MS Daily Brief-en

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The Maritime Security Forum is pleased to provide you with a product, in the form of a daily newsletter, through which we present the most relevant events and information on naval issues, especially those related to maritime security and other related areas. It aims to present a clear and concise assessment of the most recent and relevant news in this area, with references to sources of information. We hope that this newsletter will prove to be a useful resource for you, providing a comprehensive insight into the complicated context of the field for both specialists and anyone interested in the dynamics of events in the field of maritime security.

MS Daily brief- 09 JULY 2026

Can artificial intelligence redefine maritime security? This study proposes a new conceptual architecture for the protection of critical maritime infrastructure, integrating original models such as AHMDA, AMSZ, and the Dynamic Threat Index (DTI) and analyzing how maritime cognitive superiority can become the new strategic advantage in the 21st century.

BREAKING NEWS: US air strikes DEVASTATE over 80 Iranian targets; IRGC promises a DEVASTATING retaliation | TBN Israel

News from Ukraine | It’s madness! Russia has lost 22 ships in the last 3 days | Putin is losing everything

Ankara 2026 – NATO’s Maritime Turning Point – The Maritime Security Forum

A brief analysis of the NATO Summit – we will return in the coming days with a more comprehensive analysis of the implications, in which we will propose a new concept: Collective Maritime Resilience (CMR).

Over the past two decades, the international security environment has evolved from a relatively predictable model, centred on distinct regional threats, towards a system characterised by the simultaneous interdependence of military conflicts, geopolitical competition, economic vulnerabilities and technological transformations. The maritime domain has become the most visible manifestation of this convergence, as over 80 per cent of world trade takes place by sea, and critical subsea infrastructure – communications cables, energy pipelines and digital networks – forms the backbone of the global economy.

In this context, the NATO Summit held in Ankara on 7–8 July 2026 can be seen as a landmark moment in the Alliance’s conceptual evolution. The choice of Turkey as the host country was not merely of diplomatic significance; it also reflected its unique geostrategic position at the crossroads of the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, its decisive role in the implementation of the Montreux Convention, and its simultaneous involvement in issues concerning Ukraine, Syria, Libya and energy security make Ankara a strategic hub of the Euro-Atlantic architecture.

The summit’s agenda was influenced by three major developments. The first is the Russian Federation’s continued aggression against Ukraine and the expansion of the maritime dimension of the conflict, including through attacks on port and energy infrastructure in the Black Sea basin. The second concerns the deteriorating security situation in the Middle East and the vulnerability of maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, with direct effects on energy markets and global supply chains. The third is the accelerated use of emerging technologies – artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and cyber capabilities – in the planning and conduct of naval operations.

In this new context, maritime security can no longer be analysed solely through the prism of naval control or freedom of navigation. It encompasses the protection of undersea infrastructure, logistical resilience, energy security, the defence of digital ecosystems and the integration of multi-domain operations into a common architecture of deterrence and defence. The Ankara Summit reflects precisely this transformation, marking the shift from a regional to a systemic approach, in which events in the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf are treated as elements of the same interconnected strategic space.

The decisions of the NATO Summit in Ankara and their implications for maritime security

The final document adopted in Ankara is one of the most concise texts approved by NATO in recent years. Unlike the lengthy declarations adopted in Madrid (2022), Vilnius (2023) or Washington (2024), the Ankara text contains just six points. This conciseness should not be interpreted as diminishing the summit’s importance. On the contrary, it reflects the Alliance’s tendency to formulate clear strategic guidelines, with their implementation to be carried out through operational plans, industrial initiatives and permanent cooperation mechanisms. NCIA | The Ankara Summit Declaration

From the perspective of maritime security, almost every paragraph of the Declaration has direct or indirect implications. Although the term ‘maritime security’ rarely appears in NATO’s policy documents, the practical effects of the measures adopted have a decisive influence on control of maritime space, freedom of navigation, the protection of critical infrastructure and the Alliance’s logistical resilience.

The Ankara Summit can be interpreted as the beginning of a new doctrinal phase in NATO’s evolution, characterised by a shift from the concept of collective defence to a broader concept, which we propose to call Collective Maritime Resilience (CMR).

This concept implies that collective defence can no longer be ensured exclusively through military capabilities, but requires the simultaneous protection of undersea infrastructure, trade routes, energy systems, digital networks and the industrial chains that underpin combat capability.

Reaffirmation of Article 5 and the ‘360°’ approach

The summit’s first major decision is the unequivocal reaffirmation of the commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the maintenance of the ‘360°’ security approach, according to which the Alliance must respond to threats from all geographical directions and across all operational domains.

From a naval perspective, this wording has significant implications.

Firstly, it confirms that the Black Sea is no longer treated as an isolated regional theatre, but as an integral part of NATO’s overall deterrence architecture.

Secondly, the ‘360°’ approach enshrines the idea that maritime threats no longer stem exclusively from conventional naval confrontation. These include:

sabotage of undersea infrastructure;
cyberattacks on ports;
autonomous naval drones;
interference with GNSS and AIS systems;
hybrid operations against energy terminals;
the use of commercial vessels for military or intelligence purposes;
economic pressure exerted on maritime routes.

Consequently, collective defence is taking on a multi-domain dimension in which the maritime component is inseparable from the cyber, space and intelligence components.

Strengthening the defence industrial base

One of the summit’s most important decisions is the commitment to additional investment of over US$50 billion in joint procurement and the expansion of the Alliance’s defence industrial capacity. The declaration emphasises the removal of trade barriers in the defence industry and the acceleration of innovation in partnership with the private sector.

This decision has far-reaching implications for the maritime sector.

The experience of the war in Ukraine has shown that naval superiority no longer depends solely on the number of combat vessels, but on the industry’s ability to rapidly produce:

naval drones;
smart munitions;
sensors;
anti-drone systems;
electronic components;
engines;
military software;
autonomous systems.

Consequently, shipyards are becoming just one part of the maritime industrial ecosystem.

The new doctrine emphasises the entire industrial chain, from semiconductor production to the development of artificial intelligence algorithms.

Artificial intelligence and the transformation of naval warfare

Perhaps the most revolutionary provision of the Ankara Declaration is the commitment to developing an interoperable Transatlantic Warfighting Cloud and integrating advanced artificial intelligence models into the planning and conduct of military operations. The document explicitly mentions investment in unmanned systems, state-of-the-art technologies and AI capabilities as part of the Alliance’s operational advantage.

This wording marks a doctrinal shift.

For the first time, AI is no longer presented as a mere support tool, but as a strategic force multiplier.

In the maritime domain, this may mean:

AI-assisted command and control;
automatic threat detection;
predictive analysis of maritime routes;
coordination of naval drone swarms;
automated logistics management;
predictive fleet maintenance;
real-time analysis of satellite imagery and AIS data;
fusion of data from underwater sensors, satellites and naval platforms.

In this new concept, superiority is no longer determined solely by the number of naval platforms, but by the speed with which an actor can collect, integrate, interpret and transform information into operational decisions.

Support for Ukraine and the implications for the Black Sea

The summit reaffirms firm support for Ukraine and sets out a commitment of at least 70 billion euros for equipment, assistance and training in 2026, with a similar level to be maintained in 2027.

From a maritime security perspective, this decision has implications that extend beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

It contributes to:

maintaining freedom of navigation in the north-western Black Sea;
protecting maritime trade corridors;
reducing pressure on Romanian port infrastructure;
strengthening the security of agricultural and energy exports;
limiting the Russian Federation’s ability to project naval power in the region.

Furthermore, Ukraine’s operational experience in the use of unmanned systems already represents one of the main laboratories for naval innovation in the 21st century, and the lessons learnt are influencing NATO’s doctrinal transformation process.

Iran and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz

The Summit Declaration reaffirms that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons and calls for full respect for freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

This seemingly limited reference, however, is of particular strategic significance.

For the first time in several years, a NATO policy document explicitly links Euro-Atlantic security to the stability of one of the world’s most important maritime routes.

Consequently, Ankara implicitly acknowledges that the protection of global energy flows constitutes a legitimate strategic interest of the Alliance.

This development confirms the central hypothesis of this study: the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf can no longer be analysed in isolation, but form an integrated strategic system, in which disruption in one theatre has economic, energy and military repercussions on the others.

The Maritime Security Forum

From military threats to ‘immense love’: the unpredictable Trump dominates the final hours of the NATO summit

Alliance leaders, who had feared the worst, will welcome the US President’s renewed support for Article 5 as a crucial victory

Dan Sabbagh in Ankara

Wednesday 8 July 2026, 21.00 CEST

An unpredictable and, at times, irascible Donald Trump said he had felt “immense love” from Western leaders at the NATO summit, just hours after he had harshly criticised them for their defence spending and for failing to help the US in attacking Iran.

The US president’s contradictory messages dominated the final hours of the two-day meeting in Ankara, Turkey, beginning with his public description of Iranian leaders as “scum” and his renewed demand for control over Greenland.

He then adopted a more conciliatory tone in a private meeting with 32 NATO leaders late in the morning, where he made no mention of Greenland or his previous criticisms, but told his allies that “we want to stand with you”.

“It was a wonderful meeting; there was a lot of love in that room, a lot of unity,” Trump said shortly afterwards during a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which included a surprise offer to grant Ukraine a licence to manufacture Patriot air defence missiles.

Trump concluded by holding a chaotic press conference, which barely touched on NATO-related issues, but during which he praised Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, spoke highly of the US economy and claimed to be “number one on TikTok”.

Trump in a rage at the NATO summit: what does this mean for Ukraine? – Latest news

Nevertheless, the shift from fierce critic to supporter of NATO – “If there is one word that sums up today, it is unity,” Trump said at the end-of-day press conference – will be hailed as a victory for the alliance, whose stability had been called into question.

The summit’s final declaration, signed by Trump and 31 other alliance leaders, affirmed the countries’ “unwavering commitment” to Article 5, which stipulates that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all.

However, no date has been announced for the next leaders’ summit, which is due to take place in Albania – where anti-Trump and anti-government protests are taking place – amid indications that it will not be held until 2028.

NATO summits have not always been held annually, but the overriding concern in certain parts of Europe is that Trump’s flamboyant behaviour at such events risks giving Russian President Vladimir Putin false hope, thereby undermining the alliance’s deterrent power and unity.

European leaders were concerned that Trump was in a bad mood following a dinner on Tuesday evening at the Turkish president’s residence in Ankara and agreed not to mention the 4–1 defeat suffered by the US team against Belgium earlier this week.

It seemed their worst fears were coming true when Trump appeared on Wednesday morning alongside NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and began with a lengthy monologue in which he voiced a series of grievances against NATO and several individual members, as well as attacking Iran’s leadership.

Trump stated that he was “very angry with NATO” and complained that the alliance’s members “did not want to help us with regard to the main state sponsor of terrorism, namely Iran”, a reference to the refusal of European countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom, to allow the United States to openly carry out bombing missions from European air bases.

There was a specific reference to the United Kingdom, which initially did not allow the US to use RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire for bombing missions in Iran, before the British Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, changed his mind and permitted limited strikes on Iranian missile bases.

“The UK wouldn’t let us use the island for two weeks, so we had to turn back,” said Trump, reiterating the complaints he had levelled against Starmer and Britain in the spring, as the war in Iran continued without the regime in Tehran collapsing.

The presentation alongside Rutte turned into a litany of complaints. “Greenland is a big problem for us,” said Trump, reiterating his claim that the autonomous Arctic territory “was very important to the United States, but is not important to Denmark”.

Earlier, the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, had stated on her arrival that Denmark would defend “every centimetre” of its territory and emphasised that Greenland “is, of course, not for sale”.

There were the usual comments from Trump regarding NATO’s defence spending, despite last year’s agreement by all members, with the exception of Spain, to increase national defence budgets to 3.5 per cent of gross domestic product by 2035 – thereby bringing Europe’s and Canada’s spending in line with that of the US.

“I am very unhappy with NATO, because we are paying far, far too much,” he said. “Billions and billions of dollars – too much – because it is unfair; we are protecting them, so we are protecting them, but they are not there for us.”

A fresh outburst of anger was directed at Madrid, following its decision to reject the 3.5 per cent target. “Spain doesn’t agree with anything, and you shouldn’t support them,” Trump told Rutte. “I don’t want to do any business with them at all, OK?” said the president, turning to Scott Bessent, the US Treasury Secretary, who replied: “Yes, sir.”

A few hours later, the president appeared to soften his tone, telling reporters on board Air Force One that Spain “had completely changed its mind today. Spain has been very generous today.”

Rutte, for his part, tried to keep Trump in check through a mixture of flattery and occasional firm interruptions. It was a strategy that seemed to calm him down, whilst praising Trump for persuading European NATO members to increase their defence spending and bring it into line with the US as a proportion of GDP.

“You’ve done what [President Dwight] Eisenhower tried to do,” he said. “That is your victory.” Trump, interrupting him, replied: “That’s why I like him.” Shortly afterwards, however, he was asked whether he considered the truce with Iran to be over, prompting him to say that he believed it was: “I don’t want anything more to do with them. They’re a bunch of scum.”

This incident cast a shadow over what NATO had hoped would be presented as a ‘summit of results’, following last year’s commitment to spend 3.5 per cent. During the summit, international arms deals worth over $50 billion were announced, including a commitment by 12 countries to develop long-range missiles with ranges from 300 km to over 2,000 km (185 to 1,250 miles)

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/08/erratic-trump-dominates-final-hours-nato-summit

From terrifying threats to comical slip-ups: Donald Trump’s unexpected tale of love and darkness at NATO

Robert Tait in Washington

The US President oscillates between praise for the alliance, threats against Iran and confusion over the names of world leaders

Wednesday 8 July 2026, 20:38 CEST

Having arrived at the annual NATO summit under a familiar cloud of resentment and discontent, Donald Trump’s farewell message on Wednesday was an unexpected tale of love and darkness.

Speaking to journalists in the presence of his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the US president surprised everyone by directing his affection towards an alliance that he d had harshly criticised for much of the previous day, citing, amongst other things, his now well-known dissatisfaction regarding Greenland.

“We’ve just had our NATO meeting and it was an excellent meeting,” he said. “There was a lot of love in that room today, a lot of unity. It couldn’t have been better.”

