the Emirates’ heavy reliance on LNG exports via the Strait of Hormuz limits the scope for re-routing. Asian importers are the most directly exposed, but competition for alternative cargoes may also put pressure on Europe.
For maritime transport. War risk premiums, crew costs, waiting times and security requirements may rise rapidly. Some charter contracts allow for the refusal to sail through an area deemed dangerous, which may reduce the supply of vessels even if the strait remains navigable.
For traffic transparency. Switching off the AIS sometimes protects ships from being identified, but it reduces the ability of authorities and operators to avoid collisions and assess traffic flows. In a narrow corridor, reduced visibility can create additional safety risks.
For supply chains. The effects are not limited to energy. Higher fuel and transport costs can affect the prices of goods, petrochemical production, fertilisers, aviation and industrial activity.
For regional security. Unattributed attacks increase the risk of miscalculations and disproportionate military responses. Mechanisms for naval communication, early warning and independent investigation become essential to prevent escalation.
Conclusions
1. Visible traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has contracted severely. AIS data indicate an exceptional decline, but do not, on their own, provide a complete picture of actual transits.
2. The attacks have had a greater impact than the reported physical damage. Even though the LR Stephanie and Al Maryah continued their journeys without being towed, the incidents alter the risk assessment for all vessels using the route.
3. The Strait of Hormuz remains difficult to replace. Alternative pipelines can only handle part of the flows, and regional LNG exports have very limited diversion options.
4. A commercial disruption may occur before an official closure. Decisions by shipowners and insurers may reduce traffic even if the waterway remains physically open.
5. Conflicting data must be presented transparently. Trade estimates, military intelligence and AIS observations measure different components of traffic and should not be treated as directly equivalent.
6. The potential impact is global. The persistence of the risk may affect energy, inflation, transport and economic security, with Asian importers being particularly exposed.
Sources consulted
- Reuters / Emirates 24|7, 22 September 2026 — Kpler data on maritime traffic and incidents.
- The Maritime Executive, 21 September 2026 — reported attacks and discrepancies in traffic estimates.
- Seatrade Maritime News, 21 September 2026 — injuries to crew members and the vessel’s onward journey.
- International Energy Agency, factsheet updated in February 2026 — oil and LNG flows and alternative capacities.
- U.S. Energy Information Administration — the role of the Strait of Hormuz amongst strategic energy trade hubs.
Maritime Security Forum
Russia is redirecting grain exports to Baltic and Arctic ports following disruption to Black Sea routes – Maritime Security Forum
Russia is preparing to export grain via Murmansk and is expanding its use of Baltic ports, after attacks on ships and infrastructure in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have reduced the capacity and predictability of its main maritime corridor. The move represents a significant logistical adjustment, but does not amount to a replacement for the sou e routes: rail distances, the limited capacity of specialised terminals and additional costs make the north a resilience solution, not a full substitute.
1. From dependence on the Black Sea to forced diversification
Last season, nearly 90 per cent of Russian maritime grain exports passed through Black Sea ports. However, the escalation of mutual attacks on ships and port facilities has reduced flows from the south and forced companies to seek alternative routes via the Baltic Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Far East and Arctic ports.
The commercial port of Murmansk, Russia’s fourth-largest and ice-free all year round thanks to the influence of the North Atlantic Current, plans to begin loading grain in October 2026. The first consignment, of approximately 40,000 tonnes from the Stavropol region, has been approved for transport by rail. The cargo will travel over 3,000 kilometres to the port, which highlights the exceptional and costly nature of the operation.
A distinction must be made: the departure of a ship from Murmansk does not automatically mean that the entire Northern Sea Route along the Siberian coast will be used. Depending on the destination, the vessel may sail towards the Atlantic via the Barents Sea and international waters. The new element is the use of an Arctic port for grain from southern Russia, not necessarily the crossing of the Arctic Ocean to Asia.
2. Murmansk: a quick solution, without a fully developed grain infrastructure
Murmansk has a declared total capacity of up to 24 million tonnes per year and can accommodate Panamax-class vessels, but until now it has mainly handled coal, ores, metals and fertilisers. For the first grain shipments, the port operator will adapt conveyor belts and use direct transfer from rail wagons into the ship’s holds, a technology commonly used for potash.
This method allows exports to get off the ground quickly, but is less flexible than operations at a modern grain terminal. The lack of elevators and ample storage capacity reduces flexibility in batch formation, grade separation, managing rail delays and protecting the cargo from moisture. A disruption to train arrivals or the ship’s schedule can bring the entire chain to a standstill.
3. The Baltic ports are shouldering the bulk of the substitution effort
6. Implications
For Russia’s maritime strategy. The partial shift of grain exports to the Baltic and Arctic regions reduces dependence on a single basin and transforms multi-purpose infrastructure into a tool for economic resilience. However, the significant difference in capacity shows that the Black Sea remains indispensable for current volumes of Russian exports.
For food security. Russia is one of the world’s largest wheat exporters. Delays and additional costs may reduce available supply in the short term and exacerbate volatility for importers in North Africa and the Middle East, particularly if Ukrainian exports are disrupted at the same time.
For international markets and sanctions. The new routes alter the ports, banks, insurers and jurisdictions involved in transactions. Compliance monitoring becomes more complex, and authorities will need to distinguish between food trade – which is generally exempt from restrictions – and sanctioned services or entities that may appear in the supply chain.
For rail infrastructure. Redirecting traffic over very long distances may overload the main lines and junctions in the north-west. Declared transport demand may exceed the actual capacity of terminals, leading to queues, delays and demurrage costs.
