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The Maritime Security Forum is pleased to provide you with a product, in the form of a daily newsletter, through which we present the most relevant events and information on naval issues, especially those related to maritime security and other related areas. It aims to present a clear and concise assessment of the most recent and relevant news in this area, with references to sources of information. We hope that this newsletter will prove to be a useful resource for you, providing a comprehensive insight into the complicated context of the field for both specialists and anyone interested in the dynamics of events in the field of maritime security.

US Strikes Iran’s Secret Drone and Missile Base

MS Daily brief-29 MAY 2026

DEAR READERS, WE WILL NOT BE PUBLISHING MS DAILY FROM MAY 30 TO JUNE 1. WE WILL BE BACK WITH NEWS ON JUNE 2.

Read also the article from the Maritime Security Forum

The Abraham Accords: Diplomatic Normalization, Geopolitical Recalibration, and the Limits of a New Regionalism in the Middle East

Contents

BREAKING NEWS: An Iranian attack on a US base has been intercepted; the Israel Defence Forces are stepping up attacks against Hezbollah | TBN Israel 1

News from Ukraine | Extraordinary news from the front line! Gripen aircraft are arriving soon! 1

Drone explosion on the roof of a block of flats in Galati – Maritime Security Forum.. 1

Detailed update on the situation in the Middle East over the last 24 hours. 2

29 May 2026 – Maritime Security Forum.. 2

Detailed update on the situation in Ukraine over the last 24 hours. 3

29 May 2026 – Maritime Security Forum.. 3

Netanyahu orders the Israeli army to take over “70% of the Gaza Strip”, in breach of the ceasefire agreement 5

Donald Trump presents Israel and other allies with a draft peace agreement with Iran. 7

A difficult situation? Trump’s attempt to end the war with Iran before the mid-term elections risks provoking the anger of Republicans. 10

Update on the war in Ukraine: Deal on Gripen fighter jets gains momentum following Zelenskyy’s visit to Sweden. 12

Trump news in brief: the president really wants his face on US banknotes before he dies. 13

Summary of naval operations (25–27 May 2026) – Maritime Security Forum.. 16

Iran and the US exchange air strikes after Trump dismisses reports of a deal on Hormuz. 17

What is the military outlook for the next six months of the war in Ukraine – Maritime Security Forum   18

The case of the Russian oil tanker UNIVERSAL and the limits of maritime sanctions enforcement – Maritime Security Forum.. 20

Maritime threats in the grey zone and strengthening port security – Maritime Security Forum   21

Norway revokes the export of NSM missiles to Malaysia: contractual, operational and regional implications – Maritime Security Forum.. 24

The US resumes defensive strikes against Iran in the context of the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz: maritime and energy implications and trends – Maritime Security Forum.. 25

Zelensky rejects the idea of ‘associated’ EU membership and insists on a path to full membership – Maritime Security Forum.. 28

Further US strikes on Iranian targets and the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz – Maritime Security Forum   29

US sanctions Iran’s new authority for the Strait of Hormuz, and the exchange of strikes maintains the risk of escalation – Maritime Security Forum.. 30

Russia installs anti-drone nets on a ‘Buyan-M’ class missile corvette of the Baltic Fleet – Maritime Security Forum.. 31

Before deciding on war, leaders should first look to history – Maritime Security Forum.. 33

Maritime aid to Cuba: strategic significance, humanitarian implications and the limits of mitigating the domestic crisis – Maritime Security Forum.. 36

BREAKING NEWS: An Iranian attack on a US base has been intercepted; the Israel Defence Forces are stepping up attacks against Hezbollah | TBN Israel

News from Ukraine | Extraordinary news from the front line! Gripen aircraft are arriving soon!

Drone explosion on the roof of a block of flats in Galați – Maritime Security Forum

On the night of 28–29 May 2026, during a new Russian attack on the Ukrainian port of Ismail in the Odessa region, a drone that had entered Romanian airspace struck the roof of a ten-storey block of flats in the city of Galați. The impact was followed by the complete detonation of the drone’s payload and a fire breaking out on the top floor. Romanian authorities confirmed that the explosive on board had detonated in its entirety.

According to information provided by the Emergency Situations Inspectorate and reported by Reuters and the Associated Press, around 70 people were evacuated from the building. A woman and her child were taken to hospital with minor injuries, whilst others required medical assistance due to panic attacks. The explosion affected two stairwells in the block and damaged several cars in the vicinity.

The Ministry of National Defence confirmed that the drone had entered Romanian airspace prior to the impact. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, the drone crossed approximately 15 kilometres of Romanian territory before crashing in the residential area of Galați.

As an immediate response, Romania scrambled two F-16 fighter jets and a military helicopter to monitor the situation. The authorities issued RO-Alert warnings for the population in the counties of Galați, Brăila and Tulcea, and the crews on the mission were also authorised to neutralise the drones if they posed a direct threat to the population or infrastructure.

This incident is considered particularly serious as it is the first confirmed instance in which a drone originating from the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war has caused casualties in a densely populated urban area in Romania. Until now, there had been numerous cases of drone debris or drones falling on Romanian territory, particularly in the counties of Tulcea and Galați, but without any direct casualties.

In fact, Galați and the Lower Danube region have become one of NATO’s most sensitive border regions in recent months. On 25 April 2026, debris and then a drone carrying an explosive payload were identified in the Bariera Traian area of Galați, following a Russian attack on the ports of Reni and Ismail. British Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft on NATO air policing duty were then deployed, and the Russian ambassador was summoned to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

According to data presented by the Ministry of Defence and cited by Reuters, since Russia began its systematic attacks on Ukrainian ports on the Danube, Romania has recorded at least 28 violations of its airspace and recovered fragments or debris from drones on 47 separate occasions.

As for the origin of the drone that struck the block of flats in Galați, Romanian authorities and the international press attribute it to a Russian attack on Ukrainian port infrastructure in the Ismail area. However, the technical investigation into the exact trajectory, how it entered Romanian airspace and the possible causes of the deviation is still ongoing.

From a military perspective, the incident confirms that Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports on the Danube pose a direct and repeated risk to Romanian territory, particularly to the counties of Galați, Tulcea and Brăila, which are in the immediate vicinity of the affected areas in Ukraine.

Maritime Security Forum

Detailed briefing on the situation in the Middle East over the last 24 hours

29 May 2026 – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 24 hours, the situation in the Middle East has continued to be dominated by the confrontation between the United States and Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, the intensification of Israeli operations in Lebanon and Gaza, and diplomatic efforts to stabilise a regional conflict that continues to affect global energy transport and regional security.

The main issue of the day remained the Strait of Hormuz. Over the past few hours, incidents have continued between US forces and Iranian military units involved in operations to control and exert pressure on maritime traffic. According to the Wall Street Journal and Reuters, US forces carried out further limited strikes on Iranian infrastructure linked to drone operations near Bandar Abbas after Iranian drones targeted commercial vessels and were identified near shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. US sources stated that F/A-18, F-16 and F-35 aircraft intercepted and destroyed several drones before striking an Iranian facility coordinating unmanned aerial operations. Washington described the operation as defensive and limited.

Meanwhile, Iran continued its show of force in the south of the country. Iranian media and regional sources reported that Iranian forces had launched missiles from southern Iran and fired warning shots at ships near the shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian authorities have not officially specified the exact targets, but the operations were presented as part of security and control measures over the maritime area that Tehran now considers part of an ‘extended operational area’.

On the diplomatic front, indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran are continuing. Reuters, The Guardian and The Straits Times have reported that there is a draft agreement on extending the ceasefire and easing maritime restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, but the document has not yet received final approval. US Vice-President JD Vance stated that the United States is “close”, but has not yet reached a final agreement with Iran. The main sticking points remain Iran’s nuclear programme, the level of uranium enrichment and the status of control over traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

The energy market reacted immediately to this news. Oil recorded one of its sharpest weekly falls in recent months, as investors anticipated the possibility of an easing of maritime tensions. Brent fell towards $93 a barrel, and international markets began to price in the scenario of a gradual reopening of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. However, maritime and energy sources warn that commercial traffic remains severely restricted and that a return to pre-conflict levels would require months of stabilisation.

In Lebanon, the situation has deteriorated significantly. Israel has continued one of the most intense airstrike campaigns in recent weeks. Reuters reported that the Israeli military has carried out over 120 air raids on southern Lebanon and has expanded ground operations beyond the previously controlled buffer zones. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that operations are being expanded and that new areas will be occupied to reduce Hezbollah’s ability to launch drones and rockets into northern Israel.

At the same time, the Lebanese media and international organisations have reported new civilian casualties. The Lebanese authorities have accused Israel of causing damage near UNESCO-protected historical and cultural sites, including in the Tyre area and near medieval fortifications. The Times and Arab News reported that some of these sites were affected during the recent raids.

Hezbollah continued its response by launching drones and rockets towards northern Israel. According to estimates reported by Reuters and other regional sources, the conflict in Lebanon has already claimed over 3,000 lives on Lebanese territory since the escalation began in March 2026.

In Gaza, the Israeli army has continued its operations against Hamas. In recent hours, Israel announced the elimination of the new commander of Hamas’s military wing, the successor to the leader previously killed during the recent campaign. Ground and air operations are continuing in several sectors of the Gaza Strip, and the Netanyahu administration has reiterated its objective of gaining control over a large part of the territory to prevent the reorganisation of Hamas structures.

The humanitarian situation remains critical. UN organisations and humanitarian agencies continue to warn of deteriorating conditions in Gaza and southern Lebanon. Over the past 24 hours, new civilian casualties, damage to residential infrastructure and difficulties in supplying water, medicines and fuel have been reported.

In the Persian Gulf region, Arab states allied with the US have maintained high levels of military alert. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar are continuing enhanced measures to protect energy and nuclear infrastructure following the incidents of the previous weeks. The activity of air defence and anti-drone systems has remained high, and air and maritime traffic continues to be closely monitored.

Maritime Security Forum

Detailed briefing on the situation in Ukraine over the last 24 hours

29 May 2026 – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 24 hours, the conflict in Ukraine has continued to be characterised by a combination of high-intensity air strikes, Ukrainian operations striking deep into Russian territory, persistent clashes on the Donetsk front, and escalating military and diplomatic rhetoric regarding the possibility of new systematic attacks on Kyiv. The period under review confirms the intensification of drone warfare and the transformation of energy and logistics infrastructure into a central target for both sides.

One of the most significant developments in recent hours has been the continuation of Russian pressure on the Ukrainian capital. Following the massive missile and drone attacks on Kyiv in recent days, Moscow has officially reaffirmed its intention to continue striking targets that Russia considers to be military infrastructure, command centres and locations where decisions regarding the conduct of the war are made. At a meeting of the UN Security Council, the United States explicitly called on Russia to abandon its plans for “systematic strikes” on Kyiv, but Russian representatives rejected the request and maintained that the operations would continue.

These statements come after one of the heaviest attacks on the Ukrainian capital in recent months. According to Reuters, in the previous bombardment Russia used Oreshnik, Iskander, Kinzhal and Zircon ballistic missiles, as well as hundreds of attack drones. In total, approximately 90 missiles and 600 drones were launched, and the attack resulted in civilian casualties, widespread destruction and damage to entire neighbourhoods in and around Kyiv.

At the same time, Ukraine continued its strategy of targeting Russian energy and logistics infrastructure. Specialised units of the Unmanned Systems Forces and the Ukrainian security services continued attacks on refineries, fuel depots and infrastructure associated with the Russian oil industry. Reuters and other Western sources have reported that numerous major refineries in central Russia are operating at reduced capacity or have been forced to temporarily suspend operations following successive waves of drone attacks in recent weeks.

In particular, the Ukrainian campaign against oil infrastructure continues to have significant economic and logistical effects. Refineries such as Syzran, Ryazan, Yaroslavl, Kirishi and facilities associated with oil ports on the Baltic and Black Seas have been repeatedly affected. Reuters and the Kyiv Independent have reported that certain facilities have been forced to halt production or significantly reduce oil processing.

In recent hours, Ukrainian operations against military infrastructure behind the front lines have also continued. Reuters published an extensive report on Ukrainian drone units carrying out so-called ‘middle strikes’, strikes at ranges of 30–180 kilometres behind Russian lines. These units use domestically produced Drakosha-type drones to strike ammunition depots, air defence systems, command centres and logistics bases. According to Ukrainian authorities, the frequency of these operations has increased approximately fourfold since February 2026.

On the ground, the fiercest clashes continue in the Donetsk region. Fighting is concentrated around the areas of Pokrovsk, Torețk, Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka. Russia is maintaining pressure through successive attacks by mechanised infantry, artillery and guided aerial bombs. The Institute for the Study of War and other Western sources indicate that Moscow continues to attempt to exploit its quantitative advantage in ammunition and personnel to achieve limited but costly territorial gains.

In eastern Ukraine, drone attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure have also continued. Local authorities have reported civilian casualties and damage in several regions, including Donetsk and Kharkiv. In Russian-occupied territories, officials installed by Moscow have accused Ukraine of striking utility infrastructure and service vehicles with drones, causing casualties among civilian workers.

In the Black Sea and Danube regions, the effects of the war have become even more visible to neighbouring NATO states. The most serious incident in recent hours was the crash of a Russian drone carrying an explosive payload onto a block of flats in Galați, Romania. According to Reuters, the drone penetrated approximately 15 kilometres into Romanian airspace before impact, and the explosion caused injuries and the evacuation of around 70 people. The incident took place against the backdrop of a new Russian attack on the Ukrainian port of Ismail. Romania scrambled F-16 fighter jets and a military helicopter and issued alerts for the population in the Danube region.