It was a radical turnaround from the moment just before, when the US president stood alongside NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and recited a well-rehearsed litany of grievances, including an alleged lack of support in the war with Iran and Spain’s refusal to meet the new defence spending targets.

Even Zelenskyy – who had once been the target of notorious public intimidation in the Oval Office – seemed to have won Trump over. “We have some good stories to tell,” he said, speaking enthusiastically about the prospects of an agreement to end the four-and-a-half-year war between Ukraine and Russia. “He’s done a tremendous job.”

This unexpected cordiality was partly explained by Scott Bessent, the US Treasury Secretary, who – invited by Trump to describe the harmonious meeting – said: “Sir, all the Europeans give you the credit for saving NATO and want to do what they need to do, and you’re going straight there.”

The atmosphere soured when the discussion turned to Iran, with whom Trump had recently agreed a memorandum of understanding marking a 60-day ceasefire.

The US President declared on Wednesday that the ceasefire was effectively over, after US forces had struck Iranian targets the day before, claiming that Iran had breached the terms of the agreement by attacking three ships in the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, which was supposedly reopened under the terms of the recent agreement.

“We have a score to settle,” he said in the midst of a lengthy monologue in which he cited Iran’s previous violations, including the manufacture of roadside bombs that killed and injured numerous American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Having, just two weeks earlier, praised his own deal as necessary to prevent an economic disaster comparable to the Great Depression should the Strait of Hormuz have remained closed, Trump has now ruled out the possibility of a deal with Iran’s leadership – which he had recently praised as being more reasonable following the assassination of key figures.

“They are violating the agreement every day. They lie, they cheat, they kill people. They have been killing people for 47 years. They destroyed the USS Cole,” said the US president, citing Iran’s alleged role in facilitating an al-Qaeda attack on a US warship in October 2000.

Having previously expressed satisfaction at the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz – through which 20 per cent of the world’s fuel supplies pass – Trump stated that the objective is now “denuclearisation”, a reference to Iran’s capacity to build a future nuclear bomb and an objective that should be addressed through negotiations during the 60-day ceasefire.

“We will reach an agreement. We might even do it without an agreement, because, you know what, it’s easier,” he said, in a threatening tone.

It seems the circumstances were not conducive to “The Art of the Deal”, although he paid a brief tribute to Steve Witkoff, his chief envoy, Jared Kushner, his son-in-law, and JD Vance, who played a key role in negotiating the truce.

“My whole life has been about deals, [but] I don’t see how it could work with them. Perhaps a large-scale attack, which will destroy a great many things,” he said. US forces would “probably” launch major attacks on Wednes , he said in response to a reporter’s question, including, possibly, on power stations and desalination plants.

On several occasions, his tirade veered into vaguely comical malapropisms and misnomers.

At one point, referring to missiles allegedly aimed at the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, he said they had been launched by the “Islamic Republic of Japan”.

In the middle of a tirade about the destruction of Iran’s military forces, he suddenly changed tack mid-speech, saying: “one of the things we’re going to talk about today is… that we’re going to grant them the right to produce Patriot missiles” – although he appeared to be referring to Ukraine.

On another occasion, following a series of questions about the war between Russia and Ukraine, he asked journalists if they had any questions for “President Putin” – whilst Zelenskyy, the Russian leader’s arch-enemy, was sitting just a few feet away.

The moment was reminiscent of a similar verbal gaffe by Joe Biden at the annual NATO summit in Washington in 2024, shortly after the disastrous televised debate with Trump in Atlanta, which ultimately brought an end to Biden’s presidential bid.

Probably aware of this, Trump attempted a forced cover-up – doubling down and insisting that, after all, he had intended to say ‘Putin’, as he had a telephone call scheduled with him later that day.

However, perhaps his most telling mistake concerned the name of Iran’s former supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who was buried this week with state honours, four months after he was

killed in an Israeli attack at the start of the war.

“They wanted to go to Khomeini’s funeral,” said Trump, mispronouncing Khamenei’s name as that of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which marked the beginning of decades of hostility with Washington following the 444-day siege of the US embassy in Tehran and the detention of 52 American hostages.

It is assumed that Trump knows that Khamenei and Khomeini were different people. However, by invoking the latter’s better-known name, he may have subconsciously revealed his preoccupation with a long-standing grievance of the United States – and signalled his desire for revenge.

,,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/08/trump-nato-threats-mishaps

2026 FIFA WORLD CUP – (LAST 24 HOURS) – Maritime Security Forum

The last 24 hours have marked a transitional period in the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Following the conclusion of the round of 16, the competition has entered a brief hiatus ahead of the quarter-finals, giving teams time to recover, prepare tactically and regroup. This is the first time since the start of the tournament that no matches have been scheduled, a sign that the organisers have created a window dedicated exclusively to preparing for the decisive stage of the competition.

The focus is now on the quarter-final line-up, which confirms this as one of the most evenly matched editions in World Cup history. Following the elimination of favourites such as Brazil, Germany and Portugal, the race for the trophy remains wide open, and the gaps between the qualifying teams are narrower than most analysts had anticipated.

One of the key topics of the day is the appeal lodged by the French Football Federation regarding the yellow card shown to Michael Olise in the match against Paraguay. If the sanction stands, a further booking in the quarter-final against Morocco could result in his suspension for a potential semi-final. The situation highlights the importance of discipline in the latter stages of the competition, where every refereeing decision can influence a favourite’s path to the trophy.

Reactions have also continued in recent hours following Colombia’s elimination. Former captain Radamel Falcao has harshly criticised the organisation of Colombian football, stating that recent results reflect structural problems regarding player development and the competitiveness of the domestic league. His comments have sparked a wide-ranging debate in the South American press regarding the need to reform the national football system.

The state of the competition

Following the round of 16, the eight teams remaining in the race for the World Cup title represent an interesting balance between footballing tradition and the competition’s new forces. Europe continues to dominate the quarter-finals in terms of numbers, but Morocco confirms the rise of African football, whilst Norway has produced one of the tournament’s biggest surprises by knocking out Brazil. Argentina completes the line-up following their spectacular comeback against Egypt, whilst Switzerland have earned their place amongst the top eight sides after a dramatic penalty shoot-out victory over Colombia.

Knockout stage predictions

Now that the quarter-final line-up has been decided, the path to the trophy is becoming much clearer.

In the top half of the draw, the following matches will take place:

France v Morocco
Spain v Belgium

These two fixtures bring together four of the most consistent teams in the competition and could produce a semi-final of the highest technical calibre.

In the bottom half of the draw, the fixtures are:

Norway v England
Argentina – Switzerland

This half of the draw is considered the most unpredictable, with all four teams having so far demonstrated a high degree of adaptability and efficiency in the knockout stages.

At this stage, France and Spain continue to be seen as the main favourites due to the consistency of their play and their experience in major competitions. However, Belgium are in their best form of the tournament, Norway are benefiting from Erling Haaland’s inspiration, Morocco have cemented their reputation as an extremely well-organised side, and Argentina demonstrated against Egypt that they can come back even from seemingly impossible situations.

Trends

An analysis of the knockout stages highlights several clear trends. Firstly, defensive efficiency is becoming just as important as attacking potential, with many teams progressing in low-scoring matches. Secondly, balanced squads and the managers’ astute handling of substitutions are having an increasing influence on results. Last but not least, the advantage of tradition is waning, and the gap between favourites and underdogs continues to narrow.

Looking ahead to the next 24 hours, attention is focused on the start of the quarter-finals, which will begin with the clash between France and Morocco. Every match will feel like a true final, and any mistake could spell the end of a team’s campaign. Given the surprises so far, this World Cup is proving to be one of the most competitive and unpredictable editions in the competition’s history.

2026 FIFA WORLD CUP – Analysis report on the quarter-finals

Pre-quarter-final assessment

The 2026 FIFA World Cup enters the quarter-final stage with a much more wide-open draw than most observers had anticipated. Following the elimination of favourites such as Germany, Brazil and Portugal, the competition has reached a stage where tradition is no longer enough, and each of the eight remaining teams has genuine grounds for hoping to reach the semi-finals.

The four confirmed fixtures are: France v Morocco, Spain v Belgium, Norway v England and Argentina v Switzerland. These clashes bring together teams with very different styles: experience, defensive organisation, attacking prowess, tactical discipline and the ability to adapt under pressure.

France go into their match against Morocco as favourites, but the fixture carries a high degree of risk. Morocco have already shown that they can no longer be treated as a fluke, but rather as a mature, organised side capable of handling the knockout stages. For France, the key will be patience and the ability to avoid a deadlocked match in which Morocco controls the tempo through defensive discipline.

Spain v Belgium is probably the most evenly matched contest from a tactical perspective. Spain reach the quarter-finals on the back of one of the most consistent performances of the tournament, with the international press highlighting their excellent form and cohesion on the pitch. Belgium come into the match on the back of a resounding victory over the United States, but they also face squad issues, including the absence of Amadou Onana

Norway v England will be a clash between Nordic attacking efficiency and the experience of an English side under pressure to achieve a historic result. Norway have the advantage of Erling Haaland’s form and impact, whilst England have squad depth and competitive experience. However, England go into the quarter-finals under disciplinary pressure, having received a high number of bookings relative to the number of fouls committed.

Argentina v Switzerland is a battle of resilience. Argentina came through a tense match against Egypt, marked by VAR controversies, whilst Switzerland have reached the World Cup quarter-finals for the first time in 72 years, following their penalty shoot-out victory over Colombia.

From a strategic perspective, the quarter-finals will be decided by four key factors: efficiency during brief periods of numerical superiority, managing psychological pressure, defensive discipline and the ability of the substitutes to turn the game around. At this level, the differences between teams are minimal, and a single mistake can alter the entire path to the final.

As regards the semi-final line-up, the most likely scenario could lead to high-intensity clashes: France or Morocco against Spain or Belgium, and Norway or England against Argentina or Switzerland. This structure means the path to the final is wide open, with at least six teams capable of legitimately aspiring to reach the competition’s final.

The main conclusion is that the quarter-finals of the 2026 FIFA World Cup can no longer be predicted based on the logic of traditional favourites. The competition has entered a phase in which organisation, clear thinking, adaptability and resilience are becoming more important than reputation. The current edition confirms that world football is more balanced, more unpredictable and more strategic than ever before.

Maritime Security Forum

The US has launched attacks on Iran for the second day running, after Trump declared that the ceasefire agreement was “over”

The attacks on three locations in Iran came after three oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz were targeted on Tuesday

Nadeem Badshah

Thursday, 9 July 2026, 04:42 CEST

The US military launched attacks on Iran for the second day running, just hours after President Donald Trump declared that the provisional ceasefire agreement was “over”.

On Wednesday evening, Iranian state media reported explosions in the port city of Bandar Abbas in the Strait of Hormuz; in Sirik, another city on the southern coast; and in the south-western province of Bushehr, home to Iran’s nuclear power plant complex.

Trump wrote on Truth Social: “This is a response to Iran’s bombing of ships yesterday. If it happens again, things will get much worse!”

US Central Command confirmed the attacks, posting on X: “At the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command forces have begun carrying out additional strikes against Iran to further degrade its ability to threaten freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

On Tuesday, three cargo ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz were attacked, leading to the most intense exchange of fire between the two sides since the signing of the provisional agreement last month. The US Treasury has also revoked a temporary sanctions waiver granted to Tehran for oil exports.

This latest escalation has dashed hopes of turning the memorandum of understanding signed between the two sides on 17 June into a permanent agreement that would end the war.

After attacking US military bases in Bahrain and Kuwait on Wednesday, Iran targeted them again on Thursday, with air-raid sirens sounding at least twice in Bahrain, where the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is located.

There was no immediate information on the damage caused. The Kuwaiti military said it was actively intercepting approaching drones and missiles.

The overnight attacks were expected to be more extensive than those in the first round, a US official who wished to remain anonymous told Reuters.

Iranian state television reported that further explosions had been heard on Abu Musa Island. The island is one of three small islands claimed by the United Arab Emirates, which form the backbone of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.

The Iranian news agency Mehr reported that the attacks on the southern Iranian province of Bushehr had not caused any damage to the Bushehr nuclear power station.

US stock markets fell on Wednesday, whilst the price of Brent crude – the global benchmark for oil – rose by over 5 per cent to nearly $80 a barrel, as the economic impact of the war continues to be felt around the world.

US Senator Bernie Sanders said of Trump’s action: “Resuming his reckless war with Iran will not make America stronger. It will cost more lives and waste more of taxpayers’ money.” In a post on X, Sanders added that “after dragging the United States into a war based on lies, Trump has now declared that the ceasefire with Iran is ‘over’ after less than a month”.

In the first round of attacks, the US struck various military targets and port facilities after Iran attacked several commercial vessels off the coast of Oman.

Earlier, at the NATO summit in Ankara, Trump stated that the US “will probably strike [Iran] hard again tonight”, later adding that the latest attacks would not lead to “long-term” military action.

“Whatever happens, it will happen very quickly,” Trump said, although he also suggested that the US military might “simply see the job through to the end”.

Speaking on the sidelines of the summit, the US president stated that the attacks were a continued response to Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.

“They’re behaving very badly,” he said, accusing the country of launching drones and a missile at the ships.

Iran has claimed that the provisional ceasefire agreement gives it the right to manage traffic through the strait.

The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a key negotiator in the talks on a permanent end to the war, wrote on X: “The era of intimidation and blackmail is over. It leads nowhere. We will not give in.”

On his return from the NATO summit, Trump denied that security concerns regarding Iran had been behind the surprising decision to undertake part of the journey in an older Air Force One, rather than the new aircraft gifted by Qatar in which he had arrived.

Asked whether he was aware of any credible threat from Iran against Air Force One, Trump sidestepped the question.

“I’m under threat all the time. I’m number one on their list,” he said.

The new round of attacks took place as the Iranians were preparing to bury the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in his hometown of Mashhad, in north-eastern Iran, who was killed on the first day of the US-Israeli attacks that triggered the war.

The Supreme Leader’s funeral follows a multi-day mourning ceremony that drew millions of mourners to various cities in both Iran and Iraq.

,,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/08/us-carries-out-another-wave-of-strikes-on-iran

THE MIDDLE EAST – DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE LAST 72 HOURS – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 72 hours, the security situation in the Middle East has deteriorated significantly, against the backdrop of renewed direct confrontation between the United States and Iran and the collapse of the previously brokered ceasefire. The rapid succession of attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, US strikes on Iranian targets and Tehran’s retaliation against US military bases in the Gulf has plunged the region back into a phase of military escalation with direct implications for global energy security and freedom of navigation.