For the Arctic environment. Increased traffic in the north heightens the risk of accidents, pollution, black carbon emissions and difficult rescue operations in severe weather conditions. Studies on the Northern Sea Route highlight limited search-and-rescue infrastructure, rapidly changing ice conditions and a reliance on specialised vessels and services.
For Arctic geopolitics. The use of Murmansk for agricultural goods adds a civilian and food security dimension to a region already significant for energy, security and military matters. If this rerouting becomes permanent, Russia may invest in terminals, railways and northern maritime services, strengthening the Arctic’s strategic role, but also intensifying competition over its monitoring and regulation.
4. The real cost of the detour
The main drawback is overland transport. Murmansk is approximately 2,700 km from Novorossiysk, and grain from Stavropol must be transported over 3,000 km by rail. Even though large vessels can limit the maritime cost per tonne, the additional rail segment, transhipment and waiting times reduce the competitiveness of Russian wheat in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern markets.
The priority given to grain trains and state subsidies may maintain these flows, but shifts part of the cost from exporters to the public budget. At the same time, the allocation of locomotives and wagons to the north may create competition with the transport of coal, fertilisers, ores and containers.
5. Exports have fallen, and the pressure is being passed on to farmers
According to Sovecon data cited by Reuters, Russia exported 4.4 million tonnes of grain in July and August 2026, approximately 31 per cent less than a year earlier. For September, exports were estimated at 2.45 million tonnes, roughly half the volume recorded in the same month the previous year.
The logistical bottleneck is leading to a build-up of stocks and putting downward pressure on domestic prices. The gap between the grain available in producing regions and the actual export capacity reduces farmers’ liquidity, makes it harder to finance agricultural work and may affect the area sown and future production. The problem is, therefore, broader than the loss of current revenue.
At Ust-Luga, the private Ultramar terminal, which previously specialised in mineral fertilisers, has been adapted for grain. Rail transport requests for September reached approximately 260,000 tonnes, destined for destinations including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In St Petersburg, the Modul and BSMZ terminals have also begun handling grain; Modul could handle up to 70,000 tonnes per month in containers, although this solution is more expensive than bulk transport.
The existing grain handling capacity of Russian ports in the Baltic is estimated at just 2–7 million tonnes per year, compared with over 60 million tonnes in the southern ports. Converting terminals can rapidly expand supply, but the nominal capacity for all goods should not be confused with the actual throughput for grain. Constraints include rail access, storage space, cleaning and weighing equipment, loading rates and vessel availability.
Conclusions
1. Exports via Murmansk represent an operational first, not proof that the Arctic route can replace the Black Sea. The port offers access further away from the conflict zone, but relies on a long rail link and facilities adapted on an emergency basis.
2. The Baltic is the more important immediate alternative. Ust-Luga and St Petersburg have convertible infrastructure and access to markets, but their grain capacity remains well below that of the southern ports.
3. Diversification increases resilience, but also costs. Subsidies, rail priority and the repurposing of terminals are sustaining exports, without alleviating the pressure on exporters’ margins and farmers’ incomes.
4. The effects extend beyond Russia. The simultaneous disruption of Russian and Ukrainian grain flows may affect freight rates, insurance, grain prices and the food security of importing countries.
5. The expansion of northern trade routes creates new risks. Rescue infrastructure, Arctic conditions and environmental vulnerabilities require a separate assessment from the commercial case for a militarily safer route.
Sources consulted
- Reuters / Eye on the Arctic, 21 September 2026 — conversion of the terminals in Murmansk, Ust-Luga and Saint Petersburg, capacities and data from Sovecon.
- Reuters / Baird Maritime, 22 September 2026 — direct transfer from rail wagons to ships and adaptation of equipment in Murmansk.
- UkrAgroConsult, 22 September 2026 — capacity of Baltic ports and prioritisation of rail transport.
- Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 2024 — operational, safety and environmental vulnerabilities of the Northern Sea Route.
- Bellona Foundation, 2025 report — rescue infrastructure, navigation conditions and environmental risks in the Arctic.
Maritime Security Forum
The UK will begin construction of the first AUKUS SSN in 2027: strategic ambitions and industrial constraints – Maritime Security Forum
The UK intends to lay the keel for the first AUKUS nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) in 2027, marking the programme’s transition from design to production. The first British submarine is scheduled to enter service in the late 2030s. The project could lead to a larger fleet than the current seven Astute-class vessels, but the outcome depends on the expansion of shipyards, reactor production, specialist personnel, long-term funding and coordination between the UK, Australia and the United States.
Artist’s impression of a possible AUKUS SSN. The class will be operated by the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy; the final configuration has not yet been fully disclosed.
1. Programme timetable and fleet size
The Defence Nuclear Enterprise update published by the UK government on 15 September 2026 confirms that production will begin in 2027 and maintains the target for the first vessel to enter service in the late 2030s. The programme is currently in the Detailed Design and Long Lead phase, and a decision on the total number of British submarines is expected before the end of this phase in 2028.
This timetable should not be confused with the rapid delivery of a complete fleet. Nuclear submarines have lengthy design, certification, construction and testing cycles. Furthermore, the Barrow-in-Furness shipyard must complete the Astute class and build the Dreadnought strategic submarines in parallel with the new programme.
2. An industrial expansion, not just the replacement of the Astute class
The British Government estimates investments of around £6 billion in the infrastructure at Barrow, the Rolls-Royce facility at Raynesway and the supply chain. The aim is to create the capacity for a sustained rate of one submarine every 18 months, roughly double the current rate.
This target represents industrial capacity, not a promise that the Royal Navy will receive one submarine every 18 months. The actual rate will depend on orders, funding, the availability of critical components, and testing and maintenance capacity. Contracts worth around £4 billion have already been awarded for design, long-lead components and infrastructure.