On the Western military front, one of the most significant developments of the day is the strengthening of air support for Ukraine. During Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Sweden, Stockholm confirmed the transfer of 16 Gripen aircraft to Ukraine by early 2027 and its intention to facilitate the acquisition of additional Gripen E aircraft. The agreement also includes the integration of Meteor missiles and long-term cooperation in the field of military aviation.

At the diplomatic level, the European Union and the United States continue to publicly support Ukraine and condemn attacks on civilian infrastructure. European representatives have reiterated that there are currently no signs of a peace agreement being in sight, and diplomatic contacts remain limited to ad hoc exchanges regarding prisoners and humanitarian issues.

Maritime Security Forum

Netanyahu orders the Israeli army to take over “70% of the Gaza Strip”, in breach of the ceasefire agreement

In a speech delivered at a settlement in the West Bank, the Israeli prime minister, who is fighting for his political survival ahead of the elections, states: “We are putting Hamas up against the wall”

Seham Tantesh in Gaza and Julian Borger

Thursday, 28 May 2026, 20:14 CEST

Benjamin Netanyahu has said he has ordered the Israeli army to take control of 70% of the Gaza Strip, in a move that threatens to undermine an already fragile ceasefire and create catastrophic humanitarian conditions in the already devastated territory.

Under the US-brokered ceasefire in October, the Israeli army withdrew to a demarcation line that gave Israel direct control over 53% of the occupied territory. Since then, Israeli forces have steadily advanced their positions westwards into the Hamas-controlled half of the Strip and have declared an ever-expanding no-man’s-land to the west of it, within which they claim the right to decide who may enter and to open fire on anyone perceived as a threat.

In recent days, Israeli-backed armed militias have played a leading role in clearing the territory along the ceasefire line, ordering residents to leave their homes or shelters.

Throughout the eight-month ceasefire, Israeli forces have continued to open fire on Palestinians within range of the ‘yellow line’ dividing the Gaza Strip and to carry out air strikes deeper into western Gaza, killing over 900 Palestinians since the start of the truce.

Speaking at a conference in a settlement in the occupied West Bank, Netanyahu, who is fighting for his political survival ahead of elections in the coming months, outlined the scope of Israel’s territorial objectives.

The Israeli Prime Minister said: “We are currently cornering Hamas. We now control 60% of the territory in the Strip. You know, we were at 50%, we’ve reached 60%. My directive is to reach… 70%.”

Defence Minister Israel Katz said on Wednesday that the government’s ultimate goal was for a large number of Palestinians to leave Gaza through what he called “voluntary migration”, but which human rights activists describe as a long-term plan for ethnic cleansing, by making living conditions in Gaza intolerable.

The extension of Israeli military control would constitute a direct violation of the October ceasefire, the UN Security Council resolution that approved it, and Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan, which established a temporary ‘yellow line’ dividing Gaza into two halves, one governed by Israel and the other by Hamas, pending further peace negotiations.

The Trump plan also stated: “No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza.”

Muhammad Shehada, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: “Netanyahu is now declaring that the entire Trump deal, the framework for Gaza, is null and void. That is what it means, in short. There is no other way to put it plainly.”

Israeli forces have systematically destroyed the remaining buildings in their area, so expanding it to 70% of Gaza would mean that the 2.2 million Palestinians who survived the war would be crammed into less than a third of their original territory, which was already overcrowded.

“Conditions there are already appalling. It is the most overcrowded place on earth,” said Shehada. “Every square metre is home to another displaced family, another makeshift tent or some sort of makeshift shelter. So it would be a death sentence for a lot of people who physically have nowhere else to go.”

A spokesperson for the Israeli army has referred a request for comment on Netanyahu’s threat regarding the 70% “to the political leadership”.

Israeli forces have steadily expanded their area of control throughout the ceasefire. A UN briefing on Sunday for the heads of humanitarian agencies working in Gaza documented some of the most recent violations.

In the northern district of Jabalia, for example, the UN briefing, to which The Guardian had access, stated: “Daily reports of advancing tanks – drones targeting any movement near the yellow line.”

It was also reported that Israeli tanks were advancing east of the southern city of Khan Younis.

The UN briefing refers to an anti-Hamas militia backed by Israel and led by a Gaza warlord, Ashraf al-Mansi, stating that it advanced westwards from the yellow line around Jabalia last week.

A yellow block marks the ‘yellow line’ separating Israeli and Palestinian areas in the Gaza Strip since the October ceasefire. Photo: Ariel Schalit/AP

Such militias have been increasingly active along the yellow line, apparently acting as shock troops for the Israeli army, carrying out attacks on Hamas, but also telling Palestinian residents near the yellow line to leave their homes.

Wael Nayef Abu al-Ajeen, a 26-year-old man living east of Deir al-Balah in southern Gaza, said his family had been forced to leave by militants earlier this month.

“It was around 1.00 pm when armed men affiliated with the militias entered our area. They went to the Abu al-Ajeen family’s homes there and informed them that they had until 10.00 pm to evacuate all the houses in the area,” said Ajeen. “They instructed them to take whatever furniture and belongings they could carry and to empty the houses as much as possible. They also told them not to return until they were contacted and informed that they were permitted to do so.

“As a result, everyone panicked, and people gradually began to leave, taking their furniture and whatever belongings they could carry, until the area was almost completely emptied.”

Nasser Khdour, a researcher with the monitoring group Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, said: “We have observed that the militias are not only attacking Hamas, but are also helping to push residents living close to their line further west.

“We have witnessed the killing, arrest and abduction of civilians living in these areas, and there has recently been an intensification of militia patrols.”

A UN Security Council resolution adopted in November delegated the monitoring of the ceasefire to a Peace Council appointed by Trump, who appointed veteran Bulgarian UN diplomat Nickolay Mladenov as “High Representative in Gaza”.

Mladenov has been widely criticised for his report to the Security Council last week, which placed the main blame for the failure of the ceasefire on Hamas, accusing it of refusing to disarm, without holding Israel accountable for its violations. Hamas has signalled that it is ready to discuss disarmament once Israel fulfils its obligations under the first phase of the ceasefire, in particular by ceasing the bombardment of Gaza and withdrawing to the original ‘yellow line’.

Gershon Baskin, an Israeli analyst who has participated in several unofficial Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, stated that, in his view, the initial ceasefire plan had failed.

He said: “My understanding is that negotiations with Hamas have ended. The Americans presented Hamas with an offer regarding a disarmament plan, which took into account all the demands made by Hamas as far back as two months ago, but Hamas has not responded.”

Baskin said that, in his view, the US would now move to a contingency plan aimed at carrying out reconstruction work in the Israeli-administered ‘green’ zone and would allow Palestinians to move there from the Hamas-administered ‘yellow’ zone only if they had been vetted to ensure they had no links to Hamas or other radical groups.

Baskin stated: “Ultimately, the only people remaining in the yellow zone, according to the Americans, are Hamas and other armed groups. And then Israel will be free to deal with them as it sees fit. That is the thinking, that is the plan, and that is what I see happening in the coming weeks and months.”

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/28/netanyahu-orders-israeli-army-seize-70-gaza-strip-violating-ceasefire-deal

Donald Trump presents Israel and other allies with a draft peace agreement with Iran

The US president’s move comes at a time when both sides are trying to prevent further breaches of the ceasefire from jeopardising a potential agreement

Patrick Wintour Diplomatic Editor

Friday 29 May 2026, 02:09 CEST

Donald Trump has circulated a draft peace agreement for the war with Iran amongst allies, including Israel, whilst both sides are trying to prevent further breaches of the ceasefire from spiralling out of control and jeopardising any deal.

In an attempt to speed up negotiations, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Ishaq Dar, will fly to Washington on Friday to meet his American counterpart, Marco Rubio.

Tehran attacked a US airbase in Kuwait on Thursday, after Washington struck what it described as an Iranian drone operation near the Strait of Hormuz, highlighting the fragile situation as both sides refuse to give ground on the final points of disagreement. Trump’s cabinet was expected to discuss the agreement on Wednesday, but Axios reported that the US president said he needed a few more days to think it over.

The draft presented by Trump does not differ significantly from the one that has been circulating for several days in the Middle East, according to which the Strait of Hormuz would be opened to commercial shipping, the US blockade on Iranian ports would be lifted, and Iran would have access to frozen assets worth up to $12 billion (£9 billion).

The aim would be for commercial shipping through the strait to return to pre-war levels within 30 days and for negotiations, expected to last up to 60 days, to begin on the future of Iran’s nuclear programme. These would include discussions on its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, a time-limited suspension of further enrichment, and oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear watchdog. Iran would renounce the use of nuclear weapons.

US Vice-President JD Vance said on Thursday that both sides were close to an agreement, but there were a few sticking points in the talks with Tehran regarding its stockpile of enriched uranium and the issue of enrichment.

“It is hard to say exactly when or if the president will sign [the memorandum of understanding]. We are still consulting on a few drafting issues,” said Vance.

China is pressing for the UN Security Council to ratify any agreement.

The current scope of the agreement would be highly unacceptable to Israel, as it delays Iran’s assumption of firm nuclear commitments and requires that a permanent ceasefire also include Lebanon.

The draft is less specific than Tehran’s version regarding the lifting of sanctions on Iran’s oil and petrochemical exports. It also provides for duty-free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran is seeking to negotiate an agreement with Oman, separate from any memorandum of understanding, which would result in the imposition of fees for ‘navigation services’. In statements that have received no official response from Muscat, Trump threatened on Wednesday to “blow up” Oman if it attempts to reach an agreement with Tehran that includes the imposition of fees.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy has issued a statement reaffirming its control over the strait, stating that 26 commercial vessels and oil tankers have been granted permission to pass through the waterway in the last 24 hours.

The IRGC stated that “requesting permission is mandatory, and passing through on other routes will be considered a violation”. It intervened on Wednesday evening to prevent four vessels from passing through the strait with their transponders switched off. It specified that two were stopped on the spot, and two were forced to turn back.

So far, none of the clashes between the US and Iran has halted indirect contact between the two sides, mediated by Pakistan and Qatar, but if tanker operators step up their efforts to cross the strait without Iran’s permission, the fragile truce agreed on 8 April could collapse.

Oil prices rose by 2% on Thursday morning, but remained below $100 a barrel.

In Moscow, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Ali Bagheri, reiterated the demand that frozen assets be released into Iranian bank accounts without conditions.

Washington retaliated by imposing sanctions on Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority, recently established to manage the passage of ships through this waterway. Tehran has sought Oman’s agreement on coordination. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent threatened on Thursday to target Oman if it helps impose a toll system in the strait, warning that sanctions would be imposed on any country involved.

As tensions mount in Iran over the advisability of negotiations with Trump, the country’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has told officials not to turn differences into divisions and to ensure that parliament, which is currently closed, addresses the public’s economic concerns.

Khamenei claimed that the US and Israel are trying to “bring the country to its knees”. “The enemy’s blind plan… is to create division and destruction to compensate for its military defeats,” he said.

Senior diplomats in Oman were reportedly shocked and furious at Trump’s threat on Wednesday.

Oman, considered a Western ally engaged in mediating Middle Eastern conflicts, has held talks with Iran regarding the future of the strait, but does not agree to a deal that would lead to tolls on passage or excessive Iranian interference in free navigation. Newspapers in Oman did not report on Trump’s threat.

As a sign of the ongoing repression in Iran, Amnesty International has reported that the authorities have arrested over 6,000 people since the US and Israel launched their offensive on 28 February, including protesters, journalists, lawyers, human rights defenders, dissidents and members of ethnic and religious minorities.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/28/donald-trump-shares-draft-iran-peace-agreement-with-israel-and-other-allies

A difficult situation? Trump’s attempt to end the war with Iran before the mid-term elections risks provoking the anger of Republicans

Andrew Roth in Washington

The Trump administration finds itself in a delicate situation, facing mounting economic costs ahead of the mid-term elections, driven by the war with Iran

Thursday, 28 May 2026, 20:47 CEST

The terms of a purported 60-day agreement to negotiate peace in the war with Iran have caught the Trump administration between rising economic costs ahead of the mid-term elections and the wrath of Republican hawks who accuse the US government of surrendering to Iran.

The public rift between Trump and Senate Republicans over his diplomatic approach to Iran has also been reflected within his administration, where JD Vance, a proponent of a conciliatory line, and Marco Rubio, a traditional neoconservative, have been forced to perform balancing acts between Trump’s policies, as he moves towards ending the war as soon as possible.

The US media reported on Thursday that American and Iranian negotiators had reached an agreement on a 60-day memorandum of understanding (MOU) that would extend the ceasefire and launch negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. But Iran has not confirmed an agreement, and clashes have intensified in the Strait of Hormuz. The reported terms for the negotiations appear to favour Washington, even though Tehran has indicated it would demand further concessions to open the strategic waterway.

If the agreement has been reached, the White House is in no hurry to sign it, as Donald Trump seeks to mitigate the negative political backlash that a provisional agreement to begin negotiations with the Iranians might provoke. “The President has told the mediators that he wants a few days to think about this,” a US official told Axios.