The resumption of the confrontation between the United States and Iran

The main event of the period under review was the collapse of the provisional agreement to cease hostilities between Washington and Tehran. Following attacks on several commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the US administration ordered a new series of air strikes on Iranian military targets in the south of the country, stating that these were intended to protect freedom of navigation and prevent further attacks on international commercial shipping.

The US strikes targeted coastal radar installations, infrastructure used to launch drones and anti-ship missiles, as well as positions belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps near the Persian Gulf. According to US authorities, the operation was intended to degrade Iran’s ability to threaten international maritime transport and to protect one of the world’s most important energy corridors.

In response, Iran officially declared that the interim agreement was no longer in force and warned that any further military action would be met with an immediate and proportionate response. In official statements, Iranian leaders reaffirmed the Islamic Republic’s right to control security in the Persian Gulf and to respond to any military presence deemed hostile near its maritime borders.

Attacks on maritime transport

The most serious development in recent days has been the resumption of attacks on commercial shipping.

According to information confirmed by British shipping agencies and Western sources, several commercial vessels have been struck whilst passing through the Strait of Hormuz. An oil tanker carrying liquefied natural gas was struck off the coast of Oman; the fire that broke out on board required the crew to take action and led to a partial evacuation of the vessel. Other oil tankers sustained damage following projectile strikes and explosions near the hull.

Although no casualties were reported amongst the crews, the incidents led to an immediate increase in the alert level for commercial shipping. Shipping operators and insurance companies have reclassified the risk of transiting the Strait of Hormuz as ‘severe’, recommending that vessels reduce their speed, use convoys and avoid night-time transit where possible.

Several oil tankers decided to halt their passage through the strait and return to their ports of departure, which temporarily disrupted the flow of oil and liquefied natural gas exports from the Gulf states.

Iran’s response

Following the US attacks, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard announced that it had carried out strikes on US military targets in Bahrain and Kuwait, using medium-range missiles and drones. The Iranian authorities claimed that the operation was a legitimate response to the attacks on Iranian territory and warned that they would continue their retaliation if US operations persisted.

At the same time, Tehran stated that it was also considering the possibility of restricting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz should national security be threatened. Although a complete closure of the strait has not been officially announced, the mere mention of this option has heightened tensions in the energy and maritime markets.

The naval situation

At present, the Persian Gulf is home to one of the highest concentrations of naval forces in recent years.

The United States and its allies maintain significant naval task forces to protect commercial traffic and escort oil tankers. Warships from the US, the UK and some Gulf states are on permanent patrol near the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman.

At the same time, Iran has strengthened its naval capabilities by deploying fast patrol boats, maritime drones and coastal missile systems, which increases the likelihood of accidental or deliberate incidents between the naval forces present in the region.

Impact on the energy market

The resumption of hostilities triggered an immediate reaction in the oil market.

The price of Brent crude has risen significantly, as investors assess the risk of a temporary reduction in exports from the Gulf. At the same time, transport costs and insurance premiums for commercial vessels have risen considerably, reflecting the deterioration in the maritime security environment.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the main chokepoint in the global energy market, through which approximately one-fifth of global maritime oil trade passes. Any disruption to flows through this corridor has immediate effects on energy prices, inflation and international supply chains.

Regional developments

On other fronts in the Middle East, the situation has remained relatively stable.

In southern Lebanon, sporadic exchanges of fire have been reported between the Israeli army and Hezbollah, without the clashes escalating into a major operation. In the Gaza Strip, Israeli forces have continued operations against Hamas infrastructure, though the pace of these operations remains lower than in previous months.

In Syria and Iraq, no significant changes to military deployments have been reported, though US bases and logistical infrastructure continue to operate on high alert.

An analysis of the last 72 hours indicates that the Middle East is entering a new phase of instability, characterised by:

the resumption of direct confrontation between the United States and Iran;
the Strait of Hormuz becoming the main risk point for global maritime security;
the increased vulnerability of commercial and energy transport;
the strengthening of the naval presence of regional and international actors;
an increased risk of incidents that could lead to rapid and uncontrolled escalation.

From a strategic perspective, the crux of the crisis lies not only in the military confrontation between Washington and Tehran, but also in the competition for control of energy infrastructure and freedom of navigation in a region through which a significant proportion of global hydrocarbon trade passes.

Consequently, the overall risk level for the Middle East can be assessed as HIGH, with an upward trend in the short term, given that any new attack on maritime transport or energy infrastructure could trigger a large-scale military response and have economic repercussions felt globally.

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Trump makes a vague promise to Zelenskyy regarding a licence to manufacture Patriot missiles

The licence would represent a diplomatic victory for Kyiv, but the process of producing the munitions would likely be costly, complex and time-consuming

Peter Beaumont Senior International Correspondent

Wednesday 8 July 2026, 18.30 CEST

Donald Trump told Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Ukraine might be allowed to manufacture Patriot interceptor missiles to counter Russian ballistic missile attacks. It would be a diplomatic coup for Kyiv, which is struggling to counter the growing threat posed by Moscow’s missiles.

However, the US president’s commitment was couched in vague terms, and he acknowledged that he had not discussed the matter with the American defence and aerospace companies Lockheed Martin and RTX Corporation (formerly Raytheon), which manufacture the Patriot system. It was also unclear how quickly production of this costly and complex munition could be ramped up.

Trump, sitting next to the Ukrainian president at the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, said: “A little birdie whispered this to me, about the fact that we’re going to grant them the right to manufacture Patriot missiles. We’ll show them how it’s done; it’s actually very complex. But it is – you’ll quickly understand the complexity.”

He added: “We’ll grant you a licence to produce Patriot missiles. That way, you won’t be able to complain that we’re not providing enough of them.”

However, in a blow to Ukraine’s short-term air defence capabilities, Trump indicated that the US would not be able to quickly supply Ukraine with Patriot interceptor missiles from its own stocks. “We have Patriot missiles, but we don’t have that many. We need them for ourselves as well,” said Trump.

There is a global shortage of Patriot interceptor missiles due to stocks being depleted by Ukraine and the Gulf states, which are involved in the war between the US and Israel against Iran.

Their production is costly – around $3 million for a single interceptor missile – and until very recently the US was producing no more than 60 a month, a figure that has recently increased.

Zelenskyy has been requesting more of these missiles for years and, more recently, a licence for Ukraine to manufacture them itself. Even at the current increased rate of production, it is estimated that the US would not be able to replenish its own stockpile until 2028.

All of this makes it highly unlikely that Ukraine will be able to deploy locally produced Patriot interceptor missiles any time soon.

George Beebe, a former senior Russia analyst at the CIA who is now director of the global strategy programme at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, said that “the US decision to grant Ukraine a licence to produce Patriot missiles… will do little to address Ukraine’s urgent air defence needs”.

He added: “However, the United States and Europe do not have spare missiles. The conflict with Iran has severely depleted American and European stocks of such weapons, and the United States cannot produce them quickly enough to meet Ukraine’s needs.

“Russia is launching nearly 100 ballistic missiles at Ukraine every month, and the pace is intensifying. The US manufactures only around 50 Patriot missiles a month for its own country and for all its allies and partners.

“It will take many months for Ukraine to set up a production facility. But Russia will attack that facility as soon as the first foundation stone is laid, and to have any hope of completing that construction, Ukraine will have to redeploy many existing Patriot batteries from their current locations to that new facility.

“The United States should recognise that granting a licence to Ukraine will, in all likelihood, expose Patriot technology to intelligence-gathering activities by Russian intelligence services.”

Perhaps even more significant was the tone of the bilateral meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy, which took place on the sidelines of the NATO summit; this meeting was far more cordial than some previous encounters, and during it Trump praised Zelenskyy for his willingness to reach an agreement on a ceasefire in Ukraine.

He stated that the Ukrainian president had “done a fantastic job” and “been very effective” in the war.

“In fact, we’ve developed a good relationship. It’s hard to believe,” Trump said. He added that he was convinced a ceasefire agreement was on the horizon and that the US would “work on some sort of security package” for Ukraine.

The Associated Press contributed to this article

Summary of the war in Ukraine: Russia bans diesel exports, following attacks on refineries which⁠ have caused fuel shortages and sharp price rises

Moscow is taking measures to support the domestic fuel market, whilst motorists ⁠face queues lasting several hours as Ukrainian attacks intensify. What we know on day 1,597

The Guardian team and news agencies

Thursday 9 July 2026, 05:04 CEST

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Russia introduced a ban on diesel exports on Wednesday as part of a package of measures designed to support the domestic fuel market, after Ukraine’s systematic drone attacks on oil refineries caused petrol shortages and sharp price rises. Drivers in many regions are facing queues lasting several hours to fill up their cars, as the intensification of Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure is limiting supplies of diesel and petrol. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated during a televised government meeting chaired by President Vladimir Putin that the fuel situation remains complex and that “it is clear that the current situation at petrol stations is causing concern amongst the public”.

Russian ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones killed at least three people in Kyiv during the attacks on Wednesday morning, officials said, whilst Moscow is exploiting the acute shortage of US-made interceptors in Ukraine. The attacks coincided with a NATO summit in Ankara, where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Donald Trump and discussed the possibility of Ukraine obtaining licences to produce interceptors. Moscow has intensified its air war against Ukraine in recent months, as its ground advances have largely stalled and Ukrainian attacks on its military logistics and oil industry have triggered a widespread fuel shortage. In July alone, Russian attacks on Kyiv and the surrounding region killed 60 people.

However, the US president’s commitment to allow Ukraine to manufacture Patriot interceptor missiles was couched in vague terms, and he acknowledged that he had not discussed the matter with the American defence and aerospace companies Lockheed Martin and RTX Corporation (formerly Raytheon), which manufacture the Patriot system. It also remained unclear how quickly production of this expensive and complex munition could be ramped up.

A Russian attack on the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odessa on Wednesday left four people dead and six injured, a senior local official said. The city, Ukraine’s most important port, has been a frequent target of Russia in this war, which has been ongoing for more than four years. A

Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, was also the target of a missile attack on Wednesday morning, local officials said, reporting damage to private homes and a church. Another missile strike, which took place later on Wednesday on a residential building, killed two people, said the city’s mayor, Ihor Terekhov.

In Russia, overnight drone strikes by Ukraine killed one person and damaged industrial targets, authorities said.

Russia has condemned NATO’s decision to provide military aid to Ukraine, stating that it could have catastrophic consequences. Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that NATO’s priorities remained unchanged: “The militarisation of the European continent, a focus on strengthening defence capabilities, preparations for an armed conflict with Russia and, of course, aid to Ukraine.” Zakharova said in a statement published on her ministry’s website: “It is a pity, because if NATO strategists had paused to think for a moment, perhaps they would not have taken such irresponsible decisions that could lead to a catastrophe not only for the alliance, but for the whole world.”

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/europe

UKRAINE – DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE LAST 72 HOURS – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 72 hours, the conflict in Ukraine has seen a further escalation both along the front line and deep within the territories controlled by the two sides. Russia has continued its campaign of combined missile and drone strikes on major Ukrainian urban centres and critical infrastructure, whilst Ukraine has carried out one of its most extensive drone operations in recent months, targeting refineries, oil infrastructure, ships and logistical targets deep within the territory of the Russian Federation. At the same time, ground fighting remained particularly intense in eastern Ukraine, with no decisive changes to the front line, confirming that the conflict continues to be a war of attrition.

The operational situation on the front line

Over the past three days, the fiercest clashes have continued in the Lyman, Kostiantynivka and Siversk sectors, and along the eastern flanks of the Donetsk region. According to assessments by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian forces are maintaining the tactical initiative in certain sectors and are attempting to exert constant pressure on Ukrainian defensive positions through successive infantry attacks, supported by artillery, FPV drones and tactical aviation. However, the pace of advance remains slow, and territorial gains are limited and achieved at significant cost.

Numerous engagements have been recorded across the entire front line, and the frequency of clashes indicates that military activity remains at a very high level. The use of reconnaissance and attack drones has become the dominant component of tactical operations, influencing both battlefield surveillance and the precision of strikes on enemy positions.

The Russian air campaign

During the period under review, the Russian Federation launched new waves of attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones against targets in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and other regions of Ukraine. The attacks resulted in civilian casualties, damage to residential infrastructure and disruption to energy and logistics facilities. According to the Ukrainian authorities, air defence systems intercepted most of the drones launched, but several missiles struck targets in around 15 different locations.

Recent assessments indicate that Russia is adapting the composition of its strike packages, reducing the number of ballistic missiles and increasing the proportion of drones and precision-guided weapons, in an attempt to overburden Ukrainian air defence systems and maintain pressure on critical infrastructure.

The Ukrainian counter-offensive deep into Russian territory

The most significant development of the past 72 hours has been the intensification of Ukraine’s campaign of long-range strikes against the Russian Federation’s economic and logistical infrastructure.

On the night of 8 July, Ukraine launched a large-scale drone operation against refineries, pumping stations and logistical targets located hundreds and even over a thousand kilometres from the border. Confirmed targets include the TANECO and TAIF-NK refineries in Tatarstan, the refinery in Saratov, oil facilities in Bashkortostan and a military airbase in the Voronezh region. Russia claimed to have intercepted over 400 drones, but several targets were hit.

These strikes aim to reduce Russia’s ability to sustain military operations by disrupting fuel production, logistical distribution and energy infrastructure. Temporary restrictions on fuel distribution have been reported in some regions, and the Russian authorities have adopted additional measures to protect critical facilities.

Escalation of the maritime confrontation

A particularly significant development over the past 72 hours has been the expansion of Ukrainian operations targeting Russian maritime transport.

Ukrainian forces have claimed to have struck 21 vessels in around three days, 19 of which were oil tankers belonging to the so-called ‘shadow fleet’, used by Russia to transport oil in defiance of international sanctions. A cargo ship and a ferry near the Kerch Strait were also targeted. The operations took place mainly in the Sea of Azov, disrupting logistics flows to occupied Crimea.