3. Industrial cooperation with Australia
The AUKUS SSNs will utilise a joint British-Australian design, incorporating US technology and operational integration. The British vessels will be built at Barrow, and the Australian ones at Osborne, in South Australia. Rolls-Royce will manufacture the nuclear propulsion systems in the UK, including those for the Australian submarines.
Australia is contributing £2.4 billion over ten years to expand Rolls-Royce’s capacity and, in February 2026, approved a payment of 310 million Australian dollars to for long-lead components for the first two submarines. At Osborne, construction of the infrastructure and demonstration facilities is underway, with construction of the first Australian vessel scheduled to begin by the end of the decade and delivery in the early 2040s.
4. The military role of the AUKUS SSNs
The submarines will be nuclear-powered but conventionally armed. They will undertake the missions of the Astute class: anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, intelligence gathering, support for special operations, protection of naval task forces and long-range conventional strikes.
Their high endurance and ability to remain submerged for extended periods allow for deployments in the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. However, the operational value of a larger fleet does not stem solely from the number of vessels, but from their availability following maintenance, training and modernisation.
5. Key constraints
Workforce. The simultaneous expansion of the Dreadnought and SSN-AUKUS programmes requires nuclear engineers, welders, electricians, designers and naval personnel in an already strained skills market. The UK nuclear industry estimates a significant increase in staffing requirements by 2030.
Supply chain. Reactors, propulsion components, electrical equipment and precision parts have long lead times and few eligible suppliers. A delay in a single segment can affect the entire schedule.
Support infrastructure. A larger fleet requires additional docks, maintenance facilities, crews, weapons, simulators and naval bases. Without these, increased production does not automatically translate into more submarines available for missions.
Cost and governance. The programme spans decades and will compete for resources with nuclear deterrence, conventional forces and other public priorities. Parliamentary oversight and cost transparency will be essential.
6. Implications
For the Royal Navy. A fleet larger than the seven Astute-class submarines could simultaneously support conventional deterrence, the protection of naval task forces, NATO operations and commitments in the Indo-Pacific. The benefit will emerge gradually and depends on reducing periods of technical unavailability.
For NATO. More British submarines would strengthen surveillance of the North Atlantic, the protection of sea lanes and the tracking of enemy submarines. At the same time, deployments in the Indo-Pacific may create a tension between Euro-Atlantic and global commitments.
For AUKUS. The joint project creates interoperability and economies of scale, but also mutual dependencies. British delays in the design or production of reactors would be passed on to Australia, whilst pressures on the US industry could affect the intermediate phase based on Virginia-class submarines.
For British industry. The investments provide multi-year contracts, skilled jobs and technological continuity. At the same time, the concentration of production in a few sites and companies amplifies the systemic risk of delays, staff shortages or rising costs.
For non-proliferation and nuclear safety. Australia will not acquire nuclear weapons, but the operation of naval reactors imposes strict standards regarding nuclear materials, security, regulation, incident preparedness and waste management. The programme’s credibility will depend on robust safeguards and institutional transparency.
For regional balance. An increase in the number of allied submarines may strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, but it may also fuel anti-submarine competition, investment in sensors and pressures for regional rearmament. The stabilising effect is not automatic; it depends on doctrine, communication and crisis management.
Conclusions
1. The steel-cutting ceremony in 2027 is an important industrial milestone, not a guarantee that the entire schedule will be met. Entry into service remains more than a decade away.
2. The ambition to build an expanded fleet is credible only if infrastructure, the workforce and maintenance capacity grow at the same pace as production.
3. The 18-month cadence should be interpreted as an industrial capacity target. The final number of submarines and the pace of deliveries will depend on the government’s decision and multi-annual funding.
4. AUKUS creates an integrated industrial base, but also spreads the risks. The interdependence between Barrow, Raynesway, Osborne and US suppliers turns national delays into trilateral problems.
5. The strategic stakes go beyond the replacement of the Astute class. The programme aims to increase the availability of allied submarine forces for NATO and the Indo-Pacific, with implications for deterrence, expenditure and regional stability.
Sources consulted
- Defence Nuclear Enterprise 2026 Annual Update to Parliament, GOV.UK, 15 September 2026.
- Statement by the UK Defence Secretary in Parliament, 15 September 2026.
- Australian Submarine Agency, progress at the Osborne shipyard, 4 September 2026.
- Australian Government, long-term procurement of components for propulsion systems, 24 February 2026.
- ADS Advance, analysis of the timetable and expansion of British capacity, 22 September 2026.
Maritime Security Forum
The French Navy is preparing for sea trials of the Rampart modular launcher aboard a Mistral-class vessel – Maritime Security Forum
The installation of the Rampart modular launcher on a Mistral-class amphibious assault ship marks the first publicly observed integration of the system onto a French Navy platform. Footage taken off the coast of Toulon on 21 September 2026 marks the start of the naval evaluation phase, ahead of a firing campaign scheduled for October as part of the WildFire anti-drone exercise.
1. First public appearance on board a French vessel
Photographs published by specialist sources show a Rampart launcher mounted on the starboard bow sponson of one of the three Mistral-class ships. Naval News and Meta-Defence believe that the system is being prepared for its first at-sea firing trials, scheduled for October 2026. Until the results are published, the installation should be interpreted as a test configuration, not as evidence of the system’s operational adoption.
This arrangement is consistent with integration studies that analysed two launchers, one at the starboard bow and one at the port stern, in positions corresponding to the current SIMBAD installations. However, no order has been confirmed for the permanent fitting out of the entire class.