The broad outlines of the agreement, which were leaked earlier this week, included a potential lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of Iranian assets, as well as a cessation of Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon – a condition that infuriated US ally Benjamin Netanyahu.

The shift of negotiations from Pakistan to Qatar, where Iran’s central bank governor and other senior officials visited this week, also suggested that Iran likely wanted billions of dollars in frozen assets held there to be released as part of the deal, observers said.

The release of the funds could also intensify criticism that the new memorandum of understanding was similar – or worse – than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by Obama in 2015. Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018.

“It’s Obama minus,” said David Schenker, former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs during the first Trump administration and now a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The growing economic shockwaves caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz – through which 20% of global oil transit passes – help explain Trump’s eagerness to “get this sorted”. But “the president is extremely sensitive to criticism from the right,” said Schenker, adding that Trump has had to think “creatively” to find ways to sell a deal that will displease many in his own party.

“The challenges are the objectives articulated by President Trump, which have ranged from the regime’s complete capitulation to protecting the Iranian people and eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme,” said Dana Stroul, the institute’s research director. “None of these strategic objectives has been achieved.”

Reports of a deal this week provoked an early negative reaction in Washington, she said, as Republicans “felt that – given the investment of military resources and what had been achieved operationally – this was a very weak hand that President Trump was offering them”.

“The rumour of a 60-day ceasefire – based on the belief that Iran will ever act in good faith – would be a disaster,” wrote Senator Roger Wicker, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “Everything achieved through Operation Epic Fury would be in vain!”

“It’s a terrible moment,” said a Republican political strategist. “There is already discontent over the [$1.8 billion arms fund] and the mid-term elections. [Republicans] already feel betrayed by Trump and are now worried that he is giving in too much” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

Senators Ted Cruz and Lindsey Graham – the latter being an influential foreign policy adviser to Trump – also initially attacked the deal.

Since then, the Trump administration has sought to mend relations with hardline Republican senators, including Graham, through an unusual approach: in a high-stakes phone call with leaders from the Gulf and other Middle Eastern countries, Trump suggested that all parties involved in the deal should join the Abraham Accords by recognising Israel.

This was a doomed idea, observers said, and further strained relations between the administration and its Gulf allies, who may increasingly view the US as out of touch with the realities of the region.

“It’s unrealistic,” said Schenker. “This was an attempt to make lemonade out of lemons… to bring about positive regional transformation, but it’s clear that this is not the right time to make this kind of progress. These states are aware that they must remain on the president’s side; he is capricious, he tends to hold grudges, but it is not something they will be able to give in to.”

This rejection has put the Trump administration in a difficult position – either to risk the wrath of Republicans by imposing a deal that strengthens Iran and its claims over the Strait of Hormuz, or to let the deadlock continue as it is, with the mid-term elections on the horizon.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/28/trump-iran-republicans-anger-midterms

Update on the war in Ukraine: Gripen fighter jet deal gains momentum following Zelenskyy’s visit to Sweden

Ukraine will receive the first 16 Swedish aircraft in early 2027; US Congress members back Zelenskyy’s call for more Patriot systems. What we know on day 1,556

Warren Murray and news agencies

Friday 29 May 2026, 03:24 CEST

Sweden will donate 16 of its existing Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine by next year, with Ukraine subsequently purchasing an initial batch of 20 of the latest model, it was announced on Thursday, whilst Volodymyr Zelenskyy was visiting an airbase in Uppsala, 70 km (45 miles) north of Stockholm. The 16 donated aircraft will be delivered in early 2027, said Ulf Kristersson, the Swedish Prime Minister. “This is a historic decision for Sweden, but it also significantly strengthens Ukraine’s air defence,” he added.

Regarding the latest-generation Gripen E aircraft, “the aim is to quickly conclude a final agreement with deliveries starting in 2030,” said Kristersson. The two countries have a long-term agreement under which Ukraine could purchase up to 150 Gripen E aircraft. “We hope we will be able to secure funding for all of them,” said Zelenskyy. An important aspect is that the Gripen aircraft can be equipped with powerful Meteor air-to-air missiles, manufactured in Europe.

US congressmen have backed Zelenskyy’s calls for more air defence missiles. “My hope and expectation is that America will respond positively to this request,” said Senator Richard Blumenthal, speaking alongside US Representative Jim Himes, a fellow Democrat, after meeting with the Ukrainian president in Kyiv.

Himes, the Democratic leader on the House Intelligence Committee, said that discussions in Washington regarding military support for Ukraine had been complicated by the US war against Iran. “This conflict needs to have ended yesterday for many reasons, including the fact that the equipment currently being used in the Persian Gulf should be used for our own defence and should be supplied to Ukraine,” said Himes.

On Thursday at the UN, the US levelled unusually harsh criticism at Russia and called on it to refrain from the “systematic strikes” it has threatened to launch against Kyiv. Condemning Sunday’s deadly and destructive barrage on Kyiv, Tammy Bruce, the US Deputy Ambassador to the UN, described Russia’s use of the Oreshnik ballistic missile as “an inexplicable, dangerous and barbaric escalation… We warn Russia not to launch so-called systematic attacks against Kyiv, which risk causing further civilian casualties and pushing the prospect of peace further away.” Moscow has ignored this rebuke.

“The dynamics of the war are shifting in Ukraine’s favour,” said Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief. “Russia is on the defensive, militarily, economically and diplomatically, but, as the latest attacks on Kyiv have shown, Russia is not yet showing a genuine interest in peace, which was also the clear view of ministers today.” Kallas said that EU ministers, meeting on Thursday, had “a truly in-depth discussion” on what Europe should demand from Moscow in any potential negotiations.

“Europe will never be a neutral mediator between Russia and Ukraine,” said Kallas, “because we stand with Ukraine and are defending our own vital security interests.” An unconditional ceasefire was “a precondition for any kind of peace negotiations”, and Russia “must cease sabotage operations, cyberattacks, interference in elections and airspace violations across Europe”, whilst “there can be no legal recognition of occupied Ukrainian territory”. Ukraine stated that it had struck a Russian oil refinery in Tuapse on the Black Sea once again – a target that has been hit by repeated Ukrainian attacks. The Ukrainian military’s General Staff said fire and smoke were seen at the refinery, and the extent of the damage is being assessed. A drone struck a residential building in the Romanian city of Galați, near the border with Ukraine, Romanian radio station Pro Lider FM reported online. The apartment block was damaged and two people suffered minor injuries, the post stated. A drone without an explosive payload was found in Bășești, in Maramureș County, north-western Romania, and the area has been secured, TVR television reported, citing local authorities. Three oil tankers were attacked by drones on Thursday off the Turkish Black Sea coast, according to a shipping agency. The vessels are part of the ‘ghost fleet’ that exports Russian oil, circumventing Western sanctions. These included the James II, flying the Palau flag, as well as the Altura and Velora, flying the Sierra Leone flag, the Tribeca Shipping agency said. All crew members escaped unharmed, and the Turkish coastguard provided assistance. There was no immediate claim of responsibility, and Turkish officials were unavailable for comment. Ukraine has carried out successful attacks against Russian shipping during the war.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/29/ukraine-war-briefing-gripen-jet-deal-sweden-zelenskyy

Trump news in brief: the president really wants his face on US banknotes before he dies

Trump’s latest vanity project would require amending the law that prohibits a living person from appearing on US currency – key US political news from Thursday 28 May

The Guardian team

Friday 29 May 2026, 03:00 CEST

Donald Trump’s latest vanity project: putting his own face on US currency.

The White House is pressing Congress to approve a $250 banknote featuring the president’s portrait, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said, which would require amending a long-standing federal law prohibiting any living person from appearing on US currency.

At a press conference on Thursday, Bessent said the note would mark the country’s 250th anniversary of independence and that the Treasury had already begun preparations for the potential new currency. But Bessent said the Treasury would “abide by the law” and that “it all depends on Capitol Hill”.

The legislation would require a simple majority in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, but would be unlikely to secure the 60 votes needed in the Senate, where Republicans hold 53 seats.

Hakeem Jeffries, the Democratic leader in the House of Representatives, immediately mocked the proposal, writing on X that it was a “definite no to a $250 Trump bill”.

“Get a grip,” wrote Jeffries. “The upcoming 4th of July is not about a would-be kingmaker. It’s about celebrating the American journey.”

The White House is pressing Congress to approve a $250 note featuring Trump

The White House is pressing Congress to approve a $250 bill featuring Donald Trump’s portrait, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said, which would require amending a long-standing federal law prohibiting any living person from appearing on US currency.

Speaking at a press conference at the White House, Bessent said the note would mark the 250th anniversary of the country’s independence and that the Treasury had already begun preparations for the possible introduction of the new currency.

Read the full article

Trump shares draft peace deal with Iran with Israel and other allies

Donald Trump has shared a draft peace agreement for the war with Iran with allies, including Israel, as both sides seek to prevent further breaches of the ceasefire that could spiral out of control and sabotage any agreement.

In an attempt to speed up the negotiations, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Ishaq Dar, will fly to Washington on Friday to meet his US counterpart, Marco Rubio.

Read the full article

Trump files another $10 billion lawsuit against the WSJ over an article about his alleged links to Epstein

Donald Trump has refiled a defamation lawsuit seeking at least $10 billion in damages against the Wall Street Journal over its article about his alleged links to Jeffrey Epstein, after a judge dismissed a previous version due to legal deficiencies.

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The federal investigation into E Jean Carroll is part of the probe into Reid Hoffman’s non-profit organisation

The Justice Department’s investigation into E Jean Carroll is part of an investigation into an entity backed by LinkedIn co-founder Reid Hoffman, according to people familiar with the matter. A source familiar with the investigation told The Guardian that Carroll is not the subject of the investigation, but said it is linked to Carroll and her testimony and focuses more on Hoffman’s non-profit organisation.

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Trump’s Memphis crime task force accused of using ‘excessive force’

A crime-fighting task force sent by Trump onto the streets of Memphis has been accused of targeting community observers with widespread intimidation, including through the use of “excessive force”.

Officers “retaliated against, intimidated and harassed” observers attempting to monitor the federal task force’s activities, according to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Tennessee, which claims officials followed cars, surveilled homes and even “unlawfully arrested” a community observer.

The ACLU filed a lawsuit this month against state and federal officials in Tennessee who are running the crime-fighting initiative.

Read the full article

Department of Justice sues four states for refusing to issue undercover number plates to ICE agents

The Trump administration has filed a lawsuit challenging the refusal of four US states to issue unmarked number plates to US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, claiming that the states have long provided them to other law enforcement agencies conducting undercover operations.

Read the full article

No No Kings events are scheduled for 14 June, whilst Trump celebrates his birthday with a UFC match at the White House

The No Kings movement has announced a national event on 14 June, as a direct counter-programme to the celebrations for Donald Trump’s 80th birthday and an Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) bout on the South Lawn of the White House.

Read the full article

What else happened today:

Abortion restrictions in the US have made it harder to access care following a miscarriage, according to a new study. The new research found that, since the June 2022 ruling in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which overturned Roe v Wade, pregnancy care has become fragmented at state level; it is becoming increasingly difficult to access medical care for miscarriages in US states with abortion restrictions.

The White House posted a tribute on social media on Thursday to mark the 10th anniversary of the death of a figure it described as “a true patriot”. The hero, however, was not a man; it was the infamous case of the 180-kg western lowland gorilla named Harambe, who was fatally shot at Cincinnati Zoo after a young child entered his enclosure and interacted with the animal.

At least five of the nine bands due to perform in a series of concerts organised by the Trump administration to mark the 250th anniversary of the United States have pulled out, just one day after the line-up was announced.

The co-founder of the group Students for Trump was arrested on Tuesday on charges of domestic violence. The Washington DC Metropolitan Police Department arrested 30-year-old Ryan Fournier and charged him with simple assault and threats of bodily harm, as first reported by The Defector.

Gavin Newsom, the Governor of California, signed a bill on Wednesday aimed at protecting California’s elections from federal interference, stating that he expects Donald Trump’s ‘ ’ administration to attempt to meddle in this year’s mid-term elections.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has called for a new relationship with the United States to “help restore America’s greatness”. In a speech delivered on Thursday in New York, Carney said there should be a “true partnership” to reimagine cooperation in specific sectors affected by global competition.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/28/trump-us-news-at-a-glance

Summary of maritime military activities (25–27 May 2026) – Maritime Security Forum

Indo-Pacific — escalation with China

The aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN-73) departed from Yokosuka, Japan, on 23 May, and by 25 May was already conducting flight operations in the Philippine Sea. The destroyer USS Shoup and the cruiser USS Robert Smalls have also set sail, according to public AIS data, and are likely to escort the aircraft carrier on its patrol in the Western Pacific. The movement coincides with a surge in Chinese naval activity: ISR sources indicate that the PRC deployed over 100 vessels around the First Island Chain in the preceding days, shortly after the Beijing summit. The Chinese Navy’s Liaoning aircraft carrier strike group was also active in the region. The War ZoneThe War Zone

Also in the area, the USS Boxer amphibious group remained anchored in Singapore (Sembawang terminal) following its stopover on 19 May.