This development marks a significant shift in Ukrainian strategy, which aims not only to degrade Russian energy infrastructure but also to disrupt maritime supply chains and the transport of fuel to Crimea and the southern front. From a strategic perspective, the expansion of the conflict into the maritime domain increases the Russian Federation’s logistical vulnerability and may have consequences for the safety of navigation in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov basins.

In parallel with developments on the battlefield, significant political and military contacts have taken place between Ukraine and its Western partners. On the sidelines of the NATO summit, US President Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky discussed strengthening air defence and future military support. A significant development was the announcement of a licence for the production in Ukraine of certain components for the Patriot systems, a measure which could reduce Kyiv’s dependence on foreign supplies in the medium term.

Impact on critical infrastructure

Over the past 72 hours, critical infrastructure has remained the main target for both sides.

Russia has continued its attacks on energy networks, transport infrastructure and urban areas, whilst Ukraine has focused its efforts on Russian refineries, fuel depots, oil facilities and logistics infrastructure. This development confirms that the conflict has evolved into a systemic confrontation, in which economic and logistical sustainment capacity is becoming just as important as tactical success on the battlefield.

An analysis of the last 72 hours highlights several major trends:

Russia is maintaining its strategy of sustained pressure through air strikes on Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure, without, however, achieving a decisive breakthrough on the front line.
Ukraine is significantly expanding its strike capability deep into Russian territory, demonstrating an ever-increasing range of action and a clear focus on targeting energy and logistics infrastructure.
The maritime domain is taking on increased strategic importance, as attacks on fuel transport and on vessels used to supply Crimea intensify.
Military cooperation between Ukraine and Western states continues to deepen, particularly in the fields of air defence and the development of defence industrial capabilities.

Overall, the conflict remains in a phase of high intensity, characterised by a relatively stable operational balance, but with a clear expansion of the confrontation to energy, logistical and maritime infrastructure. In the absence of diplomatic progress, it is likely that in the coming period both sides will continue their strategy of attrition, combining ground operations with high-precision strikes on targets deep within the enemy’s defences.

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Ankara Summit Declaration

We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Ankara to reaffirm our fundamental commitment to our collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and to the transatlantic bond. An attack on one is an attack on all. Our unity, solidarity and collective strength remain the foundation of peace, security and prosperity for the one billion citizens of our Alliance of free and democratic nations. We remain committed to our 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence.
To counter the long-term threat that Russia poses to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, and the persistent threat of terrorism, the Allies are fulfilling the Hague defence commitment. By 2025, European Allies and Canada have increased their investment in core defence requirements by over 139 billion dollars. Our investments provide the capabilities we need, whilst strengthening our industrial base and resilience. Today, in Ankara, we are announcing over $50 billion in new procurement and committing to expand our collective production capacity and to work with industry to accelerate innovation. We will continue our work to remove defence trade barriers amongst Allies and mobilise NATO partnerships to maximise defence industrial depth and cooperation.
We are building the future: a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO – a modernised Alliance. The European Allies and Canada, working alongside the United States, are taking on greater responsibility for the Alliance’s defence. NATO’s deterrence and defence are based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber assets. We are committed to maintaining our combat advantage. We are investing in our ability to deploy, enable and sustain our armed forces and to meet our capability objectives across all domains, including deep precision strikes, integrated air and missile defence, unmanned systems, cutting-edge technologies and intelligence capabilities. We are developing an interoperable transatlantic combat cloud and adopting powerful AI models.
Ukraine contributes to transatlantic security, and the Allies are united in our unwavering support for Ukraine as it defends its freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity. European Allies and Canada are now funding the vast majority of security assistance to Ukraine through bilateral and multilateral channels. The Allies emphasise that this support must be equitable, predictable and sustainable in the long term. For 2026, the Allies pledge 70 billion euros in military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine and reaffirm their sovereign commitments to maintain at least equivalent levels in 2027. To this end, we welcome the European Union’s decision to provide multi-annual funding to Ukraine through the Ukraine Support Loan.
The Alliance continues to respond to and adapt to the strategic competition, pervasive instability, hybrid threats and recurring shocks that define our broader security environment. The Allies reiterate that Iran must never possess a nuclear- e weapon and call on Iran to fully respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by Turkey. We look forward to our next meeting.

Source: here

Maritime order and European security: rules, capabilities and funding in a more unstable world – Maritime Security Forum

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remains one of the central pillars of the contemporary international maritime order. Adopted following the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, held between 1973 and 1982, the Convention established a comprehensive legal framework for the delimitation of maritime zones, the exploitation of resources, the protection of the marine environment, navigation, scientific research and the settlement of disputes. Thirty years after its ratification by China, Beijing emphasises that the implementation of the Convention contributes to maintaining a ‘fair and just’ maritime order and to strengthening a more rational and representative system of global governance.

The official Chinese position, as expressed by spokesperson Mao Ning, emphasises the Convention’s role as an expression of multilateralism and the participation of developing countries in the formulation of international norms. From this perspective, UNCLOS is not merely a legal instrument, but also a political symbol of a post-colonial order in which non-Western states have had a greater say. However, other interpretations emphasise the tensions between the letter of the Convention and its practical application, particularly in disputed areas such as the South China Sea, where disagreements over sovereignty, maritime rights and arbitration mechanisms have turned UNCLOS into a battleground for diplomatic confrontation.

From a legal perspective, the central debate concerns the relationship between UNCLOS, customary international law, bilateral agreements and specialised institutional mechanisms. China argues that the text of the Convention must be interpreted holistically and that dispute settlement procedures should not be arbitrarily extended to matters of territorial sovereignty. In contrast, states that make more active use of arbitration mechanisms believe that it is precisely the strict application of common rules that can prevent the dominance of regional powers and protect smaller states. This difference in perspective explains why the same Convention is simultaneously presented as an instrument of stability and as an arena for legal competition.

Geopolitical and economic implications

The implications are manifold. Geopolitically, UNCLOS remains essential for managing disputes in strategic seas, for freedom of navigation and for access to energy, mineral and biological resources. Economically, the stability of maritime rules directly influences global transport, supply chains and investment in ports, submarine cables, offshore energy and seabed exploitation. From a security perspective, divergent interpretations of the Convention can heighten the risk of naval incidents, particularly when states combine legal claims with a military presence, naval exercises or dual-use infrastructure.

Timelines and likely developments

In the short term, until the end of 2026, the focus will remain on political messages marking the 30th anniversary of China’s ratification of the Convention and on states’ attempts to consolidate their own legal interpretations. In the medium term, over the next two to three years, the focus will shift to new areas that were not sufficiently clearly regulated in the 1980s: climate change, artificial intelligence applied to navigation, autonomous vehicles, the protection of marine biodiversity and the exploitation of deep-sea resources. In the long term, the credibility of UNCLOS will depend on the ability of states to avoid the selective application of international law and to maintain maritime institutions as forums for negotiation, not merely as instruments of strategic pressure.

Interim conclusion

UNCLOS remains indispensable to the global maritime order, but its authority is not automatic: it depends on responsible interpretations, adherence to the principle of good faith, and the willingness of states to accept common rules even when these limit immediate national advantages. The Convention does not eliminate competition between the major powers, but it can reduce the costs of such competition if used as a basis for dialogue rather than as a unilateral legal weapon.

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Romania and NATO 3.0: from strategic position to actual capability – Maritime Security Forum

NATO 3.0 marks a phase of accelerated transformation for the North Atlantic Alliance, in which Europe must move beyond political declarations of ‘strategic autonomy’ to the actual delivery of military capabilities, defence industry, stockpiles, logistics and combat-ready forces. For Romania, this change is more than just a diplomatic issue: it tests the state’s ability to turn its strategic position on the Black Sea into a real security, industrial and political advantage.

The NATO summit in Ankara, to be held on 7–8 July 2026, has on its agenda defence investment, increased industrial production, support for Ukraine and the translation of financial commitments into concrete results. From NATO’s perspective, the stakes are no longer merely the percentage of GDP allocated to defence, but the speed at which that money can be used to produce interceptors, drones, ammunition, air defence systems, sensors, logistics and command-and-control capabilities. This move confirms the logic of NATO 3.0: the Americans remain the nuclear and political anchor, but the Europeans must shoulder a much greater share of the conventional burden.

For Romania, this transition creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities. On the one hand, Bucharest could become a key hub for Black Sea security, for air and anti-drone defence, for military mobility and for the reconstruction of the defence industry. On the other hand, a lack of administrative coherence, delays in procurement, inadequate infrastructure and limited domestic production capacity could turn its geographical position into a vulnerability rather than an asset.

Can Europe produce fast enough?

Romania is heading to the summit with predictable objectives: strengthening the eastern flank, maintaining focus on the Black Sea, continuing support for Ukraine and attracting investment in defence. These objectives are sound, but insufficient unless accompanied by clear deadlines, budgets, industrial capabilities and institutional responsibilities. Under the new allied logic, simply invoking Russian risks is no longer enough; the allies want to see what each state can bring to the table: ready forces, infrastructure, contracts, production, interoperability and resilience.

The key question is not whether Europe will spend more, but whether it will produce quickly enough. The experience of the war in Ukraine has shown that wars of attrition deplete stocks at a rate that Western economies did not anticipate. In this context, Romania must decide whether to remain primarily a purchaser of equipment or to also become a manufacturer, integrator and regional supplier. The European SAFE programme and joint procurement initiatives can provide funding, but they cannot replace national decisions regarding factories, the workforce, supply chains and the predictability of contracts.

Perspectives on NATO 3.0

A first perspective, supported by NATO leadership, views NATO 3.0 as a necessary step towards maturity: more investment, more production and a more balanced sharing of responsibilities between North America and Europe. A second perspective, found in European analyses, warns that European operational autonomy may remain incomplete without US capabilities in critical areas such as strategic intelligence, missile defence and nuclear deterrence. A third perspective, relevant to Romania, argues that the security of the eastern flank cannot be reduced to a symbolic military presence: it must be complemented by infrastructure, civil defence, energy security, port protection and the capacity to respond to hybrid attacks.

Implications for Romania

The implications for Romania are direct. Militarily, the country must step up its air defence and anti-drone capabilities, the protection of critical infrastructure, troop mobility and the modernisation of its Black Sea ports. Industrially, there is a need for multi-year contracts to enable firms to invest in production lines and skilled personnel. Diplomatically, Bucharest must avoid being sidelined between the Nordic, Baltic and Polish priorities of the eastern flank and must assert the Black Sea as an integral part of European security. Domestically, increased defence spending will put pressure on the budget and will require clearer public communication regarding costs, benefits and risks.

Recommended timelines

In the short term, between 2026 and 2027, Romania should present a public list of priority projects: anti-drone defences, ammunition, rail and road infrastructure for military mobility, port protection and interoperability with allies. In the medium term, by 2030, the objective should be the development of functional industrial capabilities, not merely the signing of import contracts. In the long term, by 2035, Romania must reach a position where defence spending also generates domestic economic value: jobs, technology, exports, maintenance centres and regional integration.

Conclusion

Romania is relevant to NATO 3.0 by virtue of its geography, but it will not be influential solely because of its geography. Its influence will depend on its ability to deliver projects swiftly, attract investment, build domestic consensus and make the Black Sea a permanent priority for the Alliance. If Bucharest remains at the level of general requests, it risks being perceived as a security beneficiary; if it delivers capabilities, it can become a regional security provider.

Relations with the United States and regional competition

In parallel with the Europeanisation of defence, Romania is seeking to maintain a solid strategic relationship with the United States. A comparison with Poland is inevitable: Warsaw has invested heavily in military procurement, infrastructure and its direct political relationship with Washington, whilst Bucharest has a smaller American presence and a more modest capacity to translate the strategic partnership into rapid projects. The challenge for Romania is not to imitate the Polish model, but to define its own profile: Black Sea security, the protection of critical infrastructure, anti-drone defence and a logistical role in supporting Ukraine and the eastern flank.

Personal diplomacy and channels of political influence may count for something, but they cannot replace the credibility built through capabilities. If Romania wishes to be treated as an indispensable player on the eastern flank, it must demonstrate through concrete projects that it can absorb funding, host allied infrastructure and contribute to collective defence using its own resources.

What Romania should call for at the NATO summit

At the summit, Romania should put forward specific requests: strengthening air defence and anti-drone defences along the Black Sea coast; increasing the allied presence in critical infrastructure; developing military mobility corridors; and including Romanian projects in European and North Atlantic funding mechanisms. Incidents involving drones near Romanian territory show that the risk is no longer abstract; it calls for clear response procedures, integrated detection systems and closer cooperation between the armed forces, intelligence services, local authorities and allied partners.

The United States will continue to provide nuclear deterrence and the political guarantee of Article 5, but Europe’s conventional defence will increasingly depend on contributions from European states. For Romania, this means that security can no longer be built solely by appealing to allied solidarity, but through verifiable investment in personnel, infrastructure, stockpiles and industry.

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Defence funding: the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank – Maritime Security Forum

The Canadian initiative on the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) marks a significant shift: defence is no longer treated exclusively as a matter of military budgets, but also as a matter of financing, credit, guarantees, credit ratings and the mobilisation of private capital. Announced on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara, the initiative has garnered the support of a group of states including Canada, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine, with the aim of creating a multilateral institution capable of reducing the cost of financing defence and resilience projects.

The initiative is being promoted as a response to a structural problem: allied states require rapid military production, but companies need predictable funding, firm orders and affordable capital costs. In this context, the DSRB could act as an intermediary between security needs and financial markets, making resilience a bankable sector.

The DSRB aims to mobilise low-cost financing for governments, large companies and small and medium-sized enterprises in the defence industry. The central idea is that many firms can produce components, drones, ammunition, sensors or resilience technologies, but do not have easy access to long-term capital. Through guarantees, loans and, potentially, a very high credit rating, the bank could reduce the cost of investment and accelerate the expansion of industrial capacity.

There are, however, limitations. The absence of major European powers from the initial group may reduce the institution’s financial clout and complicate the process of obtaining the highest possible credit rating. Furthermore, some governments fear that such mechanisms may conceal public debt, create overlaps with existing European instruments or shift sensitive security decisions into a less transparent financial sphere. Consequently, the success of the DSRB will depend not only on its capitalisation, but also on its governance, eligibility criteria, democratic oversight and compatibility with EU and NATO policies.