2. From LMP/MPLS to Rampart
Developed by Naval Group and initially presented as a modular multi-purpose launcher, Rampart aims to provide close-in defence against aerial drones, unmanned vessels and fast surface targets. Unlike a launcher tied to a single family of interceptors, the turret has four interchangeable modules, which can combine missiles, guided or unguided projectiles and decoys.
The system can operate autonomously or be integrated with the ship’s combat management system. This flexibility is designed to reduce the use of costly anti-aircraft missiles against numerous, low-value targets, whilst reserving the more capable interceptors for complex threats.
3. Known public specifications
| Characteristic | Public data |
| Manufacturer | Naval Group |
| Configuration | Turret capable of azimuth and elevation movement, with 4 interchangeable modules |
| Payload for ammunition | Approximately 1,000 kg |
| Dimensions of a module | Approximately 2 m long and 0.6 m wide |
| 68 mm rockets | 20 per module; maximum 80 in a homogeneous configuration |
| 70 mm rockets | 12 per module; theoretical maximum of 48 |
| Very short-range rockets | 4–6 per module, depending on type; not all candidates have yet been qualified |
| Engagement range | Approximately 5 km with the Thales 68 mm laser-guided rocket; up to approximately 8 km for the initial configuration, depending on the warhead |
| Targets | Drones, unmanned vessels, fast boats and other close-range threats |
| Test platform | Mistral-class amphibious assault ship, approximately 199 m long, 32 m wide and 21,500 t at maximum load |
| Status as of September 2026 | Naval integration observed; first at-sea firing trials planned for October 2026 |
The figures describe publicly reported configurations and may vary depending on the munitions; they do not represent a confirmed final operational configuration.
4. Demonstrated munitions and options under consideration
The most mature effector is the Thales 68 mm missile, tested in both guided and unguided versions. During the land-based campaign at Canjuers, engagements were reported at ranges of approximately 3–3.5 km, including external laser designation and a salvo of five rockets. A fully loaded configuration could carry 80 68 mm rockets, providing a greater firepower reserve than nearby launchers relying exclusively on interceptors.
The 70 mm Piorun and SkyKnight missiles, as well as other munition families, have been mentioned in agreements or integration studies. These should be treated as potential options, not as armaments already qualified for service on the Mistral.
5. What Rampart would bring to the Mistral class
Mistral-class ships possess significant transport, aviation, command and medical support capabilities, but their organic self-defence is limited. Rampart would not provide area air defence nor would it eliminate the need for escorts. It would, however, add a close-in defence layer, with abundant and configurable munitions, particularly useful against saturation attacks by drones and fast craft.
The key advantage lies in the cost-effectiveness of interception: a small-calibre guided missile may be more suitable than a high-performance air defence interceptor against a low-cost drone. The limitations remain its short range, its reliance on sensors and target designation, the need for validation in maritime conditions, and uncertainty regarding permanent integration.
6. Functional comparison
SeaRAM, C-Dome and Sea Ceptor utilise established families of interceptors for close-in or local defence. Rampart follows a different approach: a single platform with interchangeable modules and an adaptable mix of munitions. This flexibility may enhance its effectiveness against diverse threats, but the programme is less mature and there are as yet no publicly available results from naval trials.
Conclusions
1. The installation on the Mistral marks the transition from land-based demonstrations to naval integration. It is an important technological milestone, though it does not yet signify entry into service.
2. Modularity is Rampart’s main advantage. The four modules allow the payload to be adapted to drones, surface threats and other close-range targets.
3. The firepower can complement more expensive missile systems. Up to 80 68 mm missiles could provide magazine depth in saturation scenarios.
4. Actual capability depends on sensors, integration and the qualification of the munitions. The theoretical number of projectiles alone does not prove operational effectiveness.
5. The WildFire trials will be decisive. They should clarify the launcher’s performance at sea, its integration with the combat system and its effectiveness against representative targets.
Sources consulted
- Naval News, 22 September 2026 — modular configuration, munitions capability and the WildFire schedule.
- Meta-Defense, 23 September 2026 — integration onto the Mistral and the status of the tests.
- Army Recognition, 22 September 2026 — dimensions, payload, munitions and platform context.
- Mer et Marine, June 2026 — the development of the LMP/Rampart and the planning of sea trials.
Maritime Security Forum
US Marines test the launch of an FPV drone from a vessel in Okinawa – Maritime Security Forum
On 18 September 2026, US Marines launched a Neros Archer FPV drone from a Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft–Bravo off the coast of Okinawa. The demonstration aimed to showcase the use of small unmanned aerial systems from maritime platforms for sea-to-land missions. The test confirms the feasibility of launching from a vessel, but does not yet demonstrate the existence of a mature operational capability.
1. What was tested
The exercise involved personnel from the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, deployed alongside the 4th Regiment, and elements of the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion from the 3rd Marine Division. Archer was launched from the MMRC-B, a vessel designed for reconnaissance, surveillance, troop transport and operations in shallow waters.
The official documentation describes the event as a proof of concept. The aim was to test the use of a small drone from a moving platform, not to fully validate naval strike or attack missions against real targets.
2. Platforms used
The Neros Archer is an FPV drone with modular payloads, which has been gradually introduced into Marine Corps units since 2025. Data published by the USMC for land-based demonstrations indicate a speed of over 90 mph, a range of over 20 km with a payload of approximately 5 pounds, and applications for reconnaissance, precision strikes and aerial interception. Maritime performance in conditions involving waves, wind and jamming has not been published.
The MMRC-B, also known as Whiskey Bravo, is approximately 11–12 metres long and can carry up to eight people, equipment and a small inflatable craft. The platform is intended for coastal patrols, the insertion of reconnaissance teams, the extension of sensor coverage and limited transport between dispersed positions.