The Middle East — the blockade of Iran and Operation Epic Fury

The naval blockade of Iranian ports remained in place despite a fragile ceasefire, with the US Navy’s deployment remaining unchanged. Enforced by two aircraft carrier strike groups and an amphibious group, CENTCOM forces had diverted over 100 commercial vessels, forcibly disabled four, and allowed over 25 ships carrying humanitarian aid to pass. In the Arabian Sea, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) group was operating in support of Operation Epic Fury, alongside the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77). A destroyer, the USS Thomas Hudner (DDG-116), was operating in the Red Sea. The War ZoneThe War Zone

The Black Sea — Ukrainian strikes on Russian naval infrastructure

On the night of 26–27 May, Ukraine carried out a long-range strike operation across a front of approximately 1,000 km. Ukraine struck the Baltimor airbase near Voronezh, the 325 ARZ aircraft repair plant in Taganrog, the Black Sea Fleet aviation headquarters in Sevastopol and the Tuapse oil terminal on 27 May 2026. Storm Shadow cruise missiles were used against the target in Sevastopol, with fires confirmed at the Baltimor airbase and the Tuapse maritime terminal following the strikes. The Tuapse terminal was struck by a drone in the early hours of the day. This campaign continues to put pressure on a Black Sea Fleet already pushed back to remote bases by Ukrainian naval drone attacks. Defence BlogDefence Blog

Caribbean / South America — build-up of forces near Venezuela

The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) has arrived in the Caribbean Sea, officially for the Southern Seas 2026 exercise, and is set to circumnavigate South America. Notably, the group has not embarked a full air wing and has only one escort (the destroyer USS Gridley, equipped with the ODIN laser system), suggesting that it is not the combat force expected for imminent major operations. Meanwhile, the USS Iwo Jima amphibious group was operating in the Caribbean and facilitated the transport of SOUTHCOM commander Gen. Francis L. Donovan to Caracas via MV-22B Osprey over the weekend — his second official visit since Operation Absolute Resolve. The War Zone + 2

Maritime Security Forum

Iran and the US exchange air strikes after Trump dismisses reports of a deal on Hormuz

Iran attacked a US airbase in Kuwait on Thursday, after the United States struck what Washington described as an Iranian drone operation near the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, President Donald Trump dismissed reports of a possible compromise deal with Tehran, according to Reuters.

Although limited, the attacks highlighted the fragility of negotiations aimed at transforming the ceasefire, which came into force at the beginning of April, into an agreement that would end the three-month war and allow the resumption of maritime traffic through the area.

Recent developments show just how unstable the conflict remains and how difficult it is to secure a lasting agreement.

US Central Command announced that American forces had shot down five Iranian drones and struck a control station in Bandar Abbas, which it claims was about to launch a sixth drone. Subsequently, Kuwaiti forces intercepted a ballistic missile fired towards Kuwait, a country hosting a major US base.

A US official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Reuters that the actions were “measured, strictly defensive and intended to maintain the ceasefire”.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed it had targeted the US base, which it holds responsible for an attack carried out earlier that morning near Bandar Abbas airport, and warned that any further similar action would draw a “more decisive response”, according to the Tasnim news agency.

Kuwait condemned the attack and called on Iran to immediately halt what it described as a serious escalation.

This is the second major escalation this week and it coincided with the Eid al-Adha holiday, observed across the region, against a backdrop where several states have already been affected by the conflict triggered by the US and Israeli attacks on Iran on 28 February.

In Lebanon, which Iran considers part of any broader ceasefire agreement, Israel announced strikes on Hezbollah infrastructure in Tyre and an attack in Beirut.

The Lebanese army announced that one of the strikes had killed a soldier. Meanwhile, Israel reported that air-raid sirens had been activated in the north of the country, as its operations against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon continued.

Oil prices rebounded, with US crude futures rising by around 3% after a 5% drop the previous day. At the same time, share prices fell and the dollar strengthened, as investor confidence waned in a peace deal that could reduce global inflationary risks.

The average number of daily crossings through the area has fallen by 88% compared to the level recorded before the first US-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026.

Trump: no country will control the strait

Trump has repeatedly stated that the war is drawing to a close, but said on Wednesday during a cabinet meeting that he is not yet satisfied with the state of negotiations and that Washington is not discussing the easing of sanctions, one of Tehran’s main demands.

He dismissed reports broadcast by Iranian state television regarding an unofficial draft agreement that would have aimed to restore maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz to pre-war levels within a month, under joint administration by Iran and Oman.

Trump stated that no country should control this waterway and issued a stern warning to Oman, a state with which the US has had close military and economic ties for decades.

“No one will control the strait. These are international waters, and Oman must abide by the same rules as everyone else,” Trump said.

Oman has not publicly commented on the idea of joint administration of the strait with Iran, although it has stated that it has discussed freedom of navigation with Tehran.

Tehran expressed solidarity with Oman following what it called “threats from US officials”. The Revolutionary Guards reaffirmed that they exercise control over the strait, claiming they had stopped two ships and allowed 26 others to pass through in the last 24 hours. Before the war, an average of over 100 ships passed through the area each day.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, stated in a letter to parliament that Iran had emerged stronger from the war and called for national unity, reconstruction and measures to tackle economic difficulties, inflation and corruption, according to state media.

According to the Tasnim news agency, Tehran is insisting that the United States unblock Iranian funds, said Ali Bagheri Kani, deputy secretary of the National Security Council.

Iran is also demanding an end to the US blockade of its ports and the lifting of sanctions. On Wednesday, the US Treasury Department announced the extension of these measures to include the new Persian Gulf Strait Authority, created by Iran to manage transit through the straits.

Before the war, foreign ships were free to traverse this maritime route, based on guarantees provided by international law.

Iranian state television claimed that the draft agreement would also include the withdrawal of US forces from the immediate area, with the issue of the US military presence in the region to be discussed at a later date. The White House dismissed the report as “a complete fabrication”, and Tehran has not commented officially.

Iranian sources stated that the nuclear issue would be addressed in a subsequent round of negotiations, to be held over a period of 60 days. Such an approach could, however, be rejected by some of Trump’s close supporters, who are calling for the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear programme. Tehran insists that its programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

“The bottom line is that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon,” said US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Maritime Security Forum

What is the military outlook for the next six months of the war in Ukraine – Maritime Security Forum

In light of recent developments on the front line, the coming months can be seen as a crucial phase for regaining the military initiative and strengthening Ukraine’s position in any future peace negotiations. The central idea is that the pace of the Russian offensive appears to have slowed, and this slowdown could create an operational window in which Ukraine could gain tactical and strategic advantages with a broader impact.

General strategic context

After more than four years of conflict, the situation on the front line remains fluid, but no longer has the same dynamics favourable to Russia as in previous stages. Although Russian forces have continued to make slow and costly gains, these advances appear to have lost momentum. At the same time, Ukraine is attempting to turn the localised pressure exerted on certain sectors of the front into a broader advantage capable of altering the balance of power. In this context, the objective is not merely to defend existing positions, but also to create the conditions for future negotiations from a position of greater strength.

Why the next six months are considered critical

The central hypothesis is that Russia has entered a phase of severe attrition, in which its ability to achieve major breakthroughs is waning. If Ukraine manages to maintain military pressure, select the directions in which it can achieve concrete gains, and exploit the opponent’s weaknesses, this period could become a turning point. From a strategic perspective, this does not necessarily involve a spectacular and instantaneous shift in the front line, but rather an accumulation of successive advantages that shift the operational initiative.

The six- to nine-month timeframe can be considered decisive, with the first six months being of maximum operational relevance. This interpretation suggests the existence of a limited window of opportunity, in which the effects of Russian fatigue and Ukrainian adaptation could converge at a favourable moment for Kyiv.

The political and military stakes: Donetsk and the peace negotiations

The Donetsk region remains a key issue in any discussion regarding a possible ceasefire or peace agreement. Control over this region holds military, symbolic and political value. In this context, Moscow’s objective remains complete control of the region, whilst Kyiv rejects ceding territories that Russia has failed to occupy. In this context, any improvement in Ukraine’s position on the ground can have a direct effect on its negotiating power.

The idea of negotiating from a position of strength is essential to understanding the strategic outlook. The stability of any potential ceasefire depends not only on the political willingness of the parties, but also on the military reality on the ground. In other words, if Ukraine manages to consolidate its positions, capture strategic points and limit Russia’s offensive options, then the framework of the negotiations could change significantly.

Developments on the front line and signs of Russian attrition

Russian advances have not stopped completely, but they are slower and more costly than in the past. There are indications of a possible exhaustion of Russian forces, manifested in manpower difficulties, losses of command personnel and a reduced ability to maintain the previous offensive pace. In response, Ukraine is attempting to exploit this attrition through distributed pressure along the front and attacks on Russian logistics and military infrastructure.

Factors that may influence the change in pace

Among the factors mentioned are pressure on Russian communications and logistics, including restrictions on access to certain communications technologies, as well as the intensification of Ukrainian drone strikes on air defences and military infrastructure. These elements alone do not guarantee a strategic shift, but they may contribute to weakening Russia’s operational coherence and increasing the costs of sustaining the offensive.

Recent territorial gains by Ukraine have also been reported, including estimates of the recapture of nearly 600 km² by 2026. However, this figure could not be independently verified. Therefore, the data should be viewed with caution, as an indicator of a claimed trend, not as a definitively confirmed fact.

There are several converging indications that Russia is showing signs of fatigue, whilst Ukraine is trying to prevent its own vulnerabilities — particularly manpower shortages — from becoming a decisive constraint. This dual pressure explains why the coming period is considered so crucial: both sides are at a critical juncture, and the advantage may go to whichever manages its resources and the pace of operations more effectively.

The ‘Fortress Belt’ and the importance of the defensive space in the east

Another key element is the so-called “Fortress Belt” in eastern Ukraine, a network of heavily fortified towns underpinning the Ukrainian defence in the Donbas. The Kostiantynivka area is considered a strategic point within this defensive system. Holding these positions is not merely of local tactical value, but could influence the entire regional military balance.

If Russia were to succeed in breaking or destabilising this defensive line, it could gain a more favourable position from which to threaten the rest of the Donbas. Conversely, if Ukraine maintains it and uses it to wear down Russian forces, it becomes a multiplier of resistance and a foothold for potential counter-attacks.

Technology, drones and the transformation of the Ukrainian army

The technological dimension of the war is becoming increasingly important. Ukraine appears to hold an advantage in certain areas, such as unmanned ground vehicles and heavy bomber drones, whilst Russia seems to retain an advantage in the use of fibre-optic drones, which are harder to jam. This technological competition suggests that superiority no longer depends exclusively on the volume of troops and artillery , but also on the speed of adapting and integrating new systems on the battlefield.

Some combined structures are presented as possible models for military modernisation, through changes to training and the integration of robotics and unmanned systems into combat tactics. If this approach yields results, it may indicate the direction in which Ukraine is attempting to compensate for personnel limitations through technology, flexibility and better-coordinated operations.

Conclusions

Overall, Ukraine could be entering a favourable, albeit time-limited, period in which it seeks to shift the balance of power on the front line. Key elements of this outlook include the slowing of the Russian advance, the accumulated attrition of Moscow’s forces, increased Ukrainian pressure on logistics and communications, and the growing role of military technology. However, this potential shift should not be interpreted as a guaranteed victory, but rather as an opportunity dependent on Ukraine’s ability to maintain momentum, manage its own limitations, and transform tactical advantages into concrete strategic and political outcomes. In this sense, the idea of a turning point should be understood as a window of opportunity rather than a certainty.

Maritime Security Forum

The case of the Russian oil tanker UNIVERSAL and the limits of applying maritime sanctions –  Maritime Security Forum

The case of the Russian oil tanker UNIVERSAL (IMO 9384306) illustrates the intersection between energy logistics, Western sanctions and the use of maritime routes as a strategic tool for exerting pressure. After a prolonged period adrift in the Sargasso Sea, the vessel resumed its journey, but not towards Cuba, rather heading south, with the declared destination ‘for order’ – a phrase indicating the absence of a confirmed final port. From an analytical perspective, this change of course suggests a stalling or a reassessment of the initial commercial mission, in a context where access to markets, ports and maritime services is increasingly influenced by sanctions regimes and the risk of their enforcement.

The ship’s route and the significance of the change of direction

Maritime tracking data indicate that the vessel spent several weeks sailing at reduced speed and making hesitant movements in the Atlantic before changing course towards the South Atlantic. Such a development is significant for two reasons. Firstly, a tanker on a clear commercial mission would normally avoid such prolonged periods of operational uncertainty, particularly near a strategic destination. Secondly, the change of course and increase in speed suggest a shift from a state of waiting to an actual re-routing, likely due to the impossibility of completing the original route to Cuba or a recalibration of the commercial and political decision regarding the unloading of the cargo.

The ship’s route is just as important as its destination. The UNIVERSAL left the Baltic Sea in April 2026 and transited the English Channel under intense surveillance, in a sensitive political context. Several reports agree that, during certain parts of the journey, the tanker was accompanied by Russian naval vessels, including the frigate Admiral Grigorovich. This escort is not merely symbolic. It sends a signal of protection for the logistical flows associated with Russian energy exports and shows that Moscow treats some vessels of the so-called ‘shadow fleet’ as sensitive assets in the economic confrontation with the West.

The application of sanctions and the testing of Western credibility

From a legal and operational standpoint, the vessel is subject to sanctions successively imposed by the United States, the European Union, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Ukraine and Canada. In the publicly available justifications, the tanker is associated with the transport of Russian oil and petroleum products to third countries and the use of maritime practices considered high-risk, including instances of route obfuscation. This profile places it in the category of vessels considered part of the ‘ ’ logistics network used to mitigate the impact of sanctions on Russian energy exports.