Implications for Romania

For Romania, participation as a supporting or founding state could be significant if approached pragmatically. The DSRB could facilitate the financing of projects relating to anti-drone defence, munitions, port infrastructure, cyber security, military maintenance and dual-use production. However, the benefit will not be automatic: Romania must prepare bankable projects, industrial consortia, faster procurement legislation and investment control mechanisms. Without these elements, its participation in the initiative risks remaining largely symbolic.

Implementation timelines

In 2026, the priority is ratification and defining the institutional architecture. In 2027, the stated objective is to make the bank operational, which involves capitalisation, credit rating, governance rules and the first financial instruments. Between 2027 and 2030, it will become clear whether the DSRB can move from promises to concrete projects by funding the expansion of industrial production and the resilience of critical infrastructure. For Romania, the decisive period is 2026–2027: if it does not quickly identify eligible projects, other countries will secure the first funding rounds.

Conclusion

The DSRB shows that future security competition will be fought not only through troops and weaponry, but also through the ability to rapidly fund production, innovation and resilience. For Romania, the bank can become a security multiplier only if it is linked to a national industrial strategy. Otherwise, it will remain yet another international initiative to which Bucharest formally adheres, without commensurate effects on the ground.

Politically, the project signals a paradigm shift: deterrence can no longer be sustained by troops alone, but requires industrial supply chains, credit, guarantees and the ability to rapidly mobilise private capital. For Romania, participation in such an initiative must be aligned with national defence priorities, not treated as a mere diplomatic affiliation.

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The vulnerability of Russian naval bases: lessons from the Black Sea and risks in the Baltic Sea – Maritime Security Forum

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that naval bases, military ports and repair infrastructure can no longer be treated as spaces protected by geographical distance, conventional superiority or the inertia of peacetime rules. Aerial drones, maritime drones, cruise missiles, special operations and strikes on critical infrastructure have extended the battlefield deep into enemy territory. Instead of a classic naval confrontation between comparable fleets, the Black Sea has become a testing ground for asymmetric competition: a naval power with inferior capabilities has succeeded, through technology, intelligence and rapid adaptation, in restricting the freedom of action of a much larger fleet.

Lessons from the Black Sea

The attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet have demonstrated that the main vulnerability lies not only on the high seas, but also in ports. Ships moored at quayside, undergoing repairs or operating at reduced capacity are dependent on coastal infrastructure, have limited reaction times and can be affected by radar blind spots, saturation of air defence systems and combined attacks using cheap drones and more powerful munitions. The examples are telling: the destruction of the landing ship Saratov at Berdiansk, the sinking of the cruiser Moskva, the strikes on Sevastopol, the attacks on landing ships and the constant pressure on Crimea have shown that the port is no longer a safe haven. In several cases, the cost of the means of attack was incomparably lower than the value of the target struck, which is changing the economics of naval warfare.

A key example is the Ukrainian Sea Baby and Magura maritime drones, used for long-range strikes against ships, bridges and port infrastructure. Their evolution, from relatively simple explosive platforms to systems with a greater range, increased payload and modular weaponry, demonstrates the speed with which naval warfare is adapting. Ukraine has used these systems not to replace a conventional fleet, but to challenge Russian control of the seas, push ships further away from the Ukrainian coast and keep trade routes vital to the economy open.

From an operational perspective, the lesson from the Black Sea is that naval defence can no longer rely on harbour defences, conventional patrols and isolated air defence systems. It requires a dense network of sensors, coastal radars, aerial surveillance, drone patrols, physical anti-drone barriers, electronic warfare, rapid response and constant coordination between the armed forces, intelligence services, the coastguard and civilian infrastructure operators. The port becomes an extended military target, and its protection becomes a joint civil-military function.

The risk of increased vulnerability in the Baltic Sea

In the Baltic Sea, Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO has radically altered the strategic environment. The Baltic region has become more difficult for Russia to operate in, and Russian naval bases at Baltiysk and in the Kaliningrad area are more exposed to surveillance, military pressure and remote attack scenarios. In an open conflict, cruise missiles, drones, mines, special operations and sabotage could target not only ships, but also docks, ammunition depots, radars, command centres, submarine cables and the energy infrastructure associated with military ports.

Recent examples in the Baltic Sea show that vulnerability is not limited to ships. The damage to the Balticconnector pipeline, the cutting of communications cables and incidents involving power cables between Finland and Estonia have made subsea infrastructure a key security issue. NATO has responded with the Baltic Sentry initiative, which aims to increase maritime presence, integrate national surveillance and utilise new technologies, including naval drones, to protect critical cables, pipelines and routes.

Kaliningrad remains the sensitive point in the Baltic equation. For Russia, the enclave provides military access, air defence systems, missiles, naval capabilities and leverage over NATO. For the Alliance, the same area represents a Russian vulnerability: an isolated territory, dependent on limited logistical lines and exposed to surveillance from Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Finland and the Baltic Sea. This dual nature means that any Baltic crisis combines the risk of escalation with the temptation to launch pre-emptive strikes, blockades and hybrid operations.

Implications for allied planning

For NATO, these developments confirm that naval defence can no longer be separated from air, cyber, space and infrastructure defence. Ports, shipyards, civilian terminals, submarine cables, fuel depots and data centres must be treated as part of the same resilience system. For Romania, the lesson applies directly to Constanța, Mangalia, Midia and the energy infrastructure along the coast: the security of the Black Sea depends not only on ships, but also on the ability to protect ports, to detect threats rapidly, to keep military and civilian logistics functioning, and to respond to attacks below the threshold of declared war.

Different perspectives

A military perspective views these developments as a democratisation of naval power: states without large fleets can achieve strategic effects through systems that are cheap, mobile and difficult to detect. A Russian perspective might interpret the same developments as an argument for the further militarisation of ports, the dispersal of ships, anti-drone defences and pre-emptive strikes against production and command centres. An allied perspective emphasises resilience: it is not enough to strike an adversary’s fleet; one must protect one’s own ports, cables, energy terminals and trade flows. Finally, an economic perspective emphasises that a naval crisis affects not only the armed forces, but also marine insurance, energy prices, grain transport, port investments and market confidence.

Implications for Romania

Romania must treat port security as a strategic priority, not as a technical appendage to naval defence. Constanța is simultaneously a commercial port, a logistics hub for Ukraine, critical infrastructure for NATO and a vulnerable point to hybrid attacks. Therefore, its defence should include systems for detecting maritime and aerial drones, procedures for dealing with incidents involving suspicious vessels, protection of fuel depots, energy redundancy, joint exercises with civilian operators, and the capacity to rapidly repair damaged infrastructure.

A second implication concerns the defence industry. If naval drones have become decisive instruments in the Black Sea, Romania cannot remain merely an observer or a buyer. There is scope for the development of national or regional programmes for maritime drones, coastal sensors, anti-drone systems, command-and-control software and naval maintenance. These projects would link defence with the local economy, technical universities, ports and dual-use companies.

Extended conclusion

The vulnerability of Russian naval bases is not merely a Russian problem, but a sign of the transformation of maritime warfare. The Black Sea has demonstrated that large fleets can be constrained by smaller actors if they combine intelligence, drones, missiles, rapid adaptation and strikes against infrastructure. The Baltic Sea shows that the same logic extends to submarine cables, pipelines, ports and militarised enclaves. For NATO and Romania, the conclusion is clear: maritime security no longer means just warships, but a complete ecosystem of sensors, industry, ports, energy, communications and civilian resilience. Whoever can protect this ecosystem will have the strategic advantage; whoever treats it in a fragmented manner will remain vulnerable even with a larger fleet.

Maritime Security Forum

The fuel pipeline through the Kerch Strait: a logistical solution or a new strategic vulnerability? – Maritime Security Forum

The proposal to build a pipeline for petroleum products through the Kerch Strait comes against a backdrop of mounting logistical pressure on occupied Crimea. The idea, put forward by Russian energy expert Alexander Frolov, stems from a simple observation: if the peninsula relies on road, rail, ferries and storage facilities that are vulnerable to attack, then an underwater pipeline could reduce the risk of disruptions and ensure a more stable supply of petrol, diesel, aviation fuel and other petroleum products. From a technical point of view, Russia already has precedents in the area: the gas pipeline to Crimea and the undersea power cables of the so-called ‘energy bridge’ have demonstrated that crossing the strait is possible.

The context, however, is different from that of previous energy projects. In 2026, Crimea is facing not just a civilian supply problem, but a systematic campaign to disrupt Russian logistics. Ukrainian attacks on facilities in Kerch and Port Kavkaz, on ferries, fuel depots, radars and air defence systems have shown that the infrastructure linking the peninsula to Russia is vulnerable both at sea and on land. In these circumstances, a pipeline could be seen by Moscow as a ‘lifeline’, but also by Kyiv as a new strategic target.

Recent examples explain why the idea has resurfaced. In June 2026, strikes on oil infrastructure in the Kerch–Port Kavkaz area caused fires, disruptions to ferry services and restrictions on the sale of fuel to civilians in Crimea. Press reports described queues at petrol stations, problems with transport supplies and pressure on the Russian-installed authorities. At the same time, strikes on the Kerch Bridge and on land routes through southern Ukraine have reduced Russia’s logistical flexibility: transporting fuel across the bridge is risky, the ferries are exposed, and the route via Mariupol, Melitopol and Simferopol is vulnerable to medium-range drones.

The historical precedent cited by Russian commentators is the fuel pipeline built in 1942 at the bottom of Lake Ladoga to supply besieged Leningrad. The analogy is suggestive, but incomplete. At that time, the infrastructure was constructed under conditions of extreme urgency, with limited technical resources, to ensure the survival of a city under siege. In the case of Crimea, the project would be part of a modern logistical contest, monitored by satellites, drones, sensors, special operations and precision strikes. Construction technology is more advanced today, but the adversary’s ability to identify and strike critical points is incomparably greater.

From a technical point of view, a pipeline through the Kerch Strait would pose different problems to a gas pipeline. Petroleum products are diverse, have different characteristics and require more complex rules governing operation, cleaning, pressure, security and storage. A single pipeline would have to transport diesel, petrol, kerosene or aviation fuel in turn, which would entail losses, controlled contamination and separation terminals. A system with multiple lines or specialised storage points would be more realistic, but this would be more expensive, more visible and harder to protect.

Relevant examples

The first example is the Kerch Bridge. Built as a symbol of Crimea’s integration into Russia and as a major logistics route, the bridge has, since 2022, become a constant target and a costly one to defend. Attacks on it have forced Russia to make greater use of ferries, overland routes through occupied territories and defensive measures such as smoke screens, additional air defence and traffic restrictions. A fuel pipeline would risk falling into the same category: infrastructure that is logistically useful but vulnerable due to its high strategic value.

The second example is Port Kavkaz, used for fuel transport, ferries and maritime links with Crimea. Ukrainian strikes on oil facilities and vessels in the area have shown that transhipment points are vulnerable to combined attacks. If a pipeline were to have visible pumping and storage terminals at both ends of the strait, these terminals could become targets just as important as the current ports and depots.

The third example comes from the energy infrastructure. The ‘energy bridge’ built after 2014 reduced Crimea’s dependence on electricity from Ukraine, but the cables, transition stations and transformer nodes remained fixed, identifiable and vulnerable points. This lesson is important: in critical infrastructure, resilience does not simply mean having an alternative connection, but the ability to protect, repair and replace it quickly.

Further examples from other maritime regions

The first relevant example comes from the Red Sea, where Houthi attacks on commercial vessels have shown just how quickly a relatively low-cost threat can disrupt a major global shipping route. Attacks involving missiles, aerial drones and maritime drones have prompted numerous operators to avoid the Suez–Bab el-Mandeb corridor and reroute ships via the Cape of Good Hope. The lesson for Kerch is clear: even if the infrastructure is not completely destroyed, the mere perception that a corridor is unsafe can drive up costs, disrupt flows and force costly logistical adjustments.

The second example is the Strait of Hormuz, where global dependence on oil and gas exports from the Persian Gulf turns every naval incident into a global energy risk. In a narrow, congested and militarised space, the threat of mines, drones, anti-ship missiles or the hijacking of oil tankers can immediately influence insurance premiums, oil prices and shipowners’ decisions. By comparison, Kerch has more regional stakes, but the logic is similar: a narrow chokepoint can become a multiplier of strategic pressure if all critical flows are concentrated there.

A third case is the South China Sea, where artificial islands, airstrips, radar stations, military ports and missile systems have transformed the disputed reefs into hubs for the projection of power. There, the infrastructure serves not only a logistical role, but also a legal and symbolic one: it underpins a permanent presence, reinforces territorial claims and alters the balance of power without open military confrontation. By analogy, a pipeline through Kerch would not merely be an energy facility, but also a political statement regarding Crimea’s integration into Russian infrastructure.

The Baltic Sea offers another set of lessons. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, the damage to the Balticconnector and repeated incidents involving communications cables have shown that undersea infrastructure can be attacked or disrupted by means that are difficult to attribute immediately. In such cases, the issue is not merely repairing a pipeline or cable, but identifying the perpetrators, determining the political response and preventing a recurrence of such incidents. For Kerch, this means that an underwater pipeline would require not only physical protection, but also constant surveillance, underwater investigative capabilities and rapid repair mechanisms.

The Taiwan Strait completes the picture through the vulnerability of undersea communications cables. In recent years, disruptions to the cables linking Taiwan to its outlying islands have shown that digital infrastructure can be used as a tool for exerting pressure in the grey zone, without triggering a conventional conflict. The lesson is relevant to all maritime regions: underwater infrastructure is critical precisely because it is invisible to the public, difficult to protect continuously, and essential to the functioning of the economy, government and defence.

These examples show that modern maritime infrastructure has a dual nature. It provides resilience, but also creates fixed targets; it reduces one vulnerability, but may concentrate risk at a new critical point. For Crimea, a pipeline through Kerch could reduce dependence on ferries and lorries, but it would introduce a new target in the competition between surveillance, defence and precision strikes. For Romania and NATO, comparisons with the Red Sea, Hormuz, the Baltic, Taiwan and the South China Sea confirm that the protection of maritime infrastructure must be treated as an integrated strategic domain, not merely as a technical issue.

Military and logistical implications

Militarily, a fuel pipeline could increase Crimea’s resilience to temporary blockades, but it would also focus attention even more on a few critical nodes. The pipeline itself would be difficult to strike along its entire length, but pumping stations, storage tanks, separation terminals, refuelling points and control systems would be vulnerable. In a drone war, there is no need to destroy the entire infrastructure; it is enough to periodically strike the elements that halt the flow.