3. The advantage of a mobile launch point
A vessel can transport the operator and the drone between islands, bays and coastal sectors, reducing reliance on fixed bases. Launching closer to the area of interest can extend the practical mission range, reduce flight time and make it more difficult to predict the drone’s direction of approach.
The concept could support reconnaissance prior to a landing, coastal surveillance, target designation and, if the system is configured and authorised for this, tactical strikes. However, each application requires communications links, target identification and coordination with naval and air forces.
4. Integration into distributed operations
The Marine Corps is developing low-footprint forces capable of operating from temporary positions in the First Island Chain. Combining reconnaissance boats with FPV drones can create mobile sensor nodes and deliver tactical effects without the need for large ships or airfields on a permanent basis.
Previous exercises in Okinawa utilised the MMRC-B for transit, troop transport and sensor operations, whilst personnel trained separately with the Archer at Camp Schwab. The September demonstration linked these two lines of development into a single maritime experiment.
5. Limitations and vulnerabilities
Communications. An FPV drone relies on video transmission and a command link. The island’s topography, the curvature of the Earth, interference and electronic warfare can reduce the effective range or force operators to use relays and alternative procedures.
The maritime environment. Launching and control from a moving platform are affected by waves, wind, corrosion and confined space. The demonstration does not publish data on success rates, accuracy or behaviour in adverse weather conditions.
Platform signature. A small boat is harder to track than a large vessel, but radio emissions, drone activity and battery logistics may give away its position. After launch, the vessel must reposition quickly and avoid detection.
Command and control. Military use requires positive target identification, rules of engagement, airspace separation and measures against friendly fire. Scaling up to numerous drones and craft can increase the burden on networks and commanders.
6. Outlook
Operational. Future trials will need to assess launch in rough seas, the simultaneous use of multiple drones, signal relay and integration with naval, airborne and ground-based sensors.
Technological. The value of the Archer will depend on resilient communications, endurance, payloads and the ability to be rapidly upgraded. Low-cost platforms can be mass-produced, but high power consumption places demands on supply chains, operators and battery stocks.
Strategic. In the First Island Chain, a network of temporary launch points could complicate surveillance and adversary planning. The effect does not stem from a single drone, but from the combination of multiple teams, vessels, sensors and dispersed positions.
Industrial. Archer is part of Blue UAS and is subject to a policy of training and deployment within units. This marks a shift from improvised experimentation towards the standardisation of operators, safety and tactics, without every configuration automatically becoming a mature operational programme.
7. Conclusions
1. The test validates the maritime launch, not the entire strike chain. The public does not yet have results regarding accuracy, resistance to jamming or effectiveness in severe maritime conditions.
2. The MMRC-B has the potential to become a mobile hub for drones and sensors. Its mobility in shallow waters offers dispersed forces additional options between islands and along coastlines.
3. The main advantage is unpredictability. Moving the launch point complicates detection and can shorten the distance to the area of interest.
4. The main vulnerability remains the network. Communications, navigation, target identification and coordination are essential for transforming a demonstration into a reliable capability.
5. The experiment forms part of a wider transformation within the USMC. The Corps is developing training, tactics and the procurement of FPV drones as organic assets for small units and distributed littoral operations.
Sources consulted
- U.S. Department of War, 18 September 2026 — official confirmation of the maritime launch and the purpose of the demonstration.
- DVIDS / 3rd Marine Division, 2026 — the role of the MMRC-B in littoral operations in Okinawa.
- DVIDS, 22 May 2026 — previous training with Archer at Camp Schwab.
- Baird Maritime, 22 September 2026 — participants, MMRC-B characteristics and the context of the test.
- U.S. Marine Corps, MARADMIN 416/25 — induction and training policy for Neros Archer.
- Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Centre, 2025 — performance reported during land-based demonstrations.
- U.S. Marine Corps, 31 March 2025 — the development of FPV tactics and the role of the Marine Corps Attack Drone Team.
Maritime Security Forum
M941 Tournai arrives in Zeebrugge: Belgium expands autonomous mine warfare – Maritime Security Forum
The M941 Tournai arrived on 22 September 2026 at its home port of Zeebrugge, becoming the second City-class vessel for the Belgian Navy and the third ship built under the joint Belgian-Dutch rMCM programme. The official transfer of ownership to the Belgian state is scheduled for 25 September. However, the event marks the start of a phase of integration, training and qualification, rather than the immediate attainment of full operational capability.
1. From minehunter to mother ship for autonomous systems
The M941 Tournai is designed according to the ‘stand-off’ concept: the manned vessel remains outside the mined area, whilst the detection, classification, identification and neutralisation of threats are carried out by unmanned surface, underwater and aerial vehicles. This change reduces personnel exposure and allows sensors to be deployed over a larger area than is possible with traditional minehunters.
Tournai follows the Belgian vessel M940 Oostende and the Dutch vessel M840 Vlissingen. The programme comprises twelve vessels — six each for Belgium and the Netherlands — to be built by the Belgium Naval & Robotics consortium, comprising Naval Group and Exail.
2. Public specifications for the City/Vlissingen class
| Characteristic | Public data |
| Type | Mine countermeasures vessel / mother ship for autonomous systems |
| Length | Approximately 82.6 m |
| Beam | 17 m |
| Draught | Approximately 3.8 m |
| Displacement | Approximately 2,800 t at maximum load |
| Maximum speed | 15.3 knots |
| Range | Over 3,500 nautical miles; up to approximately 30 days at sea |
| Crew | Up to around 63 people, including mission specialists |
| Unmanned systems | Inspector 125 USV, A18-M AUV, identification and neutralisation vehicles, towed sonar and unmanned aerial platforms, in mission-specific configurations |
| Combat system | Polaris; autonomous mission management via the UMISOFT suite and multi-drone architecture |
| Reported sensors | Thales NS50 radar, Terma Scanter 6000 surveillance radar, bow-mounted sonar and sonars installed on autonomous vehicles |
| Self-defence armament | Bofors 40 Mk4 gun, Sea deFNder remote-controlled stations and machine guns |
The exact configuration of the ‘toolbox’ may vary depending on the mission and the stage of qualification; the figures describe the class, not a guaranteed operational load for every sortie.