The UNIVERSAL case is also relevant because it highlights the gap between the announcement of restrictive measures and their effective enforcement at sea. Press reports and specialist analyses have shown that sanctioned vessels have continued to traverse sensitive maritime areas, including the waters around the United Kingdom, sometimes under Russian military protection. In this sense, the episode becomes a test of credibility for Western policies: sanctions have a real impact on Russia’s costs and logistical options, but their effectiveness depends on the ability of states to transform them from declarative instruments into coherent operational mechanisms.

The stakes for Cuba and the regional significance of the episode

For Cuba, the case has immediate stakes, as the island is going through a severe energy crisis, marked by fuel shortages and power cuts. In this context, any delivery of petroleum products has a direct economic and social dimension. Independent sources have noted that only some Russian shipments have managed to reach Cuba, whilst others have been delayed, redirected or subject to political conditions. The difference between tolerated and blocked shipments suggests that Washington is operating with nuance, assessing on a case-by-case basis whether a shipment can be classified as a humanitarian exception or must be treated strictly in line with the logic of sanctions and pressure on Havana.

Conclusions

Overall, the UNIVERSAL episode shows that maritime sanctions do not function solely through formal prohibition, but by increasing uncertainty, costs and risks for the operators involved. The fact that the tanker did not reach Cuba, after weeks of uncertainty and a closely monitored voyage, indicates the existence of real pressure on the Russian logistics chain. At the same time, the case also highlights the current limitations of the enforcement regime: sanctioned vessels continue to operate, sometimes with a military escort, and decisions to intervene remain selective and deeply politicised. From this perspective, the situation is not merely an isolated maritime incident, but an example of how the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West is increasingly shifting into the realm of trade routes, energy and control over freedom of navigation.

Maritime Security Forum

Maritime threats in the grey zone and strengthening port security – Maritime Security Forum

In 2026, commercial ports, energy terminals, submarine cables, offshore pipelines and coastal logistics facilities face a category of risks that do not clearly fall within the realm of either peace or open conflict. In the maritime domain, these threats manifest themselves through deliberately ambiguous activities, carried out below the threshold of a conventional military response, yet capable of producing real strategic effects: intelligence gathering, mapping of underwater infrastructure, disruption of commercial traffic, testing of response times, and the erosion of confidence in the security of maritime routes. For port authorities and maritime authorities, the challenge no longer lies solely in controlling access and ensuring compliance with ISPS regulations, but in the early detection of anomalous behaviour embedded within seemingly legitimate traffic.

What is the ‘grey zone’?

The ‘grey zone’ refers to the space between peaceful competition and open military conflict, in which a state actor or state-affiliated actor carries out deliberate, ambiguous and gradually calibrated actions to gain strategic advantages without triggering a major military reaction. In the maritime domain, the grey zone includes activities that appear, in isolation, to be civilian, commercial or technical, but which, when analysed in context, may serve to exert pressure, conduct reconnaissance, intimidate, test the authorities’ reaction or prepare for subsequent operations. The essential characteristic of the grey zone is precisely its ambiguity: the actor seeks to remain below the clear threshold of aggression, so that the legal, political or military response is delayed, hesitant or difficult to justify.

The difference between the ‘grey zone’, ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘hybrid threats’

Although the terms are often used together, they are not identical.

The ‘grey zone’ describes the framework of action situated below the threshold of open military conflict, where pressure is exerted gradually and ambiguously.

‘Hybrid threats’ refer to the range of tools used within this framework — for example, disinformation, economic pressure, cyber attacks, sabotage, the use of proxy actors or ambiguous maritime activities.

‘Hybrid warfare’ is a broader concept, combining these tools into a coordinated strategy designed to weaken the adversary without direct conventional confrontation. In the maritime domain, a vessel stationed unjustifiably near critical infrastructure falls within the logic of the grey zone; if the action is linked to GPS jamming, influence campaigns and economic pressure, it already falls within the scope of hybrid threats or a broader hybrid campaign.

Defining maritime threats in the grey zone

Grey-zone maritime threats refer to actions carried out by states or their affiliated actors, designed to gain strategic advantages without crossing the legal and political threshold that would trigger a major military response. In practice, these actions may take the form of ships drifting or stationing in the vicinity of sensitive points without sound commercial justification, research or fishing vessels conducting reconnaissance activities, the manipulation of automatic identification systems, the concealment of identity, intimidating patrols, or the use of unmanned platforms for observation and mapping. The crux of the problem lies in ambiguity: each incident, taken in isolation, may seem minor or inconclusive, but their accumulation alters the security environment and shifts the initiative to the aggressor.

From an operational perspective, the most common signatures include ‘dark activity’ through the disruption of AIS, loitering near submarine cables, pipelines, naval bases or energy terminals, the use of routes and speeds incompatible with commercial logic, repeated changes of flag or identity, and the synchronisation of movements between multiple vessels. In the underwater environment, the risk is heightened by the use of autonomous vehicles, survey systems and platforms capable of deploying sensors, mapping the seabed or preparing sabotage operations. This is precisely why the threat must not be assessed solely through the lens of a formal breach of a rule, but through an analysis of behaviour, navigation patterns and proximity to critical infrastructure.

Impact on ports, trade routes and critical infrastructure

Ports are particularly vulnerable because they concentrate logistics flows, commercial data, energy infrastructure, communications and interfaces between the civilian and military sectors. A grey-zone operation can affect a port without directly attacking it: it is sufficient to disrupt access channels, intimidate traffic, map vulnerable points, test the authorities’ response or create a persistent perception of risk that increases insurance and operating costs. At the same time, submarine cables, pipelines, coastal stations and the digital infrastructure associated with ports are becoming attractive targets, as striking them produces economic effects disproportionate to the cost of the operation.

From a professional maritime perspective, the port can no longer be treated as a static perimeter, defended solely by fencing, access control and local patrols. It must be understood as an extended operational node, which begins in the outer roadstead, continues along the approach routes, includes the underwater infrastructure and extends into the digital and energy networks that support its operation. Consequently, effective port security requires a layered architecture: remote monitoring, analysis of vessel behaviour, fusion of AIS-radar-satellite data, seabed surveillance and clear escalation procedures when an activity remains ambiguous but becomes persistent and unjustified.

Early detection, surveillance and operational response

Modern ports and maritime authorities are strengthening their posture by shifting from reactive surveillance to proactive anomaly detection. In practice, this means combining coastal radar sensors, AIS systems, satellite imagery, electro-optical optics, RF analysis and, where justified, underwater sensors and unmanned platform- . The real value does not come from a single sensor, but from data fusion and the ability to identify early deviations from normal maritime behaviour: suspicious drifting, repeated returns to the same point, unexplained proximity to cables or terminals, AIS interruptions and changes in operational profile.

The operational response must be gradual, documented and interoperable. The first stage is situational confirmation: validating the contact, cross-referencing sources, comparing navigation history and assessing proximity to sensitive assets. The second stage involves deterrence and control measures: visual tracking, radio warning, notification of maritime traffic services, restricting access to certain areas and, where appropriate, escorting or intercepting. The third stage is inter-institutional and strategic, involving the navy, coastguard, port authorities, infrastructure operators and intelligence agencies. In the case of underwater threats, speed of response is crucial, as once an incident has occurred, attribution and remediation become far more difficult and costly.

Governance, cooperation and institutional resilience

Managing grey-zone threats cannot be the sole responsibility of a single institution. Their hybrid nature requires a governance model in which ports, naval authorities, border police, energy operators, cable administrators and military partners exchange data in near real time and operate according to common alert thresholds. The trend observed in vulnerable maritime states is the establishment of integrated ‘space-to-seabed’ posts, where satellite surveillance, naval patrols, cyber security and the monitoring of underwater infrastructure are treated as parts of the same resilience architecture.

Recent examples from the North Atlantic and the North Sea show that coastal states are strengthening their naval cooperation precisely to protect cables, pipelines and access routes to ports. The agreement between the [United Kingdom]() and [Norway]() to protect subsea infrastructure and monitor Russian activity highlights a significant trend: port security is no longer separate from theatre maritime surveillance, and the protection of critical infrastructure requires both a naval presence and autonomous capabilities, sensors and information-sharing mechanisms. The increase in Russian naval activity in the vicinity of British waters has accelerated precisely this type of operational integration.

Analysis for Romania: maritime implications and priorities for action

For Romania, the issue of maritime threats in the grey zone is of direct and immediate relevance. The Black Sea is no longer merely a transit route and a strategic neighbourhood, but a theatre in which the war in Ukraine, sea mines, navigation interference, attacks on port infrastructure and the vulnerability of offshore assets are having an impact on trade, energy and freedom of navigation. [Constanța]() is, in this context, more than just a major commercial port: it is a regional logistics hub, a support point for flows linked to Ukraine, an interface between European corridors and the Pontic region, and an asset of strategic importance for NATO and the EU. At the same time, offshore energy projects, including [Neptun Deep](), raise the necessary protection standards for platforms, pipelines, cables and adjacent maritime areas.

From a maritime professional perspective, Romania needs an integrated approach in four areas.

  • The first is to expand maritime situational awareness around [Constanța](), access routes, offshore areas and critical underwater infrastructure, by merging radar, AIS, satellite and underwater data.
  • The second is to consolidate common procedures between the Romanian Naval Authority, port authorities, the Naval Forces, the Border Police, energy operators and allied partners, so that abnormal behaviour can be recognised and dealt with swiftly before it has any impact.
  • The third is the development of a specialised capability for the protection of underwater infrastructure and offshore energy, including through exercises, continuous monitoring and the integration of unmanned systems.
  • The fourth is to capitalise on regional and European initiatives, including the idea of a maritime security hub in the Black Sea, which can strengthen Romania’s role as a frontline state in managing maritime hybrid risks.

In conclusion, for Romania, grey-zone threats are no longer a theoretical scenario, but a practical maritime security issue, directly linking port protection, energy security, the resilience of critical infrastructure and the credibility of its strategic posture in the Black Sea.

Maritime Security Forum

Norway revokes the export of NSM missiles to Malaysia: contractual, operational and regional implications – Maritime Security Forum

Norway’s decision to revoke the export licence for the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) system and associated launchers intended for Malaysia represents more than a mere suspension of a commercial contract. From a strategic perspective, the episode reflects the tendency of Western states to restrict the transfer of certain sensitive military technologies in line with new security criteria, even when contracts have already been signed and the vast majority of payments have been made. The firm reaction of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim indicates that the issue is perceived in Kuala Lumpur not merely as a contractual dispute, but also as a direct blow to the credibility of defence partnerships and medium-term naval capability planning.

Political and diplomatic context

According to the public stance expressed by the Malaysian leadership, the government in Kuala Lumpur considers the revocation of the licence to be a unilateral measure, difficult to reconcile with the obligations undertaken under the agreement concluded in 2018. On the other hand, Oslo has cited, in general terms, national security concerns and the tightening of export controls on certain defence technologies developed in Norway. This justification suggests that the decision should not be interpreted solely through the prism of the Norway–Malaysia bilateral relationship, but also within the broader context of the changing European strategic environment and the trend towards restricting access to technologies deemed critical to allies and very close partners only.

The contractual dimension and the issue of the supplier’s credibility

From a contractual perspective, the case is sensitive, as the Malaysian side maintains that it has fulfilled its obligations since 2018, including through substantial payments made prior to delivery. In these circumstances, the cancellation of the export affects not only the execution of a specific contract, but also strategic confidence in the predictability of Western arms suppliers. For the end user, the issue is not merely one of recovering funds or securing compensation, but also concerns indirect costs: the reconfiguration of naval platforms, integration delays, the recalibration of the operational concept, and the potential search for a new compatible anti-ship system.

Operational impact on the Malaysian naval programme

The suspension of NSM deliveries directly affects the Royal Malaysian Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme, at a time when the first ship of the class, Maharaja Lela, is entering a critical phase of testing and integration. In the combat architecture of this class, the NSM missile was to serve as the primary anti-ship strike weapon and, in certain configurations, a strike vector against coastal targets. Without this system, the ships risk entering service with a reduced or incomplete offensive capability, which directly affects their military value, the concept of use and the cost-capability ratio of the entire programme. Furthermore, a forced change in missile type may require adaptations to launchers, software interfaces, integration with the combat management system and maintenance procedures.

Technical and military specifications of the vessel (Maharaja Lela class / Gowind 3100)

The Maharaja Lela-class ships, developed based on the French Gowind 3100 design, are light frigates/littoral combat ships designed for multi-role missions in coastal and offshore environments. The platform has a displacement of approximately 3,100 tonnes, a length of around 111 metres, a beam of approximately 16 metres and a draught of approximately 3.85 metres. Propulsion is of the CODAD type, with four MTU 20V 1163 M94 diesel engines, together providing approximately 29,600 kW, which allows a maximum speed of approximately 28 knots and a range of up to 5,000 nautical miles at economic speed. The crew consists of approximately 138 personnel, and the vessel features a hangar and deck for medium-sized helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles. In terms of sensors and combat systems, the class incorporates the SETIS combat management system, the Thales SMART-S Mk2 surveillance radar, hull-mounted and towed sonar for anti-submarine warfare, as well as a defensive package including VL MICA anti-aircraft missiles, a 57 mm main gun, 30 mm secondary guns and triple torpedo tubes. In the initial concept, the anti-ship capability was to be provided by eight NSM missiles, which would have given the ship a credible long-range strike capability against surface naval targets.