Logistically, the project could reduce dependence on road and rail transport, but it would not eliminate the need for internal distribution on the peninsula. Fuel delivered via the pipeline must be stored, distributed and transported to military bases, airports, ports, civilian stations and operational units. If the network of storage facilities and roads remains vulnerable, the pipeline does not solve the problem, but merely shifts the point of pressure from the straits to the interior of Crimea.

Different perspectives

From the Russian perspective, the pipeline would be a resilience project: an additional route, harder to block than ferries and less exposed than convoys of lorries. It would also send a political message: Crimea is treated as infrastructure permanently integrated into the Russian sphere. From the Ukrainian perspective, the same pipeline would be a component of the Russian military apparatus on the peninsula and, therefore, a legitimate target in the context of isolating Crimea. From the Western perspective, the project would confirm that energy and military infrastructure are increasingly difficult to separate in modern warfare.

There is also an economic perspective. The cost of such a pipeline should be compared not only with the construction cost, but also with the long-term cost of its defence: sensors, patrols, air defence, repairs, secure terminals and redundancies. Under normal circumstances, the project could be discussed in terms of energy efficiency. In wartime, the main criterion becomes logistical survival, not commercial viability.

Implications for Romania and NATO

For Romania and NATO, the discussion about a pipeline through Kerch is relevant because it illustrates how Russia is seeking to adapt its logistics in response to Ukrainian pressure. If Moscow is investing in underwater routes, dispersed terminals and better-protected storage facilities, the Alliance must analyse not only ships and bases, but the entire logistical ecosystem of Crimea: energy, fuel, ferries, bridges, ports, radars and command centres. For Romania, this analysis is of direct relevance to security planning for the Black Sea, where Constanța, Midia, Mangalia and the offshore energy infrastructure must be viewed as integrated systems, not as isolated targets.

Conclusion

The fuel pipeline through the Kerch Strait could mitigate some of the logistical vulnerabilities of occupied Crimea, but it would not eliminate the fundamental strategic problem: the peninsula depends on a limited number of connections that are easy to identify, monitor and strike. In a war dominated by drones, satellites, precision strikes and hybrid operations, any new critical infrastructure becomes both a solution and a target. Therefore, the project should be understood less as a mere energy investment and more as a symptom of the growing pressure on Russia’ e logistics system in Crimea. For Ukraine, the stakes lie in the gradual isolation of the peninsula; for Russia, in maintaining logistical continuity; for NATO and Romania, the lesson is that modern maritime security depends on the resilience of infrastructure, not merely on a naval military presence.

Maritime Security Forum

Bab el-Mandeb after the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz: lifeline or new chokepoint for energy trade? – Maritime Security Forum

The increase in tanker traffic through Bab el-Mandeb shows how quickly energy routes can be reconfigured when a critical point in global trade becomes insecure. Following the blockage or severe disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, states and oil companies in the Persian Gulf have sought to divert part of their flows to alternative corridors. Against this backdrop, Bab el-Mandeb, situated between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea, has once again become not just a transit route, but a strategic outlet for exports of oil and petroleum products to Europe and Asia.

Data cited by Lloyd’s List and Kpler indicate a significant increase in exports via Bab el-Mandeb, against a backdrop of reduced traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Before the crisis, a large proportion of the Gulf’s production was exported directly via the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important oil chokepoint. When this corridor became unsafe, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other producers used pipelines, alternative ports and longer sea routes to bypass the blockade. The result was additional pressure on the Red Sea, at precisely a time when Houthi attacks, piracy and security risks remained a concern.

Regional examples illustrate the limits of this adaptation. Saudi Arabia can redirect significant volumes via the East–West pipeline to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, whilst the United Arab Emirates can use the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline, which bypasses Hormuz and delivers oil to the Gulf of Oman. Iraq has more limited options via the Kirkuk–Ceyhan route, whilst Iran has sought to develop the Jask terminal to reduce its dependence on Hormuz. However, these solutions do not fully replace the strait’s capacity: they mitigate the shock, but do not eliminate the systemic vulnerability of exports from the Persian Gulf.

The approximately 38 per cent increase in tanker traffic through Bab el-Mandeb must be interpreted in this light: not as a sign of a return to normality, but as an expression of a forced redistribution of risk. Part of the risk concentrated in Hormuz has been shifted towards the Red Sea. Consequently, a corridor already under strain from Houthi attacks is becoming even more crucial to the global energy balance. If Bab el-Mandeb were to be disrupted at the same time, the combined effect on oil prices, marine insurance and supply chains could be far more severe than a local crisis.

At the same time, the response from shipping companies is not uniform. Some major shipping lines prefer to avoid the area entirely and reroute vessels via the Cape of Good Hope, accepting higher costs and delays of up to two weeks. Other operators, particularly those for whom the cost of the detour is very high or who assess the risk as manageable, continue to transit Bab el-Mandeb. This fragmentation shows that the market is responding not only to the military threat, but also to commercial considerations: fuel costs, vessel availability, insurance premiums, charter contracts and pressure from customers.

The main risk is that Bab el-Mandeb could become an overburdened ‘double valve’: an export route for oil diverted from the Persian Gulf and, at the same time, a vital corridor for Asia–Europe trade via the Suez Canal. Attacks involving drones, anti-ship missiles, explosive boats and hijacking attempts can have disproportionate effects even without a complete blockage of the strait. In the modern maritime economy, a corridor does not need to be physically closed to cause a crisis; it is sufficient for the perceived risk to become too high for insurers, shipowners and crews.

Risk classification also remains controversial. Maritime authorities and international monitoring centres may assess an area as posing a ‘moderate’ risk, but this label does not always reflect the perception of commercial operators. For a government, the risk may be manageable; for an insurer, it may mean higher premiums; for a shipowner, a change of route; for the crew, a direct threat to their lives. The discrepancy between the official assessment and market behaviour is one of the key features of current maritime crises.

Different perspectives

From the perspective of producers in the Persian Gulf, Bab el-Mandeb is a necessary, albeit imperfect, alternative. The pipelines to Yanbu and Fujairah can maintain a portion of exports, safeguard budget revenues and signal to the markets that energy flows are not completely paralysed. From the shipowners’ perspective, however, every transit through the Red Sea is a risky decision: a shorter and cheaper route can become more costly than the round-the-world route around Africa if insurance premiums rise or if a vessel is damaged.

From the perspective of the Houthi movement and its regional backers, the pressure on Bab el-Mandeb provides a disproportionate lever of influence: a relatively modest force can disrupt global trade routes, impose costs on distant economies and transform a regional crisis into a global economic security issue. From a Western perspective, this highlights the limitations of traditional naval escorts: protecting every ship is impossible, and the complete destruction of coastal attack capabilities is difficult, costly and politically risky.

Economic and security implications

The first implication is a rise in energy costs. If flows through the Strait of Hormuz decline, whilst flows through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait simultaneously become risky, the oil market reacts not only to the physical shortage of barrels, but also to uncertainty. Prices, freight rates and insurance premiums may rise before an actual disruption occurs. In this sense, geopolitical risk acts as a pre-emptive tax on global trade.

The second implication is the pressure on the Suez Canal and the economies that depend on it. If ships avoid the Red Sea and opt for the Cape of Good Hope route, Europe receives goods later and at a higher cost, Egypt loses revenue from transit fees, and ports in the Mediterranean and the North Sea have to manage delays and rescheduling. At the same time, East Africa may be affected by rising costs of fuel, food and regional transport.

The third implication concerns Romania and the Black Sea region. A simultaneous crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb could increase interest in alternative energy routes, regional terminals, strategic stocks and more resilient Euro-Asian logistics corridors. For Romania, this means that the port of Constanța, storage infrastructure, rail links and the capacity to manage additional flows may become more important within a European economic security framework.

Timelines and likely scenarios

In the short term, over the next three to six months, the flow of traffic through Bab el-Mandeb will depend on the intensity of Houthi attacks, the Western naval response and whether or not traffic through the Strait of Hormuz stabilises. If incidents remain sporadic, some operators will continue to use the route, accepting higher costs. If attacks intensify or major oil tankers are hit, the trend towards rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope will accelerate.

In the medium term, up to 2027, Gulf producers will seek to increase the flexibility of their export infrastructure: expanding capacity at Yanbu and Fujairah, investing in pipelines, alternative ports and regional storage facilities. However, these projects require time, capital and political stability. In the long term, by 2030, the crisis may accelerate an already visible trend: importing nations will seek more diversified sources, larger stockpiles and routes less dependent on maritime chokepoints.

Conclusion

The increase in tanker traffic through Bab el-Mandeb does not indicate a normalisation of energy trade, but rather a redistribution of vulnerabilities. When Hormuz becomes unsafe, Bab el-Mandeb takes on the role of an alternative route; when Bab el-Mandeb in turn comes under threat, the entire global energy system is forced to pay the price for its dependence on a few narrow maritime passages. The strategic lesson is clear: energy security is no longer measured solely in terms of production and reserves, but in terms of routes, insurance, naval escorts, pipelines, alternative ports and states’ capacity to absorb logistical shocks. For Romania and Europe, this means that the Black Sea, Constanța and the transport infrastructure must be viewed not merely in regional terms, but as part of a global network of energy resilience.

Maritime Security Forum

The Royal Navy tests the Nyan drone: a step towards a hybrid fleet or still a limited experiment? – Maritime Security Forum

The sea trial of the Nyan One-Way Effector drone marks an important milestone in the Royal Navy’s transition towards a hybrid fleet, in which manned vessels will operate alongside aerial, naval and underwater drones. However, the experiment does not replace cruise missiles, anti-ship systems or major combat platforms, but rather points the way towards a new architecture: low-cost mass production, distributed sensors, precision strikes and digital integration.

The Royal Navy launched the Nyan One-Way Effector attack drone for the first time from a ship at sea, using the experimental vessel XV Patrick Blackett off the south coast of England. The test took place as part of Exercise Neptune Reach, under the umbrella of Project Vantage, a joint-service programme aimed at accelerating the evaluation of maritime attack drones. Units from the Royal Navy, the British Army and the Royal Air Force took part in the exercise, indicating that London does not view OWA drones as an isolated naval project, but as a component of the future integrated force.

The Nyan is being developed by Callen-Lenz, a BAE Systems affiliate, and is described as an unmanned aerial vehicle with a wingspan of approximately 2.9 metres, designed for precision strikes. The system had previously been tested by the British Army in Estonia, as part of Exercise Spring Storm, as part of the UK’s deep-strike capability in support of NATO allies. The transition from land-based operations to launch from a moving ship is significant as it introduces new variables: the ship’s roll and pitch, deck wind, limited storage space, integration with command systems, and the risk of operating in a contested naval environment.

During the test, a pneumatic catapult installed on the ship’s deck launched the drone onto a pre-programmed flight path. According to British reports, the launch system can accelerate OWA drones to approximately 55 metres per second, and teams from the Royal Navy and the Air and Space Warfare Centre are analysing the results to decide on the next phases. The possibility of further tests on the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth demonstrates the ambition to ascertain whether low-cost launch systems can be integrated not only onto experimental vessels but also onto major platforms within the fleet.

Parameter / mission	Publicly available data	Military relevance
System type	One-Way Effector / expendable, unmanned attack drone	Enables precision strikes at a lower cost than complex munitions, and is intended for use in salvos or saturation scenarios.
Developer	Callen-Lenz, a BAE Systems affiliate	Integration into the UK industrial ecosystem facilitates rapid production, software updates and adaptation to the Royal Navy’s requirements.
Wingspan	Approximately 2.9 metres	Its relatively small size allows it to be stored on ships with limited space and launched from a variety of naval platforms.
Naval test platform	HMS XV Patrick Blackett, a Royal Navy experimental vessel	The test validated launch from a moving vessel and paved the way for integration onto larger platforms.
Launch system	Catapult / deck launcher, with an acceleration capacity of up to approximately 55 m/s	A relatively simple launcher can transform existing ships into distributed strike platforms, without the need for complex VLS-type systems.
Flight profile	Pre-programmed flight to a designated area or target; the exact level of autonomy has not been fully disclosed	Reduces the operator’s workload after launch, but requires precise planning, targeting data and integration into the command-and-control network.
Primary role	Precision strikes against vulnerable land or maritime targets	Useful against radars, depots, coastal installations, vehicles, light vessels or exposed logistical infrastructure.
Possible missions	Overwhelming the defence, reconnaissance by engagement, strikes against fixed targets, support for deep strikes, testing the enemy’s defences	May force the opponent to expend costly interceptors, reveal their sensors or disperse their defences.
Operational integration	Project Vantage and the Hybrid Navy concept	Part of the transition to a fleet in which manned ships, aerial drones ( ), naval drones and autonomous systems operate as part of a network.
Production	Over 1,000 units produced, according to the company’s statements	Production volume is essential for deployment in waves, the rapid replacement of losses and reducing the cost per military effect.
Previous testing	The Spring Storm exercise in Estonia, in support of the UK’s deep-strike capability for NATO	This demonstrates that the system is designed for joint-arms use, not just naval use.
Unpublished data	Cruising speed, service ceiling, payload, warhead type, exact range and jamming resistance have not been officially confirmed in detail	The lack of this data limits a full assessment of lethality, survivability and effectiveness against well-defended targets.

The experiment must be viewed within the broader context of the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and the Defence Investment Plan, through which the United Kingdom has announced significant investment in drones, autonomy, artificial intelligence, digital targeting networks and unmanned platforms. The ‘Hybrid Navy’ concept aims to combine manned vessels with autonomous systems in the air, on the surface and underwater, to increase range, operational tempo and combat power without a proportional increase in crews and costs.

The Hybrid Navy: operational promise and real constraints

From an optimistic perspective, OWA drones offer the Royal Navy a rapid means of adding strike capability to ships that were not originally designed to carry additional missiles. A relatively simple catapult, a few storage containers and a command-and-control link can transform an auxiliary vessel, a frigate or an aircraft carrier into a platform capable of launching remote strikes. This is a significant shift for Western navies, which for decades have relied heavily on expensive munitions that are difficult to produce and can only be stockpiled in limited quantities.