3. Arrival at Zeebrugge does not yet mean full operational readiness
Prior to arrival, the vessel underwent acceptance trials in port and at sea. Following the transfer of ownership, work will continue on the installation and verification of equipment, crew training, the integration of the drone ‘toolbox’ and the qualification of procedures. Actual capability will depend on the coherent operation of the vessel, sensors, data links, autonomous vehicles and command teams.
This distinction is important: the handover of the platform marks an industrial milestone, whilst combat capability is the result of a subsequent, gradual process. Drone availability, maintenance and trained personnel may become more limiting factors than the number of ships delivered.
4. Why it matters for Belgium and NATO
North Sea ports, submarine cables, pipelines and energy routes are strategically valuable infrastructure. Historic mines continue to require clearance, whilst modern threats can be used to block access, disrupt trade or exert disproportionate pressure using relatively inexpensive means.
For NATO, an interoperable Belgian-Dutch fleet can support the opening of ports, the escorting of naval formations and the protection of maritime routes. The common architecture facilitates training and logistics, but also creates dependencies on the same supply chain, software updates and the availability of autonomous systems.
5. Outlook
Operational. In the coming years, the programme’s success will be measured less by the delivery of ship hulls and more by the availability rate of the ‘toolboxes’, data processing speed and the ability to operate multiple vehicles simultaneously in conditions of jamming, adverse weather and hybrid threats.
Technological. The modular concept allows drones and sensors to be replaced more quickly than the mother ship. This advantage may extend the class’s relevance, but it requires an open architecture, cyber security and rigorous control over software updates and data links.
Industrial. The programme demonstrates a European division of labour between design, construction, systems integration and robot production. Standardisation can reduce support costs, but delays affecting a common supplier may impact both navies.
Strategic. The Belgian-Dutch experience may influence future European programmes, including cooperation with France. If standards and procedures are harmonised, ships can form multinational task forces with compatible equipment and training.
Limitations. Autonomous systems reduce crew exposure but do not eliminate the risk. Vehicles may be lost, jammed or deceived; communications may be disrupted; and the mother ship remains vulnerable to missiles, drones and submarines. Therefore, rMCM must be integrated into a broader naval and air defence framework.
6. Conclusions
1. The arrival of the M941 Tournai marks a delivery milestone, not the end of the operationalisation process. The integration of autonomous systems, crew training and the validation of procedures will determine when the vessel can contribute fully to missions.
2. The ‘stand-off’ concept fundamentally changes mine warfare. The risk is transferred from the vessel and its crew to a network of unmanned vehicles, sensors and command systems.
3. The value of the programme depends on the entire ecosystem. A modern vessel without available drones, resilient communications, maintenance and qualified personnel cannot deliver the promised capability.
4. Belgian-Dutch cooperation could become a European model. Joint procurement and interoperability offer economies of scale and critical mass, but require joint governance and careful management of industrial dependencies.
5. The stakes go beyond mine clearance. Protecting ports, cables, pipelines and supply routes transforms rMCM into a tool for economic resilience and collective security.
Sources consulted
- Belgian Ministry of Defence, 22 September 2026 — the ship’s arrival and the steps towards operational deployment.
- Naval Group, 22 September 2026 — the rMCM programme, the ‘stand-off’ concept and industrial cooperation.
- Naval News, 23 September 2026 — acceptance trials and the handover schedule.
- Naval Technology, February 2026 — class specifications and autonomous systems.
- Marineschepen.nl — autonomy, operational duration and the mother-ship concept.
- GICAN, 22 September 2026 — the European dimension and the link to future cooperation with France.
Maritime Security Forum
US destroyers: caught between operational pressure in the Middle East and a maintenance crisis – Maritime Security Forum
The concentration of US destroyers in the Middle East highlights a structural contradiction: Arleigh Burke-class ships are indispensable for air and missile defence, escort duties and long-range strikes, but their availability is limited by maintenance periods that are longer than planned. The pressure stems not only from the number of missions, but also from the overlap of intense deployments with industrial delays, staff shortages and an ageing fleet.
1. A significant regional concentration
On 14 September 2026, public data compiled by USNI News indicated two guided-missile destroyers in the Red Sea and a further thirteen in the Arabian Sea. These positions are approximate and may change rapidly, but they illustrate the scale of the commitment in a region that includes the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and access to the Suez Canal.
The USS Stout also departed from Norfolk for deployment operations following its training, maintenance and certification cycle. The mobilisation of additional ships can support force defence and freedom of navigation, but reduces the margin available for other theatres and for the technical recovery of crews and platforms.
2. The USS Carney lesson: high performance, intensive operational usage
The USS Carney was deployed for 235 days between September 2023 and May 2024. The US Navy reported 51 engagements against missiles and unmanned systems launched by Houthi forces. The ship carried out air and missile defence, defensive strikes and assistance to a damaged merchant vessel.
This case demonstrates the utility of the multi-role destroyer, but also the cost of a protracted campaign: the consumption of interceptors, wear and tear on sensors and equipment, strain on the crew, and the need to replenish stocks. The number of engagements alone does not measure the total burden, as constant surveillance and a state of alert consume resources even when no shots are fired.