Technical and military specifications of the NSM missile

The Naval Strike Missile (NSM), manufactured by Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace, is a modern-generation anti-ship strike system with a secondary capability to engage land-based targets. In the configuration publicly presented by the manufacturer, the missile has a mass of approximately 407 kg, a length of around 3.96 metres and a range of over 300 km for the most recent publicly announced versions, maintaining a high subsonic flight profile. The NSM utilises very low-altitude sea-skimming flight, evasive terminal manoeuvres and a low signature to increase the probability of penetrating enemy defences. The guidance system combines inertial navigation, route profiling and an infrared imaging seeker with autonomous target recognition, enabling target discrimination and selection in the terminal phase. This is particularly important in congested maritime environments, where distinguishing between real targets, decoys and collateral targets is critical. In operational terms, the NSM is valued for its flexibility in integration onto naval and coastal platforms, for its ability to strike from outside the range of naval defence systems, and for its profile suited to littoral warfare, where coastal geography and radar clutter can be exploited tactically.

Maritime Security Forum

The US resumes defensive strikes against Iran amid the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz: maritime and energy implications and future trends – Maritime Security Forum

The resumption of US strikes on Iranian targets associated with drone activities in the Bandar Abbas area confirms that the Strait of Hormuz remains the focal point of the strategic confrontation between Washington and Tehran. According to public reports based on official US sources, US forces targeted a ground control station and intercepted several drones considered direct threats to US forces and commercial traffic. The incident occurred at a time of a fragile ceasefire and was immediately followed by conflicting reactions regarding the existence of a possible agreement to resume maritime traffic through the strait. From an analytical perspective, this shows that, although negotiations have not ceased, the operational reality on the ground remains dominated by coercive logic, demonstrations of force and competition for control over the rules of access in one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

The immediate military dimension

The available data points to a pattern of US action presented as ‘defensive’, but with broader strategic implications. The neutralisation of drones and the strike on the command infrastructure in Bandar Abbas aim, in the short term, to reduce the risk to commercial vessels and to the US military presence in the region. In the medium term, however, these actions also send a political signal: Washington is seeking to assert that freedom of transit through the straits cannot be unilaterally conditioned by Iran and that any attempt at coercive control of navigation will be met with a swift response. At the same time, Iran is attempting to maintain strategic ambiguity, combining limited military pressure, political signalling and the assertion of a role of authority over the flow of ships.

Maritime confrontation and pressure on commercial traffic

Reports of warning shots fired at ships and attempts to turn back commercial traffic show that pressure on shipping need not materialise into a formal, complete closure to produce major strategic effects. In practice, an increased perception of risk is sufficient for operators, insurers and shipowners to reduce or postpone transits. This is one of the most important mechanisms of influence in the Strait of Hormuz: a credible threat, even a limited one, can generate disruptions disproportionate to the tactical cost of the action. Consequently, the strait functions not only as a transit route, but also as an instrument of geopolitical and economic pressure.

The US military also carried out emergency strikes in southern Iran on Monday, in what it described as a defensive action, but which Iran said was a “serious violation” of the ceasefire.

Energy and trade implications

The oil market’s reaction to the new strikes confirms the extreme sensitivity of energy markets to any deterioration in security in the Strait of Hormuz. Even when prices temporarily correct downwards on the back of hopes for a deal, the mere resurgence of military risk quickly brings risk premiums back into the price. The importance of this route remains structural: the strait is a critical corridor for oil, liquefied natural gas and essential maritime trade flows. Furthermore, the severe reduction in the number of transits compared to normal levels signifies not only a security crisis but also a shift in commercial logic: transport becomes more expensive, insurance more restrictive, and routing decisions are increasingly influenced by military and political risk criteria, not just economic efficiency.

The diplomatic dispute over control and administration of the strait

The US president’s public rejection of reports regarding an arrangement whereby Iran and Oman would jointly manage traffic through Hormuz highlights the real stakes of the negotiations: not merely the resumption of navigation, but the definition of legitimate authority over transit rules. For Washington, accepting a formula that would enshrine an explicit Iranian role in the political administration of trade flows would amount to validating a strategic lever that Tehran has long sought to turn into diplomatic capital. For Iran, on the contrary, linking the resumption of traffic to the recognition of a role of control or coordination would represent a form of political legitimisation of its regional influence.

Trump said that no country would have control over the waterway and appeared to be threatening Oman, a country with which the US has had military and economic ties for decades.

“Nobody is going to control (the strait),” Trump said. “These are international waters and Oman will behave like everyone else or we’ll have to blow them up. They understand that, they’ll be fine.”

The White House and the Omani embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Iran’s permanent mission to the United Nations was not immediately available for comment.

The legal dimension and sanctions regime

From a legal perspective, the Strait of Hormuz is generally treated as a strait used for international navigation, and the general regime established by the law of the sea protects the principle of continuous and unimpeded passage. In practice, however, the application of this principle depends on the relationship between the rule and the power to enforce it. This is where one of the most significant contradictions of the current crisis arises: although international law provides a framework for freedom of transit, armed incidents, threats, mines, drones and financial sanctions can render transit legal but operationally unsafe or commercially unviable. The addition of Iranian entities to sanctions lists increases economic pressure, but does not automatically resolve the issue of the physical security of maritime routes.

However, Trump’s comments and reports of new US military action have shown that the two countries remain far apart, even following the White House’s suggestions in recent days that an initial agreement to end the war could be imminent.

Ebrahim Azizi, head of the Iranian parliament’s national security committee, said that Trump’s “rhetoric” would not force Iran to abandon its demands to enrich uranium, exercise authority over the straits and see the lifting of sanctions against it.

“It is clear that Trump, seeking a way out of this strategic impasse, is alternating between issuing threats and calling for a deal,” Azizi said in a post on X.

The three-month war has killed thousands of people and led to a sharp rise in global energy prices since it began on 28 February with strikes by the US and Israel. Trump has repeatedly said that a deal is close.

The Strait, which handled a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas traffic before the war, the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capacity and ongoing sanctions are the sticking points in negotiations to end the three-month conflict.

The parties’ positions and trends

The US position currently combines three lines of action: maintaining limited military pressure to protect shipping, refusing to recognise any political monopoly over the Strait, and retaining sanctions as a negotiating tool. The Iranian position, in turn, combines three objectives: preserving its deterrent capability, turning de facto control over maritime risk into a diplomatic advantage, and avoiding a full-scale confrontation that would reduce its room for manoeuvre. In this regard, neither side appears willing to make rapid concessions on the substance of the issue, even though both are keeping the channels of discussion open.

The main trends emerging are as follows: firstly, the persistent militarisation of maritime security in the Gulf, including through the use of drones, mines and precision strikes against command infrastructure; secondly, the transformation of trade routes and insurance costs into a direct indicator of geopolitical risk; thirdly, the growing importance of instruments of coercion below the threshold of open warfare, where warning shots, threats and selective control of access can produce effects comparable to a partial blockade; fourthly, the strengthening of the link between nuclear negotiations, the sanctions regime and freedom of navigation; and, finally, the consolidation of the idea that global energy security once again depends on the ability of external actors to keep a vulnerable and highly contested maritime corridor open.

Likely short-term scenarios

In the short term, the most likely scenario is neither full peace nor the total and declared closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but the continuation of a regime of controlled insecurity. This means limited transit, periodic episodes of military coercion, energy volatility and intermittent negotiations without a final strategic solution. A second scenario is rapid deterioration, should a naval incident involving casualties or major commercial losses create pressure for broader retaliation. A third scenario, less likely in the immediate term, would involve a limited technical agreement allowing for the partial resumption of traffic without resolving the fundamental differences between the parties.

US military ships, some carrying thousands of sailors and marines, regularly transit the region, calling at ports including Oman. The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The Iranian TV report on the draft agreement made no mention of Iran’s nuclear programme, which the US seeks to dismantle.

Iranian sources have stated that discussions on the nuclear issue will take place during a second round of negotiations – something that may not be acceptable to some of Trump’s closest supporters. Iran maintains that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only.

“The bottom line is that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon,” US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said at the cabinet meeting.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy said on Wednesday that 23 vessels, including oil tankers, container ships and other commercial vessels, had passed through the Strait of Hormuz with its permission in the past 24 hours – a fraction of the 125 to 140 vessels that passed through daily before the conflict.

Conclusion

Overall, the resumption of US strikes on Iranian targets near the Strait of Hormuz shows that this route is not merely a transit corridor, but a theatre where military competition, diplomatic pressure, energy security and international law intersect. Beyond isolated incidents, the real stake is who can influence, condition or guarantee freedom of navigation in a corridor of global importance. For maritime and strategic analysis, the main conclusion is clear: Hormuz has entered a phase where apparent stability may conceal high volatility, and the dominant trend remains that of a controlled confrontation, yet one that remains persistently dangerous for shipping, energy and the regional balance.

Maritime Security Forum

Zelensky rejects the idea of ‘associated’ EU membership and insists on a path to full membership – Maritime Security Forum

The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, has rejected the proposal for a possible intermediate or “associated” form of Ukraine’s participation in the structures of the European Union, insisting that Kyiv’s objective remains full membership, with full rights of representation and voting. His reaction came against the backdrop of a European debate reignited in May 2026, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz suggested a transitional arrangement that would allow Ukraine to participate in certain EU meetings and mechanisms without yet becoming a full member state. According to public reports, the envisaged model would have offered extended political and institutional access, but without voting rights, as an intermediate stage between the current candidate status and full membership.

From Kyiv’s perspective, such an intermediate arrangement risks creating an ambiguous political category: close enough to the Union to generate expectations and obligations, but insufficient to guarantee equal status with the other member states. This is precisely the crux of Zelensky’s refusal. For the Ukrainian leadership, the idea of participation without voting rights could enshrine an incomplete integration, in which Ukraine would be present within the European political architecture, but without the ability to influence decisions that directly concern it. The message from Kyiv is, therefore, that Ukraine’s political support, strategic solidarity and military role in the continent’s security cannot be separated from the principle of political equality within the European project.

In a letter addressed to the President of the European Council, António Costa, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, Zelensky argued that Ukraine must not be pushed towards “partial solutions” or symbolic forms of membership. The central idea of his appeal was that Ukraine is not merely defending its own territory, but is contributing directly to European security, and this role must also be reflected in the logic of political integration. In the formulations attributed to the letter in the international press, the key argument is that it would be unfair for Ukraine to be present in the European Union but to remain without a voice in the decision-making process.

Friedrich Merz’s proposal must be understood in the context of the structural difficulties of EU enlargement. The accession process is, traditionally, lengthy, technical and dependent on the consensus of all Member States. In Ukraine’s case, the complexity is amplified by the ongoing war, the costs of reconstruction, the budgetary implications for the Union, and the reservations expressed by some European capitals regarding the pace of enlargement. From this perspective, the idea of ‘associated membership’ can be interpreted as an attempt to offer Kyiv political and institutional benefits before the entire legal accession process is completed. Supporters of such a formula see it as a pragmatic compromise: ambitious enough to maintain Ukraine’s pro-European course, yet flexible enough to avoid internal deadlocks within the Union.

However, Kyiv’s position points to a legitimate strategic concern: any intermediate status lacking clear deadlines, solid legal guarantees and an explicit path to full membership could become a convenient substitute for genuine integration. That is why Zelensky’s refusal is not merely a reaction of principle, but also an attempt to prevent the institutionalisation of a permanent ‘waiting room’ for Ukraine. In practical terms, the country’s European path remains on track: Ukraine submitted its application for membership in February 2022, obtained candidate status in June 2022, and accession negotiations were formally opened in 2024. According to the European Commission, the legislative screening has been completed, and Ukraine has made progress on several key fronts — from reforming the judiciary and public administration to alignment with the European acquis. Consequently, the current dispute does not concern Ukraine’s strategic direction, but rather the political form in which this direction should be recognised and accelerated by the European Union.

Maritime Security Forum

Further US strikes on Iranian targets and the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz – Maritime Security Forum

The US armed forces have carried out new strikes on Iranian targets in the Bandar Abbas area, in an episode presented by the US as a defensive action intended to protect its own forces and commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. According to reports by Reuters and other corroborating sources, the operation involved striking a control facility associated with drone launches and intercepting several unmanned aerial vehicles which US officials claimed posed an immediate threat to commercial vessels and the US military presence in the region. The incident occurred against the backdrop of a fragile ceasefire and ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran, which explains why the military action was publicly framed as part of efforts to ‘maintain’ the ceasefire, rather than a formal resumption of hostilities.

From an analytical perspective, the situation reflects a type of incomplete ceasefire, in which the cessation of large-scale hostilities coexists with targeted strikes, interceptions and demonstrations of force justified as preventive measures. This strategic ambiguity is significant, as it allows both sides to avoid, at least temporarily, the political costs of a full-scale escalation, without, however, relinquishing coercive instruments. For Washington, maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and protecting its own forces constitutes the official line of justification. For Tehran, contesting these strikes as violations of the ceasefire is part of a strategy to delegitimise American pressure and preserve a margin for political and military response.

The stakes of this episode go beyond the strictly military dimension, as the Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. Data published by the International Energy Agency shows that in 2025, approximately 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products transited through this corridor, equivalent to around a quarter of global maritime oil trade, to which must be added essential flows of liquefied natural gas originating mainly from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Consequently, even without a formal closure of the strait, the mere increase in military risk can have significant economic effects: higher insurance premiums, route re-routing, reduced transit volumes and immediate volatility in energy markets.