However, the critical perspective is equally important. OWA drones do not automatically solve the Royal Navy’s manpower shortage. Even if a drone is autonomous in flight, it must be transported, checked, programmed, launched, integrated into mission planning and assessed after impact. In practice, unmanned systems reduce the risk to pilots and can expand strike options, but they do not eliminate the need for sailors, technicians, data operators, electronic warfare specialists and maintenance personnel.

Furthermore, Nyan should be viewed as a complementary system, not as a replacement for cruise missiles or heavy anti-ship weapons. An OWA drone can saturate the enemy’s defences, identify penetration routes, strike vulnerable targets or force the enemy to expend costly interceptors. However, against large ships with layered defences, or against fortified targets, its lethality may be insufficient unless it is deployed in large salvos or in combination with missiles, electronic warfare and high-quality targeting intelligence.

Examples and operational lessons

The first relevant example comes from the war in Ukraine. Air and maritime drones have demonstrated that relatively inexpensive systems can produce disproportionate effects against expensive platforms, if used intelligently, in large numbers and integrated with targeting intelligence. Ukrainian attacks on Russian infrastructure in Crimea, on the Black Sea Fleet and on fuel facilities have shown that mass, persistence and rapid adaptation can partially compensate for the lack of a large conventional fleet.

The second example is the Red Sea. Houthi attacks using drones, missiles and explosive-laden boats have forced Western navies to deploy expensive interceptors to protect commercial and military vessels. The lesson is an uncomfortable one: if a cheap drone forces a ship to use a much more expensive defensive missile, the economic advantage may lie with the attacker. That is why Western navies are seeking mass-produced solutions, including their own drones, directed-energy weapons, jamming systems and cheaper interceptors.

The third example is the competition in the Indo-Pacific. In a crisis scenario involving Taiwan or the South China Sea, autonomous platforms could be used for reconnaissance, defence saturation, strikes against radar systems and restricting the adversary’s freedom of manoeuvre. For the Royal Navy, the lesson is that a hybrid fleet must not only be cheaper, but also harder to neutralise: dispersed, digitally connected and capable of generating effects from multiple directions.

Implications for the United Kingdom and NATO

The first implication is a shift in the balance between quality and quantity. Western fleets cannot abandon their cutting-edge weapons, but nor can they rely exclusively on them any longer. Cruise missiles, torpedoes and anti-ship systems remain essential for high-value targets, but OWA drones can create volume, force defensive reactions and expand the commander’s tactical options. In this sense, the future hybrid fleet will not be a ‘cheap’ fleet, but a layered one: expensive munitions for decisive targets, and cheap munitions for saturation, reconnaissance and attrition.

The second implication concerns the industry. If Nyan and other similar systems are to be produced in the hundreds or thousands, then defence becomes a matter of industrial pace, supply chains, software, off-the-shelf components and rapid updates. For the United Kingdom, the advantage will come not only from a successful prototype, but from the ability to rapidly produce, modify and deliver systems adapted to lessons learnt in the field. For NATO, interoperability will be essential: British, American, French, Turkish or Romanian drones must be able to operate within a shared data, targeting and command-and-control network.

The third implication concerns Romania and the Black Sea. The British trial shows that existing ships can be adapted relatively quickly to launch autonomous assets. For Romania, which requires anti-drone defence, coastal surveillance and distributed strike capabilities, the lesson is that naval modernisation must not be limited to the acquisition of large platforms. Frigates, corvettes, auxiliary vessels, port platforms and even coastal infrastructure can become nodes in a sensor and drone architecture, provided there is doctrine, secure communications and local industrial capacity.

Maritime Security Forum

Study summary: ‘Australian security in an era of uncertainty’ (ASPI, June 2026) – Maritime Security Forum

The compendium brings together articles published by ASPI’s Defence Strategy Programme in *The Strategist* over the past 12 months, written by 18 authors. The central theme is that Australia has entered a period of profound strategic uncertainty, in which its security depends both on strong alliances and, increasingly, on national resilience and autonomy — objectives that are complementary, not competing.

Strategy and deterrence. The new National Defence Strategy (NDS 2026) marks a significant shift: from defending a ‘rules-based order’ to actively contributing to a favourable regional balance of power, aligning with US strategic logic. The authors advocate the concept of ‘strategic self-reliance’ built upon the alliance with the US — not in place of it — even though the Trump administration has become a more transactional and unpredictable ally. The US National Security Strategy of December 2025 explicitly calls on allies to spend more and do more, and Australia is directly targeted. Also noteworthy is the significant step taken with Japan: cooperation on ‘flexible deterrence options’ (FDO) brings the two countries closer to an operational collective deterrence.

Regional security. The main threat identified is China’s coordinated effort to replace the international system with a Sino-centric order, amplified by its ‘no-limits’ partnership with Russia — described as an unprecedented trans-Eurasian threat in the last half-century. China’s military budget continues to grow (+7 per cent in 2026), and Beijing is expanding its influence in the Pacific: Timor-Leste, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea (where the Pukpuk Treaty with Australia has been postponed). Russia is modernising its nuclear submarines in the Pacific, which could complicate the allies’ planning in the event of a conflict. It is also recommended that the partnership with the EU be deepened.

Taiwan. ASPI has used simulations (wargaming) to test four scenarios for subjugating Taiwan: subversion, quarantine, blockade and invasion. Conclusions: none would end quickly or cleanly; Taiwan would resist in all scenarios; and the consequences would rapidly spiral out of Beijing’s control — a global economic shock (a blockade would put ~565 billion USD of Taiwanese trade at risk), possible sanctions and international isolation. For Australia, a crisis would be a systemic shock felt within days, not a distant geopolitical event. Prevention requires visible, credible and multilateral deterrence, built now.

Capabilities. Abandoning AUKUS Pillar One would destroy Australia’s credibility and its alliance with the US, but the programme’s risks are real — which is why several authors recommend preparing a Japanese fallback option (purchasing or leasing conventional submarines), especially following the scaled-back programme to extend the service life of the Collins-class submarines (doubled cost, ~A$11 billion, reduced capability). Australia has opted for the upgraded Japanese Mogami-class frigates (first delivery in 2029), is expanding its fleet of Bluebottle autonomous surface vessels (from 15 to 55) and is being urged to adopt autonomous systems on a massive scale — including a ‘drone wall’ in the north — under the principle of ‘low cost, high volume, rapid acquisition’.

Defence spending. ASPI recommends spending of at least 3 per cent of GDP (compared to the current ~2.05 per cent, with a trajectory towards ~2.33–2.5 per cent), justified by specific shortfalls: integrated air and missile defence (only A$850 million approved out of the planned A$21–30 billion), long-range munitions stocks, autonomous systems, and space and cyber capabilities. The 2026–27 budget is criticised for funding the future force at the expense of the current force’s readiness, and 75–80 per cent of planned expenditure remains unapproved. There are also concerns about a loss of transparency (the discontinuation of the Major Projects Report) and the risks associated with the reorganisation of procurement under the new Defence Delivery Agency.

The editors’ conclusion: difficult decisions, long-term investments and an informed public debate are indispensable — a strategy that cannot be explained to the public is a strategy that is difficult to sustain.

Maritime Security Forum

Norway and Lithuania in the standardised naval vessels project: Nordic-Baltic naval integration and a strategic signal for NATO – Maritime Security Forum

On the sidelines of the NATO summit on 8 July 2026, Lithuania and Norway signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation within the Norwegian standardised ships programme. The document does not yet constitute a firm procurement contract, but it establishes the intergovernmental framework for technical, commercial and industrial negotiations, including the possible acquisition by the Lithuanian Armed Forces of vessels developed in Norway. Beyond the technical aspects, the agreement marks an important step in Nordic-Baltic naval integration and in strengthening NATO’s north-eastern flank.

According to the Norwegian Government, Lithuania regards the Norwegian programme as the preferred option for renewing part of its fleet after 2030, with an initial requirement for four modular multi-role vessels and associated mission modules. Norway, for its part, intends to procure up to 28 standardised vessels to replace several classes currently in service with the Royal Norwegian Navy and the Coast Guard. The rationale behind the programme is to reduce fleet fragmentation, lower maintenance costs and increase interoperability among allies.

Norway articulates the central principle of the project as the idea that the vessels must be ‘as civilian as possible and as military as necessary’. This approach reflects a broader trend in Western naval planning: the use of relatively simple, modular and adaptable platforms capable of carrying out diverse missions — patrol, surveillance, logistical support, mine countermeasures, protection of maritime infrastructure and contributions to NATO operations — without the costs and complexity of a fleet composed exclusively of specialised platforms.

Strategic context: why the Baltic Sea matters

Following Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, the Baltic Sea has become an area almost entirely surrounded by allied states, yet no less vulnerable. Russia maintains significant military positions in Kaliningrad and St Petersburg, and the region is criss-crossed by submarine c , energy pipelines, trade routes, critical ports and military supply lines. In this environment, small and medium-sized vessels, capable of operating in coastal waters, monitoring critical infrastructure and responding rapidly to incidents, are becoming just as important as major combat platforms.

For Lithuania, the stakes are high. The country has a short but strategically important coastline, with the port of Klaipėda being essential for trade, energy, military mobility and regional supply. A modernised, modular fleet that is interoperable with Norway and other allies would enable Vilnius to contribute more credibly to the surveillance of the Baltic Sea, the protection of undersea infrastructure and joint NATO operations. At the same time, for Norway, bringing Lithuania into the programme confirms its ambition to transform the national project into an allied class of standardised ships.

Geostrategic and regional implications

The first implication is the strengthening of the Nordic-Baltic axis within NATO. The Norway–Lithuania cooperation is not merely a procurement project, but a signal that the states of northern and eastern Europe are seeking joint solutions for the defence of narrow maritime spaces that are heavily monitored and vulnerable to hybrid threats. Standardising the vessels can enable joint training, joint maintenance, shared spare parts and a common operational doctrine, thereby reducing costs and increasing response times.

The second implication concerns deterring Russia in the Baltic Sea. A more standardised and interoperable allied fleet complicates Russian planning, as it increases the number of platforms capable of carrying out surveillance missions, port protection, mine countermeasures and support for multinational operations. In a crisis scenario, such vessels can be used to protect routes to the Baltic states, to monitor suspicious traffic, to respond to sabotage of submarine cables, and to support military mobility at sea.

The third implication is industrial. The programme offers Norway the chance to transform its naval and technological expertise into an exportable product for allies, developed by consortia such as Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace and Salt Ship Design. For Lithuania, participation could bring not only ships, but also industrial transfer, local maintenance and the involvement of national shipyards and companies. Specialist sources indicate the ambition that a significant proportion of the project’s value be realised in Lithuania, which could transform the procurement into a tool for industrial development, rather than merely a military expenditure.

Operational implications for NATO

At an operational level, standardised vessels can serve as flexible platforms for missions that do not always warrant the use of frigates or destroyers. In the Baltic Sea, where distances are short, the coastline is fragmented, and threats include mines, drones, sabotage, anti-ship missiles and attacks on undersea infrastructure, fleets require volume, persistence and the ability to disperse. A fleet of modular vessels can provide precisely this kind of continuous presence, at lower cost and with the ability to adapt rapidly to different missions.

However, there are also limitations. Ships built on the principle of ‘as civilian as possible’ can reduce costs, but must retain sufficient survivability, sensors, secure communications and the ability to integrate into NATO networks. If modularity is designed superficially, there is a risk of producing platforms that are cheap but insufficiently robust for a high-intensity conflict. Consequently, the programme’s success will depend on striking a balance between cost, militarisation, protection, automation, maintenance and digital integration.

Relevance for Romania and the Black Sea

For Romania, the Norway–Lithuania project offers an important lesson. Naval modernisation should not be understood solely as the acquisition of large platforms, but also as the development of modular vessels, sensor systems, drones, port protection capabilities and maintenance infrastructure. The Black Sea, like the Baltic Sea, is a contested area, with critical trade routes, offshore energy infrastructure, strategic ports and the risk of hybrid attacks. Romania could therefore explore similar models of regional standardisation, possibly in cooperation with coastal allies and European partners.

Such a model could be relevant for patrol missions, the protection of maritime infrastructure, countering naval drones, the surveillance of cables and pipelines, logistical support and joint operations with NATO. Rather than treating each procurement as an isolated project, Romania could pursue a coherent architecture: modular platforms, common equipment, local maintenance, integration with air and land-based systems, and an industrial base capable of supporting the life cycle of the vessels.

Conclusions

The Norway–Lithuania Memorandum is more than just an intention to procure naval vessels. It signals NATO’s shift towards a framework of standardisation, interoperability and joint production, at a time when European maritime security is affected by Russian pressure, hybrid threats, the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure and the need for rapidly deployable forces. For Lithuania, the project could mean modernising its fleet and closer integration into the defence of the Baltic Sea. For Norway, it could transform its national programme into an allied platform. For NATO, it offers a practical model for multiplying maritime capabilities without relying exclusively on large, expensive ships.

The strategic conclusion is that the fleets of the future will combine major platforms, modular vessels, drones, distributed sensors and resilient industrial infrastructure. In the Baltic Sea, this combination can strengthen deterrence and the protection of critical infrastructure. In the Black Sea, the lesson is equally relevant: maritime security is not achieved solely through a symbolic naval presence, but through interoperable platforms, production, maintenance, rapid response and the ability to protect the port, energy and logistics ecosystem as a whole.

The Maritime Security Forum

The Sea Baby naval drone and the attack on the Blue oil tanker: the expansion of Ukraine’s war against Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ – Maritime Security Forum

The strike on the Blue oil tanker by a Ukrainian Sea Baby naval drone marks a new stage in Ukraine’s campaign to reduce the Russian Federation’s economic and logistical capacity in the Black Sea. The operation, claimed by the Ukrainian Security Service, targets not just an isolated vessel, but a broader mechanism through which Russia is attempting to circumvent international sanctions and maintain revenue streams from oil exports. In this context, maritime warfare is no longer confined to military vessels, naval bases and ports, but extends to the commercial infrastructure that provides financial and logistical support for Russian aggression.

According to reports published by the Ukrainian and international press, on the morning of 8 July 2026, a Sea Baby naval drone operated by the SBU struck the stern of the oil tanker Blue near occupied Yalta, within Ukraine’s exclusive economic zone. The sources cited state that the vessel sustained significant damage, and that the Russian air force reportedly attempted unsuccessfully to intercept the maritime drone. The Blue oil tanker is described as part of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ and is subject to sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Ukraine for its involvement in the transport of Russian oil in breach of the international sanctions regime.