3. Maintenance effectively reduces the available size of the fleet
The Congressional Budget Office analysed 225 maintenance periods for DDG-51 destroyers that began between the 2011 and 2024 financial years. These lasted, on average, 26 per cent longer than estimates in the final programmes and required 8 per cent more labour than had been planned.
The CBO estimates that a DDG-51 destroyer will spend, on average, over nine years — approximately 27 per cent of its planned service life — in maintenance. The 2012 class plan anticipated approximately four years. This difference means that a fleet that appears large on paper may actually provide substantially fewer days of deployment and training.
4. The causes are systemic, not exclusively financial
The CBO report identifies fleet ageing, delayed inspections and contracts, additional work discovered after entering the shipyard, a shortage of spare parts, and poor integration of modernisations with repairs. The average age of the DDG-51 fleet has risen from around ten years in 2011 to twenty years in 2024.
The GAO found that the Navy had requested nearly $24.9 billion for the maintenance of surface combatants in the financial years 2020–2023 and had received nearly $25.9 billion. By the end of the financial year 2023, 99.7 per cent of the total had been committed. However, shortages of parts, a lack of skilled personnel and delays in work persisted. Consequently, funding is necessary but not sufficient without industrial capacity, planning and a skilled workforce.
5. Implications
For operational readiness. Delays at the shipyard reduce the time available for training and certifying crews ahead of the next mission. To fulfil a regional commitment, the Navy may extend the deployment of other ships or accelerate the rotations of those available, thereby shifting the pressure into the future.
For global response capability. A heavy concentration in the Middle East reduces the flexibility to respond simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The risk is not the immediate absence of ships, but the depletion of reserves for an unexpected crisis or for the rapid replacement of a damaged vessel.
For ammunition stocks. Defence against missiles and drones can consume expensive interceptors at a rapid rate. Sustainability depends on production, resupply and the integration of lower-cost solutions, not just on the availability of the ship’s hull.
For crews. Long deployments and continuous alert duty increase fatigue and can affect staff retention. Combat experience is valuable, but repeated high-intensity operations without sufficient recovery periods can erode performance and safety.
For the naval industry. The central issue is the predictability of work: early inspections, contracts awarded on time, spare parts availability, and the coordination of modernisation with maintenance. Increasing funding without improving these processes may raise costs without a proportionate increase in availability.
For allies. Partner nations can take on some of the escort, surveillance and air defence duties, but interoperability, rules of engagement and the limited capacity of some fleets restrict substitution. Task-sharing becomes increasingly important if the US presence is to be maintained simultaneously in several regions.
For fleet planning. The total number of ships is not a sufficient indicator. Planners must monitor the number of days actually available, the duration of repairs, the on-time completion rate, stocks of interceptors and the crews’ ability to sustain repeated missions.
6. Outlook
In the short term, persistent tensions will sustain demand for Aegis destroyers, particularly for air defence and missile defence. Commanders will need to balance the immediate protection of forces with the need not to over-deplete future availability.
In the medium term, the decisive factor will be reducing the discrepancy between the planned and actual duration of repairs. A modest but repeatable improvement can generate greater operational presence than the slow addition of new ships.
In the long term, the Navy will need to combine the modernisation of the DDG-51 class with the expansion of industrial capacity, the standardisation of configurations and the introduction of future classes. Extending the service life without funding for maintenance may preserve the fleet’s numbers, but not its actual operational readiness.
Conclusions
1. The Arleigh Burke-class destroyers remain the backbone of US naval defence. Their versatility explains their extensive presence in the Middle East, but also the over-strain on the class.
2. Delayed maintenance results in a effectively smaller fleet. Ships that remain unavailable beyond their scheduled time cannot be immediately compensated for through budgets or redeployments.
3. Operational pressure and technical backlogs feed into one another. Intense deployments cause wear and tear, whilst prolonged repairs shift the burden onto a smaller number of ships.
4. The problem cannot be solved solely by increasing funding. Spare parts, qualified personnel, early inspections, better-coordinated contracts and the integration of modernisations into maintenance plans are required.
5. Availability must become the central criterion for planning. A realistic assessment of force capabilities must include mission-ready vessels, resupply capacity and the time required for recovery following deployments.
Sources consulted
- USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker, 14 September 2026 — approximate positions of naval forces.
- Defense News, 22 September 2026 — the concentration of destroyers and its relationship to maintenance issues.
- Congressional Budget Office, December 2025 — delays and labour requirements in the maintenance of the DDG-51.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, 31 January 2025 — funding and structural challenges in the maintenance of surface ships.
- US Navy, 16 July 2024 — the duration of the deployment and the 51 operations carried out by the USS Carney.
Maritime Security Forum
South Korea: Between Security in the Strait of Hormuz and Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula – Maritime Security Forum
US pressure for a South Korean contribution to the security of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz presents Seoul with a difficult strategic choice. South Korea has a direct economic interest in maintaining energy flows, but any deployment of forces to the Gulf would drain resources needed for deterring North Korea and could turn a defensive mission into a broader political and military involvement.
1. What has been confirmed and what remains under consideration
President Lee Jae Myung’s administration has confirmed that it is examining practical ways to support freedom of navigation, including military options. However, no final decision had been taken. Among the options publicly reported were P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, a logistics support vessel and capabilities for mine detection or neutralisation.
On 18 September, President Lee set a political limit: South Korea would not deploy forces to participate in or intervene in the war. At the same time, he argued for the need for minimal measures to protect citizens, commercial vessels and oil routes. The distinction between a protection mission and participation in the conflict will depend on the mandate, command structure and rules of engagement.