It is in this context that the dispute over who can claim a role in administering or controlling traffic through the straits must be understood. US President Donald Trump has publicly rejected reports in the Iranian state media that Iran and Oman would jointly manage navigation through Hormuz as part of a possible agreement. From the US perspective, accepting such an arrangement would amount to recognising Iran’s strategic leverage over a maritime corridor of global interest. From the Iranian perspective, however, linking the resumption of traffic to the recognition of a political or administrative role in the strait would represent a significant diplomatic gain, transforming de facto control over the risk into a form of legitimate influence.

From a legal standpoint, the Strait of Hormuz is typically analysed through the prism of the regime governing passage through straits used for international navigation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea enshrines the principle of continuous and unimpeded passage for ships in transit, even though the practical application of this principle depends, in reality, on the relationship between the rule and the capacity of state actors to enforce it. It is precisely here that one of the fundamental contradictions of the current crisis arises: international law provides a clear framework for freedom of navigation, yet drones, mines, threats and coercive measures can transform a legal transit into one that is operationally unsafe or commercially unviable. In other words, the current dispute concerns not only the formal legality of transit, but also the actual ability to keep a vulnerable maritime corridor open.

In the short term, the most likely scenario is neither a rapid return to normality nor a total and declared closure of the strait, but the continuation of a regime of controlled insecurity. This implies reduced or intermittent transit, ad hoc military reactions, energy volatility and negotiations that remain open without yet producing a stable strategic agreement. Under these circumstances, every military incident in the vicinity of Hormuz has a dual significance: tactical, through its immediate impact on the security of navigation, and systemic, through its effect on energy markets, shipping costs and the global perception of risk. Therefore, the latest US strikes must be interpreted not merely as an isolated operational episode, but as part of a broader confrontation over rules of access, freedom of navigation and the balance of power in the Persian Gulf.

Maritime Security Forum

US imposes sanctions on Iran’s new Hormuz Strait Authority, whilst the exchange of fire maintains the risk of escalation – Maritime Security Forum

The United States’ decision to include the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) on the list of entities sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the exchanges of fire in the Bandar Abbas area should be seen as part of the same confrontation over political, legal and operational control of the Strait of Hormuz. According to the official announcement by the US Treasury and reports by Reuters, Washington considers that this structure created by Iran is not merely an administrative mechanism for the safety of navigation, but an attempt to transform the de facto control exercised over the strait into a formalised instrument of economic pressure and strategic influence (sources: Reuters; US Department of the Treasury/OFAC). At the same time, Iran’s reaction to the US strikes, presented as defensive, shows that the dispute no longer concerns only the transit regime, but also the balance of power through which this regime can be imposed or challenged.

According to publicly available data, the PGSA was established as the body responsible for managing requests to transit the Strait of Hormuz and for coordinating the rules applicable to vessels in transit. In the US authorities’ view, cooperation with this body may amount to providing material support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which extends the risk of sanctions to shipowners, insurers and intermediaries who would accept the new authorisation regime (sources: US Department of the Treasury/OFAC; Reuters). For this reason, the stakes are not exclusively military: for commercial operators, the issue becomes twofold, involving both physical security and legal and financial compliance, in a context where every transit through Hormuz may entail both operational risk and exposure to sanctions.

In practical terms, the new regime proposed by Iran has been linked to a transit protocol requiring commercial vessels to submit in advance details regarding ownership, crew, insurance, cargo and route, including via the ‘Vessel Information Declaration’ form, as described in reports by CNN, the shipping press and sources cited by Lloyd’s List (sources: CNN; Lloyd’s List; AGBI; Reuters). From an analytical perspective, this move signals a shift from a de facto coercive blockade to a model of selective access management. If such a system were to become established, freedom of navigation through a strait used for international navigation could gradually be replaced by a discretionary authorisation mechanism, with direct implications for commercial costs, operational confidentiality and the predictability of maritime transport.

From a legal perspective, the dispute directly concerns the regime governing passage through straits used for international navigation, as enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This framework protects the principle of continuous and unimpeded passage, but the current crisis highlights the practical limits of the rule when maritime security, sanctions and demonstrations of force overlap (legal source: UNCLOS). Therefore, the sanctioning of the PGSA must be understood not merely as a reaction to a new Iranian institution, but as part of a broader confrontation over who sets the rules of access in a corridor vital to global energy trade.

Against this backdrop, the Iranian response to the US strikes near Bandar Abbas sought to convey that military pressure would not go unanswered. Iranian state-aligned media and communications attributed to the IRGC claimed that a US airbase had been targeted in retaliation for strikes on Iranian targets, whilst US sources confirmed the downing of Iranian drones and the striking of a ground control station linked to preparations for a new attack (sources: Iranian state media; CNN; Reuters). Even in the absence of complete and independently verifiable details regarding the full effects of these exchanges, the strategic signal is clear: both Washington and Tehran are seeking to keep the confrontation below the threshold of all-out war, whilst not relinquishing the coercive tools that underpin their negotiating positions.

Overall, the episode shows that the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a formal issue of freedom of navigation, but also concerns the actual ability of the actors involved to condition access, to pass on costs to the shipping industry, and to turn control of maritime risk into a political advantage. The sanctions against PGSA, the new Iranian transit procedures and the reciprocal military reactions point to a dynamic of controlled insecurity, in which the corridor remains open only to the extent that neither side decides to push the escalation too far. Sources used in this article: Reuters; U.S. Department of the Treasury/OFAC; CNN; Lloyd’s List; AGBI; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Maritime Security Forum

Russia installs anti-drone nets on a ‘Buyan-M’ class missile corvette of the Baltic Fleet – Maritime Security Forum

The Russian small missile ship “Orekhovo-Zuyevo”, of Project 21631 “Buyan-M” and belonging to the Baltic Fleet, has been observed with a makeshift anti-drone protection system, consisting of nets stretched over key elements of the deck and superstructure. The appearance of this type of protection on a combat platform designed to launch cruise missiles suggests that the threat posed by cheap maritime and aerial drones is perceived by Russia as serious enough to warrant rapid adaptations even on warships outside the Black Sea theatre.

The existence of this configuration is indicated by a photograph taken in Baltiysk by observer Petri Mäkelä and published by the AST Centre, with the information being picked up by the Ukrainian publication Militarnyi. From an analytical perspective, the value of the image lies not only in its illustrative nature, but also in the fact that it documents the spread of an improvised defensive practice to the Baltic Fleet, which may reflect a broader reassessment of Russian naval vulnerabilities in the face of new unmanned threats.

The small missile ship “Orekhovo-Zuyevo” of Project 21631 “Buyan-M” of the Russian Federation’s Baltic Fleet, fitted with anti-drone nets. Photo: Petri Mäkelä

The published photograph shows that the nets have been stretched around sensitive areas of the superstructure, presumably with the aim of reducing the ship’s vulnerability to strikes by FPV drones, loitering munitions or unmanned vessels capable of attacking at low altitude or during the final approach phase. Such measures do not offer complete protection, but they can deflect the trajectory of improvised projectiles, trigger warheads prematurely, or complicate the identification of optimal points of impact. In the current combat environment, where low-cost threats can cause disproportionately severe damage, even rudimentary solutions acquire a limited but real tactical utility.

The presence of such an improvised system on a Baltic Fleet vessel indicates that the practice of anti-drone protection, initially developed in response to pressure on Russian forces in the Black Sea, has gradually spread to other fleets. This development suggests that the threat is no longer viewed in Moscow as a local issue, specific to the southern Ukrainian front, but as a structural vulnerability of Russian naval platforms as a whole. In operational terms, it is a sign of defensive adaptation, but also of an implicit recognition that ships designed for a conventional combat environment are exposed to cheap, flexible and difficult-to-counter means.

This is not the first indication of this trend. In recent months, there have been reports of similar structures being installed on other Russian naval platforms, including Project 21980 ‘Grachonok’ anti-sabotage patrol boats. At the same time, specialist publications and open-source imagery have highlighted the use of nets, grilles and other improvised devices around bases, fuel depots and fixed naval installations. The expansion of these measures indicates that Russia is attempting to create an additional layer of physical protection against a category of threats that has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to penetrate conventional defences.

The same defensive approach has also been observed around stationary targets, such as oil depots, logistics infrastructure and, according to other open-source reports, even in the vicinity of strategic submarines. From a military perspective, this expansion is significant because it shows that the drone threat is no longer treated merely as a one-off tactical risk, but as a persistent factor necessitating changes to how sensitive assets and infrastructure are protected. In other words, Russia is adapting not only its front-line units, but also part of th nd platforms previously considered relatively secure.

The vessel “Orekhovo-Zuyevo” is part of Project 21631 “Buyan-M”, a class of missile corvettes designed primarily for operations in coastal waters and inland seas, but also used by Russia as a launch platform for cruise missiles of the “Kalibr” family. According to public data on this class, the ships have a displacement of approximately 949 tonnes, a length of around 75 metres, a crew of approximately 52, and are armed with vertical launchers capable of firing Kalibr missiles or, in certain configurations, other types of guided munitions. This profile makes the emergence of improvised protective measures all the more significant: this is not an auxiliary platform, but a combat vessel of obvious operational and symbolic value.

Although designed for operations in coastal waters and shallow waters, the ‘Buyan-M’ class ships have acquired greater strategic relevance than their size would initially suggest, precisely because of their ability to launch cruise missiles from a distance. Russia has also used such platforms for attacks on Ukraine, which makes them high-value targets and explains why the Russian command is attempting to provide them with at least some additional protection against unmanned threats. At the same time, improvised solutions of this kind also indicate a certain tension between the need to keep ships operational and the difficulty of adapting them quickly to the new conditions of naval warfare.

Improvised constructions of this kind have become one of the Russian military’s most visible responses to the rapid development of Ukrainian unmanned systems. Their actual effectiveness remains, however, debatable: they may reduce vulnerability to certain types of attack, but do not offer a complete solution against manoeuvring drones, coordinated strikes or munitions capable of detonating at optimal range. Nevertheless, their mere presence has analytical value, as it shows that Russia implicitly accepts that the standard protection of combat ships is no longer sufficient in the current operational environment.

The extension of these defensive measures to the Baltic Fleet can be interpreted as an indication that the drone threat is now being assessed by the Russian command in a broader context, which clearly extends beyond the Black Sea theatre. From a strategic perspective, this reflects a lesson learned from the war in Ukraine: the vulnerability of naval assets no longer depends solely on proximity to the front line, but also on the adversary’s ability to project cheap, flexible and hard-to-predict means against targets that are, on the surface, at a safe distance. Consequently, the photograph of the ship ‘Orekhovo-Zuyevo’ with anti-drone nets is not merely a snapshot, but also a sign of the rapid transformation of contemporary naval warfare.

Maritime Security Forum

Before deciding on war, leaders should first look to history – Maritime Security Forum

The war with Iran has often been framed in terms of strategic urgency, technological superiority and the need to restore freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. However, a historical analysis suggests that such moments tend to produce not only immediate military effects, but also economic, political and geopolitical consequences that frequently escape the initial control of decision-makers. In this regard, the central argument put forward by historian Niall Ferguson in his essay on the global expansion of the war with Iran is that modern technology has not nullified the classic rules of strategic geography: even in a conflict dominated by drones, precision strikes and automation, control of a maritime chokepoint such as Hormuz can become more important than the tactical advantage gained in the air or in the information domain.

Viewed from a historical perspective, this idea is not new. From the Peloponnesian Wars to the major conflicts of the 20th century and the interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq, historians have repeatedly emphasised that wars usually begin with clear and limited objectives, but often evolve under the influence of unforeseen dynamics: the adversary’s reaction, public pressure, constraints from allies, economic disruptions, and the temptation to escalate in order to avoid the political cost of retreat. From this perspective, the value of history lies not in providing perfect analogies, but in identifying patterns of error: underestimating the adversary’s resilience and , overestimating one’s own control over the pace of the conflict, and ignoring second- and third-order effects.

In the article published in The Free Press, Ferguson uses precisely this kind of applied reading of the past to warn of the strategic risks of a protracted confrontation with Iran. His central argument is that decision-makers in Washington may be tempted to view the conflict primarily through the prism of immediate military effectiveness, without sufficiently assessing how the disruption of maritime traffic, rising energy prices, trade pressures and opportunities opened up for external rivals could significantly alter the overall strategic balance.

One of the most important observations is the contrast between the technological nature of the war and the persistence of geographical constraints. The conflict with Iran has been described as a potential ‘war of artificial intelligence’, characterised by the use of drones, sensors and algorithmically assisted targeting. However, the major systemic impact does not stem exclusively from this technical sophistication, but from the vulnerability of a narrow sea route through which essential volumes of oil and gas transit. Public data from the International Energy Agency shows that, in 2025, approximately 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products passed through Hormuz, accounting for around a quarter of global maritime oil trade, to which a significant portion of global liquefied natural gas exports is added. Consequently, even if technological superiority allows for rapid and precise strikes, it does not eliminate the fact that the geography of a chokepoint can impose enormous costs on global markets and on the political cohesion of the coalitions involved.