Context: from striking the Black Sea Fleet to targeting the Russian maritime economy

Ukraine’s naval drone campaign began by challenging the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s freedom of manoeuvre, but has gradually evolved into a broader model of maritime interdiction. Warships, bridges, fuel terminals, ferries, ports and oil tankers associated with Russian exports have become part of the same logistical ecosystem. From Kyiv’s perspective, striking a vessel from the ‘shadow fleet’ aims to achieve three simultaneous effects: reducing Russian oil revenues, increasing Moscow’s logistical costs, and sending the message that no maritime route used to support the war is entirely safe.

What is the ‘shadow fleet’ and why does it matter?

The ‘shadow fleet’ refers to the network of oil tankers, cargo ships, front companies, opaque insurers and shipping registers used to transport Russian oil in defiance of Western sanctions and the price cap imposed by the G7 nations. These vessels often operate with complex ownership structures that are difficult to trace, frequent changes of flag, de ed or switched-off transponders, or ship-to-ship transfers, which complicate the enforcement of sanctions and increase environmental and security risks. The Blue, being a Suezmax-class oil tanker, has the capacity to carry large volumes of crude oil or petroleum products, which gives it economic and strategic significance beyond the value of the vessel itself.

The importance of these vessels stems from the fact that oil remains one of Russia’s main sources of revenue. Even when sanctions restrict access to Western markets and services, exports continue via alternative routes, intermediaries and fleets that are more difficult to monitor. Consequently, striking a sanctioned vessel is not merely a tactical manoeuvre, but a means of exerting pressure on the financial architecture of Russia’s war effort.

Geostrategic implications

The first geostrategic implication is the extension of the battlefield to the Russian maritime economy. Ukraine is signalling that it will not limit its pressure to Crimea, Sevastopol or military vessels, but will also target commercial assets that underpin Russia’s ability to finance the war. This approach alters the relationship between sanctions and military action: sanctions create the legal and political framework, whilst drone strikes can turn the cost of circumventing them into a tangible operational risk.

The second implication concerns Russian deterrence in the Black Sea. If oil tankers associated with the ‘shadow fleet’ become vulnerable near Crimea or on routes to Russian ports, Moscow must allocate more resources to escort, air defence, surveillance, repairs and logistical dispersal. Thus, Ukraine can achieve strategic effects without a comparable conventional fleet, by using maritime drones, targeting intelligence and exploiting vulnerabilities in the Russian logistics chain.

The third implication relates to the law of the sea and the risk of escalation. The fact that the attack is presented as having taken place within Ukraine’s exclusive economic zone strengthens Kyiv’s argument regarding the legitimacy of the operation, but does not eliminate the risks of controversy. Oil tankers are commercial vessels, and attacking them may spark debates regarding the status of the targets, the protection of crews, the risk of pollution and the safety of navigation. However, when a vessel is sanctioned and accused of directly supporting the war economy of an aggressor state, the line between trade and military support becomes increasingly difficult to draw.

Regional implications in the Black Sea

For the Black Sea region, the attack on the Blue oil tanker confirms the transformation of the maritime space into a theatre of economic, not just military, interdiction. Routes to Novorossiysk, Crimea, the Kerch Strait and the ports used by Russia for fuel transport are becoming high-risk areas. This may affect insurance premiums, vessel availability, shipowners’ decisions and the commercial costs associated with the transport of Russian oil.

For Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia, the indirect effect is increased pressure on the safety of navigation and maritime surveillance. Even if the attacks are directed against Russian assets, any major incident involving an oil tanker carries risks of pollution, traffic disruption, a Russian military response or heightened tensions near commercial shipping routes. At the same time, the success of the Sea Baby drones demonstrates that coastlines and ports can no longer be protected by conventional naval means alone; sensors, patrols, electronic warfare, anti-drone defences and civil-military coordination are required.

Implications for Romania and NATO

For Romania, the incident is relevant for at least three reasons. Firstly, it shows that the Black Sea remains an active theatre of conflict in which energy infrastructure, ports, oil tankers and trade routes are intertwined with military operations. Secondly, it demonstrates the effectiveness of unmanned systems against large, costly targets that are difficult to defend permanently. Thirdly, it raises the issue of protecting the port of Constanța, the oil terminals, the offshore infrastructure and the maritime routes that underpin regional trade and support for Ukraine.

For NATO, striking a vessel from the ‘shadow fleet’ confirms that economic sanctions, energy security and naval warfare are increasingly intertwined. The Alliance must monitor not only the movements of the Russian Fleet, but also oil flows, sanctioned vessels, ship- -to-ship transfers, port infrastructure and the risks of sabotage or pollution. At the same time, allied states must prevent the Black Sea from becoming an area where commercial risks are rising without sufficient mechanisms for surveillance, early warning and rapid response.

Economic and legal implications

Economically, attacks on the ‘shadow fleet’ may increase the cost of Russian exports by raising insurance premiums, reducing the number of vessels willing to carry Russian oil, and forcing Moscow to use longer or riskier routes. If these effects accumulate, they may reduce the effectiveness of sanctions-evasion mechanisms and limit some of the revenue used to finance the war.

Legally, the Blue case will fuel the debate regarding the status of commercial vessels involved in supporting the war economy. Ukraine argues that such vessels constitute legitimate targets when they help Russia circumvent sanctions and finance its aggression. On the other hand, the international maritime community will be mindful of the risks to crews, respect for the principle of proportionality, the prevention of pollution and the maintenance of safe navigation. This tension will become increasingly significant as the economic war intersects with military operations at sea.

Conclusions

The strike on the Blue oil tanker shows that Ukraine is attempting to transform the Black Sea into a space where Russia can no longer separate the military conflict from the economy that funds it. The Sea Baby naval drones are not merely tactical weapons, but instruments of strategic pressure on Russian shipping routes, vessels, ports and oil revenues. By attacking the ‘shadow fleet’, Kyiv aims to raise the cost of circumventing sanctions and to curtail Moscow’s freedom of action at sea.

The regional conclusion is that the Black Sea is entering a phase in which commercial infrastructure, energy, sanctions and naval warfare form a single security system. For Romania and NATO, the key lesson is the need for an integrated maritime architecture: constant surveillance, port protection, anti-drone defences, analysis of sanctioned traffic, cooperation with the maritime industry and rapid incident response capabilities. Whoever controls information, mobility and the resilience of infrastructure will hold the advantage in the naval competition of the coming years.

Maritime Security Forum

Ukrainian attacks in the Sea of Azov and the withdrawal of Russian tankers: pressure on Crimean logistics and the ‘grey fleet’ – Maritime Security Forum

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil tankers and vessels in the Sea of Azov have had an immediate operational impact: some of the tankers loaded with petroleum products have begun returning to port, rather than continuing their journey to occupied Crimea or to transhipment areas in the Black Sea. Information reported by journalist Kateryna Yaresko, an associate of the Myrotvorets Centre’s SeaKrime project, points to an emerging trend: vessels no longer view the Azov–Kerch–Crimea route as a secure logistics corridor, but rather as an area under Ukrainian military and information pressure.

According to public reports, a fully-loaded oil tanker returned to Rostov-on-Don following the attacks on ships in the Sea of Azov, either due to damage or because of the perceived risk to the crew and operators. At the same time, other reports suggest that a stricken tanker, carrying petrol, nevertheless managed to reach Kerch. These incidents suggest that Ukraine is not merely seeking to destroy specific vessels, but to disrupt Russia’s logistical operations: every return, delay, diversion or temporary halt reduces the predictability of supplies to Crimea.

Context: The Sea of Azov as a logistical artery for occupied Crimea

The Sea of Azov is of disproportionate importance relative to its size. It connects the Russian ports of Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog, Azov and Temriuk with the Kerch Strait, occupied Crimea and, indirectly, with the maritime routes of the Black Sea. Before and after the large-scale invasion, these ports were used to transport petroleum products, grain, construction materials , equipment and other logistical flows associated with the Russian war economy. With the Kerch Bridge, ferries and land routes through the occupied territories having become vulnerable, the Azov Sea terminals have taken on an increasingly important role in supplying Crimea.

Within this ecosystem, the ports of Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog and Azov function as collection hubs: petroleum products arrive by rail or via regional infrastructure, are loaded onto small and medium-sized tankers, and are then sent to Crimea, Kerch, the occupied ports or transhipment areas. Yaresko describes the concentration of these vessels at the entrance to the Kerch Strait as a situation akin to a ‘firing range’, precisely because the density of traffic, the predictability of routes and the military-economic value of the cargoes create repeatable targets.

The ‘grey fleet’ and the vulnerability of fuel transport

Ukrainian Navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk explained that for Russia, it is not just the loss of a particular vessel that matters, but the reduction in overall fuel transport capacity. This is the crux of the matter: if Moscow loses sufficient transport capacity – even without the complete destruction of all vessels – resupply becomes slower, more expensive and riskier. In a war of attrition, reducing available volumes can have greater effects than a spectacular strike on a single target.

The concept of a ‘grey fleet’ or ‘shadow fleet’ encompasses vessels operating between Russian ports and occupied ports, such as Mariupol and Berdiansk, or between transhipment areas that are difficult to monitor. These vessels do not always call at Western ports; they utilise opaque ownership structures, can circumvent sanctions through alternative registers and routes, and are often linked to schemes for the export of oil, petroleum products or goods extracted from the occupied territories. SeaKrime’s investigations have for years documented such practices in maritime transport from Crimea and the Sea of Azov, including the use of false documents, the switching off of transponders and transhipments near Russian ports.

The military dimension: logistical interdiction using drones

The commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, stated that, within 72 hours, Ukrainian forces had struck 21 vessels, including 19 tankers from the shadow fleet, one dry cargo ship and one ferry. Reports by Reuters and the Ukrainian media have mentioned strikes on several oil tankers in the Sea of Azov, on Russian refineries and on energy infrastructure, as part of a wider campaign to put pressure on Russia’s fuel supply chains. Although some figures remain difficult to verify independently, the strategic direction is clear: Ukraine is seeking to make Russian logistics a permanent target, rather than merely a backdrop to the war.

This type of logistical interdiction has three cumulative effects. The first is physical: the damage or destruction of ships, terminals, ferries and warehouses. The second is economic: the increased cost of transport, insurance, repairs and security. The third is psychological and organisational: crews, shipowners and port authorities begin to avoid certain routes, postpone departures, reduce cargo volumes or request additional security measures. The fact that some tankers are returning to port shows that the deterrent effect is beginning to take hold, even when the vessel is not destroyed.

Geostrategic and regional implications

The first geostrategic implication is the gradual isolation of Crimea. Ukraine does not need to completely block the peninsula to achieve strategic effects; it is sufficient to make supplies more uncertain, slower and more costly. If the routes through the Sea of Azov, the Kerch Strait, the Kerch Bridge, the ferries and the land corridor all become vulnerable at the same time, Russia is forced to spread its resources thinly, deplete its air defence capabilities, relocate stocks and accept losses in logistical efficiency.

The second implication concerns the economic militarisation of the Sea of Azov. Ports, tankers, terminals and depots are no longer merely commercial infrastructure, but components of the logistical apparatus of war. This reality complicates the distinction between military targets and economic objectives, but explains why Kyiv is targeting ships carrying fuel to Crimea or to the occupied ports. In modern warfare, fuel, transport and transhipment are just as decisive as ammunition or military equipment.

The third implication is regional. The Sea of Azov, although de facto controlled by Russia following the occupation of the Ukrainian coastline, is becoming a contested space through remote means: aerial drones, maritime drones, OSINT intelligence, attacks on infrastructure and pressure on the ‘grey fleet’. This reduces Moscow’s sense of impunity and demonstrates that geographical occupation does not guarantee operational control.

Implications for Romania, NATO and Black Sea security

For Romania, developments in the Sea of Azov are relevant because they demonstrate how an adversary can use civilian transport, commercial ports and small vessels to support a military effort. The port of Constanța, the oil terminals, the railway infrastructure and the connections with Ukraine must be viewed as part of a security architecture, not merely as economic infrastructure. If Russia uses grey fleets for fuel, grain or military logistics, Romania and its allies must develop capabilities for monitoring, identifying suspicious vessels, analysing ownership, enforcing sanctions and responding to maritime incidents.

For NATO, the key lesson is that maritime security can no longer be separated from energy security and the enforcement of sanctions. A grey fleet transporting petroleum products can finance war, supply military bases, conceal transhipments and create pollution risks. Consequently, allied maritime surveillance must combine AIS data, satellite imagery, port intelligence, financial analysis, sanctions and cooperation with civilian operators.

Economic, legal and environmental implications

Economically, attacks on tankers in the Sea of Azov may reduce the efficiency of fuel transport to Crimea and increase costs for Russia through diversions, repairs, escorts, delays and capacity losses. Legally, the situation remains complex as many vessels appear to be civilian but may directly support the logistics of an aggressor state in occupied territories. From an environmental perspective, the risks are significant: small and medium-sized oil tankers, struck in relatively enclosed waters, can cause fuel spills that affect the coastline of the Sea of Azov, the Kerch Strait, Crimea and even the western parts of the Black Sea via currents and dispersion.

Conclusions

The withdrawal of some Russian tanks to ports following Ukrainian attacks in the Sea of Azov shows that Ukraine is beginning to have an impact not only through destruction, but by shaping the behaviour of its adversary. When ships return, routes become congested, operators hesitate, and ports must reorganise their flows; Russian logistics lose time and predictability. In a war of attrition, these invisible losses can count for just as much as spectacular losses.

The strategic conclusion is that the Sea of Azov has become a logistical front. Formal control of the coastline does not guarantee control of maritime flows, and civilian vessels used for fuel, transhipment or resupply become vulnerable when integrated into the war economy. For Russia, the challenge is maintaining supplies to Crimea and the occupied ports. For Ukraine, the objective is the gradual isolation of the peninsula and increasing the logistical costs of the occupation. For Romania and NATO, the lesson is the need for integrated maritime security, capable of linking naval surveillance, sanctions, infrastructure protection, traffic analysis and port resilience into a single coherent system.

Maritime Security Forum

MS Daily brief- 09 JULY 2026

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