2. Seoul’s economic interests
South Korea is a major energy importer and relies heavily on flows through the Strait of Hormuz. According to data cited by Reuters, 61 per cent of South Korea’s crude oil imports and 54 per cent of its naphtha imports passed through the strait last year. A prolonged disruption could affect refineries, the petrochemical industry, domestic prices and the trade balance.
Consequently, ensuring the safety of navigation is not merely a concession to Washington. It serves a direct national interest. However, the economic benefit must be weighed against the risk that the assets deployed could become targets or be drawn into an operation with objectives broader than merely escorting commercial shipping.
3. The Cheonghae Option
The Cheonghae Unit has been operating in the Gulf of Aden since 2009 to combat piracy and protect commercial vessels. The task force typically comprises a KDX-II destroyer, a helicopter, naval special forces, marines and support personnel. Its experience in escort operations, multinational cooperation and incident response makes it the option with the lowest institutional burden.
Extending its area of operations could allow for the priority protection of South Korean ships, evacuations, humanitarian assistance and the exchange of maritime intelligence. However, this solution is limited: a single task force cannot protect all shipping traffic, and deploying a destroyer to the Gulf removes it from the Korean Peninsula for an extended period.
4. The peninsular constraint
The debate is taking place whilst North Korea continues its missile tests and naval development. On 20 September, Pyongyang launched two short-range ballistic missiles, and earlier this month unveiled a new combat vessel of approximately 5,000 tonnes. These developments do not make a mission in the Gulf impossible, but they increase the opportunity cost of every destroyer, patrol aircraft or specialist sent outside the region.
A P-8A deployed in the Middle East cannot simultaneously carry out maritime surveillance and anti-submarine missions around the peninsula. Similarly, a logistics vessel or a destroyer deployed to the Gulf cannot support exercises, patrols and response plans in North-East Asia.
5. The issue of mandate and control
For Seoul, the formulation of the mission is just as important as the choice of platform. The geographical area, duration, chain of command, ships to be protected, conditions for the use of force and withdrawal procedure must be specified. A contribution under national command, limited to escort and the protection of citizens, would have a different profile from participation in US-led military operations.
A new overseas deployment may require the approval of the National Assembly. The precedent set in 2020, when the Cheonghae Unit’s area of operations was expanded without fresh parliamentary approval, offers flexibility but may give rise to disputes regarding democratic oversight and the limits of the existing mandate.
6. Implications
For deterring North Korea. Any deployment must be assessed in terms of its impact on local readiness. The main risk is not the decisive loss of a single platform, but the accumulation of overseas missions that reduce flexibility in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
For the alliance with the United States. A limited contribution can signal solidarity and burden-sharing without direct participation in the war. However, if Washington interprets the gesture as a precedent, Seoul could face recurring requests for extra-regional missions.
For relations with Iran. Even a mission declared to be defensive may be perceived in Tehran as support for US operations. The risks include diplomatic pressure, threats to South Korean ships and companies, and the need to respond if personnel are attacked.
Regarding domestic policy. A limited mission may be easier to justify than the explicit deployment of combat forces. Its legitimacy will depend on the transparency of its objectives, proper legal authorisation and the existence of verifiable limits.
For energy security. Escorting ships may reduce the immediate risk, but it does not eliminate the structural dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. In the long term, Seoul will need to combine maritime protection with strategic stockpiles, diversification of suppliers and alternative routes.
For multinational cooperation. A clearly defensive mission, separate from combat operations, could provide a more acceptable political framework. Coordination with multinational naval forces can improve intelligence and logistics, but must maintain South Korean control over the use of force.
7. Outlook
The most likely scenario is a limited and gradual contribution: extending the protection provided by the Cheonghae Unit, sharing intelligence, providing logistical support or conducting patrols, without explicit involvement in an offensive campaign. This option reduces the political costs, but does not eliminate the risk of escalation.
If the situation in the Strait of Hormuz deteriorates, the distinction between escort and combat may become difficult to maintain. An attack on an escorted vessel would force the commander to react, and the government would have to decide whether to expand the mission or withdraw its forces.
In the long term, this dilemma will resurface whenever Washington calls for global contributions and Pyongyang maintains regional pressure. South Korea will need permanent criteria for the deployment of forces, not just decisions taken on a case-by-case basis for each crisis.
Conclusions
1. Seoul has a direct interest in maintaining navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Its energy dependence makes it impossible to treat the crisis solely as a matter for the alliance with the US.
2. A naval contribution entails a real opportunity cost. Ships and aircraft deployed to the Gulf are no longer available for surveillance and deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.
3. The Cheonghae Unit is the most feasible option, but it is not without risks. Its experience and regional presence reduce the initial cost, without guaranteeing separation from the conflict.
4. The mandate must be defined before the platforms are deployed. Objectives, command structure, rules of engagement and duration are essential to prevent the mission from expanding uncontrollably.
5. The main strategic issue is the precedent. A temporary solution may create expectations of repeated South Korean contributions outside North-East Asia.
6. A sustainable response must combine defence with economic resilience. The protection of ships must be accompanied by energy diversification and plans to disrupt transport through the Strait of Hormuz.
Sources consulted
- Reuters / U.S. News, 4 September 2026 — options under consideration, legal procedures and energy dependence.
- UPI, 18 September 2026 — President Lee’s stance on non-participation in the war.
- Defence News, 22 September 2026 — the dilemma of force allocation and the Cheonghae option.
- Indo-Pacific Defence Forum, 6 May 2024 — the composition, missions and experience of the Cheonghae Unit.
- Stars and Stripes, 20 September 2026 — recent North Korean missile launches.
- The Diplomat, 23 September 2026 — legal, political and strategic constraints.
Maritime Security Forum