In Ferguson’s view, maritime chokepoints remain the place where the law of unintended consequences manifests itself most clearly. Where global trade depends on narrow passages — such as Hormuz, the Dardanelles, Malacca, Suez or Panama — a local conflict can produce disproportionate global effects. A total blockade is not necessary to cause severe disruption: sometimes an increase in perceived risk, insurance premiums and logistical uncertainty is enough for the market to react as if supplies were already compromised. This mechanism explains why a regional war can quickly become an economic crisis with global repercussions.

The historical parallel: the Dardanelles, Gallipoli and the temptation of a military solution

To illustrate the risk of responding militarily to a problem with economic and logistical roots, Ferguson revisits the example of the British campaign in the Dardanelles and the Gallipoli landings of 1915. In his interpretation — reinforced by recent historical research on the link between trade globalisation and British strategic decision-making — London was not merely pursuing a classic military manoeuvre against the Ottoman Empire, but also the reopening of a route essential to the flow of grain and the financial stability of its Russian ally. Thus, what appeared to be a military solution to a strategic constraint turned into a costly operation, with poor results and economic and political effects far more extensive than anticipated.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the United Kingdom was heavily dependent on maritime imports of food and raw materials. The closure or contestation of the straits linking to the Black Sea therefore had direct consequences for food prices, social stability and the financial sustainability of the war effort. From this perspective, the Dardanelles were not merely a military objective, but also a vital hub of economic traffic. It is precisely this interdependence between maritime security and the domestic economy that makes the analogy relevant to Hormuz: what is at stake is not merely the abstract freedom of navigation, but the functioning of trade chains without which the internal political balance of the great powers becomes more fragile.

When a strategic chokepoint is disrupted, the effects are not limited to shipping. They ripple out into prices, financial markets, public policy and social stability. The British experience during the First World War showed how shortages and volatility in imports can push governments towards emergency interventions: subsidies for shipping, control of certain markets and political decisions accelerated by fear of domestic costs. In this vein, Ferguson warns that a serious disruption to traffic through the Strait of Hormuz could lead not only to higher energy prices, but also to broader pressures on inflation, trade, marine insurance and the political cohesion of the states involved.

The key lesson of the Gallipoli episode is not that historical analogies should be applied mechanically, but that leaders under pressure are often tempted to opt for a quick military solution to resolve a far more complex economic, logistical or diplomatic problem. In 1915, the attempt to force the opening of the Dardanelles resulted in a war of attrition with heavy losses and uncertain benefits. Today, the warning is similar: a military response designed to rapidly reopen or secure the Strait of Hormuz may, if poorly calibrated, generate precisely the kind of escalation it seeks to prevent.

Strategic lessons that history offers for the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz

Several useful lessons can be drawn from this historical parallel for assessing the current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. They do not offer ready-made solutions, but they help to understand the limits of strategic planning in an environment dominated by uncertainty, economic interdependence and political pressure.

  1. Policy-makers tend to underestimate the second- and third-order consequences of their own actions. In a space such as Hormuz, even a limited intervention can produce effects that go beyond the military plan: energy disruptions, inflation, pressure on allies and strategic repositioning by third-party actors.
  2. Decision-making in times of crisis is rarely unified. Divergences between military, economic, diplomatic and electoral considerations can lead to incoherent solutions or push policy towards unstable compromises.
  3. Allies and neutral states have their own interests and their own red lines. Any strategy that ignores these differences risks turning passive support into reluctance or even opposition.
  4. In times of shock, governments often intervene in markets to limit domestic costs. However, such interventions can cause further distortions if they are not underpinned by a realistic understanding of trade and logistical mechanisms.
  5. The pace of the crisis favours quick decisions, but not necessarily good ones. The greater the time pressure, the stronger the temptation to escalate in order to achieve a visible result.
  6. Technological superiority does not negate the constraints of geography and political economy. A vulnerable maritime corridor can erode the tactical advantage if the adversary manages to shift the cost of the confrontation onto the global market and onto the public opinion of others.

The dilemma of escalation: between the pressure to act and the cost of widening the conflict

Applied to the context of 2026, this historical logic highlights the United States’ strategic dilemma: how can freedom of navigation be restored and Iranian pressure on Hormuz reduced without turning a limited campaign into a broader, more costly and harder-to-control conflict? It is precisely here that the temptation of gradual escalation arises. When air strikes and deterrence measures fail to produce the desired result quickly, the pressure for further action — expanding targets, increasing naval presence or even deploying specialised ground forces — grows stronger.

From an analytical perspective, such a dynamic is dangerous because it can shift the focus away from the initial objective — securing a maritime corridor — towards the reputational logic of the conflict: avoiding the impression of retreat, demonstrating political will, and maintaining credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries. History shows, however, that once political objectives are subordinated to the need to save face, exit costs rise and strategic flexibility declines.

Therefore, the historical lesson is not that any limited intervention inevitably leads to a stalemate, but that powerful states often enter into short-lived conflicts on the assumption that they can control the escalation. In reality, the adversary’s reaction, economic vulnerabilities and domestic pressure can prolong the confrontation and turn a strategic correction operation into a resource- and political capital-consuming engagement.

Geostrategic implications: who stands to gain from a prolonged crisis

Another key point of the analysis is that the indirect beneficiaries of a prolonged crisis around Hormuz may be actors not directly involved in the confrontation. A sustained rise in energy prices could bring additional revenue to some of the West’s rival exporters, , whilst the diversion of US diplomatic and military resources to the Middle East could create additional strategic space in other theatres. In this context, Russia may benefit from the dynamics of hydrocarbon prices and the shift in Western attention, whilst China may exploit both the energy vulnerabilities of others and the dispersion of US strategic focus between the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

This is relevant because strategic power depends not only on absolute capabilities, but also on the distribution of attention, resources and political capital. Even a very powerful actor faces difficulties when it has to manage major pressures in several regions simultaneously. The more absorbing the conflict around Hormuz becomes, the higher the opportunity cost for other strategic priorities, including supporting Ukraine, managing competition in the Indo-Pacific and maintaining a credible deterrence posture on multiple fronts.

Conclusions

Overall, Ferguson’s historical analysis calls for strategic caution, not passivity. The central idea is not that the use of force is always wrong, but that the decision to resort to it must also be assessed in light of the indirect effects it has on trade, energy, alliances and competition among the great powers. The Strait of Hormuz demonstrates once again that geography can negate some of the advantages of technology, and that a seemingly limited conflict can generate global repercussions if it affects a critical hub of the world economy.

From an analytical perspective, the operational conclusion is twofold. Firstly, any strategy regarding Hormuz must combine military instruments with economic, diplomatic and market-stabilising measures, as the security of navigation cannot be separated from the functioning of the global trading system. Secondly, the value of history for decision-makers lies not in providing perfect analogies, but in disciplining strategic judgement: it compels an assessment of hidden costs, escalation scenarios and how adversaries or third parties might benefit from a protracted crisis.

Maritime Security Forum

Maritime aid to Cuba: strategic significance, humanitarian implications and the limits of mitigating the internal crisis – Maritime Security Forum

The maritime aid shipments that continue to arrive in Cuba must be understood not merely as isolated acts of solidarity, but as indicators of the deepening of a structural crisis affecting food, energy, transport and the functioning of public services simultaneously. The arrival of a Chinese vessel in the port of Havana with a new shipment of rice confirms that external support has become, for the Cuban authorities, a mechanism for compensating for an acute domestic shortage. At the same time, the fact that these deliveries are officially presented as gestures of solidarity also carries political significance: Havana is attempting to demonstrate that, despite external pressures and economic isolation, it continues to benefit from partners willing to offer material support. From an analytical perspective, these shipments must be viewed on two levels: in the short term, they can alleviate the shortage of essential goods; in the medium term, however, they illustrate Cuba’s growing dependence on external aid to maintain a minimum level of economic and social functioning.

The bulk carrier Sunny Hong (33,847 dwt) arrived in Havana on 23 May, being welcomed by Cuban officials as the first visible instalment of a new package of Chinese assistance. According to publicly available information, the cargo ship carried approximately 15,000 tonnes of rice, a quantity presented by the Cuban side and other media sources as part of a broader Chinese pledge of around 60,000 tonnes of rice, intended to alleviate food shortages on the island. Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel described the delivery as a “noble gesture of solidarity”, and the Minister of Domestic Trade, Betsy Díaz Velázquez, stated that the goods would be distributed immediately across all provinces. In practical terms, this shipment has significant immediate value as rice is a staple food for the Cuban population, and its shortage directly affects daily food security. Symbolically, the shipment also signals the consolidation of China’s role as a provider of last-resort support for Havana at a time of heightened economic pressure.

The ship’s route adds an important logistical and analytical dimension. The Sunny Hong departed from Qingdao on 1 April and transited the Panama Canal on 8 May, after which it reduced its visibility signature, being reported as ‘dark’ on certain segments of the voyage, despite its declared destination of Cuba. This detail is relevant because, in today’s maritime environment, the behaviour of ships carrying cargo to geopolitically sensitive destinations is closely monitored. This is not necessarily evidence of illicit activity, but such practices indicate the high level of operational caution associated with routes to an island under economic pressure and intense political scrutiny. From this perspective, the transport is not merely a commercial-humanitarian operation, but also an example of how maritime logistics is influenced by geopolitical, reputational and risk considerations.

The true significance of this shipment becomes clearer when viewed against the backdrop of Cuba’s domestic crisis. Public data and press reports from the spring of 2026 show that the island was facing a severe combination of food shortages, fuel shortages and widespread power cuts. Reuters reported that protests in Havana were fuelled by prolonged power cuts and fuel shortages, and explanations regarding the energy crisis point to Cuba’s heavy reliance on oil imports, given that domestic production covers only a limited portion of its needs. Under such conditions, food aid does not address the root cause of the crisis, but it can temporarily ease social pressure and prevent the shortage of essential goods from worsening. In other words, the Chinese cargo ship does not represent a structural solution, but a short-term stabilising measure in an environment marked by profound economic vulnerability.

The Chinese shipment followed shortly after the arrival of another aid vessel from Mexico, demonstrating that external support for Cuba does not come from a single source, but from a wider network of states and organisations willing to address the most urgent shortages. According to public reports, the cargo ship Asian Katra arrived in Havana with approximately 1,700 tonnes of supplies, including rice, beans and milk, whilst the total amount of Mexican aid received by Cuba in the preceding months exceeded 3,125 tonnes, comprising food, medicines, hygiene products and solar panels. The significance of these deliveries is twofold. On the one hand, they demonstrate that the Cuban authorities still enjoy regional political and humanitarian support. On the other hand, they show that, in the absence of stable energy and trade flows, Cuba is being pushed towards a survival model based on successive emergency shipments, rather than on the normal functioning of its economic supply chains.

Humanitarian and religious organisations also play a complementary role. The Community of Sant’Egidio announced the departure, on 15 May, from Genoa, of a new container bound for Cuba, loaded with medicines, medical supplies and wheelchairs, valued at approximately €700,000. Other shipments by the same organisation have included rice, flour and other staple foods, and further deliveries of oil, flour, vegetables and sugar have been announced for the coming months. These initiatives have particular humanitarian significance, as they address critical aspects of the Cuban crisis: not only access to food, but also to medical treatment, medical supplies and support for vulnerable people. From an analytical perspective, these shipments indicate that the deterioration of Cuba’s domestic situation is serious enough to mobilise not only states but also transnational solidarity networks. At the same time, they suggest that the economic pressure on the island is producing social and health effects that go beyond the strictly commercial sphere.

However, this food and medical aid should not be confused with a solution to Cuba’s central problem: the energy crisis. Despite the arrival of ships carrying rice, medicines or other essential goods, the functioning of the economy and public services continues to depend on access to fuel. Reuters has shown that a single Russian oil shipment provided only a limited respite, lasting a matter of days, without resolving the island’s structural deficit. Therefore, the lack of clear information regarding a new Russian energy shipment and the uncertainty surrounding the tanker Universal, previously in the Atlantic and reported as ‘awaiting orders’, are of greater strategic importance than might appear at first glance. While food alleviates immediate social pressure, it is fuel that determines whether the electricity grid, transport, distribution and minimal economic activity can continue. Consequently, the real issue is not merely food supply, but Cuba’s ability to keep its energy infrastructure operational.

Conclusions

Overall, the arrival of the Sunny Hong in Havana and the succession of other aid shipments from Mexico and European humanitarian networks show that Cuba has entered a phase in which external support no longer has merely diplomatic or symbolic value, but one of immediate support for economic and social survival. The significance of these deliveries is, therefore, manifold. On a humanitarian level, they help to temporarily alleviate the shortage of food and medical supplies. On a political level, they confirm that Havana is attempting to offset its isolation and external pressure by strengthening relations with partners willing to offer support. Strategically, however, they also highlight a harsher reality: the Cuban economy is becoming increasingly dependent on ad hoc external aid, and this dependence indicates a weakening of its capacity for self-sustainability. The major implication is that, without the restoration of relatively stable energy and trade flows, maritime aid can only postpone the worsening of the crisis, not reverse it. In other words, ships carrying rice, medicines or supplies buy time and ease immediate pressure, but they cannot replace the normal functioning of an economy. From an analytical perspective, this episode confirms that Cuba’s problem is no longer merely one of a temporary shortage of resources, but one of systemic vulnerability, in which food security, energy, distribution and social resilience have become deeply interdependent. Sources used in this article: Reuters; The Maritime Executive; Community of Sant’Egidio; DW; Al Jazeera.

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